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THE
AMERICAN
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REVIEW.

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

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
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THE MORAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF ANGLICAN ORDERS.

IT is curious that, in the present controversy about Anglican orders, so little stress is being laid on the moral side of the question, while so much is being said about the historical. Let us explain what we mean by the "moral" side. In all controversies in regard to a divine origin, we naturally look for certain broad characteristics which distinguish the divine from the human. For example, as to the origin of the Reformation, we naturally inquire (1), what was the character of the persons who are said to have "reformed" the Catholic Church, its authority, its dogmas, its worship? (2) what were the means by which the reform was effected? and (3) what were the consequences of the reform? And we proceed to judge of the moral probability of the Reformation being the work of the Holy Spirit, or, conversely, of its being political, or wicked, by what we know from State papers and records as to the actors, the means, and the consequences.

So it is in regard to Anglican orders. We are now asked by the Ritualists to believe that Anglican orders are the same orders as those of the Catholic Church; that, when an Anglican bishop ordains a Bachelor in Arts, he confers the same powers, the same privileges, as would be conferred by a Roman Catholic bishop. And we naturally rejoin: Well, if this be so, let us see what are the points of similitude as to priestly or ministerial character, as to office and function and duty; as to doctrine, devotion, and practice; and we ask all such questions as distinct from historic details in regard to the legitimacy of the succession. In other words, we first take the "moral" side of the argument,

as indicating the moral probabilities; because we know that the Roman orders are divine in their origin, and therefore divine in their functions; and we proceed to search for sufficient tokens of identity in the orders of the Anglican communion. It is this moral side we are now going to consider. We will first take a glance at the whole picture, and then we will examine the details.

I.

From the time of St. Augustine, in the sixth century, to that of Archbishop Warham, in the sixteenth, there was never any doubt about form or intention in regard to the conferring of orders, nor any dispute as to legitimate succession; while as to jurisdiction—a very different question, indeed—the Holy See was always acknowledged to be its sole source or fountain, in the sense of the “plenitude of jurisdiction.” But at the time of the Reformation all this was changed. Form was changed; intention was changed; while as to spiritual jurisdiction, it was transferred from the Pope to the lay king or queen of the island. Nor was there so much as one aspect in which the essentials of priesthood, as they had always been regarded for a thousand years, were not changed in a revolutionary sense. Thus, to speak of two priestly functions only: For a thousand years every Catholic deacon had been “made a priest,” that he might offer the holy sacrifice of the Mass, and hear confessions in the sacrament of penance; but, after the Reformation, every Protestant deacon was “made a priest” that he might *not* offer the holy sacrifice of the Mass, and might *not* hear sacramental confessions. And, from the period of this great change to about the year 1850, no Anglican clergyman was ever known to “say Mass,” or to hear a “sacramental confession.” Thus, the very soul of the institution, “Catholic priesthood,” was taken out of the Protestant body, Church of England; and three centuries were devoted to reviling those priestly powers which are now claimed by the Ritualists as their heritage.

More than this, the whole “character” of the Anglican ministry became the exact opposite of what it had ever been. Instead of an unmarried priesthood, clergymen married; instead of special vocations filling the monasteries and the convents, the religious life was tabooed as superstitious; instead of the sacrifice of the Mass being the daily glory of the Church, preaching became the one grand clerical function; instead of the churches being open every day, they were closed every day except Sunday; instead of the churches being the homes of the Holy of Holies, they were turned into ugly barns full of boxes, with a pulpit which always obscured the communion table; instead of the Real Presence, there was a real absence; nor was a single token left of the ancient

faith, while every observance was strictly ordered to condemn it. And this state of things lasted for three centuries, down to the time when the Oxford movement stirred the heart of all England and roused the national alarm or indignation.

Yet we are now asked to believe that the Anglican ministry is the same priesthood as that of the Roman Church; that a clergy which, for three centuries, has been preaching against the Mass, against confession, against Catholic significance in church-ritual, has suddenly become identical with that Roman Catholic priesthood which it has existed for the sole purpose of defaming. And we are assured that the three centuries of apostasy, of delirious antagonism to Catholicity, though deplorable as national accidents or infirmities, have not touched the validity of Anglican orders. Are we not justified, then, in retorting, "But look at the moral side of the question"; where are the tokens of your priesthood being divine, in its origin, its doctrines, its consistency, in its spiritual harmony with the ancient Catholic priesthood, which it supplanted with bitter hatred and persecution? Can you give us moral evidence as to identity, when we can give you moral evidence as to contrariety? We say to you, frankly, that it is impossible, morally speaking, that the same God can have instituted Catholic orders and have instituted the orders of the Church of England. But now let us take a few details, so as to work out the moral argument to demonstration.

II.

(a) First, take the Sacrament of Baptism; both because, morally, it is improbable that the same priesthood should teach opposite doctrines about baptism, and, historically, it is certain that a great number of Anglican clergymen have not been effectually baptized. Now, the best way to make sure as to what was the *doctrine* of baptism, from Queen Elizabeth's time to Queen Victoria's, is to make sure as to what was the *practice*. Catholic theologians have taught, from the earliest days, that, for the validity of baptism, the water must be made to "flow on the head," and that if the water only falls on the hair, or if only a few drops (which do not flow) touch the infant, the baptism, to say the least, is uncertain; while, if the water simply falls on the clothes, the baptism is certainly invalid. Now what has been the general practice among Anglicans? Wheatly tells us, that during the time when the "Directory" was in force (from 1645 to 1660) "a basin was brought to the minister in his reading desk, and the child being held below him, he dipped in his fingers, and so took up water enough just to let a drop or two fall on the child's face." Nor did the re-establishment of Anglicanism decrease the carelessness. Mr. Bennet,

Vicar of Frome, when writing of sixty years ago, said, "Baptism as a sacrament was well nigh lost amongst the English people. . . . It is very questionable whether the water, when used, really did touch the person of the child meant to be baptized." Dr. Lee also, in one of his books, quotes the "Reunion Magazine" as showing that Bishop Alford "openly baptized fourteen adults by once flicking his wetted fingers in the air over all of them." While, as to the form and the matter of baptism—up to the time, say, of the "Tracts for the Times"—it was not unusual for a clergyman to dip his finger in the font, and then to go round to each child in silence, touching each child on the head; in which cases the baptisms were invalid. The writer of the present paper has frequently seen Anglican clergymen—from the year 1845 to 1855—simply "spirt" a drop of water at a row of infants; thus omitting both the matter and the form. Indeed, there is no exaggeration in the statement that Anglican baptisms, before the time of the High Church movement, were purely apologetic and perfunctory; being retained as a traditional compliment to orthodoxy, but without the slightest idea of regeneration. The font itself was always hidden in some corner, so as to signify that the rite was of no importance; and grievous were the complaints of sponsors or parents if the infant's head-gear or ribbons were moistened. Compare this indifference, this doctrinal laxity, with the exquisite care of all Catholic priests in administering the sacrament of baptism; and say, is it probable that the same Catholic priesthood could both honor and dishonor the same sacrament? Apart from the fact that it is morally certain that an immense number of Anglican bishops and clergymen were never effectually baptized, and therefore could not possibly be ordained, there remains the moral improbability that Catholic priests and Anglican clergymen can both be true priests of the same religion. If they can be, then there is really no reason why "identity" in doctrine and function, in faith, and in devotional spirit, should not signify "having nothing in common."

(b) As to Confirmation, not much need be said beyond the suggestion of three terrible doubts: (1) that the bishop not being certainly consecrated; (2) the Holy Chrism being purposely wanting; and (3) the form being irregular or incomplete; there is enough doubt to create a moral improbability as to the sameness of either "bishop" or "sacrament." There is no need to press such arguments beyond the point of grave doubt; for, it is in this doubt, as compared with Catholic certainty, that the want of identity is shown.

(c) We may next take the Sacrament of Penance. To simplify the comparison, we may name five characteristics—all admittedly Roman Catholic through the centuries—not one of which is com-

mon to both "priesthoods:" (1) the *power* given to Catholic priests in their ordination to hear confessions sacramentally, and to absolve; (2) the *habit* of Catholic priests to sit regularly in the confessional, as their essential, ministerial obligation; (3) the *belief* of all Catholic laity in the obligation of confession, especially before going to Holy Communion; (4) the longing desire of all Catholics, at the hour of death, to confess before receiving the Holy Viaticum; and (5) the fact that never once, since the day of Pentecost, has it been known that a Roman Catholic priest has broken the seal of the confessional. Against these five characteristics set their Anglican opposites: (1) no power to hear confessions sacramentally is given in an Anglican ordination, but only to forgive sins (which have not been confessed) in a general and declaratory sort of way; (2) Anglican clergymen have never sat in the tribunal of penance, but have only given "ghostly counsel and advice," such as one layman might piously give to another; (3) the Anglican laity have never practiced, have never believed in (the obligation of) sacramental confession; on the contrary, they have protested against it, and their clergy have taught them to do so; (4) not even at the hour of death, have the Anglican laity desired to confess sacramentally, though, naturally, they have talked penitently to their pastors; (5) the seal of the confessional need not be spoken of in this contrast, since it lies outside Anglican practice, and has no place in Anglican theology. Yet the remark may be hazarded, that the supernatural silence, which has been the gift of Catholic priests for eighteen centuries, marks off the Catholic priesthood from the Anglican ministry by a token which is irresistibly divine. And now to conclude the argument as to confession. Is it probable, is it possible, that the two "priesthoods" can both have the same divine origin? Is it probable, is it possible, that Almighty God can have given the same orders to two priesthoods, whose teaching and whose practice as to the sacrament of penance have been, in all senses, antagonistic?

(d) We may speak now of Holy Communion. Is it*probable that an Anglican ministry, which for three centuries has swept the tabernacle from the altar, can have the same orders as a priesthood which, for eighteen centuries, has bent the knee to the Adorable Presence? Is it probable that an Anglican ministry, which has always placed the consecrated bread in the hand of the unconfessed sinner, can have the same orders as the priesthood which has reverently placed the Adorable Host on the tongue of the confessed and absolved penitent? Is it probable that an Anglican ministry which has left the consecrated crumbs to be scattered on the floor around the communion rails; and has allowed the parish clerk to cast away the remnant, or the church cleaner to sweep the

remnant into her shovel, can have the same orders as a priesthood whose very care and priestly exactness have been mocked for three centuries by most Protestants? And, finally, is it probable that an Anglican ministry which has always preached against the Roman Catholic doctrine; has always warned its congregations against the soul-destroying error of the Roman Catholic dogma of Transubstantiation, can have the same orders as a priesthood whose insistence on the Catholic doctrine has exposed it to three centuries of vituperation? The contrast might be enlarged at great length. We are speaking only of the "moral probabilities"; and enough has been said for serious souls.

(e) As to the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, it has no place in Church of Englandism, so that here we have the elimination of a sacrament, contradicting an indentity of priesthood.

(f) Matrimony has been respected by all Anglicans. It has not indeed been accepted as a sacrament, but it has always been religiously regarded. But what are we to say about divorce? True, the Anglican clergy disapprove of the legislation which would admit of the remarriage of divorced persons; but no authoritative condemnation has been issued by the Anglican bishops, not even by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Here again we search in vain for some moral identity between the Anglican and the Catholic episcopate.

(g) And, finally, as to the Sacrament of Holy Order. One reflection alone shall be hazarded. Form and intention, like historical incident, may be argued from different standpoints; but let us keep closely to "moral aspects." Now perpetual controversy as to the validity of a form, like perpetual controversy as to the sufficiency of intention—or, for that matter, like perpetual controversy as to the truth or the falsehood of disputed incidents—is in itself a moral evidence of the humanness of Anglicanism, since doubt is absolutely fatal to faith. Imagine English Catholics contending through three centuries in regard to the validity of their orders, and we see at once the impossibility of reconciling doubt with the divine unity of the whole Catholic belief. The almost innumerable books which have been published in the last twenty years (and the controversy began in Queen Mary's time) to justify the Ritualist claim to Catholic orders, are in themselves so many admissions that what requires all this apology must be as uncertain as is the teaching of the Establishment. The Russian schismatics do not apologize for their orders, because they know that there is no doubt in regard to them; indeed Anglicans are the only Christians in the world who disprove their orders by always proving them. And seeing that five sacraments out of seven must depend for their validity upon the validity of the priesthood which

administers them, it follows necessarily that five-sevenths of the Anglican faith must be torments of doubt to all Anglicans. Here we touch upon a point in the moral probabilities which must be afflicting to every serious Anglican. And it is the more afflicting because High Churchmen are the only sect in the Christian world which insist on true succession but cannot be sure of it. Do we go too far in saying that it is morally impossible that Anglican orders can be valid—can be the same as Roman Catholic orders; since, in every case where valid orders exist, or have existed in schismatical bodies, there has never been apology or doubt?

III.

We have thus glanced at the seven sacraments, as indicating the moral probability of a difference in the origin of the two "orders." We will now take an equally practical test; the difference between the preaching of Catholic priests and the preaching of Anglican clergymen, in regard both to authority and to doctrines.

The first object of preaching is to teach. "Go, teach all nations," was the command and the commission which our divine Lord gave to the Apostles. Now there is no need to dwell on Catholic preaching, because it is always and everywhere the same, both in regard to authority and to doctrines. But we may dwell for a moment on that Anglican substitute which has been popular in England for three centuries. So far as "Divine Worship" is concerned, preaching has been the primary priestly function of all the Anglican clergy from the beginning. And what has been its principal characteristic? It has been to "teach" the Anglican laity that the "abominations of Rome," its "errors," its "superstitions," its "corruptions," have rendered the Holy See and the Roman priesthood the principal source of doctrinal falsehood in the world. Now we have only to ask one simple question, and we can dismiss this crucial test of Anglican preaching. How is it possible that the Anglican preachers should prove their descent from Roman preachers who for fifteen centuries have taught a "lying" rule of faith—for this is the belief of all Anglicans—and have taught it on an authority which all Anglican preachers, without perhaps so much as one exception, have repudiated as a "monstrous usurpation?" How can the *true* preachers be the heirs of the *false* preachers, who taught "Popery" from the time of St. Augustine? This is as unlikely as that the false Anglican preachers have been the heirs of the true Roman preachers. Whichever way we look at it, the moral improbability reaches a depth which seems outside Christianity.

(b) But now as to a new kind of difficulty. There are two prin-

cial churches within the Church of England, the Ritualistic and the Evangelical or "Low." The former insists on the identity of the origin of the Roman and the Anglican priesthoods, while the latter repudiates that identity. Thus, in regard to the former, Dean Farrar has told us that there are "5043 churches in the Church of England in which sacerdotalism is triumphant," and we all know that sacerdotalism implies a belief in the powers which are inherited by Apostolic Succession. But this calculation would leave ten or twelve thousand churches in which sacerdotalism is condemned, the clergy of these churches having emphatically assured us that their priesthood is "not sacrificial." We will quote two only of these clergy, a bishop and an archdeacon, as our authorities for the statement that the Low Church Anglican clergy repudiate Roman Catholic orders. Thus, the Bishop of Worcester, Dr. Perowne, when writing of "the Ordinal in the first Prayer Book of Edward VI., for making archbishops, bishops, priests and deacons," remarked as emphatically as truthfully, "There is, perhaps, no formula or document which marks more clearly the *essential difference* between the office of ministers of the Church of Rome and that of ministers of the Church of England." So, too, the Archdeacon of Warrington has recently written, "Seventeen sacrificial statements in the Sarum Missal were omitted from the 1st Book of Edward, and ten reliquiæ, or survivals of sacrificial doctrine, which were left in the 1st Book—statements capable of, though not necessarily involving, sacrificial doctrine—were expunged from the 2d Book of Edward, thus eliminating the sacrificial element in no less than 27 instances." Here, then, we have two "priesthoods" within the same Protestant establishment, a Ritualistic and an Evangelical priesthood, and the high authorities of the one priesthood—numbering, say eight thousand clergy—and the high authorities of the other priesthood—numbering, say twelve thousand clergy—are as opposite as the poles in their insistence on the identity, or in their insistence on the antagonism, of the Roman and the Anglican orders. And these two priesthoods, be it remembered, were both imparted by the same Bishops, and are both approved by the same Anglican primate. Do we not here reach a climax of improbability? That in the very same church there should be two opposing churches, insisting upon and repudiating the Roman priesthood, seems as significant a fact as that, outside the Church of England, all Christians repudiate Anglican orders.

(c) We may now speak particularly of public worship—to which, hitherto, we have but passingly alluded—because public worship is the surest possible indication of the conviction of Anglicans as to priesthood. Briefly we will picture two periods: 1. Just after

the accession of Queen Elizabeth, and 2. Just before the introduction of Ritualism.

1. As to the first period, we maintain that the new Protestant public worship proved positively a change in holy orders. Not only is there a moral probability of change, but proof absolute, irrefutable and final. Our authority shall be Mr. Pocock, the well-known Anglican writer, and we will quote only from the Anglican newspaper, the "Guardian." But first we must say one word as to the new Anglican clergy who conducted the new public worship, and who were, therefore, its authorized expositors. When we have seen what the new clergy were like, we shall be prepared better to appreciate their worship. Mr. Pocock assures us that it was so difficult to persuade persons of any respectability or character to "play at being priests" in Elizabeth's time, that "mechanics had to be employed to read the service in empty churches, with cobblers, weavers, tinkers and fiddlers," and Presbyterian and Lutheran ministers had to be invited to do the work of the "inheritors of the Apostolic Succession." Moreover, the new clergy, being an utterly ignorant class of men—"rude and unlearned ministers," as Burleigh called them, being also Calvinists or else Zwinglians—were utterly contemned by the common people, and were spoken of with disgust by their own Bishops. Thus, Scory, Bishop of Hereford, wrote to Cecil: "My cathedral is a very nursery of blasphemy, impurity, pride, superstition and ignorance." Bishop Best, of Carlisle, called his clergy "wicked imps of hell." The Vicar-General of Lincoln, among other horrid details, says, "At Aylesbury the clergy perform clandestine marriages, with gloves and masks on." We read also a variety of such testimonies as that "the churchwardens of Knotting, in Bedfordshire, were charged before the commissioners of the archdeacon with having allowed for the last three years cock-fighting to go on in the chancel of the church, the minister of the church, with his sons being present and enjoying the sport." So that we need hardly ask, after these few eloquent details, what was the character of the public worship itself which this curious new Anglican priesthood conducted? "Divine service"—familiarily spoken of as the "May Game" or the "Christmas Game"—was ridiculed by the people in every ale-house, and, if possible, still more ridiculed in the churches; Bishop Pilkington, of Durham, writing of the "walking, talking, chidings, fightings that went on inside the churches, and that especially in the time of divine service." Indeed, public worship had become a public mockery not only of the Christian faith but of all decency. But did this impiety, this profanity, last for long? Yes, right down to the time of Archbishop Laud, in whose day, as the state papers tell us, "the congregation sat, the

men wearing their hats or not, as it suited their convenience, the communion table, standing in the body of the church, being made the receptacle for such hats and clothes as were not worn, and frequently used as a seat by any one who was not accommodated with a pew." But we need not go further with the picture. Public worship throughout the period of the Reformation was the rejection not of priesthood, but of religion.

2. And, taking a leap over a hundred and fifty years, let us come down to the Victorian era. We will ask Dr. Gregory, the present Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, to give us a picture of what public worship used to be, so late even as 1820. After telling us that, at this period, "the sick and dying were uncared for, the poor were unvisited, the children were untaught, the most solemn services of the Church were so negligently performed as to be productive of evil rather than good," the dean adds: "In some churches the squire's seat was fitted up as a parlor, with a table and chairs and a fireplace, and with curtains to hide the occupants from the view of the rest of the congregation. Nor were the services more attractive. There was no chanting; hymns were unknown. The week-day services in cathedrals were compulsorily maintained, but the choirs and clergy attended so irregularly and behaved so irreverently as effectually to keep worshippers away. There were few churches in which Holy Communion was celebrated more frequently than once a month."

If this description of public worship and of the clergy who conducted it, both in the Elizabethan and Georgian era, does not suffice to prove morally that it was totally impossible that the Roman orders should have been inherited by the new Protestant clergy, we must despair of all reasoning in which the faculty of common sense is assumed to be of any value whatever.

IV.

It will have been observed that, in the arguments which have been employed, there has been an almost keeping clear of the usual grounds of disputation, and an insisting on purely moral considerations. It would have been easy to ask a variety of questions, historical, theological, or canonical, but such questions have been discussed by many writers. We might have asked, for example (to take only three points), (1) who gave Cranmer and Ridley the authority to alter Forms of Ordination which had been in use in the English Church for a thousand years; totally ignoring the fact, as Cardinal Newman has so well expressed it, that "the Church's ritual is a concrete whole, one and indivisible, and acts *per modum unius*; and having been established by the Church, and being in possession, it cannot be cut up into bits, be docked

and twisted into essentials and non-essentials, genus and species, matter and form, at the heretical will of a Cranmer or a Ridley, or turned into a fancy ordinal by a royal commission of divines, without a sacrilege perilous to its validity." (2) We might have asked, by what law of interpretation are we to conclude that the reformers intended to make "sacrificing priests," and not, as they always called them, "Gospel Ministers," seeing that they abolished priest, altar and sacrifice, and also all sacerdotal vestments, and emphatically protested against the "Popish priesthood" as being "unscriptural, idolatrous and superstitious." Or (3) we might have asked, how comes it to pass that the eastern schismatics, without exception, have always repudiated Anglican orders; even the schismatics who fraternized with the Old Catholics at Bonn contemptuously dismissing such pretensions; and how comes it to pass—and this is more important than all—that the Roman Catholic Church has never recognized the validity of Anglican orders, the Canterbury Register testifying that certain Anglican prelates were deposed *ob nullitatem consecrationis*: and Cardinal Pole, by the authority of the Holy See, always insisting on the Catholic Form of Ordination as the condition of the validity of English orders? We might have proposed a large number of such questions. But they would hardly have touched the gist of our inquiry. What we are considering is the *moral* aspects of the question, "Can Anglican and Roman orders be the same?"

And, taking the word "moral" in scholastic sense, we say that the Anglican clergy, in their relations to their own laity, have been like cruel step-fathers to the young Anglicans, and so have proved that they were not Catholic priests. We should like now to consider "moral aspects" with special reference to the young—then to the old. We have always maintained that, in their purely natural relations, Anglican clergymen have been strikingly exemplary; but as priests, as supernatural pastors, they have done no more for their laity than their laity could do for them, because they were only laymen themselves. We alluded, at the beginning, to the sacrament of baptism; and we saw that a priesthood which had so little faith in baptism must, if possible, have still less faith in order. This want of the gift of faith has lain at the root of the whole of the priestly (not the personal) life of the Anglican clergyman. And it has made Anglican clergymen very cruel towards their laity—cruel from the cradle to the grave. Thus the cruelty which was begun towards the infant at the font was continued towards the child in the nursery; every Anglican child was robbed of its birthright in not being taught to say the Hail Mary; it was robbed of its heavenly mother; it was defrauded of all that exquisite spiritual tenderness which is the heritage of every Catholic child.

And yet we are told that this "teaching" on the part of Anglican clergymen was no evidence that Queen Elizabeth's priesthood was not identical with that of the Roman Church. We should, on the contrary, regard it as the same sort of direct evidence which King Solomon sought for on his judgment-seat: the evidence as to "whom was the child," the woman who cared, or who did not care.

But this want of priestly care and of supernatural teaching has been necessarily continued all through the life; and we will take but three more illustrations. We have already referred to the three points we shall illustrate, yet not so as to bring out clearly what we have designated the "cruelty" of the relations of Anglican clergy to their laity. In looking for moral evidence as to the essential non-identity of Catholic and Anglican orders, we cannot do better than show that the two priesthoods are as divided by what they do not do as by what they do.

1. At seven or eight years of age every Catholic child is taught to prepare for confession; not to talk piously about his sins, but to confess them in the sacrament of penance; and, having confessed them, to beg for absolution from a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. The Anglican clergy, on the contrary, have for more than three centuries warned young people against that "corrupt following of the Apostles" which is one of the seven sacraments of the Church. If the same priesthood could teach and do these two opposites, one does not see what is the use of having a priesthood at all, since the laity could be quite as human or contradictory.

2. And, having deprived three centuries of young Christians of this sympathetic and paternal divine sacrament, the Anglican clergy have gone on to teach youths and maidens that Holy Communion—which was never prepared for by confession—is nothing more than a commemorative rite, the priest having "no power to transubstantiate," and the consecrated bread remaining unchanged, a mere symbol or memento of the Last Supper. And yet we are gravely assured that this Anglican priesthood, which has thus abjured every one of the priestly powers; which has denied its own power to absolve and denied its own power to consecrate, is the very same priesthood which stands daily at the Catholic altar and sits daily in the tribunal of penance. If this be so, then why not admit the orders of all Nonconformist reverend gentlemen, since, mere forms excepted, they have taught the same doctrines and practised the same religion as the clergy of the national establishment?

3. A few years later, when the young Anglican has been to college, he may develop a wish to "take orders." Three years at

one of the English universities have been his ordinary preparation for priesthood. Until quite recently, theological colleges were unheard of as preparatory for taking holy orders. The same preparation was thought sufficient for "the church" as for the bar, or the army, or the parliament. And the knowledge of "theology" was about the same for all four, though religious tastes would naturally tone the private studies. And so the young aspirant was ordained. But to *what*, we must ask, was he ordained? To read the prayers on a Sunday to comfortable Anglicans, and then to preach to them his "views" on Christianity. Can any one assure us, with imperturbed gravity, that this is the same priesthood as that of the Roman Church; that these Anglican curates have been identical with the Catholic priests who, for twelve centuries, in this same England, have ascended the steps of the Catholic altar, saying, "*Introibo ad altare Dei*"; have consecrated and then adored the Host; and have given Holy Communion to those who have adored—adored the Host on the altar and in the tabernacle? Such a suggestion seems as foolish as it is impious. Exact contraries may, in some cases, be both innocent, but in the case of the Christian priesthood they are impossible; there cannot be contraries in divine things.

The modern Ritualists seem to plead that because, within the last forty years, they have introduced decorum into public worship, therefore the whole of the last three centuries "go for nothing," and Ritualism is the alone Church of Englandism. But even if Ritualism had been the rule from the beginning—instead of being unknown, unimagined—the contrast would be very slightly lessened. "Common Prayer" is a service addressed to a congregation, not a sacrifice offered to Almighty God. In St. Paul's Cathedral it is almost difficult to suppress a smile when the clergy turn their Oxford hoods to the gaze of the congregation and try to persuade themselves that they are priests before an altar. True, the most beautiful portion of their communion service—like their epistles, gospels, collects, and their "*Dominus vobiscum*"—have been extracted out of the Roman Catholic Missal; but where is their high altar, where their sacrifice, where their tabernacle, where their consciousness of the divine gifts of Catholic priesthood? A *mise en scène* is all that they can give us. To try to make a Protestant service look something like a Catholic Mass is as hopeless an endeavor as to try to persuade a rational being that Westminster Abbey was built for "Common Prayer."

If, inside a church, it is a quite hopeless task to try to trace the identity of the two priesthoods, it is as impossible to trace it outside in daily life, in the daily contact of priests with their people. Where is the authority, where are the dogmas, where is the unity

of the Catholic faith, where is the obedience of all clergymen to their "Canterbury?" We cannot wonder that the Anglican laity are divided, when their priesthood enthrones an arbitrary egotism. Where is the fellowship of all Anglicans ecclesiastically—may we say on earth, in purgatory, or in heaven? There is none; not ostensibly, nor as "of faith." The Church of England is not a family, not even in an ordinary earthly sense, still less in a sense that is supernatural. And so its priests are, as the laity, divided, with no union but that of church-forms and ceremonies, and no consciousness of true Catholic oneness. Are these priests, then, Roman Catholic priests? Is it possible that their orders can be identical in origin any more than in powers, in functions; in all the gifts which appertain to Catholic priesthood; seeing, that in all things—excepting personal sincerity—they are so strikingly unlike, so opposed?

But we come now to the end of life, to that most awful last moment, when the soul is to depart naked before God. How has the Anglican priesthood, which is now said to be the Roman Catholic priesthood, behaved at the last hour of life, behaved to the disturbed, dying Christian, who was yearning for supernatural aid? "Let us say the Lord's prayer," suggested the late Dean Stanley, to a venerable clergyman, who was dying. And that was *all* that the Dean of Westminster could do for him. The intention, no doubt, was thoroughly Christian; but where was the office of Catholic priesthood? A hospital nurse could have done the same thing, and could have read a comforting chapter from the Bible, and have discoursed on the merits of the Redeemer. But, say that the Anglican clergy ordinarily administer Holy Communion—and it is certain that they always do all that they can do—to a person who is dying and penitent, how shall a sinner receive Holy Communion before he has made his confession? If the Anglican communion be not a real communion, but only a pious remembrance, there is, indeed, no sacrilege in communicating; but, if the Anglican communion be—what the Ritualists now say it is—the same communion as the Roman Catholic communion, then is the unconfessed soul of the penitent simply adding sacrilege to his sins. But here again arises a dread difficulty. No Anglican clergyman can hear a confession, even supposing him to be a true priest, because he has no faculties, no jurisdiction; he might, indeed, do so, *in articulo mortis*, but then, where are his orders, where is his own preparation, his fitness, his knowledge of what to do? The most delicate, the most intricate of offices, cannot be irregularly attempted by a person who, to speak familiarly, knows nothing about it, and is himself not sacramentally confessed. For an Anglican clergyman to assume the office of con-

fessor, when even his own bishop has not authorized him, and when his whole education has been in the direction of the negation of the supernatural functions of a priest, seems, naturally speaking, to be shockingly presumptuous, and from a Catholic point of view, almost impious. Kindness or charity, good will or the best intentions, may render such a presumption not culpable; but the Sacrament of Penance is beyond kindness or charity, is above all good will, and the best intentions; it is a divine sacrament, demanding divine powers, and it cannot be administered by the incompetent. Here, then, at the last hour of life, we have a contrast between Anglican and Catholic orders which proves that they cannot be identical. "Moral aspects" seem to afford their ultimate demonstration of the non-identity of these two kinds of priesthood, when a Catholic priest stands on the one side of the bed, and a Protestant clergyman on the other, and the dying person asks, "which is the real?"

There are some truths which need no demonstration; instinct suffices to apprehend them. The nullity of Anglican orders should be one of these truths, and the sole reason why every one does not think so is that the real issues are commonly obscured. Instead of reasoning from facts which are certain, some persons reason purely from hypotheses, or instead of conducting the inquiry on broad principles, some persons love to linger upon details. You cannot get one school of reasoners away from their insistence on the certainty that Barlow was a bishop; another school will rest contentedly on the sufficiency of the Ordinal which Cranmer is believed to have approved; a third school will cling tenaciously to their views on intention, which, they say, was to hand on a true succession; or a fourth school will say, "Since Anglicans admit Roman orders, and never think of reordaining Roman priests, it follows that, so far as priesthood is concerned, Anglicans and Romans are of one mind." But we reply that all this is the obscuring of real issues; it is the turning the face away from plain truths. We must judge of holy orders by their "character," by what priests have habitually done or have not done. "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" Is a sacrificing priesthood one that does not sacrifice? Is an absolving priesthood one that does not absolve? Is the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass the same worship as common prayer? Is a Catholic tabernacle the same as a communion table? Is the word Protestantism the same in significance with the compass of the whole Catholic faith? Is the Catholic "Communion of Saints" identical in spirit with that religion which has always repudiated purgatory, has always neglected, even disesteemed, the Blessed Virgin, and has treated the Invocation of

Saints as a habit and as a doctrine with which the Reformed Church could have nothing to do? Here we get at the true tests of identity. The Eastern schismatics, who have retained a true priesthood, have also retained a true doctrine in regard to all the functions of priesthood as well as almost all Catholic doctrines; whereas, all Protestant sects, having lost the succession, have also lost belief in priestly functions and in most of the specifically Catholic doctrines. This is what we may call the proof from "character." "By their fruits ye shall know them." You cannot spend three centuries in reviling Catholic priesthood, or, at the very best, in treating it as a delusion, and then suddenly turn round and say, "We have always had the Catholic priesthood, but British prejudice has obliged us to disown it."

Common-sense is the theologian which is needed. Were we to enter a court of justice, and find that the presiding judge had no power to define law or to pass sentence, we should not make the mistake of confusing such a travesty with the real judicial tribunals of the country. Were we to go on board a large ship, and find that the ship's crew were all dictating their commands to the captain, we should not be misled into any serious inquiry as to whether the ship was a man-of-war in active service. And, in the same way, when we are considering Anglican orders, we see at once that they are radically fictitious. We see at once that the Archbishop of Canterbury, who derives his orders, parliamentarily, from Queen Elizabeth, and his jurisdiction from Queen Victoria or her minister, cannot possibly be a successor of Saint Augustine, whose episcopate was purely Catholic and canonical, and whose jurisdiction was derived from the Holy See. And we trace the same dissimilarity in every sphere. In no one single aspect do Anglican orders, in any degree, resemble Roman Catholic orders. In personal piety, in active duty, Anglican clergymen may be admirable, and so are a vast number of Nonconformists. As to identity of origin, office or function, three centuries have disproved the illusion.

"Moral aspects" are the best tests of true orders. We apprehend the truth by a moral instinct, which all the controversy in the world cannot cloud.

A. F. MARSHALL.

THE RELATIVITY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

THE logical filiation of the sciences corresponds in some degree to the order of their historical development. The conspicuous objects of nature, such as the heavenly bodies, first engaged the attention of the thoughtful, and the latest phenomena to receive man's scientific investigation are those which most nearly relate to himself. In the history of the sciences we find that astronomy had attained a state of comparative perfection, and its character as a science was well established before attention was paid to sociology; and we learn that in the order of the development of the sciences man has not been governed by considerations of their utility, for the latest of the sciences may be said to be the most useful.¹ The development of the sciences, however, has not proceeded at haphazard and by chance. We might expect that man would first attempt to study the laws of those phenomena which it is most useful for him to understand, but the sciences have been developed along the line of least difficulty, and not in the order of greatest utility. The progress of the sciences has been mainly determined by the nature of the phenomena, and has been from the simple to the complex. The first of the sciences deals with phenomena of a wide order of generality, and the latest sciences to be carefully studied have only a narrow and limited application. Thus some of the laws of astronomy apply throughout the known universe, and approach an absoluteness of character, whereas in complex sciences, like political economy, absoluteness is nowhere to be found, and relativity is the distinguishing feature of all its generalizations.

Now, the laws of all the sciences are true, relative only to the conditions which they describe. There is no known absolute physical law. We presume the absoluteness of such fundamental postulates of all science as the persistence of force, the immutability of nature's laws, and the presence of universal gravitation; but we have no warrant, other than analogy, for asserting that these postulates are true of all possible systems.² The general-

¹ "La plus utile et la moins avancée de toutes les connaissances humaines me paroit être celle de l'homme."—J. J. Rousseau, *Sur L'Inégalité*, p. 34. The fact that he was one of the first moderns to emphasize the significance of this fact has given an undue and exaggerated importance to the works of this superficial writer.

² "We can imagine reasoning creatures dwelling in a world where the atmosphere was a mixture of oxygen and inflammable gas like the fire-damp in coal mines. If devoid of fire, they might have lived on through long ages in complete unconscious-

izations of experience cannot be erected into laws of universal validity, and hence no law of experience can be truly absolute. But these laws are true in the sense that they are always true of those conditions which they describe, but of no other conditions. When, however, no change is ever observed in the conditions, we say that the laws are absolute or nearly so; but when the conditions are continually changing—when a law true to-day may, owing to the presence of some new condition, be found totally inapplicable to-morrow, we say that the laws of such conditions are distinguished by their relativity. In such a science as astronomy, for instance, it is not of great importance for us to remember that its laws are true only of the given conditions; for these conditions remain substantially the same throughout vast periods of time; but in a science like political economy the conditions which we investigate are never the same for two consecutive ages, and hence we are under the grave necessity of ever keeping before our minds the fact that the laws which we discover and formulate are true only of the precise conditions which we are studying.

By the relativity of the laws of a science, then, we mean that these laws are true only of specified conditions or phenomena, and when we speak of the relativity of one science being more pronounced than that of another, we mean that in one science it is more important to bear in mind the relations of laws to phenomena than it is in the other.

This relativity is more characteristic of political economy than of any other well-developed science that at this day engages the attention of learned men. On this account it has been much disputed whether political economy is anything more than a mass of empirical observations of more or less generality and value, and whether it has any valid claim to be called a science. Comte has said, that "the limits of variation are wider in regard to sociology than any other laws."¹ He always ridiculed the pretensions of political economists and derided their claims. This dispute, however, for the most part is mere logomachy. Science may be said to be the explanation of phenomena and their reduction to laws. We may take any group of closely related phenomena, and if we can truly formulate their laws we may be said to have a science of them. It is claimed that the true test of a science is the power it

ness of the tremendous forces which a single spark could call into play. In the twinkling of an eye new laws might have come into action, and the poor reasoning creatures who were so confident in their knowledge of the uniform conditions of their world, might have no time even to speculate upon the overthrow of all their theories. Can we, with our finite knowledge, be sure that such an overthrow of our theories is impossible?"—Jevons, *Principles of Science*, vol. ii., p. 439.

¹ *Positive Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 75, edition of Miss Martineau.

gives us to forecast future events. Astronomy enables us to predict the position of some heavenly bodies for thousands of years to come; who will venture to predict the state of society in the next century? But it has been well rejoined by Cairnes that "economical prevision is not a prevision of events, but of tendencies,"¹ and while we are unable to predict any event in the social sciences with certainty, the study of these tendencies is, nevertheless, of the greatest utility to us.

The habit of forming hasty generalizations has been the bane of political economy. Adam Smith believed that he was determining the principles of the science for all time to come. Ricardo and Mill began to speak of the laws of political economy as eternal physical laws,² forgetting that they are merely explanations of men's actions in relation to external nature. Capitalists took this up as a shibboleth, and when laborers endeavored to obtain redress for intolerable evils, they were given the cold comfort of learning that they were contending against the decrees of nature as recorded in the books of political economy, until in despair they began to exclaim, "If political economy is against us then we must be against political economy." It has been a fruitful source of error and mischief in political economy to suppose that what is found to be true of present conditions was true also of the past, and will be true of the future; that what is true on the banks of the Thames must be true on the banks of the Ganges.³

Much of the error of political economy, and all the popular prejudice against it, have resulted because it was not understood that its laws are true only of certain conditions, and that these conditions are in a state of constant change; and because, moreover, economists endeavored to extend their generalizations beyond legitimate premises. John Stuart Mill, who, at one time, was partial to the abstract political economy, has very wisely observed that the economist must avoid "the error of regarding the present experience of mankind as of universal validity, mistaking temporary or local phases of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the wonderful pliability of the human mind, deeming it impossible, in spite of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a different type from that which is familiar to him in his own age, or even in his own

¹ *Essays in Political Economy, Theoretical and Applied*, p. 305.

² This assumption vitiates all the sociological writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer.

³ A noted instance of this was the inability of the English conquerors in India to imagine any other system of land-holding than that of the large proprietors in England. See "Tenure of Land in India," by Sir George Campbell, in *Systems of Land Tenure*, Cobden Club. "It has been said Lord Cornwallis designed to make English landlords in Bengal, and only succeeded in making Irish landlords," p. 177. See also E. De Laveleye, *Primitive Property*, chap. iv.

country. The only security against this is a liberal mental cultivation. A person is not likely to be a good economist who is nothing else. . . . Social phenomena acting and reacting on one another, they rightly cannot be understood apart; but this by no means proves that the material and industrial phenomena of society are not themselves susceptible of useful generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be related to a given form of civilization and a given state of social advancement."¹

This relativity of the laws of political economy may be more clearly seen and appreciated by a study of the subject-matter with which the science professes to deal; by an examination of some of its fundamental postulates, with a view to ascertaining the extent of their application and validity; and by a study of history and ethnology, which will show how many and how varied are the ways in which men obtain subsistence and supply their material wants.

Political economy studies the phenomena displayed by man in gaining subsistence, and obtaining goods and services to satisfy his wants. It inquires how men, as individuals and as members of society, obtain their income and how they expend it. It is a study of man's motives, on the one hand, and a study of the relation of nature's forces to his efforts, on the other. It has, therefore, a subjective side which deals with all the phenomena of man's wants, or demand and consumption; and an objective side, which deals with the phenomena of efforts, or supply and production. The subject-matter of political economy is circumscribed by narrow limits, and it is but a subordinate branch of the general study of man. Economic actions do, indeed, constitute a large portion of the conscious acts of man, but they are not always the most important; and as man is ever gaining his subsistence in different ways, and as all the phenomena of political economy are of an extremely complex character, we must perpetually vary our conclusions to suit our conditions. In phenomena of a wide order of generality, small variations may be safely neglected, but in phenomena so intricate and complicated as that of political economy a slight change of conditions may render a law inaccurate as a description of facts. Kepler's laws are true, on the supposition that there are no perturbing forces, and those slight perturbations which do appear do not affect the truth of the general statement; but while we may generalize about the economic phenomena we observe to-day, it is altogether probable that the same facts may not exist to-morrow; and, on account of the infinite variety in

¹ *Essay on Comte.*

the conditions of the subject-matter of political economy, we must be careful not to give undue extent to our laws, and the caution to beware of theories and hypotheses is an imperative necessity.

A cursory examination of a few of the postulates of political economy will better enable us to see how limited the laws based upon them are in their application. There is no law of this science of universal validity for mankind, and none that does not admit of some important exceptions. There has never, perhaps, been a general law stated in political economy that has met with unqualified acceptance. If it was accepted by one generation, it was sure to be denied by the next, and one-half of the writings of political economy have been devoted to criticising the other half. In regard to the so-called law of supply and demand, we may say that this can hardly be called a distinctive economic law, but it is, rather, the economic statement of the general problem of equilibrium that is found in all the sciences.

The reasoning of political economy starts from the principle of self-interest, which postulates that man will always seek his own interest in so far as he knows it. This science regards man as a wealth-producing and wealth-acquiring being, and takes no account of him as a rational being, as a religious being, or as a being of other attributes except in so far as these attributes affect him as a self-seeking and wealth-acquiring being. Inasmuch as he seeks wealth because it is primarily necessary for his existence, it may be said that his wealth-seeking activities are but particular and special manifestations of the more general law of self-preservation.

Now, even this law of self-preservation needs a large amount of qualification. It is not quite true that all individual life is a struggle for individual existence. This view of human life has been emphasized by the followers of Darwin, who formed their judgment from a study of the lower orders of life; but Professor Drummond has shown that while biologists, and the sociologists who followed in their wake, have been laying stress on the struggle for individual life, they have overlooked the equally important fact in all animate nature of the struggle for the life of others. To regard the self-preserving and the wealth-acquiring activities of man as his predominant and only important characteristics is to form a precarious estimate of human nature. As a matter of fact, it is only in our day that the economic influences and self-seeking propensities can be isolated so as to form the subject of special study and investigation. There are many who are dominated by religious or æsthetic influences, and in whose lives the acquisition of wealth or the means of subsistence is only an inci-

dent. The one who lives for subsistence alone does not act up to the highest purpose of human life. In the time of Aristotle the pursuit of riches was not held in very high esteem. In the time of the Crusades man might have been defined, by a prominent characteristic, as a glory-seeking animal. A notable share of man's activities has in all ages been directed to the unproductive destruction of wealth instead of to the acquiring of it. We see how futile it is, therefore, for economists and historians to claim absoluteness or universality for a postulate which requires so much important qualification. Reasoning from this premise has given us the monstrous abstraction of political economy—the economic man. The laws of this science are true of man, then, considered only as a wealth-acquiring being.

Another premise of political economy is that men will always buy in the cheapest markets and sell in the dearest. In reality this is but a corollary of the preceding. But it must appear a strange anomaly that this dictum should have been so widely accepted as a law when we consider the prevalence of the protective policy in most countries in our industrial era. We can see the relativity of our science in the study of this law. It is never perfectly realized. Perhaps the buyer is ignorant of the cheapest market or he may have a personal prejudice against the seller. Some buyers, for instance, will not purchase from trusts even though their quotations are somewhat lower for the same goods. In fact, the desire to buy in the cheapest market is likely to be the dominant motive only for the buyer who buys to sell again, for the retailer and the wholesaler; while this desire is probably only one of the many motives which actuate the man who buys for his own use.

Much of the reasoning of political economy is based on the supposition of the permanence of perfectly free competition. This also may be only a transient phase of economic activity. There is no competition in slavery. In modern industry competition is being more and more superseded by combination and co-operation in both labor and capital. Wages are hardly ever wholly determined by competition, but for the most part are now settled by contract. All the reasoning based on this supposition does not, therefore, apply to present conditions.

All these postulates, then, are of narrow extent, and their relativity is their prominent characteristic. Nothing is more certain about them than that new conditions are likely to leave some of them true of the past and not of the present. In all laws relating to human affairs there are numerous elements to be reckoned with, and it is misleading to attempt to give these laws a universality or generality which they are not capable of receiving. Of course, it

is necessary to have some postulates to give unity and logical cohesion to the science. Were it impossible to have these, political economy would be nothing more than mere empiricism; and while we point out the relative character of these laws, it is not denied that they have validity and sufficient generality to form the basis of a true but narrow science.

The study of history and ethnology best shows us the relativity of the laws of political economy. Man seeks his subsistence in an infinite variety of ways. It would be foolhardy to imagine that the principles which explain the acquisition of the means of subsistence in our era of capitalistic production will explain anything whatever of the political economy of savage tribes, or that our political economy will prevail in all times to come. In no two ages and in no two countries does man obtain his subsistence in exactly the same way, and consequently the political economy of one age may have but little in common with that of the next. Before the advent of Christianity all industry was based on slave labor, and the study of such a system now is interesting to us only as a branch of curious learning. If Aristotle were to declare that the laws he studied would always apply to economic phenomena, his statement would be as unreasonable as if he were to declare that it would always be possible to defend the pass of Thermopylæ with three hundred men. In feudal times again we find conditions greatly modified. We have different conditions of land-holding and changed relations of the various classes to each other. Such a state of society must be studied by itself. The changes in political economy in our era have been most rapid, and it takes shorter time for a work on this subject to become antiquated than in any other science. Ricardo's work is all based on the supposition of competition, and, as we have just seen, we must now take into account combinations of both labor and capital. To formulate a set of principles in economics and think that they will explain economic phenomena in all ages, nations, and countries is fatuity. Some economists would have us think that the laws of political economy would prevail in the fixed stars. If the conditions existed, the laws would prevail; but the conditions are never the same for any two periods even on earth.¹ To apply the political economy of Athens to the industrial system of England would be much the same as to apply the laws of Lycurgus to the State of New York. The political economy of China has little in common with that of the United States, and it requires much ingenuity to see anything in common in the economic phenomena of the population of Lon-

¹ The universe itself is at no two instants exactly the same. See Sir Wm. Grove's *Essay on the Correlation of Forces*. "Nothing repeats itself, because nothing can be placed again in the same conditions; the past is irrevocable." End of chap. i.

don and the savages of South Africa. A political economy for all nations and ages is an idle dream, and we may apply to it the judicious criticism which De Maistre has passed on universal constitutions: "Une constitution qui est faite pour toutes les nations n'est faite pour aucune: c'est une pure abstraction, une œuvre scholastique, faite pour exercer l'esprit d'après une hypothèse idéale, et qu'il faut adresser à l'homme dans les espaces imaginaire où il habite."¹

In taking up any science, we should study its limitations and the bounds beyond which its generalizations will not extend. Some of the laws of chemistry, as we learn from the spectroscope, may be true of matter in the sun, but we cannot say that any of the laws of biology are true of life that may exist on the planet Mars, and the conclusions of political economy are of still more limited extent. Many English writers, and notably Ricardo, have failed to appreciate these essential facts in political economy, and were noted for their disregard of the practical application of the principles they were studying. McCulloch even assured us, that "Mr. Ricardo paid comparatively little attention to the practical application of general principles; his is not a practical work."²

These economists, taking certain premises for granted, reasoned from them, and it was a matter of indifference whether the conclusions they arrived at were true of conditions on earth or in Saturn. This gave political economy an abstract and mathematical cast. Instead of confining the laws to the conditions they studied, they endeavored to extend their generalizations, and thus gave the science a deceptive air of generality and solidity.

Of late years a new school, whose most conspicuous exponent was the late Wilhelm Roscher, has introduced the historical method into the study of economic problems. Writers of this school rightly contend that the laws of political economy are true, relative only to particular times and places; and they show how the passion for hasty generalization has tended to make political economy a thing remote from human use: "The historical method has revolutionized political economy, not by showing its laws to be false, but by proving that they are relative, for the most part, to a particular state of civilization. This destroys their character as eternal laws, and strips them of much of their force and all their sanctity. In this way the historical method has rescued us from intellectual superstition."³ Hence it is that these writers

¹ *Considerations sur La France*, chap. vi.

² Life of Ricardo, prefixed to edition of *Principles of Economy and Taxation*, p. xxv.

³ Arnold Toynbee, *Industrial Revolution in England*, p. 25.

often speak of a national economy, and they regard this science as intimately allied with the study of history.

Now, although the truths of political economy are of this relative character, and their validity is dependent on such variable conditions, we are not to suppose that the study is of small value because its truths cannot have wide range and generality. That the subject-matter is of such a nature as not to admit of precise mathematical delimitations, is the fault of the constitution of things, and the wise philosopher will take his facts as he finds them, and then formulate his theories, and not formulate his theories and then find his facts. The study of political economy is of importance owing to the grave character of the problems that come with the advent of free labor and free enterprise. It is not intimately concerned with problems of development, but it aims to solve the problem of subsistence for humanity, and it will always be of value this side of Utopia.

But political economy, on account of its relative character, should be studied only with reference to the practical application of its truths. It must be studied with reference to human happiness and well-being, for, otherwise, it will degenerate into a mere academic discipline for the edification of the erudite. When political economy is studied too much for its own sake, it becomes too abstract; we run into mathematical formulæ; we get total-benefit curves, monopoly-revenue curves, and the science is in great danger of becoming of much the same character as the learned speculations of the philosophers of Laputa. On the other hand, if we pursue the historical method, without reference to the principle of man's well-being, our science becomes little better than an undigested heap of materials and miscellaneous observations—"rudis indigestaque moles." Ethics alone gives a purpose and value to economic studies; for "it is the problem of poverty which gives to economic studies their chief and their highest interest,"¹ and the problem of poverty owes all its present importance to the growth and prevalence of ethical feeling. Our economical studies should be based upon the principles of ethics. We should study what will promote the best interests of the whole human family, and not seek out the prosperity of a single nation. With ethics as a basis, political economy will have a broader scope; and if we pursue economical studies with reference to human welfare, we shall avoid the error of speaking of these laws as eternal truths, and of applying to all states of society generalizations that are, perhaps, true of only one. This guiding principle will prevent the philosopher from drawing out the "thread of his

¹ Marshall, *Prin. of Economics*, p. 4.

verbosity finer than the staple of his argument"; it will aid the statesman to apply the rules of justice to the problems of distribution, and it will enable the philanthropist to make the best use of this knowledge in the interest of humanity. Those who take up economical studies should always have in mind the relative character of the laws they are investigating, and the fact that they are subject to the revision of the standards of ethics; and therefore, they should study political economy with reference to its practical application, and not for the mere sake of intellectual discipline and love of abstract truth.

FRANCIS W. HOWARD.

MODERN THEORIES OF SOCIETY.

THE END OF SOCIETY.

IT would be astonishing, if in an age like ours, when all creation is being reconstructed on a new basis of advanced science, human society alone were allowed to rest on its old theory. In a period of intellectual revolution, changes in the social doctrine must result from a restless tendency to set aside inherited beliefs, and still more from the close connection that exists among the several branches of human knowledge in general and between theoretical and practical philosophy in particular. Ethics embodies the ultimate consequences of metaphysics. Independence in being conditions independence in action; identity of the mind with matter implies moral and social laws not distinct from those of the physical and organic world, while the immateriality of the soul imports a free will; the immersion of all existence in God so completely fuses rational beings as even to exclude distinct personalities, whereas unity must be denied in proportion as the self-sufficiency and independence of individuals is asserted. In fact, new theories of society are daily coming forth in such number and with such boldness, that, like a hurricane, they threaten to sweep away whatever institutions preceding centuries have bequeathed to us. It looks as if they were to shatter the very foundations of society, to tear asunder all the bonds uniting it, and to disjoin its entire structure. Of course, it would be wrong for us to imagine that they were levelled at overthrowing it. No, our reformers mean

only to remodel society so as to fit it better for the pursuit of universal happiness, as in general it is their ostensible aim by the advancement of science to open new paths to enlightenment and perfection.

These are undoubtedly splendid promises. But the philosopher cannot blindly believe in a theory on account of the high sounding pretensions with which it is broached, or take its adequacy for granted, because it is boldly asserted. His proper function is to examine any given subject by inquiring into its causes, extrinsic and intrinsic, efficient, final, and constituent. Hence in the matter before us he necessarily asks: What is the nature and conception of society remodelled and transformed by modern thinkers? What is its peculiar end higher than that pursued heretofore? What is the origin from which it springs stronger and healthier than in former times? What are its component elements and its intrinsic constitution that fit it to reach its sublimer destination? The present essay will give a short answer to the first two questions. However, before starting, we have to make out the exact limits of our subject. Our discussion will not bear chiefly on society in general, nor on any special form of it that is transitory or incomplete, but on that society which, existing everywhere and at all times, is alone in the order of nature complete and independent—the State.

I.

What then, is the conception of society according to the modern theory?

There are generally two conceptions of objects known by daily experience, the one obvious and still imperfect, the other reflex and developed. As to the first there is usually no difference in the minds of men; it is the direct impression of the phenomenon, and is, for this very reason, upon the whole, unalloyed with falsehood. But as to the second, which is the product of continued observation and reflection, thinkers nearly in all cases greatly disagree. Society is, undoubtedly, for all an object of daily experience; for we were born and continually move in it, as we live and breathe in the atmosphere that surrounds us. Accordingly, history discloses the fact that however conflicting the elaborate social theories may be, still there is an obvious conception of society in which all ages and all minds concur.

The old school, down from the time of Aristotle, defined society in general as a permanent union of persons jointly pursuing a common end, and it applied this definition, taken in the strictest sense, to the State. In like manner, modern philosophers consider co-operation for a common end as the essence of society. "Co-

operation or band-work," says Professor Clifford, "is the life of it." According to A. Comte, the founder of French positivism, the principle of co-operation is predominating in it. At greater length is the idea set forth by Herbert Spencer, the chief exponent of modern sociology; to whom therefore we must listen with special attention.

The following passages taken from his "Principles of Sociology," leave nothing to desire as to clearness and exactness:

"A society, in the sociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxtaposition, there is co-operation. So long as members of the group do not combine their energies to achieve some common end or ends, there is little to keep them together. They are prevented from separation only when the wants of each are better satisfied by uniting his efforts with those of others, than they would be if he acted alone. Co-operation, then, is at once that which cannot exist without society and that for which society exists. It may be a joining of many strengths to effect something which the strength of no single man can effect, or may be an apportioning of different activities to different persons, who severally participate in the benefits of one another's activities. . . . In any case the units pass from the state of perfect independence to the state of mutual dependence, and as fast as they do this, they become united into a society properly so called."¹

It is, however, not co-operation of whatever kind that Herbert Spencer considers as the constituent of society, but such co-operation as is persistent.

"We consistently regard a society as an entity, because, though formed of discrete units, a certain concreteness in the aggregate of them is implied by the general persistence of the arrangements among them throughout the area occupied. And it is this trait which yields our ideas of society. For, withholding the name from an ever-changing cluster such as primitive men form, we apply it only where some constancy in the distribution of parts has resulted from settled life."²

Agreement is found to exist also among the philosophers of all ages, when they come to define in general terms the nature of the arrangement necessary for social co-operation. The ancients are unanimous in likening society to an organic body and in laying stress on the resemblance which the distribution of its parts and functions has to organization. And so are recent writers. Professor Clifford does not hesitate to call society the highest of all organisms. Herbert Spencer develops the reasons on which, according to the modern view, the analogy rests in a special chapter and at the end of it sums them up in the following words:

"It (*society*) undergoes continuous growth. As it grows, its parts become unlike; it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual dependence of the parts. And the mutually dependent parts, living by and for one

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 440.

² *Ibid.*, § 212.

another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as in an individual organism."¹

Society, then, has three characteristic traits; it is a permanent union of persons, a union in the pursuit of a common end, and a union analogous to an organism. The universal conception of it by these three marks, plain, intelligible, taken almost from direct experience, must be regarded as true and correct, and may safely be adopted as the test and basis of all sociological speculation.

But, however simple and uniform the obvious conception of society may be, it is greatly diversified, when developed by analysis and reflection, according as the development is carried on in different methods and from different points of view; nay, it grows into utterly irreconcilable theories, according as it is evolved by ancient or by modern thinkers, in the light of Christian, or of anti-Christian principles. It now becomes our task to follow out the many branches of the social doctrine shooting forth from one germ. To perform it properly and methodically, we have to see to what causes society, and especially civil society, must be traced back; for philosophical analysis, as was said above, is an inquiry into causes final, efficient, and constituent; and it is by establishing them that theories and doctrinal systems are built up. Let us commence with the final cause of society, the end for which its members co-operate.

II.

It is a peculiarity of modern sociologists to conceive society as an organism in the strict sense, and to deduce from this one idea the whole social theory, even as drawn out into the remotest conclusions. The view thus made fundamental to all their discussions is obviously based on the resemblance of the social body with organic beings, which, as we have seen, is so striking that it enters as an element into the first conception of society. Having adopted this course, they quite consistently endeavor to determine the end of society from its organic nature. Yet though taking their departure from this common point, they land us, as if carried by diverse winds, in altogether different and opposite deductions.

Some of them, and their number is not small, hold that every organism, because a complete and independent system, is its own end, and that on the contrary, its several organs, having but dependent existence and activity, are only means destined to subserve it. Accordingly society, at least if complete, is considered as absolute and independent, its members as dependent in every respect; the State as an end unto itself supreme and ultimate, the

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 223.

life and activity of the citizen as means wholly subordinate to the preservation and development of the social body.

This is the view taken by Plato and Aristotle and made the basis of State-absolutism in ancient Greece and Rome. This is the view generally espoused by our modern pantheists; for, in their opinion, the differentiation of the universal divine being is a sort of organization, and the universe evolved by the divinity, one all-comprising organism. This is the view of Hegel, whose ethics has of late gained so many admirers. According to him the State is God Himself as the actual self-evolved and self-organized spirit; wherefore it is an end for itself to which all individual being must be sacrificed, an unlimited power to which all are unconditionally subject. This is the only view consistent with the several monistic theories of evolution. They all are more or less pantheistic, because the one universal principle inhering in the world and evolving all from itself must necessarily be conceived as self-existent and divine; they all, in order to establish universal unity, reduce the things evolved to one great organism. Hence the moral and social tenets they embody must needs be set forth in the words of Mr. J. T. Bixby.

"In the light of modern science, humanity is one vast organism, whose span of life runs back to the very dawn of animal existence upon the earth. . . . The great law of duty is to make, not one cell or nerve of the body politic flourish, but the great all-connected whole of social life progress to higher life, rational, emotional, moral, and spiritual. The ultimate standard then, for determining what is morally good and morally bad, is the tendency to help forward or impede the progress of our race toward the ideal of humanity. The supreme end of moral action is the evolution of the completest and highest soul life of humanity."¹

This is the view fundamental to utilitarianism; how else could the end of man consist in the happiness of all mankind or all sentient existence? It is the view implied in all forms of communism and socialism; for otherwise the State or the community could not be made the general producer, the universal employer and apportioner of labor, the dispenser of all goods, the owner of all land and all capital.

It is thought to be an auspicious progress of our enlightened age, that it has so determined the end of social life by means of scientific researches. Two advantages of the highest importance seem to be secured by this achievement. The members become effectively adapted to work out the well-being and development of the social body; for they are rendered completely subservient to it in perfect unity and harmony; and the end itself of society is raised in dignity and widened in extension; for it is proposed as

¹ *Crisis in Morals*, pp. 213, 214.

absolutely supreme and made to comprise the complete happiness of the whole of mankind in the enjoyment of all good and the possession of all perfection.

Undoubtedly, a greater excellence than this could not be claimed by the authors of the theory expounded. Yet what they so loudly claim, is not so generally conceded to them. They represent but one view of the question before us; another view quite opposed to this is held by modern thinkers of no less renown.

There are scientists who deny the very foundation of social centralization. On the ground also of recent researches they maintain that the units of organic bodies are not, as was formerly thought, dependent and incomplete, but rather independent and self-subsisting principles of activity, and that, consequently they are combined to a living whole not by subordination, but mere aggregation.

"Kant," said the late Professor Huxley, "defines the mode of existence of living beings by this, that all parts co-exist on account of the whole, and that the whole itself exists on account of the parts. But since Turpin and Schwann have decomposed the living body into an aggregation of almost independent cells, having each their special laws of development and of growth, the view of Kant has ceased to be tenable. Each cell lives for itself as well as for the whole organism; the cells which float in the blood live at their own expense and are organisms as independent as the *torulæ* which float in the wort of beer."¹

According to scientists holding his view, organization is not essentially different from crystallization, nor is an organism anything else than a colony or an aggregate of living beings. But a mere aggregate of independent beings, because devoid of real unity, has not an end of its own, distinct from that of its components. It is the collective end of the latter that is the end of the whole.

There are others who admit the total dependence of vital units in the organic body, but deny it in the social organism. This is the opinion espoused by Herbert Spencer in his "Principles of Sociology" and interpreted by J. Fisk in his "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy." The cardinal difference between the individual and the social organism is thus set forth by "the Apostle of the Understanding:"

"In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate, in the other it is diffused throughout the aggregate; all the units possess the capacities for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate. As, then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of the society. It has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the

¹ Quoted from P. Janet, *Final Causes* (translated by W. Affleck), p. 48.

claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals."¹

The difference between the two kinds of organism is no less forcibly asserted by Herbert Spencer's American interpreter. He affirms :

"It would be a great error to infer from this necessary coincidence in development, that a community is nothing more than a kind of organism, as Plato imagined in his 'Republic' and Hobbes in his 'Leviathan.'" . . .

"This inseparable distinction is the fact that in a community the psychical life is all in the parts, while in an organism the psychical life is all in the whole. The living units of society do not and cannot lose individual consciousness, 'while the community as a whole has no corporate consciousness.' The corporate life must here be subservient to the lives of the parts, instead of the lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate life. (Spencer's "Essays," 2d series, p. 154.)"²

Still it is not meant that the social units have their independence from the very beginning of corporate life, on the contrary, they obtain it only in the higher stages of development. For, in the opinion of Herbert Spencer, as there are two kinds of organisms, the one individual, the other social, so there are also two kinds of social organization.

"Social organization," he says, "necessary as a means to concerted action, is of two kinds. Though these two kinds generally co-exist and are more or less interfused, yet they are distinct in their origins and their natures. There is a spontaneous co-operation which grows up without thought during the pursuit of private ends; and there is a co-operation which, consciously devised, implies distinct recognition of public ends. The ways in which the two are respectively established and carried on, present marked contrasts."³

Organization of the first kind is more completely characterized in the following lines :

"Whenever, in a primitive group, there begins that co-operation which is effected by exchange of services—whenever individuals find their wants better satisfied by giving certain products which they can make best, in return for other products they are less skilled in making, or not so well circumstanced for making, there is initiated a kind of organization, and throughout its higher stages, results from endeavors to meet personal needs. Division of labor, to the last as at first, grows by experience of mutual facilitations of living. Each new specialization of industry arises from the effort of one who commences it to get profit; and establishes itself by conducting in some way to the profit of others. So that there is a kind of concerted action, with an elaborate social organization developed by it, which does not originate in deliberate concert. Though within the small subdivisions of this organization, we find everywhere repeated the relation of employer and employed, of whom the one directs the actions of the other, yet this relation, spontaneously formed in aid of private ends and continued only at will, is not formed with conscious reference to achievement of public ends; these are not thought of."⁴

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 222.

² *The Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii., pp. 226, 227.

³ *Principles of Sociology*, § 441.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Two traits are consequently peculiar to such organization. It is industrial, being an elaborate division of labor in behalf of production and distribution, and it is free from external restraint and stimulation, because arising spontaneously and carried on unconsciously.

The second kind of organization is described in the following passage :

"When the primitive group has to defend itself against other groups, its members act together under further stimuli than those constituted by purely personal desires. Even at the outset, before any control of a chief exists, there is the control exercised by the group over its members ; each of whom is obliged by public opinion, to join in the general defence. Very soon the warrior of recognized superiority begins to exercise over each, during war, an influence additional to that exercised by the group, and when his authority becomes established, it greatly furthers combined action. From the beginning, therefore, this kind of social co-operation and a co-operation which is not wholly a matter of choice—is often at variance with private wishes. As the organization initiated by it develops, we see that in the first place, the fighting division of the society displays in the highest degree these same traits: the grades and divisions constituting an army, co-operate more and more under the regulation, consciously established, of agencies which override individual volitions—or, to speak strictly, control individuals by motives which prevent them from acting as they would spontaneously act. In the second place, we see that throughout the society as a whole there spreads a kindred form of organization—kindred in so far that, for the purpose of maintaining the militant body and the government which directs it, there are established over citizens, agencies which force them to labor more or less largely for public ends instead of private ends. And, simultaneously, there develops a further organization, still akin in its fundamental principle, which restrains individual actions in such wise that social safety shall not be endangered by the disorder consequent on unchecked pursuit of personal ends."¹

This organization, then, is military, because adapted to the waging of war, political or governmental, using coercive power to attain its purpose.

The main distinction between the two kinds of organization lies in the end to which they are severally adjusted. Industrial organization exhibits combined action "which directly seeks and subserves the welfare of individuals, and indirectly subserves the welfare of society as a whole by preserving individuals. Military and governmental organization exhibits combined action "which directly seeks and subserves the welfare of the society as a whole, and indirectly subserves the welfare of individuals by protecting the society."

Military or political organization, however, cannot be useful but within certain limits ; for it entails disadvantages, and it is quite possible that they outweigh the advantages for which it is established. Besides, its necessity disappears in proportion as individuals are peacefully united into groups, groups into states, and

¹ *Ibid.*

these into large empires. The necessary consequence is that, with the progress of civilization, it loses its force and influence, and falls into decay. Industrial organization, on the contrary, as peace and order are secured, gains in strength, until at last a period will come when it will universally predominate. This stage being reached, social organization will aim directly at individual welfare only, and will forever continue to do so.

Mr. John Fiske arrives on a like line of reasoning at the same conclusion :

"It will thus be seen that the very same process, which has resulted in the formation of social aggregates of a higher and higher order, has also resulted in the more and more complete subordination of the requirements of the aggregate to the requirements of the individual. And be it further noticed that the relative strength of the altruistic feelings, which maintain the stability of the highest social aggregation, maintains also to the fullest the independence of its individual members, while the relative strength of the egoistic feelings which in early times prevented the existence of any higher organization than the family or tribe, was also incompatible with individual freedom of action. Now this is precisely the reverse of the state of things which we find in organic evolution. In organic development, the individual life of parts is more and more submerged in the corporate life of the whole. In social development, corporate life is more and more subordinated to individual life. The highest organic life is that in which the units have the least possible freedom. The highest social life is that in which the units have the greatest possible freedom. This feature of social evolution is most conveniently described by Schelling's term *individuation*, which is employed in a kindred sense both in Mr. Spencer's and in other modern works of biology."¹

In his work on "Justice," Herbert Spencer deduces the end of the State from the profounder consideration of the conditions necessary for social life.

"Each citizen," he says, "wants to live and to live as fully as his surroundings permit. This being the desire of all, it results that all, exercising joint control, are interested in seeing that while each does not suffer from breach of the relation between acts and ends in his own person, he shall not break those relations in the persons of others. The incorporated mass of citizens has to maintain the conditions under which each may gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest lives of fellow-citizens."²

To achieve this object is not only the essential, but also the *only* duty of the State—the incorporated mass of citizens. The assertion is thus substantiated. The conditions which render it possible for each and all to gain the fullest life coincide with the two fundamental laws of justice. The first is couched in the following terms :

"Each individual ought to receive the benefits or the evils of his own nature and consequent conduct, neither being prevented from having whatever good his actions normally bring to him, nor allowed to shoulder off on other persons whatever ill is brought on him by his actions."

The second runs thus :

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol ii., pp. 222, 223.

² *Justice*, § 116.

"Each individual, receiving the benefits and the injuries due to his own nature and consequent conduct, has to carry on that conduct subject to the restriction that it shall not in any large degree impede the conduct by which each other individual achieves benefits or brings on himself injuries."¹

These two laws are conditions so essential to social life, that whenever they are transgressed, society suffers injury and is bound to perish, so necessary to the progress and evolution of mankind, that their infringement, because entailing the survival of the less fitted, must always result in deterioration. The social body, then, if it is not to destroy itself, can in making laws and carrying on its policy, never go beyond the maintenance of justice,² and consequently, as the order of justice coincides with the conditions essential to the full life of each and all, can directly aim only at the individual welfare of its members.

It would seem as if Herbert Spencer had borrowed some ideas from Kant. According to the German philosopher, the object of the State consists in the external enforcement of right, the universal law of which is: "Act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may be able to coexist with the freedom of all others, according to a universal law."³ The enforcement of external freedom is likewise regarded by the English philosopher as the proper object of the State, with this only difference, that he refers freedom to a farther end, the fulness of individual life attainable by all.

The Spencerian theory is no less recommended by its advocates than the systems of State absolutism are recommended by theirs; nay, it is thought to be of decided superiority. We are told that it directly furthers the well-being of each and all citizens and at the same time makes for the welfare of the social body; for when is society in a better condition than when all its members are happy? We are assured that it secures to man that rank and dignity which else is claimed for the State, since it is the individual whom it regards as supreme and whose absolute independence it asserts. And by doing so it is said to raise the whole of mankind in all its parts to the highest elevation possible.

We see now, a gulf divides the modern sociologists, notwithstanding their starting from a common point of departure, a gulf as wide as it can possibly be, because it means a total difference in the very object and nature of society.

III.

Let the contradictions of the theories expounded be ever so radical and far-reaching in consequences, the Christian philosopher

¹ *Ibid.*, §§ 12, 14.

² *Ibid.*, § 141. See also *The Man versus The State*, ch. iv.

³ See H. Spencer on *Justice*. Appendix A.

does not feel perplexed. He recognizes in them but the opposition that must exist between error and error. For erroneous are to his mind the conclusions at which modern sociologists arrive, as well as the suppositions and principles from which they proceed.

The welfare of society is not an end supreme and absolute. The end of man in which he finds ultimate rest is the highest truth perfectly known and the highest good embraced with perfect love, which end, if fully attained, makes up the glorification of God the Creator. To this end society is bound to be subservient by the very fact that it is not self-existent, but finite and produced. Such is the imperative dictate of reason, such the necessary will of the Creator, who is infinitely wise and holy. To maintain that society itself is an absolute and ultimate end, to which its members are subordinate as means, is tantamount to placing it on the throne of the Deity, tantamount to depriving man of his true happiness, tantamount to overturning the whole moral order, of which God is the eternal foundation, as he is also the supreme law-giver, judge, and avenger. Nor can in any sense the State be considered as an end unto itself. For under such a supposition, while private well-being would be unprotected and unwarranted, and individual rights be abolished, the will of the body politic, respectively the majority of its members, while subject to no higher law, would be entitled to require unconditional submission in all things. Could there be a worse tyranny, a more complete suppression of freedom? It is inconceivable how in our days, when all former ages are being denounced for their lack of political liberties, social theories are advanced which, if carried into practice, would initiate a policy as oppressive as that of ancient Greece and Rome, as arbitrary as that of the despotic East.

No less untenable are the principles and suppositions on which these absurd deductions rest. Their immediate basis is the assumption that society is an organism in the strict sense. Undoubtedly, and the philosophers of all ages admit it, there exists an analogy between organism and society. For, like a living body, society is made up of many parts and members, of which each has its peculiar function, yet all combine their energies so as to form one whole and to pursue one end. Analogy, however, is resemblance in some respects only, and not identity. There is between society and organism a most important and essential difference. The units and organs of the living body, being unable to act independently of one another, are neither complete principles of actions, nor do they severally pursue and achieve an end of their own. On the contrary, as they constitute one agent complete and perfect, so is their individual activity directed to one end to be accomplished by their united forces. In a word, as prominent biologists say, they live and act by the whole, and for

the whole of which they are parts. Besides, their activity in the pursuit of the common end is so regulated by necessary laws that freedom is completely excluded. Hence the constant uniformity of action in all individuals of the same species, the perpetual identity of the process by which they evolve, the perfect similarity of instincts and habits which they follow. Just the contrary obtains in the members of society. Each one of them is of himself a perfect principiant, a person in the strict and proper sense. Each is consequently destined for an end of his own, an end that corresponds to his peculiar nature, an end to be obtained by his personal activity, and to be possessed and enjoyed in individual happiness. It is, moreover, an undeniable fact attested by consciousness, that each member is endowed with freedom of choice in the pursuit of his destination. The end of the individual man is supreme, because, consisting in the knowledge and love of the Infinite Good, it can never be subordinate, but is the object to which all other ends and purposes of social as well as individual life must have reference. And freedom of choice or self-determination is so universal as to extend to all acts proceeding deliberately from the will, and therefore also to social activity.

Evidently, then, the relationship in which individuals stand to the social body is essentially different from that in which the vital units stand to the living body. Consequently, society is an organism, not in reality, but in resemblance, not in a proper, but in a metaphysical sense only. We now reach a conclusion of far-reaching consequences. In the face of the truth established we cannot predicate of society all the properties which we find in an organism, nor predicate any in the same manner and in the same sense; we cannot gather from the nature of an organic being the nature, the structure, and the functions of human associations, just as little as we can infer the qualities of a brave soldier from the nature of a lion which he resembles in courage. An argumentation based on analogy, on a metaphor, as every sound logician knows, cannot beget exact conclusions, and if it is carried on beyond the limits of resemblance it must end in falsehood and sophistry.

These reflections if sincerely weighed must lead to a complete condemnation of the theory that considers the society as an end unto itself and the individual merely as means subordinate to it. But our modern philosophers are not the ones to weigh them. They deny every one of the propositions and premises we have laid down. They deny the dependence of society on a higher cause, and its subordination to a higher end, deny the personality and freedom of the individual man, deny an end proposed to him which is distinct from, and superior to, that of society, and hence

deny that society may be called an organism only in a metaphorical sense. Denials so radical are, of course, not made gratuitously, but are based on further grounds which must be looked upon as the ultimate foundation of the modern theories. What are these grounds? They are nothing else than pantheism of some kind or other, either realistic or idealistic, either cosmological or theological; pantheism, according to which God the supreme reason and the supreme being is considered as intrinsic to creation and not distinct from it, as the all-animating soul and spirit, the universal power in nature, the sole cause and principiant bringing forth all that is by perpetual self-evolution; whereas the universe is looked on as a mere manifestation of the Deity, as the sum total of all divine phenomena, as a mode of divine activity or as a phase of God's development. Doctrinal tenets of this kind do away with all individual independence, all individual ends and purposes. And quite consistently, for they merge all things into one universal being and all action into one general activity; they wipe out all distinction between the finite and the infinite, between creation and the Creator, and abolish all laws except the one which is identical with absolute necessity.

But pantheism is an absurdity, a contradiction to reason as well as to our consciousness. The foundation, then, itself of the theories spoken of is absurd and unreasonable, no less than the deductions drawn from them, namely, the suppression of personal rights and of freedom, and the entire subversion of the moral order.

The absolutistic view being disproved, are we not compelled to adopt the Spencerian theory which subordinates society to man as to its proper and ultimate end? No such inference can be legitimate. If society is not supreme and absolute, man is still less so.

If society is not its own end, its members are not such either, for the individual is no less finite, contingent and dependent than the entire social body. The logical consequences of the one view are just as absurd as those of the other. Suppose man to be supreme and absolute, and you establish atheism in full sway, you deny a higher end or destiny, you abolish all to which he could be subject, and you supersede morality by unrestrained egoism.

However, let us examine Herbert Spencer's theory from its social rather than its metaphysical aspect. First of all, it is absolutely unintelligible how society can be an organism, whether in the proper or in a metaphorical sense, if every one of its units is supreme and an end unto himself, even to the extent that the social action is directly subordinate to his well-being. In every organism the several members and organs work manifestly for the whole, adjusting their activity to its preservation and development, and they work for it exclusively, when components of a physical

body. So necessary is the subordination, that any disturbance of it brings on disease and even death. Now Herbert Spencer regards society as an organism in the strict and proper sense and admits in it no other forces than those that work in the material universe with absolute necessity in the line of the greatest attraction or least resistance. His position, therefore, is an inextricable self-contradiction.

He does not allege the opinion of the late Professor Huxley that according to modern researches the units also of a living body are independent of one another like animals living in the same coral or like *torulae* in the wort of beer. For he firmly maintains that in the individual organism the whole is the end of the parts. And he does so for very good reasons. No modern researches have substantiated the opposite opinion held of late by some materialists. Certainly the immediate components of living bodies, the nerves, the muscles, the glands, the bloodvessels, the digestive and respiratory apparatus, the skeleton, the organs of sensation and appetite are mutually dependent in existence as well as action. This is a fact not questioned by any biologist. The ultimate components or units, the cells, at least if perfect, are minute organisms themselves, in which division of labor and dependence of parts is observed. That also cell depends on cell is evident from the fact that when their union is dissolved, their vital activity becomes extinct. Another subordination is equally manifest. Singly as well as jointly they are in the same way as the organs subservient to the building up and evolving of the living body, their activity being wholly directed to this end and object. Were it not so, the oneness of the living being would be destroyed. A lion, a fish, a bird would not be one animal, but a multitude of animals, which considering the closeness of vital unity, is altogether impossible for us to conceive. Man himself would not be one, but millions of living beings, a thought which our consciousness repudiates.

There is, consequently, nothing that could vindicate Herbert Spencer from the charge of open self contradiction. He so characterizes the social organism that it ceases to be an organism. He goes still farther; he destroys society itself. As is universally admitted, society is a permanent union of persons jointly pursuing a common end. But there is no common end pursued, where the immediate purpose of all action is individual well-being. It cannot be meant that the associated members must directly aim at the private well-being of every individual; this is an impossibility. It must, therefore, be and is, in fact, understood by him that the object of society consists in guaranteeing to all individuals the possibility to pursue their own personal welfare, or to speak his own language, to reap the fruits of their own nature and consequent

conduct. Now what does this object presuppose and what does its realization imply? It supposes men, the units of society, independent, absolute, self-sufficient, needing for their complete development nothing but untrammelled freedom; it is, when realized, the establishment of an order, in which every one seeks his own comfort and happiness by applying his self-sufficient faculties chiefly to industrial and commercial enterprises and by restricting himself so much as is necessary not to hinder others from the same pursuit, in order not to be hindered by them himself. Could in reality such condition exist upon earth—for it is plainly a chimerical fiction—there would be no need of united efforts to achieve the great objects of life, no direct pursuit of any other end than one's own prosperity; nay, there could not even another end be aimed at consistently with the autonomy and absoluteness of individual nature. Thus society is destroyed, just when it is supposed to reach its higher stages; it ceases, just when fully developed, to have a reason for existence; it lacks its formal element, loses its basis and its very possibility.

But this is not yet the height of Mr. Spencer's self-contradiction. He also turns the attainment of individual well-being, proposed to society as its end, into an impossibility, and with such thoroughness and completeness that therein he takes unenviable precedence before other philosophers. Kant, too, as we have seen, regards the protection of right and freedom for the sake of private welfare as the proper object of the state. Yet he is at least consistent enough to guarantee the liberty of all without exception, thus to bring prosperity within the reach of every one. But such is not the purpose of Mr. Spencer; he aimed at the survival of the fittest only and dooms the less fitted to perish. In accordance with his first fundamental law of justice, "individuals of most worth," that is, "best adapted to the conditions of existence, shall have the greatest benefits and prosper best"; "inferior individuals shall have smaller benefits and suffer greater evil and thus prosper least"; "because not allowed to shoulder off on other persons whatever evil is brought on them by their actions." Under the operation of these two laws, mankind must soon divide into two hostile classes, the one highly prospering, the other, and by far the more numerous, dragging themselves along in miserable existence. The former will accumulate ever greater benefits and constantly improve and progress; the latter will fall into ever deeper distress until at last it wastes in utter wretchedness. The ever-increasing woes and final decay of the one is just as well demanded as the continuous thrift of the other; both are of equally imperative necessity for the survival of the better variety and the consequent progress of the human race. Herbert Spencer, indeed, needs not



pose as the people's friend; could he carry his view into practice, he would bring on them degradation and misfortune worse than ancient slavery.⁴

Decidedly, then, the theory that takes individual happiness for the direct end of society proves no better than that which makes social happiness an end unto itself, subordinating to it the individual member merely as a means. While the one is pantheistical, the other is atheistical, while the one uproots freedom and personal rights, the other destroys the organism, the nature, the existence of society, and destines the vast multitude of men to extinction and perdition.

The conclusions we have reached may seem legitimate, and yet raise a grave question in the reader's mind. If both the theories spoken of are erroneous, in what then, does the real object of society consist, and where do Christian philosophers place it? The answer may, at first sight, appear beset with no small difficulties, as between the two doctrines no other seems to mediate. But some reflection will spread sufficient light.

The direct and immediate end of society is unquestionably the common end for which its members co-operate, or in the pursuit of which they combine their energies. Now this common end is a common good, that is a good desired by all, because all unite for the purpose of obtaining it; and to be shared by all, because all take part in its achievement. For this reason it is also an external good; for otherwise it could not be the object of human co-operation. So far, it is true, the immediate end of society is not a private, but a public one, not individual, but public welfare. But the common good directly aimed at is not supreme and ultimate, nor is it so wide and universal as to comprise all that is necessary for happiness. The reason for saying so is plain enough. In general, men unite their energies for the purpose of obtaining goods of which they are severally in need, but which they cannot provide by their private efforts. In particular, the families, or their heads respectively, unite into civil society with the intent to co-operate for temporal prosperity by jointly procuring the external means thereof which they cannot obtain singly. The object of the State, therefore, has been correctly defined as the sum total of all the external means and conditions necessary for the perfect temporal prosperity of all citizens, yet not obtainable by private activity.²

¹ See data of *Modern Ethics Examined*, by the author, p. 304.

² *The greatest good of the greatest number* is the ultimate end of man as stated by utilitarian philosophers. They consider this end wide and general enough to deduce from it all duties of man and unlimited rights for society. It looks strange when some Christian writers and speakers express the object of the *State* in the very same terms.

Evidently the social end so described and limited is subordinate to the individual good of the members of the body politic : but it is not subordinate to the good of some only, but to the good of all ; not to such an individual good of theirs as is unreal and is not worthy of their dignity as men, but to that which harmonizes with their nature and thus lies in the direction of their ultimate end and happiness. The conclusion we now arrive at is obvious. Society aims directly at the common weal, as far as it is external and temporal, and indirectly at the true individual well-being of all its members. This idea underlies the theory of the State as advanced by all truly Christian philosophers ; it is set forth by St. Thomas Aquinas,¹ it is insisted upon by His Holiness Pope Leo XIII. in his encyclicals on the *Christian Constitution of States* and on the *Condition of the Working Classes*. According to their teaching, the various functions incumbent on those who rule civil society and direct it to its end are reduced to two obligations : First, to the duty of promoting by their administration and legislation the public welfare, and this is regarded as so essential that laws not conducive to this end are of themselves null and void ; secondly, to the duty of providing with equal concern and interest for the private welfare and prosperity of all without exception, because political power is conferred not for the benefit of those who wield it, but of those over whom it is to be exercised.

Nothing can be more consistent than this Christian theory. It proposes to social life an end in full harmony with its nature and conception ; it reconciles public with private welfare so as to further both in a most efficient manner ; it combines the liberty of each and all with perfect universal order ; it rests the whole society on a solid basis, not by rendering it supreme and absolute, which is at once absurd and immoral, but by subordinating it to the eternal Deity. It is, therefore, not possible for an unprejudiced mind to look on the discrediting of such a doctrine as an advancement of knowledge and well-being. What presents itself as truth on incontestable grounds cannot be decried as antiquated and old-fashioned. What supports order by efficient means, promotes prosperity, peace, and justice, upholds society and protects rights and freedom can never be set aside as worthless and unavailing.

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If compromise with utilitarianism is thought to be progress and enlightened liberalism, then let it not be forgotten on what anti-Christian foundation this modern theory rests, nor let it be overlooked that from the end of civil society so described powers may be inferred for ruling parties and majorities as absolute and oppressive as were ever claimed by tyrannical monarchs.

¹ *Sum Theol.*, i.-ii., qu. 90, art. 2 ; qu. 91, art. 1, 4 ; qu. 96, art. 2, 3 ; qu. 99, art. 3.

EXPLORERS IN THE MIDDLE AGE : MARCO POLO.

HE who has carefully studied the Middle Age knows that it was not the period of darkness which many suppose it to have been. He realizes that it was in this epoch that many of our most useful inventions were evolved ; that many of our most prized institutions originated. Therefore he is not surprised when he learns that from the depths of the often alleged Cimmerian darkness there issued a genius, or rather an associated trio of them, who contributed more to geographical and ethnological science, than had resulted from all the voyages and conquests of the preceding thirty centuries. The children of the nineteenth century, sometimes reasonably and often preposterously complacent toward its wonders, may well exult over its geographical conquests, so brilliantly prosecuted by a Livingstone, for instance, or a De Brazza. But they seem to forget that from the day on which these explorers set forth on their expeditions, until they returned, their chief means of success were things which had originated in the Middle Age. From that needlessly pitied epoch were derived the bills of exchange which facilitated their travels until they had reached the limits of civilization. From the same source came the compass, with which they guided their course through arid desert and trackless jungle. Thence also came the gunpowder with which they were more than a match for numerically superior foes, and which enabled them to remove the otherwise insurmountable obstacles which nature had placed in their way. *Unicuique suum.* We propose, in this brief sketch, to introduce the reader to three of the most enterprising and intrepid explorers whom the world has known ; and they were men of the thirteenth century. Before these heroes of science made their voyages, Europeans knew very little concerning the immense countries of eastern Asia. Many Catholic missionaries, notably the physician Philip, sent in 1177 by Pope Alexander III. to the "Priest-King" of Karait ; the Dominicans sent by Pope Innocent IV. to Persia, in 1245 ; the Franciscans sent by the same Pontiff to the great Ghengis Khan ; had furnished Europe with little information about the States which they had tried to evangelize. All remembrance of ancient geographical discoveries in the East—such as they were—had vanished from the West during that period of transition in which the Catholic Church was forming a new civilization out of the remnants of ancient Roman culture, the unpromising material exhi-

bited by our barbarian ancestors, and her own spirit. All honor, therefore, to Nicolao, Maffeo, and Marco Polo, who put an end to an ignorance of geography nearly as dense as that of Homer, for whom the Mediterranean was the greatest of seas, and the Pillars of Hercules the "thus far, and no further" of the world.

I.

Before giving any account of the travels of the three Poli, it may be as profitable as interesting to note one of the most romantic attempts of missionary enterprise, and therefore of geographical exploration, which the Christian world had hitherto seen. We allude to the matter of the Priest-King John, a personage whom some have regarded, with no good reason, as merely legendary. Until comparatively modern times, Abyssinia was supposed to have been the kingdom subject to this monarch; but now it is certain that his dominion was in Tartary, to the north of what is now known as China. From the very first days of their existence as a putrid branch, cut off from the mystic Body of Christ (year 431), the Nestorians had endeavored to propagate their tenets in the far East, despairing of any success in the West. That they succeeded, to some extent, during the seventh century, in planting the Cross in China, is evident from an inscription found in 1625 in Singan-fu.¹ In the early days of the eleventh century, these schismatics converted a king of Kerait, and ordained him to the priesthood.² This monarch then assumed the title of the "Priest-King," and his successors continued to glory in it. That the title was not merely honorific, but indicative of a real priesthood on the part of these successors, would appear from the recognition of it, given, as we shall observe, by a Roman Pontiff. In illustration of the real position of these Priest-Kings on the stage of life, we may adduce the deputation of Armenians, headed by a Syrian bishop, which waited upon Pope Eugenius III., then resident in Viterbo, in 1145. This deputation reminded the Pontiff that in the distant regions of Eastern Asia there was a powerful monarch, who was also a Christian priest. This sovereign, the bishop declared, claimed to be a descendant of one of the three Magi; and he then ruled, insisted the prelate, over the same territories which, accord-

¹ The best disquisition on this inscription is one inserted by Zaccaria in his valuable *Raccolta di Dissertazioni sulla Storia Ecclesiastica*, Rome, 1790.

² Among the missionaries sent by St. Louis of France into the East, was the Franciscan, Rubuquis, whose interesting narrative is given by Bergeron, in his *Recueil des Voyages en Asie*. This friar thought, and the Protestant Mosheim agrees with him, that the King-Priest was a Nestorian missionary who (and this remark reminds us of the Protestant so-called "missionaries" in the Sandwich Islands) seized the throne, and left the peculiar title to his descendants. But according to the legend which Rubuquis found current in the East, this supposition is ill-founded.

ing to the traditions obtaining among their peoples, had been governed by those holy first adorers of our Lord. The magnificence of the Priest-King of that day, continued the Syrian, was scarcely describable, but one could form some idea of it from the fact that milk and honey flowed freely in his dominions; that the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel were under his sway; that his palace was constructed on the model of that which the Apostle Thomas designed for King Gundafor of the Indies; that every day thirty-two bishops dined with him; that his chief butler was primate of the realm, and also a king; and that his chief cook was both abbot and king. And finally, the Pope might realize the power of the priestly sovereign from the fact that lately he had written to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel, commanding that ruler to pay him the homage of a vassal. If the reader smiles at this description, he may fear that his incredulity has been premature, when he reflects that the story made some impression upon Cardinal James de Vitry (b. 1207), a shrewd thinker, and author of one of the best historical works ever penned.¹ Writing to Pope Honorius III., his Eminence said: "Seraph, brother of King Corradin of Damascus, has retreated before an invasion by the king of the Indies. This shrewd, powerful, and victorious monarch, whom the Lord has raised up in our day to be a scourge to the Mohammedans, is David, whom the people style Priest-John. . . . He is, at present, distant from Antioch only a three days' march, and hopes to capture Jerusalem, after he has forced the sultanate of Iconium and the intermediate states to submit to the Christian law."² The great annalist, Baronius, records a letter of Pope Alexander III. to a king of Karait, who bore the title of Priest-John.³ This document was entrusted to a physician, named Philip, who had already visited Karait, and who was then ordered to return thither, as an Apostolic Legate. The Pontiff is careful to address the monarch as his "Most dear son, the illustrious and magnificent king of the Indies, and most holy of priests." His Holiness says that he has learned that the king is noted for his Christian charity, and that he desires to enter into communion with the Apostolic See, thereby professing the true faith; that he also wishes to have a church in Jerusalem devoted to the use of his subjects, so that they may be indoctrinated as to the discipline of the Holy Roman Church. Therefore, concludes the Pope, the physician Philip has been commissioned as Papal Delegate to the said Priest-King, with authority to grant all proper favors. Unfortunately, there are no documents to show what was the result of this embassy. The last of the line

¹ *Historia Occidentalis et Orientalis*, Douay, 1597.

² D'Achery, *Spicilegium*, vol. iii., p. 590.

³ At year 1177, Nos. 32 to 36.

of the Priest-Kings was conquered and killed in 1202, by Ghengis-Khan.

II.

In the year 1250, two Venetian merchants, Nicolao and Maffeo Polo, having disposed very advantageously of a cargo in Constantinople, invested the profits in jewels, and turned to the Orient to seek their fortunes. At the mouth of the Volga they were cordially welcomed by a khan named Barca, and sold their jewels for double their value. Then they travelled over deserts, finding here and there only nomadic Tartars, until they arrived at Bokhara, where they were forced to remain three years. At the end of that time there came to Bokhara an envoy of Kublai-Khan, the grandson of Ghengis-Khan, and sovereign of the Mongol Tartars. This dignitary conceived a great affection for the Latin adventurers, and invited them to accompany him to the court of his master. They assented, and after a journey of twelve months in a northeasterly direction, they found Kublai at Chemen-Fu. Intense was the joy of the Grand Khan when he embraced the sons of the Queen of the Adriatic. He displayed much anxiety to learn all about the Roman Pontiff and the organization of the Catholic Church; and when, twelve years afterward, the visitors took leave, he appointed them his ambassadors to the Holy See, charging them to procure for his veneration some of the oil from the lamp which hung before the Sepulchre of Christ. He also begged them to see that the Pope sent missionaries to his Tartar and Chinese subjects; for, he added, he could not hope to civilize them through any aid from the lethargic Eastern schismatics, and he had still less confidence in the Llamas of Thibet.¹ After three more years of travel, the Poli reached a port of lesser Armenia, called Laias; and thence they sailed to St. Jean d'Acre, the ancient Ptolemaide, from which place their further voyage was easy. When they arrived at Venice, after an absence of twenty years, they found it irksome to settle down again to the commonplaces of a cultured life, and soon yearned for more experiences of something exciting. Naturally they thought of returning to Kublai; but this they dared not do, unless they fulfilled that monarch's commissions to the Holy See. But the Papal Chair was then vacant, and the Conclave appeared to be in no haste to fill it. Therefore, these born explorers determined to depart at once, and to visit Palestine, on

¹ The reader may be surprised at the courtesy of Kublai toward his Christian guests, but all the earlier successors of Ghengis-Khan were just as favorable. This fact may be explained by the marriage of Ghengis to the daughter of the Priest-King whom he had killed; by the marriage of his son, Oktai, to another Christian; and by the conversion of his heir, Dschagotai, to Christianity, through the influence of these women.

their way, there to lay the khan's requests before the Papal Legate. But in this journey they took a companion.

On the arrival of Nicolao at his home, he had found that his wife, whom he had left with child in 1250, had borne him a fine, robust, and intelligent boy, who was called Marco. This was the youth who was destined to reveal to Europe the wonders of China, India, and Japan. It was a terrible time for a traveller in Western Asia and Northern Africa, when, in 1271, the three Poli started on the exploration which has rendered the name of Marco, at least, so famous.¹ That they carried their lives in their hands, is evident from the following letter, written in 1270 by the Mameluke sultan, Bibars, to King Bohemond of Antioch: "We entered Antioch, scimeter in hand, on the fourth day of the Ramadan. Why were you not there, to see your knights crushed under the hoofs of my horses, your palaces sacked and reduced to ashes, your treasures seized and weighed, your women sold, your temples burned, your crosses trampled under foot, your Holy of Holies profaned by your Islamite foe, your priests and monks slaughtered at the altars, your princes of the blood-royal dragged into slavery? Had you been there, you would have asked heaven to reduce you to dust." But the intrepid Venetians were not deterred by the state of affairs indicated in this ferocious communication. When they arrived in Jerusalem, they made known to Cardinal Theobald Visconti, the Papal Legate, the desires of Kublai-Khan; and while arrangements were being made to satisfy them, news came that the cardinal had been elected to the pontifical throne. Therefore it was Pope Gregory X., now venerated as Blessed, who appointed two Carmelite friars, men of artistic tastes and sound theologians, to carry the Cross into China.² Having bidden a long farewell to civilization for the second time, the two elder Poli encouraged the lad who was now making his first essay at exploration; but Marco needed but little incentive other than his own insatiable curiosity. As to courage, patience, and above all, resignation to the will of God, he proved himself even superior to his more seasoned relatives. Our adventurers passed safely through the countries subject to the savage Bibars, and May, 1275, found them at Kaiping-Fu, the summer residence of Kublai. Their four years of

¹ It is strange that Columbus never mentions, in his writings, the name of Marco Polo, especially since he often has passages which are evidently taken from that traveller's book. In the time of the great Genoese, the work of Polo had not yet become popular, for Ramusio had not yet taken it in hand. But probably Columbus learned Marco's experiences through the medium of the writings of Toscanelli, Nicola dei Conti, and Cardinal d'Ailly.

² These Carmelites soon became discouraged, and returned to Europe. In 1246, another Italian missionary, Piano Carpini, had entered China, but his narratives were very meagre.

travel had been fraught with peril of every kind ; but we are obliged to omit any account of their experience before their arrival at the court of the Grand Khan. If the reader is surprised at the length of time consumed by the journey of the Poli from Palestine to Kaiping-Fu, we can, perhaps, explain the fact by some information received at the time of our present writing, concerning a similar journey just completed. In the early part of 1891, two Calmuck Tartars, Buddhists in religion, left their homes in the Russian province of Astrakhan on the Volga, on a mission to the sacred city of Lhassa in Thibet. After incredible hardships, it took them, despite their knowledge of Mongol languages, three years to make the journey. Let us imagine, then, what the Poli had to endure before they rested at Kaiping-Fu.

The sovereign immediately invited his Christian guests to enter his service, and the offer was accepted. Kublai was especially attracted by the talents and engaging qualities of Marco ; and soon he promoted the youth, despite his inexperience in practical matters, to a seat in the Privy Council. Marco was employed, during the first few years of his service, in tabulating the statistics of the vast Celestial Empire ; and this important work entailed upon him what was to a man of his temperament the most pleasant of tasks, visits and protracted residence in the most distant provinces. He became well acquainted with Thibet ; far better, most probably, than any Caucasian of our day. He knew thoroughly the vast land of Yunnan, scarcely known at all by us. For three years he was governor of Yangchow. He witnessed and helped to procure the fall of the Chinese dynasty of the Sung ; and very much of the success of Kublai in that enterprise was due to engines manufactured by the Poli, machines which threw stone balls weighing three hundred pounds. When Kublai resolved to undertake the conquest of Japan, he relied chiefly upon the aid of his Venetian friends ; and it is very probable that he would have succeeded, had he not been forced to abandon his design because of rebellions at home and the destruction of his naval armament by a tempest. After a residence of fifteen years in China, the Poli signified to Kublai their wish to return to their beautiful Italy ; but the venerable sovereign hesitated to grant the permission. Finally, he became reconciled to what was a very reasonable wish ; and as he had just then received an embassy from the Shah of Persia, sent to ask for the hand of an imperial princess, and since the Poli had pronounced a voyage by sea to Persia to be feasible, he appointed them ambassadors to convey the lady to her new home. They bore with them two golden tablets inscribed with an imperial order that they should everywhere be treated like sovereigns ; and they also carried a letter to the Roman Pontiff, in which Kublai

said that he had learned to prefer the religion taught by Rome to his own. However, he manifested no intention of embracing the appreciated faith. Fourteen vessels, "each with four masts and twelve sails," bore the Poli, the princess, and their retinues—six hundred persons, not counting the sailors—from the port of Zaiton on the eastern coast of China. In three months they touched the coast of Java. Then they sailed to Ceylon, and afterward to the mainland, Hindostan, which Marco calls "Greater India." Madagascar was also visited, and the African continent, which is styled "Lesser India." Finally, after a voyage of eighteen months, during which their retinues had been diminished by sickness to eighteen persons, the Poli and the princess bade each other farewell at Ormus on the coast of Arabia. Our indefatigable travellers now set out overland for further adventures. Turning toward the Caspian, they visited Tauris, and remained there nine months. Then they stopped awhile at Trebizond, then at Constantinople, and at length arrived in Venice in the year 1295. The elder Poli had been travelling forty-five years, and Marco twenty-four, in countries which were, nearly all, hitherto unknown to Europeans, and they had never met with a serious accident.

When the Poli presented themselves at their olden residence in the Via di San Giovanni Crisostomo, they found it occupied by certain relatives, who, since the travellers were supposed to have attained immortality some time before, had entered upon the rights of the next of kin. When they declared their identity, they only excited an explosion of incredulous laughter. The idea of those haggard wretches in Mongolian clothing, and that in tatters, claiming to be Venetian gentlemen! And how could they dare to hope that their leathery skins, their goodness-knows what of the Mongolian in expression, the slantingness of their eyes, their purring and other cat-like manners, would ever be mistaken for Caucasian attributes? To jail with the impostors! But Marco soon convinced the doubting Thomases of the truth of his claims. He produced the money wherewith to furnish an elegant banquet to an immense assembly of those whom his father and uncle had known in the olden time; and when the guests had arrived, the Poli appeared in garments of gorgeous hue, the finest texture, and ultra-fashionable style. Then leading the way to the tables, they seated the company; and flinging off their trappings, they shone in garments of still greater splendor, and gave their previous clothes to the menials. Again they performed the lightning change act at the end of the feast; and the now good-humored relatives began to suspect that the eccentric hosts might be, after all, what they claimed to be. Finally, Marco produced the rags in which his party had come to Venice; and from many hidden pockets he

brought forth handfuls of precious stones of every kind and of such purity and size as had never before been seen in the West. Then indeed the bewildered guests swore that the claimants were true Poli, the Simon pure article.

An active and adventurous life was a necessity to Marco Polo; therefore it is not strange that we find him, in 1295, in command of a Venetian galley at the battle of Curzola, fighting against the Genoese. Here, together with 7000 of his countrymen, he was made prisoner, and held in close confinement for twenty-five years. But this terrible misfortune was a benefit to Venice, and indeed to all Europe; for it was in order to alleviate the torments of prison ennui that Marco composed the narrative of his travels. He obtained his liberty in 1328, and saw his eightieth year before the angel of death bade him relinquish his checkered career. The book written by Marco Polo, which soon came to be known as the *Millione*,¹ was long regarded by many as a mere collection of fables, worthy of no more credit than we now accord to the romances woven around the shadowy form of the mythical King Arthur, or to the legend of William Tell. And in modern times, the Protestant mania for a decial of all good, and of nearly all science, in the age of faith, confirmed this notion. But the investigations of competent and impartial critics have shown that three centuries before the modern "emancipation" of humanity from the presumed thralldom of Rome, three mediæval travellers had traversed the entire width of Asia, described all its kingdoms and their institutions, even the then new court of Cambalu, now Peking. Polo is now regarded by the best judges as an authority in matters of olden Chinese and Persian history. He made men familiar with the rich manufactures, the immense cities, and the majestic rivers of China; he spoke of the gentle monks of Thibet;² he described the shining pagodas of Burmah; he dilated on the beauties of that Indian Archipelago which moderns do not yet know perfectly; he made men tremble with his pictures of the man-eating savages of Sumatra; he told of the precious gems of Ceylon, and of the supposed tomb of Adam in that interesting island; and he gave to the European world a very different idea of what occurred under the burning sun of Hindostan, from that they had derived from the Alexandrian fables. Ridicule was his portion when he described the wonders of the Polar regions, as he had heard them depicted by men from Siberia;

¹ In his prologue to the *Millione*, Ramusio tells us that the stories of Marco Polo about the wealth of Cathay and the magnificence of the Grand-Khan so constantly harped upon "millions" of ducats, that the name of *Messer Millione* was given to the narrator, and hence to his book.

² It is noteworthy that although Polo is merciless toward the schisms and heresies which distracted Christendom, he shows much sympathy for those peoples who have not heard the doctrines of Christ.

and let us not deem this ridicule blameworthy in his first readers, for while we are comparatively familiar with Polar bears, Esquimaux, trained dogs, and reindeer, our own almost immediate forefathers did not believe in them.

The first Jesuit missionaries to China (year 1584) surprised Europeans by their account of the coal burnt by the Chinese, "a bituminous stone which kindles easily, and furnishes a stronger and more lasting heat than that emitted by carbon." Three centuries before this was written, Polo had told his countrymen about "black rocks which are found in veins, and which are used exclusively by the people of Cathay for heating and cooking." He also showed the Westerns how the Chinese used what we know as paper money. "The imperial money factory is in Cambalu, and one would credit the Grand-Khan with a knowledge of magic, for his money is made of strips of bark. Each piece is stamped with the names of different officials, and having been thus authenticated, it must be received by all as good, under pain of death." It was, in all probability, through the narrative of Polo that the art of printing was finally disseminated in Europe. For whether that art was practiced first by Castaldi of Feltre, or by the Dutch priest Coster, or by that priest's disciple, Gutenberg,¹ it is more than likely that the idea of printing with movable types was first excogitated by men who had seen the xylographic prints which Polo brought from the Celestial Empire. Polo's description of Pekin, as he saw it, is interesting. The imperial palace, built by Kublai-Khan, formed a square, each side of which was a mile in length. The walls of most of the rooms were covered with gold and silver, and there were "many beautiful sculptures, illustrating tales of knights and ladies, and many of the sculptures were of birds and beasts." In the grand hall, 6000 persons often dined at the same time. On the outside, the palace was covered with paint of vermilion, purple and green hues, and the varnish shone like crystal. Through the luxuriant gardens of the palace flowed a wide river, "so netted, that no fish could escape." The reader is informed that when the emperor hears of any especially fine tree, no matter how tall it is, and how far off it is, "it is transplanted, branches and all, to the imperial gardens, elephants being used for that purpose." The capital was twenty-four miles in circumference, and its walls were pierced by ten openings, in which hung brazen gates, and near each one of which was a splendid palace. At nightfall, a tremendous bell was rung thrice, and from that moment until sun-

¹ We leave Faust out of the question, for he seems to have been merely an adroit speculator, who appropriated the plans of Gutenberg which this enterprising man had perfected from the ideas of Coster; if, indeed, he had not learned the secret, as the *Chronicles of Feltre* assert, from the humanist, Panfilio Castaldi.

rise, "no person could leave home, unless to summon a physician for a lying-in woman or for some other person dangerously ill." When the Grand-Khan was in residence, 40,000 men took all their meals in his palace. "And you must know that when he dines, great barons are the waiters, and their mouths and nostrils are covered by beautiful silk napkins, so that their breath may not taint the viands of their sovereign." Perhaps Shakespeare had been reading Polo's book, just before he thought of putting on the lips of Denmark's king an order for plenty of noise, because his Majesty was about to drink to Hamlet. For the Venetian says than "whenever the Grand-Khan drinks, all the musical instruments, and there are very many, are sounded." And no persons, even of the most exalted rank, could stand or sit while their dread lord was imbibing. "All fall on their knees with great humility." When the birthday of the emperor was celebrated, the imperial tunic was "of beaten gold, and each one of the 12,000 barons and knights in attendance wore similar, though not so costly, apparel." It is well to know, however, that "all these garments, as well as the cinctures of gold, were imperial gifts," and that Kublai distributed them to all his courtiers thrice a year. We have observed that Marco Polo carefully tabulated the statistics of the Celestial Empire. Excluding Corea, which was, even at that early period, an independent state, save only in the matter of a small tribute, he calculated the population as 59,000,000. If we observe the rate at which the population of Western countries has increased since the thirteenth century, we need not wonder that many think that the Celestials now number nearly five hundred millions.

After one has read the quaint, but carefully penned recital of Marco Polo, which often appears to have come down to us from the author of the "Arabian Nights," he is not astonished when he learns that the traveller's friends besought him, when he was at the point of death, "to retract his lies, for the good of his soul." But time has verified nearly all his assertions; and if we consider the inadequacy of the means at his disposal, we must pronounce him the peer, at least, of any explorer of modern times.¹

REUBEN PARSONS, D.D.

¹ As an illustration of the manner in which the narrative of Polo was at first received, we cite the following commentary subjoined to a codex of the fourteenth century. "Here ends the book of Messer Marco Polo of Venice, transcribed by me, Amelio Bonaguasi, with my own hand, while I was magistrate in Cieretto Guidi, in order to drown melancholy and to pass the time. The contents appear incredible to me; not that they are necessarily lies, but because they seem so miraculous. They may be true, but I do not credit them; although, of course, it is certain that things are different in different countries. While copying these tales, they certainly interested me, but I deem them unworthy of belief. At any rate, that is my opinion. And I completed this copy at Cieretto aforesaid, on Nov. 12, 1392."

BALFOUR'S PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

(SOME CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEF.)

EVERY now and again it is granted to exceptionally gifted minds to make known, it may even be unconsciously, a new path which men are about to follow in the pursuit of some form of science or some department of art. It is not absolutely necessary for such men to be distinguished as promoters of either of these forms of human activity. It is enough that they should serve to make manifest that a new spirit is abroad, which is destined to influence men's tastes and aspirations and largely control their actions.

Such were the men who first raised the pointed arch in western Europe, and such again the earliest artists of the Renaissance. Such also were Ray and Lamarck in biology, the immediate predecessors of Shakespeare and Scott in literature, and both Roger and Francis Bacon in philosophy.

A distinguished place amongst the precursors of a new era is, we believe, destined for Mr. Arthur Balfour. His two works not only deserve but demand a careful and detailed examination, and such an examination is especially incumbent upon Catholics; and this even more on account of their defects than on account of their many merits. His first work, entitled "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt," was published in the year 1879. Its great importance—the precious and pernicious characters it possessed—were at once recognized by men who had made a serious study of the grounds of our deepest convictions. His second and recent publication, "The Foundations of Belief," has, however, excited a much more widespread interest. Less abstruse and addressed for the most part to a more popular audience than was his former book, it has produced a greater effect in England than has any other work which has appeared since Darwin's "Origin of Species."

This is, of course, partly due to the distinguished ability which its author has shown and the increase of fame which he has acquired in the field of politics since 1879, the date of the appearance of his earlier volume. It is also due to the excellence of the style in which his recent work is written, to its great, but delicate humor, its refined and ever-courteous irony, the overwhelming force of many of its arguments, and the limpid clearness of its

sentences—though, it must be confessed, that not a few lengthy passages require careful re-reading before their import can be fully mastered. Its efficiency is thirdly, and finally, due to the fact that the fundamental position taken up by its author favors that halting, undecided and doubtful spirit which is so widely diffused at the present time; although, happily, in all the most effective portions of his volume he argues in favor of sound conclusions with a force and urgency beyond all his predecessors. Thus it is that the appearance of his second work, as we have already said, marks—and fitly marks—an important era in the history of speculative thought—nothing less than a turning point from the most fatal error towards saving scientific truth. We believe it marks the initiation of a profound change in the popular apprehension of what is to be regarded as rational and as to those who are to be deemed the best guides to all higher knowledge.

After the long decline in philosophy since the decay of scholasticism began, there is a very manifest and hopeful change for the better. This reaction, which, at the latest, began in the third quarter of the present century, has now become so unmistakable that it is publicly rejoiced at or lamented by friends or foes.¹

The disciples of subjectivism and empiricism are disappearing without leaving successors behind them. Mill has gone and Darwin has gone, the sophistical rhetoric of Tyndal can be heard no more, and in the very midst of Professor Huxley's assault on "the foundations of belief" the sword was struck from his hand and he passed away from amongst us, to the sincere regret of not a few of his most determined and persistent opponents. Very remarkable, too, was his passing. To nothing was he so opposed as to Roman Catholicism—Catholics being (as he himself declared) *feræ naturæ* in his eyes—and he hated and dreaded above all things the increasing sway of the representative and successor of St. Peter. But it was on St. Peter's day he died, and while the sights and sounds of this world were fading from his consciousness, a great crowd of priests, of monks and of friars were with solemn chants and majestic ceremonial assisting the Cardinal-Primates of England and of Ireland to lay the foundation stone of the first Metropolitan Roman Catholic cathedral to be erected since the disappearance of the mediæval Church of England. Soon after its abolition, the use of the pallium, the visible sign of lawful jurisdiction, ceased in our land. Fitly, then, was it displayed on the shoulders of the successor of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Archbishop Warham and Cardinal Pole, while he blessed

¹ Very noteworthy are the reiterated shrieks of distress and alarm which it has called forth from that typical example of obscurantism, Prof. Karl Pearson. (See his article in the *Fortnightly Review* for September, 1894.)

the foundations of that church in which the archiepiscopal metropolitan throne is to be once more set up.

This most eventful year, 1895, which has thus witnessed the end of the greatest and most skillful of all the promoters and preachers of empiricism and non-theistic evolution, has thus also witnessed the appearance of Mr. Balfour's second book, which has dealt the most powerful and effective blow yet delivered against that system of thought whereof the late Professor Huxley and the as yet surviving Mr. Spencer may be said to have been the chiefs.

But the great influence which Mr. Balfour's work has exercised and will exercise, is partly due to yet one more cause than those we have before enumerated. It is so influential, because Mr. Balfour himself belongs, to a considerable extent, to that very school of thought he so effectively combats. It is thus as if that school had actually committed suicide. Fully acquainted with all the details of the various forms of empiricism, he well knows their weak points, and thrusts unmercifully through the joints of their armor, the construction of which is so familiar to him, because he himself is clad in a coat essentially similar in build. His, then, is necessarily a most fatal attack, and, in his denunciation of what he terms "naturalism," to the absurdities of which he has opened the eyes of so many of his readers, we are reminded of that far-resounding fatal voice which told the world, "The great Pan is dead!"

But some readers may not unnaturally exclaim: "How can Mr. Balfour, possessing the acuteness and ability he does possess, how can he stultify his own position, as well as that of his opponents?"

The fact, however, is, that in a sense, and according to his intention, he does not stultify his own position. That position enables him who holds it to criticise destructively either science or religion as he will. It was religion that received all the attacks of those subjectivist empiricists he opposes. It is the widely-received philosophy of (physical) science which is, in turn, the victim of his assaults. His own sympathies and aspirations are entirely and energetically on the side of religion, which he venerates, and the social benefits, not to say necessity, of which he clearly perceives and strongly urges on his readers. The outcome of his philosophy may be thus expressed with extreme conciseness: Neither science nor religion is capable of satisfactory proof, and the scientific arguments urged by the former against the latter are vain, because the philosophy of science, as commonly understood, is incoherent, baseless, and self-contradictory. Religion, on the other hand, responds to our inmost and most urgent needs, and is to be accepted on that ground, because its disproof is impossible.

To the defence of this position both of Mr. Balfour's volumes are devoted. They are exceedingly valuable on account of their triumphant overthrow of all the recent popular anti-religious philosophies, and also on account of the many very excellent remarks concerning morals and religion which they contain. But his position urgently needs to be supported by the truths of Catholic philosophy, for lack of which all that would be instructive in it is necessarily weak, because reposing upon no adequate foundation. This fact, however, is the necessary result of the affinity which exists between his own system and that of his opponents, and is hardly to be regretted, because that very affinity has so well enabled him to dispose, triumphantly, of those who are our greatest enemies, as well as his.

That we have not misrepresented his true position is shown by the following extracts from a chapter¹ from his earlier work, entitled "Practical Results;" but it is to a careful and rather full review of his later work that this examination will be devoted.²

¹ Pp. 296-327.

² On this account we think it may be useful to supply here a brief analysis of his earlier publication: "A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT; BEING AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF."

All the parts of this work bear a common relation to the contents of the first chapter, wherein are stated the conditions which any system of thought must satisfy to be reasonable. The other chapters contain an examination of how far these conditions are satisfied by orthodox science.

The author takes for granted that the ordinary topic of science is correct, only modifying the assumption when this is found untenable. The conclusion is that the principles of science are unproved, its inferences are inconclusive, and its conclusions incoherent and that there is no defect to which systems of belief are liable, from which it may not properly be said to suffer.

PART I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF INFERENCE.

This part shows that, assuming the phenomena of the world to be persistent and governed by causation, there is, even then, no method by which inference from particulars is possible, but some further principles or modes of inference must be added to the knowledge we derive from observation, to enable us to arrive at a law of nature, and to place science on a reasonable foundation.

CHAPTER I.

On the Idea of a Philosophy.

All things knowable may be grouped under one of four heads:

1. *Science*, or knowledge of phenomena and their relations.
2. *Metaphysics*, or the study of noumena (the non-phenomenal).
3. *Ethics*, or rules for actions with reference to an end.
4. *Philosophy*, or the study of the ultimate grounds of belief and disbelief and not the study of their causes or antecedents.

Philosophy must consist of two main departments (*a*) that of ultimate, or self evident propositions; (*b*) that of modes of inference. Philosophy has neither to investigate the causes nor prove the grounds of belief, but only to disengage the truly ulti-

"The reader who has followed the long argument of this essay may perhaps be disposed to ask, what, if any, is intended to be the practical result of a piece of criticism of so purely distinctive a character? If it is intended to influence actual belief what effect can it have, except the foundation of a universal or nearly

mate from the apparently so, to distinguish valid inferences and classify axioms. Neither the forms of inferences nor axioms are the grounds for the belief of any particular truths, but philosophy distinguishes and classifies particular self-evident propositions into forms of valid inference and into axioms. There is no ground for supposing that ultimate judgments are all general or all particular. This is the form to which every reasonable system of belief must be capable of being reduced.

Does the modern system of physiological science conform to this standard? It affirms itself to be founded entirely on observation and experiment, which are the sole evidence of scientific truth.

CHAPTER II.

Empirical Logic.

Any system of logic may be criticized (1) as to whether it is satisfactory in its account of the inferences with which it deals, and (2) as to its completeness in dealing with all methods of inference. Mill affirms there is no inference save from particulars and therefore mistakenly objects to syllogism on the ground that its conclusion is already contained in its major premiss. In this he is wrong. But (1) the question does not lie within the province of logic; (2) it cannot be proved, and (3) it does not apply to ethical inferences. Mill can never prove universal causation. He says a wide observation of sequences may justify their attribution to causation, excluding chance or the action of collocation; but such distinctions are meaningless unless the law of causation be already known. An attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate inductions from particulars, needs some general principle and then the inference ceases to be from particulars. Some general preparation, therefore, must be added to observation, to attain to a law of nature—namely the law of causation; but this can never be inferred and proved from particulars.

CHAPTER III.

Induction.

Admitting the law of causation, and that particular sequences and co-existences between phenomena can be observed, can we single out causes and effects, and special laws of nature? Induction, even by Mill's method "of difference" and "of agreement," cannot give certitude because the universe is never the same in all particulars save one, at any two successive instants, and it never has occurred that two instances of a phenomena have only one circumstance in common. Therefore, we can never tell which accompanying phenomena are or are not necessary as concomitants, still less as to their future occurrence, and so, granting the uniformity of nature, and the law of universal causation, induction can never alone assure us that supposed laws of nature will apply to unobserved instances.

CHAPTER IV.

Historical Evidence.

Every scientific proposition expresses a law or a fact, while every law must repose on known facts, and every fact (not immediately observed) on known laws. Knowledge of past events reposes on reasoning from effect to cause, but more than one cause may produce a given effect. Therefore, if two explanations of the universe are but possible, they would, for all we know, be equally probable, and there is no period of history at which creation might not have taken place. To have confidence in the teachings of science about the cosmos, a man must be more than an agnostic. He must

universal scepticism? . . . Scepticism taken without explanation is ambiguous. It may mean either the intellectual recognition of the want of evidence, or it may mean this together with its consequent unbelief . . . In the second of these senses, it might be well, before asking whether such scientific scepticism is desirable, to see whether it

have solid ground for believing not only that one past series of phenomena has been possible, but that nothing besides phenomena capable of acting on phenomena ever existed, and these grounds must be derived from his own immediate observations. Empiricists base our knowledge of the law of causation on long uncontradicted experience, but unless we already possess this, we have no reason for believing past observations, while the only experience we can infer from is the direct experience of each individual.

PART II.

CERTAIN PROBABLE PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS AND ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC PREMISES.

The arguments of philosophic systems in England are invalid, and cannot support the doctrines of a persistent universe or of causation, while neither Idealism nor Realism can be proved. Science, also, is a system of belief which, for anything we can allege to the contrary, is logically unsatisfactory; its inferences are erroneous, and its premises are unproved.

CHAPTER V.

Introduction.

Berkeley and Hume say we know nothing save sensations and ideas. Green's school says we do not perceive these, but only qualities which are "relations," which are thought, not felt. Do we by perception gain an assurance, both immediate and reflective, of the existence of persistent objects? No! for the senses occasionally deceive us. Besides, may not persistence be a "relation?" But to think of an object as persisting, cannot make it persist. Scepticism is not impossible, and, therefore, systems affirming the persistence of objects must be criticized. What, then, is the evidence for the law of universal causation and for a persistent universe which is implied in individual particular experiences?

CHAPTER VI.

Transcendentalism.

Transcendentalists (Kant, Green, Caird, etc.) cannot dispose of sceptical objections to a permanent external world and causation, for their argument from change to permanence and from succession to causation are both insufficient. The transcendental premises are: (1) We have some knowledge; (2) whatever is involved therein (can be transcendently deduced) must be granted; (3) an external world and causation are involved therein. As to the first, Kant says we cannot experience change (know facts) unless we assume an unchanging substance—a uniform nature. But many do not perceive this relation, therefore either an object can be known without being so thought (*i.e.* without assuming an unchanging substance), or we so think while we think we do not so think, and either alternation is fatal to transcendentalism, and denies the identity of *esse* and *intelligi*. Kant's refutation of Idealism is: The consciousness of my own existence in time amounts to an immediate consciousness of things outside myself, for the existence of such things is the condition of determination in time.

His first analogy affirms permanent substance under changing phenomena. But change need only imply slight persistence, not permanence. Moreover, the Kantists allow alternation, which is all that is needed. But why for the permanent need we go to external matter? The ego is enough! The doctrines of refutation and first analogy taken together amount to a transcendental proof that our conscious states are mere accidents of matter.

is possible. . . . If then, scepticism in the second sense be impossible, is scepticism in the first sense . . . of any but a speculative interest? Scepticism which does not destroy belief, it is natural to suppose, does nothing. This, however, is by no means, necessarily the case.

If, in the estimation of mankind all creeds stood on a philosophic equality, no doubt an attack which affected them all equally, would probably have little or no practical

As to causation (his second analogy), Kant says it is implied in our experience of succeeding events, but he confuses the order of events with the order of moments. Succeeding moments, however, can each occur, but only each at its own time; but events in causal succession, though they must occur at some time, may occur at any time. Men recognize succession without apprehending causation, and the transcendental argument only shows that we cannot have a clear idea of non-causal succession without the idea of some other succession which is causal. That the state of the universe at any one time stands in a fixed relation with that of the next instant is not enough. A law of nature refers to fixed relations between very small portions of each such succeeding cosmic state.

CHAPTER VII.

Three Arguments from Popular Philosophy.

The first argument that, from general consent, cannot be an ultimate ground of belief, for the proposition that what the generality of mankind assents to is true itself needs proof, and the fact of consent, and any particular beliefs which may be deduced from the above-mentioned proposition require proof by reasoning, while, as a fact, even philosophers do not agree. The second argument which would base truth or success in practice is but an appeal to experience, and "verification" can no more be an ultimate ground of belief than any other empiricism. Thirdly, an appeal to common sense as the ultimate ground of belief is a negation of philosophy, while as to "an intelligence working normally" confidence in that must rest on "design," and this again requires proof.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Authority of Consciousness and of Original Beliefs.

Hamilton is necessarily confused and ambiguous because he had to try and place desirable, but doubted, beliefs on the same level as our knowledge of our conscious states. Therefore he erected consciousness into a faculty vouching for both, and itself declared credible on five accounts which are themselves declared credible as deliveries of consciousness and original convictions of mankind, while he confuses the two meanings of "original," viz, (1) first in logical order and (2) first in time.

Mill only differs from Hamilton in consistently treating "original" beliefs as those first in time, and taking a young baby as the oracle of truth. But why is a baby to be believed and why are original beliefs more likely to be true than induced ones? There is no ground for deeming acquired beliefs specially unfitted, or original ones specially fitted, to serve as the foundations of a creed; while it is impossible to determine which are original and which acquired without assuming the truth of many propositions the only evidence of which can, on this theory, be that they are original.

CHAPTER IX.

Psychological Idealism.

Idealism is popular because so easy and simple, but it is untenable because, though reconcilable with ordinary observation, it is not so with science which postulates external causes and external actions, some actually imperceptible. Mill's "permanent possibilities of sensation" are either really substances external to the mind and absolutely inconsistent with idealism, or else they are a mere name to which nothing corresponds.

result. The only result it could reasonably produce would be general unbelief. . . . But if in the estimation of mankind there is the greatest difference in the relative credibility of prevalent systems of belief, if now one system and now another is raised to the dignity of a standard of certainty, it is plain that a sceptical attack, especially if it deals with the system which happens at the moment to be in favor, may have considerable consequences. . . . In a sentence or two I can map out in outline the creed secretly or avowedly professed by the two largest and most important classes. . . .

CHAPTER X.

Test of Inconceivability.

Mr. Spencer declares uncomposable propositions whose negative is inconceivable to be unquestionable. This test is worthless, since such a proposition as "a thing must either be or not be is not decomposable, and cannot be reversed in thought," is less certain than the original proposition itself, that "a thing must be or not be." To assume that a psychological fact warrants some other fact, implies a pre-established harmony, and the inconceivableness of the contrary of any proposition affords no logical justification for holding it.

CHAPTER XI.

Mr. Spencer's Proof of Realism.

His proof rests on appeals which would justify what he scorns as "crude realism," while his arguments refute his own "transfigured realism," which satisfies neither science, theology, common sense, or philosophy. To appeal to the judgment of rustics, or to common sense, is absurd; while the theory that a vibrating particle can cause a sensation is, on Mr. Spencer's system, nonsense, since such a particle is but part of the faint aggregate of mental states.

PART III.

This part turns from the study of philosophers to an examination of the general character of the scientific system regarded as a logical whole, the reality of an external world being taken for granted. The result is, that as a general system of belief, science is also incoherent, for, there is a discrepancy between the facts which science asserts to be its (particular) premisses and the facts which it puts forward as its ultimate conclusions. Also, its conception of the universe is purely anthropomorphic. Besides this, all ultimate beliefs are necessary results of the primeval arrangement of atoms, which arrangement has also produced much error, and science shows that the premisses of all science are doubtful. Therefore, science fails in its premisses, inferences, and conclusions—the first are unproved, the second are inconclusive, and the third are incoherent.

CHAPTER XII.

Science as a Logical System.

The contrast is great between the world as it appears and what science assures us it is; and the scientific reasoning which makes our knowledge of what it is depend (as it does and must) upon its appearance (the data given in perception), must—since its conclusions are in contradiction with their data—be incoherent and confused. Science declares the world to consist of atoms and ether, which is very unlike the perceived world. Science, also, is necessarily anthropomorphic. As to its two main constituents, force and matter, our mental imagery of the former must be very different from the reality; while matter is quite unimaginable and uncolored atoms, ether and magnetism are also unimaginable. All scientific truths are inferred from immediately-known appearances, which appearances (*e.g.*, as to color) are not to be trusted. Moreover, if we cannot argue from perception to the existence of material objects, still less can we argue from them as to such objects' qualities.

In the opinion of both of these, beliefs tend to assimilate themselves to one of two types. The first type is that presented by established science . . . the second type may be found in any superstitions.

Our more advanced thinkers . . . deal very shortly with the distribution of beliefs

CHAPTER XIII.

The Evolution of Belief.

Every belief may be considered from two points of view—as a member of a logical, or of a causal series. As to cause, science tells us that every belief has a cause, but by no means every one has a reason; and ultimate ones cannot have such. As products they belong to the class of opinions, multitudes of which are passing and temporary. Like them, they are (according to science) the necessary results of a primeval arrangement of atoms. This cause has produced many errors—possibly, more error than it has truth; therefore, any ultimate belief may be deemed probably erroneous. Regarded logically, if the premisses of all science are thus doubtful, the more certain we consider our inferences, the less assurance we have for believing them at all. If it be said, the scientific system is merely probable, no system can be deemed such, which, if it were suddenly to become certain, would be self-contradictory (would contradict its premisses), and therefore impossible. No conclusion less than the recognition that some fundamental error or omission has been made in the system of science, will satisfy the argument, and this especially applies to the doctrine of evolution. For, that becomes impossible to accept as really true, as soon as it is certain, because by the very fact of its becoming certain, its premisses must be true and these make its conclusion uncertain. It is thus a specially incoherent doctrine. But evolution alone claims to regulate the whole world of phenomena; if it is not universal, it is nothing. If its deductions are correct, its premisses must be wrong, while if its premisses are correct, its deductions must be wrong.

Note.—Though the origin of ultimate beliefs can never supply any ground for believing them—since their origin can only be known by inference—nevertheless their origin may furnish ground for doubting or disbelieving them. Thus, if it could be demonstrated that the world was the work of a deceitful power, we should be compelled either to doubt our beliefs or that demonstration. This is the sceptical dilemma which evolution applies to all our ultimate beliefs.

SUMMARY.

If these criticisms seem too destructive, the reason is that speculation seems now sadly to want a destructive criticism. Any faith held strongly tends to convert philosophy, from being its judge to be its servant. In Mediæval times philosophy became almost identical with theology, and it has now become almost a scientific department, as if it consisted of the more general aspects of scientific truth. But, as we saw in the first chapter, no scientific knowledge can ever supply grounds of belief. Our path of argument has been narrow, neither deviating with science on the one hand or metaphysics on the other, and however trying, must be traversed before intellectual repose can be attained.

PRACTICAL RESULTS.

Entire scepticism as to facts being impossible, the apparent simply negative result of this treatise is to show that if religion is destitute of satisfactory evidence, it is quite as well off in that respect as science is. This is practically useful, because so many persons are persuaded that the best warrant for a creed is that science supports it, and that the most fatal objection to it is that science contradicts it. But we have seen that science has almost every possible philosophical defect, and we may turn the tables on it by making objections to it which are parallel to those raised against religion. Many theologians are to blame for their anxiety to exhibit a perfect congruity between science and religion, and are ready to lop off everything not agreeable to the former,

between these types. Everything which has to do with phenomena they put into the first class; everything else they put into the second. . . . Though in the first class are to be found almost all those who disbelieve in religion, while the second includes almost all those who believe in it; yet, however great may be the practical differences between them . . . they nevertheless agree in thinking that no more certain warrant for a creed can be found than the fact that science supports it: no more fatal objection to one, than the fact that science contradicts it. . . . Has science any claim to

which is equivalent to seeking to abolish religious mysteries. In accepting both science and religion, we resign ourselves to acquiescing in the demands of impulses and needs, and the need for religion (rooted in the loftiest region of our moral nature) is one from which we would not, if we could, be freed. Freethinkers assure us that religion depends on science; but the two great creeds (religion and science) repose upon separate bases, and freethinkers should, as a moral duty, examine into the philosophy of science. This treatise will not convert them, but it may be of use to some inclined to give up religion on scientific grounds, and if so, it will have a satisfactory utility.

NOTE ON THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

This discord is mainly due to the exerted interference with the natural by the supernatural, which seems to contradict "the uniformity of nature"; but the law that "similar antecedents are always followed by similar consequents" is in no way inconsistent with miracles; for a supernatural being acting is a new cause, as Mill admitted. Moreover, such events are so few that they are lost in the mass of facts which have succeeded each other. Therefore our confidence in causation is in no way impaired, and it only seems possible it should be so, because freethinkers approach the question with minds that are saturated with a conviction of the dependence of religion on science.

APPENDIX.

On the Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics.

Here we extend and apply the idea of philosophy in general (as depicted in the first chapter) to the philosophy of ethics. Ethics is no department of science, though it has been supposed to be so, because psychology, physiology, ethnology, etc., have something to say as to the origin and development of moral ideas, though all such inquiries are irrelevant to ethics. All knowledge is either certain in itself or validly deduced. Therefore the general propositions which lie at the root of any ethical system must themselves be self-evident and ethical. By no artifice can an ethical statement be evolved from scientific or metaphysical ones. Therefore ethics is not, and never can be, founded on experience, and questions of origin and causation cannot answer the question why any precept is to be accepted. Similarly, the supposition of a moral sense—a conscience—invalidates the fundamental nature of a moral precept, or is tautological. But ethic is wider than morality; for an ethical proposition is one which prescribes an action with reference to an end, and these may be non-moral ends or immoral ones, such as the gratification of revenge. Ethical propositions, therefore, may be either moral, non-moral or immoral. "Universality," or the existence of a special mental faculty, cannot be a ground of obligation; for we may say, why should we conform to either? It follows that no instructive analogy exists between ethics and aesthetics. The duty of the moralist is to clear away the confusion which so widely exists amongst men, as to their ethical first principles. (1) What do I hold to be the ultimate ends of action? If more than one, how do I estimate them in case of conflict? It is his duty to help his readers to discover these facts, not to force his own views down their throats by attempting to prove what, by its nature, can never be proved. His task is to place before his inquirers various problems of ethics free from the misleading particulars which surround them in practice. He has to make clear to his readers what ethical precepts are to them fundamental and self-evident. His method is casuistical, and not dogmatic.

be thus set up as the standard of belief? A close examination of its philosophic structure reveals the existence of almost every possible philosophical defect. We have seen that whether science be regarded from the point of view of its premises, its inferences, or the general relation of its parts, it is found defective: and we have seen that the ordinary proofs which philosophers and men of science have thought fit to give of its doctrines are not only mutually inconsistent, but are such as would convince nobody who did not start with an implicit and indestructible confidence in the truth of that which had to be proved. That men of science should exaggerate the claims of science is natural, but why the ordinary public should do so is not quite so easy to understand. There exists now a kind of literature produced by experts for the benefit of those who desire to be "generally informed;" there are easily found eminent authors anxious to purvey for that apparently increasing class of persons who aspire to be advanced thinkers, but who like to have their advanced thinking done for them. Now the very starting point of these productions is the principle that science is the one thing certain. And since this is the doctrine which is constantly reiterated, we need not be surprised that a not very critical public should easily believe it. How it comes about that the distinguished authors who so serenely take for granted this principle of criticism should themselves never be troubled by any suspicion as to its solidity is harder to understand.

The whole tenor of this essay goes to prove that claims to belief do not consist, so far as science at least is concerned, in *reasons*. It would be more proper to describe them as a kind of inward inclination or impulse. The reader may, perhaps, think that we ought not to rest content with this "impulse." If so, I am quite of his mind. I know no means, however, by which the evil can at present be remedied. Religion is, at any rate, no worse off than science in the matter of proof. I and an indefinite number of other persons, if we contemplate religion and science as unproved systems of belief standing side by side, feel a practical need for both the need for religious truth is one from which we would not, if we could, be freed. In the absence then of reason to the contrary, I am content to regard the two great creeds by which we attempt to regulate our lives as resting in the main on separate bases. I cannot hope that my reasoning will produce any but a negative effect on those who approach the question of religious truth in that indifferent mood which they would perhaps themselves describe as intellectual impartiality. There may, however, be some of another temper, who would regard religion as the most precious of all inheritances—if only it were true; who surrender slowly and unwillingly, to what they conceive to be unanswerable argument, convictions with which yet they can scarcely bear to part; who for the sake of truth are prepared to give up what they had been wont to think of as their guide in this life, their hope in another, and to take refuge in some of the strange substitutes for religion provided by the ingenuity of these latter times. It is not impossible that to some of these, hesitating between arguments to which they can find no reply and a creed which they feel to be necessary, the line of thought suggested may be of service. Should such prove to be the case, this essay will have an interest and utility beyond that of pure speculation; and I shall be more than satisfied."

That his second work is a further elaboration and development of his first, is shown by their respective titles. The second part of the title of his first book "An Essay on the Foundations of Belief," is taken up by his second, which is designated "The Foundations of Belief, Being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology."

It is much more directly concerned with religion, above all with Christianity, than was his earlier volume, but the fundamental

unity which underlies such divergences of treatment and exposition as exist between the two will, we think, plainly appear in the course of that examination of the latter work to which we now proceed to address ourselves.

The "Foundations of Belief" consists of four parts; the first, considers *some consequences of belief*; the second, examines *some reasons for belief*; the third part treats of *some causes of belief*; while the fourth part is devoted to *suggestions towards a provisional philosophy*.

In a preliminary explanation of the nature and purpose of the work, he declares it to be an introduction to theology, only "in the narrowest sense," and might be fitly described as "Considerations Preliminary to a Study of Theology." They are, truly, not the less important on that account; for, the decisive battles of theology are, as Mr. Balfour says, often fought beyond its frontiers, and depend largely upon each man's general mode of looking at the universe, and with this physical science and ethics are often largely concerned. He declares that his object is "to recommend a certain attitude of mind, and a particular way of looking at the world-problems, which, whether we like it or not, we are compelled to face." The author, while denying that his book is a work of "Apologetics," defending successively different theological dogmas, solving doubts and allaying difficulties, nevertheless expresses (as one citation has already shown) his hope that it may indirectly aid the task of the apologist, as, in his opinion, the greater number of such doubts and difficulties are but due to the superficiality and one-sidedness with which the wider problems of belief are habitually considered.

Therefore it is that there is more secular matter in the book than its title might suggest. He declares it to be intended "for the general body of readers interested in such subjects," no knowledge of the history or technicalities of philosophy on the part of the reader being assumed.

As a contrast to his own views he has selected "the only system which ultimately profits by any defeats which theology may sustain, or which may be counted on to flood the spaces from which the tide of religion has receded."

This system is the one which teaches that we can know nothing but phenomena and the laws by which they are connected, and that what, if anything, unknowable to us may exist, the world of which we can alone have any cognizance is that which is the subject-matter of the natural sciences. This system he designates "Naturalism." We have here already spoken of it as "empiricism" and "subjectivism;" but although the word may be open to some objection, we find (and have found it) convenient to call

it "*sensism*" instead. To that we oppose what we believe to be the only possible sound system of philosophy, and that we distinguish as "*intellectualism*." Henceforth, then, "*naturalism*" and "*sensism*" will be used by us as equivalent terms. Here "*intellectualism*" will be employed to denote our own system, but not that of Mr. Balfour, from which ours widely and most fundamentally differs.

There is sometimes much ambiguity in his use of the terms "reason" and "rationalism," and on that account we desire to distinguish between two kinds of intellectual cognition which seem often to be confounded in Mr. Balfour's use of the term "Reason." We propose to distinguish between (1) The *direct* and (2) the *reflex* modes of action of our intellect.

We have elsewhere explained at length¹ what are our lower, sensuous, mental powers, the possession of which we share with the higher animals,² and that instinct is a faculty essentially both telic and blind, being directed to a practical, though unforeseen, end.³

But our sensuous faculties being "sensed" by a reasonable human nature, become transfigured, "consentience" being replaced by "consciousness."

These truths being premised, we would discriminate between two modes of the action of our intellect as follows:

Direct cognition is the mind consciously (but not reflexly) perceiving facts and the relations between facts and apprehending them directly (but not reflexly) as being doubtful, probable or certainly true, as the case may be, in each concrete instance perceived.

Amongst the facts thus apprehended is the fact of our own continuous existence, and amongst the relations between facts are inferences, the truth of which may be known without any advertence to the process of inference.

Reflex cognition is the mind consciously and, of course, reflexly perceiving (1) facts and certain relations between facts and (2) abstract truths thereto related—the former as being absolutely evident and indisputable and the latter as being absolutely evident, universal and necessary truths.

Amongst the facts thus recognized as evident is that of our own continuous existence as distinguished from its passing states, and amongst the relations seen to be necessary are logical processes of

¹ See *On Truth*, chap. xiv., pp. 178–202.

² See *op. cit.*, chap. xxii.

³ See *op. cit.*, p. 427.

⁴ For a definition of consentience, see *op. cit.*, p. 133; for its relation to consciousness, see p. 213.

inference, apprehended not only directly but reflexly, as processes of valid ratiocination, as also the various abstract necessary truths which concrete facts imply.

There are two truths which it is very necessary to bear in mind: (1) One is that instinct is blind, as are all impulses the ends of which are not foreseen. They can form no part of "reason," or "intellect," with which instinct stands in the most marked contrast. The other truth is (2) that all rational perception is conscious and the certainty it may attain to is absolute and evident, although the mind may not, by any reflex process, attend either to the process it has performed as a process or to the evidence of the result as being evident.

Having, as we hope, made clear the foregoing distinctions, we must return to reconsider Mr. Balfour's term, "naturalism" and his conception as to its meaning. With that term the late Professor Huxley expressed¹ much dissatisfaction as insufficiently defined and as quite inapplicable to agnosticism. He said:²

Agnosticism has not necessarily anything whatever to do with naturalism properly so-called. For one may surely hold that he knows nothing about any supernatural powers, and even is unacquainted with any means of knowing about them, and yet totally refuse to commit himself to a denial of their existence. This elementary consideration is so often, but it would seem quite uselessly, urged that a man may say he knows nothing of any Saturnians and does not believe we shall ever have the means of knowing, and yet leave the existence or non-existence of inhabitants in that planet quite open, is surely worth some attention.

But this is a false analogy, for no one whatever asserts that there is satisfactory evidence as to the existence or non-existence of Saturnians, but multitudes of mankind, and most eminent philosophers amongst them, affirm that there is such abundant evidence for believing in the existence of God, that to decry it in one's heart fully merits for the denier the appellation bestowed upon him in Holy Scripture. Professor Huxley wholly repudiated³ Mr. Balfour's portrait of agnosticism and even went so far as to say⁴ that Mr. Balfour's "conceptions of empiricism and agnosticism" must refer to what is "non-existent."

But this cannot be maintained, for agnosticism loudly asserts that we have no sufficient reason to believe the world, including human nature, to be the work of a power of superhuman intelligence and that we cannot affirm with certainty that all the goodness and intelligence which exist on the earth may not have been due to the action of non-intelligent forces and have been potential,

¹ See the paper entitled "Mr. Balfour's Attack on Agnosticism," in the *Nineteenth Century*, No. 217, March, 1895, p. 527.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 533.

³ P. 540.

⁴ P. 539.

as the late Professor Tyndal said in his Belfast address, "in the fires of the sun."

All these agnostic doctrines Mr. Balfour confidently denies, not, indeed, as we do on the ground of necessary deductions from self-evident fundamental intuitions, but on the ground that a reasonable recognition of the lessons to be learnt from the consideration of our highest perceptions, our noblest emotions and our supreme needs alike demand it.

But Professor Huxley seems an avowed admirer, disciple and, as we believe, a very remarkable dupe of the great Scotch sophist, who, we believe, had far too acute a mind to be the victim of his own ingenious paradoxes.

There is a remarkable passage in Hume's writings (which Professor Huxley quoted and referred to in his Lay Sermons) to the following effect:

If we take in hand any volume of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.'

To this Professor Huxley referred (p. 159) as follows :

Permit me to enforce this *most wise* advice. Why trouble ourselves about matters of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing and *can* know nothing?

Professor Balfour's meaning with respect to "Naturalism" must surely be clear enough to the understanding of all those whose volition does not entitle them to admission amongst that well-known class as to whom the proverb says there are "none so blind."

Agnostics, positivists, secularists, and empiricists—such men as the late Professor Huxley himself, Mr. Herbert Spencer, the late John Stuart Mill, the living Karl Pearson and the deceased John Tyndal are (or were) one and all, disciples of "Naturalism" in Mr. Balfour's sense—the system, that is, which affirms there is no evident absurdity in the evolution of intellect and morality from a cosmos utterly devoid of intellect and therefore of the most rudimentary sentiment of goodness. We fully adhere therefore to what Mr. Balfour affirms as to the existence, prevalence and necessary characteristics of the system he calls "Naturalism" and we "sensism."

But he makes use of the term "phenomena" in a peculiar manner, for which he apologizes,¹ saying :

¹ See the *Foundations of Belief*, note on page 7.

I feel that explanation, and perhaps apology, is due for this (his) use of the word "phenomena." In its proper sense the term implies, I suppose, that which *appears*, as distinguished from something, presumably more real, which does *not appear*. I neither use it as carrying this metaphysical implication, nor do I restrict it to things which appear, or even to things which *could* appear to beings endowed with senses like ours. The ether, for instance, though it is impossible that we should ever know it except by its effects, I should call phenomenon. The coagulation of nebular meteors into suns and planets I should call a phenomenon, though nobody may have existed to whom it could appear. Roughly speaking, things and events, the general subject-matter of natural science, is what I endeavor to indicate by a term for which, as thus used, there is, unfortunately, no substitute, however little the meaning which I can give to it, can be etymologically justified.

As to this use of the word we think a certain distinction requires to be drawn, but before proceeding to draw it we would call attention to a remark of Professor Huxley on the subject. He says:¹

The doctrine that the subject-matter of knowledge is limited to phenomena, is common to all I have mentioned (*i.e.*, to Kant, Hume, Berkeley and Locke—critical, sceptical, idealist and empiricist schools), and it is as common to all of them to include mental as well as physical phenomena among the subject-matter of knowledge.

Of course if everything that can be known is a "phenomenon," then it is very clear that we can know nothing but phenomena. The question, by such an assertion, is simply begged. We are certain that Kant, Hume, Berkeley and Locke with all their followers—including Professor Huxley—are absolutely wrong in their common doctrine above stated, but we also think that the term "phenomenon" should have some distinct reference to "appearance," while we agree with the late Professor Huxley and the metaphysicians he quotes, in thinking that certain mental states should be classed amongst "phenomena."

We regard "phenomena" as being essentially related to the senses and sense-perception—vivid and faint sensations, sense-impressions and sense-perceptions—such as we share with animals as we do dreams and imaginations. Phenomena are apprehended as being such by our intellect exclusively.

A man's own existence—his persistent personality as made known by memory—is *not* a phenomenon, though the various aspects in which our existence reveals itself to our external or internal senses are so many phenomena.

I would, therefore, divide phenomena into two classes; (1) *external*, and (2) *internal*.

The first class—phenomena referred to external causes—I would further subdivide into (a) "*real*" and (b) "*imaginary*."

By the "real" I would signify such phenomena as are ordi-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 535.

narily referred to the real action of something external to the mind—such as all the phenomena of nature, living and not living, including our own corporeal frame. By the “imaginary,” I would denote phenomena supposed to refer to distinct entities external to the mind, but which do not actually appear, and yet can be imagined as appearing to ourselves as we are, or as we should be if we were endowed with higher powers of sense-perception. Amongst such phenomena would be the “ether” and the “coagulating nebulæ” of Mr. Balfour.

By “internal phenomena,” I would denote feelings and perceptions which we do not refer to distinct entities external to the mind and external to our own body. Reminiscences of past sensations and sense perceptions, appearances which may be produced by pressure on the eyeball, smells and tastes which are but subjective affections, “singing in the ears,” rheumatic pains, those of colic, cramps, etc., are examples of phenomena of this kind. As these may be actually felt or subsequently imagined, they also may be subdivided into (a) “real,” and (b) “imaginary.”

Our thoughts about our own continuous existence, necessary truths, the soul separated from the body, about angels and devils and about God, are none of them phenomena, because they can never be imagined, though the various mental images (*phantasmata*), by and through which¹ such unimaginable thoughts may be sustained before the intellect, are, of course, but so many different internal phenomena. Professor Huxley quotes² his own words in a former publication saying: “To all these mental phenomena, or states of consciousness, Descartes gave the name of ‘thoughts,’ etc.” But as, according to him, we can know nothing but phenomena, it was necessary for him either so to designate his thoughts, or else to commit the absurdity of saying that his thoughts were things he did not and could never by any possibility know.³

¹ See our article entitled “Science in Fetters,” in the *Dublin Review*, for January and July, 1895.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 557.

³ It is very interesting, and it should awaken the reader's sympathy for the late Professor Huxley, to note how he fell a victim to the influence, first of Sir William Hamilton, and subsequently of Mansel. He quotes (p. 534), a passage of the former writer (first read by him in the year 1840), which, he tells us, so far as he was concerned, was “the original spring of agnosticism,” and he describes the thrill of pleasure he felt when, many years later, he first read Mansel's *Limits of Religious Thought*.

It is also interesting to know, and it is only just to call attention to the fact, that Prof. Huxley in his earlier days was attracted by Hamilton's rhetoric in favor of a theistic belief, which he (Hamilton) taught, was implied by the very limitations of human knowledge, as he depicted it, and that Prof. Huxley was (p. 535) as ready as Hamilton himself, to forget his own warnings, to confuse the necessities of thought with the obligations of things, and, by positivising nescience, pretend, under the guise of faith, to the possession of knowledge. But riper years brought rooted dislike to the lan-

In the same note wherein Mr. Balfour explains his use of the term phenomena, he is careful to restate what was the subject of the first chapter of his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," namely, the signification he assigns to the two terms "Philosophy" and "Metaphysics."

By the former he means any study or exposition of the *grounds* of belief or disbelief in any proposition as distinguished from the consideration of the *causes* or *antecedents* which may have produced it. "Thus," he tell us (p. 7), "the philosophy of religion or the philosophy of science would mean the theoretic justification of our theological or scientific beliefs."

As to metaphysics, on the other hand, he affirms that he usually means "the knowledge that we have or suppose ourselves to have respecting realities which are not phenomenal, *e.g.*, God and the soul."

Having now, we think, sufficiently noted Mr. Balfour's preliminary observations and certain points we deem indispensable for a comprehension of his work and our treatment of it, we will proceed to examine its first part which deals with ethics, æsthetic and

guage, and distrust of Hamilton's dialectic process. He then adds the following passage, which we think most valuable and quite true: "It seems to me that the admission of a state of mind intermediate between knowledge and no-knowledge is fatal to all clear thought, and holds the door open to the return of one or other of the many forms of the absolute which Hamilton took so much trouble to expel. There is no intermediation between a right line and a bent line; however slight may be the deviation of the latter, it is not straight. There is nothing intermediate between darkness and light; the merest glimmer of twilight is as much not-darkness as broad sunshine." This does not affirm that we have no such thing as partial knowledge—a knowledge true but inadequate to give us a full acquaintance with the thing known. The importance of the cause which Mr. Balfour champions is very distinctly admitted by Prof. Huxley. He says (p. 530): "The future of our civilization as certainly depends on the result of the contest between science and ecclesiasticism which is now afoot, as the present state of things is the outcome of former strife. . . . For it is by opinion that men always have been, and always must be, governed since force, their obvious and immediate master, is but opinion's bully." He also adds the significant words (p. 531): "Force no longer waits upon the orders of only one of the combatants: the heretofore weaker has become strong, and is daily growing in power."

This we very much doubt. Reaction against the folly of sensism and its consequences is everywhere in the air, and one evidence thereof has been afforded by the late Parliamentary election. The "reaction" so dreaded while its imminence is proclaimed by Karl Pearson will, we are confident, be brought about, not by any special dexterity, political or ecclesiastical, but by the judgment of the mass of the people when their eyes are once opened to the nature and consequences of that absurd mode of thought called "naturalism" or "sensism." The healthy normal human mind recoils with aversion from teachers who, in order to undermine religion, deny that we can know each event to need an adequate cause, that a thing cannot both be and not be, that a whole must be greater than its part, that conclusions logically drawn from certain premises must be accurate, that our faculty of memory is trustworthy, and even that we have a most certain knowledge of our continued personal existence. (See our article entitled *Professing Themselves to Be Wise They Became Fools*, in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for April, 1891.)

reason (in Mr. Balfour's sense) in their relation to "naturalism," which is entitled, as we before stated, "Some Consequences of Belief."

This is the special section of assault, directly destructive, with suggestions towards reconstruction. It is as remarkable for the charm of its style as for its dialectic acuteness, while the richness of its humor and the sparkle of its wit are not less remarkable than the polished courtesy of even its most sarcastic passages. Seldom have we read anything more thoroughly enjoyable than the first four chapters of Mr. Balfour's second work, which, in our opinion, triumphantly demolishes the whole sensist system—above all, in its relation to morality—by an unanswerable *reductio ad absurdum*.

Its first chapter is entitled "Naturalism and Ethics," and therein he forcibly draws out the inevitable tendencies of such systems as those of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and their allies, on the morals of mankind.

He begins by noticing the remarkable unanimity with which the majority of the professors of the most diverse speculative views inculcate not only obedience but also attachment to our generally received moral ideals and precepts, a fact which suggests¹ that at least some of them in their speculations

Have taken current morality for granted, and have squared their proofs to their conclusions, and not their conclusions to their proofs.

His first object is to call attention to certain questions relating to the origin of morality on the naturalistic system since, men being what they are, a moral code to be effective must be revered, and this feeling of reverence cannot be wholly independent of the source and origin from which such code may have sprung. But according to naturalism, life, sensation, thought and, therefore, moral perceptions, form but a petty and passing episode in the history of the universe, as also do all our sentiments and desires. In Mr. Balfour's words:²

On most of the processes by which consciousness and life are maintained in the individual and perpetuated in the race we are never consulted. . . . But in the few and simple instances in which our co-operation is required, it is obtained through the stimulus supplied by appetite and disgust, pleasure and pain, instinct, reason and morality; it is hard to see, on the naturalistic hypothesis, whence any one of these various natural agents is to derive a dignity or a consideration not shared by all the others, why morality should be put above appetite or reason above pleasure.

It is true that many sensists have moral "tastes," but then their tastes and creed are antagonistic; for, according to the latter, tastes

¹ P. 12.

² Pp. 14-15.

have but been evolved by "natural selection," because their existence has been an advantage, not to the individual (often the reverse), but to the race. The very existence of such expressions as "noble" and "base" is exclusively (if Darwinism is true) due to such a cause.

Nature, indifferent to our happiness, indifferent to our morals, but sedulous of our survival, commends disinterested virtue to our practice by decking it out in all the splendor which the specifically ethical sentiments alone are capable of supplying. . . . Kant compared the moral law to the starry heavens and found them both sublime. It would on the naturalistic hypothesis be more appropriate to compare it to the protective blotches on the beetle's back, and to find them both ingenious.

Of course, our author is far from denying, indeed he asserts, that in spite of all theories men will long retain the moral lessons received in childhood :

But if, while they are being taught the supremacy of conscience and the austere majesty of duty, they are also to be taught that these sentiments and beliefs are merely samples of the complicated contrivances, many of them mean, and many of them disgusting, wrought into the physical or into the social organism by the shaping forces of selection and elimination, assuredly much of the efficacy of these moral lessons will be destroyed.¹

With respect to free will, apart from the question of the truth of its existence, it has plainly been of the greatest service in producing a keen sense of responsibility, and therefore, in modifying a multitude of human actions. Without it remorse, self-condemnation, and repentance, would be but amiable weaknesses and essentially absurd, though the facility with which men ignore the consequences of their own accepted theories, would, of course, mitigate the evil results of the naturalistic creed.

It is plain that between the dicta of Naturalism as to the origin of ethics and our moral sentiments, there is a striking incongruity. Is the incongruity less between what it tells of the final goal of human endeavor and our perceptions of what is equitable and right? Are such perceptions satisfied, when we view the world as it is and accept the doctrine of Naturalism, which denies the existence of future rewards and punishments? Are they satisfied with such an object as the perfection and felicity of the whole sentient creation? Is such an end emotionally adequate to satisfy our ethical imagination? Is its importance sustained and augmented by Naturalism? On the contrary: it tends constantly to dwarf, more and more, our estimate of man's importance. Mr. Balfour well depicts its teaching in this respect : ²

We survey the past, and see that it is a history of blood and tears, of helpless blun-

¹ Pp. 17-19.

² P. 30.

dering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. Imperishable monuments and immortal deeds, death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of men have striven through countless generations to effect. "Though the substance of the moral law need suffer no change . . . [that] is irrelevant. We desire, and desire most passionately, when we are most ourselves, to give our service to that which is Universal, and to that which is Abiding. Of what moment is it, then (from this point of view), to be assured of the fixity of the moral law, when it and the entire sentient world, where alone it has any significance, are alike destined to vanish utterly. . . . We may well feel inclined to ask, whether so transitory and so unimportant an accident, in the general scheme of things, as the fortunes of the human race, can any longer satisfy aspirations and emotions nourished upon beliefs in the Everlasting and Divine."

Excellent as Mr. Balfour's reasoning and rhetoric are, while thus combating Naturalism on the ground of its inconsistency with, and fatal tendency against, what all reasonable men most venerate and prize, his appeal, on the whole, is rather to our sentiments and our needs than to our evident ethical intuitions.

The fact is interesting because this method is in harmony with his contentions in other portions of the work. Nevertheless, it would be very unjust to him to be anything less than quite certain that he is as much in harmony with Catholic philosophy in this matter as any upholder of his sceptical system can well be. This is abundantly evident from the appendix to his work on "Philosophic Doubt,"¹ wherein he so well shows that moral perceptions can never have been evolved by or founded on experience, since the propositions which lie at the root of our ethical system must themselves be ethical. Moreover, he has declared in the beginning of this first chapter² that his business in it is not "to examine the philosophy of morals, but to show that the origin naturalism assigns to moral precepts and sentiments entirely nullifies them." As he has said,³ though the origin of ultimate beliefs never can supply grounds for believing them because such origin must be inferred, it is nevertheless quite possible that some origin assigned to them may, if accepted, furnish logical grounds for doubting or disbelieving them. And of the origin which "naturalism" assigns them—namely, complex waves of ether and vibrations of

¹ See *ante*, p. 23, note.

² P. 12.

³ *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, p. 275.

atoms and molecules—our author well shows the complete absurdity.

Mr. Balfour's second chapter is called *Naturalism and Æsthetic*. Therein he presents us with his conclusions as to the logical outcome of the system of naturalism when applied to our perception of beauty. He assumes that whereas morality has (on that system) been developed by the "natural selection" of feelings beneficial to the tribe, sentiments known as æsthetic must, on the other hand (inasmuch as they are useless in occasioning survival), have been mere by-products of the great machinery by which varying organisms have been selected and preserved.

Choosing, then, as an example, our æsthetic enjoyment of music, he very rationally contends that however much "sexual selection" may have increased the fervor of male animals' power of making appropriate noises and improved their vocal apparatus to that end, it could never have increased the artistic side of such sensibilities, and, we may add, could certainly never have initiated them.

How, he asks, does the fact that our ancestors liked the tomtom,¹ account for our liking the ninth symphony?

As to the question of the objectivity of beauty, he urges the great divergences in taste which exist amongst mankind and their frequent and great mutability. That critics often agree, he tells us,² is explicable because

An agreement . . . is to no small extent an agreement in statement and analysis, rather than an agreement in feeling; they have the same opinion as to the cooking of the dinner, but they by no means all eat it with the same relish.

"Naturalism" evidently, as he contends, is irreconcilable with anything objective in beauty, and its advocates scout the idea that æsthetic sentiments are anything more than merely subjective feelings, modified by convention and fashion. Yet Mr. Balfour urges:³

When we look back on those too rare moments when feelings stirred in us by some beautiful object not only seemed wholly to absorb us, but to raise us to the vision of things far above the ken of bodily sense or discursive reason. . . . We must believe that somewhere and for some being there shines an unchanging splendor of beauty, of which in nature and in art we see, each of us from our own standpoint, only passing gleams and stray reflections, whose different aspects we cannot now co-ordinate, whose import we cannot comprehend,⁴ but which at least is something other

¹ P. 38.

² P. 63.

³ P. 65.

⁴ The reader no doubt recollects the splendid passage of Cardinal Newman on this subject, written before he became a Catholic. It specially merits perusal in this connection. See *Sermons Before the University of Oxford*, Sermon XIV., p. 348.

than the chance play of subjective sensibility or the far-off echo of ancestral lusts. No such mystical creed can, however, be squeezed out of observation and experiment. Science cannot give it us; nor can it be forced into any sort of consistency with the naturalistic theory of the universe.

Science, so-called (that is "naturalism"), most certainly *cannot* give it us—for such beauty is but the chance occasion of a passing pleasurable feeling. But *rational* science no less certainly *can* do so. This we have elsewhere¹ endeavored to show. Mr. Balfour, however, does not distinguish between the nervous thrills which may accompany our æsthetic perceptions (and may also accompany much lower human activities) and intellectual apprehensions of the beauty of objects, states and actions. We have pointed out,² concerning our *idea* of the beauty of an object, that it is profoundly distinct from any corresponding *feelings*. To feel attracted towards, or very pleasurably excited by, any object is one thing; to have a conception of its beauty is another and very different thing.

As to the divergences of taste and the preferences of many persons for things which are æsthetically inferior, we argued that they might be accounted for by pleasurable or fanciful associations formed between the feelings and mental images which underlie and support the intellectual æsthetic perceptions.³

In his third chapter, "*Naturalism and Reason*," Mr. Balfour observes that some find compensation for the irrationality of reason in the thought that at least nature produced it, though accidentally, there being, of course, no such thing as design in nature. The inadequacy of reason—since it has been merely evolved for the preservation of the species—to satisfy speculative curiosity (a most curious by-product of evolution) is, by many persons, readily

¹ See *On Truth*, chapter xvii., pp 225-261, and also in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, "Why Tastes Differ," January 1888, p. 12.

² *On Truth*, p. 255.

³ In our article *Why Tastes Differ* (A. C. Q. R., January, 1888, p. 27) we said: "We think it may be confidently affirmed, that such a being as man, replete with animal feelings and desires and dim, unconscious memories of ancestral brute experiences, but with an intellect endowed with a perception of truth, goodness and beauty, would hardly fail to show, in his tastes and perceptions, just those mingled and more or less discordant and varying mental phenomena which we find mankind do exhibit. . . . Tastes differ because we human, intellectual animals vary as to the peculiar influences we have received from parents, family and tribe, from the diverse associations and feelings to which we have been severally exposed, and from the action upon us of the tastes and feelings of our friends and fellow-tribesmen."

We venture to think this article constitutes a full reply to the objections of the sens-ists, and might do away with the difficulties which Mr. Balfour feels as to the evidence of the objectivity of beauty. We would refer our readers especially to pp. 24 and 14, and we are convinced much of the difficulty felt about this matter has been due to non-appreciation of our composite nature and the co-existence of our higher and lower psychical faculties.

acknowledged, but not so the inadequacy of our senses. But besides the limitations of those we have,

There must be countless aspects of external nature of which we have no knowledge, of which, owing to the absence of appropriate organs, we can form no conception, which imagination cannot picture nor language express. . . . To suppose that a course of development carried out, not with the object of extending knowledge, but solely with that of promoting life, on an area so insignificant as the surface of the earth, between limits of temperature and pressure so narrow, and under general conditions so exceptional, should have ended in supplying us with senses even approximately adequate to the apprehension of nature in all her complexities, is to believe in a coincidence more astounding than the most audacious novelist has ever employed to cut the knot of some entangled tale."

Our author points out the fact, familiar to every biologist, that the organic actions of the body are performed unconsciously by reflex action, sensory-motor action¹ and instinct. The best way of looking at reason, according to "naturalism" (and according to Herbert Spencer), is to regard it as an instrument for securing a flexibility of adaptation which instinct cannot attain to.

Instinct is incomparably the better machine in every respect save one. It works more smoothly, with less friction, with far greater precision and accuracy, but it is not adaptable. Many generations and much slaughter are required to breed it into a race. Once acquired, it can be modified or expelled only by the same harsh and tedious methods. Mind, on the other hand, from the point of view of organic evolution, may be considered as an inherited faculty for self-adjustment, and though, as I have already had occasion to note, the limits within which such adjustment is permitted are exceedingly narrow, within those limits it is, doubtless, exceedingly valuable. . . . But if the conscious adaptation of means to ends was always necessary in order to perform even those few functions for the first performance of which conscious adaptation was originally required, life would be frittered away in doing badly, but with deliberation, a small fraction of that which we now do well without any deliberation at all.²

Thus by the formation of habits, "attention and intelligence are set free to do work from which they would otherwise be deterred by their absorption in the petty needs of daily existence."³

Yet this "formation of habits" must, on the principles of naturalism," be a first step towards the actual destruction of conscious deliberate activity according as natural selection forces men to be

¹ See *On Truth*, p. 168.

² P. 73.

³ On this point we formerly (*On Truth*, 1888, p. 363) expressed ourselves as follows: "It is, moreover, very fortunate for us that such is the case, as thereby we are saved great mental friction. Our intellect has first to be laboriously applied to learn what afterwards becomes almost automatic—as is the case with reading and writing. Sensations and bodily actions having been duly kneaded together, the intellect becomes free to withdraw and apply itself to other work, leaving the organism to carry on automatically, and with little effort, the new powers acquired by a great effort. Were it not for this power which we have of withdrawing our attention, our intellect would be absorbed and wasted on the merest routine work, instead of being set free to appropriate and render practically instructive a continually wider and more important range of deliberate, purposive action."

more and more conformed to their environment, till, as Mr. Spencer teaches, and Mr. Balfour says :

The reign of absolute righteousness will prevail; conscience, grown unnecessary, will be dispensed with; the path of least resistance will be the path of virtue. He adds: "But I confess that my own personal gratification at the prospect is somewhat dimmed by the reflection that the same kind of causes which make conscience superfluous will relieve us from the necessity of intellectual effort, and that by the time we are all perfectly good we shall also be all perfectly idiotic."

Such a state of things, however, would evidently bring upon us so much loss of adaptability to new circumstances that these might become fatal to the whole community. Our only hope would then repose upon those individuals who had, fortunately, remained less virtuous, and so, not having become altruistically idiotic were able, on such conditions as might suit them, to save society from destruction.

Mr. Balfour professes himself¹ as

Sensibly poorer by this deposition of reason from its ancient position as the ground of all existence, to that of an expedient, among other expedients, for the maintenance of organic life; an expedient, moreover, which is temporary in its character and insignificant in its effects. An irrational universe which accidentally turns out a few reasoning animals at one corner of it, as a rich man may experiment . . . with some curious "sport" accidentally produced amongst his flocks and herds, is a universe which we might well despise if we did not ourselves share its degradation.

In his next and fourth chapter, headed *Summary and Conclusion of Part I.*, the results arrived at in the three preceding chapters are very forcibly driven home and we think our readers will be grateful to us for furnishing them with some rather copious extracts therefrom.

The great result arrived at he expresses as follows:²

If naturalism be true, or rather, if it be the whole truth, then is morality but a bare catalogue of utilitarian precepts; beauty but the chance occasion of a passing pleasure; reason but the dim passage from one set of unthinking habits to another. All that gives dignity to life, all that gives value to effort, shrinks and fades under the pitiless glare of a creed like this.

As to æsthetics, he reminds us of what "naturalism" declares, but adds how certain it is we cannot accept without suffering the conviction that in referring beauty to an eternal and unchanging reality, we are but the dupes of our emotions.

But if, on the naturalistic hypothesis, he adds,³ the sentiments associated with beauty seem like a poor jest played on us by Nature for no apparent purpose, those that gather round morality are, so to speak, deliberate frauds perpetrated for a well-defined end. The consciousness of freedom, the sense of responsibility, the authority of con-

¹ P. 75.

² P. 77.

³ P. 79.

science, the beauty of holiness, the admiration for self-devotion, the sympathy with suffering—these and all the train of beliefs and feelings from which spring noble deeds and generous ambitions are seen to be mere devices for securing to societies, if not to individuals, some competitive advantage in the struggle for existence. They are not worse, but neither are they better, than the thousand-and-one appetites and instincts, many of them cruel and many of them disgusting, created by similar causes in order to carry out through all organic nature the like unprofitable ends.

The feeling of discord to which such considerations as these must give rise, are, he tells us,¹ due to our intellectual vision having grown out of proportion to our actual circumstances and been enormously increased by recent scientific discovery.

We have learned too much. We are educated above that position in life in which it has pleased Nature to place us. We can no longer accept it without criticism and without examination. We insist on interrogating that material system which, according to naturalism, is the true author of our being, as to whence we came and whither we go, what are the causes which have made us what we are, and what are the purposes which our existence subserves. And it must be confessed that the answers given to this question by an oracle are extremely unsatisfactory. We have learned to measure space, and we perceive that our dwelling place is but a mere point, wandering with its companions, apparently at random, through a wilderness of stars. We have learned to measure time, and we perceive that the life not merely of the individual and of the nation, but of the whole race is brief, and apparently quite unimportant. We have learned to unravel causes, and we perceive that emotions and aspirations whose very being seem to hang on the existence of realities of which naturalism takes no account, are in their origin contemptible, and in their suggestion mendacious.

To me it appears certain that this clashing between beliefs and feelings must ultimately prove fatal to one or the other. Make what allowance you please for the stupidity of mankind, take the fullest account of their really remarkable power of letting their speculative opinions follow one line of development and their practical ideals another, yet the time must come when reciprocal action will perforce bring opinions and ideals into some kind of agreement and congruity. If, then, naturalism is to hold the field, the feelings and opinions inconsistent with naturalism must be foredoomed to suffer change; and how, when that change shall come about, it can do otherwise than cast all nobility out of our conception of conduct and all worth out of our conception of life, I am totally unable to understand.

To the objection that so many persons who hold naturalistic views lead irreproachable lives he replies by comparing them to so many parasites. If their conduct is practically consistent with ethical ideals with which their creed has no affinity, it is because²

their spiritual life is parasitic: it is sheltered by convictions that do not belong to them, but to the society of which they form a part; it is nourished by processes in which they take no share, and when those processes come to an end, the alien life which they have maintained can scarce be expected to outlast them.

One other and final quotation we must make before bringing to a conclusion our notice of the first part of Mr. Balfour's work. In it he further makes manifest what he understands by "natural-

¹ P. 80.

² P. 83.

ism," with his concluding reflections on the consequences which he believes must follow therefrom. By the letter A he denotes the ordinary philosophico-religious opinions common amongst us, while B signifies the teaching of naturalism as Mr. Balfour understands it.

A. The universe is the creation of reason, and all things work together towards a reasonable end.

B. So far as we are concerned, reason is to be found neither in the beginning of things nor in their end; and though everything is predetermined, nothing is preordained.

A. Creative reason is interfused with infinite love.

B. As reason is absent, so also is love. The universal flux is ordered by blind causation alone.

A. There is a moral law, immutable, eternal; in its governance all spirits find their true freedom and their most perfect realization. Though it be adequate to infinite goodness and infinite intelligence, it may be understood, even by a man, sufficiently for his guidance.

B. Among the causes by which the course of organic and social development has been blindly determined are pains, pleasures, instincts, appetites, disgusts, religions, moralities, superstitions; the sentiment of what is noble and intrinsically worthy; the sentiment of what is ignoble and intrinsically worthless. From a purely scientific point of view these all stand on an equality; all are action-producing causes developed, not to improve, but simply to perpetuate the species.

A. In the possession of reason and in the enjoyment of beauty we, in some remote way, share the nature of that infinite personality in whom we live and move and have our being.

B. Reason is but the psychological expression of certain physiological processes in the cerebral hemispheres; it is no more than an expedient among many expedients by which the individual and the race are preserved, just as beauty is no more than the name for such varying and accidental attributes of the material or moral world as may happen for the moment to stir our æsthetic feelings.

A. Every human soul is of infinite value, eternal, free; no human being, therefore, is so placed as not to have within his reach, in himself and others, objects adequate to infinite endeavor.

B. The individual perishes; the race itself does not endure. Few can flatter themselves that their conduct has any effect whatever upon its remoter destinies; and, of those few, none can say with reasonable assurance that the effect which they are destined to produce is the one they desire. Even if we were free, therefore, our ignorance would make us helpless; and it may be almost a consolation to reflect that our conduct was determined for us by the distribution of unthinking forces in pre-solar æons, and that, if we are impotent to foresee its consequences, we were not less impotent to arrange its causes.

The doctrines embodied in the second member of each of these alternatives may be true, or may, at least, represent the nearest approach to truth of which we are at present capable. Into this question I do not yet inquire. But, if they are to constitute the dogmatic scaffolding by which our educational system is to be supported; if it is to be in harmony with principles like these that the child is to be taught at its mother's knee, and the young man is to build up the ideals of his life, then, unless I greatly mistake, it will be found that the inner discord which exists, and which must gradually declare itself, between the emotions proper to naturalism and those which have actually grown up under the shadow of traditional convictions, will, at no distant date, most unpleasantly translate itself into practice.

Such is Mr. Balfour's first part. It is an admirable attack on

Sensism,¹ and an excellent demonstration of its folly by the process of *reductio ad absurdum*. If Naturalism was veracious, all inquiry after what is good or beautiful or true would be an absurdity. Our conviction that we are free and responsible is pathetic or ludicrous, according to the temper with which we regard it; morality is a fraud, and reason itself but a transitory passage from one set of unthinking habits to another. Nevertheless, excellent as is the book we are examining, that strong tendency which, as we shall plainly see later on, impels Mr. Balfour to appeal to impulse, feeling, and opinion, rather than to the solid ground of evident certitude, is already apparent. Hereafter, we hope (following the tradition of Catholic philosophy) to show how the inestimable truths for which he contends repose on a far more solid foundation than he provides for them.

Our second part will be devoted to the examination of the "Reasons for Belief," which Mr. Balfour has drawn out, and his representations as to certain philosophical systems.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

¹ Such readers as may care to peruse a further enforcement of Mr. Balfour's arguments, are referred to our article entitled "Spencer *versus* Balfour," in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1895.

EPISCOPAL ELECTIONS.

FORMER PRACTICES ; MODERN DISCIPLINE.

I.—The rules of the Council of Baltimore are based on the traditions of ecclesiastical antiquity—The Sovereign Pontiff immediately or indirectly has always exercised his authority in episcopal elections—First appointment made by Christ and his apostles—The people had afterwards a certain rôle in the choice of bishops—This rôle was not so considerable as is generally supposed : it was especially one of consultors—Why so many divergences in its interpretation—Information given by the documents of the first four centuries—Electoral power of provincial bishops—“*Docendus est populus, non sequendus*”—Still there existed another principle—“*Nullus invitis detur Episcopus*” ; traces of its continuance to this day—Reflections on the wisdom of the Church—In fine, the word “electio,” has, in ancient writers, several distinct senses.

II.—The *Honorati* soon replace the common people—13th canon of the collection of Laodicea—Strange religious phenomena produced by the change of worship in the old Roman city—The great families nurseries of bishops—Governmental interference—The emperors usurp the choice of prelates of the most important sees—Some bishops, to avoid the danger of an interregnum, thought they could choose and consecrate their successor—There is no historical foundation for the assertion that the Popes had no right to reserve to themselves elections—Why they seem to have at first taken no part in them—They asserted from time to time their authority—Powerful argument of Pius VI. against the Febronian objections.

III.—How the Popes were led to reserve to themselves episcopal elections—Interference of the Visigoth kings in church matters in Spain—Similar conduct of the Merovingians in Gaul—The Carolingians follow the same way—A few words on the quarrel about investitures—Fruitless attempt to introduce a new method of election—The cathedral chapters—Influence of secular princes also prevents the advantages of this method—Clever and prudent policy of pontifical reservations—The Councils of Constance and Bale try to hinder it—Mute struggles between the papacy and royalty—Understanding come to through Concordats.

IV.—Various forms of discipline—Specially advantageous conditions of the United States—A few words of the procedure followed here for episcopal appointments—This system safeguards the ancient rights of the Church, and avoids the abuses shown by experience—Proofs of this assertion—Nobility of the Roman Church ; its practical knowledge of ecclesiastical antiquity.—*Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia.*

IN the Catholic Church there are several points of discipline which are fixed and unalterable, because they are of divine right, and of Christ's own institution. There are others, which vary according to the times, because the Divine Author of the Church left it to herself to take into account the ever changing vicissitudes of human society, the progress of civilization, and the needs and requirements of succeeding ages. To a hierarchy strongly organized and deeply imbued with His spirit and His teaching, He entrusted the delicate task of adapting the Church's discipline to the wants of the moment.

No more striking example of what we assert can be found than in the history of the episcopacy. A sacred order, ranking higher

than the priesthood, with powers of jurisdiction and with authority partially sovereign—although controlled by a central administration, which, in view of the general good determines the extent of its action—the episcopacy instituted by Jesus Christ, and ever remaining the same, has, however, been conferred in various ways in different ages of the Church. The reason of this changing discipline is to bring it more in touch with the spirit of the times and the needs of the faithful.

The late Council of Baltimore,¹ confirmed by papal decree in 1885, fixed a very prudent and far-reaching ordinance with regard to the election of bishops. Like all disciplinary decisions of the Church, these laws although in some respects new, are not, however, innovations nor without canonical precedent. The Church does not like changes; it loves to model its action on the traditional past, and even when it has to modify its discipline so as to meet some pressing local need, or satisfy some national tendency, it never loses sight of its old methods, and tries to engraft the new practices it adopts on the time-honored usages of the past, and above all, to preserve the *spirit* which influenced it in any particular line of action. The present case is an example of this. In the choice of bishops for this country, the Church revived the old system of election, but, while adopting the principle, every precaution is taken to guard against its abuse. Later on we shall see how, while even giving some liberty to secular interference, it has scrupulously guarded against the danger of allowing anything to destroy or diminish the authority of the central organization.

To understand thoroughly the laws which actually govern episcopal nominations in the United States, we shall take a rapid survey of the past history of the Church, dwelling with preference on the early ages of Christianity, since it is there, especially, that our separated brethren try to find arguments and objections against our present discipline.

Without canonical election and papal institution, no one would ever dream of assuming the title or performing the duties of a bishop. In our present paper we propose to consider exclusively the first of these two conditions, and treat the question of canonical election.

The Catholic Church recognizes as a fundamental principle that it is for the Sovereign Pontiff to meet the needs of our holy religion by appointing to the different regions or circumscriptions known as dioceses, spiritual heads, or pastors, called bishops, either by his own immediate selection, or by establishing rules to guide others in making such a choice. This principle is based on

¹ *Concil. Plenar. Baltim. III.*, tit. 2, No. 15.

solid arguments, and it is not without good reason that it is universally accepted. Here, as in many similar cases, we cannot do better than to go to the source of all information, and see how Christ acted, and how his immediate followers understood him and imitated him. Did not Christ himself choose his apostles? "Non vos me elegistis, sed ego elegi vos, et posui vos" They in turn appointed bishops in virtue of the apostolic authority which they shared with Peter, through whom it was to be transmitted to the Roman bishops, Peter's successors in the headship of the Church. There was no semblance of secular interference then. The pagan magistrates, both civil and imperial, were in no way interested. From the beginning, then, we see the hierarchy specially set apart for the election of the bishops. An impartial investigation of the succeeding ages of the Church will bring to light no other principle and no other practice. Guided, then, by the light of history, let us draw our own conclusions.

We do not intend our assertion to be so sweeping as to exclude the entire diocesan family from all participation in the selection of its head.

For the first eight centuries at least, and in some countries even for a longer time, the faithful took a more or less active part and had a sort of suffrage in the nomination of bishops. It is certain that this secular interference had no other object and was permitted for no other end than to aid the preliminary inquiry in removing all candidates deemed unworthy, either from some hidden crime, or from some unknown disqualification. Laymen were not the only advisers of the bishops in these matters; the earliest records show us how much more important was the action of the inferior clergy; but we have no warrant for ascribing to either, anything more than a purely deliberative influence¹ in the ordinary course of Episcopal nominations. Individual cases of violence or local revolutions are not to be confounded with existing discipline nor to be considered as such. Above both clergy and laity is the real power that acts, if not always with absolute independence, at least with an unquestioned inherent right. This power is that of the Provincial bishops united in synod under the presidentship of the metropolitan, and this body having heard the wishes and examined into the reasons of the faithful, determine upon the ad-

¹ Thomassin very aptly resumes this discipline in the following terms: "Eligebant Episcopi testimonio suo, plebs eam electionem approbat, atque ita et ipsa eligebat. Plusculum etiam momenti erat in suffragio cleri quam populi testimonio. Sed utrique imminebat autoritas Episcoporum synodice ibi collectorum, vota cleri, testimonia populi audientium, librantium, nunc probantium, alias improbantium, suo denique iudicio et arbitratu rem conficiendum."—Thomassin, *Vetus et Nova Ecclesie disciplina*, p. ii., lib. i., cap. i., No. 2.

mission or rejection of a candidate according to their own conscience and the virtue of their own authority.

It is often a matter of astonishment to see the very widely diverging interpretation of the documents of antiquity which bear on the question of Episcopal elections. If we listen to the followers of the Reformation, or to some adherents of the Gallicans or Jansenists, we should be inclined to leave the dogmatical theory as a still controverted point, and to assert that it has no historical documents to strengthen or maintain it. Let us not hope to find in history more than it can give. It is for us to make the most of what is handed down to us, by a careful grouping, close comparison and scientific analysis of all the references and allusions it furnishes us. It is not necessary to remind our readers that the ecclesiastical language of the early Church had an infancy and a development, so we cannot expect to find it, at every stage, of the same technical precision that it has in our days; and again, that the observance and enforcement of the laws of the Church were hindered by geographical and political difficulties, which we can hardly conceive in the altered conditions of our modern society. All this must be carefully considered and kept in view, if we wish the past to be a guide to lead us to the truth, and not a misunderstood accumulation of facts, which will invariably lead us astray. Premising this, and taking into consideration the circumstances of the times, we can assert that for the first four centuries of the Church's history, there is to be found no positive enactment and no weight of evidence sufficiently strong, to warrant our calling in question the theory of the Pope's authority in episcopal nominations. But our opponents appeal to history, and would fain have us see examples of secular interference everywhere. Well, certainly, the people took no part in the Apostles' selection of the first bishops. And if there is frequent mention of the people in connection with subsequent appointments, is there a single scrap of evidence to show that they were electors, or even that they had any weight in the elections? The contrary is borne out by all the documentary evidence of the time, and from the best records we can safely come to the following conclusions: There are laws governing these elections; laws clear, formal and well defined, but all concern the action of the bishops of the province in the selection of their future colleague. Later on we shall examine their right to vote. As to the people we find nothing definite, nothing uniform, nothing absolute. The sacred authority of the bishops perpetuated by a kind of mutual selection and brought about by the choice of other bishops almost required the electors to take into consideration the wishes of the people. From that arose the custom of consulting the faithful about their future pastor. And

if, as it frequently happened, the new bishop was chosen among the local priests,¹ it was only natural to make inquiries into his character, abilities, zeal and sanctity, from those best qualified to give reliable information. An investigation was ordered,² but frequently all the desired information came unsolicited. Vry often the names of the most fitting candidates were proposed, thus facilitating the election. The alleged admissions of St. Cyprian, which some try to exaggerate into a difficulty against the present discipline, do not amount to anything when considered in this light.³

But as every one knows, public opinion is a very fickle standard, changing, uncertain, unreliable. In the frequent clash of parties, in the outbursts of passing enthusiasm, some calm reflection is needed to see through conflicting reports and determine the value of opposing claims, and the fitness of different procedures. This was the duty of the official electors. A check was needed to moderate the ardor of the unthinking, to control the passions of the ignorant and to keep within bounds the selfish aims of clique and caucus. For, if the Church, which makes itself all to all for the sake of humanity, takes into consideration the temporal and transitory concerns of its children, still, it must never forget and never force into the background the only interests worthy of the name and worthy of the Church—the interests that are eternal. Hence, then, after hearing all the considerations proffered and heedless of all influence, and undue pressure, the electors in virtue of their rights and privileges, determine on the fitting one to be bishop. “Docendus est populus non sequendus,” was the terse remark of

¹ Tradition favored the choice of a bishop in the vacant diocese itself. Pope Celestine writing to the bishops of the Province of Vienne and Narbonne in 428, gives the following advice (*Cf. Jaffé, No. 152; Coustant, Ep. R. P., c. 1065*). “Tunc alter de alterâ eligatur Ecclesiâ, si de civitatis ipsius cui est episcopus ordinandus, nullus dignus (quod evenire non credimus), poterit inveniri. Primum enim illi reprobandi sunt ut aliqui de alienis Ecclesiis non merito praeferantur. Habet unusquisque clericorum suae fructum militiae in Ecclesiâ in quâ suam per omnia officia transegit aetatem.”

² That is all can be drawn from the famous text of St. Cyprian, *Ep. 68, Migne, P. L., v. iii., p. 1027, No. v.* To prevent the election of an unworthy candidate, says the saint, “diligenter de traditione divinâ et Apostolicâ traditione observandum est, et tenendum, quod apud nos quoque et ferè per provincias universas tenetur, ut ad ordinationes ritè celebrandas, ad eam plebem cui praepositus ordinatur, episcopi ejusdem provinciae proximi quique convenient, et episcopus eligatur *plebe praesenti* quae singulorum vitam plenissime novit et uniuscujusque actum de ejus conversatione perspexit.”

³ “Dixit quidem Cyprianus primariam potestatem eligendi dignos et repudiandi indignos episcopatu, penes populum esse sed his verbis non significatur nisi conscientia et testimonium populi cui potissimum explorata sunt vel virtutum insignia, vel vita eorum qui candidati sunt S. S. dignitatum. Multa fallunt episcopos, quae plebem non fallunt, sive in vitio, sive in laude posita privatorum gesta. Hac ergò libertate, imò et hac necessitate denudandi quaeque quisque reciscet de moribus et factis eorum qui ad episcopatum invitabantur, videbatur electio in plebis potestate esse.”—Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. i., cap. i., No. 3.

Celestine to the Bishops of Apulia,¹ a saying which gives us the true inner meaning of a thought only too often liable to be overstrained and misunderstood.

We may go still further. Not only were the bishops elected without this kind of popular consent which we have described, but it often happened that all secular interference was rejected and totally discarded. Was not this the case, when St. Cyprian himself tells us,² that the votes of even absent bishops were made to play a part at election times? We have here the example of the bishops of a province making known by letter the subject of their choice, and forwarding their vote several days, if not weeks, before the public opinion found expression. Here at least the faithful had little influence on votes recorded in that way, and in a system of suffrage which sanctioned such a practice. The Council of Nice tells us that such was the usual procedure, another proof, if needed, of the very secondary rôle taken by laymen in the matter of episcopal elections. So true is this, that we have instances on record, of the people rising up against an unpopular pastor selected for them by the metropolitan, in defiance of their wishes.³ A very subtle distinction is introduced here. The validity of the election was entirely independent of the people, but the acceptance of the bishop elect, was, even after his consecration, left in a measure to the good will of the diocesans. This was not, it is true, so much a right as a prudent concession made to popular feeling in view of preventing scandal and averting discussions. The facts are there. We have Celestine I. positively forbidding the French bishops from imposing an unpopular candidate on a diocese, alleging the decrees of preceding councils as the grounds for his action. "Nullus invitis detur episcopus." This principle still holds good. Although far from wishing to cater to the ever-changing desires of the masses, still the Church is ever on the alert so as not to cause any needless irritation nor wound any reasonable susceptibility. Thus in a newly conquered country, acquired and held by force of arms, it would be to go contrary to public opinion to appoint as bishop an openly avowed partisan of the conquerors, while at the same time it would be equally imprudent and a danger to the public peace, as well as a slur on the invaders, to select any unyielding factotum of the old *régime*. The same rule holds good after great intestine strife and social upheavals. The principle of "nullus invitis" accommodates itself to times and to surroundings, the same spirit directs its numerous applications. We see in this a reason, why the Sovereign Pontiff keeps up friendly relations

¹ Epist. 3, *Dist.*, lxii., can. 2.

² S. Cyprianus, Ep. 6. Migne, *P. L.*, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. *Concilium Aceranum* an. 314, can 18.—Labbe, iv., p. 519.

with schismatical, heretical, and even Mahometan governments, and tries by every means in his power, such as special delegations, frequent interchange of letters with the official and officious representatives of these governments, to secure their friendly interference in the filling of vacant sees. Coming down more closely to our present subject we shall see that the weight attached to the demands of the people does not, in any way, constitute them voters, or give them the rights of suffrage. Celestine puts the matter clearly when he says, "*Nullus . . . detur episcopus . . .*" A bishop is chosen *for* the faithful but not *by* the faithful, although their wishes are consulted and followed as far as practicable, without putting them on an equal footing with the legally authorized electors.

We have in this matter another example of that mild and considerate treatment which the Church ever uses in regard to her children. In every age, however, there have not been wanting men who, carried away by gusts of human passion, have left nothing undone, nothing untried, to distort the nature and change the bearing and import of these wise laws; but to the unprejudiced mind how noble is this foreseeing goodness, which accommodates itself to every weakness—nay, even to every foible—to accomplish more thoroughly the great mission of the salvation of souls.

Here is how Leo the Great considered it necessary to reprove the bishops of the Province of Vienne for nominations of prelates who were odious to the people and who could only be put in possession of their sees by military intervention.¹ "*Militaris manus per provincias sequitur sacerdotem . . . ad invadendas Ecclesias quae proprios amiserint sacerdotes. Trahuntur ordinandi . . . his quibus proficiendi sunt civitatibus, ignorati . . . per vim imponuntur.*" These abuses have lasted too long already, says the Pope; let the people express their wishes; they will quietly make known their candidate, and then you may see how far you can satisfy them or what prevents you from accepting their choice. "*Expectarentur certe vota civium, testimonia populorum, quaereretur honoratorum arbitrium, electio clericorum, quae in sacerdotum ordinationibus solent ab his qui noscunt Patrum regulas custodiri.*"² These words should be carefully considered; the far-reaching effects of this wise advice merit our consideration and are worthy of our closest attention. The Pope is far from acknowledging in the people a right to vote; he speaks of their desires and wishes, of their leanings and inclinations, of the popular verdict in favor of any particular candidate, but he maintains

¹ *Epist.*, S. Leon. Papae. Migne, *P. L.*, vol. liv., *Ep.* x., p. 634, cap. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 632, cap. iv.

that the right of suffrage is exclusively reserved to the bishops of a province. We must not let our feelings take the place of arguments, and in the light of the explanation given, we cannot but see the meaning of that most used and abused formula which we find in the same decretal: "Qui praeftuturus est omnibus, ab omnibus eligatur."¹

The word "electio" had, as we have seen, different significations when applied to different things, and it would be absurd to confound the "electio," properly so called, which was made by the provincial bishops, with that manifestation of sympathy and support given by the clergy, or the more pressing solicitations of the people. Evidently, when all these different elements favored the same person, there was a well-grounded reason for proclaiming the total independence and unquestioned validity of the election; but care must be taken not to strain the natural import and recognized meaning of the word.

* * * * *

The custom tolerating this popular interference, even in the minimized form in which we have exposed it, could be exercised only in small communities. This co-operation of the laity supposed a continuance of the primitive fervor, a thorough and personal knowledge of the candidates, great fraternal union and enlightened zeal. From the time the city churches extended their influence to the adjoining country, and when the faithful increased in numbers, a necessary selection had to be made, and a few of the prominent and most influential members were appointed to watch over the interests of the masses. Thus, when the cabals of intriguers, always on the alert to use the crowds for the furtherance of their own ambitious schemes, had compelled certain ecclesiastical² provinces to forbid the people to take any part in the elections, still the influence of the laity was far from being destroyed by the prohibition. The canonical collection commonly known as the Council of Laodicea, renews this prohibition; but how was it observed? It is very hard to say with anything like accuracy. Even if we suppose that every ecclesiastical province which inserted the decrees of Laodicea in its directory had positively enforced the observance of this law, still the question would remain, as Thomassin very well puts it, to know whether this was not understood only as a needed temporary condemnation of factions and malcontents, or, again, as the law had been later on interpreted by Justinian,³ who contended that the profanum vulgus

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 634, cap. vi.

² Can. 13 *Conc. Laodiceni*: "μη τοῖς ὄχλοις ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς ἐκλογὰς ποιεῖσθαι τῶν μελλόντων καθ' ὁμοσταθαι εἰς ἱερατεῖον."

³ *Novell.* cxliiii. (an. 546), cap. 1: "Sancimus igitur, ut quoties episcopi ordinandi

was merely replaced by the most prominent influential citizens, "the honorati." No matter who is right, Gratian is historically wrong when he tries to bring the Canons of Laodicea under a title which is too sweeping and too misleading to represent the Church's discipline in the fifth and sixth centuries.¹ "Laici nullo modo debent se electioni immisceri."²

The monopoly by an aristocracy (no matter how called) of popular rights is a fact too general, and seemingly too necessary, to cause us any surprise. Every epoch gives examples of such forced evolution.

Later on, indeed, there will be a revulsion, the masses will join hands in self defence, and in an endeavor to win back the rights of which they were deprived, but their numbers are their greatest source of weakness; and no matter what their works may be, their aims or ambition, they are compelled to confide their interests to a few, who, unassumingly perhaps at first, always end by becoming masters, and by centering in their own persons the authority of which they were originally the mere instruments and representatives. This is the almost invariable line of action of the prominent citizens in every Christian community. At first lost among the crowd of humble followers of the Crucified, their worldly position, their independence, their easy circumstances, their superior training and education, brought them gradually into prominence, and gave them a privileged place among their brethren. For a time their co-operation was useful, but too often, alas! it was most baneful and pernicious, and in Italy, especially during the Middle Ages, the *λαμπρότατοι* usurped the rights of the people, and exercised an unhealthy detrimental influence in all ecclesiastical nominations, not even excepting the elections of the Roman Pontiffs. Memnon, Bishop of Ephesus, had to denounce John of Antioch to the clergy of Constantinople for the intrigues of this

necessitas exstiterit, *clerici et primores urbis* in quâ episcopus ordinandus est, de tribus personis periculo animarum suarum decreta faciant, etc. . . ." *Novell.* cxxxvii. (an. 564), cap. 2: "Sequentes igitur ea quæ à sacris canonibus definita sunt, præsentem legem facimus, qua jubemus, quoties episcopus creandus est, clericos et primores urbis, in qua episcopus creandus est convenire, etc. . . ."

¹ ". . . . Notum est Gratiano sat familiare fuisse canones detorquere ad disciplinam sui temporis . . . canonibus sensum plane à mente Patrum alienum assignando."—Van Espen, *Jus Eccles. Universum*, tit. xiii., cap. i., n. 4, p. 65.

² Thomassin also is of this opinion: "Quamquam visa sit multis Laodicena synodus . . . populum spoliassse pristinâ potestate eligendorum altaris ministrorum, certum est tamen, illum semper aliquas ad eam partes interposuisse . . . Itaque, hoc canone, non suo suffragii qualiscumque aut testimonii jure excussa est plebs; sed, aut summotæ tantummodo tumultuosæ turbæ quæ negotio pacis et sapientiæ . . . plebique obstrepebant; sed illud diffinitum est, non ex voluntate plebis, sed ex judicio et arbitrio episcoporum terminandas esse electiones aut eorum qui sapientia et religione præstant; ut ponderari magis debeant suffragia quam numerari."—*Op. cit.*, cap. ii., n. 1.

potentate, both in the senate and with the λαμπρότατοι in his efforts to dethrone the bishop. "Quotidiè," says he, "venerandum senatum illustrissimosque cives ad se evocans magna importunitate efflagitabat, ut eorum suffragiis ab iis in meum locum ordinaretur Episcopus."¹

This lay intervention was never looked upon or exercised as a right, but merely as a manifestation of popular opinion, so as to enlighten the electors on the subject to be chosen. Even Van Espen admits this in spite of his well known desire to magnify the popular rights, of which he makes the secular rulers the guardians and dispensers, "Neque etiam eo tempore electio illa plebis jus aliquod *ad rem* dabat ipsi electo, sed potius, erat simplex postulatio ipsius plebis et cleri de persona sibi gratâ in suum pastorem."² The great danger of popular or aristocratic interference was soon to show itself in a more tangible manner, for even after Rome changed its religion, it still retained many of the old pagan customs which had grown, as it were, into its very growth. The teachings of Christ supplanted nearly everywhere throughout the empire the old worship of Cæsar and of Rome, which had heretofore been the state established religion. The Pontifex or Sacerdos of old, usually chosen among the noble or senatorial families, ceased his ministry at the altar of pagan divinities, to become the *Episcopus*, the *Sacerdos* of the new religion. The same intrigues, the same family pride and family ambitions made the new positions sought after and coveted as were the old, and often secured in the same fashion. For the last one hundred and fifty years of the empire, the episcopacy seemed to be the exclusive appanage of the rich, and we can easily conceive how political intrigues and purely human considerations tainted the manner of elections and vitiated the lofty conceptions of the primitive Church. We even find the true electors, the provincial bishops,³ torn asunder by family influences, by party spirit, and by the clamors of a salaried mob. Sulpicius Severus gives us a proof of this in the election of St. Martin of Tours. From the surrounding country and neighboring villages the crowds thronged into the city. All wanted Martin for bishop; he was in public opinion the only available man capable of governing the Church. The electors at first resisted the popular outcry; "nonnulli ex Episcopis qui ad constituendum antistitem fuerant evocati, repugnabant, dicentes contemptibilem esse personam, indignam esse Episcopatu, veste sordidum." This curious trait gives us an insight into the respective parts taken by both the people and the bishops. Worldly

¹ Cf. Synod. Ephesina, Labbe, iv., p. 1439, *Epistola ad Clerum Constantinopl.*

² *Op. cit.*, No. xi., p. 66.

³ Sulpicius Severus, *Vita Martini*, Migne, P. L., vol. xx., p. 169.

views were gaining ground in the Church, while the motives of self-interest, and of the powerful families, all combined to fix the choice of the electors on some magnate, but the people complain and murmur, and their faith sustains and nurtures their discontent; they implore and threaten, and disregarding their ordinary representatives, they join issue with the electors, and finally the bishops yield and accept the people's choice. Moreover, the great were less influential in the Western than in the Eastern Churches, and there the common people maintained that influence which they had attained as early as the second century. But soon there was to rise above the civil magistrates an authority which was to make all subservient, and which was alone to wield all the civil power, and exercise every influence, we mean the despotic interference of newly converted¹ emperors and barbarian sovereigns. The recognition by Constantine and his successors of certain civil rights and privileges—heretofore denied—to bishops, invested the episcopacy with secular rank and dignity, and as a natural consequence entailed state interference, sometimes openly exercised, more frequently covertly employed in the elections to vacant sees.² Thomassin tries hard, but labors in vain, to explain or excuse this abuse. From the very outset the results were so pernicious that no reason and no palliation can be offered for this unfortunate State-meddling which has always proved itself a danger and a menace.³ The necessities of political situations and the growth of civil institutions may require concessions, but it would be folly to deny that this policy is dangerous and unsafe. We would not be far astray in ascribing to these regrettable weaknesses the abuses and disorders which so often tarnished the fair history of the Church, and were the cause of so many schisms which centuries have not succeeded in uprooting.

Some find cause for wonder and astonishment that the Popes

¹ "Simul ac fidem christinam susceperunt principes et reges, continuo et ipsi cœperunt curam et auctoritatem adhibere, non quidem ut ad se plenum jus conferendi aut nominandi avocarent . . . sed quo providerent ut sacerdotia rite ac canonicè conferrentur . . . ideoque, et sine suo assensu consecrari confirmari electos episcopos ægre sinebant."—Van Espen, *op. cit.*, P. I., tit. xiii., cap. iii., n. 1, p. 70.

² "Mit Constantin erhielt die Kirche an dem Kaiser einen Schutzherrn, aber darin lag auch der Keim einer Einflussnahme der Staatsgewalt auf die Besetzung der Bis thümer . . . Indem Constantin ferner der Kirche die ihr in den letzten Verfolgungen entrissenen Güter zurückgab, er und spätere Kaiser den kirchlichen Vermögenserwerb begünstigten, und nun die Kirche ein grösseres Vermögen erwarb, so bot das bischöfliche Amt auch grössere Vermögensvortheile. Eine Folge davon war es, dass, in der Folge auch öfter die bischöfliche Würde um irdischer Vortheile willen und auch mit unerlaubten Mitteln erstrebt wurde. Diese musste dann zu Unordnungen bei den Bischofswahlen führen."—Phillips-Vering, t. viii., p. 13.

³ St. Athanasius in his time was indignant at this interference.—*Historia Arian. ad Monachi*, Migne, P. G., xxv.

gradually withdrew from the people and centered in themselves every right of nomination or selection. Our only regret is that the Popes did not do so much sooner; many evils and misfortunes would undoubtedly have been spared the Eastern Church.

The imperial intervention grew gradually more exacting, especially in cases of important sees,¹ and consequently the influence of the people and inferior clergy soon disappeared completely from the Eastern Church. The courtier prelates, who were indebted to imperial favors for their bishoprics, were powerless to complain, and the dreadful Iconoclastic persecution was needed to urge on the Eighth General Council to demand for them freedom of election. The Fourth Council of Constantinople (869) says formally:

"Neminem laicorum, principum vel potentum semet inferre electioni vel promotioni cujuslibet Episcopi, ne videlicet inordinata hinc et incongrua fiat confusio vel contentio: præsertim, cum nullam in talibus potestatem quemquam potestativorum vel ceterorum laicorum habere conveniat, sed potius silere, ac attendere sit, usquequo regulariter a Collegio Ecclesiæ suscipiat finem electio futura pontificis."

It was not so hard to find a remedy for another abuse which showed itself very early in the Church. The bishops, grown old in the service of the diocese and attached to the faithful among whom they lived, naturally desired to preserve their authority and end their days among their people; hence the temptation to many of them to choose their successors and form them to the workings and administration of the diocese and to the continuance of their own works of zeal. This was a ready way, it is true, to check the intrigues of the ambitious and to prevent the confusion and disorders of a vacancy; but it was, nevertheless, a violation of the electoral laws and the generally admitted principle of a certain secular participation. Again, it was putting too much power in the hands of men at an age when the likes and the dislikes of the man often betray the whims and fancies of approaching dotage, not to speak of a still greater objection in the transmission of ecclesiastical charges by way of legacy or inheritance. This abuse was already condemned in the Council of Antioch (341),² but we see it reappear in Spain and in Italy in the fifth century, when it was again censured by St. Hilary in a Roman synod.³ In Gaul it

¹ "Einer Bestätigung durch den Kaiser oder eine Staatsbehörde bedurfte die Wahl nicht. Wohl aber, nahmen die Kaiser die Befugniss in Anspruch in jedem einzelnen Fall aus eigner Machtvollkommenheit den neuen Bischof zu bezeichnen. Selbstverständlich kam es verhältnissmässig selten vor, dass sie bei entfernten oder wenig bedeutenden Bischofsitzen von dieser Befugniss Gebrauch machten."—Ed. Loening, *Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenrechts*, t. i., p. 122.

² Can. 23.

³ *Synodus Romana*, 46. Labbe, t. vii., p. 961, an. 5: "Hilarus dixit nova et inaudita, sicut ad nos missis de Hispaniis epistolis pervenit per-

often showed itself, and, fostered by royal protection, it waxed¹ strong.

From all we have seen so far we can infer nothing which would lead us to doubt the inherent power of the Roman pontiffs to choose candidates for the episcopacy and to legislate on all electoral matters.

In the very earliest age of the Church, when persecutions were raging, and when Christianity had no social standing in the state, it was impossible for the successors of St. Peter to send representatives of their authority all over the world to see to the exact enforcement of discipline. However, as Christianity took deeper root and spread more widely, there was soon established the custom of consulting the Roman Pontiffs when difficulties arose and doubts had to be met and solved. The Pope, as metropolitan or patriarch, settled controversies in Italy, Gaul and Spain.² When communications were addressed him from more distant countries, he was never slow in interfering, in spite of the difficulties to be encountered and the scanty information supplied. Moreover, he showed his authority by sending missionaries of the Gospel into savage and barbarous lands and in appointing vicars to direct the growth of rising churches. The bishops and patriarchs who were far away from Rome were obliged to notify him about their election, and if they failed to do so, they were invariably called to order and reminded of their duty. Thus did Pope Hormisdas³ severely censure the Bishop of Constantinople, reproaching him for neglecting time-honored regulations and insisting upon his compliance with this important formality. The reproof, though

versitatum semina scribendo nascuntur. Denique, nonnulli episcopatum . . . non divinum munus, sed hæreditarium putant esse compendium et credunt, sicut res caducas, ita, sacerdotium velut legati aut testamenti jure posse dimitti. Nam, plerique sacerdotes in mortis confiniis constituti in locum suum nituntur alios designatis nominibus subrogare, ut scilicet non legitima expectetur electio, sed defuncti gratificatio pro populi habeatur assensu . . . hanc licentiam generaliter de ecclesiis, auferamus.”

¹ Gregorius Turonensis, *Vita Patrum*, viii., 3. Migne, P. L., t. lxxi., p. 1042: “Quo rege (Childeberto), redeunte, ait episcopus: . . . rogo ut Nicetius presbyter, nepos meus ecclesiæ Lugdunensi substituatur episcopus.” Respondit rex: “Fiat voluntas Dei. Et sic, pleno regis et populi (?) suffragio, Lugdunensis episcopus ordinatus fuit.”

² Zaccharia, *Antifebronius vindicatus*, dissert. viii., cap. 3. “Nihil eorum quæ ad ejusmodi electiones pertinent (sive eligendos sive electores, sive ipsius electionis formam spectes), designare erit, de qua Apostolica Sedes pro suâ auctoritate, multa sæpius non præscripserit observanda. Imò, quæ saltem in Occidente servata est universa electionum norma, eam ad Romanorum Pontificum leges prorsus exactam invenies . . . , etc.”

³ Cf. Thiel, *Epistola R. P.*, p. 913: “Diu nos nuntiata tuæ primordia dignitatis tenere suspensos, et in ipsa communis gratulatione lætitiæ, mirati admodum sumus, morem pristinum fuisse neglectum . . . Docuerat siquidem . . . te legatos ad Apostolicam sedem inter ipsa tua pontificatus destinasse, ut, et quem tibi debeamus effectum bene cognosceres, et vetustæ consuetudinis formam rite compleres.”

conveyed in words of kindness and charity, gives us to understand that the Pope did not relinquish his control—a small proof, it is true, of his hierarchical right, but still an official declaration of it. The Popes always maintained the principle that the sole jurisdiction by which the eastern prelates ruled their charges was derived from Rome and from the successors of Peter. The sees of Alexandria and Antioch, which became patriarchal, were founded by St. Peter, and it was because the beneficiaries of them remained in communion with the centre of Catholicity that they maintained a supremacy over the other churches. Hear on this point the sound reasoning of Pius VI. in his admirable answer, “*De Nunciaturis.*” Whence comes, he asks, this distinction of power which places one bishop above another? From divine right, do you answer? or from some general or provincial council, or in virtue of some mutual understanding? In a few brief sentences he shows peremptorily the impossibility of all or any of these courses:

“*Non à jure divino*: quippe ordo episcopatus, ut ipsimet sentiunt, unus est et par in omnibus. *Non ab universali concilio*: quippe jam longè antè invaluerat ea distinctio antequam de cogendo universali concilio cogitaretur.

Non à provincialibus Synodis: quippe, provinciarum distinctionem antecedere debuit graduum distinctio quâ unus in definita regione cæteris ejusdem provinciæ episcopis præesset.

Non ex pacto convento inter nonnullos episcopos quibus commodum visum esset hanc hierarchiæ formam instituere: nam, nec isti minuire poterant, aut alteri subjicere auctoritatem sibi divinitus tributam, nec præter divinum institutum alterius cujusvis auctoritatem amplificare; aliundè nec successoribus eam legem præscribere potuissent, cui se ipsi suâ voluntate subjecissent.”

The ancient patriarchs of the East did not reason otherwise nor recognize any other source of their dignity and pre-eminence than the authority of the Pope. The rules which they made were, like themselves, subject to papal control, and it was always understood and admitted that the supreme head of the Church could change, modify and even abolish all provincial ordinances as the good of the Church demanded.

* * * * *

Let us now see how the Popes were led gradually to modify the electoral right, and at length to reserve it to themselves, or at least so to supervise its action that it remained virtually in their hands alone.

The intervention in elections of secular princes in place of the people soon increased. Not alone did the Greek emperors, at the bidding of their heretical counsellors, choose from among the courtier ecclesiastics bishops whom the clergy dared not refuse, but barbarian kings even, feeling the necessity of strengthening their power by the support of the Church, named their creatures to important sees, and gave to politics rather than to the needs of the

Church a preponderating importance in the nomination of titularies. The Twelfth Council of Toledo shows us, in the seventh century already, the kings of Spain exercising a truly exaggerated power in the promotion of bishops.¹ The wishes of the people and of the clergy, who until then had been considered an important factor in Spanish elections, were united in the hands of the princes; and the electoral body of provincial bishops had little to do but give a hurried assent to the royal will, meanwhile not making the slightest pretence of interference. Is not this, alas, the story of all the abdications of the Church? The first Visigoth kings converted felt, in their unstable power, the necessity of obtaining the assistance of the Church, then so powerful over the minds of the nations. Far from trying to rule her, they sought her strength in state affairs, whether regarding foreign wars or internal discord. In the meeting of the great men of the kingdom, the bishops took the foremost place, and their decision prevailed. But once the throne was firmly built, once the kings ceased to fear attacks from without and revolts from within, instead of showing, at least by respecting ancient customs, their gratitude to the Church, they aimed at developing their own supremacy at the expense even of those that had made it, and to control more surely the episcopal nominations, they monopolized them to their own advantage.

With slight differences, such is the history of the relations between Church and State all through the West. In Gaul, for instance, when the Franks established themselves they found an episcopacy already firmly constituted. It would have been the height of imprudence to attack it; for though the Church refused to mix in the intrigues of politics and human ambition so long as these remained in their domain of temporal discussions, she rose heroic and undaunted against whoever tried to encroach upon her ministry of salvation. Clovis, even before baptism, always showed a deserved consideration towards the bishops, who were both justly satisfied and even flattered. When his sway was established by his conversion to Christianity he went yet further. He sought their counsels. He gave them territories conquered in war, which, by the way, cost him little. And thus the Church in Gaul was attached to the fortunate conqueror by a thousand ties of friendship and interest which joined her to him much more closely than ever she had been united to the Roman emperors. These good rela-

¹ Gratiani, *Decretum*, dist. 63, can. 25: "Unde placuit omnibus pontificibus Hispaniæ, ut, salvo privilegio uniuscujusque provinciæ, licitum maneat deinceps Toletano pontifici, *quoscumque regalis potestas elegerit*, et jam dicti Toletani episcopi iudicium dignos esse probaverit, in quibuscumque provinciis in præcedentium sedibus præficere præsules, et decedentibus episcopis eligere successores."

tions were not without danger. Very soon by their counsels, their influence, their creatures, and at length by their official expressed will, the Frankish kings came to govern the entire episcopacy and to claim the right of sharing in the elections. The attempts at resistance were limited to maintaining the principle of the ancient rules, subordinated, however, to the king's will.¹ The king seemed to control these rules with the power, often, of suspending them.² Against the timid reserve of the Council of Orleans, in 549, the Council of Paris, in 557,³ tries, it is true, to react, but apparently in vain; for the kings, when they pleased, threw into the balance of justice their heavy sword, and in spite of all rights the elections were corrupted.⁴ The Pope was too distant, too materially weak, to be able to interfere or even to be warned in time. The evil then had to be endured until the central spiritual authority, casting off the bonds that still checked it, could counterbalance the material strength of human power opposing its temporal weakness.

The kings did not even hesitate to directly name their own creatures for episcopal sees. Old formulas, published by Marculte, later by Sirmond, and often since, show us the preponderating part the kings played in elections. Van Espen could then say, that these formulas prove beyond doubt the action taken by the kings in such matters;⁵ but it by no means destroys the fact that, by acting thus,

¹ The *Conc. Arvernense* (535), can. 2; Labbe, t. viii., p. 860, says clearly: "Eminentissimæ dignitatis apicem *electione* conscendat omnium, non favore paucorum, etc. . . ." but soon modifications were introduced.

² *Conc. Aurelian.* v. (549), can. 10; Labbe, t. ix., p. 131: "Ut nulli liceat episcopatum præmiis adipisci, sed, *cum voluntate regis*, juxta electionem cleri ac plebis, à metropolitano cum comprovincialibus pontifex consecratur."

³ *Concil. Parisiense*, iii., 557; Labbe, t. ix., p. 746 (can. 8): "Nullus civibus invitatus ordinetur episcopus, nisi quem populo et clericorum electio plenissima quæsierit, *non principis imperio*. . . . Si per ordinationem regiam honoris istius culmen pervadere aliquis præsumpserit, à comprovincialibus loci ipsius recipi non mereatur."

⁴ A better proof of this cannot be given than the following example. In the V. Council of Paris, in 614 or 615, the bishops decided in I. can., "Ut decedente Episcopo, debeat ordinari quem metropolitani cum provincialibus suis, clerus vel populus civitatis elegerint," Labbe, vol. x. Here there is no question of the royal pleasure, but since the canons of the council became law only after being promulgated by the king's authority, here is how Clotaire II. transformed the decree before publishing it: "Episcopo decedente, in loco ipsius qui à metropolitano ordinari debet, cum provincialibus à clero et populo eligatur; et, si persona condigna fuerit, per ordinationem principis ordinetur" And, in order to make more precise his intentions, and show what special class of clergymen he wished to promote, the king adds: "Si de palatio eligitur (episcopus), per meritum personæ et doctrinæ ordinetur" (Pardessus, *Diplomata*, n. 229). The king's chaplains, and even the royal favorites, will have no need of metropolitan or popular election. The king's recommendation as to their science and sanctity suffices.

⁵ Van Espen, *op. cit.*, cap. iv., p. 72.

they outrageously outstepped their power, and violated the unalterable rights of the Church. The Carolingians imitated their predecessors. Charlemagne himself, in spite of his protestations of submission to Holy Church, at times forgot himself, and promoted to bishoprics courtiers and ecclesiastics warmly recommended by the imperial princesses; deceived perhaps, himself, by the eulogies made of their talents, and thinking to benefit the Church by assuring the interests of the state.¹ At any rate, his successors, from weakness or led on by the times, sought, above all to have faithful vassals; and did not refrain from distributing sees to their trusty followers, just as they did lay benefices.²

The evil was so great and seemed so incurable, that the Popes dared not attack it directly; and, in order to keep for those they elected the sees of which they judged them worthy, they appeared to beg the Emperors' condescension and permission. Thus, Leo IV. wrote to Lothaire: "*Vestram mansuetudinem deprecamur quatenus Colono humili diacono eamdem (Reatinam) Ecclesiam ad regendam concedere dignetis, ut vestra licentia accepta ibidem eum, Deo adjuvante consecrare valeamus episcopum. Sin autem in praedicta Ecclesia nolueritis ut praeficiatur episcopus, Fusculanam Ecclesiam quae viduata existit, illi vestra Serenitas dignetur concedere ut à nostro praesulatu consecratus, Deo omnipotenti vestroque imperio grates peragere valeat.*"³

This humble attitude on the part of a Pope, towards an emperor unjustly exercising a right that was not his, doubtless is revolting to us; but we forget that the Good Shepherd must often run to meet his faithless sheep, and endure humiliating fatigue in order to save them from straying, and to lead them back to the fold. How often in the history of civilization have we seen the Church lowering herself, so it seems, to the greatest concessions, passing over in silence the vindication of her most just prerogatives, that she may save souls; and reserving her greatest energy for an unconquerable effort if her rights are systematically denied.

The time was nearing. All possible concessions had been made; the measure was full. So long as they could, without

¹ Cf. Flodoardus, *Historia Rhemensis Ecclesiae*, lib. iii., cap. 25, 28. Migne, t. cxxxv. p. 236 *et seq.* Baluze, *Capitularia* ii., p. 601: Allocutio Missorum. Phillips, adopting the views of the monk of S. Gall, says notably:

"Karl der Grosse mit dessen Kaiserkrönung das kirchliche Schutz und Schirmrecht vom Pápste ausdrückliche Anerkennung gefunden hatte, besetzte die meisten Bisthümer, wie es sein Vater Pipin gethan hatte in einer der kirchlichen Bedürfnissen entsprechenden Weise, und die Pápste traten auch ihm daher hierin nicht entgegen."

—*Op. cit.*, viii., p. 277.

² Dist. 63, cap. 16.

³ Cf. also, the Canon 18 of the same Dist., where Stephen IV. uses similar language.

sacrificing dogma, without positively renouncing the sacred theory of their hierarchic sovereignty, endure the innovation of the lay element represented by the emperor in the promotion of prelates, the Popes were patient, silent, suffering. On the day that the empire, reducing to a system its abuses, directly claimed a right the exercise of which was only tacitly granted in order not to cause incalculable evils, the Church rose up, feeble in human resources, but strong in the certainty of her duty, and did not shrink, after the example of Gregory VII., from breasting the power of the German emperors until she lowered their pride. We cannot here recount, even in outline, that wondrous struggle; it is enough for our purpose to have sketched its origin, and shown its necessity. We see better, now, with what noble aim the Papacy, supreme president of the Church's destinies, has been forced to reduce the participation of laymen in elections; and how, for the utility of the faithful, she has been obliged to eliminate, at the price of the greatest efforts, the never-ending causes of confusion and disorder.

However, before centralizing in the Roman curia the care of looking after the vacant sees, the Popes tried another system, which promised much good fruit, but the political influences of which soon came also to add to the unsatisfactory state of things.

From the twelfth century, we see the cathedral chapters representing, officially, the diocesan clergy, proceed to elect. Generally, the people disappear entirely,¹ even in those countries in which they have longest preserved some share in elections; and the power of temporal princes is efficaciously neutralized.

In the beginning of the thirteenth century, this method was commonly admitted, so much so, that the resistance made by the Episcopal College became unwelcome at Rome.² Thus, Innocent III. overruled the provincial bishops in their claim to elect a bishop other than the choice of the Chapter. However, it appears that the Chapter was obliged to proceed then according to public opinion, as formerly the electors were supposed to do.³ This is, also, the opinion of Thomassin, who has made a most serious study of the matter.⁴

¹ Notwithstanding we see them interfere in certain circumstances. Cf. S. Bern, *Ep.*, 13 and 27.—Migne, *P. L.*, clxxxii, pp. 117, 131.

² Cap. 4, "Bonæ Memoræ," tit. v., lib. i.: *De Postulatione Prælatorum*.—Van Espen, *op. cit.*, p. 68, § 4.

³ Cf. Cap. 20, tit. vi., lib. i., Decret., *De Electione* (Innocent III.): "Faciebant ad id non modicum concors capituli Vigoriensis electio, petitio populi, assensus principis, votum tuum, suffraganeorum suffragia."

⁴ Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. ii., cap. xxxiii., No. 3: "Nec tamen in unius capituli gremio ita circumscriptæ erant electiones, ut populi, abbatum, comprovincialium episcoporum, metropolitanorum vota pro nihilo reputarentur. Certè quidem scrup-

This evolution of the electoral right did not perfect itself suddenly and without opposition. It seems to have taken as precedent the papal elections. From the day the Sovereign Pontiff was elected by the cardinals, and not as before by the bishops, the example was set, and the custom spread;¹ for the western provinces accepted as of common right, the special customs originally admitted for the Roman Church alone.² But the royal policy had no idea of yielding because of such a change in the ecclesiastical system. It was at first abashed, but soon took control by its clever moves, so influencing the new episcopal elections that its power was by no means lessened. Van Espen admits this candidly.³ At one time the secular princes obliged the chapters to wait for the royal authorization in order to hold its election. At another, they forced them to seek approbation on the choice they made; but in one way or other, the canons could not but elect the person designated by the king. In fact, princes have a way of requesting that seems very like commanding.⁴

We may well believe that Rome was not slow to see the insufficiency of the new system. Numberless appeals, complaints, timid accusations, supported, however, by documents, reached the Supreme Pontiff after nearly every election. The Pope would gladly have overlooked these disorders, but at times there was clamor for a protest. Hence, oppositions on the part of Rome, refusals to confirm, prohibitions to consecrate, etc. On the other side was obstinacy. The kings thought the Popes would tire of leaving the sees vacant, disorder reigning in ecclesiastical administration, and souls perishing. And, indeed, these considerations at times did actually induce the Pope to legalize unjust elections to avoid greater evils. Yet, on the other hand, so great was the scandal, that resistance became a duty.

It is in the fourteenth century that we find the first pontifical reservations; and this practical proceeding took deep root, especially under the administration of Clement V.⁵ Barbosa⁶ shows in a few words how this change was brought about.⁷

tinium in solo et à solo fiebat capitulo; conferebantur, numerabantur, ponderabantur suffragia, et ita electio concludebatur: sed, nihilominus, certissime eas dicebatur testimonio populi et consensione episcoporum roborari et invalescere."

¹ "Admodum verisimile est jus . . . electionis ad capitula cathedralia demum transisse, postquam jus cleri Romani in electione Romani episcopi ad solos Cardinales translatum fuit, quod contigisse sub Alexandro III., id est, sub finem sæculi xii." . . . videtur.—Van Espen, *op. cit.*, P. I., tit. xiii., p. 67.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, cap. iv., p. 73, No. 4.

⁴ Cf. P. de Marca, *Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii*, L. vi., c. ix., Nos. 12 et 13.

⁵ Extrav. . . . "Et si in temporalium," . . . de *præbendis*. in com.

⁶ Barbosa, lib. i., Juris Eccles. cviii.

⁷ Clement. tu plerosq. de Electione.

"Primum cathedrales ecclesias quæ apud Romanam tantum curiam vacare contigissent, suæ dispositioni reservare cæpit Clemens; vacantium quoque ecclesiarum provisionem quæ clero et populo Christiano carerent Romani Pontificis dispositioni reservavit." . . . It was an energetic remedy, but necessary. As in many analagous cases, the evil was at first attacked indirectly, under other pretexts, by way of exception, which may cause unfriendly minds to err in regard to the end pursued by the Popes, and to accuse them of avarice¹ or Machiavelism; but the general plan soon showed itself. Benedict IX. declares the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff over the great patriarchal sees, whose direction is henceforth reserved directly² to the Pope. John XXII. takes another step forward.³ Benedict XII. (1335)⁴ and his successors develop yet more this disciplinary principle seen in the famous rule of the chancellry, reserving to the Pope the election of all bishops.

Of course, this energetic action, though prudently and gently carried out, was not effected without difficulties. Bishops, chapters, secular patrons, all protested vehemently and resisted boldly, or hypocritically, according to circumstances. The councils of Constance and Bâle⁵ in particular allow us to see in life this great struggle of a portion of the episcopacy fighting to safeguard what it claimed as its prerogatives, and of the papacy ever faithful to its duty, ever enlightened in its judgments, and which, while seeming to restrict secular rights, preserved in reality their independence and their purity. In France especially the struggle was fierce. We may say that for fifty years it went on without respite between the royal might and the pontifical authority.⁶

The concordat of Leo X. and Francis I. put an end to these unhappy misunderstandings. The Holy See and the prince profited, and the Church of France found again peace. In fact, it is undeniable that the capitular electors had come to lose their inde-

¹ "Ex translatione Sedis et Curie Romanæ in civitatem et ecclesiam Avenionensem, reservationibus his omnibus, non excusatio tantum parabatur, sed et perspicua quædam necessitas providendæ curiæ, et sustentandi sacrum Collegium accedebat et alia gravissima necessitas ex electionum corruptissimâ jam disciplinâ."—Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. ii., chap. xxxiii.

² Extrav. "Sancta Romana," cap. iii., *De Electione*, tit. iii., lib. i., inter communes.

³ Extrav. "Ex debito," cap. iv., *eod. tit.*

⁴ Extrav. "Ad regimen," cap. xiii., *de Præbendis*, tit. ii., lib. ii., inter communes.

⁵ See especially the famous *Pragmatic Sanction* that was adopted in the 23d sess. of this Council. Cf. also Van Espen, *op. cit.*, p. 68, No. 8.

⁶ "Electiones enim litigiosæ Romam adhuc referebantur, et ubi electus minus idoneus probabatur, id quod sæpe eveniebat, beneficium à papâ conferebatur; electiones metropolitanorum à papâ confirmandæ adhuc erant, mittendumque pallium; facile autem ille abnuebat, nostra retinenda pragmaticæ constantiâ. Ne episcopos quidem fere ordinare audebant metropolitani nisi eorum electio à papâ confirmata fuisset, propter eas quæ alioqui sæviebant, interminabiles lites."—Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. ii., cap. xxxiii., No. 8.

pendence by the daily growing influence of secular princes. The popes could not, however, endure that bishoprics became uniformly recompenses of political or literary merits—at times, of merits still less respectable—and they sought to satisfy a government anxious to keep away all internal dissension, and to give to the Church the best possible pastors. This was one of the aims of the Concordat of 1516, which was so severely judged by both the clergy and the parliamentary law makers. According to the concordat, the king presented the persons and the Pope conferred the canonical institution. This system was extended afterwards, and was perfected. Other analogous conventions renewed it or adapted it to other countries.

If we wish now to examine the legitimacy of the pontifical action in the important modifications of the electoral right, we cannot do better than reason with Bouix thus: The popes, he maintains, have not gone beyond their powers in acting as they did; for the right of electors, left to certain colleges or individuals, was exercised only in virtue of an interpretative concession, tacit or formal, of the Pope. This concession, made for the public good, could be revoked from the same motive. No one has even doubted that a bishop chosen and charged with his mission by the Pope was valid from all antiquity. But this would not have been admitted had not the Pope at the same time the right to control the election or the confirmation made by his hierarchical inferiors, whether habitual electors or confirmers. In case of conflict a decided authority was needed. We cannot admit a double principle of authority equally independent and powerful.

From these, and similar reflections, Bouix concludes, very lawfully :

“Ergo, si vere potuerit Papa episcopos legitime constituere cum solâ suâ electione et confirmatione, potuit hoc ipso illegitimos reddere electos et confirmatos ab aliis. Ergo, potuit semper irritum reddere jus quod habuerunt olim alii præter ipsum, episcopos eligendi et confirmandi. Ergo, jus illud nemo unquam habere potuit nisi ejus concessione.”

To try and follow the study of episcopal promotions, would be, so to say, to try and write anew the history of the Church. It would be interesting to speak of the attempts made by Louis XIV., by the Revolution, and by Napoleon I., to fill the vacant sees without recurring to Rome; it would be no less useful to treat of the government of the Eastern Churches, of the condition of the schismatic churches; but, it would take several volumes. Before finishing, let us say a word of the actual discipline of the Catholic Church.

1. Nowadays, the Pope chooses and names directly the per-

sons destined to fill the vacant sees within the limits of the Roman Church—the titular bishops and the vicars apostolic.

2. Some chapters, by special derogation, have yet preserved their electoral right. Such are the chapters of Cologne, Trèves, Paderborn, Münster.¹

3. France, Austria, and Spain, have concordats that leave their chiefs the right of nominating, according to fixed rules, while the Holy Father always confers the canonical institution.

4. A somewhat analogous system appears in Russia. The Holy See and the government agree as to the nominations, without the schismatic power exercising a real right of nomination, or even of official presentation.²

5. When the hierarchy was restored in England, the chapters obtained a right of presentation, which in no way binds the Sovereign Pontiff; so that, he can designate and promote a candidate different from the one recommended.³ This régime has since been applied likewise to Holland.⁴

6. In America, where there are no chapters, the method is different.⁵ The diocesan consultors and the immovable rectors of the vacant church draw up a list of three names, which list is sent to the bishops of the province. These, under the presidency of the metropolitan, or of the oldest bishop, discuss the merits of the persons proposed, and adopt or modify at pleasure the list, even substitute another, if they judge proper. The reason of this refusal, must, however, be expressed. They then send the list of their candidates to the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda. The information given about each candidate is on the following points:⁶

1. Nomen, cognomen, ætas, patria Candidati.
2. Cujus diocesis sit ac Provinciæ ecclesiasticæ?
3. Ubinam studiis theologicis vacaverit, et quo profectu?
4. An gradus assecutus fuerit, et quos?
5. An professor extiterit et cujus facultatis?
6. An et ubi missiones sacras obiverit, et quam in eis experientiam obtinuerit?
7. Quot linguas calleat, et quas?
8. Quibus officiis sit perfunctus, et quo successu?
9. Quam prudentiam exhibuerit in deliberationibus et agendi ratione?
10. An sit corpore sanus; frugi, patiens, atque in administratione rerum temporarium versatus.
11. Utrum sit propositi tenax, an ingenio mutabilis?

¹ *Const.*, "De Salute Animarum," Pii VII., an. 1821.

² *Conventio* Pii IX. cum Nicolao I., Russorum Imperatore, an. 1847, art. xii.

³ *Decret. S. Cong. de P. F.*, 21 Apr. 1852. *Collectanea, S. C.*, p. 22, No. 42; *Concilium Westmonaster*, an. 1852.

⁴ *Cong. Gener., S. C. de P. F.*, 7 Jul. 1858.

⁵ *Cf. Conc. Plen. III., Baltim.*, tit. ii., n. 14, § 1 et seq.

⁶ *Cf. Conc. Balt., II. Plen.*, tit. ii., No. 107.

12. Num gaudeat fanâ honestatis, et an fuerit numquam in eo quid contra mores?
13. An in exercendis sacerdotalibus muniis sit attentus, compositus cum ædificatione, rubricarum studiosus observator?
14. An habitu, gestu, incessu, sermone, aliisque omnibus, gravitatem ac religionem præseferat?

This system safeguards, as much as possible, the most ancient practices of the Church, taking into account abuses which the experience of centuries has shown to exist. These venerable consultants and immovable rectors represent the most healthy element of the clergy.

In a certain measure, they are also the spokesmen of the Christian people whose aspirations, needs, and desires, they know. Bound to secrecy, held by solemn oath to lay aside all intrigue and partiality, they feel the greatness of the mission entrusted to them.¹ They choose three names, which are sent to the bishops of the province.² These are, in a sense, the successors of the first electoral colleges which we have seen in action in the beginning of the Church. Like their brethren of sixteen or seventeen centuries ago, they listen to the voice of the multitude, they gather various testimonies, they ask the advice of the clergy belonging to the vacant see, and, under the eye of God, they ask Him who will be the most worthy to enter their "corps d'honneur." Generally, they have not to go outside the list presented them. "Nullus invitis detur episcopus." They remember the old adage. The interest of the Church, for which a head is needed, will inspire their choice. Perhaps there is need of a young man, enterprising, capable of enduring long fatigues, painful journeys; perhaps, on the contrary, in a diocese already old and counting many members, a man of experience is needed, a man who has already passed through many trials. Perhaps discipline is to be enforced, and a canonist is necessary; or again, the neighborhood of enterprising dissidents

¹ Such was the consideration put forward by a recent writer in a pamphlet entitled "Episcopal Nominations," where the good intentions of the writer may excuse many excesses otherwise very deserving of censure. His contention was, that the bishops should be elected by the priests alone; in this, he showed a lamentable ignorance of the spirit and tradition of the Church. As far as the Council of Baltimore adopted the idea which he put forward with such exaggeration, we may admit the following: "It will certainly give her (the Church) an element of strength which she needs just now by securing a co-operation of a majority of priests, and consequently of the laity. This is a most serious point, and we do not always secure it by our present system," etc.

² Popular agitation has tried, again and again, to revive those means of intimidation which provoked the indignation and censure of the Fathers at Laodicea. Every influence was enlisted for a candidate; the daily newspapers waged an energetic campaign in his favor, etc., to such an extent, that in 1892 Rome had to interfere, and did so in such a vigorous denunciation, that we think the candidate championed in such a way in the future stands little chance of acceptance by Rome.—*Cf. Litteræ Encycl. S. C. P. F.*, 15 May, 1892. *Collectanea*, Append., p. 869, No. 2 (5).

demands a powerful dialectician, a first-class theologian. It is for those that have experience of Church government, and of the people's needs, to weigh these considerations. Placed in a higher position, they see further. More detached from the spirit of companionship, more penetrated with the heavy responsibility for souls, they are better able to reject human considerations, to regard only religious interests. They decide conscientiously before God, with all the authority of their high functions, of their ripe age, of their evangelical labors, as to the priest who seems to them to fulfil the conditions required that he may become, according to the beautiful expression of the Scriptures, the "Angel" of the faithful.

Yet above them is another hierarchical grade. In Rome there is a most august senate, whose members, instructed in all ecclesiastical sciences, trained by a long acquaintance with the world and a daily management of the most delicate affairs to the finest measure of high administration, rule, in the name and under the control of the Universal Father, the great interests of the Church. Some of them, surrounded by prudent advisers, well *au courant* with varied and serious information, are especially occupied with the development of the faith in heretic and infidel lands. They are the members of the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda. In their hands rests the last supreme decision, for the Pope will rarely reverse their choice. They study, then, the documents, they master the different pieces of information sent them, and away from local excitement and national prejudice, considering only the talents, virtues and qualities of the candidates, the needs, extent and nature of the dioceses; they make their choice as a rule from among the names presented.

This seems to us the most perfect organism the Church has yet set to work to effect useful and wise elections. Every element interested is represented, and in proportion to its worth and importance. The Christian people has no right to command; but its susceptibilities must not be outraged. The parish priests who know its needs and desires are its echo. The diocesan clergy take a natural interest in the choice of their pastor. They manifest their choice and put forward their candidates. The bishops of the province are judges sufficiently disinterested and competent; they follow the wishes of the faithful and the priests in determining him they judge worthy to take rank among them. But the jurisdiction of the bishop flows from the Vicar of Christ. He, then, more than any one else, is interested in having the Episcopal Authority confided to the person most fit to use it. As the many cares of the whole universe rest upon him and as he cannot do humanely alone such an immense work, he divides his labors among the

most eminent ecclesiastics of the world, called around him to help him with their counsels. And these men who see concentrated near them the glorious results of eighteen centuries of apostolic conquest, who know that they work with him to whom the divine co-operation has been promised forever, take up the work outlined beyond the seas. When they have decided, the Sovereign Pontiff ratifies and approves. He speaks, and in the silence surrounding him the representative of Christ on earth pronounces these words, never heard without emotion by those privileged to be present: "By the authority of God Almighty, by the authority of the Apostles Peter and Paul, and by our own, we provide for this Church in the person of N., whom we appoint as bishop and pastor in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen."

We ask any unprejudiced man, is there aught more grand, more wise, more regardful of all interests than this manner of selecting the pastors of the faithful? Surely the Roman Church has not degenerated from the primitive Church. She has, better than any other religious society, preserved the ancient spirit. Full of reverence for sacred antiquity, yet attentive to the needs of the present, she applies herself by an intelligent adaptation to preserving in their purity and developing in all their fruitfulness the institutions of the Saviour. The more we study her, the more clearly we see her faithful interpretation of His will. Here, as in all other points of dogma, of morals and of discipline, we have the delight of proving once again the oft-repeated assertion: The successors of Peter and the Church are inseparable. "*Ubi Petrus ibi Ecclesia.*"

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FREDERICK BARAGA AMONG THE OTTAWAS.¹

BEFORE the British had surrendered Detroit "and its dependencies" in 1796, the bishops of Quebec had exercised spiritual jurisdiction in the Northwest Territory. St. Anne's, of Detroit, the mother-church of the Northwest, had, from 1701 till 1782, been served by Recollect fathers, and from the latter date by distinguished secular priests from Quebec. With the change of dynastic rule occurred a change of spiritual rule from the Canadian to the American hierarchy.

In 1796 Bishop Carroll sent the Sulpician, Father Michael Levadoux, to assume possession under his see; upon the advent of the latter, Rev. Peter Frichette, last of the illustrious line of pastors of St. Anne's, of Detroit, retired to Quebec, and Father Levadoux became the first incumbent under American hierarchical auspices of this ancient parish.

In 1798 Father Levadoux was recalled to France, but his departure was deferred for two years, to enable his successor, Rev. Gabriel Richard, who with his assistant, Rev. John Dilhet, both Sulpicians, had been transferred from Kaskaskia, Illinois, to become familiar with the situation at Detroit.

The parochial jurisdiction of St. Anne comprised a large portion of the Northwest Territory as then constituted. It extended from the head waters of Lake Erie to the Sault de Ste Marie, and beyond these rapids to distant points in Lake Superior. It included the shores and islands of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and the Georgian Bay in the Northwest; the south shores of Lake Michigan, the territory covered at the present time by Chicago, Green Bay, and the regions tributary to the St. Joseph River.

It included all of Michigan, portions of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, as these States are at present constituted. Throughout this extensive lake region, which had been sanctified by the blood as well as by the labors of some of the most distinguished missionaries of the Catholic Church during nearly all the seventeenth century, there dwelt during the first four decades of the present century several of the most prominent western and northwestern nations of the extensive Algonquian Confederacy;

¹ Frederick Baraga, born, 1797. Ordained to the priesthood at Laibach in the Austrian Empire, 1823. Serves as a priest for seven years in his native province, and resolves to devote his life to missionary work among the Indians in Michigan. Arrives at Detroit in 1831 and enters upon his missionary labors at Arbre Croche. Dies Bishop of Marquette, 1868.

including the Chippewas, the Ottawas, the Illinois, the Menominees, the Miamis, the Kikapoos, the Pottawotomis, and a colony of several thousand of the people of the Oneida nation of New York, who had settled upon the shores of Fox River in the present State of Wisconsin. With the exception of the Iroquoian colony, the other nations had occupied the soil for centuries, while their population far exceeded that of the same nations during the missionary periods of the seventeenth century.

The most ancient was the Chippewa nation, which, according to General Cass, had been hereditary custodians of the council fire of the Algonquian Confederation from remote centuries.

After Father Richard had visited that portion of his parish lying between the River Raisin and Lake St. Clair, he determined to ascertain how much of Christianity had remained among the copper-colored races of the western and northwestern dependencies of the parish of St. Anne. He embarked in June, 1799, on board a trading schooner bound for the island of Mackinac, which after a stormy voyage he finally reached.

On this island at the time was one of the most extensive trading posts of the American Fur Company. It had been the centre of an extensive Ottawa mission during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

There probably had not been a Catholic priest on the island for several decades. Its population at the time of Father Richard's visit was made up of white traders, half-breeds and Ottawa Indians. There were a few French families among the company's officials, while the family of the resident physician was Catholic. Father Richard wrote Bishop Carroll that the half-breed and Indian population had become greatly demoralized, debauchery and immorality prevailed.

He remained on the island three months; baptizing, validating those holding conjugal relations, reforming the lives of many, and teaching the children their prayers.

What this æsthetic French priest endured from contact with the vilest, probably, of the occupants of the soil, would be difficult to describe.

When he had accomplished this good work, he resumed his journey; he visited the islands in the Georgian Bay, ascended the river Saint Mary, tarried at the Sault, and after an absence of four months he returned to Detroit to permit Father Levadoux to return to France.

The Lake region, the south shore of Lake Michigan, and the old missionary station on St. Joseph River, were subsequently visited; while the great need of missionary laborers in this extensive field was fully described to Bishop Carroll.

But no priests were available. It was not until the ordination of Rev. Francis Vincent Badin, a protégé of Father Richard, by Bishop Flaget, in whose diocese Detroit had been placed, that Father Richard obtained missionary aid. But in the interim he had visited at times all these upper lake dependencies, in order to keep alive what little faith existed. Father Badin in 1825 made a missionary tour and was very successful in reaping where Father Richard had sown.

Father Badin in the following year, made another tour, during which he dedicated many chapels and converted eight of the Ottawa chiefs at Arbre Croche.

To the old mission of Arbre Croche, 1740-1765, there came periodically some of the Jesuit fathers from Michilimacinac, and among these, was Father Pierre Du Jaunay, who in 1741, compiled a French-Ottawa dictionary. It is a manuscript of 581 pages in octavo, well preserved and bound; and it now forms one of the literary treasures of McGill College, Montreal. While at Arbre Croche in 1825, Father Badin found a connecting link between his mission and that of the eighteenth century, in the person of a non-agenarian Ottawa Christian, who had served mass for Father Du Jaunay.

He pointed out to Father Badin the place where the "black gown" used to walk up and down while reading his breviary.¹

By the persistent efforts of Father Richard, another missionary was obtained for the lake regions in 1827. Father Dejean, from Rhodéz, France, succeeded Father Badin and continued his work.

In the meantime Detroit, which deserved episcopal rank, had been placed under the jurisdiction of the see of Cincinnati created in 1822. But the pious Dominican, Bishop Fenwick, became the warm supporter of the missionary work of Father Richard in the Lake regions.

Father Bellamy arrived soon after Father Dejean and joined the latter in missionary work.

When, in 1830, Bishop Fenwick made his episcopal visitations to Father Richard's missionary centres in the Western waters, he was edified with the piety of their Christian constituents, and he wrote: "The happiest days of my life were those passed among the Ottawa and Pottawotomi Indians."

Realizing the great extent of this missionary field, Father Richard continued his efforts to increase his staff. Fathers Mazzuchelli, Stephen T. Badin, the brother of Father Francis Vincent, and Frederick Résé, the latter destined to be the first bishop of Detroit, in succession served in this missionary region of the Western

¹ Manuscripts, Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F., Indian missionary in Wisconsin.

lakes ; included within whose boundaries were all the localities celebrated in the missionary annals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

We have shown how this Lake region had for thirty-one years been under the pastoral care of the Very Reverend Gabriel Richard, the distinguished pastor of St. Anne's Church of Detroit. No such extensive field of missionary work under the supervision of one head, had existed under the metropolitan rule of the first three Archbishops, Carroll, Neale, and Mareschal. The venerable prelates, Flaget and Fenwick, had blessed this work and had personally encouraged it by the prestige of their episcopal ministrations.

It forms an interesting chapter in the history of the Church under the early American hierarchy.

It occurs to us to introduce some testimony as to the success of Father Richard's missionary work among the Ottawas of the lakes, about the time he found the assistance of his protégé, Father Francis Vincent Badin, available. It is from the pen of Colonel Thomas Lorraine McKenney, of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

In 1826, this officer was appointed joint commissioner with Governor Lewis Cass, to negotiate a treaty with the Chippewas of Lake Superior, at Fond du Lac. He wrote an account of his journey from Washington to Detroit, where he joined Governor Cass, and the expedition which the latter had organized and of their voyage by sailing vessel to Mackinac, from which island the journey was to be continued in open bateaux up St. Mary's River to the Sault, and thence along the coast of Lake Superior to its head waters at Fond du Lac.

This account was written in a series of letters to his family, which in 1827 were published by Fielding Lucas, Jr., Baltimore, under the title of "Tour to the Lakes." It is an octavo volume of 494 pages, illustrated with original sketches in colored lithographs of Indian chiefs, Indian life, places of note, councils, etc.

On their way from Mackinac to the Sault, the expedition made a detour to visit Drummond's Island, where a battalion of British troops and the sub-agent of British Indian affairs in the West, were stationed. It was in the month of July, and the following is Colonel McKenney's account of this visit :

"On landing we found there several officers of the post ; we were received with great courtesy, and invited to their quarters. After having taken wine with the officers, Captain Anderson, who was in command, showed us the garden, and accompanied us to the Indian lodges.

"There remained, of the 3000 who had been there to receive

presents, about 600, principally Ottawas. Their lodges were in fine order, and filled with many comforts; and themselves well clothed.

"After having visited them pretty generally, we arrived nearly opposite Captain Anderson's quarters, when he invited us to take tea, adding Mrs. Anderson's request to his own; and when we referred to the lateness of the hour, he overcame all further difficulties, which our wish to return to the vessel might have started, by adding, 'Mrs. Anderson has prepared tea, gentlemen, and desired me to express the hope that she may not be disappointed in seeing you.'

"As we neared the house, my attention was attracted to a building not far off, in which some persons were singing. I inquired what it meant? the Captain answered, 'The Indians are worshipping.' 'Who are they?' 'Ottawas.' 'What is their religion?' 'The Roman Catholic.' 'Have they forms of worship?' 'Yes.' And then listening awhile, said, 'I will bring you the hymn they are now singing.' It was the following. The title is French, the words Ottawa:

' Sur cet autel.

Jesus nosé

Ontetuta kisa ki kin

Hustiwenig kimanna Ti hin

Jesus nosé

Kigate pue tun

Kakik kiga Pamitun

Jesus nosé.'

There were four verses of the hymn, the first of which is given. The Colonel gives the literal translation, which, in their simple language, is a pathetic appeal to the Saviour, and the utterance of faith in His mercy.

He continues:

"The Indians that remained on the Island were, no doubt, the most improved in all respects. I believe they were from L'Arbre Croche, about twenty miles west of Michilimacinac. The Ottawas of L'Arbre Croche have been, for many years, the most improved Indians in these regions, and upwards of fifty years ago supplied Michilimacinac with corn and other articles of subsistence.

"They are the best dressed Indians I have met with, and are so superior in cleanliness and comforts, and conduct, to the Chipewas, as to be known from them by their gait and exterior."¹

In religious belief, Colonel McKenney was a Presbyterian; his testimony as to the Ottawas on this account is all the more valuable. He may have been posted by Governor Cass, who was a

¹ *Tour to the Lakes*, pp. 165-7.

warm friend of Father Richard ; which friendship originated before the pusillanimous surrender by Governor Hull, of Detroit "and its dependencies," to General Brock during the "war of 1812."

After the exit of Very Rev. Frederick Résé, in 1831, Father Baraga commenced his apostolate among the Ottawas, in May of that year.

The high-born Carniolan priest came as a missionary among a race of people such as he had never known before ; but he conceived a paternal affection for these Indians, which grew warmer as he learned the honest and simple nature of these descendants of a great race of warriors ; while they, in turn, reciprocated his affection by filial obedience, by love, esteem, and veneration.

Our recollection of the personality of Bishop Baraga is quite distinct ; but we will describe him as he appeared to us in 1855, when he was Vicar-Apostolic of Upper Michigan.

He was then 57 years old. He had spent twenty-three years of his mature life in missionary work in the Lake regions ; he had compiled and had printed the most extensive series of Indian philological works known in modern times, the last of which, a work of 334 pages, in the Chippewa language, had just then been published in Cincinnati.

But he had not laid down the missionary cross ; although, perhaps, it was heavier to carry than ever before.

He was a man frail in appearance, whose weight, apparently, would not exceed one hundred pounds. He was short in stature, with regularly proportioned frame, small feet and hands ; his features were classic, and mild in expression ; his eyes were blue, but passive ; while his face was tanned to the color of a half-breed, the general expression of which tended to abstraction. His hair, which he wore rather long, was a light brown ; it was abundant, but apparently lifeless ; it had probably become so from the necessity of keeping his head protected from the cold atmosphere in which he lived during ten months of the year.

We were present at the second Plenary Council of Baltimore in October, 1866, and we saw the bishop after he had been stricken down by an apoplectic stroke, while his purple robe was stained with blood.

When two years later the death of Bishop Baraga occurred, January 6, 1868, his obsequies were held in the cathedral of St. Peter, Marquette, Michigan ; his eulogy was delivered by the vicar-general of the diocese, Very Rev. Edward Jacker. And in this eulogy we find the most reliable outline of the life and missionary work of the bishop.

Father Jacker was ordained to the priesthood by Bishop Baraga at Sault Ste Marie in 1865. He was the confidential friend of the

bishop; he was a fine scholar, very pious, of splendid physique, and an adept in the practical use of the Chippewa and Ottawa languages.

Under such a mentor Father Jacker became a great missionary in the regions of Lake Superior; the bishop placed much reliance upon his judgment; while, when obliged to leave his diocese to go to the eastern cities or to Europe, he did not hesitate to place it in charge of Father Jacker.

Sharing the intimate life of his bishop, the associate and assistant in his philological studies, his confidant in missionary and episcopal affairs, Father Jacker, with his superb physique, and with his intelligent mind, was enabled to lighten the burden which the failing vigor of Bishop Baraga at times rendered him unable to carry. Unfortunately there has been no memoir of Father Jacker published, although it is said the material for such is in the possession of one of his brothers.¹ With his eulogy, therefore, we must be satisfied for the most authentic details of his bishop's career; while we may avail ourselves of contemporaneous testimony relating to some particular occurrences or incidents not embraced within the outline of Father Jacker's tribute.

Appleton's "Cyclopædia of American Biography" has this to say of the family of Frederick Baraga:

"His family, a younger branch of the house of Hapsburg, was the most distinguished in Illyria."

This would give princely rank and the prestige of the blood of the imperial family of Austria, to the Baraga who became a priest, who devoted his life to the evangelization of the Chippewas of Lake Superior and the Ottawas of Lakes Huron and Michigan, and who died in the purple of the Catholic Church, and was buried in his cathedral of Marquette in Lake Superior.

If this account of his lineage be authentic, and while the biographies given in Appleton are generally reliable, we can add, that in Detroit during the "forties," where Bishop Baraga while yet a priest was well known, such was the general belief as to his birth-right; it is the second instance where princely blood has coursed the veins of a Catholic priest who has won distinction on missionary fields in the United States.

The Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the apostle and founder of religion in the Allegheny mountains, 1799-1840, was the first illustrious example.² It was a good kind of blood, how-

¹ Now residing in Lake Superior.

² For an authentic comparison of princely with plebeian origin in missionary experience in North America see *Autobiographie du Pere Chaumonot, S.J.*, eminent Huronian and Iroquoian missionary and philologist, who was the son of a poor vine dresser.—*Relations*, 1639-1679.

ever, that gave life to Frederick Baraga, who first saw the light of day in his father's castle on the feast of Saints Peter and Paul, 1797. The home of the Baraga family was in Carniola, kingdom of Illyria, in the Empire of Austria, and according to one of our authorities, "in the parish of Dobernith, while the family domain was in Treffen, Unterkrain."

A glance at the map of Austria as the empire was constituted before the Napoleons of France and the kings of Prussia had interfered with her boundaries, shows Carniola in Illyria to be within the influence of the breezes from the Adriatic, not far from the port of Trieste, between Lombardy and Croatia, near the great high road to Vienna.

As the family was wealthy, Frederick Baraga was instructed in the castle by a private tutor until he was nine years old, at which early age he was sent to the neighboring college of Laibach for a preliminary course of studies. • He was the only son and heir to the family estate. The other children were two daughters.

His father evidently intended he should succeed to the family honors and perpetuate the Baraga line, and his education was shaped accordingly.

When he had finished his course at Laibach, although still a youth, he had already become an accomplished scholar. At that early age his capacity for philological study was evidenced by the fact that before he left Laibach, he could speak fluently his native Sclavonic, the French, German, Italian, Latin, and Greek languages.¹

This was in 1816. Since he had been born the star of the first Napoleon had shined brilliantly over all Europe, and then had paled in cloudy exile on St. Helena. All Europe had felt the power of the great soldier, and especially the empire of Austria.

When the Bourbons had been restored and the blessings of peace returned, a brilliant career seemed to await young Baraga; such seemingly was the impression of his father, for he sent Frederick to the University of Vienna for a five years' course of law and political science. When he graduated in 1821 his father must have complacently believed that he would leave a successor who would bring renown to the family name. Great was his disappointment, however, when Frederick announced his intention of entering the priesthood, which, at the time, was not a promising profession for such a brilliant young man. The fact was, that while gaining university honors, the young student had become convinced that his career was not destined to be a worldly one; his true vocation

¹ These facts indicate the studious nature of Frederick. German students of his rank at the time, and since, yielded to the attractions of women and wine. The mid-night lamp, and study such as his, were rare exceptions.

appeared to him to lead to the sacred ministry, and he followed the light. He commenced his theological studies at the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Laibach in 1821. His collegiate and university education enabled him to complete his theological course in two years, and he was ordained a priest September 21, 1823. He was then twenty-six years old.

If his father was disappointed in not having his family line perpetuated in the manner he had intended, he would have been consoled, had he lived, by the renown which his son shed upon the family name; first, as a missionary whose works and success have not been surpassed in North American history; second, as one of the greatest philologists in the languages of the Indians of America; and third, as a prelate whose name has added distinction to the roster of the American hierarchy.

His priestly labors were commenced in his native province, first as assistant pastor at Melitka, and then as parish priest at Smartna. It has been said of Father Baraga that he was a priest whose exemplary devotion and whose unwearied pastoral care, whose great charity, for there was much poverty succeeding the continuous wars, whose abstemious example, for there was much dissipation from the same cause, endeared him to the people among whom he ministered. No journey was too great, no hour of the night inopportune when the consolations of religion were required at his hands. He was for seven years the good shepherd in this field. If he found leisure hours they were not wasted. His had not been the education of the average young priest of those days in his country. We have seen what an accomplished graduation was his at Laibach and Vienna; with such a mind as he possessed literary labor became a diversion. With filial devotion he sought to reform, to reconstruct his native Slavonic written language, which had become to some extent hybrid. This he accomplished, and this was an appropriate beginning of what in after years he accomplished in America, which connects his name for all time in the world of letters with the languages of the Algonquin nations of North America.

Although we have seen no critical description of the works of doctrinal discussion and of devotional exercises which he wrote and published during these seven years of his pastoral life, it is said the former have been extensively republished in a translated form, while the latter continue to be used by the people for whom they were originally written. These first fruits of this distinguished mind should be collected and critically described.

In the meantime an arrangement had been made with regard to the succession to his ancestral estate. Where on the continent of Europe at that time, and since, there happened to be an only son

and heir to an estate, with one or more sisters whose marriage dowers would not be in proportion to the wealth or standing of their brother, it sometimes happened in Catholic families that the brother and heir entered holy orders. In such cases his share of the estate was made over to the sister or sisters and became a part of the marriage portion.

This custom generally prevailed in such cases as that of Father Baraga, but there are on record many examples of chivalric inheriting brothers renouncing their birthright and going forth in the world to carve out their own fortune, in order to enable their sisters to marry according to their family station.

Father Baraga renounced his rights of succession, reserving for himself an annuity of 750 Austrian florins. His intention to devote his life to the evangelization of the Indians of northern Michigan had probably been maturely considered; it was evidently among the results accomplished by Very Rev. Frederick Résé, who, while vicar-general of Cincinnati, visited Vienna to gain volunteers for these Indian missions and to establish permanent means for their support.

By the efforts of this young and distinguished prelate the Leopoldine Society of Vienna was founded, with an imperial archduchess as its patroness, whose annual allocations were to be principally applied to the support of these Michigan Indian missions of the lakes.

After his resignation as pastor had been accepted, and after some tedious formalities had been completed at Vienna, Father Baraga left that city November 12, 1830; he visited Paris, and embarked on board a sailing packet which left Havre for New York, December 1. The voyage lasted thirty days and on the last day of the month he landed on American soil in the city of New York. It required eighteen days, more than half the time consumed on the Atlantic, to reach Cincinnati, at which city he arrived January 18, 1831. He was then thirty-three years old. Here he was warmly welcomed by Bishop Fenwick, to whom he announced his intention of devoting his life to missionary work among the Indians upon the shores of the lakes and on the upper peninsula of Michigan. Access to these regions, however, during the winter season was closed.

During his detention in Cincinnati he studied the English language; while with the assistance of a young Ottawa, who was studying for the priesthood, he acquired his first knowledge of the Ottawa dialect, which he continued to study until he became a proficient in this language. But in the meantime Bishop Fenwick gave him the temporary charge of a German congregation, to whom he preached and brought many back to the performance of

their religious duties. He also performed missionary work in the city, bringing back to the fold many who had strayed away, including some who had been strangers to the sacraments from their youth. It was in Cincinnati Father Baraga had the happiness of making his first convert in America. A negro deck hand on a river steamboat discharging cargo at the levee, was fatally injured by a hogshead of sugar rolling on him; he called for a priest. Father Baraga came, received the dying negro into the church, and after he had baptized and administered to him the last sacrament, consoled him with the assurance of eternal salvation until his last breath.¹ There is food for reflection in this dying scene.

He accompanied Bishop Fenwick to Detroit, performing the work of a travelling missionary while traversing the State of Ohio.² This journey commenced April 21st, and ended May 15th. During the five days he was detained at Detroit he sought out what few Germans there were in the city, preached to them and heard their confessions.

Father Baraga left Detroit on a steamboat May 20th, which landed him at Mackinac a few days later and procuring passage in an Indian's canoe, he arrived at Arbre Croche May 28, 1831.

This locality may be easily found on a map of Michigan; it is on the south shore, at the head of Little Traverse Bay, in the waters of Lake Michigan.

Its old name has been changed to Harbor Springs, and on the map it is in Emmet County. Its Ottawa name, *Wa-gan-a-kis-si* translated into French, is *L'Arbre Croche*, "The Crooked Tree." But it was commonly used during the first half of the present century without the article, Arbre Croche.

It was a flourishing out mission of Michilimacinac during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and on this account it is classic ground in the missionary annals of *l'ancien régime*. During this period, the Hurons and the Ottawas were the elite of the Indians of the West. The Ottawa cantons had from remote centuries existed on the shores and islands of Lake Michigan and the Straits of Mackinac, but in an evil hour for their welfare, their tribes were in 1702, to a great extent induced to leave their homes on the lakes, by La Mothe Cadillac, founder of Detroit, and to build their cantons on the south shore of the strait opposite where Detroit now stands.

Their village at the *Pointe des Ottawas* was surrounded with a high enclosure, while their castle or stronghold overlooked the vicinity and the bay at the head of the strait.³

¹ Manuscripts of Rev. Walter Elliot, C.S.P.

² Manuscript of Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

³ The canton and fort of the Huron nation had been built on the north shore of the

An official report to the government of France made in 1718, describes their status as follows: "Their fort is a strong one, their cabins similar to those of the Hurons, their people industrious and well clad, and the finest formed and most athletic appearing of the Indians in the vicinity."¹ Pontiac, leader of the Ottawas from about 1750, was not a type of the average Ottawa; he was about five feet six, with a powerful frame, while as a rule the Ottawa chiefs and warriors were six feet, and finely proportioned. They continued to be industrious farmers and expert hunters, until the failure of Pontiac's league for the destruction of the English, and the establishment of Indian supremacy in the West. After the discomfiture of their leader, their castle was destroyed, their canton abandoned, while their tribes wandered back to their old homes on the lakes. From this time the decadence of the Ottawa race commenced; while the fine standard of the men remained to a great extent.

But the habits of industry and tribal thrift which had long made them happy, gradually disappeared. The British, through Sir William Johnson, sought to conciliate them, and they were paid an annuity; the payment of this annuity was continued after the war of 1812 and down to modern times; while the American government by treaty made them yearly payments in money and kind. Before the end of the eighteenth century the Ottawas of the lakes had become, what Father Richard found them in 1799, a demoralized people. The vicinity of such a trading post as was on the Island of Mackinac, where the product of one day's hunt would purchase enough raw "Ohio whiskey" to keep an Indian drunk for a week, was a temptation to which they yielded.²

Tribal rule or human influence failed to wean them from habits of debauchery, with its immoral and degrading accompaniments.

The supernatural aid invoked in their behalf by the saintly men who sought to win them to Christianity and to reform their habits, was alone effectual. It was the spectacle of their transformation from brutalized unbelievers, to pious, sober, and industrious Christians, which moved the heart of Bishop Fenwick to the extent he described in his letter, which was written just before the advent of Father Baraga.

In his missionary life, Father Baraga adapted his daily wants to the situation; he partook of the same simple food the Indians used. The people lived in bark cabins, while the young mission-

strait, but it was removed in 1733 to the south shore, where was the Huron mission, three miles below *Point des Ottawas*.

¹ N. Y. Col. Doc. ix., p. 888.

² An Indian does not get drunk like a white man, or go reeling for hours before he drinks enough to tumble him over. With a pint only of raw whiskey, the Indian will drink and drink, till he drops dead-drunk in his tracks.

ary, who had been reared in a castle, was content to live in a cabin which afforded but poor protection against the elements; while he, who had been accustomed to have a valet within call, found from necessity the way to prepare his own moderate meals.

He adopted the same mode of life which had been his rule while serving as a parish priest in Carniola. He rose early, and devoted the morning hour to meditation and prayer. He soon found the Christian elements of the population and led them to the practice of Christian life. At 5 o'clock, the little bell of his rude chapel rang out the Angelus; again at noon, and at 6 o'clock in the evening. At the early morning Mass, there were prayers recited by some of the Christians before the Holy Sacrifice was offered. When he had fully instructed the men, women, and children, who had been baptized before his coming, he turned his attention to the reclamation of the unbelievers. The services in the chapel on Sundays and festivals, consisted of High Mass and vespers, at both of which Father Baraga preached. At first, his instructions were interpreted by a competent lady whom Bishop Fenwick had sent to him, but he soon became sufficiently proficient in the Ottawa dialect to address his remarks direct to his hearers. These services attracted the attention of the unbelievers, but when any among them were found to be inclined to listen to the explanation of the Christian ceremonies they witnessed, Father Baraga sought them out, instructed them, and by prayer and perseverance prepared them for baptism.

The presence of such a man as Father Baraga, in the Ottawa community, his saintly personality, his simple and abstemious mode of living, and his devotion to missionary work, was not without its effect upon the minds of those he sought to win to Christianity.

While his work was laborious, his nourishment poor, and his dwelling but a poor protection against rain or snow, he still persevered.

In ten weeks he had baptized 75 Indian converts, young and old. During one day, which he described as a most happy one, and never to be forgotten, he baptized 11 persons.

In seven months from his coming to the mission, he had baptized 131 Indian converts, who became fervent Christians, attended church regularly, and frequented the sacraments. This was the result up to the 4th day of January, 1832. Six months later, June 24th, the number of baptisms of converts during the half-year had been 109, mostly adults. If Father Baraga's work had been laborious, if his privations had seemed great, his soul was overjoyed at what he had accomplished."¹

¹ Manuscript, Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

He found a log schoolhouse at the mission when he came, which he had repaired. During the favorable season, he gathered forty children, whom he instructed during part of the day, and then commenced his round of visits to the cabins of his neophytes, to explain and to instruct where necessary.

Bishop Fenwick came to the mission in April, 1832; and this devoted prelate was again made happy by the results of Father Baraga's missionary work. He confirmed 137 persons at this visit; another school was opened for the Ottawa girls.

Among the places he visited was Manistique, where there was an unfinished chapel.

The people of this village were mostly unbelievers; but, by assistance, he completed the chapel, dedicated it, and offered the Holy Sacrifice in it regularly. After long and careful instruction, he baptized all the people of the village except one man.

When contemplating his work at Manistique, he was inspired to write: "The thought, that in this wild spot, in the midst of the ancient forests, where but yesterday only the cries of the wild children of nature resounded, and idolatrous sacrifices were offered to the evil spirits—that on this spot now stood a temple of the living God, in which the unspotted Lamb of God was offered to the Holy Father—this thought seized me so mightily, that I wept tears of the deepest emotion, and could find no words to offer thanks to God. This poor little church is, indeed, built only of logs and of the bark of trees; but, to me, it seems a more precious temple than so many of those more costly edifices enriched with gold, and adorned with the genius of the masters, which are dishonored by the lukewarmness, and, indeed, the indecorum of those who enter them."

After the bishop's departure, and after he had seen the performance of their paschal obligations by his congregation, Father Baraga visited Beaver Island, which could be indistinctly outlined from the Lake shore at Arbre Croche.

This is the largest of the islands grouped in Lake Michigan, near the Straits of Mackinac; its circumference is about 12 miles. On Beaver Island lived a large tribe of Ottawas governed by a chief. They had been solidly pagan, until one of their warriors hearing at Mackinac of Father Baraga's renown, had the curiosity to come to Arbre Croche to see and converse with the "black gown." That man remained, was instructed, baptized, and he became a fervent Christian; he obtained a promise from the missionary that he would visit the island and preach to its people.

When the Beaver island convert returned to his tribe, he told the chief of his visit and of his conversion, and of the promise made him by the "black gown," that he would come and preach to the people of the island.

The account of this visit is minutely given by Father Baraga. He was cordially received by the chief and his people, and the honors of a distinguished guest rendered in true Indian fashion. At his first interview with the chief, he informed him that he had come upon important business, and, in accordance with Indian etiquette, he asked that a council might be assembled on the following day.

The North American Indians transact all important affairs in council ; whether it be a tribal question or a national question, a message to be received from another tribe or nation, or a chief "to raise up," a council is assembled. Father Baraga appeared before a council of the chiefs, head men and warriors of Beaver Island. He writes :

"I made a speech briefly and energetically explaining the necessity and advantage of the Christian religion, and finally requested the chief to give me an answer. He did so by his orator, saying they considered themselves happy to see a priest on their island, and that they frequently desired to adopt the Christian religion. The joy with which such an answer filled the missionary's heart can be imagined ! I remained with them some time and instructed them, and the 11th of May was the happy day on which I baptized twenty-two of these Indians."

But much hard work had to be done before the Beaver Islanders were made Christians. It was the most compact body of anti-Christians in any one place in the lake region.

In time, however, all opposition was overcome, when a chapel was built and dedicated.

That same summer he extended his apostolate to La Croix, known as Cross Village, and returned in time to preach to the head men and warriors at Arbre Croche prior to their departure for Canada to receive their annual presents from the British government. It may seem strange that Indians domiciled on American soil should go every summer to Canada and receive the bounty of the British ; but not only the Ottawas received such annuities, but many tribes of the Chippewas and of other nations did likewise. It is apparent that as late as the "thirties" the British government entertained the idea that these Indian nations might become useful allies in the West in case of war with the United States. They had been subsidized during the war of 1812 and harassed the settlements on the American frontier to a fearful extent ; in the event of another war they might be utilized in a similar manner. This was probably the policy of Sir John Johnson, son of Sir William, and controller of Indian affairs in Canada.

But this coddling with our Indian nations probably induced the United States government to hasten their removal from the frontier to a safe place west of the Mississippi. The manner in which

this was done in the case of some nations, we regret to say, was discreditable to humanity.¹

His Indians having gone to Canada to be absent three weeks or more, Father Baraga took occasion to fulfil a purpose he had much at heart.

During the long and dreary winter season of 1831-2 his nights had been devoted to the preparation for the press of a little book of 200 pages, written in the Ottawa dialect.

It was intended as a prayer book for his neophytes, containing prayers at Mass, at vespers, litanies, hymns and devotional prayers, besides a catechism.

This little book was his first philological effort in America, and he went to Detroit in August (1832) to have it printed.

It was no easy matter to have such a work go through an American press. It involved in its proof reading much labor and patience on the part of Father Baraga; but it was nevertheless published by George L. Whitney, proprietor and editor of the *Detroit Daily Advertiser*, in 1832.

If the missionary toil of Father Baraga during his first year at Arbre Croche had been incessant, we have every reason to believe that he enjoyed much satisfaction in the compilation of this little Ottawa prayer book. When he returned to his cabin, chilled with the cold and fatigued from a day's tour in the deep snow, he found his solace in this philological study, of which he was so fond. His young neophytes, boys and girls, could read and write in their native dialect. He would instruct the elder members of his fold, and then old and young, with book in hand, could assist at the solemnities in the chapel.

But the remarkable talent displayed by Father Baraga as a linguist deserves notice. We have seen how he had commenced the study of the Ottawa language upon his arrival at Cincinnati in 1831. This was his first contact with an American Indian dialect, and yet by July of the following year he had ready for printing a work of 200 pages in a language to which, a few months before, he was an utter stranger.

To Father Baraga this was an important event. His book was intended solely for the use of his Ottawa congregation; its use would make the Christian members of his fold better able to spread the light of faith among the unconverted. Linguistic contributions to the Ottawa language have been altogether limited to Catholic missionaries who have worked within the central zone of

¹ The scenes attending the forcible removal of the Pottawatomies from their homes on the St. Joseph by United States troops were heartrending. They were mostly Catholic.

Michilimacinac. The earliest of these contributions is a manuscript, extant, of 50 pages, in the Ottawa language, written by Father Louis André, S.J., 1680.¹ Father Du Jaunay sixty years later compiled his French-Ottawa dictionary, the location of which manuscript we have given. The first book printed in the Ottawa-French language appeared fifty years later. Father Augustine De Jean, a missionary under Father Richard, whom we have mentioned, had this work printed at Detroit in 1830 by George L. Whitney. It has 106 pages 18mo, and comprises prayers, hymns, devotions and catechism in French and Ottawa, designed for the use of the Ottawas living in the same lake regions where Father André had labored one hundred and fifty years previously:

But Father Baraga had the honor to compile and write the first book ever published in the Ottawa language pure and simple.

While Father Baraga in Detroit was occupied in correcting the proof sheets of his forthcoming book, an event occurred of serious import to the progress of religion in Detroit "and its dependencies." This was the death of Very Rev. Gabriel Richard, the founder of the Indian missions of the lakes, at the old presbytery of St. Anne, September 13, 1832. He died a martyr to Christian charity. By his bedside at his last moments were the tried soldiers of the cross, Francis Vincent Baden and Frederick Baraga.²

On his return to Arbre Croche he brought with him Father Saenderl, a Redemptorist missionary, whom he introduced as his assistant, and, leaving him in charge of that and of contiguous missions, he spent the year 1833 in a series of visits to the Ottawa villages; at Manistique, where he had a chapel, at Grand Traverse, and at the chief canton of the Ottawas on the Grand river. There were at the time a number of Ottawa villages in the Grand River Valley. At the chief canton a Baptist missionary had been established for some years, but he had secured only a small following. Here was the seat of the United States Indian agency for Southern Michigan; Indian traders and their white followers were numerous, with the result that the Ottawas in these cantons, who were nearly all unbelievers, had become badly demoralized. Raw Ohio whiskey could be had for twenty-five cents per gallon.

Debauchery had taken a strong hold to the great pecuniary advantage of the Indian traders. But Father Baraga built his cabin where the city of Grand Rapids now stands, and he began to preach in the Ottawa dialect. This enraged the Baptist missionary's followers, who found active allies among the traders.

¹ See memoir of Father André, S.J., by Father A. E. Jones, S.J., Archivist St. Mary's College, Montreal.

² For our sketch of the career of Father Richard see the *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xviii., No. 69, January, 1893, pp. 94-101.

They instigated a drunken crowd one night to attack Father Baraga's cabin. He had been hastily warned of their coming and had strongly barred the doors and windows. Fortunately they were too drunk to effect an entrance. Had they succeeded he would have been murdered. For hours this drunken mob besieged his cabin. Their yells were frightful. He expected every moment to see the bark roof ablaze and contemplated his death by fire. Word, however, was sent to the acting United States Marshal of the riot, and he came and dispersed the rioters.

All during this infernal uproar Father Baraga remained on his knees in prayer. Convinced of the evil brought upon this people by the abuse of liquor, he came to the conclusion to offer himself as an example. There in that cabin, but unawed by his assailants, he solemnly vowed to abstain from intoxicating drink during the whole course of his life.¹ He kept that pledge faithfully to the last. But many a time, when overcome with exhaustion, when his stomach was nauseated by unpalatable food, when shivering in his wet clothing or partly frozen during Lake Superior winters he sadly needed a glass of wine or of brandy to revive both body and mind he may have been tempted, but the night scene in his cabin on the Grand River would recur to his mind and he offered the privation to his Redeemer whenever experienced. But opposition such as this could not deter Father Baraga. He improvised a chapel and continued to preach while the number of his hearers increased, and in a short time he had baptized forty-three Ottawa converts. On Whitsunday he baptized thirty-eight, and wrote home to his sister that it was the happiest day of his life. His success continued. On the shore of Lake Michigan, west of the Grand River Valley, was Mus-ke-gon, an Ottawa village of many cabins. This Father Baraga visited. He built his cabin and a small chapel and commenced his missionary work. There was a sober and well-ordered community of Ottawas living in this village and he converted nearly all of them. There was a council assembled at Mus-ke-gon to deliberate about moving west of the Mississippi.

Father Baraga attended this council and greatly admired the native eloquence of some of the speakers. He decided to remain among the Ottawas of Grand River, and in the autumn of 1834 he made an overland journey to Detroit, probably to obtain funds for missionary necessities.²

Although many pioneers had located in Michigan, the journey

¹ Manuscript, Rev. Walter Elliott, C.S.P., from V. Rev. Father Jacker.

² Among the objects of this memorable journey was to obtain an assistant and to arrange for the printing of his second work in the Ottawa language.

to and from Detroit, which was partly in the saddle and partly on foot, exceeded any experience Father Baraga had yet had of the hardships of travel in Michigan. The journey east lasted seven days. The return journey was longer. In some bad places one horse had to carry three persons on his back, while during the last two days not a dwelling of any kind, log cabin or Indian lodge was seen until the vicinity of the Indian cantons was reached.

One fortunate result of his visit to Detroit, was the obtaining from Rt. Rev. Dr. Résé, its first bishop, the services of Rev. Andrew Viszoczky, a young Hungarian priest, who had devoted his life to missionary work among the Indians of Michigan. He was taught the English and Ottawa languages by Father Baraga.

His coming was a great solace to the latter; being from the same empire which had Vienna for her capital, he proved not only an agreeable companion but also a very pious and zealous missionary priest; he soon acquired a practical knowledge of the Ottawa dialect and was able to preach to and instruct Father Baraga's neophytes, while this missionary was, by his aid, enabled to give more attention to the reformation of the habits and to the conversion of the unbelievers.

Father Baraga had converted and baptized about two hundred Ottawas on the Grand River. He had reformed the habits of these neophytes before baptism, having won them over from their propensity to get drunk and they gradually fell into the practice of industry and thrift.

Their example had had its good effect on others; but there were opposing influences at work of such strength as he had never encountered before in his missionary experience.

The situation was this. All that part of the Grand River valley, where at the time, the Ottawa cantons were located and which embraced the field of Father Baraga's missionary labors, was an Indian reservation under the United States government.

Within the limits of this reservation, the potency of the United States Indian agent was supreme; he had for his assistance, in case of need, a small force of United States soldiers; while on any extraordinary occasion he could have a full regiment sent from Fort Dearborn, now Chicago, to the reservation. But the fate of the Ottawas had already been decided.

The outbreak of the Black Hawk war had demonstrated the danger menacing the western frontier settlements from the vicinity of such Indian nations as the Ottawas, Pottawotomis, Miamis, Illinois, and the Sac and Foxes.

During this outbreak, by adroit and prompt measures, the Pottawotomis and Prairie tribes were all assembled at Fort Dearborn, placed under guard, and regularly rationed until Black

Hawk had been captured, and his revolt had collapsed; then they were permitted to return to their cantons, placated with presents of blankets, kettles, and silver trinkets for the squaws. The following summer the Miamis, Ottawas, and Pottawotomis, were assembled in council at Fort Dearborn, and by the usual methods, these nations were induced to sign a treaty by which they ceded their reservations in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin, for reservations of five million acres of lands west of the Mississippi to each of the nations entering into treaty obligations.

But there remained the matter of form process of obtaining the assent of the separate tribes of each nation to their emigration to the West. With the Christian tribes this assent was not so easy to obtain. This duty devolved upon the Indian agent resident with each nation.

The Pottawotomis, who were mostly Christian, were reluctant to leave their homes and the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors, where for centuries this nation had occupied the soil of the fairest regions of Michigan and of Indiana, and were not unanimous; but speculators wanted their lands and means were found by the United States Indian agent to obtain the signature of a sufficient number of chiefs to make a majority in favor of removal, which being in opposition to the wishes of the minority, the latter refused to leave their homes. A regiment of United States troops was sent from Fort Dearborn to drive these Christian men, women and children, from their own homes by the bayonet and to escort them like wild cattle to the place assigned them in the far distant West.¹

Hence the painful scenes accompanying this outrage to which we have already referred. The process of obtaining the assent of the separate tribes of the Ottawas to emigration in accordance with their national treaty was then in progress. Hence the tribal councils to which all came, hence the presence of so many Indian traders on the Grand River reservation, and the debauchery prevalent while Father Baraga was there. It is certain he would not advise his converts to leave their homes. The United States government did not want a repetition of the disgraceful scenes which had blackened its reputation in the Pottawotomi removal. But the Ottawas were more efficient warriors; should there be any trouble

¹ The Christian Pottawotomis were not all expatriated; the Catholic chief Po-kagon, and others of his tribe, remained in their homes.

Among the great historical paintings which adorn the walls of the University of Notre Dame, is one representing the first meeting of its illustrious founder and his companions of the Order of the Holy Cross with the Pottawotomi Indians more than half a century ago. In this painting the distinguished artist outlines to perfection the tall and slender form of Father Sorin, while giving the peculiar and perhaps inspired reflection visible upon his face.

another general Indian war might ensue, and the development of the Western States, then in fair progress, would be retarded; Michigan, which at the time was rapidly filling with settlers, would be the theatre of this war. The Indian agent was instructed to effect the removal of the Ottawas peaceably, and to avoid the violent methods resorted to with the Pottawotomis. The government had acquired the title to the Indians' lands by treaty, while the less important details could be managed by well known methods. Besides, there was not at the time, the same sharp crowd of land sharks and speculators eager to acquire lands in Michigan there had been in Indiana and Ohio, to rush the Indian agent to rid the Territory of the original owners of the soil.

While Father Baraga was so successful in his apostolic work, this success was creating an opposition he probably was not at first aware of. The number of his converts crazed the Baptist missionary with his dozen or more followers.

The reform in the morals of the Ottawas seriously lessened the quantity of whiskey which the Indian traders had been selling; while the probability that the converted Ottawa bands would object to remove to the unknown country west of the Mississippi, would bring the Indian agent into trouble with the government at Washington for inefficiency in effecting their removal.

This functionary, as stated, was virtually controller of the reservation. That he was influenced by the sectarian missionary there is but very little doubt; that he was a sharer in the profits of the traders, through the permits he sold them for privileges on the reservation, there is every reason to believe, for that was in all probability the rule.

That Father Baraga was considered a serious obstacle to the personal interests and to the official task of the United States Indian agent, however, is beyond any question, for it is proved by the edict of the latter functionary, that the Catholic missionary should leave the reservation for the alleged reason that he was disturbing the peaceful status of its Indians, and that he would in all probability thwart, to some extent at least, the plans of the government for their removal. Father Baraga opposed this edict. Notwithstanding the efforts of Bishops R  z   and Purcell, and the intervention of Stevens T. Mason, the youthful governor of the Territory of Michigan, the Indian Department at Washington sustained the action of the Indian agent of the Grand River reservation, and Father Baraga was forced to leave the scene of his successful missionary works. The Indian agent then accomplished the conditions of the treaty of Fort Dearborn, and the Ottawas were removed to their new reservation west of the Mississippi. Father Baraga left Father Viszoczky in the Grand River valley.

This distinguished priest remained after the missions had been abandoned by the Ottawas, Christians and unbelievers alike.

His chapel was located where the city of Grand Rapids was subsequently built. Such was the rapid settlement of the newly created State of Michigan by immigrants from the older States and from Europe, that Kent county, which included the Grand River country, possessing as it did fine water-power facilities, and rich agricultural advantages, attracted from 1835 a large number of pioneer settlers.

What is now the second city in population and wealth in Michigan, was founded; and at Grand Rapids, from the time its first log house was built, until long after it had obtained commercial prominence, Father Viszoczky remained.

No other county, except perhaps Monroe, during all the "thirties" and "forties" in Michigan, outside of Wayne county, in which is Detroit, had a resident priest such as Kent county was blessed with. The nucleus of Father Viszoczky's congregation was composed of the Franco-American families whose chiefs had been connected with the Indian trade; these were not numerous; but the fact that there was a Catholic church and priest at Grand Rapids, induced many Irish, a few German, and a still smaller number of American Catholics to locate in the town or in its vicinity; and this Hungarian disciple of Father Baraga soon found himself in charge of the largest Catholic English speaking congregation in Michigan, outside of Detroit. His rude log and bark roofed chapel was replaced by St. Andrew's Church which was in time enlarged.

After twenty-five years of incessant labor, Father Viszoczky—being worn out, was placed on the superannuated list and came to Detroit, where his days were peacefully passed until he was called to his eternal reward. In 1883, Grand Rapids was created a see. St. Andrew's Church has been made a cathedral.

Where Father Baraga preached to the Ottawa Indians in their village, and where he had built his first chapel in the Grand River valley, in which he baptized the aboriginal owners of the soil more than sixty years ago, there are now five Catholic churches. The foot-prints of this holy missionary on Grand River soil, have not been trodden by generations of the Ottawa race. What the fate of these generations has been, it would be difficult to say. Their history differs but little perhaps, from that of other western Indian nations, whose presence, in their normal state, in the homes of their forefathers, had become an impediment to the settlement of the regions in which these homes were located, by the white races. The red man required ten thousand acres of wild land to constitute his hunting domain; while the white man who culti-

vated the soil, required for his support, fifty acres at the utmost. The Indian had to get out of the white man's way.

The expatriation of the tribes of the Ottawa nation, depopulated the missionary centres of Father Baraga. Arbre Croche, particularly, is a name which has a place only in the history of the past.

This locality where sixty-two years since Father Baraga preached to the Ottawas, and where, during the long winter of 1831-2, he wrote his first book in an American Indian language, has become a summer resort; while its peculiar and ancient Indian name has been changed to the common-place one of Harbor Springs. It is one of the beauty spots on the shores of Michigan's lakes. Its springs are said to be healing; they ought to be, for they were blessed by holy men from Michilimacinac more than one hundred and fifty years ago. The island of Mackinac, whose eventful history during the past is so interesting, is an example of some of the remarkable changes which have occurred during the last two decades. During the early part of this century, as has been stated, it was one of the principal stations in the western lakes of the American Fur Company, whose trappers gathered furs in regions as far west as the Pacific Ocean. The condition of the inhabitants of the island, when Father Richard first visited it in 1799, has been outlined. It had not materially changed during Father Baraga's sojourn at Arbre Croche.

Coureurs de Bois, traders, half-breeds, Ottawas and other straggling Indians, forming the lower strata of its population, came and went, season after season. The chief-factor of the American Fur Company and his staff, the officers of the garrison and their families, formed the exclusive upper circle of its population. The removal of the Ottawas was soon after followed by that of the Fur Company's depot. The garrison of two companies remained, but the trade of the island became of little account.

During the past fifty years, a Catholic church has been maintained, whose pastor visited the settlements on the islands and main shore, but his local parishioners were few. The Indian department assembled the near-by Chippewas and a few Ottawas, during the month of July of each year, and distributed the government annuities. While the Fur Company had its depot at Mackinac, and under the auspices of its factor an evangelical missionary agency was established.

The Indians have gone; the Fur Company also; and the missionary agency has been discontinued. All that was left, connecting the present with the past, was the Catholic church and the garrison of the U. S. soldiers. Since the "fifties," the island has become a favorite summer resort.

During nine months of the year it is a solitary place ; but, during June, July, and August, crowds come from far and near to enjoy the health-inspiring air, and to eat the fish caught in the cold waters of the vicinity, which are probably unsurpassed among the fresh-water species. Another great change is now going on. Congress has donated its military reservation to the State of Michigan for a State park. In the month of September, 1895, the commanding officer lowered the United States flag, which had fluttered for a century, and the troops retired to Fort Brady at Sault Ste. Marie.

The Catholic Church is all that has life on Mackinac Island connecting with its past history of more than two centuries.

Wheresoever the footprints of Father Richard and of his missionaries, and of Father Baraga and his assistants, had marked the advent of these saintly men, on the mainlands of the coast of Lake Michigan, the most wonderful transformations have taken place.

Take, for example, Chicago, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Green Bay, Muskegon, and many other cities, on both shores of the peninsula of Michigan.

The missionary career of Father Baraga had but commenced when he was forced to leave his work on the Grand River.

But a more extensive, and a far more hazardous field, was now to be entered. Some of the tribes of the once great Chippewa nation still clung to their homes on the coasts and islands of Lake Superior, towards its eastern extremity.

The condition of their people was wretched. They had lost their pride of race, succumbed to debauchery, and they were living in dire poverty. As a rule, Christianity was unknown, while idolatrous superstition prevailed. Father Baraga resolved to reform their habits, and to lead them to the knowledge and practice of Christian life.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

A HERO OF OUR DAY.

IN last September there passed from this life one who, in exile and suffering, had been for over thirty years the foremost object of veneration of a great nation and whose funeral was such as the mightiest rulers could not rival. That man was Sigismund Felinski, the former Archbishop of Warsaw, the historic capital of Poland and the centre of a nationality of twenty millions of human beings. Like Louis Kossuth, another prominent figure in the life of a nation, Archbishop Felinski had outlived the storms and struggles of his public career and spent his last years in privacy, but the difference was wide between the sentiments which each displayed in his retirement. The once popular idol of Hungary expressed nothing but disappointment and despair of the future during his declining years, while Archbishop Felinski at three score and ten busied himself with the duties of an humble parish priest and never once expressed a doubt of the ultimate triumph of right in the struggle still waged by his countrymen for faith and freedom. The man of the world had got the world's reward and found it only vanity and vexation of spirit, the Christian had borne the world's penalty for those who hold conscience as their guide; but he had won the peace which passes human understanding and in it he closed his chequered life.

Sigismund Felinski was born in 1821 in Volhynia, a province of the old Polish nation, but not included in the modern kingdom of Poland. Since the Treaty of Vienna the larger part of the former Poland has been politically incorporated with Russia, while the title "Kingdom of Poland" with a separate administration in some respects is left to the western provinces around Warsaw. Volhynia, the native province of the future Archbishop, is officially regarded as Russian soil, but its people still retain their faith and nationality in defiance of the Czar's will. The Felinski family were distinguished in science and literature. Sigismund's father who died (1831) when he was still a child was a professor in the College of Kremenetz and his Uncle Aloysius was the author of the celebrated hymn "Boze Cos Polske," "God who guards Poland," which has been to the Polish race for fifty years what the "Marseillaise" is to the Frenchman or the "Star Spangled Banner" to patriotic Americans. His mother, Eva Felinski, was also a writer of distinguished merit in the literature of Poland and her "Memoirs of Exile" ranks with Silvio Pellico's "Le Mie Prigioni."

The young Sigismund was only permitted a very brief enjoyment of his parents' care. Subsequently to his father's death his mother was accused of conspiracy (1838) against the Russian Government and transported to Siberia, leaving her six children wholly unprovided for. Her place of exile was the town of Bere-zoff near the Arctic Ocean, where Mentchikoff, the once favored Minister of Peter the Great, had been sent to die early in the last century. The children were adopted by different friends and a wealthy Polish proprietor, Count Brzozowski, took Sigismund into his family and educated him with his own children. He was sent by his benefactor to the College of Klevan and subsequently to the Russian University of Moscow, where he graduated in the Scientific Course. During his studies at Moscow he was permitted to see his mother, who had been allowed, after some years, to leave Bere-zoff for the milder climate of Saratoff in Southern Russia, though forbidden entrance to her native land. To aid her he employed nearly the whole of the allowance made for his own support by M. Brzozowski and he literally lived the life of an anchoret in the Russian capital during his university course. His yearly visit to his mother was his chief indulgence, and that, too, was commonly shared by another brother, whose expenses Sigismund defrayed out of his scanty savings. The bond of affection, which united all members of the family, was remarkable and in this respect as in others there was a strong resemblance in character between Archbishop Felinski and the late Cardinal Newman.

His university course finished, it was open to young Felinski to enter upon a professional career with very favorable prospects. He preferred to make some recompense to his benefactor by taking charge of the education of his younger boys. In the capacity of their tutor he visited Paris in 1848 and spent several months there. His acquirements and polished manners made him a favorite in society and he contracted acquaintance with many distinguished men, especially amongst the large colony of Polish emigrants. Chopin, the composer, was amongst them and in the last illness of Chopin it was Felinski who brought him a priest and secured him the consolations of the Church. About this time he conceived the wish of adopting the ecclesiastical state in his native land, and on his return to Volhynia he offered himself to Bishop Borowski as a student for the priesthood, at the age of thirty. He was received into the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Luck-Zytomir in 1851.

The life of a Catholic priest in Volhynia as in other Russian lands is a career which recalls the old penal days in Ireland. The Russian Government while tolerating their existence within limits fixed by the administration, regards the Catholic clergy with unconcealed

distrust and regulates their actions much as it would those of suspected criminals. To speak or write against the state church is felony, to administer the sacraments to any but their own parishioners is punished with transportation, and any direct communication with the Holy See involves the same penalty. It would be rebellion to build or even repair a church without government permission and the organization of confraternities for any religious purpose is equally forbidden. In every act of his life the Catholic priest is hampered by a minute legal code which restricts his motions, examines his sermons and even scrutinizes those who approach his confessional or residence. Such, however, was the career chosen by Sigismund Felinski in the flower of early manhood with every prospect of a brilliant worldly life before him.

His stay in the Zytomir Seminary only lasted two years and he was then sent by his Bishop to the Central Seminary of St. Petersburg. This is an institution for the higher education of distinguished students from all the Catholic seminaries of the Russian Empire, and has been established by the Imperial Government with the view of training the future prelates of the Church in a distinctively Russian institution, even if it allows Catholic teaching in their purely theological studies. In fact it was founded on much the same principle that induced the Protestant Ascendancy Parliament of Ireland to establish the College of Maynooth in the last century. As in Maynooth, too, the Catholic influence has dominated over the political and the Seminary of St. Petersburg has furnished no small proportion of confessors to the church in Russia. In it Felinski completed his studies and received ordination, but not for his native diocese. The Archbishop of Mohileff, whose vast diocese embraces nearly the whole of Russia east of Poland, claimed his services and his mission work began in St. Petersburg. After some time the popularity which Father Felinski attained in the capital gave umbrage to the jealous Russian police. He was in consequence named a Professor in the Ecclesiastical Academy, where he continued residing until 1862.

During these years Father Felinski had kept aloft from any share in politics, devoting himself exclusively to his priestly duties. A time had come, however, when he was forced into unsought prominence. The people of Poland began in 1860 to show symptoms of restlessness under the oppressions which had weighed on them since the overthrow of their national constitution by Nicholas I. in 1831. Warsaw became the scene of public demonstrations of a new kind. On the anniversary of the Battle of Grochow, fought under the ramparts of the Polish capital in 1830, an immense procession visited the battlefield to pray for the souls of the slain. An officious police officer, Colonel Trepoff, ordered

the crowds to disperse, but in vain. Either through mistake or in vexation at his repulse he ordered a band of Cossacks to charge the members of a procession coming from one of the Catholic churches, which was only a common funeral. Four persons were killed and forty wounded and the scandal was so great that the Governor of Warsaw, General Gortchakoff, publicly condemned the act of his subordinate. The popular feelings were inflamed terribly and found expression in the form of immense gatherings in the various Catholic churches, where unarmed crowds joined in singing patriotic hymns. These gatherings were spontaneous manifestations of public sentiment and they were highly offensive to the Russian authorities, who revenged themselves by numerous arrests and banishments. The Agricultural Society of Poland, the most important public body in the Kingdom, which had established a bank for the transfer of the land to the peasantry on a system similar to Mr. Gladstone's subsequent legislation for Ireland, was summarily suppressed and on several occasions numbers of unarmed citizens were shot down or butchered by the police and Cossacks. The Governor of Warsaw vainly tried to end this condition of turmoil and alternately apologized for the police outrages and threatened greater severities. The archbishop, Mgr. Fialkowski, was ordered to forbid the chanting of hymns in the churches, but he steadfastly refused and addressed a spirited remonstrance to the Governor of Poland against the conduct of the executive. It was almost his latest act as he died in September, 1861. An administrator of the Archdiocese was duly elected to fill his place, but only held the office a few weeks. On the 15th of October, 1861, a public funeral service was held in nearly all the Catholic churches of Warsaw in memory of Kosciusko. The police and Cossacks surrounded five congregations and kept them seventeen hours shut up in the churches, after which they drove them out by brute force and arrested nearly 2000 of every age and sex. The sensation caused both in Poland and throughout Europe by this brutal action was enormous and the administrator ordered the suspension of all services in the Catholic churches of Warsaw until the government would secure the worshippers against a repetition of such outrages. He was at once arrested, tried by court martial and sentenced to death, but he steadily refused to allow the churches to be opened. Alexander II. was deeply affected by this unexpected turn in events, which covered his government with disgrace in the eyes of the civilized world. He called the Minister of Worship for Poland, the Marquis Wielopolski, a Catholic and a Pole, but a thorough aristocrat of haughty temper, to St. Petersburg for consultation. Wielopolski advised as the only remedy that a new archbishop should be immediately

chosen. He further urged that a candidate should be proposed, who would be acceptable as a Catholic to the Holy See but not a member of the Warsaw or Polish clergy. Felinski united both qualifications and Wielopolski advised his nomination. On the following day, 15th December, 1861, a courier was dispatched to Rome with the Imperial nomination and on the 22d of the same month Pius IX. held a consistory and preconised Mgr. Felinski to the Archbishopal See of Warsaw. His consecration followed within the next month, 26th of January, 1862, and on the 9th of February, 1862, he arrived in his new diocese where he was escorted to his residence by a squadron of cavalry, so anxious was the governor to give the population the impression that their chief pastor would support with all his authority the measures of the Russian authorities.

It is hard to conceive a more difficult position for a man of conscience and honor than that in which the new archbishop found himself placed. On the one hand the Catholic population had been excited by gross oppression to the verge of open revolt, on the other he could not but be aware that against the power of Russia such a revolt could only produce still worse disaster to the whole of Poland. Under a thin mask of official respect, the Russian authorities required an absolute obedience to all their demands. On the other hand, the Catholic population demanded not less imperatively that their bishop should show his sympathy in the persecutions they were suffering for faith as well as for Fatherland. It required consummate prudence as well as fearless courage to guide Mgr. Felinski in such a conjuncture, but though a novice in public life he quickly showed that he possessed both. The churches were re-opened and at the same time he selected as vicar-general, Father Rzewuski, whose patriotism as well as his courage had been already shown. In May an order was issued by the chief of police that there should be no lighting of candles at the altars of the Blessed Virgin. The archbishop was requested by the director of public worship to order his priests to regulate their churches according to this order, with the threat that, if not, they would be liable to legal punishment. The answer of the archbishop was addressed to the Governor of Warsaw and was a respectful but firm refusal to regulate Catholic worship by governmental rules. After pointing out that the May Devotions were simply a religious observance and had been practised for many years as a part of Catholic devotion he wrote :

Considering that the practice of decorating the altars of the Saints goes back to the farthest times and that it is suggested by pure sentiments of Christian piety which religion must approve instead of condemning, I ask you, Mr. Director, to hold the

Episcopal authority excused when it cannot issue an order forbidding its clergy that which religion itself does not forbid. Allow me to add that the request made to the first dignitary of the Church in this country, to publish police regulations to his flock, offends so strongly the respect due to the character of a bishop that I hope the Director will be good enough to dispense with forwarding me similar requests for the future.

It seems easy to write such a letter for an American accustomed to no higher worldly authority than public opinion for his utterances, but it was a widely different thing to address it to an official who held the writer's liberty and life at his almost free disposal. General Luders, the governor, however did not think fit to reply directly to the courageous prelate, but the police adopted the course of entering the churches during the May Devotions and arresting arbitrarily some of the worshippers, especially women, each evening. Luders summoned the archbishop to his palace and complained bitterly of the attitude of the clergy, finishing by demanding if the archbishop knew what responsibility he was incurring. Felinski answered calmly that he felt no scruple about his action though he knew well he might be sent to Siberia. Luders gave up further attempts to make an impression on Felinski's courage for the time, but the storm continued to gather over his head.

The following month the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor, was named Lieutenant of Poland and it looked as if a conciliatory system of government was about to be tried by Russia. An educational system was drawn up by Wielopolski, which was a decided improvement on existing methods and Archbishop Felinski gave it his public approval and used all his influence to allay the excitement still prevalent among the Polish people. He endeavored to obtain from the Grand Duke some measure of freedom for the clergy and that the Bishops should be free in their choice, and also that the priests exiled to Siberia in the past year should be released. At times Constantine seemed favorably disposed on these points, but the police system was stronger than his will and the arrests continued with ever growing exasperation of the public mind.

In August the Viceroy published a proclamation inviting the Poles to trust in him and labor in concert with him in promoting the national welfare. The principal members of the proprietary signed an address in answer, in which they promised their aid on condition that the government should be Polish and that all the provinces of Poland should be united under a common head. The immediate result was the arrest of Count Zamoyski, the most prominent man in Poland, and things grew worse than before. The Polish population in the old provinces, officially sepa-

rated from Poland, joined in the movement for Home Rule and a few weeks after the arrest of Zamoyski the assembly of notables of Podolia prepared an address to the Czar pointing out the wretched condition of their country and asking for a reunion with Poland as the only remedy. The only answer was the summary arrest of the marshals and most of the signers. Everything pointed to a new outbreak and the Russian government felt it with mixed feelings of regret and anger. At this moment Archbishop Felinski had to address his first pastoral letter to his clergy and it would be hard to find braver words than it spoke at such a time. We give an extract :

My love for my country is a sacred sentiment which, like you, I have drawn from my mother's breast and from which I will never part. I am a Pole by the Divine Law and also the law of man. Our tongue, our history, our national way of life, are an inheritance which we received from our fathers and which we are bound to transmit to the coming generations. I am convinced that the Kingdom of God is not in words, but in the will, and that true love of country is not a thing of noisy clamor, but of conscientious works directed to the common welfare. The development of public instruction, the teaching of human knowledge and of morality in the schools, the organization of charitable works, and above all the formation of a truly national character by the practice of public and private virtues. Such is the sublime and useful task in which every effort adds to the common well-being of the country. But in the case of armed revolt, of conspiracies and demonstrations, when the project fails of success all sacrifices for it are lost.

Besides, can we say that our country is blameless; can we say that our misfortunes are not the punishment of the faults of our fathers and ourselves? Sincere penitence, zeal to acquire virtue and fervent and humble prayer are the surest means for our nation to recover peace and prosperity. Every one, in this direction, can help the public happiness. To build up, not to destroy, is our word of command. If we work always for God, God will be always with us.

It would be hard to find words which more clearly express the true course of a Christian patriot than this pastoral address, but it was too fearless for the suspicious rulers of Poland and its public reading was forbidden by the Grand Duke. He abandoned all idea of making the archbishop an instrument of his administration and passed further in the common course of despotic misgovernment. To crush the spirit of the people a forced conscription of the young men of Warsaw, made at police selection, was ordered, and on the night of January 15, 1863, the garrison of Warsaw filled the streets while bodies of police entered private houses and seized some thousand young men to be sent at once to distant parts of Russia as forced recruits. Similar measures followed in other cities of Poland, and on the 22d of the same month a number of conscripts who had escaped broke into open rebellion, which quickly spread through both Poland and Lithuania.

A general disarming of the population was ordered on the 16th

of February, 1863, and the Grand Duke followed it up with a proclamation calling on the peasantry to seize all suspected persons in the country districts with promises of rewards and governmental favor to the most active. The members of the Council of State of Polish birth, of whom the archbishop in virtue of his office was one, refused to join in this proclamation and resigned their offices, as did most of the government functionaries of Polish nationality. Constantine threatened and begged alternately the archbishop to withdraw his resignation and sent it back to him, while it was officially declared that he "remained in his post." Constantine declared that the two offices of Archbishop and Councillor of State could not be separated and at an interview he demanded of Mgr. Felinski if he was ready to resign both.

"I hold my place as archbishop from God and by institution received from the Holy See," was the answer. "No human power can take it from me. It has pleased you to join to it certain civil functions, which I believe I cannot discharge without violating my conscience. I have a perfect right to resign these functions. But as for my pastoral charge I cannot and I will not lay it down. Should I quit my post I would deserve the name of a hireling. With God's help I hope to prove myself a good shepherd and, if need be, to give my life for my flock."

The Grand Duke angrily replied that he wished to take the part of a rebel, and dismissed him with the declaration that by will of the emperor he would still be regarded as a state councillor. It was evident that such a state of affairs could not last, and on the 15th of March, 1863, the archbishop, making use of the privilege granted him at his consecration, addressed a letter to the Czar himself. In the general servitude of Russia it is doubtful if such a document was ever received by a Russian emperor. It is too long to give here in full, but an extract will give an idea of Felinski's character better than many pages. To appreciate the full value of this utterance, we must remember that it was addressed by an unarmed ecclesiastic who but a year before had been filling a quiet professorial chair in a seminary and whose public experience was compressed within that year. Also that it was addressed to the absolute master of the lives and liberties of a hundred millions of men, who reckoned the writer as his own subject and to whom Polish nationality and the Catholic clergy were at the time special objects of suspicion and dislike.

"Sire," wrote Felinski, "it has ever been the mission and the privilege of the Church to make its voice heard by the powers of the world in times of public misfortune. It is in the name of that privilege and duty that, as first pastor of the kingdom of Poland, I venture to address your majesty to show you the urgent needs of the people entrusted to my charge. Blood is flowing in floods and repression is only

exasperating men's minds in place of intimidating them. I beg your majesty in the name of Christian charity and of the interests of both Russia and Poland to end this war of extermination. The institutions granted by your majesty are not enough to secure the welfare of the country Poland will not be satisfied with a separate administration; she needs political life. Sire, assume the initiative in the Polish question boldly. Make Poland an independent nation united to Russia simply by your august dynasty. It is the only solution which can stop the flow of blood and lay a solid basis for a definite peace. Do not wait, sire, for the final outcome of the combat. There is more true greatness in the mercy which recoils from the shedding of blood than in the victory which depeoples a kingdom. I dare to hope that the monarch who has delivered from serfdom twenty millions of his subjects will not hesitate before the equally glorious task of restoring the happiness of a suffering nation. Pardon, sire, the frankness of my language. The moment is too serious for aught else. Pardon the pastor who, in view of overwhelming misfortunes, ventures to intercede for the flock entrusted to his charge."

Alexander made no reply to this letter, and the rebellion with its attendant carnage and executions went on. Archbishop Felinski felt there was only one course for him to follow as a Catholic prelate, and that was to abstain from taking any part in the tyranny, which he condemned while urging on his flock the criminal folly of vain resistance. He showed his people that a bishop in his sacred ministry can receive no instructions from any earthly power. The Russian government might dispose of his life, but they should not make him their accomplice in oppression. The test was soon made. The Feast of St. Mark (April 25th) is a special festival in Warsaw; but in 1863 the chief of police thought proper to forbid any celebration by the customary processions. It was not alone that he issued a proclamation to that effect, but he called on Mgr. Felinski and required him as archbishop to prohibit processions in the Catholic churches on St. Mark's Day. The archbishop replied firmly that he could not receive rules of episcopal action from police authorities, and the ceremonies were conducted as usual. The police then arrested and imprisoned all priests who had officiated, and the archbishop himself was placed under military arrest in his own residence. A few days later the Grand Duke Constantine summoned him to the viceregal palace and required him to forbid the Corpus Christi processions. Mgr. Felinski refused unless he were allowed to telegraph for instructions to the Sovereign Pontiff. "I cannot allow that," said the viceroy. "Then," replied the archbishop, "I am forced to repeat that I have no right to issue such a prohibition." "And I," said the viceroy, "will use force and what can you do? I will place soldiers at the churches and will not let processions leave their doors." The archbishop rose and replied, "If so, I will be the first to head a procession, and with the crucifix in my hand I will meet your bayonets. It will then be seen whether it is I or your highness that seeks religious war."

The processions were not stopped, but loaded cannon were turned on all the principal streets as a hint of the possible consequences. In face of this military display the archbishop attended the Uniat Church of the Basilians and celebrated divine service according to both the Latin and Slavonian rites. It was a public declaration that he regarded both Uniats and Latins as equally belonging to his flock. This point was one which the Russian government, while admitting formally, had always sought to confuse. To keep the Latin and Uniat Catholics as far as possible separated has ever been the policy of Russia, and this action of Archbishop Felinski determined the viceroy to get rid of him at any cost. A number of arrests were made by the police among the Uniat Catholics of Warsaw with a view of striking terror, and within a few weeks another requisition was made on the archbishop to employ his pastoral authority for police purposes. A Capuchin, Father Konarski, who had acted as chaplain to the insurgents under Langiewicz, was made prisoner, and the Grand Duke himself directly ordered his execution. As a preliminary he desired Archbishop Felinski to formally degrade him as an unworthy priest. The latter refused absolutely. He could not apply the rules of canon law on the orders of a civil tribunal without any trial of the accused. He was then ordered to proceed at once to St. Petersburg and there await the judgment of the Czar himself. In obedience to this order he quitted Warsaw, never to see it again, on the 14th of June, 1863, just sixteen months after his entry as its archbishop.

He was not allowed to see the Emperor, however, nor even to reach St. Petersburg. Orders on the road detained him at Gatchina for three weeks during which the Secretary of State for Poland vainly endeavored by remonstrances and threats to change his mind and get him to lend his episcopal authority to the political action of the Russian government. He was finally ordered to forward a memorial in explanation of his conduct to Alexander II. The latter read this document in the presence of a few members of his Court, one of them a Catholic lady. Turning to her in high excitement he said: "See what your Felinski has written to me! He shall never return to Warsaw while I live." Next day the archbishop was ordered to proceed at once to Jaroslaf, a city in the interior of Russia, and remain there under police surveillance. All communication with his see or the Holy Father was strictly forbidden.

The exiled archbishop thus found himself practically a solitary prisoner in a distant land and absolutely cut off from all communication with either Poland or the Church authorities. Alexander to his last moment refused to allow even his name to be mentioned

to him. The Polish insurrection was suppressed and the country deluged in blood. The vicar-general, left by Mgr. Felinski in Warsaw, was banished to Astrakhan and the two substitutes appointed by the archbishop before his departure were banished to Siberia. Nearly every diocese in Poland was deprived of its bishops by exile or death and the Russian government refused to allow successors to be appointed. Twenty years of this persecution passed and at the end Catholicity was more deeply seated than ever in the hearts of the Polish people. Mgr. Felinski in his lonely exile won the respect even of Russian officials and he was allowed to exercise priestly functions among the few Catholic residents of Jaroslaf. To the task of a simple parish priest he devoted himself as ardently as to those of head of the Church of Poland. The whole face of Europe changed in the meanwhile. The German empire had risen and France had been cast down from its pre-eminence. The war between Russia and Turkey had begun and ended. Alexander II. slept in his blood-stained grave, and still Felinski lived in exile and Warsaw continued without a head for its Church. At length the Russian government grew sick of the persecution. Negotiations were opened in 1882 with the Holy See for establishing some *modus vivendi* for the Catholic Church and the Russian empire. The new Czar agreed to allow Bishops to be appointed to the ten sees that were without them, but with regard to Warsaw it was made an indispensable condition that Mgr. Felinski should be removed from his office.

To remove a Bishop from his see is certainly within the supreme jurisdiction over the Church of the Sovereign Pontiff, but it is a power which he, like every other human being entrusted with authority is bound strictly to exercise according to the law of justice. Mgr. Felinski had done nothing but his duty in resisting the commands of the Czar, and Leo XIII. refused to deprive him of his dignity for any motive of human expediency. At such a crisis the archbishop showed the full nobleness of his character. He had told the Grand Duke Constantine, that he would suffer exile or death rather than renounce his charge, but now he placed his resignation of his dignity freely in the hands of the Sovereign Pontiff for the common welfare, March 13, 1883. The Holy Father accepted his resignation and named him Archbishop of Tarsus in *partibus infidelium*. He was then permitted to leave his place of exile and a small pension was assigned for his support, but coupled with a prohibition to enter the Russian dominions.

On leaving Russia Mgr. Felinski proceeded at once to Rome where he was received with the highest favor by the Holy Father. His journey through Austrian-Poland was a great popular ova-

tion, for Poles throughout the world recognized him as the fearless confessor and champion of fatherland. With the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff he then took up his residence in Gallicia near Cracow under the dominion of Austria. There he spent his time between literary work and priestly duties, avoiding all publicity and the honors which popular favor was anxious to bestow on him. His mode of life was most simple, but his charities exceeded the limits of his small income and even his episcopal cross was sold to help the needs of those poorer than himself. Such was his life up to last summer, when his health began to fail and, after a visit to the springs of Carlsbad, he died on the way home at the hospitable house of the Bishop of Cracow in Gallicia.

The population of Cracow, itself once the capital of Poland, gave a royal funeral to the exiled archbishop. Delegations arrived from every part of Poland. Two archbishops, five bishops and many hundred priests joined in the celebration in the old Cathedral of Wawel on the 20th of September, 1895, while the famous Sigismund, the historic bell which for centuries has tolled the funerals of Poland's kings, rang the nation's mourning over the body of the patriot prelate. His life had not been a failure, though spent so long in exile, for the Catholic faith for which he struggled still holds sway in Poland in spite of Russian bayonets and despotic schism, and Catholic Poland fitly honored her dead hero.

B. J. CLINCH.

CATHOLICISM IN THACKERAY AND DICKENS.

THE works of non-Catholic genius are often mines of Catholic sentiment. In some, more especially the writings of the great poets, this treasure is very much thrown out on the surface. Who runs may read, who passes by may know that the minds of these men, unconsciously to themselves, have been more or less formed in the school of the Mother of Souls. Thus, any one who was acquainted with Longfellow's poems, but not with his life, would easily suppose him to have been a Catholic; and Tennyson's Arthurian legends breathe the spirit, the ethics, the doctrine, the outward beauty, the inward grace of the ancient Church. In prose fiction, where the element of commonplace, the sordidness, follies and ironies of everyday life must necessarily be taken into account, the precious strata may lie deeper down; but undoubtedly they are there, if the writers are really of those great ones who understand human nature and to whom was given, each in his degree, the gift of grappling with the problem of a fallen world. A commanding intellect can find but little material and few suggestions in religions of human selection, which only meet the needs of mankind so far as shreds and patches of Catholic teaching have been retained; for genius and common sense alike tend, however unwittingly, towards the one God-created system of faith and morals.

There is a passage in a well-known novel where a lover of Shakespeare says, "You cannot speak without quoting him." This is true enough in its measure; but far truer is it that no man can dive into the secrets and sorrows, the greatness and miseries of the human soul without quoting from the abounding wisdom and knowledge of the Catholic Church, as unconsciously it may be as we often drop into Shakespearean phraseology in our ordinary conversation. Not for nothing did the Church mould the mind of Europe for fifteen centuries. A novelist, unless he be of that modern type which flouts both morals and belief, and of which type the really great writers were not, could hardly treat of sin without a tacit reference to the Church's code of laws, nor of repentance without being influenced by her doctrine of mercy and justice, nor of grief without falling back on the soothing thoughts inspired by her consolations. And as both Dickens and Thackeray were strongly imbued with a certain Christian reverence which is wanting to the inferior writers who imagine themselves to be the present wearers of their mantles, we should have a prima

facie certainty that their works would contain treasures of Catholic thought well worth digging for, even though the outer soil show but little promise of the gem-bearing deeps within.

In Dickens especially we find the rich ore of a quite exuberant good will towards men, or at least towards certain classes of men, those whom he looked on as the weaker and the more unfortunate. Undoubtedly these riches are overlaid by the spirit of exaggeration inseparable from his peculiar mental temperament and by a certain unintentional falsification of facts. Active charity would become easy, instead of being one of the most difficult of problems, if Dickens's portraits of the poor and lowly were a reproduction of real life and an extreme selfishness an accompanying mark of culture. At the same time there is no doubt that this kind of exaggeration was a protest wrung from generous natures by the almost unbearable hardships which beset the poor in former times. It is to be found in writers of an older date, and quite unlike Dickens in all their other characteristics; for instance, in Miss Edgeworth and Mr. Thomas Day, the author of "*Sandford and Merton*." In Kingsley, a writer of the forties and fifties, it was modified by his clear observation of facts which were under his eyes (widely as he went wrong when writing from foregone conclusions on subjects of which he knew nothing), and by a dispassionate study of the objects of his sympathy, of whom Dickens took a rather one-sided view as he wandered through the streets of the London that was.

But honor to all those writers, whatever their shortcomings in other respects, to whose courage and charity we owe the blessed fact that such a London no longer is nor ever will be, whose vivid and terrible word-painting startled the public conscience into a horrified inspection of the slums of the great cities! Very much the work of Dickens is it that the pathetic figure of "Jo," nameless child of want and ignorance, and the dreadful squalor of his indescribable dwelling-place, have disappeared from amongst us. And yet one cannot but wish that Jo, in the gutter but not of it, capable of gratitude and even of delicacy of feeling, sturdily truthful above all, had been reclaimed and Christianized, but not abolished. "Know it's wicked to tell a lie!" Not many a board-school boy, brought up without religion or reverence, without either outward or inward grace, knows that much, as did the outcast whom Dickens painted in such sombre yet tender shades.

In Thackeray there is far less than in Dickens of the spirit which "has compassion on the multitude." Thackeray, indeed, seldom thought about the multitude. They interested him but little. The bent of his genius was to hunt out the vulgarities and hypocrisies of every class, rather than to right the wrongs of any. Nor

can it be said that Thackeray's campaign against abuses was so successful as that of Dickens. Though he had charity, it was not quite of the sort which hopeth all things. His spirit was destructive of evil, but not exactly constructive of good.

He lacked, too, that especial attraction towards childhood which runs like a golden warp through the works of Dickens, who, non-Catholic by birth and training, yet was somehow filled with the beautiful Catholic devotion to the Sacred Infancy. Dickens's nature was of a kind to which that most joyful of mysteries would strongly appeal, as it did of old to the hearty and joy-loving people of the Merry England that once was. To such a temperament the thought of the Babe on His mother's knees hallowed the weakness of even the most pitiable and woebegone human childhood.

"It looks as if it was born yesterday," Dickens makes Bucket say of the wretched brickmaker's poor little baby; and goes on, "He is not at all rough about it; and as he turns his light gently on the infant, Mr. Snagsby is strangely reminded of another Infant encircled with light that he has seen in pictures." In the "Short Stories," and most especially in the "Christmas Carol," the same theme recurs again and again, always with the same reverent salutation to the Babe of Bethlehem, yet often, too, with a curious oblivion of the austere circumstances which surrounded the Divine Child. For Dickens's gospel is strangely alloyed with an idea of the necessity to spiritual well-being of material comfort. No wonder, perhaps. The poverty with which he was acquainted was the squalor of a hopeless heathen poor, the dreadful destitution of a people robbed of their faith. The holy poverty of a pious peasant's home in Spain or Italy, a humble and devout though infinitely distant copy of the house of Nazareth, might have shown him that even without turkey and plum-pudding, holly and punch and blazing fires, the festival of our Lord's nativity may be worthily kept; and how people whose bodies are devoid of everything except hardly-earned daily bread and scanty clothing may yet save their souls, and that generously.

The "Christmas Carol" is, of course, especially inspired by an attraction to the human gentleness and mercy of the Christ child; though the writer sees Him in the worldly setting of the observances with which a half-heathen Northern custom has surrounded the feast of Christmas. Nevertheless, the famous "Carol" stands first and foremost among all the works of Dickens as a mine of buried Catholicism.

For, in the first place, it gives us a glimpse of a very real and orthodox purgatory. This may possibly have been confused in the author's mind with the state of everlasting punishment spoken

of in the New Testament ; but to a Catholic it would seem certain that the wandering spirits of dead misers and money-getters, clogged and weighted with their safes and ledgers and keys, cannot have been of the damned. For lost souls could not feel charitably towards the living ; neither, if Marley were in hell, could he by his intercession—for it really comes to that, ridiculous as the word sounds when used in connection with Dickens's description of the ghost—have obtained the grace of Scrooge's conversion—"A chance and hope of my procuring Ebenezer." The whole incident is full of good theology. Marley is in purgatory because of his love of Mammon, and his want of mercy for his fellow-creatures ; and his prayers avail to save his old partner from a like doom. It is the general belief among Catholics, though not of faith, that the souls in purgatory can help others yet on earth, even while powerless to help themselves ; and thus the sad picture of the suffering spirit, floating out on the night air to continue his melancholy wanderings and fulfil the sentence from which he hopes to preserve his partner, is one that comes home to every Catholic heart. Also Marley's exclamation of "Mankind was my business ! The common welfare was my business ; charity, mercy, forbearance, and benevolence were all my business ! The dealings of my trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my business !" is the natural outcry of the soul whose eyes have been opened by death, and illumined by the piercing light that shines around the judgment seat.

The extreme suddenness and thoroughness of Scrooge's conversion is, of course, of a piece with the exaggeration and want of artistic shading and of fine gradations, natural to the author's mind and style. Nevertheless, it is curiously like some of the popular Spanish legends of a complete renewal of heart and transformation of sinner into saint consequent on a supernatural vision, some fiery glimpse of the things beyond the grave.

Sin and repentance, indeed, are a very favorite subject with Dickens, who always treats them from a Catholic point of view. In poor, passionate, unselfish Nancy ; in Em'ly, vain and feeble, yet never utterly lost, there is the same desperate perception of the necessity of flight from the occasions of sin ; and Nancy dies in her new contrition, while Em'ly struggles back to a fresh and untainted life. Mr. Haredale is another type. He is represented as a faithful Catholic of virtuous life, though he is strangely melancholy and devoid of the cheerfulness which as a rule comes naturally to Catholics who practice their religion. But there is something fine, though pitiable, in the story of his fall when he allows himself to be lashed into fighting the duel with Sir John Chester, when, after he has implored his enemy not to sting him into an

act of crime, the taunt of cowardice and the code of honor of the age overthrow the resistance of his conscience and his sword is steeped in that cruel enemy's blood—a sin afterwards mourned through years of penance in a Trappist monastery. In "*Bleak House*"—at once the gloomiest, the most humorous and the most graphic of all Dickens's books—we have a picture of unprofitable repentance, of all but Judas-like despair, in Lady Dedlock's hopeless, remorseful, godless death at the terrible churchyard gate.¹

Very few of these scenes are to be found on Thackeray's canvas. He seems rather to have held the opinion that, as a rule, people die as they have lived, that those defects in their character which cause their sinfulness are so little perceived by themselves, or else are looked on as of such small account that correction does not occur to them as the one thing necessary. He has, indeed, given us an easy kind of reformation in the cases of Lord Kew and the Vicomte de Florec; not that the reformed attain to any heroic degree of virtue, but that they turn in a commonplace way into the beaten path of decent and sober living.

As to the hypocrites of the various books, one is happy to think that they would be almost impossible as Catholics. When Catholics wilfully remain out of the grace of God they do so as a rule without any veneer of piety or sacrilegious show of devotion. They are openly, defiantly bad. It is only Protestantism, leaving everything to private judgment, and not even safeguarding its sacraments by any definite rule of penance, that has made the Heep and the Pecksniff possible. One of Dickens's best studies of a truculent hypocrite is the apostate Gashford, whom he paints realistically as persecuting the creed which he had disobeyed and deserted.

There is one matter in which both the great mid-century novelists were distinctly un-Catholic, and that is in their general idea of womanhood. It was the influence of the Reformation that brought into vogue the imbecile and clinging woman, no less than the aggressively strict and Puritanical woman, against both of whom there is now a too fierce reaction which is agnostic in its origin and sympathies. All these types are very far removed from the Catholic ideal, modelled on the Blessed Virgin and the saints. Shakespeare, whether he were a Catholic at heart or not, and he almost undoubtedly was, had certainly not lost sight of this great ideal of Christian womanhood; his heroines are attractive, brave, pure, kind, full of wit and of common sense. From time to time their type has been reproduced by more modern

¹ The space formerly occupied by the dreadful inter-mural burial-ground, described in *Bleak House*, is now a playground for the children of the poor districts near Drury Lane.

English authors, but only by those who have studied in the school of the Church.

Neither Thackeray nor Dickens had that grasp of the Catholic idea of womanhood which we find, for instance, in George Eliot, who could create a Dinah Morris, or, rather, could copy her from the lineaments of a Saint Catherine of Siena, and in Kingsley, who, all Protestant though he was, seems to have gone to Catholic models for his study of Grace Harvey and of Lady Ellerton. Thackeray, indeed, has painted woman, not unbeautifully in the Brown letters, but his portraits of her in his books are touched in quite otherwise. With the exception of Madame de Florac (of whose character we shall speak later when considering the direct attitude of our authors towards the Catholic religion), he has never given us a woman who was at once good, lovable, natural, and life-like. Women natural and life-like he drew by the score, but they are not high types. His vulgar women, his worldly women, his old dragons, his *intrigantes*, are studies for all time, truthful but assuredly not very pleasant ones. His good women may be real portraits of women as they existed in his day; but they are either disagreeably pedantic, displaying at every turn a conscious certainty of being infinitely more virtuous than any one else, or fatuously weak and gullible. It may almost be said that with the exception already named, Lady Jane Crawley is the only one of Thackeray's female characters who is not positively irritating to the reader. Dickens's womankind is doll-like where it is not grotesque and laughable. We who live in these latter days and are accustomed to see women foremost among the toilers, can hardly imagine that bygone ringleted woman who was always fainting or screaming and whose one remarkable point was her incapacity for every duty in life. There are, of course, sensible and highminded heroines in Dickens; but they have not the ring of reality, of an absolute human personality about their attributes. The rest, Trotwoods, Peggottys and the like are delightful caricatures, but do not seem to come out beyond the realms of the imagination. More good-naturedly drawn than Thackeray's women, those of Dickens are much more unmistakably lay figures. All, perhaps, are mementoes of the futility of female education as it existed in England in the early part of this century.

The failure of both writers to portray woman in a lovely and lovable light is the more remarkable because they could both rise to the saint-like in painting the characters of men. For instance, Colonel Newcome in his latter days is very nearly a saint. He had failed, of course, in that unfortunate lapse which seems so foreign to his nature that one marvels at the author for permitting it when he launches himself on a career of vengeful opposition to

his wretched nephew; and he is originally wanting, too, in that prudence which, even though it be "*la plus triste de toutes les vertus*," as St. Francis of Sales called it, has rarely been absent from the canonized saints. But in his patience, his mercy to the weak, his purity of heart, his shining honor, his unfailing trust in God, the noble and gentle old soldier reaches the heroic and almost climbs up to the supernatural weakness of those saints who bowed their heads before actual blows and wounds. There is no pathos in all the writings of Thackeray—who did not abound in that quality—equal to his description of the old man's beautiful meekness as the cruel tongue of his son's mother-in-law writhes about him like a lash; nothing that at once pierces and soothes the heart like that humble lying down to die, that last "Adsum" in the almshouse bed.

Then, again, the little painter, "S. S.," in the same book, is a perfect creation—a lily-white soul, which Thackeray has not allowed his spirit of satire to tarnish with so much as a touch of meanness, malice or self-seeking. And William Dobbin approaches very nearly to sanctity in the selflessness which is the inmost being of a saint. We do not see such types now in the godless and soulless, weak and useless heroes of the impure modern novelist.

Nor will the spirit of infidelity which infests the novel of our day allow us to rejoice in the presentment of such a character as Daniel Peggotty, patient, forgiving, forbearing, manly, noble, God-fearing; or in men like the sweet old Cheeryble brothers; or in the tender-heartedness of quaint but chivalrous Cuttle. All these are studies of far more than common virtue, though touched with that dash of the comic which was the favorite and prevailing colorer on the painter's wonderful palette. Daniel is strangely like the beautiful peasant studies in the works of Fernan Caballero; and Cuttle is drawn somewhat on the lines of Don Quixote, that delightful creation of a mind at once profoundly Catholic and humorous in every fibre of its being.

Much, then, of Catholic feeling, and of intuitive good theology, is to be found in these two great English novelists. But what were their direct thoughts, what was the attitude of their minds towards the Church ever ancient and ever new, the city set on a hill and which cannot be hid?

Nothing can be inferred from their ridicule of sectarian Protestantism. Thackeray especially was sure to be keenly alive to the absurdities and incongruities of the sects; but he was ever given rather to pulling down than to building up.

"Tu sais que mon esprit est fait pour le satire,"

wrote Boileau, who thus gave it to be understood that he chron-

icled the defeats of bad poets more willingly than the conquests of victorious armies; and so Thackeray, whose spirit was similarly formed, found a greater enjoyment in running a tilt against the Anglican establishment, worldly State bishops, and the sybaritic and sycophantic State clergymen of the times of Queen Anne and the Georges; or dissenting divines with austere professions and large appetites, than he would have taken in recording the triumphs of saints and martyrs.

He was very far from being anti-Christian or irreverent. No Catholic could have burst into a grander protest of indignation than was wrung from him in one of his early essays by the blasphemies of George Sand and of Heine. "Oh, awful, awful name of God! Light unbearable! mystery unfathomable! vastness immeasurable! Who are those who come forward to explain the mystery and gaze unblinking into the depths of the light, and measure the immeasurable vastness to a hair?" a rebuke which some of our modern novelists might very well take to their own hearts. And Dr. John Brown has given us a beautiful anecdote of the impression made on Thackeray by the sight of the accidentally found figure of a cross uplifted on Corstorphine Hill, dark against the clear horizon of a winter afternoon. "He gave utterance in a tremulous, gentle, and rapid voice, to what all were feeling, in the one word, 'Calvary.' All that evening he was very gentle and serious, speaking, as he seldom did, of divine things—of death, of sin, of eternity, of salvation."

Evidently, in fundamental, and so far as his times and his education and his traditions went, the novelist was a sincere Christian; and only played with the artillery of his sarcasm on what rightly sometimes and wrongly sometimes, he imagined to be a superstructure of inventions raised by human self-interest. And of Dickens, in a lesser degree, the same may be said.

As a general rule, though it was not an unbroken one, they both wrote with respect of the Catholic Church. It must be borne in mind that Dickens and Thackeray lived and worked at a time when the prevalent feeling in England towards Catholicism was almost inconceivably different to what it is now; a time when, on the one hand, the cultured few, the flower of English intellect, the pride of Oxford scholasticism, found themselves irresistibly drawn into the arms of the Church, and when on the other hand, for that very reason, every prejudice of old-fashioned ignorance was roused up to struggle against her incomprehensible fascination. In the days of the great Victorian writers, the No-Popery craze was at its height. The restoration of the hierarchy raised a storm of savagery which would be quite impossible in the England of our day; an explosion not only of un-Christian hatred,

but of unmannerly insult. The public press, which in our time is respectful enough to all men who act according to their conscience, teemed with abuse and ribaldry, grounded solely on the imaginings of the writers. "Punch," now edited by an eminent Catholic and convert, was then so offensive in jest and caricature that Richard Doyle—"the immortal gentle who signs his drawings with a D surmounted by a dickybird,"—as Thackeray calls him, withdrew, as in duty bound, from the staff. At this time Thackeray, who throughout the forties had helped more than any one else to build up with his genius the fortunes of the celebrated comic journal, had ceased to be more than an occasional and rare contributor to its pages. Then, as ever, it followed rather than led public opinion,

And public opinion in the early fifties was but an extension of that of the posse of old ladies who are depicted in the latter part of "Vanity Fair" solemnly and eagerly plotting the extinction of the Pope.

One can well imagine how the absurdity of the outcry of 1851 must have appealed to the satire which sprang in Thackeray like a fountain and to the wide human sympathies of Dickens. Dwellers in the London of the forties and fifties have told us how the tall form and quaint, shrewd face of the renowned author of "Vanity Fair" were often to be seen at the newly-opened Church of the Oratory in King William Street, where he made one of a group of eminent non-Catholics who came to hear the preaching of Newman and Faber; and how all the great intellect of the time, even though it remained outside the Church, budded and brimmed, as it were, with sap in the vigor and balm of the second spring; while Protestant stupidity and wrong-headedness opposed the inevitable resurrection with the same success that attended the setting of a guard and rolling of a stone over against the door of the sepulchre.

For intellect was out of sympathy with the Protestant howl, and even where it was not prepared to cast in its lot with the great band of converts, of whom some happily remain with us yet, it at least conceded to them willingly enough that right of private judgment which it claimed for itself. Intellect recognized the absurdity of the imitative traditional cry about "the fires of Smithfield," "foreign priestcraft," and "Bloody Mary." "That unfortunate Bloody Mary has done more harm in her grave than she ever did in her lifetime, I believe," remarks Lord George Gordon's honest servant, John Grueby, in "Barnaby Rudge," the famous book in which Dickens has immortalized his own spirit of toleration and his full appreciation of the usual meaning of anti-Popery outcries.

"They cried to be led on against the Papists," says the apostate

Gashford, speaking of the rabble, "they vowed a dreadful vengeance on their heads, they roared like men possessed—'

"But not by devils," said his lord.

"By devils, my lord. By angels!"

"Yes, oh surely, by angels, no doubt,"

said Lord George. . . . "I suppose it would be decidedly irreligious to doubt it, . . . Though there certainly were some plaguy, ill-looking characters among them."

We may almost wonder that such a book as this, which had appeared in the early forties and had been universally read, did not succeed in precluding the absurdities of 1850-51; but old-fashioned Protestantism had no sense of humor. It would have died a natural death if it had. The agitation of 1851, on which Newman, in his "Lectures," has turned the limelight of a wit as ineffable in its way as Dickens's own, was the general insurrection of old foggydom against a thing too great, too ancient and too new, to be understood by narrow minds. And nothing is so irritating to human nature, unless its outlook be very broad, as that which it is incapable of understanding.

From Foster's "Life of Dickens" it would appear that when "Barnaby Rudge" came out the author was very generally supposed to be a Catholic. This mistake arose because Dickens, wiser than the majority of non-Catholic authors, avoided those subjects of which he knew little or nothing, namely, the doctrines and practices of the Church. His sympathies and respect were with an oppressed and conscientious minority; but he never dipped into details which must have betrayed him as an outsider. Thus the only internal evidence of his Protestantism in the whole of "Barnaby Budge" is a sentence which might easily escape observation, wherein he speaks of the prostitution of a "noble word"—the word Protestant—to evil and selfish ends.

Thackeray, though equally tolerant, was not always so prudent. It is a foible of non-Catholics to fancy that they know all about the Catholic religion without ever having studied it. Even Thackeray was not above this foible. But he was well-intentioned. It must not be forgotten that his one truly amiable, pure, lovely and noble female character, Madame de Florac, is a Catholic, a veritable Monica, venerable, mild and dignified, whose prayers prevail in the end for her foolish sinner of a son.

Had Thackeray limited himself to his limning of Léonore de Florac we should have been content to applaud this one only example, in the whole of his works, of a lovable, holy and virtuous woman. But in his digressions about the other members of her family he digresses too much, and like many other Protestant writers rushes in where angels fear to tread, namely, into the con-

fessional itself, of which even the best-intentioned and most benevolent outsiders seldom have a correct idea. "Mon frère ce saint homme," says the Vicomte de Florac, speaking of his brother, the Abbé, and of his brother's former penitent, Madame d'Ivry, "ne parle jamais de Madame la Duchesse maintenant. She must have confessed to him des choses affreuses—oh oui! affreuses! ma parole d'honneur."

In another part of the book the dissolute vicomte is made to say that he does not care to frequent his home because the same saintly abbé will only *troquer* absolution against repentance. The author does not seem to know that the same may be said of every priest with faculties for hearing confessions throughout the Catholic world, nor to be aware, either, that M. de Florac was by no means obliged to confess himself to his brother. Thackeray evidently fell into the common error of not distinguishing social intercourse and ordinary conversation with a priest from sacramental confession with its solemn obligations and inviolable secrecies.

But one word above all others, will arise in the minds of those who read these reflections, and that word is "Esmond." For in "Esmond," of all his books, does Thackeray deal most directly with the Catholic religion and betray most unhappily the innate and invincible ignorance and misapprehension of the outsider. And yet he is not without a sort of tender leaning towards the Church, which he misrepresents, not without a half-puzzled appreciation of her irresistible attraction and mysterious power. Bitten as he was by the strange mania of belief in Jesuit intrigue and the occult power of what prejudice has been pleased to represent as a secret society, he yet draws in Father Holt a figure at once fascinating and to some extent sincere. Father Holt had brought Harry to think as he himself "thought with all his heart that no life was so noble, no death so desirable, as that which many brethren of his famous order were ready to undergo. By love, by a brightness of wit and good humor, which charmed all, by an authority which he knew how to assume, by a mystery and silence about him which increased the child's reverence for him, he won Harry's absolute fealty and would have kept it, doubtless, if schemes greater and more important than a poor little boy's admission into orders had not called him away."

"Schemes!" How unfortunate it is that the popular idea of a Jesuit should have appealed so intimately to Thackeray's weakness of trying to see the worst side of all people, as to betray even him, who usually valued a popular craze at its true worth, into following without inquiry the worn-out old invention! Even so, Father Holt contrasts very favorably in dignity and unselfishness, with the ludicrous cringing figure of poor Dr. Tusher; the

State parson of Anne's or the Georgian times having within himself every quality that could make him a target for the satirist's shafts. But the whole book is full of illusions and disillusion, and of incorrect deductions from equally incorrect premises and traditional cries. Because the Stuarts were a weak, injudicious, infatuated race, who discredited every cause which they made their own, and because the Catholic priesthood and laity, ground down by penal laws which Thackeray, to do him justice, by no means approves, naturally strove for the restoration of a friendly house to its senses and to its kingdom, he involves priests and Jesuits in State intrigue, fatuity and folly. There is not a shadow of ground for the supposition that the priesthood were involved in "designs against King William that were no more honorable than the ambushes of cutthroats and footpads." And in spite of Esmond's protest that he always entertained "a great reverence for Mother Church, that hath been as wickedly persecuted in England as ever. She herself persecuted,"—there can be no question that this book, in other respects one of the greatest historical novels ever written, uses stereotyped misrepresentations to point a false moral, and is, besides, a disagreeable study of religious profession in contrast with a concurrent immorality. The spirit of rebellion against central authority is perhaps at the root of its mistakes.

"I want English Church and English king," Esmond is made to say. "English Church" is not represented as very holy or venerable in this book, or as having much to say on the matter of faith and morals; still, such as it was, the nation chose it and belonged to it; and moreover, the heroine of the story, one of the author's disagreeable virtuous women, happen to be deeply attached to it. The whole is an affair of likes and dislikes, and of its not mattering particularly to what religion one belongs.

Painful as "Esmond" is, it is certainly less so than "Barry Lyndon," the most irredeemable story that Thackeray ever wrote, and containing nothing but selfishness and wickedness from cover to cover. But even in "Barry Lyndon," the ferocity of the author seems rather to lie down at the feet of the Church. He despises from his very heart the father of Barry for the apostacy which earned for him his brother's estate; he makes the son a worthy heir of such a parent; and speaks of the Irish priests alluded to with something of respect, and without the cheap-ridicule which would have been introduced into such a book by a novelist of lesser genius, writing in the dark days of half a century ago.

Of converts to Catholicism, some of whom were figures of such great note in Thackeray's day, he generally speaks with the reverence for their conscientious and often dearly-bought convictions

which one might expect from one who had listened to Faber's fervent eloquence, and to Newman's clear, concise, yet gentle words—"like falling snow," as Manning said of them. He is tender in his allusions to men who "went over." He knew that at that time their number included many distinguished persons. Of a friend of Clive Newcome's, who "belonged to the old religion," and tried to convert him, he makes Clive say, "I could not but feel a kindness and admiration for the good man. I know his works are made to square with his faith, that he dines on a crust, lives as chastely as a hermit, and gives his all to the poor."

A few pages further on, in the same book Clive expresses the feeling of the author who made him in a cry of almost pathetic yearning towards the great Church of his forefathers, yet a cry, too, which dies off mockingly into the inevitable satire, levelled chiefly against the insular church to which the writer himself belonged.

"There must be moments, in Rome especially, when every man of friendly heart, who writes himself English and Protestant, must feel a pang at thinking that he and his countrymen are separated from European Christendom. . . . One must wish sometimes that from Canterbury to Rome a pilgrim could pass and not drown beyond Dover. Of the beautiful parts of the great Mother Church I believe many people have no idea; we think of lazy friars, pining cloistered virgins, etc., and the like commonplaces of Protestant satire.

"Lo! yonder inscription, which blazes round the dome of the temple, so great and glorious it looks like heaven almost, and as if the words were written in stars—it proclaims to all the world that this is Peter, and on this rock the Church shall be built, against which hell shall not prevail. . . . Come, friend, let us acknowledge this and go and kiss the toe of St. Peter. Alas! there's the channel always between us; and we no more believe in the miracles of St. Thomas of Canterbury than that the bones of his grace John Bird, who sits in St. Thomas's chair presently, will work wondrous cures in the year 2000."

Thus it ever is with Thackeray! His fiercest sneer is reserved for his own church; yet he somehow includes all defined dogmatic religion in the same sneer and seems to refer the welfare of mankind to some hitherto undiscovered dispensation. With Dickens the case is very nearly the same. The fault was not their own. Dissatisfied with the narrowness of sects, misinformed from childhood as to the breadth and all-sufficiency for human needs of the Church with the reality of which their spirit and intellect were in sympathy, they could but present us with fragments of Catholicity and leave us regretting the accidents of birth and breeding which deprived two such minds of its entirety.

A. M. GRANGE.

POETIC PROSE VERSUS PROSAIC POETRY.

" . . . both of precept and example shows
That prose is verse and verse is merely prose,"
—Byron.

THE above verses extracted from Byron's playful criticism of Wordsworth's poetry are epigrammatic, if not quite iridescent with "a crystalline delight." There is, indeed, little of delight in them. They will, however, serve a double purpose—their condensation fits them for use as a text and their strictly prosaic thought, while it is very much in the nature of a critical boom-rang, is also itself a proof of the truth it expresses :

" Convincing all by demonstration plain
Poetic souls delight in prose insane."

Byron had evidently one ideal in poetry and "the dull disciple of the school" another. Byron, again, made verse the vehicle of very prosaic criticism. Wordsworth made prose the vehicle of an elevated, if not strictly poetical, view of his own art. Byron awoke one morning to find himself suddenly famous. Wordsworth entered slowly into a recognition which cannot be called "popular." Differing from each other, both in their ideals and in their successes, they are but symbolic of the wide fact that there are many different, and at times opposite, views respecting the nature and province of poetry. From the long history of these varying ideas one is almost led to infer that poetry is only a matter of taste and that it contains but little to serve as a basis for objective criticism. Nevertheless, the question involved is not wholly one of taste. If it were, the antagonism suggested in the title of this paper would be without justification. For tastes are almost as various as character and have had their prerogative of dignity and unassailable propriety guaranteed in every language under the sun. "Tastes differ," say the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons, who, like their ale-swilling ancestors, have no taste. "Chacun à son gout," say the heirs of the old Romans, who, like their patrons, acquired a monopoly of it.

Unless, therefore, anarchy is to reign in the republic of letters (which, by the way, the "signs of the times" almost persuade us it is going to do), we must agree with the critics that there are certain masterpieces in literature as in art, concerning which there can be no real ground for disputation. To analyze them is but to

demonstrate their possession of those characteristic excellences which constitute genius in literature. It shall not be the ambitious attempt of this paper to illustrate this postulate by an analysis of any masterpiece. Our office is the humbler one of pointing out some of the difficulties lying in the terminology of criticism.

The terms "poetry" and "prose" are, of course, the most immediate of all the divisions of literature. They are, nevertheless, while the most common, the most difficult to define. In passing to this subject, however, it might not be useless to give a slight illustration of the postulate of objective worth as opposed to the wide license claimed for itself by "taste." If Byron's diatribe against the "dull disciple of the school" be analyzed, there will be found in it neither a sentiment nor an expression rising higher than the level of the plainest prose. Rhyme there is and metre—*vox et præterea nihil*. Place in comparison with it an epistolary—and, therefore, an unpretentious and private—diatribe written by Lowell against his critics, and there will be found an unquestionable advance into the poetic realm, an imaginativeness and a rhetorical expressiveness which clearly, if not indeed very deeply, mark a distinction between poetry and prose:

"Gainst monkey's claw and ass's hoof
My studies forge me mail of proof;
I climb through paths forever new
To purer air and broader view.
What matter though they should efface
So far below my footstep's trace!"

What is poetry? What is prose? The question of their essence is an old one, going back even to the earliest dawn of history, when in truth prose and poetry were identical. "See deeply enough and you will see musically," said Carlyle. He might have substituted "poetically," and he would have announced practically the same thought. In the old days when history was just beginning to be made, men could see deeper and with less trouble than men may see now, because they had not to remove first a vast superincumbent mass of conventionality and traditional formalism,

"Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life."

Within and without themselves they saw rhythmically, not with the mathematical straight-lacedness of our modern sense of rhythm, but with that of men who could see, having their eyes "anoint of nature." Then it was that all of nature spoke to them, in the unmeasurable rhythm of the wind-furrowed grain, the slow-lapsing stream, the sun-kissed ripple, and what Wordsworth so elegantly and so truly called:

"The soft eye-music of slow-waving boughs."

"Culture" had not hampered them with a scholarship run down into pedantry. "Form," or what the Chinese call "face," had not stifled emotion with an overweening desire to be superior to feeling.

But the inevitable came at last. Prose made its appearance (perhaps at the same time as patterns), and so the critics began to discuss the nature of the newly-discovered beast. But the critics stated wrongly the real question at issue. And the world still follows their error in the query, What is poetry? Rather should we ask, What is prose? The oldest of literary monuments, the Bible, would furnish, and has furnished, very interesting material for analysis, in the attempt to answer this question. Looking through its venerable pages with the embarrassment of modern spectacles, we are too apt to furnish its poetry with a dress of the externals of poetry as we have it now—a dress which in truth the ancient melodies may not tolerate. Had the Hebrews rhythm, either accentual or quantitative? It is extremely questionable. Had they rhyme or assonance? No. And yet, without any one of these external earmarks to guide us, how shall we assert that they had poetry? Modern Philistines would certainly deny that they had. A literal and inelegant translation of the Songs of Moses and Mary, of Debora and Barac, of David and Jeremias, even the grand Song of Solomon, would appear as simple prose in its external dress. All these are, nevertheless, poetry; and Byron esteemed the Book of Job as the sublimest poem ever written.

Lacking rhyme and assonance, accentual and quantitative rhythm, modulation and cadence, in what externals did the prose of the Hebrews differ from their poetry? In a system of correspondence between the lines or verses, say some investigators into their poetical form. This is the so-called "parallelism"—synonymous when the second line varies the expression, but retains the sense, of the first; antithetic, when it contrasts with the first; whether in sense or only in expression; synthetic, when there is neither an equivalence nor a contrast, but a balancing of the propositions with respect to each other and to the completed sentence. None of these parallelisms could constitute for us anything more than a matter of the periodic style of prose.

Our distinction, therefore, between prose and poetry is, in the matter of their externals, the merest conventionality. It has been our purpose thus far to "illustrate a truism"; it shall be our purpose henceforth to "demonstrate a paradox," which, sensitive to the force and justness of Macaulay's witty criticism, we shall do at greater length. Our paradox is that prose may, and at times should, adopt some of the trappings of poetry, without thereby laying itself open to the charge of trespass. Strange to relate,

while prosaic poetry is infinitely less tolerable than poetic prose and while essentially there is no difference between the finest imaginative prose and the finest imaginative poetry, the critics still persist in drawing that line of demarcation which Walt Whitman viewed with contempt—*measurable verse*. They contend that if a man thinks poetically, he may be allowed to express himself either in ordinary prose-style or in verse; but that he may not camp on both sides of the line in the same composition, and, for a greater reason, in the same sentence. They have scarce objected to tricking out the prosiest of thought in the meretricious ornaments of metre and rhyme,—a feat of endless occurrence in English literature; while they meet with a storm of opposition the prose writer who would adorn a poetic thought with occasional use of measurable rhythm. This is a repetition of the old Roman disgust at the rounding of a sentence with a strictly quantitative adonic in the manner of a hexameter. And like that piece of Ciceronic abhorrence, it would seem to be a piece of classical pedantry, an insistence on the merest of conventional formalities.

Our paradox would cease to be one if the old, old question, what is poetry, had not been asked in every rhetoric and every essay with endless insistence. To add to the confusion, what poet has not written a poem on "The Poet?" Neither poetic expression nor poetic thought can be invoked to settle the difficulty; for these are not easy things to measure, and are found, as a matter of fact, not to have settled it. The old question returns again and again to puzzle and it would seem, to baffle, the whole fraternity of rhetoricians and critics. At last, in what must seem to be the resort of despair, the text-books have practically confessed judgment by entitling their treatment of "the other thing" verse. And so we have now the distinction of prose and verse. But again the distinction will hardly avail; for out of the hazy mist looms up a new terror. Walt Whitman scattered the devices of the text-books to the winds; wrote verse; published volumes of it, was hailed, in not illiterate circles, as the prophet of a new order; and entertained with a Spartan simplicity, typical of his "verse," men who had acquired a reputation in the "legitimate" kinds of verse. How shall his muse be measured? Rhymes are abandoned, alliterations and the rest of the tricks of the trade are regarded as puerile, and in the Camden poet even metre is discarded.

Our paradox would, as has been said above, cease, if the poetic mind were not worried perpetually over a wrong-headed question—What is Poetry? Ask instead, What is Prose? and leave the poet free to pack his thought into whatever form will best hold it;

for *Poeta est omnis scriptor* ! He is an artist, not an artisan. He creates, he does not fashion. He can crystallize the carbon—do not quarrel with him if he polish his diamond to suit himself; for he is to be a chemist first, and only secondarily to be a lapidary. Not one or two faculties (as with the metaphysician), or several (as with the scientist), but the whole man is necessary to make up the poet. He is not to be measured with a foot-rule, and he cannot be categorized and labelled. Prose or verse—the distinction should have no meaning for him; he writes poetry ! If, then, “prose” be the medium which he happens to be employing, and he becomes suddenly aware of an unsuspected beauty lining the pathway of his thought, or of some precipice of feeling at whose verge he stands, or of some mountain peak beckoning him up to the sublime heaven—why must he pause to guard himself from traditional rhythmic forms of beauty in which he is instinctively impelled to put such thoughts? For while there are some thoughts which are best expressed in what is called “prose,” others demand blank verse; others, the various rhymed metres and stanza-forms. If prose, then, has been the medium of the thought, must the writer choose either the sacrifice of his poetic thought, or its admission in a less beautiful (because unrhymic or unrhymic) form? Again the thoughts that lie on the borderland of poetry are too modest to rush into garish rhyme and rhythm; and yet, if they seek only prose dress, they lose some of the piquancy of their freshness, and must relinquish an adornment to which they are entitled.

In spite of the arbitrary line drawn between verse and prose, there are not a few examples in English of the employment of strict rhythmic prose. If the rhythmic form be not consciously employed, but the writer has nevertheless sought expression in rhythm as in the most natural form for the worthy housing of the thought, then is our contention approved by instinct itself. On the other hand, if it be sought out with conscious effort, then there is given a testimony of the unnecessarily hampering limitations of prose. A few examples will illustrate our contention.

Ruskin, writing “prose,” suddenly finds his mind filled with the beauty of the rich landscape he is describing and is allured into poetic pathways. He continues to use the prose form for a few sentences, but with scarce-noted gradations falls at last into a clearly-marked rhythm, which, if it were not for the absence of the conventional rhythming, would sound as musical as the great Wordsworthian ode. Any one on reading the description of Ruskin would certainly appreciate it as musical; but in order to draw attention to its almost mathematical precision it is given here, not in the prose form in which it is printed, but arranged into verses in the Pindaric form :

"Consider what we owe to the meadow grass, to the covering of the dark ground by that glorious enamel, by the companies of those soft, countless and peaceful spears. The fields! Follow but forth for a little time the thought of all that we ought to recognize in those words. All spring and summer is in them—

The walks by silent scented paths,
 The rests in noonday heat,
 The joy of herds and flocks,
 The power of all shepherd life and meditation,
 The life of sunlight upon the world,
 Falling in emerald streaks, and soft blue shadows,
 Where else it would have struck on the dark mould
 Or scorching dust.
 Pastures beside the pacing brooks,
 Soft banks and knolls of lowly hills,
 Thymy slopes of down
 Overlooked by the blue line of lifted sea,
 Crisp lawns all dim with early dew,
 Or smooth in evening warmth of barred sunshine,
 Dinted by happy feet,
 And softening in their fall
 The sound of loving voices."

The attentive ear will have noticed several extremely felicitous alliterations in these lines; while the constant use of poetic words, smooth sounds and other scarce definable poeticisms leave only rhyme to be added to make of the verses—not poetry, for that they already are—but an ode in its most common of forms. "The walks by silent scented paths," "pastures beside the pacing brooks," "overlooked by the blue line of lifted sea," "and softening in their fall the sound of loving voices." How gently rhythmic are these verses, and how subtly the alliteration enters as well to emphasize as to beautify words which have some close connection of meaning!

It is a great gain in effect that such rhythmic writing should not advertise itself to the reader beforehand by any division on the printed page into well-defined verses. It is rather more pleasant to enjoy a thing without a previous notification that one is expected to enjoy it. In such prose the reader is sensible of a pervading harmoniousness which suits the thought admirably, and which, if he retrace his pathway to analyze the writing, will bring to him, when he has found out the secret, only "a gentle shock of mild surprise" that such a device is not resorted to more frequently to adorn the simplicity of "prose."

Of course it would not be desirable that every poetical thought or emotion should be cast in such a mould. Variety is the spice of all good feasting, and perhaps most of all in "the feast of reason and the flow of soul." The palate will be palled at last with sweets, the eye will turn away from the soft but endless swaying of leafy boughs, the ear will grow impatient of perpetual melody. The balanced sentence is refreshing at intervals, but will soon

bring tedium in its wake. Witness the style of Sir Jonah Barrington, as regular as the rolling of a ship, and almost as likely to end in producing nausea. A typical example of how to give readers too much of a good thing is furnished by Marie Corelli's "Barabbas." An ear quite insensible to rhythm could hardly fail to awake to some appreciation of its meaning in the perusal of this tedious volume. About the same time as such a reader will have realized the fact of its melodiousness the man possessed of an ordinary ear will have become quite surfeited with rhythm. We might quote in illustration almost the whole long and tedious volume, "which," to repeat Waller's unjust criticism of "Paradise Lost," with a just application, "if its length be not considered a merit hath no other." But a few extracts must suffice.

"'Twas a face to be remembered,' said Melchoir meditatively—
Set in the solemn shadows of the trees,
'Twas a pale warning to the world!
Nevertheless, despite
Its frozen tragedy,
It was not all despair.
Remorse was written in its staring eyes—
Remorse, repentance; and for true repentance
God hath but one reply—pity and pardon!

The last three lines are quite good pentameters; indeed, the frequent use of couplets in pentameters throughout the whole novel, in places where the thought seemed to desire some special rounding off, this device is employed unsparingly. As before, illustrations would be endless, the type being like this:

"A glowing cactus-tree confronted him,
All in a seeming angry blaze of bloom."

The following could hardly have been accidental, and if the rhythmic swing of the entire book had not already fatigued the reader, would prove an acceptable mould in which to recast a fragment of "the story beautiful: "

"A little way beyond where he stood—beyond
The roses and the sentinel cactus-flowers
The dewy turf still reverently bore
The impress of a form divine that there
Had fallen prone and wept for all the world—
Wept with such tears as never yet had rained
From mortal eyes—
There, too, had lighted for a little space
A great consoling angel,
And there no human step had passed
Since the fair king of perfect love
Had gone forth patiently to die."

Again :

("One tress of her fair hair escaping)
 Glittered against her throat,—and on her lips
 Rested the tender shadow of a smile.
 Behind her flamed the sunset,—
 Round her the very air grew dense and brilliant,
 As though powdered through with the fine dust,
 Of finest amber,—
 And at her feet one fallen lily-bud
 Opened its satin petals to the light,
 Disclosing its interior heart of gold."

Again :

"Rememberest thou His shining face in death?
 Methought He wore the lightning as a crown!
 Hast thou not subtly slain the Nazarene?
 If He indeed were dead the world should know
 That thou has killed Him."

One more quotation to show to what an ambitious length the
 rhythmical device has been carried in this book :

(" I knew not what did chance to me.)
 Nevertheless it seemed I was awake,
 And wandering solitary within
 Some quiet region of eternal shade."

She paused, trembling a little, and then went on :

"A solemn depth of peace it seemed to be,
 Wherein was neither landscape, light nor air.
 Methought I stood upon a rift of rock
 Gazing far downward,—and there before mine eyes
 Were laid millions on millions of the dead,—
 Dead men and women white
 As parchment or bleached bone.
 Side by side in wondrous state they lay;
 And over them all brooded a pale shadow
 As of outspread wings.
 And as I looked upon them all and marvelled
 At their endless numbers,
 A rush of music sounded like great harps
 Swung in the wind, and far away a voice
 Thundered hosannah!" etc.

Plainly, this is not alone rhythmic prose, but mathematically rhythmic, and highly poetic in its conception and treatment. A little of this is what we have been contending for; but we think the principle has been carried entirely too far,—so far, indeed, as to make "Barabbas" constitute an argument against "poetic prose." In such a treatment, too, there is a danger to be feared like that which perpetually lurks in the caves of allegory. A step sepa-

rates allegory from mixed metaphor, pathos from bathos, the poetic from the prosaic, the sublime from the ridiculous. Notice this description in the same volume, of what a woman's scream was able to do: "Beholding this, she leaped erect, and tossing her arms distractedly above her head, gave vent to a piercing scream that drove sharp discord through the air, and brought the servants of the household running in." This sounds very much like the pathetic declaration, "I will soon follow you to the grave—in a hackney coach." Scott, although his poetic narratives read like versified prose could not write anything like this, partly for the reason that his attention was not embarrassed by a conflict between an elevated poetic style and a prose medium. Evidently, the authoress of "*Barabbas*" has overdone her cooking. What should be an occasional graceful ornamentation of prose has developed into the whole staple of the style. A straining, too noticeable to be pleasing, after poetic effect, caused her, again, to employ an almost reckless abundance of figure, comparisons, contrasts, alliterations, and bizarre expressions. A single sentence will show many of these defects, which by a writer who seeks what we have claimed to be a lawful device in poetic prose, must be guarded against with unceasing care: "And with a sharp shriek that seemed to stab the stillness with a wound. . . ." The alliteration is here too much in evidence; the figure employed is somewhat startling, and is slightly mixed," the effect being put for the cause in a strange manner. One is tempted to ask without fear of seeming hypercritical, How could anything be stabbed "with a wound?"

This illustration leads us to remark on another device used rarely with effect in prose, although of pleasing pungency when skillfully introduced into poetry. We mean alliteration. It is a lawful device, but should be sparingly employed. In a few of our proverbs it serves to accentuate related words, and perform besides something of the function of the initial letters in the old abecedaries,—that, namely, of stamping the verse or the saying on the memory: "Waste not, want not," "Where there's a will there's a way," "Many a mickle makes a muckle," "At length the fox is brought to the furrier," "Every path hath a puddle," etc. But it was reserved for the most rhythmical of all our poets to discard, with rare exceptions, rhythm as an ornament of prose, in favor of alliteration. This Swinburne has done frequently in his earlier prose, and with an iteration plainly indicative of malice prepense, in his "*Studies in Prose and Poetry*." In an earlier work, "*A Study of Shakespeare*," he occasionally indulges the alliterative temptation to excess, besides invoking at times the aid of a pentameter iambic to give a sonorous finish to a piece of

"fine writing." A few examples of the former will suffice to prove the excess: "*Fresh follies spring up in new paths of criticism, and fresh laborers in a fruitless field are at hand to gather them and to garner.*" "Though the pedagogue were Bria-reus himself who would thus bring Shakespeare under the rule of his rod or Shelly within the limit of his line, he would lack fingers on which to count the syllables that make up their music, the infinite varieties of measure that complete the changes and the chimes of perfect verse. It is but lost labor that they rise up so early, and so late take their rest; not a Scaliger or Salmasius of them all will sooner solve the riddle of the simplest than of the subtlest melody." It is not a refinement of criticism to underline the initial letters of the proper names appearing in the above extract; for the names too evidently have been selected by Swinburne not less for their sound than for their power of illustrating his thought. If not, why does he revel, a couple of pages after, in this: "The genius of Titian or of Raffaele, of Turner or of Rossetti?" In the following quotation from the same work, the alliteration becomes quite intolerable: "I must part from his presence again for a season and return to my topic in the text of Macbeth. That it is piteously rent and ragged and clipped and garbled in some of its earlier scenes, the rough construction and the poltfoot metre, lame sense and limping verse, each maimed and mangled subject of players' and printers' most treasonable tyranny. . . ." Or this: "The passion of Posthumus is noble, and patent the poison of Iachimo!" Not only the excessive use of alliteration makes these extracts faulty in style, but as well their wholly uncalled for poetical rhythm. The prosaic thought will admit of neither; and all that this singer of melodious songs has succeeded in doing is but to furnish an easy argument against the use of poetic adornment in prose. In his studies in "Prose and Poetry" he shows that added years have not brought added wisdom; if possible, his prose style has become worse—has degenerated into a tropical growth of leaf and flower and the heavy undergrowth of interweaving tendrils and interlocking branches and upshooting ferns and mosses—an impenetrable mass of luxuriant verbiage which it is safest, as well as most pleasant, to view from a distance. Without any justification in the nature of his thought and sentiment, he multiplies, with reckless ingenuity, and perverse insistence the paraphernalia of poetic expression which only poetic thought or emotion can justify, and even then can justify only within modest limits. His completed production becomes thus, not an elegant tapestry, but a "crazy quilt."

Despite the unfavorable impression left by such a preposterous use of alliteration it is, if employed with moderation and skill, a

real adornment of prose. Some of the greatest rhetoricians have not disdained to use it when a certain piquancy was desirable or a contrast of thought could be secured with more emphasis by a consonance of sound.

But, in truth, Swinburne should not be quoted against our thesis. He does not write prose colored by any poetic sentiment or emotion; and, indeed, although very rhythmical in his poetry, rarely uses rhythm in his prose. He seems to be simply a man who could not write good prose.

Possibly as fine and subtle a use of rhythm in prose as can be instanced in our literature is given by Dickens. Only where the thought will bear it and the expression will be notably enhanced in beauty does he permit himself an occasional use of it. But when he does so he furnishes us with the best of vindication for our contention. The quotations already made from Marie Corelli, and to some extent those also from Ruskin, showed a less felicitous application of rhythm to prose in the too evident cadences and modulations of the phrases. *Ars est celare artem*. The ear should applaud the beauty without being asked to assign its cause. Even if the reader, filled with the unperceived rhythm of the language, pauses to analyze it, and at length discovers the secret of its beauty, he will still be left in a pleasant doubt whether Dickens elaborated his rhythm with conscious purpose, or found himself an unconscious artist whose thought has dressed itself in the most appropriate expression. The second chapter of Martin Chuzzlewit will illustrate our meaning. It opens with a description of an autumn scene, full of accurate and artistic touches, which paint to the imagination with greater skill than most of our painters could to the eye, the mellow richness of the dying year. The description is finely poetic as well; for it clothes the landscape with life and motion and mixes in with the soulless character of all landscapes the subtle fancies of the beholder. Here the poet is discerned; and if he choose to write in what is called "prose," he may justly employ any poetic device he finds suitable for the best exposition of his theme. If he be not a true poet, and still attempts such devices, he will but furnish us with a few "purple patches" instead of a royal robe. He may not plead in apology the beauty of the scene he attempts to paint. He must himself be a poet who can clothe "the empty world that round us lies, dead shell, of soul and thought forsaken," with his own vigorous life. For Dame Nature, even in what have been styled her "various moods," is not poetic. "Old ocean's gray and melancholy waste"; Mont Blanc with its "bald, awful front"; the moon, that "doth with delight look round her when the heavens are bare"; "waters on a starry night"—all these inspiring beau-

ties, all these majestic glories have poetry in them only when looked at through poetic spectacles. It is proper to have insisted on this fact if we are to escape an avalanche of examples warring against our "paradox" that poetic prose is allowable—to the poets! Alchemy has found its best success in the laboratory, not of the scientist, but of the poet. It has there found the stone which can turn all base things into gold. It has indeed found it, not in the projection of some midnight alembic, but in the sun-warmed hearts of the children of men:

Dickens, whatever else he was, could claim to be a poet, not that he wrote good verse, for that seems to have been rather beyond his power, but, because he found that beauty in life, he saw in all of God's creatures that exquisite skill of the Divine Artisan which neither squalor could utterly deface nor sin could wholly mar,

"Which neither listlessness, nor mad endeavor
Nor man, nor boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
Can utterly abolish or destroy!"

The whole poetic treatment of this autumn scene is justified by its success. With respect to its rhythmic qualities, a few illustrations must suffice. "On the motionless branches of some trees autumn berries hung like clusters of coral beads, as in those fabled orchards where the fruits were jewels; others . . .

Showed somewhat stern and gloomy in their vigor,
As charged by nature with the admonition
That it is not to her more sensitive
And joyous favorites,
She grants the longest term of life.
Still athwart their darker boughs
The sunbeams struck out paths of deeper gold;
And the red light,
Mantling in among their swarthy branches,
Used them as foils to set their brightness off
And aid the lustre of the dying day.

A moment, and its glory was no more.
The sun went down beneath the long dark lines
Of hill and cloud which piled up in the west
An airy city,

wall heaped on wall, and battlement on battlement; the light was all withdrawn, the shining church turned cold and dark, the stream forgot to smile, the birds were silent, and

The gloom of winter dwelt on everything."

Again, describing "a dark and dreary night," in the same novel, Dickens treats the reader to a rhythmic account of the "cautious

wind" in what is almost a tone-picture, so admirably is the sound forced to echo the songs: "The earth covered with a sable pall as for the burial of yesterday; the clumps of dark trees, its giant plume of funeral feathers, waving sadly to and fro:

All hushed, all noiseless, and in deep repose,
Save the swift clouds that skim across the moon,
And the cautious wind,
As, creeping after them upon the ground,
It stops to listen, and goes rustling on,
And stops again,
And follows, like a savage on the trail.

Whither go the clouds and wind so eagerly? If, like guilty spirits, they repair to some dread conference with powers like themselves,

In what wild region do the elements
Hold council,
Or where unbend in terrible disport?

Here! Free from that cramped prison called the earth,
And out upon the waste of waters. Here, . . .

in the fury of their unchecked liberty they storm and buffet with each other, until the sea, lashed into passion like their own,

Leaps up, in ravings mightier than theirs,
And the whole scene is madness.
On, on, on,
Over the countless miles of angry space
Roll the long heaving billows.
Mountains and caves are here, and yet are not,
For what is now the one is now the other . . ."

It is questionable if the most rigid upholder of the unadorned beauty of prose would quarrel with such an unostentatious, but very sensible, rhythm. The stately but unmeasured modulations and cadences of oratorical prose, the "parallelism" of phrase and and clause and sentence, the harmony of the diction—all these are the peculiar possession of a good style in prose and are hardly to be sought in verse. But splendidly as they deck out the thought, they do not necessarily forbid such a quiet use as this of a device which our reading has led us to associate exclusively with "poetry," or at least with verse. A classical example of the felicity with which Dickens employed rhythm, and always interesting on its own account, is the description of the funeral of Little Nell in "The Old Curiosity Shop." In it the rhythm is less measurable, or rather is not so easily divided into equal verses. But it is plainly perceptible throughout. It resembles very much more a poem written in the style of an ode, with unequal lines, than it does blank verse. It is able thus almost to cheat the ear into an ap-

prehension of rhyme, somewhat after the fashion of Collins's "Ode to Evening" or Milton's translation of the "Ode to Pyrrha" of Horace. The extract is a long one, but it so well exemplifies the kind of rhythm best suited for occasional use in a piece of prose that it is here quoted almost entire :

"And now the bell—
The bell she had so often heard,
By night and day,
And listened to with solemn pleasure
Almost as a living voice—
Rung its remorseless toll, for her,
So young, so beautiful, so good.
Decrepit age, and vigorous life,
And blooming youth,
And helpless infancy, poured forth—
On crutches, in the pride of strength and health,
In the full blush of promise,
In the mere dawn of life—
To gather round her tomb.

Old men are there,
Whose eyes were dim and senses failing—
Grandmothers,
Who might have died ten years ago,
And still been old—
The deaf, the blind, the lame, the palsied,
The living dead in many shapes and forms,
To see the closing of that early grave.
What was the death it would shut in,
To that which still could crawl and creep above it?

Along the crowded path they bore her now ;
Pure as the newly fallen snow
That covered it ; whose day on earth
Had been as fleeting. Under the porch,
Where she had sat when Heaven in its mercy
Brought her to that peaceful spot,
She passed again ; and the old church
Received her in its quiet shade.
They carried her to one old nook,
Where she had many and many a time sat musing,
And laid their burden softly on the pavement.
The light streamed on it through the colored window—
A window where the boughs of trees
Were ever rustling in the summer,
And where the birds sang sweetly all day long.
With every breadth of air
That stirred among those branches in the sunshine,
Some trembling, changing light
Would fall upon her grave.

Then, when the dusk of evening had come on,
And not a sound
Disturbed the sacred stillness of the place—
When the bright moon

Poured in her light on tomb and monument,
On pillar, wall and arch, and most of all
(It seemed to them) upon her quiet grave—

In that calm time,

When outward things and inward thoughts teem with
Assurances of immortality,

And worldly hopes

And fears are humbled in the dust before them—then,

With tranquil and submissive hearts,

They turned away, and left the child with God.

When Death strikes down the innocent and young,

For every fragile form

From which he lets the panting spirit free

A hundred virtues rise,

In shapes of mercy, charity, and love,

To walk the world, and bless it.

Of every tear that sorrowing mortals shed

On such green graves,

Some good is born, some gentler nature comes.

In the Destroyer's steps there spring up bright

Creations that defy his power, and his

Dark path becomes a way of light to Heaven."

While in this extract many perfect pentameter iambics occur, and in several places consecutively, it will perhaps be objected that not a few lines are arranged in verse-form without being really rhythmic; that a little ingenuity could make almost any prose composition appear metrical if it be split up into lines of a length arranged to meet the exigencies of a preconceived theory. In answer this much of truth may be conceded to the objection that an occasional iambic swing can be observed in our English prose, due to the fact that our monosyllabic particles enter with such frequency and in such great abundance into the fabric of composition as to form a series of hinges corresponding well to the short, or rather unaccented, alternate syllables of iambic metre. But it is also equally clear that where a curious ingenuity may be able to construct verse out of such an accidental arrangement of syllables the unsuspecting ear would rarely divine the fact. On the other hand, the quotations introduced thus far to illustrate our contention first recommended themselves by their own melodious character to versified treatment before any thought had been taken to make them serve as proofs of a thesis.

To a great extent the question raised by the objection resolves itself into one of fact, and this last comes within the province of the rhythmic ear for decision. Certain it is, however, that less violence is done to the prose selected thus far for analysis, in the attempt to versify it, than must be done to several passages in Shakespeare which have been always classed as prose until Maginn suggested spacing them as blank verse. This is his attempt to

versify the porter's soliloquy in "Macbeth:" "Here's a knocking indeed! If a man || were porter of hell gate, he should have old || turning the key. Knock, knock, knock! Who's there, || in the name of Beelzebub? Here's a farmer, || that hanged himself on th' expectation || of plenty: come in time; have napkins enow || about you; here you'll sweat for't. Knock, knock! ('I) faith, || here's an equivocator, that could swear || in both the scales against either scale; (one) who || committed treason enough for God's sake, yet || could not equivocate to heaven: O come in, || equivocator. Knock, knock, knock! Who's there? || Faith, here's an English tailor come hither, || for stealing out of a French hose: come in, tailor; || here you may roast your goose. Knock, knock! never at quiet! || What are you? But this place is too cold for hell. || I'll devil-porter it no further: I had thought || to have let in some of all professions, || that go the primrose way to the everlasting bonfire (darkness). || Anon, anon! I pray you, remember the porter." After this performance the Shakesperian scholar remarks ingenuously enough that the "alterations" he proposed were "very slight—*upon* for 'on,' *i'faith* for 'faith,' and the introduction of the word *one* in a place where it is required." It is somewhat regrettable that he preferred this "labor of love" to the easier task of rejecting the bulk of the passage (wherein he would have agreed with the best of the Shakesperian emendators and critics) as spurious. Maginn also believed the succeeding dialogue to be in blank verse, and that the sleeping scene of Lady Macbeth is in blank verse, "and that so palpably that I wonder that it ever could pass for prose." Difficult as was his task in the porter's soliloquy, the arranging of the sleeping scene would prove even more so, as in some parts it is not rhythmical to any appreciable extent. Delius does not go so far as to assert that the scene is in verse, but is willing to admit that "the speeches of the doctor in this scene have a certain cadence verging on blank verse without quite gliding into it." Behind the shield of such illustrious vindicators of the Shakesperian rhythm in prose, in places where the ear would scarce surmise it, our much easier attempts to versify a prose which the uninformed ear cannot fail to find instinct with rhythm may well pass unchallenged.

Reference was made in the first part of this paper to the poetry of the Hebrews to "illustrate the truism" that poetry may appear with all appropriateness in "prose," and that the better distinction lies between poetry and verse than between poetry and prose. To bring to an end the attempt "to demonstrate a paradox," reference may be made again to the Old Testament. The twenty-fourth chapter of Proverbs ends with an Oriental apologue as daintily sketched as though it were a vignette to fill in with a few sug-

gestive strokes of the pen a blank space of some grandly printed page. It is shorter than the ordinary "Oriental apologue" of our English poets and tells its moral with greater force and finer poetic phraseology than any of them. Its translation into English will serve to point the moral to the tale of this paper. For one of the two translations we shall quote here is in rhythmic phrases, and the other lacks such melody. The first is taken from the King James' version; and it seems to us that the superiority in elegance and harmony of diction claimed for that version over the Douay translation would receive nowhere throughout the sacred text, a more striking confirmation:

"I went by the field of the slothful, and by
The vineyard of the man void of understanding:
And lo, it was all grown over with thorns,
And nettles had covered the face thereof,
And the stone wall thereof was broken down.
Then I saw, and considered it well:
I looked upon it, and received instruction,
Yet a little sleep, a little slumber,
A little folding of the hands to sleep:
So shall thy poverty come as one that
Traveleth; and thy want as an armed man."

Not only is the versification wonderfully melodious for prose, but the lines almost spontaneously fall into the form of iambic tetrameters. A silent but, if intentional, a very skillful use of alliteration, together with a traditionally "poetic" diction, heighten the poetic treatment of the composition, and could suffice to have it ranked as what is commonly called "poetry." Is it not likely that the translator of this passage, having made at first a prose draft in his work of translation, afterwards felt the propriety of dressing in a more ornate style a piece of Hebrew poetry? If not, his rendering stumbled, with exquisite felicity, on "a thing of beauty."

The Douay version seems to have aimed only at as literal a translation as possible, and not to have sought out any special adornment of the language. It is still, of course, a piece of beautiful thought, and a finely painted picture; but it suffers in contrast with the rhythmic flow of the previously quoted version:

"I passed by the field of the slothful man, and by the vineyard of a foolish man: and behold nettles had filled it wholly, and thornes had couered the face thereof, and the wal of stones was destroyed. Which when I had seen, I layd it in my hart, and by the example I learned discipline. A litle I say, thou shalt sleep, a litle thou shalt slumber, a litle shalt thou joyne thy hands together to rest: and as a poste, pouertie shal come to thee, &

beggerie as a man armed." The quaint spelling, and slightly antique flavor in the diction, of this extract from the unrevised Douay version, have been retained in order to compare it with the emendation of Challoner, and to show that in neither edition did the editors think a rhythmical cast of expression desirable: "I passed by the field of the slothful man, and by the vineyard of the foolish man: And behold it was all filled with nettles, and thorns had covered the face thereof, and the stone wall was broken down. Which when I had seen, I laid it up in my heart, and by the example I received instruction. Thou wilt sleep a little, said I, thou wilt slumber a little, thou wilt fold thy hands a little to rest: And poverty shall come to thee as a runner, and beggary as an armed man." In the first of these three versions, the translator seems to have lent an ear to the melody of the language, and to its rhythm. He inserts, for instance, "thereof" in the line, "and the stone wall (thereof) was broken down,"—evidently for the rhythmic swing to be attained by the insertion, which brings this line into consonance of rhythm with the preceding lines. In the line, "the vineyard of the man void of understanding," it would seem that he desired the play of the alliteration in "vineyard" and "void"; and that by using the phrase "void of understanding," instead of the single "foolish" he found himself able to round out a sonorous cadence in the metre which prevails throughout his whole piece of work; and that in the same way he preferred the phrase "one that traveleth," to such single words as "runner" and "poste." In Challoner's emendation the changes are in the line of improved rhythm, but probably without any view to this end.

The King James' version of this passage from Proverbs proves, we think, the desirability of a rhythmic treatment of such a poetically conceived parable. In the original Hebrew the Book of Proverbs was a poetic composition, and although our poetry has nothing in common with that of the Hebrews with respect to the external forms of expression, still there is a fitness in retaining in a translation a hint of the fact that its original is not ordinary prose. A clearly versified translation would not, indeed, be appropriate, since it would be apt to mislead a reader into supposing that the original had also a clearly defined metre—a thing which will probably forever remain a matter of the merest conjecture and surmise: it would also offer difficulties in the way of a literal version—a thing for lack of which no mere ornamentation of language would supply. Still, however true it may be that Hebrew poetry is "a poetry, not of sounds, or words, but of things," it does not follow that a mere literal rendering of the words of the original will fairly present it in our modern vernacu-

lars. A certain delicate cast, not so much of metre as of rhythm, will enhance the expression, and sufficiently intimate its discrimination from mere prose. This the Anglican version has done. It is rather couched in rhythmical, than in metrical language—a distinction which the extract given above will clearly illustrate: but the rhythm is nevertheless not identical with that large definition of rhythm implied by the word when used to describe oratorical prose. It is such a rhythm as is found best exemplified in the old Anglo-Saxon alliterative verse, where accents, and not the number of words, differentiate the poetry from prose. In the revised version of a decade of years ago, the discrimination between the prose and poetry of the Bible is set forth in the varied manner of printing; and no apparent attempt was made to have the form of expression correspond to anything like our modern idea of a poetic cast of language. With respect to the quotation from Proverbs, however, the revision did not succeed in depriving it of its old pleasant rhythms; so that it may still stand as an example of how much a mere form may add to the content of thought—how much an ear that is sensitive to melody in language can illustrate by an apt choice of words and phrases, the power and beauty of the thought.

A careful and modest use of the external ornaments of poetry may well be permitted in prose. If any warfare is to be waged in the matter of style, let it first attack the most intolerable of all the old and sanctioned literary solecisms—prosaic poetry. To dress up a prosaic thought in the finery of verse is but to call attention to its vulgarity. It is to put a tyro's daub into a Florentine frame—to print an *édition de luxe* of a screed which has been rejected by a provincial daily. And yet this very thing has been done from the beginning until now. It excuses itself on the ground of its illustrious ancestry: for some of the greatest names of literature have lent their sanction to the abuse. What is a vast amount of Pope's "poetry," for instance, but versified prose? A didactic or philosophical poem is a *contradictio in adjecto*. For the province of poetry is rather to insinuate, than to teach, Truth; rather to warm the heart, than to sharpen the mind. It was a poet who gave this piece of advice to the poetasters:

"Put all your beauty in your rhymes,
Your morals in your living."

Like Madame Sévigné, who requested one of her correspondents to open to her, not his library, but his heart, the reader of a composition which appears printed in the form of verse, has a right to expect that poetic thought shall be found underneath that form. The setting leads him instinctively to look for an inclosed

gem—he will be disappointed if he at once recognizes it to be only paste. A catalogue of names that might be used to illustrate prosaic poetry would embrace almost every name in the long annals of English poetry. And extracts from their works would alone furnish forth a great library. *Si monumentum quaeras circumspice*. Room may be made, however, for a single illustration which will serve as a type of prosaic verse in possibly its most ordinary form. In his translation of the Iliad, Chapman prefixes to the several books a versified argument :

“Apollo’s priest to th’ Argive fleet doth bring
 Gifts for his daughter, pris’ner to the king:
 For which his tendered freedom he entreats;
 But, being dismiss’d with contumelious threats,
 At Phoebus’ hands, by vengeful pray’r he seeks
 To have a plague inflicted on the Greeks.
 Which had; Achilles doth a council cite,
 Embold’ning Calchas, in the king’s despite,
 To tell the truth why they were punished so,”

And so on, through as much more verse, to give the argument of the First Book. He seems, however, to have admitted some little, though a tardy, sense of compunction after completing his little gem of verse, for he adds another, and a much briefer summary, in the distich :

“Alpha the prayer of Chryses sings:
 The army’s plague: the strife of kings.”

And Chapman was a poet, too! “Unless one’s thoughts pack more neatly in verse than in prose,” said Homer Wilbur to the young poetical aspirant in “The Biglow Papers,” “it is better to refrain. Commonplace gains nothing by being translated into rhyme.” Would not the argument have packed more neatly into prose than into such a verse—even though that verse had not included so many intolerably hissing English genitives? so many prosy and latinistic words and phrases? so little pleasurable rhythm? Would not the very plainest of prose have better suited, as well as better conveyed, its commonplace thought? If such a piece of writing, and the general principle for which it stands, go unrebuked, then an occasional dressing up of a poetic or semi-poetic thought in the midst of a prose composition may surely pass unchallenged.

The quotation from Chapman is an example of the rough-shod Pegasus of Shakespeare’s day. It is even more tolerable, because of its very roughness, than the smoother iambs which came in with Pope, and which formed a glittering ideal of rhythm for

the prosiest versifiers ever since. The prosier the thought, the more perfect the unendurable see-saw of the metre. No more is the sound an echo of the sense! Be the thought rapid or slow, rugged or smooth, intense or superficial, sublime or puerile,—the verse drags its slow length along with imperturbable grace and unconscionable peace.

The manifest evil in the whole matter is that such verse sets up a false standard by which many are misled in their inquiries into the nature of poetry. As the glittering paste passes with the vulgar for the crystallized carbon, so such a counterfeit poetry passes with the multitude for the real inspiration. It has become the vehicle for worlds of waste energy and tons of waste paper. But the judicious grieve. They have been themselves so often fooled into reading the first lines of such verses that they have come to look with suspicion on every new attempt at the heroic couplet. "The art of arranging words in that measure," says Macaulay in his essay on Addison, "so that the lines may flow smoothly, that the accents may fall correctly, that the rhymes may strike the ear strongly, and that there may be a pause at the end of every distich is an art as mechanical as that of mending a kettle or shoeing a horse, and may be learned by any human being who has sense enough to learn anything." Plainly, then, verse which serves such vulgar uses has fallen greatly from its high estate of ministering to the beauty of poetic thought. It flatters the ear and cheats the soul. It awakens expectations which it cannot satisfy. It gives intimations of a beauty which it neither conceals nor makes manifest. Serving alike the royal ambitions of poetic emotion and the meretricious aims of prosaic babbling, it tends only to confound the one with the other and to prolong a worse than useless distinction between prose and poetry. Without following Wordsworth so far as to assert that "there neither is nor can be any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition," we may safely adopt his view that "the language of prose may yet be well adapted to poetry . . . that the language of every good poem can in no respect differ from that of good prose," and that therefore good prose may well admit, on occasion, some of the less obvious adornment of poetry, the occasion being had when it is desirable to give worthy expression to some thought or some emotion, to some delicate fancy or subtle abstraction, which is too modest to advertise itself as "poetry" and which is still something above the ordinary levels of prose. Wordsworth properly inveighs against the common distinction between poetry and prose: "Much confusion has been introduced into criticism by this contradistinction of poetry and prose, instead of the more philosophical one of poetry and matter-of-fact or science. The

only strict antithesis to prose is metre; nor is this in truth a *strict* antithesis, because lines and passages of metre so naturally occur in writing prose that it would be scarcely possible to avoid them, even were it desirable." Let, then, the distinction lie between poetry and matter-of-fact, or perhaps metre, and we may rest our contention here that the thought should determine the form, whether one be writing in prose or in metre. It seems unreasonable that a writer in prose should be withheld from employing any device which can improve the expression of the thought. Prosaic poetry offers a much more profitable, however much less attractive, field for weeding-out than does poetic prose. After that task shall have been accomplished with even mediocre success, some enterprising publisher might find his advantage in issuing a complete edition of English poetry for a sum which would "place the work within reach of the masses." For of the vast quantities of verse in our language a small proportion is poetry, a larger amount is verse, and the vast remainder is prose indeed!

The overmastering desire *to analyze* is responsible for much of the embarrassment caused by the question, What is poetry? The philosophers and the rhetoricians must be able to give an answer of some kind. Accordingly, they analyze whatever is analyzable by unpoetic temperaments (and it may be stated as a general truth that the passion for analysis demonstrates such a temperament); and since the poetic lies quite beyond their ken they must perforce confine their efforts to the externals of poetry. After so many attempts even of poets, not to analyze, but to describe the divine afflatus, had been compelled to confess as many failures, the philosophers found it necessary to confine their attention rather to the usual concomitants of poetry than to its essential nature. They were therefore led to group under that sublime title all that could not with utter strictness be called prose. Whatever could be measured with a foot-rule, whatever gave evidence of a conscious employment of rhythm or rhyme or alliteration or assonance became, for such investigators, "poetry." But the quarry is as elusive as life itself, although quite as real. And the dissecting-knife of the anatomist, the microscope of the biologist, will never reach the essential principle—that soul by whose virtue alone the heart throbbed with love, the brain quickened into keen thought and warm fancy, the nerves tingled with an exquisite sense of vigor. It may happen that the flower of poesy will fade under such scrutiny; the knife of the botanist may destroy the beauty he would make manifest.

What is the inspiration of poetry? They who do most experience it are least able to tell it. It is not only beyond definition, it is even beyond description. It is like to a

" . . . music heard once by an ear
That cannot forget or reclaim it,
A something so shy, it would shame it
To make it a show,
A something too vague, could I name it,
For others to know,
As if I had lived it or dreamed it,
As if I had acted or schemed it,
Long ago !"

Leave the poet alone in his heaven. Be he a Ruskin in the fields, or a Dickens in the streets, a Solomon on his throne, or a Job on his dung-hill, he will not question the spirit of poesy, though it should lead him on to-day through wonted pathways of poetical expression and

"To-morrow to fresh fields and pastures new !"

H. T. HENRY.

ST. CHARLES' SEMINARY, OVERBROOK.

Scientific Chronicle.

PRECIOUS STONES OF THE BIBLE.

IN the two last numbers of this REVIEW we spoke somewhat lengthily on "Precious Stones, Gems," etc., and have at times since then thought that perhaps our readers have had enough of such things. Still, we hope that a few parting words on "The Precious Stones of the Bible" will prove neither out of place nor altogether uninteresting.

The second chapter of Genesis gives us a description of the terrestrial paradise, saying, among other things: "The name of one (of the rivers) is Phison; that it is which compasseth all the land of Hevilath, where gold groweth. And the gold of that land is very good; *there* is found *bdellium* and the *onyx* stone."

The Hebrew word "*bedolach*" occurs only twice in the sacred Scriptures, first, in the text just quoted, and secondly in Numbers xi., 7. In both of these cases the Vulgate (Latin) translates it by *bdellium*. St. Jerome may have known what the word meant, but his translators evidently did not, for the Douay Bible does not even attempt to render the word into English, but merely inserts the Latin one.

The verse of Numbers referred to reads: "Now the manna was like coriander seed, of the color of *bdellium*," while in Exodus xvi., 14, the manna is described thus: "And when it had covered the face of the earth, it appeared in the wilderness small, and as it were beaten with a pestle, like unto the hoar-frost on the ground."

The Septuagint translates the word in Genesis by the Greek word *anthrax*, but the same word in Numbers by *crystallos*. Notwithstanding this discrepancy, it is clear that they took it to mean a precious stone. The first meaning of *anthrax* (from which word we moderns derive our word *anthracite*), is "coal," not indeed a dead coal, but a "coal of fire that shineth." On this account the ancients applied the word to several different brilliant stones, such as the carbuncle, the ruby, the beryl, and even to the mineral cinnabar, which, though dull in itself, often shines with drops of liquid mercury.

Theophrastus, who died only a few years before the Septuagint was begun, gives the name *anthrax* to a stone whose description exactly suits the ruby, "which is red in color, but when held against the sun assumes the appearance of a burning piece of charcoal." The Seventy Interpreters, or perhaps rather the one who tackled that verse in Numbers, saw clearly that he could not translate *bedolach* by *anthrax*, because he knew the color of the manna was "like unto the hoar-frost," that is, "white." He therefore put *crystallos* (crystal), which is from *cruo*, to freeze, and may therefore, according to the idea of the ancients,

stand for frost, ice, glass, rock crystal, etc. Some moderns have, therefore, supposed that *bedolach* means rock crystal.

To this others object that rock crystal would hardly deserve to be classed with the gold and onyx-stones of Hevilath. An answer to this objection, however, would be that onyx differs from rock crystal only in color, the substance of each being quartz, and in the estimation of ancient times, rock crystal may have been judged worthy of just as high a place as onyx. Pliny says that bdellium was of the color of one's finger nail, white and shining; but this is our description of *onyx*, and its derivation too, *i.e.*, *ονυξ*, *a nail*. Moreover, "onyx" occurs in the same verse, and it would not be used twice. However it may be with the *crystallos* of the Book of Numbers, it is pretty evident that the *anthrax* of the Septuagint is an error, even though Dioscorides, in the first century, does use the word for a colored precious stone. He comes too late, and his views were probably colored by those of his predecessors.

Other views again differ widely from the foregoing. Thus, Bochart, whose authority ranks high, is of opinion that *bedolach* means "pearls"; and this agrees very well with the description of the manna, as made out from the quotations from Exodus and Numbers as already given. Besides, pearls are very abundant on the shores of the Persian Gulf, on which the land of Hevilath, according to the opinion of many, was situated. To get at this meaning however, Bochart refers us back to a Hebrew root, *badal*, and so makes *bedolach* mean "a choice and excellent pearl." Gesenius and some of the best modern commentators follow this opinion.

Bdellium has however yet another signification, about which there is little if any dispute. A tree growing in Arabia, India and Babylonia, formerly bore this name. It was about the size of the olive tree, and bore a fruit somewhat resembling the wild fig. From this tree exuded a gum-resin, whitish, semi-transparent, and resembling myrrh in appearance and qualities, but weaker though more acrid. The tree and its products have been described by both Dioscorides and Pliny. Some have supposed this gum to be the bdellium of Genesis, but this is now looked upon as altogether improbable. When what has been said above, with heaps more for which we have no room, is summed up, it seems pretty clear that the *bedolach* of the Bible is a precious stone, and that it is probably "pearls," though we still admit that this latter point is by no means certain.

Having got in the thin edge of the wedge, by settling, as far as possible, on the *first* precious stone of the Bible, the whole subject lies open before us, and we may go on with the others without insisting on any attempt at a chronological arrangement.

ADAMANT AND DIAMOND.

In the Hebrew text of the Bible we find the word *shamir* three times. The Vulgate in all these cases has *adamas*. The Douay, however, for some reason or other, or perhaps for no reason at all, varies the rendering of the word. The three passages are (1) Jeremias, xvii., 1: "The

sin of Juda is written with a pen of iron, with the point of a *diamond* it is graven on the table of their heart, upon the horns of their altars."

(2) Exechiel, iii., 9: "I have made thy face like an *adamant* and like a flint." Here the Protestant version has: "as an *adamant*, harder than flint." (3) Zacharias, viii., 12: "And they made their heart as the *adamant* stone, lest they should hear the law."

All linguists agree that the *shamir* means a thing of excessive hardness, and as the Greek, *adamas*, *adamant-os* (which naturally became *adamant* in English) means, according to the etymology, "untamed," "unsubdued," it no doubt translates the original *shamir* correctly, at least in a generic way. The word *adamas* was employed by both the earlier and the later Greek writers, and by the Romans as well, either as an adjective or a substantive, but always to render this idea of "unconquered," "unconquerable." Homer applied it as a personal epithet to his heroes; Hesiod to the hard metal, iron or steel, used for armor; Theophrastus applied it to a precious stone, probably the diamond; Pliny almost certainly to the diamond, and perhaps also to corundum; Ovid thought the lode-stone, or magnet, hard enough to deserve the epithet. The French word for magnet (*aimant*) is thought to have come to them over this road.

Shamir in its generic sense, and its equivalent, *adamas*, would therefore appear to mean anything excessively hard; and, in a specific way, is especially appropriate to the diamond, the hardest of all known substances. The Arabic name for the diamond is "*almas*," and the Greek word is probably derived from that.

A confirmation of this view is found in the fact that nearly all authorities in these matters derive the word "diamond" precisely from "*adamas*." Speaking of the change from *adamas* to diamond, the "Century Dictionary" says: "The change of form (in simulation of words with prefix *dia* = Greek *διὰ*) is supposed to have been due to some association with the Italian, *diafano*, = French, *diaphane*, = Greek, *διαφανής*, transparent." This may possibly be so, but it seems like "looking for noon at fourteen o'clock," as the French saying goes. Trench, whose word is worth that of ten, says, under the title "Diamond:" "Diamant and adamant are in fact no more than different adoptions by the English tongue of one and the same Greek, which afterwards became a Latin, word."

This is common sense boiled down, and, knowing that in classical English literature, the words are often used, one for the other, seeing also how the backbone of the two words is the same, viz. d-m-n-t (for d and t are easily interchanged), we philologically *feel* that one may very well have come from the other, and if so, we would know that diamond, the younger, came from adamant, the older. There is another Hebrew word besides *shamir*, which has sometimes been translated diamond. We refer to "*yahalom*," but there is a good deal of doubt, and a great deal of dispute about it, some translating it *emerald*, some *onyx*, and other some *jasper*; but of this, more anon.

In order to render more intelligible what should, in the logical order

of things, follow just here, we shall have to ask permission to make a rather long digression into the domain of sacred history.

About the year of the world 2280, and before Christ, 1724, Joseph, the eleventh son of Jacob, was sold by his brothers, to some Ismaelites, and was by them carried into Egypt. He became a great man there, and when a few years later, a famine arose in the land of Jacob, Joseph brought his father and brothers, with all their households and belongings down, and settled them comfortably in the land of the Pharaohs. They were at first, and for a long time, in great favor, and prospered exceedingly, so that by the end of about 250 years, their census footed up to over six hundred thousand. This was exclusive of the descendants of Levi, of all boys under twenty years of age, of the infirm, and of all women and girls. It was in fact, a war census, and consequently represented at least two million souls all told.

However, long before the 250 years were ended, there arose in the land, a king who "knew not Joseph," and who reduced the whole colony to a condition of hard servitude. Next, by the intervention of Divine Providence, through the leadership of Moses, and in spite of all opposition on the part of the king, the day of deliverance dawned at last, and the afflicted people went forth out of the land of bondage.

For the orderly carrying out of this retreat, and accomplishing of the journey which the Lord knew was to last so long, the Israelites were divided into twelve bands, according to their descent from the sons of Jacob. These bands were called tribes. Now the sons of Jacob, in the order of their birth were: Ruben, Simeon, Levi, Juda, Don, Nepthali, Gad, Aser, Issachar, Zabulon, Joseph and Benjamin. In the numbering of the tribes, however, for offensive and defensive purposes, the tribe of Levi was left out. They were set apart for the priesthood. Neither in this place is the tribe of Joseph named, but all his descendants were counted under the names of his two sons, Ephraim and Manasses. This brought back the number of tribes to the original number, twelve.

Of the tribe of Levi was Moses, the great leader, or commander-in-chief, the future law-giver, the prophet, the wonder-worker, the type of the One that was to come, and with the exception of that One, the grandest figure that has ever trod the stage of human history.

But what has all this to do with precious stones? Much, and with other closely connected matters too. Patience, and we shall see. During the first year after the departure of this great army out of Egypt into the wilderness, God commanded Moses to make a "tabernacle," and showed him, on Mount Sinai, the pattern after which it was to be built. By tabernacle is meant not merely the ark, but everything pertaining to it, as the altar, the table, the propitiatory, the cherubim, bowls, dishes, censers, candlestick, snuffers, lamps, etc.

The description of the tabernacle, with all its appurtenances, fills up three whole chapters of Exodus (xxv., xxvi., xxvii.). Everything is described to the most minute details, and though too long to be quoted here, we recommend their perusal in connection with this subject. Gold

and silver, and brass and setim (acacia) wood ; and skins and fine linen, dyed in gorgeous colors ; and pure olive oil for lights, and spices for incense, are contributed in abundance, and even in excess, so much so that Moses had finally to stop further contributions. Only once in these chapters, and even then not for the tabernacle, do we find mention of gems, thus : “. . . onyx stones and precious stones to adorn the ephod and the rational ” (Ex. xxv., 7). We shall meet them again below.

When the tabernacle was completed it was set up (on the first day of the second month) in the middle of the advancing hosts, and was given in charge to the descendants of Levi, and it was death for any one else to come near it. It was they who set it up when a halt was made, and carried it when it was time to move on ; and day and night they formed a bodyguard around it. The other tribes were arranged around it too, but at some distance, in the following order, which was invariably preserved whether the great army was at rest or on the march :

On the east side, the camp of Juda, which was made up of the tribes of Juda, Issachar and Zabulon ; on the south side, the camp of Ruben, made up of the tribes of Ruben, Simeon and Gad ; on the west side, the camp of Ephraim, composed of the tribes of Ephraim, Manasses and Benjamin ; on the north side, the camp of Dan, composed of the tribes of Dan, Aser and Nephthali.

The tabernacle, as we have said, was in the centre of the hosts. But what is a tabernacle without a priest ? And what is the priest in his sacred functions without his vestments ? For since the priest is as far above the tabernacle as living- is above dead-matter, and since, at the same time, man always stands in need of symbols and emblems to aid him in his public worship of God, therefore it follows that the priest in the discharge of his priestly functions should be adorned more gloriously than the tabernacle itself.

Gold, and silver, and brass, fashioned in all the fairest forms that art knew how to give ; curtains, and veils, and coverings of the finest linen, and of skins, all doubly-dyed in the richest hues, were lavished upon the tabernacle. How then shall the central figure of all this, the priest, be vested ? Surely it must be in glorious vesture, and every part of it must have its meaning in symbol. We have not space to refer to these symbols in detail, but we cannot refrain from mentioning one, the “bells.” “And beneath the feet of the same tunic, round about, thou shalt make as it were pomegranates, of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed, with little bells set between ; so that there shall be a golden bell and a pomegranate, and again another golden bell and a pomegranate. And Aaron shall be vested with it at the office of his ministry, that the sound may be heard when he goeth in and cometh out of the sanctuary in the sight of the Lord, and that he may not die.” Exod. xxviii., 33-35. The same thought is again expressed in Ecclus. xlv., 10-11.

The poet has tuned his lyre to this theme, and sung in words full of meaning, and pathos, and beauty :

"Since sound and sight in eye and ear
 Are fabric of man's mind-spun thought,
 Jehovah philosophic wrought
 When thus he clothed his majesty :
 A bearded priest with sweet-faced boys,
 His tunic hemmed about with bells ;
 A tinkling golden clink, that tells
 The heart, God passes in the noise,
 A heaving dome of incense clouds
 Through which uncertain glimmer floats,
 The light of myriad taper boats,
 With haze of awe in all their shrouds,
 God dwells not in the whirling wind,
 God rides not on the wingéd storm ;
 He steals in with the subtle charm
 That permeates a quiet mind.

* * * * *

"Each people has one common heart,
 Which all the nation's glory thrills,
 On which the nation's heavy ills
 Inflict a universal smart.
 In sobbing Israel's history
 No page with blacker lines is crossed
 Than page recounting how she lost
 The priest and bells of mystery.
 She opes the tome, and spells the rhyme,
 To which the golden tongues made song ;
 She wails things hid amid the throng
 Of spectre-sounds in silent Time.
 Her grief is not a precious pain :
 'Tis hopeless sad. For, God is passéd,
 His pathway is with curses cast ;
 The bells—they must not ring again."

This chapter of Exodus (xxviii.) is entirely devoted to the description of the vestments that were ordered to be made for the high-priest, Aaron, and the more simple ones for his four sons who were to assist him in the ministry, and with which they were commanded, under pain of death, to be clothed whenever they were engaged in their sacred functions. These vestments were : "A rational and an ephod, a tunic and a straight linen garment, a mitre and a girdle" (verse 4), to which is added in verse 42, "linen breeches." Though not mentioned here, it is supposed there were two forms of mitre, a high and a low one. The rational, and ephod, and high mitre were worn, only by the high-priest, the other articles both by him and his sons. The "ephod" and the "rational" bring us back to the precious stones, from which we have so long strayed. They were both made of the finest materials, richly dyed and heavily embroidered.

The ephod is described as consisting of two parts, one of which covered the back, the other the breast. These two parts were connected to one another on the shoulders by two large onyx stones, set in gold, the attachments being made by means of rings of pure gold. Each stone had engraved on it six of the names of the tribes of Israel. "And

thou shalt take two onyx stones, and shalt grave on them the names of the children of Israel ; six names on one stone and the other six on the other, according to the order of their birth. With the work of an engraver and the graving of a jeweller, thou shalt engrave them with the names of the children of Israel, set in gold and compassed about ; and thou shalt put them in both sides of the ephod, a memorial for the children of Israel. And Aaron shall bear their names before the Lord upon both shoulders, for a remembrance " (verses 9-12). The Hebrew word that is here translated onyx is "shoham," concerning which we shall have something to say further on. The ephod was further tied around the waist with a twisted girdle of gold, blue, purple and scarlet.

The "rational," or "rational of judgment," called in some translations "pectoral," in others "breast-plate," was made two spans long, and one span wide, but was doubled cross-wise, and stitched at the edges, so that its final form was a square of probably eight or nine inches on the side. It was slung from its upper corners, by chains and hooks of fine gold, to the rings which served to connect the front part of the ephod with the onyx stones ; while its lower corners were fastened to the edges of the ephod, "that the rational and ephod may not be loosened one from the other" (verse 28). It seems therefore that the rational was in front of the ephod and covered the lower portion thereof. So far, we have been merely skirmishing on the way to the real stone age of our article, into which we plunge forthwith.

There are three remarkable lists of precious stones given in the Bible ; the first in Exodus xxviii., 17-21, and this is repeated word for word in Exodus xxxix. ; the second in Ezechiel xxviii., 13, but this is like the first, except for the omission of three of the stones ; the third in Apoc. xxi., 19-20, in which two of those of the first list are left out, and two others inserted. Practically then the first list is the important one. It is as follows :

"And thou shalt set in it (the rational) four rows of stones ; in the first row shall be a sardius stone, and a topaz, and an emerald ; in the second a carbuncle, a sapphire, and a jasper ; in the third a ligurius, an agate, and an amethyst ; in the fourth a chrysolite, an onyx, and a beryl. They shall be set in gold by their rows. And they shall have the names of the children of Israel ; with twelve names shall they be engraved, each stone with the name of one, according to the twelve tribes." We have already quoted concerning the ephod.

One would think that all this was clear enough, and that it would not be difficult to construct from the descriptions given, exact *fac similes* of both ephod and rational. The ground work of cloth, dyed and hemmed and embroidered, is easily settled, but it is with the precious stones that we are concerned just now. For the ephod therefore let us, in company with an expert in gems, visit a first-class jewelry house, and order two large onyxes, and have engraved on them the names of the twelve tribes, "according to their birth." Well and good—let us now pass to the rational. For this we shall order the twelve stones enumerated above, and have engraved on each the name of one of the twelve chil-

dren of Israel. How simple and easy! But just here, when we set ourselves fairly at work, we shall probably encounter worse snags than ever fell in the way of a Mississippi steamboat.

The first of these snags is, uncertainty about the identity of the stones; the second, uncertainty about the order of their arrangement; the third, uncertainty as to what name was to be engraved on each several stone; the fourth, uncertainty as to *how* the names were engraved; the fifth, uncertainty as to the symbolical meaning that each stone was supposed to bear. There may be yet more of them, but we think these will suffice; and the man or woman (for even ladies are men now) who succeeds in changing these five uncertainties into as many certainties, or, even into real, good, strong probabilities, will deserve to have a rational of his (or her) own, as the high-priest (or priestess) of the highest criticism; and, on our own part, we would be willing to add the ephod, and perhaps even the mitre. To prepare the way for the one who is to undertake this work, we shall condense a good deal of what has been already said by various authorities on the subject.

I.—IDENTIFICATION OF THE STONES.

Here we have just one little, fairly-solid piece of ground for a foothold, and that is, the Hebrew names of the stones. The moment, however, we step off this little spot, and endeavor to discover the *meaning* of these names, we find ourselves in a treacherous bog. As a guide through the labyrinth (if we be allowed thus to change the metaphor) we have compiled from various sources the following table (A), to which we shall frequently refer in the course of our remarks:

In explaining this table, we shall find occasion to get in the bulk of what we know or guess about the stones of the rational.

The headings of the columns are:

(a) The received Hebrew text of the Bible, the first five books of which, the Pentateuch, being from the pen of Moses, who died in the year of the world (A.M.) 2553, before Christ (B.C.) 1451. The other books were written by various authors at various later dates.

(b) The "Septuagint," a version made in Greek by seventy-two interpreters (commonly called the "Seventy") of the five first books of the Old Testament, about A.M. 3719, B.C. 285. It is referred to by the sign LXX. The most esteemed copy is the Codex Vaticanus.

(c) A Greek version of the rest of the Old Testament, probably by several persons, in Alexandria of Egypt, A.M. 3874, B.C. 130. It is included in later editions of the LXX., but is sometimes referred to separately.

We have deemed it unnecessary to insert in the columns the name of the great Jewish historian, Josephus, since he agrees, line for line, with the Vulgate, except that he has Sardonyx for the eleventh stone, instead of Onyx. He was born A.D. 37, and died about A.D. 100. He was himself a priest, and is considered a very high authority in the matters which we have in hand.

(d) The Vulgate, St. Jerome's Latin version, made between the years

385 and 405 of our era. This is the version authorized for use in the Catholic Church.

(e) The Douay Bible, a translation into English from the Vulgate, the Old Testament at Douay in 1609, the New Testament at Rheims, in 1582.

(f) The authorized version of Protestants, or so-called King James's Bible, brought out in 1610. It was translated from various sources. It is referred to by the sign A. V.

Table (A) of Comparative Translations from the Original Hebrew of the Twelve Stones Mentioned in the Rational.

Rows.	Nos.	(a) Hebrew.	(b) Septuagint.	(c) Alexandrine.	(d) Vulgate.	(e) Douay.
First Row.	1	Odem.	Sardion.	Sardion.	Sardius.	Sardius.
	2	Pitdah.	Topazion.	Topazion.	Topazius.	Topaz.
	3	Bareketh.	Smaragdos.	Smaragdos.	Smaragdos.	Emerald.
Second Row.	4	Nophek.	Anthrax.	Anthrax.	Carbunculus.	Carbuncle.
	5	Sappir.	Sappheiros.	Sappheiros.	Sapphirus.	Sapphire.
	6	Yahalom.	Jaspis.	Onychion.	Jaspis.	Jasper.
Third Row.	7	Leshem.	Ligurion.	Ligurion.	Ligurius.	Ligure.
	8	Shebo.	Achates.	Achates.	Achates.	Agate.
	9	Achlamah.	Amethystos.	Amethystos.	Amethystus.	Amethyst.
Fourth Row.	10	Tharshish.	Chrysolithos.	Chrysolithos.	Chrysolithus.	Chrysolite.
	11	Shoham.	Beryllion.	Beryllion.	Onychius.	Onyx.
	12	Jashpeh.	Onychion.	Jaspis.	Beryllus.	Beryl.

Rows.	Nos.	(a) Hebrew.	(f) Protestant.	(g) Chaldean.	(h) Syriac.	(i) Arabic.
First Row.	1	Odem.	Sardius.	Samkan.	Sumoko.	Jacuth Achmar.
	2	Pitdah.	Topaz.	Yarkan.	Sorgo.	Jacuth Azphar.
	3	Bareketh.	Carbuncle.	Barkan.	Borko.	Samurod.
Second Row.	4	Nophek.	Emerald.	Ismaragdan.	Zadiro.	Cochli.
	5	Sappir.	Sapphire.	Shabrez.	Saphilo.	Maha-al-Ballur.
	6	Yahalom.	Diamond.	Sibhalom.	Neketho.	Bahraman.
Third Row.	7	Leshem.	Ligure.	Kanchara.	Konkenum.	Gasa.
	8	Shebo.	Agate.	Tarkja.	Karkedono.	Sebh.
	9	Achlamah.	Amethyst.	En Egl.	En Egl.	Firusag.
Fourth Row.	10	Tharshish.	Beryl.	Krum Yama.	Thorshish.	Asrak.
	11	Shoham.	Onyx.	Burla.	Berulo.	Ballur.
	12	Jashpeh.	Jasper.	Panthireth.	Jashpeh.	Jasaf.

(g) A translation of the Hebrew text into Chaldean, with considerable amplifications, done by Onkelos, shortly after the return of the Jews from Babylon, A.M. 3468, B.C. 536. The work, however, suffered many modifications, and in its present form is said to date back no earlier than the third century of our era.

A little later, Jonathan Ben Uzziel made a similar version, which does not differ much from that of Onkelos, at least as far as regards our subject.¹

¹ Vigouroux says that both Onkelos and Ben Uzziel were of the first century of our

(h) A version in Syriac, of both the Old and the New Testaments. It appeared in the eighth century of our era.

(i) An Arabic version of both Testaments, a little later in date than the Syriac.

With all these, as finger-posts to point the way, let us start out on our search for the gems of the rational. As headings, we shall place first the Hebrew name, and then the English word according to the Douay.

1.—*Odem* = *Sardius*.

The root of the word *odem* is "adam," which means "red," and the same is the name of our first father. On looking over Table A, a great similarity, in fact you might say identity, will be noticed between the different names, in all the versions, until we get to the Chaldean "*Samkan*," and the Syriac "*Sumoko*"; but even in these there is a family likeness with the others. When we strike the Arabic, however, we meet "Jacuth Achmar," who looks like a foreigner, or perhaps a "Jesuit in disguise." Yet he is quite innocent and means well, and his meaning is "Red Jacinth" (qu. Hyacinth?), but whether that means a corundum stone, or only a common Hyacinth, it has been impossible to determine. At any rate, in all Chaldean and Syriac versions, and Persian too, that have been pointed out to us, just as in the Hebrew, the root of the word always means "red."

Pliny, however, who ought to have been at the head of his class in geography, derives the name *Sardius* from *Sardis*, in *Lydia* whence the gem was obtained, but remarks at the same time that the best specimens came from *Babylon*, *Josephus*, in his "History," calls it "*sardion*," but in his "Antiquities" uses the word "*sardonyx*." Some commentators have taken him to task for this inconsistency, while others think it is all a much-ado about a trifle, for, they say, the *sardonyx* is a variety of *sardius*, or as we commonly call it, "*sard*." We think, however, that since *Josephus* puts the *sardonyx* in the eleventh place in the rational, its occurrence here is a mere slip of the pen. This stone is also called *carnelian* (à *carne*), from its color which resembles that of raw flesh.

The *sardius* has always been a favorite with engravers. C. W. King ("Antique Gems," p. 5) says: "On this gem all the finest works of the most celebrated artists are to be found. And not without good cause, such is its toughness, facility of working, beauty of color, and the high polish of which it is susceptible, and which Pliny states that it retains longer than any other gem." The testimony of eighteen centuries since Pliny's time has served but to confirm his judgment; and it is meet that this gem "*odem*," "*adam*," "*Adam*," should hold the first place in the rational of the high priest.

2.—*Pitdah* = *Topaz* (modern *chrysolite*).

The root of this word *pitdah* may, according to Fürst, be the *San-*

era, but the controversy as to that point is too long, and too useless for our purpose, to be entered upon here. (*vid.* Emanuel Deutsch.)

scrit, pita = yellow; and Skeat thinks the root of *topaz* may be *tap* = to shine. The Septuagint, the Alexandrine version, Josephus, and the Vulgate all translate "pitdah" by the same word, the equivalent of topaz, and Bellermand claims that the "Oriental Topaz," of modern mineralogists is here meant. Others claim that it means our modern chrysolite, or as it is sometimes called Peridot. We shall discuss this point under No. 10, below.

3.—*Bareketh* = *Emerald* (oriental).

The Hebrew root of this word is *barak*, which means "to flash like lightning," while a root of this root is *rakh*, "to light a fire." The Chaldean, *barkan*, the Syriac, *borko*, and the Arabic, *samurod*, mean "brilliant," while the roots of these words have the sense of "boring," a meaning which may be traced to the production of fire by rapid boring. The Greek and Latin versions of Table A., as well as many others, render *bareketh* by "smaragdos," "smaragdus," which surely means "emerald." The Sanscrit form is *marakata*, or *marakta* = emerald. To many people it would perhaps seem almost like a joke to attempt to find any etymological relationship between *marakta*, *emerald*, and *smaragdus*. And yet that relationship does exist, and for one who can not only see the words, but see through them, it is as plain as a wart on the end of the nose, it is even obtrusive. Remember that *emerald* was once *esmeralda*, and then set the skeletons of the three words together:

Skeleton.

Marakta	=	—	m	—	r	—	k	—	t,	
Smaragdus	=	s	—	m	—	r	—	g	—	d,
Esmeralda	=	s	—	m	—	r	—	l	—	d,

and if one is blessed with the philological instinct, he will need no more; if he is not, then medicine is of no use to him, and his vocation lies along other lines. But let us return. Kalisch says the "*bareketh* is a sort of precious corundum of strong glass lustre, a beautiful green color, with many degrees of shade, pellucid and doubly refractive." Nothing but emerald will answer to this description, and how the A. V. fell upon "carbuncle," is hard to conjecture. There is a legend that a large *bareketh* was hung up in Noe's ark, to serve for a lamp during the voyage.

4.—*Nophek* = *Carbuncle*.

The Hebrew word means "glowing like a coal," and its root, *puk*, means "to inflame." Some however say that *puk* is the same as "red alkanet," from which a red dye or paint is made, but it is clear that these things are not contradictory. The Greek versions appropriately have *anthrax*, the Latin, *carbunculus*, and the Douay *carbuncle*, not only in this place, but in several others. By anthrax and carbunculus the Greeks and Romans respectively designated a stone of a deep red color, and this explains why some moderns have translated *nophek* by "ruby"; we think this is an error. Greater is the error of those who render it by

"garnet," for the stone of the rational was very hard, transparent, and beautiful, neither of which is true of garnet. The word *zadiro*, under the heading Syriac, is on the authority of Emanuel. It is probably a mistake, for we can find no such word, while the Syriac "*zdido*" means exactly the same as "*puk*." Onkelos has *ismaragdan*, and Ben Uzziel, *esmorad*, both evidently akin to emerald, the reading in the A. V. We think however we have firmer ground in standing out for the anthrax of the LXX., and of Josephus; and besides we believe we have given sufficient reason under No. 3 to show that the emerald has a clear right to that place, although, had we been free in the matter, we should have preferred to send the dear old emerald, not to the third place, but to the first, or above.

5.—*Sappir* = *Sapphire*.

The root of *sappir* is *shapher*, "to shine with splendor"; also, "to appear beautiful." This is too general to give us much help in identifying the stone, for it might be said of many other gems as well. In the rendering of *sappir*, both in the rational and elsewhere, there is an almost complete unanimity among the different versions, as will be seen by the table. The Persian too, *saffir*, is evidently the same word. The Arabic, according to Emanuel, has *Maha-al-Ballur*, which Freytag makes out to be "crystal of beryl." Richardson's Dictionary renders the Arabic (which he spells *ballawr*), by "beryl," and yet calls this fifth stone of the rational "*adamas*." Now, therefore, Emanuel, or Freytag, or Richardson must be wrong, possibly all three. We shall leave them in peace for the present.

Notwithstanding the identity in name, it has sometimes been asserted that the *sappheiros* of the Greeks, and *sapphirus* of the Romans is not our sapphire, the blue crystalline variety of corundum, but only our lapis-lazuli. This opinion is founded on a description by Pliny: "*Sapphirus* is refulgent with spots of gold, of an azure color, sometimes, but not often purple; the best kind comes from Media; it is never transparent, and is not well suited for engraving upon when intersected with hard, crystalline particles." Every word of this exactly suits our lapis-lazuli, but, except what is said about the color, not a word of it is applicable to our sapphire.

This looks like strong evidence, but yet we are persuaded that the sapphire of the Bible is our true sapphire. The reason of our opinion is because the lapis-lazuli does not come up to what the sacred text requires. Let us read Exod. xxiv., 10. "And they saw the God of Israel; under his feet as it were a work of sapphire stone, as the heaven, when it is clear." The stone is supposed to be durable, for it constitutes the floor of heaven, "under his feet, a work (or as the A. V. has 'a paved work') of sapphire stone." Now Pliny's "spots of gold" are iron pyrites (fool's gold), which easily decompose; and so cause the stone to crumble.

The stone is supposed to be transparent, "as the heaven, when clear." The A. V. has, "as it were the body of heaven in clearness." Moreover, Braun says: "*Sane apud Judæos sapphiros pellucidas notas fuisse*

manifestissimum est, adeo etiam ut *pellucidum* illorum philosophis dicatur sappir." Which being literally thrashed out, reads: "It is certainly most manifest that among the Jews sapphires were known to be transparent, so much so that *transparent* was by their philosophers called sappir." But the lapis-lazuli is densely opaque.

Now let us try Job xxviii., 16. "It (wisdom) shall not be compared with . . . the most precious stone sardonyx, or the sapphire." The same ideas are repeated in other texts, as Tobias xiii., 21: "The gates of Jerusalem shall be built of sapphire, and of emerald." In Apoc. xxi., 19, one of the foundations of the Holy City is to be of sapphire. The stone then is supposed to be precious. Now the lapis-lazuli neither is, nor was, nor ever can be really precious.

We think the Gordon knot of the difficulty can be untied by saying that probably Moses knew some things that were unknown even to Pliny, and that with his knowledge of "all the learning of the Egyptians" he would never have put a lapis-lazuli in the rational, thinking it a sapphire. Finally, there is a legend that the Ten Commandments were engraved on two large Tables of Sapphire, but for this we cannot vouch.

6.—*Yahalom* = *Jasper*.

The root of the word is given as "*halam*," "to strike," "to crush," "to conquer," "to be hard." This would apply perfectly to the diamond, which is, indeed, the rendering of the word by Eben Ezra, followed by the A. V. Still the best authorities hardly admit that the diamond could have been one of the gems of the rational. Among other reasons for denying we have, first, that it is generally admitted that the names of the children of Israel were really engraved on the stones, and as King says: "It would baffle all engravers, both ancient and modern, to cut an inscription on this invincible gem." Secondly, a diamond, to match the rest of the stones in the rational, would have to be equal in size to the Koh-i-Noor, which King, a clergyman of the Reformed Church, characterizes as "most absurd."

What then is the *yahalom*? By referring to the Table we shall probably be persuaded that the word has been made to mean altogether too much, or too many. The LXX., the Vulgate, and the Douay agree on *jaspis*. The Alexandrine, and many ancient versions have *onychion*. It seems that Josephus in one place gives onychion and in another jaspis. The *sib-halom* (or *sab-halom*) of Onkelos is no clearer than the *ya-halom* of the original. Ben Uzziel has *kadkodin*, by some rendered carbuncle, but which is evidently nothing more than the *kadkod*, or *chodchod* of Ezech. xxvii., 16. This word the LXX., by a little twist of replacing *d* by *r*, turns into *chorchor*, which is not much to the purpose; while the Vulgate gives it up and does not translate it at all. When, however, the same *kodkod* appears in Isaias, they both translate it by *jasper*, while the A. V., strangely enough forgets its "diamond" and is contented with *agate*. The Arabic bahraman (bahr = the sea, and man = like) evidently calls for a colored gem, while among the translations of the Syriac, *neketho*, we find *jasper*.

Rosenmüller attempts to find a way out of this labyrinth as follows: He says, in substance, that the Alexandrine translator must have fallen in with a Hebrew MSS., in which *yahalom* had, through carelessness or accident, been transferred from the sixth to the twelfth place, and *jashpeh* from the twelfth to the sixth. He left them transposed, but rendered them correctly by *onychion* and *jaspis* respectively. Next, some one in getting out a new edition of the LXX., and collating the original Hebrew with the Alexandrine Version, put the Hebrew words back in their proper place, but failed to notice the transposition that had been made in the Alexandrine, and hence put *jaspis* for the translation of *yahalom*, and *onychion* for that of *jashpeh*. Rosenmüller, therefore, means that it was all an accidental error, but still an error, and that *yahalom* should be translated by *onychion*, and *jashpeh* by *jasper*.

The explanation is ingenious, and we should be glad to leave it so, were it not for a very serious objection which meets us. Thus, whenever in the Scriptures any indication is afforded as to the nature of *jashpeh*, a beautiful, clear, transparent stone is supposed, and the quality of transparency is often strongly insisted on. In *Ezech. xxviii., 13*, it is emphatically called a *precious* stone. In *Apoc. iv., 3*, it is used as an emblem of the glory of the One sitting on the throne. In *Apoc. xxi., 11*, we read: "And the light of the Holy City was like to a precious stone, as to the *jashpeh* stone, even as crystal." In *Apoc. xxi., 18*, it is the superstructure of the walls of the New Jerusalem, while in the next verse, it is made the first of the twelve foundations of those walls. Now according to the universal opinion of mineralogists, ancient and modern, the *jaspis* had none of these qualities, and therefore it is not the true *jashpeh*. We cannot pursue this dispute any further, but as we have no other place for jasper except where the Vulgate puts it, we are content to put it in the sixth rank, as the probably true rendering of *yahalom*.

7.—*Leshem* = *Ligure*.

No root has been found for *leshem*. Fürst says: "Leshem, the name of a precious stone, whose origin is lost." Onkelos translates it by *kanchara* which a to-us-unknown author treats thus: "Kanchera = Gr. kenkros = 'millet seed,' which is like emery = smiris; whence shamir = diamond." Whew!

The word *ligure* does not occur in modern mineralogy, and Houghton says it is impossible to make out with any degree of certainty what stone is denoted by the Hebrew term. We do not think it quite so hopeless. Passing over a number of conjectures that have admittedly very little foundation, such as *tourmaline*, *rubellite*, *sapphire*, *amber*, the fossil *belemnite*, etc., we come immediately to the stone which seems to enjoy a higher probability than any other, viz.; the *jacinth* (our modern *hyacinth*, or *zircon* stone). The thread may be a slender one, but it is better than none.

Theophrastus derives the word "lynkourion," of which the "lygursion" in LXX. is only a corrupt form, from *lynx* (*lynkos*) a lynx, and

ouron = urine, basing his statement on the absurd notion that the stone was the petrified urine of the lynx. With this as a foundation, he solemnly goes on to inform us which kind of lynx produced the best sort, and where and how it was obtained. His next observation, and this time it was real *observation*, is more to the point. "Out of it signet rings are engraved, and it is very hard, exactly like real stone. It is highly transparent and cold to the touch." Ovid, in his "Metamorphoses," xv., 413, gives the lynx-fable in verse.

The Greek word became *lyncurium* in Latin, and this according to King was again corrupted into *ligurius*, which he says evidently means *jargoon*, or *jacinth*. Pliny loses all patience with Theophrastus for his superstitious lynx-yarn, and, overdoing it, refuses to believe in the stone at all, saying that unless it were "amber" it did not exist. But Pliny is wrong, having been deceived by the fact that amber was brought from Liguria. The true stone did exist, and was used very frequently both for intaglios and cameos, some of which have come down to our own day. One, a magnificent full-face intaglio, supposed to represent Maecenas, belonged to the Hertz collection; another, a figure of Ptolemy XII., brother of Cleopatra, was to be seen a few years since in the Somerville collection, in Philadelphia.

Now, the description of lynkourion, as given by Theophrastus and others, agrees perfectly, down to the minutest details of color, hardness, peculiar behavior under the burin, porousness, and everything else, with that of our jacinth, and with it only. All this is certainly enough of evidence that our jacinth = *ligurius* = *lyncurium* = lynkourion = *ligurion*. The weak point is the connection between *ligurion* and *leshem*.

Since however the ancient versions all agree, without even one dissenting voice, and since we can find no reason whatever for doubting their testimony, we think it wise to let it stand. The jacinth would be well worthy of a place in the rational. King says: "A fine jacinth is a splendid stone, and much superior to the best topaz, as it has a peculiar golden lustre mixed with its rich orange."

8.—*Shebo* = *Agate*.

Two derivations have, according to W. L. Bevan, been suggested for the word *shebo*; first, *shabah*, "he took him prisoner," or, "to shine," the latter of which agrees with the Arabic *sebh*, or *shaba*, "kindling a fire."

The second derivation suggested is the proper name Sheba, whence all kinds of precious stones were brought to Tyre. The first of these gives us no definite light as to the nature of the gem. Neither does the second, and moreover, according to the Vulgate, the prophet (Ezech. xxviii., 13), in describing the glory of the King of Tyre, enumerates all the stones of the rational, except the three of the third row, viz., *ligure*, *agate* and *amethyst*. Even if we admit with Bellermand, that the omission was through the carelessness of some scribe, there is no

known reason why Sheba should be connected with agate rather than with some one of the other stones.

We can find no reasons either for or against the translation "achates," adopted by the LXX., Josephus and the rest, and since everybody seems satisfied, we too are content to remain in blissful ignorance of what cannot be made out.

Our English word agate comes directly from the Greek. Theophrastus says: "A handsome stone is the achates, brought from the river of that name" (now the Drillo) "in Sicily, and is sold at a high price." But Pliny observes: "The achates was anciently in high estimation; now in none at all."

9.—*Achlamah* = *Amethyst*.

According to the Rabbins the root of *achlamah* is "*chalam*," "to dream," since: "He who constantly wears this ring on his finger sees dreams." Fürst denies this, saying, "*Achlamah*, a precious stone, named from its hardness, not from dreaming as Eben Ezra and Quinchi have imagined. *Chalam* means *to be strong*, firm; also, fat or hard." The root is *lam*, the same which is found in *halam*, which is found in *yahalom*.

About all the versions of the Bible either agree on the same word, or at least give one which means nearly the same thing. Even the Chaldean, "En Eglā," and Syriac, "En Eglo" (= calf's eye), need not disturb our serenity, for if *we* honor the cat by calling one of our varieties of quartz "Cat's Eye," why should not others honor the dreamy (*chalam*) calf, by naming another variety "Calf's Eye?" It is all a matter of taste, and we even prefer calf to cat, as a dish, if not as a gem. The notion of the Greeks that the amethyst preserves from drunkenness we have not had occasion to test.

Anyhow, as to its special place, or presence in, or absence from, the rational, there is no real cause of dispute. Only one or two disgruntled rabbins want *onyx* or *beryl* in this ninth place; but we need those stones for other places from which they cannot be spared, so we shall leave *achlamah* and *amethyst* in possession of the situation.

The amethyst was formerly considered quite precious, and even as late as the last century Queen Charlotte's necklace of fine amethysts was valued at \$10,000; it probably would not bring as many cents now, so plentifully has the stone been found.

10.—*Tharshish* = *Chrysolite* (modern Topaz).

As was promised under No. 2 above, we now take up the rival claims of Topaz and Chrysolite. On this subject commentators are all at sea, and nearly all rowing in different boats. Having examined the conjectures, opinions and reasons of quite a number of them, we are, for the present, pretty well convinced that, contrary to the Vulgate and Beller-mann, *pitdah* should be translated by "chrysolite" and *tharshish* by "topaz." Let us see.

The word "tharshish" occurs eight times in the Bible. In order to take in the whole ground at a glance, we map it out as in table B.

Table B (Showing the Different Versions of Tharshish).

	Hebrew.	LXX.	Vulgate.	Douay.	A. V.
Exod. xxvii., 20 . . . }	Tharshish.	Chrysolithos.	Chrysolithus.	Chrysolite.	Beryl.
" xxxix., 13 . . . }	"	Tharsis.	Hyacinthus.	Hyacinthus.	"
Cant. v., 14	"	"	Mare.	Sea.	"
Ezech. i., 16	"	Anthrax.	Chrysolithus.	Chrysolite.	"
" x., 9	"	"	"	"	"
" xxxviii., 13	"	"	"	"	"
Dan. x., 6	"	Tharsis.	"	"	"
Apoc. xxi., 20	"	Chrysolithos.	"	"	Chrysolite.

This is a pretty muddle. To translate that sweet-sounding word "tharshish," the LXX. has three different words, the Vulgate (and Douay of course) three, the A. V., two. These however overlap so as to make in all *only* six different readings. The LXX. uses *tharsis* three times, *chrysolithos* twice, and *anthrax* once. The Vulgate and Douay agree with the LXX. twice, and differ from it four times. The A. V. agrees with the LXX. once, and differs from it five times.¹

What now is to be made of all this? There is no possible method of proving or disproving the identity of ancient with modern gems, except by comparing their properties. When the properties of an ancient stone have been thoroughly described, all we have to do is to go to our Cabinet of Gems, and pick out the one corresponding to the description, and after that we "don't care a fig" how ancients or moderns *spell* the name. But sometimes the descriptions that have reached us are very sketchy and incomplete; and in the Bible especially, which is not a treatise on stones, though it may say hard things at times, we cannot expect to find anything more than casual hints in this matter. Even so, a mere hint is often sufficient to prove a negative case (*i.e.*, to prove disparity), or help to prove an identity. For example, if a stone were described as, precious, transparent, of a yellow color, and easily engraved on, the "transparent," and "yellow color," might suggest our modern topaz, but the "easily engraved on" would prove it was not; though each of the statements would help to prove that it was "amber." Now in this case of Topaz *versus* Chrysolite, we have arguments both positive and negative.

(1) Let us now compare our texts of Table B. Exodus merely gives the word with no context to help us, so we let it pass.

(2) In Canticles v., 14, the Beloved is portrayed. The Latin of this text taken word by word from the Hebrew reads (leaving tharshish untranslated): "Manus ejus circuli aurei, pleni *tharshishim*" (this from Benedict Arias). The Vulgate has: "Manus illius tornatiles aureae, plene hyacinthis." The Douay has: "His hands are turned, and as of

¹ We are aware of course that in the case of the Apocalypse, the Hebrew was translated from the original Greek, and not the Greek from the Hebrew; but that does not matter as far as we are concerned here.

gold, full of hyacinths." The A. V.: "His hands are as gold rings set with beryl." Braun (quoted by Smith, Dict. Bible, art. Beryl), has: "His hands are orbs of gold set with tharshish stones," and he argues thus: "The orbs or rings of gold, as Coccius has observed, refer, not to rings on the fingers, but to the fingers themselves, as they gently press upon the thumb, and thus form the figure of an orb or ring. The latter part of the verse is the causal expletive of the former. It is not only said in this passage that the hands are called orbs of gold, but the reason why they are so called is immediately added—specially on account of the beautiful chrysolites with which the hands were adorned." Braun concludes by saying that "the ancient chrysolite or the modern yellow topaz appears to have a better claim than any other gem to represent the tharshish of the Bible, certainly a better claim than the beryl of the A. V., a rendering which appears to be unsupported by any kind of evidence." This translation seems nearer the original than any of the others, and the exegesis in harmony with the canons of common sense. It throws out the *hyacinthus* of the Vulgate, which is *blue*, and the *beryl* of the A. V. which is *green*, neither of which can be reconciled with other texts.

(3) The next text is Ezech. i., 16, where the prophet in a vision of glory sees four wheels whose color was like tharshish, which the LXX. translates again by "color of tharsis." Nothing however can be gathered as to what that color was; and whence the Vulgate gets its "*visio maris*," "*appearance of the sea*," and the Chaldean (Table A) its *krum yama*, "sea color," can so far be but dimly conjectured.

(4) In Ezech. x., 9, we have again a vision of wheels, where the LXX., for no reason that we can discover, gives up *tharsis* and puts in *anthrax*, and for just as much reason apparently, the Vulgate deserts its first *hyacinthus* and substitutes *chrysolithus*; but here again the context gives nothing to judge by.

(5) Ezech. xxxviii., 13, speaks of the precious stones that adorned the King of Tyre in glory. The LXX. in our hands (Walton's "Polyglott," London, 1657) puts the same stones and in the same order as those of the rational, but the Vulgate, Douay and A. V. leave out three, as we said before, and mix up the others so badly that no comparison is possible.

(6) Dan. x., 6. We have been waiting for Daniel to come to judgment, and behold he is here. The prophet standing by the great river Tigris, and lifting up his eyes, is wrapt in a vision, in which he sees a man whose body was like the *tharshish*. The LXX. now changes back to *tharsis*, while the Vulgate has *chrysolite*, and the A. V. *beryl*. Up there in the clouds, a man, ten-fold gigantic, whose body "gleams with a glorious golden glowing," is something to look on; but a man of hyacinth, a *blue* man, or a man of beryl, a *green* man—shades of the beautiful, defend us. This is the keynote of the whole business, the man shone like gold in the sunshine.

(7) In Apoc. xxi. 20, the seventh foundation-stone of the New Jerusalem is, according to the LXX., *chrysolithos*, which word is preserved

in all the subsequent translations, even the A.V. wheeling into line at last with the others.¹

All the indications therefore afforded by Scripture as to the nature of the stone *tharshish* point to it as a stone of a *golden yellow color*.

A strong confirmation of this view is to be found in the testimony of nearly all mineralogists, ancient and modern, from Theophrastus down to Dana. They all describe the *chrysolithos* of the Greeks, *chrysolithus* of the Romans, as a stone of a bright golden-yellow color, excessively hard and beautiful. Pliny says: "A transparent stone, with a refulgence like that of gold." Josephus testifies that the *chrysolithos* was "a golden-colored gem." The Persians called it "a transparent stone with golden lustre." Marbodus, mineralogist, poet, and Bishop of Rennes (1081), says: "It is bright and yellow, and very hard." Albertus Magnus says: "A gem of yellow color, and good for the gout." Epiphanius has: "Chrysolithus, by some called chrysophyllus, is of a golden color." Propertius ranks the *chrysolithus* on a par with the emerald, and complains that the prætor of Illyria lured away his *fiancée* by bribing her with these gems:

" quoscumque smaragdos,
Quosque dedit flavo lumine chrysolithos."

" whatever emeralds,
And what chrysolites of yellow light he gave."

These are but specimens; numbers of others might be adduced.

On the other hand, the witnesses that the *Topazion*, *Topazius*, was *green*, are not less numerous, but we have space for only one. Pliny says: "The topazius is held in high estimation for its green tints."

Now what we moderns call oriental Topaz is certainly yellow, and what we call chrysolite is just as certainly green. Moreover, every point in the descriptions given by the ancients, of the *chrysolithus* fits our topaz perfectly, and fits nothing else; while all they say of the topazius is exactly applicable to our chrysolite, and to no other stone. Chrysolite (our modern article) is therefore the second stone in the rational; and topaz (our modern stone) is the tenth. But just how the curious interchange took place is another matter, and one which we have not room to ventilate now.

II.—*Shoham* = *Onyx*.

Braun derives the word *shoham* from the Arabic "*sachma*" = *blackness*, while Gesenius and Fürst refer it to another Arabic word "*sa-*

¹ A great deal of learning has been expended on that Greek word *tharsis*, of the LXX. Some hold that it is merely the Hebrew word spelled, as near as possible, in Greek characters; the Greeks had no such sound in their language as *sh*, and no means of representing it, and therefore they did the best they could by substituting *s* in its place. Others maintain that Tharsis was an old Greek name for Tartessus, a Phœnician city in the south of Spain with which the Jews traded. Others again think the word by some hook or crook came to mean "the sea." This of course would account nicely for the "visio maris" of the Vulgate in Ezech. i., 16.

hama," "to be pale." This looks like a bad beginning, but perhaps it is not really so bad as it looks. Onyx always consists of two layers, one of which is often white, the other often black, so that you can turn one side up and get "*sachma*," blackness, or turn the other side up and get "*saham*," paleness. Josephus says "*sardonix*," but as *sardonix* has three layers, one of which may be white, another black, and the third something else, there is no real contradiction. The LXX. has *beryllion*, but since for the same *shoham* it gives for the stone of Hevilath, *prasinus*, and for the one of the ephod, *smaragdus*, its inconsistent testimony is ruled out. In a similar way the Alexandrine version contradicts itself by putting *beryllion* in the rational and *chrysoprasi* in Hevilath. The Vulgate, the Douay, and the A. V., consistently put *onyx* in all three places. There is no positive internal evidence to be found, but the word of Josephus who testifies to having seen the two stones of the ephod, and whose fine quality he specially notices, must, in the absence of any other reliable authority, suffice for the present. Therefore *onyx*, and probably the species called *sardonix*, was the eleventh stone of the rational.

12.—*Jashpeh* = *Beryl*.

The word *jashpeh* has lost its root, if it ever had one, just as is the case with the Manx cat and his tail. The Arabic words *jashaf*, *jashab*, *jashf*, have the same meaning, but they too are without visible root. In English, *jasper* has been given as the equivalent of *jashpeh* in many versions of the Bible, but we think we have given, under No. 6 above, sufficient cause for not accepting this reading. The LXX. has *onychion*, while the Vulgate has *beryllus*. In our arrangement, *onychion* is already settled in No. 11, and so it seems we have nothing left to wind up with except *beryl*. This reason if left alone would be rather weak, but when it is backed up by the authority of Josephus, and there is no solid reason advanced against it, we shall have to leave *beryl* at the foot of his class.

Josephus says that all the stones were remarkable for their size and beauty, and that they were of incomparable value.

The Rational must have been a thing of glory, adorned as it was with the fairest specimens of Nature's fairest handicraft, resplendent with twelve of the most precious gems of earth, emblems all, of other gems beyond the earth, shining, glistening, sparkling with rays of every gorgeous hue. The Sardius was red; the Topazius (= *chrysolite*), green, with a touch of gold; the *Smaragdus* (emerald), bright green; the Carbuncle, dark red; the Sapphire, dark blue; the Jasper, dark green; the Ligurius (= *Jacinth*), orange, with a hint of gold; the Achates (*Agate*), banded, probably of many colors; the Amethyst, royal purple; the *Chrysolithus* (= *Topaz*), bright golden yellow; the *Onyx*, black and white, or blue and white; the *Beryl*, light green.

II.—SIZE AND ORDER OF THE STONES.

The gems were arranged in four rows of three each, and the whole space covered measured a span each way. We take the span at nine

inches, so that each gem with its setting of gold, would occupy a space of 3 inches in length by $2\frac{1}{4}$ inches in width. The order was of course from right to left, as Hebrews are used to write. Table C shows this arrangement.

Table C.

3 Bareketh. Emerald.	2. Pitdah. Topaz.	1. Odem. Sardius.
6. Yahalom. Jasper.	5. Sappir. Sapphire.	4. Nophek. Carbuncle.
9. Achlamah. Amethyst.	8. Shebo. Agate.	7. Leshem. Ligure.
12. Jashpeh. Beryl.	11. Shoham. Onyx.	10. Tharshish. Chrysolite.

We have left the English names as they stand in the Douay. Should any one wish to make the slight changes suggested above; he may do so mentally.

III.—NAMES ENGRAVED ON THE STONES.

The names in Table C were *not* engraved on the stones, but have been put there merely to show the position of the gems themselves. In Exod., xxviii., it is ordered that the names of the twelve children of Israel shall be engraved on the stones, one name on each, while in Exod., xxxix., it is clearly stated that the order has been carried out. Every version of the Bible says the same thing, and yet in the face of this, there are found some who deny or at least doubt that it was real engraving. Why? We confess that we do not quite understand this. Is it because the stones are thought too hard? Yet, all known stones, the diamond alone excepted, have been cut, time and time again with both letters and portraits, in intaglio and in cameo. Ancient Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, have left us specimens. Until further notice therefore we shall accept the words of the Bible in their literal sense, and suppose that the names were really engraved, either in full, or in initials, on the stones, not pasted on them, nor yet left floating around mentally in the air. A pen of iron with a point of shamir is capable of doing the work, but the dispute as to which twelve names, we shall attend to below.

IV.—ORDER OF THE NAMES.

For the two stones of the ephod it is expressly commanded that the names shall be in the order of birth of the children of Israel, *i.e.*, sons of Jacob. Some suppose that this order was preserved in the rational, others deny it. The whole thing is so complicated that we must perforce insert another Table, D, in order to straighten it out.

Table D.

(a).	(b).	(c).	(d).	(e).	(f).	(g).
Ruben	1	Lia.	1	1	4	2
Simeon	2	"	2	2	5	7
Levi	3	"	3	8
Juda	4	"	4	3	1	1
Dan	5	Bala.	7	9	10	. .
Napthali	6	"	8	12	12	5
Gad	7	Zelpha.	9	11	6	3
Aser	8	"	10	10	11	4
Issachar	9	Lia.	5	4	2	9
Zabulon	10	"	6	5	3	10
Joseph	11	Rachel.	11	11
{ Ephraim	Aseneth.	. .	6	7	. .
{ Manasses	"	. .	7	8	6
Benjamin	12	Rachel.	12	8	9	12

Column (a) gives the names of the sons of Jacob (children of Israel), together with those of the two sons of Joseph.

Column (b) the order of birth of the sons of Jacob, about which there is no doubt whatever. Gen. xxix., xxx., xxxv.

Column (c) the names of the mothers of all these men.

Column (d) is an arrangement in which the sons of Lia are all named first, and then those of Bala, Zelpha and Rachel in succession.

Column (e) is the order given in Num. i., 1-15. It is the war census of the host of the descendents of Jacob's sons, but not the order of battle array.

Column (f) is the order of Numbers ii., 3-34. It gives the position of the hosts around the tabernacle; 1, 2, 3 on the east; 4, 5, 6 on the south; 7, 8, 9 on the west; 10, 11, 12 on the north. This order seems to have been made in accordance with the strength and importance of the several tribes.

Column (g) is from Apoc. vii., 5-8, in which St. John gives the number of those that were "signed" of each of the tribes, from which Dan and Ephraim are omitted. This enumeration evidently has no connection with the order of the names in the rational.

On the whole, the most *probable* opinion seems to be that the order of the names on the stones was simply the order of the birth as in column (b). The reason for this is, in brief, as follows:

In Exod. xxxix., the ephod and rational are declared finished and ready. In Exod. xl., the tabernacle is set up and Aaron is vested with all his paraphernalia, on the first day of the first month of the second

year in the desert; up to that time there had been no mention of the tribes of Ephraim and Manasses.

Then on the first day of the *second* month of the second year, that is, *one month later* (Num. i.) the tribes were put on a war footing, and that of Levi put in charge of the sanctuary, but not counted among the twelve, while the tribe of Joseph was divided into two, under the names of his sons.

Therefore the names of Levi and Joseph were on the rational, not those of Ephraim and Manasses. This rids us of the order proposed in columns (e) and (f); while for that of column (d) no reason whatever has been assigned. Therefore we conclude that the order of the names was that of column (b), *i.e.*, the order of birth of the sons of Jacob.

V.—SYMBOLICAL MEANING.

It is generally thought that some symbolical meaning was attached to each stone in connection with the name engraved thereon, but if so, it has been lost in the mists of the ages, from which it will probably never emerge.

VI.—WHERE DID THE ISRAELITES GET THE STONES?

This may have happened in one or other, or both, of two ways. First, they set forth on their journey laden, by God's command, with the spoils of Egypt, and though only gold, and silver, and raiment are enumerated, other precious things may well have been included, and precious stones were well known in Egypt. There was no theft in this transaction, for God owned the treasures even of Egypt, and could rightly bestow them on whom he willed. Besides this, the Israelites had been refused their wages, and could therefore make use of the doctrine of occult compensation, *overtly*.

Secondly, their journey was through Arabia, famed throughout the ages for its precious stones of many kinds; and these could easily have been procured by trade or barter.

VII.—WHERE ARE THE STONES NOW?

King believes that, if not this set, at least a second set worn by the high priest after the return from Babylon, was, after many vicissitudes, deposited in the sacristy of Saint Sophia, in Constantinople, and that when the Turk gets his deserts, it will emerge from oblivion. May the Lord hasten the day.

VIII.—THREE OTHER STONES.

If we accept the list given above of stones of the ephod and rational, we find that all except two of them, are mentioned as foundation stones of the New Jerusalem (Apoc. xxi.), but their order is entirely different. The two left out are *agate* and *carbuncle*, instead of which we have *chalcedony* and *chrysoprase*.

We know what is now understood by *chalcedony*, a species of stone

belonging to the quartz group; but what the ancients meant by "*chalcidonus*" is not quite clear. From what Pliny says, this latter would seem to be an inferior kind of emerald from the copper mines of Chalcedon; but how the change in signification came about is still a mystery.

Chrysoprase is an opaque, apple-green stone, of a most agreeable hue and extremely hard. Its material is chalcedony colored by oxide of nickel. The name is derived from the Greek, and means "leek-green with a golden tinge."

Lastly, we find "pearls." The Hebrew words *gabish* and *peninim* (Job xviii., 18, Ezech. xiii., 11-13, and xxxviii., 22) have sometimes been translated by "pearls," but the majority of interpreters do not consider them stones at all.

In the New Testament the pearl is mentioned in Matth. xiii., 45, 46, where a merchant finds one of great price, and in exchange for it parts with all he owns. In 1 Tim. ii., 9, St. Paul advises women to "adorn themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair and pearls."

Pearls are again mentioned in Apoc. xvii., 4, and xxi., 21. In the latter place: "The twelve gates (of the Holy City) are twelve pearls, one to each, and every one was of one several pearl." Here "pearl" must mean pieces of "mother-of-pearl," fitted together to form the doors, since an oyster big enough to furnish a pearl as large as a city gate would surpass the wildest dream of the wildest of archæologists. There is no difficulty about the matter anyhow, for the Greek word *margarites* and Latin *margarita* may mean either pearl or mother-of-pearl, according to circumstances.

IX.—TWO LISTS NOT IN THE BIBLE.

The first list, as such, is not given in the Bible, but it has a legendary connection therewith. In it the twelve Apostles are symbolized by twelve stones, thus:

- St. Peter is represented by Jasper.
- St. Andrew is represented by Sapphire.
- St. James is represented by Chalcedony.
- St. John is represented by Emerald.
- St. Thomas is represented by Beryl.
- St. James, the lesser, is represented by Topaz.
- St. Philip is represented by Sardonyx.
- St. Bartholomew is represented by Carnelian.
- St. Matthew is represented by Chrysolite.
- St. Simon is represented by Jacinth.
- St. Thaddeus is represented by Chrysoprase.
- St. Matthias is represented by Amethyst.

This is probably due to Apoc. xxi., 14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb."

Another list, neither in the Bible nor connected with it, is one in which a particular stone is sacred to each month, the list of "zodiac stones."

January	=	Aquarius	=	Jacinth.
February	=	Pisces	=	Amethyst.
March	=	Aries	=	Bloodstone.
April	=	Taurus	=	Sapphire.
May	=	Gemini	=	Agate.
June	=	Cancer	=	Emerald.
July	=	Leo	=	Onyx.
August	=	Virgo	=	Carnelian.
September	=	Libra	=	Chrysolite.
October	=	Scorpio	=	Aquamarine.
November	=	Sagittarius	=	Topaz.
December	=	Capricorn	=	Ruby.

Beyond this, there are superstitions innumerable attributing to gems many properties, hygienic, lethal, angelic and diabolical; but we have already trespassed too far on the patience of our readers.

We have found, in all, about a score of different precious stones in the Bible. The subject has been of deep interest to the writer, and he only regrets being unable to treat it in a more interesting manner.

T. J. A. FREEMAN, S.J.

Book Notices.

THE HISTORY OF THE POPES, FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. Drawn from the secret archives of the Vatican and other original sources. From the German of Dr. Ludwig Pastor, Professor of History in the University of Innsbruck. Edited by Frederick Ignatius Antrobus of the Oratory. Vols. III, and IV. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1894. Received from Benziger Brothers.

Dr. Pastor occupies a unique position among the Catholic *literati* of our generation. Though still comparatively a young man he has already forged his way by persevering and conscientious work to the very front rank of that noble corps of men who have consecrated their lives to the investigation of historical truth. He has received most flattering encomiums from the Supreme Pontiff whose especial esteem he deservedly enjoys, and bears, among Protestant writers, the reputation of being *par excellence*, the champion of the Catholic Church. The position of Dr. Pastor is all the more honorable, as it does not oblige him to become a special pleader, or to distort or to slur over the witness of original documents. His commission from the great Pope who threw open to scholars the doors of the most secret archives of the Vatican is to present the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He is to allow each historical personage to appear as he spoke, wrote, and acted: "Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice." What an advance is this upon the old-time, polemical method of writing history, when every Pope, bishop, priest or monarch was either an immaculate saint or an unreclaimed fiend, according to the theological standpoint of the so-called historian. The time is past in reputable scientific circles when each individual actor on the page of history was regarded as a sort of abstraction, or the incarnation of the principles which he was supposed to represent. The bright idea has dawned upon us that the heroes of history were *men*, mortals like to us, with human motives, instincts, virtues, and weaknesses, and not demigods or demifiends come from a different planet among us.

It cannot be denied that our present method of studying history by means of original documents, while possessing the advantage of scientific truth and reality, has stripped it of a great deal of its poetic charm. The development of history as a *science*, or product of pure reason, has tended to hurt it as an *art*, the child of the imagination employing the embellishments of elegance and eloquence. This is painfully apparent in works like the one which we are introducing to our readers. Dr. Pastor is too busily engaged in overturning old errors and prejudices, and too scrupulously intent upon obtaining absolute accuracy, to devote much attention to the allurements of mere literature. It is next to impossible to be at the same time an expert in handling a microscope and a telescope; nor is it reasonable to expect that a scholar whose energies have been expended in ransacking archives everywhere for manuscripts, and establishing the dates and true readings of letters and other documents, should be able to rise to those brilliant generalizations which make history pleasant reading to the general public.

We regard, therefore, this work of the learned Pastor, and all similar

works, only as preliminary contributions to a Church history still to be written, and most probably not in the present generation, when it will be no longer necessary to distract the reader's attention from the current of the narrative by the encumberment of annotations as bulky as the text. Even now, it often causes us surprise and vexation when our eye is called off from some important statement to the bottom of the page without any sufficient justification. The suspicion is sure to be aroused that the writer is making a vain display of erudition. Every note or reference which is not of evident utility is a sheer nuisance and a disfigurement. Creighton's custom of massing his authorities at the end of the volume is vastly preferable to the method of Pastor, and of Germans generally. These notes are of no service to the great bulk of readers, who could not verify them if they wished, not having the documents at hand. The custom is somewhat amateurish, and better honored in the breach than in the observance. When we prove an author to be correct in essentials, we may readily trust him for matters of very slight importance. At any rate, in such things, he is to be judged, not by the general public, but by his fellow-experts, who can verify his statements without the assistance of a finger-post at every turn.

The period of history which Dr. Pastor has chosen for his special field is not one calculated to develop much enthusiasm in either the writer or his readers. No force of genius could elevate the public characters, ecclesiastical or civil, of the fifteenth century to the dignity or stature of heroes. There was no room for heroism in that age of trifling pedants and petty politicians. The grand ideals which had dominated, united and civilized Europe during the Middle Ages had lost their hold on the intellects and imaginations of men, who lived, so to speak, a hand-to-mouth existence, intent upon seizing, each what came next to him out of the universal wreck. It was a minor misfortune that the Holy Roman Empire was no longer a name to conjure with; the prime disaster and gloomiest outlook for the future, was the decadence of that papal prestige which, in happier times, had made a united Christendom not only a possibility but a living reality. The great schism had unloosed passions and scattered seeds of dissension and insubordination destined to produce in time most lamentable fruit. The calamities of the sixteenth century were the logical sequence of the follies of the fifteenth; the tocsin of the great apostacy was sounded, not at Wittenburg but at Constance and Basel.

Could a Leo or a Hildebrand have averted the impending catastrophe? Hard to say. It is much safer to affirm that no man of the calibre of a Leo or Hildebrand could have received the suffrages of the cardinals of the fifteenth century.

The two volumes before us contain a translation of Pastor's second volume in the original German edition. They deal with the pontificates of three Popes, namely, Pius II. (1458-1464), Paul II. (1464-1471) and Sixtus IV. (1471-1484), an aggregate of about twenty-six years.

It has been repeatedly asserted that the history of these and of the other pontificates of the fifteenth century will be entirely revolutionized by the new documents which are being every day discovered in the archives of Europe. The persusal of Pastor's work and a comparison between it and, say Creighton's, will show that this assertion is altogether too sweeping. The archives in question had been already fairly well exploited by earlier investigators, and the stale lies of the slanderous gossippers of the Renaissance era had been banished from the pages of reputable historians. Indeed, the errors which all Pastor's

diligence has been able to discover in Creighton's narrative are remarkably few and insignificant, and the result has been in our mind an increased appreciation of the Anglican bishop's worth as a fair-minded and capable historian. Taking into account the Anglican's point of view which makes him naturally adverse to the Papal claims, we are forced to avow that his judgments passed upon the Popes of the Renaissance are far less severe and his sympathy with their difficulties much more humane and kindly than those of the Catholic professor of Innsbruck. This is, no doubt, owing to the fact that a Catholic is prone to expect a higher ideal in the Vicar of Christ, to demand from him greater sanctity, purity of intention, disinterestedness, spirituality, than would a Protestant. The loftier one's conception of the dignity of the papacy, and the more intimate one's association of the Visible with the Invisible Head of the Church, the more intolerant must one be of the slightest appearance in the Roman Pontiff's character of human frailty. Hence, the severest critics of the papacy, and indeed of the clergy in general, have been the Catholics themselves.

Another remark: The History of the Popes is by no means the history of the Catholic Church, which is but slightly interested in the farago of petty Italian squabbles, intrigues, and family ambitions, which make up the main bulk of this book. Whether this or that cardinal is elected Pope, or whether one or a dozen of his brothers or nephews are made princes of Church or State,—these are things of very remote interest to the Catholic Church if they attend faithfully to their duties and lead lives of edification. And yet it is just such trifling and ephemeral matters which are most apt to engross the thoughts of the curia and of chroniclers of Roman gossip, of all gossips the most flat, stale, and unprofitable.

We conclude by complimenting Father Antrobus upon the fidelity and elegance of his translation and the publishers upon the beauty and accuracy of their work.

THE MONASTIC LIFE, FROM THE FATHERS OF THE DESERT TO CHARLEMAGNE. Eighth Volume of the Formation of Christendom. By *Thomas W. Allies, K. C. S. G.* London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Limited. 1895.

The casual reader will need a key to the rich store-house of the volume entitled "The Monastic Life." Superficially read, it will convey nothing new, and yet we venture to say that Mr. Allies' conception of monasticism *is* entirely new. He makes it the second great pivot which supports the edifice of Christendom. The fruitful generation of chastity is engrafted on the Apostolic See, its living force and its support.

The Rome of Peter has succeeded to the *Pax Romana*, as another volume pointed out, and inherited its traditions of human wisdom. The dominion of old Rome, mighty and far-stretching as it was, did not sacrifice the individual, or idiosyncrasies worthy of being perpetuated. Real genius recognizes genius wherever it is. Rome assimilated the good things of its world-wide tributaries, and was contented to eat the food prepared by other hands than her own. St. Peter's Rome has the same gift, and cries *Spiritus ubi vult spirat*. It does not constrain or localize the voice of the spirit, whose riches are poured into its great and ever open spiritual emporium. After the fashion of the *Pax Romana*, though in a sense as much higher as souls are than bodies, it draws, in the far-off land, its subject, the mystic boundary, which constitutes the Roman *civitas* and *ager*, and confers the proud title of Roman citizenship.

Monasticism, as a state and an institution, was not of Roman birth. It was a contribution of the East, transplanted to Rome, and submitted to Roman customers before it could gain the traffic of the West. St. Athanasius, whose confessorship placed him in the foremost ranks of Roman citizenship, conveyed St. Anthony's legacy to headquarters in 340, and found Rome only just recovering from the throes of persecution. Martyrs had been her principal achievement in the first ages; she was now to make confessors and virgins. The smallest *supplica* at Rome has to be regularly presented. No one could dispute the credentials of St. Athanasius. After suffering hair-breadth escapes, and all but death from heretical hands, he had written the life of Anthony, a book which stirred up the world itself and converted Augustine. Anthony was taking the Kingdom of Heaven by violence, he said, whilst he was given up to dry books. There were other enemies in the field than "dry books." Anthony's example in reality spoke to his heart as nothing else had done, and the heart is man's stronghold, whether for good or evil.

Athanasius did not stop at writing. He carried Anthony's fame with his inheritance to Rome. Rome tasted and saw that it was good, and after the example of old Rome, extended the benefit of the eastern institution to the whole Christian Empire, a work of assimilation which was accomplished by centuries.

As long as the Church is persecuted, and the courage of martyrs does not fail, she is safe in the higher sense. The want of security is the best security in the spiritual life. Constantine had produced a new state of things. No sooner had he paved the way for practice of the counsels than they were revealed by St. Athanasius, who, great saint and genius as he was, may possibly not have grasped the reasonableness of his tidings. It seems an anomaly to say that liberty and independence have their dangers, yet it is no less true. The moment when a bloody persecution stops is always a critical moment. The forces of the world immediately come into play and threaten to pervert even the children of martyrs by a subtle worldliness. Two years after Constantine became sole emperor, he concerted with the Patriarchs of the Petrine Sees the calling of the first Œcumenical Council at Nicea, in 325. It was the first Christian Emperor's "gift to the Church." (p. 117.)

Not by words only does the Church legislate. The history of General Councils reveals the simultaneous working of facts. Deeds were not slow to follow in the wake of Nicea. Fifteen years later Athanasius revealed to Rome the secret of Egyptian deserts. The first exposition of doctrine drew strength from the virginal life as an institution. The annals of the Church, in Rome as elsewhere, had from the first presented numerous individual instances of it. Anthony, expounded by Athanasius, drew it forth into the full light of the sanctuary. Greek philosophers had their porches for the study of human wisdom, and had practised a certain kind of *vita communis*. Philosophy was in fact its key-note. It was more skilled in the brain than in the heart. As St. Jerome said, *Plato in cerebro, Christus in corde*. The Christian philosophy differed from the Hellenic in its scope and in its end. It rested on a Crucified God, and aimed at reproducing His Divine Life. Yet no less than the Greek wisdom it had to be learned, or rather far more. On Christian lines, the monks were to the rest of the world what certified scholars are compared to amateurs, who are the Greek *ιδιωται*.

The cessation of persecution was not the only cause at work to make the times critical. The Roman Empire was slowly dissolving in the incapacity and instability of its rulers. The sons of Constantine showed a

falling off, and the barbarians who were at no distant age to be put into Constantine's inheritance, were already in the field. They constituted the future Christendom and were largely moulded by religious of both sexes. From the time that the religious rule took root, and between 340 and the appearance of St. Benedict in the following century, the life, as a life, was freely recognized; monasteries were generally called upon to supply the pastors of the church. It was found that the monk's religious training eminently fitted him for the task of governing, and this is an answer to an objection which is often raised against early vocations. The wisdom of these ages decided that the great study of all was the study of God. A knowledge of the world could bring no good. To live, therefore, for God's service was the highest life, whether as novice or professor. The experience of a London season, or of many London seasons, would have been declined as a disqualification, and the spiritual lilies, unsoiled by worldly contamination, freely gathered to adorn the high places of the Church. The choice of holy bishops was an important factor in winning barbarians to Our Lord, and it was due to religious houses.

Prior to the bishop, however, was the apostle, and these pages convey nothing if not the conviction that Europe would not have been converted at all without religious. The two apostles, who received most prominence, are St. Patrick and St. Boniface, whilst the conversion of Saxon England is ascribed with much detail to the practice of the counsels.

Another reason lay hidden in the design of Divine Providence for the rise and growth of monasticism. The personality of Benedict presented an exact antithesis to that of Mohammed, and the life which he inaugurated was the weakening and overthrow of sensuality. "The harem fought the monastery." (p. 481.) The work of St. Benedict was, not to build monasteries, for many great centres were in being before his time, but to give unity to the religious life by one fixed rule. No design or undertaking would be marked with God's sign if it lacked unity, neither would it take root. Even the splendid monasteries, with their hundreds of monks, Bangor, Marmoutier, Lérins, for instance, might have been temporary and passing wayside dwellings, without the abiding strength of a rule. Some houses followed several, and the obvious conclusion is that they would not have been followed long. Dissolution, more or less speedy, results from want of unity. During two hundred years the rule of St. Benedict was sinking into the spiritual soil, building up nations, scattering the seeds of civilization, and making saints. A new society, if society it can be called, was springing up in the "countless multitudes," who followed upon Roman decay. Benedict and his children fashioned them for the Yoke of Christ. They Christianized the barbarian world. Two centuries after St. Benedict's death, it was ripe for the new dynasty, which was crowned by Pope Leo in the person of Charlemagne.

Mr. Allies entitled the first chapter of his work "The Philosophy of History." To the uninitiated history gives no voice. It is a series of events, crimes and wars, which repeat themselves in dull confusion. Let an Augustine take hold of fifty years, or even of a single fact, which was hitherto judged absolutely insignificant, and he at once sheds broad daylight on the scene. Our minds open to the knowledge that God had a particular design in the fall of an empire, or the birth of a certain individual at a given time. In these pages, as throughout all his eight volumes, Mr. Allies follows in the wake of St. Augustine, and illumines the dull or obscure page of history. The degenerate Roman emperors,

the dying Empire, the savage barbarian hordes, the fate of Rome, five times sacked, the Holy See left in the city of ruins, and building up a principedom, in moral strength, these are facts which other volumes have clothed with startling reality. Then, we have the gradual formation of the new races, the hardly Christianized barbarian prince, who is half savage, half gentleman, with instincts often wholly good. The philosophy of history shows him to be an important factor in the new world, which grew up after the Roman Empire, and thus attaches interest to himself and his fortunes. In a former volume, too, the encounter of Pope St. Leo with Attila, was set forth, and it was a typical meeting. In his spiritual character the Chief of Christians spoke to the Scourge of God "as one having authority." The Papacy is the standing miraculous fact, which goes far beyond actual miracles, however striking. The monastic life is the second miraculous fact, with which the world has to count. It is so far beyond unaided human powers that Protestantism characterizes it as unnatural, or at best, the refuge of disappointed hearts, or a channel for the survival of the fittest. The Protestant who is an incipient agnostic, should be referred to these pages. *Amare et servire* was the device in deeds of St. Benedict. His heart was in heaven, his hand at work, tilling the soil either of the ground or of the human intellect. It mattered not in what way he toiled so long as he carried out his appointed labor.

The conversion of Saxon England is the poem of monasticism and the refutation of Protestant prejudices. The noblest of the land gave themselves up to religious life, and the bruised hearts belonged to those only who could not follow Christ alone. St. Ethelreda's story is wonderful in the annals of monasticism itself. For twelve years she was a wife only in name, hungering and thirsting for the hour of her spiritual espousals. Then, after her years of probation at court, she put off her royal crown, and received from St. Wilfrid the religious veil. What, the Protestant often asks, can be the attraction of the cloister? This book answers the question in the lives it exhibits. Christ, and Christ only, for He it is Who rivets the human heart to Himself by His divine election. Perfect happiness was the mark He set upon the higher life. It was the promised "hundredfold," and this was apparent in the names of religious houses, names chosen in the joy of crucified hearts, expressive of that peace which the world cannot give. The "fair place," the "good place," the "joyous place," the "delight," the "sweet rest," the "comfort," the "joy," (p. 203.) are some of the most touching. They are an epitome of man's cravings; joy, delight, rest and comfort, and a realization of the Gospel commands, "Leave all things and follow Me." They are a further bearing out of St. Chrysostom's words that God persuades by contraries. It was as if He had said, "Give up all and thou shalt find all."

The high ideal of domestic life which the Church placed before the world in the sacrament of matrimony was the first safeguard of the new society. Roman legislation had signally failed in giving a stable character, or indeed any character, to marriage. The Roman matron, who chose the epitaph *Uni viro*, recorded an exception which she fully appreciated. Human marriage had been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and then the spiritual espousals of the soul to Christ in the monastic life came to encompass the society as with a shield. The philosophy of history points to the birth and rise of Mohammed as a reason for this double precaution. The false prophet grounded himself on sensuality, and thus appealed to every instinct of fallen man. To withstand the subtle temptation of his system, the Cross was not too much, and the

Cross strengthened by its "divine folly." An army stretched in battle array checked the onslaught of the Crescent, and offered man the only arms which would lead him victorious from the battle-field, chastity and purity. Mr. Allies' seventh volume treats specially of Mohammed's Flood beating vainly against Peter's Rock. This is in itself a powerful argument, and an overwhelming proof of the existence in the world of divine truth. Let the Agnostic, who says we know nothing, and that there is nothing to know, consider the rise of Mohammedanism. It put no check upon the natural appetites of man, and has, therefore, been the devil's most powerful instrument as well as man's most cruel enemy. Far from reinstating fallen nature, it would have swamped the world, and hurried it on to a premature dissolution, not the *felix exitus* of St. Augustine, but a second Deluge of ignominy.

The Flood beat vainly against the Rock in virtue of the divine promise, which caused the desert to fructify, and made human nature supernaturally strong. It was not enough to set forth the ideal Christian marriage in contradistinction to the harem. It was necessary to reach greater heights, and this was the marvel of the life to which the Rule of Benedict gave expansion.

'Αληθής

CHRIST IN TYPE AND PROPHECY. By *Rev. A. J. Maas, S. J.*, Professor of Oriental Languages in Woodstock College, Md.

The first volume of this remarkable work has already been noticed in the *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, and it is gratifying to find that our high estimate of its merits is fully borne out by the concurrent testimony of reviews and periodicals which reflect every shade of Christian opinion. "This is a very scholarly work and apparently exhaustive of the subject," says the *Christian Leader*. "He (Professor Maas) meets deists, dogmatics and infidels with extraordinary force, and, in his panoply of irrefutable testimony, routs them, foot, horse and dragoon." Others speak in the same strain. "Beyond anything else, it is scholarly . . . his work should have a place on the library-shelf of every careful student." (*New York Herald*.) "He (the author) finds Christ in type and prophecy throughout the Old Testament, and develops his argument with ingenuity, fullness of learning, patient study and with excellent spirit." (*The Independent*.) "His treatise is learned, able and exhaustive. . . . We bid Professor Maas hasten his work." This last wish has been realized; we are in possession of the second volume; it fully equals the first in erudition, logical power, clearness and directness of diction, and it far surpasses it in interest, owing to the growing impressiveness of the prophecies which refer directly to the life, death, perpetual priesthood and eternal kingship of Christ.

This second volume contains the Vth, VIth, VIIth and VIIIth parts, which treat respectively of the Offices of the Messias, the Public Life of the Messias, the Sufferings of the Messias and the Glory of the Messias. Each part is divided into chapters, each chapter into numbers or paragraphs. It is a true history of the *Life of Jesus*, written long before the events actually took place by those who saw in the light of divine revelation the future struggles, sufferings and triumphs of the Redeemer. The same tone of fair criticism with regard to the opinions of other scholars, and of deep reverence towards the sacred books that marks the first volume, is also conspicuous in the second. The best way to make the reader acquainted with the manner of dealing with the subject adopted by the author is probably to select one of the prophe-

cies, and to show how its meaning is brought out by F. Maas. We choose, almost at random, the Psalm cix. (cx.), which refers both to the kingship and to the priesthood of Christ. We are first told how Dr. Bickell describes the poetical form; even verses are pentasyllabic and the uneven are heptasyllabic. The movement is iambic. Then a short summary of the psalm is given. The psalmist hears the invitation of Jehovah addressed to a king, to be seated near him on his war-chariot; the king complies, and proceeds against the enemies of Jehovah and his own. Then Jehovah declares that the king is a priest also:

"The Lord hath sworn; and he will not repent;
Thou art a priest forever
According to the order of Melchisedech."

After drinking of the torrent in the way, the king proceeds and destroys his enemies. According to Le Hir, this psalm can be divided into three parts: the words of Jehovah, address to the king, address to Jehovah. In the second number it is shown that David is the author of the psalm. In the third number we are treated to a summary of all the opinions which take away from the psalm its Messianic character. The arguments adduced by those who hold them are fairly stated, but easily disposed of. Then the new objections of Driver are brought forward. Here we give the text in full, because it is a very fair sample of the manner in which Father Maas meets the difficulties of his opponents.

Driver in his "Literature of the Old Testament" [p. 362, note] has added the following difficulties: 4. Adoni [my lord] is commonly used in addressing the Israelite king. But the learned author surely cannot deny that the Messiah was eminently the theocratic king. 5. Messianic prophecies have regularly as their point of departure some institution of the Jewish theocracy—the king, the prophet, the people [Is. xlii., 1, etc.], the high-priest, the temple [Is. xxviii., 16]; the supposition that David is here speaking and addressing a superior who stands in no relation to existing institutions, is not indeed impossible [for we have no right to limit absolutely the range of prophetic vision], but it is contrary to the analogy of prophecy. We have noticed already that at the time of David prophetic writings existed or came into existence in which the Messiah is exhibited under nearly the same aspect under which we see him in the present psalm. As to the principle enounced by Driver, the leading Messianic characteristics of the psalm are the priesthood and the royal dignity; now both existed at David's time so that the prophet could take his point of departure from them. 6. The correctness of this reasoning, Professor Driver says, is strongly confirmed by vv. 3, 5-7, where the subject of the psalm is actually depicted, not as a spiritual superior, but as a victorious Israelite monarch, triumphing through Jehovah's help over earthly foes. It is strange, indeed, that the professor can almost in the same breath advance two objections, one of which answers the other. Have we not been told a moment ago by the learned author that the prophets commonly take their point of departure from some existing theocratic institution? and must they not in the same manner take their departure from some tangible fact of sense in order to be understood by their readers or hearers? The psalmist, therefore, taking his starting point from the semblance of a successful warrior, depicts the Messianic hero in all the glory of his spiritual conquests. 7. To do justice to Prof. Driver, we must add, that he continues his dissertation by telling his hearers that "the psalm is Messianic in the same sense that Ps. ii. is; it depicts the ideal glory of the theocratic king who receives from a prophet . . . the twofold solemn promise of victory over his foes [and] of a perpetual priesthood. . . ." Prof. Cheyne [p. 301] speaks in the same manner: "Its [the psalm's] historical interpretation is correspondingly difficult; nor have I space to discuss rival hypotheses. To me it appears like an imitation of Ps. ii; but I am not positive that we can follow the analogy of that psalm in our interpretation."

Father Maas, according to his wont, has begun by stating the objections; like St. Thomas he says first, "*Videtur quod non.*" In the fourth number we have the "*sed contra est.*" This proves the Mes-

sianic character of the psalm. 1. By many passages of the New Testament; 2. By the intrinsic evidence supplied by the text itself; 3. By the Christian tradition; 4. By the Jewish traditions, and by numerous quotations from the Talmud. He gives the Jewish commentaries for each verse, then he gives a literal translation of the whole psalm, verse for verse, and discusses the meaning of every word. It is only after this exhaustive examination that he draws the following corollaries:

1. "The psalm clearly represents the Messiah as both king and priest, and as overcoming his enemies in that double capacity. The Messianic victory is, therefore, different from that of other warlike princes.

2. "The nature of the Messianic priesthood is described as resembling that of Melchisedech rather than that of Aaron.

3. "The Messiah is king in such a manner as to share the power and dignity of Jehovah himself, hence, he must be God, since God's attributes can be applied to no one besides God."

But this is not enough, the Messiah is a priest *according to the manner of Melchisedech*. To fully realize the meaning of these words, it is necessary to refer to Gen. xiv., 14-20. In n. 1 the connection of the passage of Genesis with its context is fully established. In n. 2 Father Maas proves by the Assyrian and Chaldaic inscriptions that the Biblical narrative is not an allegory, but a historical fact. Then follows in n. 3 the proof that Melchisedech was a figure of Christ, and that his sacrifice was a type of the perpetual sacrifice of the New Testament. A translation of the passage is given, and the meaning of each part of it is fully discussed. The conclusion is irresistible, and must be given in the author's own words:

"Hence we must conclude that the sacrifice of Melchisedech was a type of the unbloody sacrifice of the New Testament.

"This conclusion may be further confirmed by the following considerations: According to St. Paul, Melchisedech was the type of Christ in as far as he was priest. Hence the sacrifice of Melchisedech must have been a type of Christ's sacrifice. But we know only one sacrifice offered by Melchisedech—that of bread and wine; and we know only of one occasion on which Christ offered sacrificially bread and wine—at the Last Supper. Hence Melchisedech's sacrifice was the type of the sacrifice offered by Christ at the Last Supper. On the other hand, Christ is a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech; hence he must have a victim forever, resembling that of Melchisedech. Therefore, as Christ's victim is his own body and blood, he must offer them forever under the appearances of bread and wine. But he does not do this personally; hence it must be done through his ministers."

The author adds that his conclusion is confirmed not only by the practice of the Church, by the consent of the Fathers, and by a constant Christian condition, but by the Jewish traditions themselves; and he quotes the following astounding saying of a Jewish master:

Rabbi Phinees in Num., xxviii., says: "At the time of the Messiah all sacrifices shall cease; as it is said, Gen., xiv., 'Melchisedech, the King of Salem, brought forth bread and wine.' For Melchisedech, *i.e.*, the king Messiah, shall exempt from the ceasing of the sacrifices, the sacrifice of bread and wine, as it is said [Ps., cx.]: 'Thou art a priest forever, according to the order of Melchisedech.'"

This is but a sample of the skill with which Father Maas expounds a scriptural text, brings out its full meaning, and draws his conclusions. With the same thoroughness, he shows in type and prophecy every circumstance of the Passion. It is impossible to read one after another, these sorrow-laden articles, to see them discussed, analyzed, coherently indeed, but with a calmness more impressive than fast flowing tears, and

not to feel awe struck at the divine character of the drama in which Justice and Mercy united in eternal embrace.

One of the last prophecies on which Father Maas has turned his searchlight, is that referring to the conversion of Israel. It is peculiarly consoling in these days of strong anti-Semitic excitement. We shall give it in the literal translation of the author, and it shall bring to an end this unduly lengthened notice.

"On that day, saith the Lord, I will gather up her that halteth, and her that I had cast out. I will gather up, her whom I had afflicted. I will make her that halted a remnant, and her that had been afflicted a mighty nation, and the Lord will reign over them in Mount Zion, from the time now and forever. And thou O cloudy tower of the flock, of the daughter of Zion, unto thee shall it come; yea the first power shall come, the kingdom to the daughter of Jerusalem."

We hope that Father Maas may be prevailed upon to continue his work and give us a complete course of Sacred Scripture, written with the same erudition and fairmindedness that characterized his "Christ in Type and Prophecy."

FRACTIO PANIS. Die Aeltese Darstellung des Eucharistischen Opfers in der "Cappella Greca." Entdeckt und erläutert von *Joseph Wilpert*. Herder: Freiburg and St. Louis. 1895. Price \$6.25.

The spirit of de Rossi still lives in the band of able disciples with which the illustrious pioneer of scientific Christian Archæology took care to surround himself; who, having inherited their master's "doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, long-suffering, love, patience," are thoroughly equipped for the continuing of his great life-work in the sacred precincts of the Catacombs. Prominent among these scholars of the lamented de Rossi is Mgr. Wilpert, on whom the prophet's mantle seems to have especially fallen. We have already given expression to our admiration for his charming monograph on "Consecrated Virgins in the First Ages of the Church," in which the author's best qualities—his profound theological judgment, his thorough mastery of the entire field of patristical lore, his sincere Catholic faith and piety, his intimate acquaintance with every nook and corner of the catacombs, and his wonderful mechanical skill in drawing and photography—were given full scope in illustrating a phase of ancient Christian life which possesses a perennial attraction for Catholic hearts. "Lei ha scelto per Suo studio il fiore dell' archeologia cristiana," was the flattering encomium of his aged master upon the young disciple's choice of virginity as his subject, and the encomium was equally creditable to master and disciple, and served as a fitting prelude to the study.

Wilpert opens his present dissertation also with a compliment from de Rossi as gracious as it was deserved. We shall let him tell the story in his own words:

"Any one who visits the catacombs of St. Priscilla on the *Via Salara* will retain an enduring memory of the chamber which is known as the "Cappella Greca." The archæologist in particular will be struck by its architecture, and will be surprised to find in it paintings which compare favorably with good Pompeian productions. The chapel is situated within a few paces of the (modern) entrance of the catacomb, and has been accessible for a long time, as is evidenced by the names of visitors, accompanied with the dates, written on the wall. . . . The latest name inscribed is that of him whom we honor as the scientific founder of Christian archæology; *J. B. de Rossi*. The year, 1851, annexed to the name, marks the time when the master began his investiga-

tions in the catacomb of St. Priscilla. Forty-three years later, April 6, 1894, he was destined to visit it for the last time. He came for the purpose of viewing some paintings which I had recently uncovered in the 'Cappella Greca.' Although deprived by a paralytic stroke of the free use of his limbs, he dragged himself painfully along, leaning on the arm of his brother, *Michele Stefano*, to the paintings, which I showed him by the light of a taper. After a prolonged study of the principal piece, he said to me as we were leaving the chapel: 'Con questa scoperta Lei ha coronato gli scavi.' (With this discovery you have crowned the excavations.) It was his last journey to the catacombs. His malady increased in violence from day to day, and on September 20th, he was snatched away by death from the studies to which he had consecrated his entire life."

The Catacomb of Priscilla, the scene of Wilpert's latest labors, is probably the oldest of the Roman catacombs, it having been used for Christian burials and service in sub-apostolic times.

The *Cappella Greca*, so called from two Greek inscriptions therein found, enjoys the double distinction of being at the same time one of the very oldest of the Christian sepulchral chapels and of having remained intact to the present day; for at an early period it was walled up for the purpose of strengthening the galleries of the catacomb. The decorations and paintings on the walls are in strictly classical style, and according to the archæologists, were finished as we now find them, untouched by any hand save that of time, in the early years of the second century. The chapel already enjoyed the distinction of furnishing the first example of a Madonna and Child, and now, thanks to Mgr. Wilpert's skill and diligence, it presents antiquarians with "the oldest representation of the Eucharistic Sacrifice." This is that "crown of the excavations" which excited the admiration of de Rossi.

Space does not allow us to give the author's highly interesting narrative of the manner in which he liberated the important relic from its covering of mud and stalactite. The plate which he inserts from the original photograph shows it to have been an altar-piece representing the *Fractio panis*, or Breaking of Bread, and is a clear symbol of the sacrifice which took place on the altar beneath.

Mgr. Wilpert is no mere antiquarian. He is as much at home in history and theology as in archæology. Hence he is enabled to clothe any subject he treats with a great variety of interesting information drawn from allied branches. Taking his discovery as a starting-point, he goes into the whole subject of ancient Christian worship, fortifying every assertion with texts of the Fathers and illustrated views of ancient monuments. The course of his argument having led him to make frequent allusions to the famous Abercius inscription, he ends by devoting a long appendix to a discussion of its text and meaning. Altogether, he has given us a masterly work on the most important and timely of subjects. We cannot close our scanty notice without a warm congratulation to the distinguished publisher who has spared no pains to make this *édition de luxe* worthy alike of the author and of the subject. In looking at the magnificent illustrations, we seem to be standing on the sacred spot where our primitive fathers in the faith fortified themselves for martyrdom by eating the mystical bread of heaven:

FRA GIOVANNI ANGELICO DA FIESOLE. Sein Leben und seine Werke, von *Stephan Beissel S. J.*, Mit vier Tafeln und 40 Abbildungen im Text. Freiburg and St. Louis. Herder: Pp. 95. Price, net \$2.75.

This charming monograph of the learned Father Beissel, comes timely

to illustrate our remark made in noticing Dr. Pastor's great work, that the personal history of the Popes is by no means an adequate presentation of the manifold activities of Holy Church. The exciting period of the Great Schism and the Renaissance gave rise to all sorts of movements, good and bad, starting from a hundred independent centres. The Papacy originated very little in those stormy days, being engrossed by the effort to maintain its position in the Church and in society; nevertheless, the Popes of the fifteenth century deserve the gratitude of posterity for their solicitude, in spite of their grave embarrassments, to foster and turn to account the improvements initiated by others.

It was in the very midst of the gloomy disasters of the Schism that God raised up one of those great men, so numerous in the Church, whose benefactions are more brilliant and enduring than their name. Whilst the world resounded with theological strife, Brother Giovanni Dominici was quietly engaged in restoring a few Dominican convents to pristine vigor and discipline. Himself a man of extraordinary sanctity, solid learning and magnetic eloquence, he infused his own spirit, or rather the spirit of his saintly Founder into the gifted and pious youths who flocked about him. He it was who trained the future Archbishop of Florence and Father of the science of moral theology, St. Antoninus. To his feet came also the two brothers whom he named in religion Fra Giovanni and Fra Benedetto, the former a young miniaturist of excellent taste, and the latter giving promise of great literary ability. Under the experienced guidance of Dominici, the brothers rose to eminence, each in his particular sphere.

The first years of Fra Angelico's convent life were devoted to prayer, meditation and a careful study of the works of the early Italian painters, which abounded in the regions of Tuscany and Umbria. It is scarcely correct, however, to say that in the mind of this saintly religious, piety and painting were distinct subjects. His paintings have been aptly called "frescoed prayers and embodied meditations." It was his maxim that "Art demands quiet and freedom from all distracting thoughts"; and that "Whoever desires to depict the actions of Our Lord must live entirely absorbed in Our Lord." Never did he take his pencil in hand without a preparatory prayer; nor was he ever seen to paint the Crucified One without tears streaming from his eyes. Very touching is the anecdote told of him to illustrate how, even in old age, he retained the spirit of humble obedience which had distinguished his novitiate. "It chanced one day that Pope Nicholas V. came upon him as the artist was quite exhausted at his work, whereupon the Pontiff ordered some flesh meat to be brought to him. It was, however, a day on which the Dominicans of strict observance were not permitted the use of flesh meat. Fra Angelico, therefore, with childlike simplicity and forgetful that the Pope's order was equivalent to a dispensation, declined with thanks, 'as he could not eat without the permission of his Prior.'"

Our readers can easily imagine how fascinating the story of this lovely character becomes in the able hands of a veteran writer like Father Beissel. The simple record of his uneventful life is told in eight chapters, and in naming them we shall follow the artist's career in outline. I. Early Training and First Fruits in Cartona and Perugia (1387-1418). II. Sojourn and Activity in Fiesole (1418-1436). III. Sojourn in Florence (1436-1445). IV. External Influences, or the relations of the Dominicans of San Marco to Cosimo dei Medici, their patron. V. Fra Angelico's Last Judgment and its indebtedness to Dante's Poem. VI. Fra Giovanni's Madonnas. VII. His Labors in Rome and Orvieto (1445-1455). VIII. His Last Years and Death.

The volume is brought out with the taste and beauty characteristic of the distinguished publisher. In addition to the forty illustrations scattered through the text, there are four remarkably fine plates. For frontispiece we have Fra Angelico's Coronation of Mary, the original of which is at present in the Galleria degli Uffizi, in Florence. The other plates represent "The Descent from the Cross"; the "Last Judgment," and the sweet "Madonna and Child."

PRÆLECTIONES DOGMATICÆ QUAS IN COLLEGIO DITTON-HALL HABEBAT *Christ. Pesch*, S. J. Tom. II. De Deo Uno. De Deo Trino. Pp. xiii., 369. Price \$1.90. Tom. III. De Deo Creante De Peccato Orig. de Angelis. De Deo Fine Ult. De Actibus hum. Pp. xii., 370. Price, \$1.90. Herder. Friburgi (St. Louis, Mo.). 1895.

The first volume of Fr. Pesch's lectures on dogmatic theology, dealing with the sources of that science, was noticed in a preceding number of the REVIEW. The two volumes now before us cover the first four treatises of special dogmatics. The author's plan embraces five more volumes to complete the course. In the first of the two present volumes Fr. Pesch enters on the central object of theology—the unfolding of the content of revelation concerning God as One in nature and Triune in personality. The first half of the book presents a wide and a tempting field for philosophical speculation, but the author, faithful to the medium through which theology views its subject, keeps closely to the principles supplied by S. Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition, and on the whole calls in the subsidiary light of philosophy mainly in the direct development and illustration of those principles. In the question agitated within the Catholic schools of theology, philosophy of course receives the prominence required by those subjects, and let it be noted here in passing that Fr. Pesch, in these vexed questions, does not content himself with an historical statement of opinions, leaving the student to select which he may. There is no uncertain ring in his pronouncement in favor of the *scientia media* and against the *præmotio physica*.

The second half of the volume, treating as it does, of the mysteries of the B. Trinity, offers almost exclusive scope to purely theological principles. Philosophy must needs here take its ministerial position.

Thus far the author's plan has held him to the absolute side of his subject. With the second volume before us, the third in the entire series, he takes up its relative side, the relations of the Creator to His creation, or rather the relations of creatures to God as their Creator. As Creator, God must be the lord and master of His works, their end as well as their beginning. The scientific presentation of revealed truth in respect to the creative act and its objects or terms is completed only by being connected with the truths bearing on this final purpose of creation. On this ontological identity of the Alpha and Omega of things is based the logical conception of the matter set forth in the volume before us. God as Creator, God as the absolutely final end of His creative act and its effects: around these central thoughts hinge the two tracts herein contained.

Fr. Pesch has here made liberal as well as skillful use of the handmaid of his science especially in the first section on the nature of the creative act and, therefore, the after portions on man's nature, final end and on human acts in the free and moral aspects as means to the attainment of that end. On the other hand, the questions concerning the creative days, the origin of man, his elevation to the supernatural order, the fall with its consequences, the singular exemption of the Immaculate Virgin, the creation, nature, elevation and sin of the angels—all these must be primarily and

mainly seen through the media of revelation, through the Sacred Scriptures and the authoritative teaching of the Church. It is these subjects that call for manysidedness in the theologian, for his being at once an exegesis, a historian, sacred and profane, as well as a philosopher and a critic versed in the various theories of modern science. That the author of these profound, and at the same time erudite, tomes brings these qualities to his work, one realizes the longer and the more carefully one studies them. Studies them, we say, for the nature of their subjects renders the dipping or the skimming processes of little avail. At the same time they do not demand hard reading. Fr. Pesch's clear insight into his subject, his luminous definitions, his orderly arrangement, his straightforward transparent style, aided by the elegant typography of the book, all this, supplemented by the special importance and interest of the subjects themselves, draws one on without the strain of overtaxed attention. F. P. S.

BIBLISCHE STUDIEN Unter Mit Wirkung, von *Prof. Dr. Fell*, in Münster; *Prof. Dr. Felton*, in Bonn, etc. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. O. Bardenhewer, in München. I. Band. I. Heft: Der Name Maria. Geschichte d. Deutung desselben von Prof. Dr. Bardenhewer. Herder. Freiburg im B. (St. Louis, Mo.). 1895. Pp. x., 160. Price, 67c. Unbound.

A number of the leading Catholic scriptural scholars of Germany, professors in the higher institutions of learning in Münster, Bonn, Prague, Freiburg, Paderborn, Breslau, Tübingen and Munich have combined to publish a series of monographs on Biblical studies. The impulse to the design has come from the memorable Encyclical of Leo XIII., *Providentissimus Deus*, and the studies are to follow the teaching and the spirit of the papal pronouncement. The most thorough scientific and historical investigation is to be united in the work with that reverence for the inspired record which genuine Christianity inculcates and safeguards. The field to be covered by these studies is extremely broad. It will embrace exegesis proper, introduction to S. Scripture. Biblical Philology, Hermeneutics, Biblical Criticism, History, Archæology and Geography, together with the history itself of these various branches of learning. Though the studies will all be loosely connected by the general bond of subject-matter, it being intended that from four to six numbers shall constitute a volume, yet each number will stand with a certain completeness and independence by itself. The first of these studies to appear is an essay on the history of the interpretation of the name of the Blessed Virgin MARY, by the chief editor of the undertaking, Dr. Bardenhewer, professor in the University of Munich. The author has devoted years of research to subjects akin to that of the present study. It is hardly necessary for us to say that the ripened fruit of his labor, exhibited in this monograph, deserves, by its scope and character, to take the place of honor in the projected series.

The name of the Mother of Our Redeemer has always had a charm for the rightly tempered Christian mind and to it has been devoted a vast amount of historical and philological criticism. That widely varying interpretations should have in the course of centuries been attached to the name does not appear strange in view of the fact that it is but recently that anything like certainty has been reached regarding the laws of Semitic, especially of Hebrew etymology. The older attempts at interpreting the name are of little hermeneutical value, yet they are not without their interest in other respects. In them are seen "the roots or seeds of those titles of honor, symbols or appellations with which the piety of the middle ages and the Liturgy of the Church has adorned the Mother

of God," and so they furnish material for the history of this veneration the ages have given to Mary.

The present brochure traces the history of the meanings given to her name. Beginning with the significance of the name in the Old Testament, the author follows it through the Greek lexica attributed to Philo and Origen, along the stream of early and mediæval Greek and Latin church history. He searches out its meanings in the Syriac lexicography, through the German literature of mediæval times, as well as in the works of modern scholars who have thrown on it the newest lights from oriental philology. The various interpretations are hunted up to their beginnings and followed along their history. The work is a marvel of patient, critical research. It shows that wide and thorough acquaintance with eastern and western philology and with Christian archæology and history for which the German University professor is deservedly renowned. If the rest of these Biblical studies follow on the high plane of scholarship exhibited by this initial number, the learned Catholic world both in and out of Germany, will have reason to be proud of the solid and timely addition that shall be made to true scriptural science.

CHRISTUS ALS PROPHET. NACH D. EVANGELIEN DARGESTELLT. Von Dr. F. Schmid, Prof. d. Theologie Brixen, Buchandl. d. Kath. Politisch Press-vereins. 1892. Pp. iv., 186.

The conviction that true prophecy is of divine origin and is consequently a divine seal on the mission of the prophet, is ingrained into the human mind. The Christian religion, therefore, in pointing to the prophetic utterances of her Founder as to a motive of belief in His Divine nature and her divine mission, appeals to a natural intellectual tendency of man.

There are a number of works devoted to the special presentation of the prophecy argument, notably that of Fr. Maas on "Christ in Type and Prophecy," just completed. These works, however, are mainly restricted to the unfolding of the Messianic Prophecies of the Old Testament. Outside of works on general Apologetics, where the prophecies made by our Lord Himself are briefly exhibited as arguments for the Divinity of His person and His revelation, little has been written on His special prophetic office. The brochure before us by Dr. Schmid, Professor of Theology in the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Brixen, is devoted to this subject. It presents, therefore, a logical complement to the argument from the Messianic Prophecies by gathering from the four Gospels the prophetic utterances of Christ in testimony of His person and mission. These prophecies our author groups under four divisions; the first embraces those which our Lord made in close connection with His miracles and whose fulfilment followed at once or shortly afterwards, as, for instance, His predictions bearing upon the raising of Lazarus to life; the second including prophecies He uttered concerning His own future and that of His disciples, the fate of Jerusalem, Capharnaum, etc., the fulfillment of all of which is one of the best verified facts of history; the third group comprises Christ's prophecies in regard to the nature, progress, history of the Kingdom He established—prophecies which have been, still and shall yet be in course of fulfilment throughout the Christian ages; the fourth and last division contains His predictions as to the consummation of time, the signs that shall precede His last coming, the general resurrection, the final judgment, the eternal lot of the blessed and of the condemned.

Under these four heads Dr. Schmid collects the Gospel prophecies,

interprets their meaning and points to their fulfillment in the past, progressive present or future as the individual utterances demand.

His point of view is, as he says himself, that of a believing Catholic. At the same time the argument of his book appeals most strongly to the non-Catholic. The rationalist who rejects the inspiration for the entire genuineness of the Gospels, has an insoluble problem to confront. How could an intentional falsifier, or the myth-building fancy of the early Christian hit upon such prophecies as are contained in the Gospel record? On the Protestant who still accepts the inspiration of the Bible devolves the task of explaining the fact that the Catholic Church alone adequately answers to the picture of Christianity sketched in prophetic lines by its Founder.

To the earnest student of Apologetics, Dr. Schmid's monograph will be of great service by giving him a fairly complete survey and a satisfactory analysis of the prophetic argument for Christianity as presented by the Gospels, whilst the intelligent Catholic, layman as well as cleric, will gain from it a deeper knowledge and a better appreciation of that "Prophetic Word" to which the Apostle would have "his followers attend as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn and the morning star rise in their hearts."

THE OXFORD MOVEMENT IN AMERICA; or Glimpses of Life in an Anglican Seminary. By *Rev. Clarence E. Walworth*. New York: The Catholic Book Exchange, 120 West Sixtieth street. Price, \$1.00.

These *Reminiscences* of the venerable Father Walworth, jotted down without any attempt at rhetorical effect, and with slight effort at preserving the "unities," make most fascinating reading. They plant us in the early forties, and place us amidst surroundings quite unfamiliar to the vast majority of us. The memories which crowd upon the aged convert are of the most varied kind; and notwithstanding the kindly feeling he retains for the professors and fellow-students of his youthful days, the humorous side of the situation in an Anglican Seminary, with its motley assortment of High and Low, Tractarian and Evangelical, all huddled as in a Noe's ark, forces from him and his readers a good-natured smile. We quote a typical instance:

"Americans who remember Barnum's museum or his maneries will understand what I mean when I say that the Anglican Church constitutes what Barnum would have called 'A Happy Family,' in religion. A happy family, according to Barnum's phraseology, was a group of various animals, by nature most hostile to each other, shut up in one cage and obliged *per force* to keep peace. A dog was made to dwell in apparent harmony with a cat, a cat with a mouse and bird. A monkey kept peace with a parrot. The parrot whistled to call the dog, who wagged his tail at the call while he playfully pretended to bite the cat, who showed no signs of fear." . . . p. 39.

But the General Theological Seminary drew the line at Romanism, or even misprision thereof. This, Arthur Carey found to his cost, and so did the facile Onderdonk himself. One of the most amusing incidents in the book is that of the evergreen cross: . . . p. 37.

"During the Christmas vacation at the close of the year 1843, several students remained at the seminary, including myself and Whicher, also a candidate from our western diocese. Some of us undertook to decorate the chapel for Christmas. We introduced evergreens after the usual manner, and as profusely as circumstances would allow, especially around the little chancel. Unfortunately, however, none of us being low-churchmen or evangelical, and none having any great fear of Rome before our eyes, we introduced a large evergreen cross at the centre of the chancel railing and directly in front of the desk. Professor Turner, who was also dean of the faculty,

having charge of the buildings and all the rooms, was either offended at this, or feared that others would take offence. He sent for Whicher, berated him roundly, and ordered that the cross should be taken down. Whicher was disposed to resist this order as being unfriendly to the very symbol of our salvation, and fanatically evangelical. He consulted with his co-partners in misdemeanor, who encouraged him to carry the case to Bishop Onderdonk, president of the seminary. This he did. Dr. Onderdonk expressed great surprise at the dean's order, which he considered very foolish and unnecessary. He advised, however, that we should submit promptly and quietly to the dean, who was acting strictly in the line of his office and ought to be obeyed. This ended the matter, but left us feeling very foolish."

After a futile attempt of "Prior Wadhams" and Walworth to found a "monastery" on the Wadhams' Farm in Essex County, the amateur ascetics, soon followed by their fellow-student, James A. McMaster, sought and found rest in the bosom of the Catholic Church.

CURSUS PHILOS. IN USUM SCHOLARUM, AUCT. PLUR. PHILOS. PROFESSORIBUS IN COLLEGII EXAETENSI ET STONYHURSTENSI S. J. THEOLOGIA NATURALIS. Auctore B. Boedder, S.J. Friburgi (St. Louis, Mo.). Herder. 1895. Pp. xii., 371. Price, \$1.40.

With this volume on Natural Theology the series of text-books of which it forms a part, edited by the exiled German Jesuits in England and Holland is brought to a close—the volume on Ethics, which forms the logical termination of a course of philosophy having been the first in point of time to appear in print. Regret has been felt and publicly expressed that the editors of the series did not contemplate, or as it may be, did not see their way to adding a volume on the History of Philosophy. The extreme meagreness of reliable literature on this important branch of philosophical culture renders such an addition most desirable. We have already quite a large number of books on scholastic philosophy just short of this completion, so that it seems a pity to leave another unfinished monument in the field.

However, let us examine the claims on our attention of the present closing (if so it must be) volume. Its subject-matter is evidently inexhaustible, but judging from the number of works that have been devoted to it it might seem that at least the possibilities of doing more than repeating over again the oft-repeated truths concerning it had been exhausted. Waiving, however, the profit there is in this very multiplied repetition, the claims of the present volume for acceptance lies in its being an essential part of a whole course, whose merit is undoubted. But aside from this relation its independently inner worth is very considerable. Its author wrote the volume on Natural Theology in the Stonyhurst series of English manuals of Catholic Philosophy. His familiarity, therefore, with the requirements of English-speaking students of philosophy invites the presumption that his present work will have for them a special interest. And this it has. Compared with its English companion this Latin manual is of quite another character. It appeals not to the general reader, it makes no claim or effort to be popular. It is essentially didactic, and addresses exclusively the professional student of philosophy. It has, therefore, all that method, arrangement, incisive terminology, technique of thesis and counter-thesis that characterize the text-book of the study-hall and class-room. At the same time, however, it evinces, as has been hinted, special regard for the English reading student.

Many of the illustrations of its thesis, as well as the counter-objections refer to authors familiar, some as friends, others otherwise, to the reader of English philosophical literature.

This feature—its literary timeliness—together with its other undoubted merits, its fuller development of its subject than is found in the average text-book of philosophy, the closely logical weaving out of its theses, the special attention it gives to the solution of objections, its lucid, simple style, the attractive appearance of the book—all this makes the work a worthy companion of the preceding excellent manuals in this series, which in its present state of completion stands in the very front line of kindred literature.

F. P. S.

SYNOPSIS THEOLOGIAE DOGM. SPECIALIS AD MENTEM D. THOMÆ AQ. HODIERNIS MORIBUS ACCOMMODATA. Auctore *Ad Tanqueray S.S.* Tom. I., pp. 618. Tom. II. Editio Altera aucta et emendata. Pp. 927. Tornaci, Desclee, Baltimore (St. Mary's Seminary). Benziger (New York). 1895.

One takes up these handsomely printed volumes quite biased in their favor. The presswork is done in the style for which the Desclee house is deservedly famed, and the whole mechanical make-up shows the hand of the experienced teacher who realizes how much the labor of his pupils is facilitated by a well-ordered text-book. Nor is it necessary to pore long over these attractive pages to be impressed with the fact that the mould but befits the matter.

There are those who look with eyes askance on synopses of theology. They fear the evil in the little book, and sigh for the folios of the schoolmen. Others there are who believe we must have compendia of theology as we have of every other science, and they have strong reasons to urge for their opinion. There are synopses and synopses. Some are indexes, catalogues, satchel-guides to continents of knowledge. Others are curtailed descriptions but full of suggestiveness, opening out views which the beholder can enlarge and complete by his own insight, and pointing the way to richer information from additional sources. Of the latter kind is the work before us. Its author has written it for the use of students in our seminaries, and his experience has taught him their special needs. He has not, therefore, indulged in lengthy speculation on abstruse questions of little practical import. His aim has been to inform the minds of young theologians for their work in the ministry of to-day—to enable them to preach the word with solid fruit, and to confute the prevailing errors of heresy and infidelity. With this in view he pays more than wonted attention to the scriptural arguments for his theses and to the statement and disproof of false views and theories of so-called modern science. It would be wrong, however, to class the author with those who have no taste but for the "practical," the utilitarian aspect of theology. He evidently realizes that the theologian is formed only by deep and patient study of the master-minds of divine science. Hence his constantly recurring references to the work of the Angelic Doctor, to Suarez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Billuart, Franzlin and the other great theologians, as well as to modern writers both within and without the church, a knowledge of whose thought he sees to be of service in broadening and deepening the theological culture of his readers. The work as thus far completed covers the ground of special dogmatics. The author, we are informed, has in hand a separate volume on these foundations and principles of his science. With the addition of this volume the work will be a highly useful and timely addition to the literature of theological text-books.

A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES. By *Thomas O'Gorman*, Professor of Church History in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1895. Price, \$2.50.

This work of the learned professor of church history in our Catholic

University appears as vol. ix. in "The American Church History Series," published "under the auspices of the American Society of Church History." This fact ought to be kept in view in reading and passing judgment on the book. Being directly addressed to a non-Catholic, and, therefore, unsympathetic public, it cannot surprise us if it betrays a certain lack of that enthusiasm which would have welled up in the writer's mind, and have found a glowing expression on his pages, had he told the story of what he is too fond of calling our "National Church" to a distinctively Catholic audience. Moreover, he was seriously hampered by the necessity of compressing his narrative within the limits which might be quite sufficient to give a detailed account of the achievements of Baptists, Congregationalists, Lutherans, and other sects, but which were entirely too narrow to allow anything like "a thorough and scientific and psychological" presentation of the history of Catholicity in this nation. If, then, we find the narration at times vague and sketchy, the fault is rather in the nature of the undertaking than in the gifted author. To quote his own words:

"Bare and lifeless on this printed page are the statistics we have just given; but to the imagination of the historian, how eloquent they are. They tell of heroic feats of apostolic zeal, of hardships and perils by water and land, of lives spent and deaths incurred in the pursuit of souls; they tell of brave men and women crossing mountains and plains, floating down great rivers in search of homes; they tell of the settler's hut, of forests cleared, of all the weak beginnings and mighty struggles out of which was born our great western commonwealth."

The volume bears, furthermore, numerous marks, in style and inaccuracies as to name and dates, of having been written in haste. It will, nevertheless, accomplish a good work especially among the non-Catholics for whom it has been primarily compiled.

GESCHICHTE DES BREVIERS. Von P. Suitbert Bäumer, O.S.B.. Herder: Freiburg and St. Louis. 1805. Price, \$2.85, net. 8vo., pp. 637.

This admirable fruit of truly Benedictine industry possesses a melancholy interest from the fact that it is prefaced with an obituary notice of the author, who, if we may be permitted to say it, died in the parturition of his life-long labor. The deep regret with which the learned Catholic world parts with so able a successor to the Mabillons and D'Acherys of old, is tempered by the reflection that Divine Providence spared him long enough to complete the task which had chiefly engaged his thoughts throughout the whole of his priestly career. Though many another valuable work would have followed to enrich our scientific Catholic literature, yet one such volume as this "History of the Breviary" is sufficient to immortalize his name.

Bäumer divides his history of the development of the Breviary into three epochs. In the first division he gathers together all the information ascertainable regarding the public prayers of the Church during the early ages. Then follow the labors of Sts. Benedict and Gregory, of the bishops of the Carolingian era, and of Innocent III., and Gregory IX., the sum total of whose contributions towards the modelling of office, gave it the shape which it has substantially ever since retained. The labors of the Council of Trent, and of the Holy See in modern times, have been in the direction of improvements, curtailments, and additions to the *Proprium Sanctorum*. Everything in any way bearing upon the subject of the breviary is treated with diligence, and an apparatus of erudition which is truly bewildering. Experts may possibly discover

flaws, here and there, which ulterior investigations would have enabled the author to remove, but, as it stands, Bäumer's work is universally acknowledged one of the great masterpieces of Catholic learning, and an enduring monument to the theological science of the present age.

THE ROMAN COURT: Or, A Treatise on the Cardinals, Roman Congregations and Tribunals, Legates, Apostolic Vicars, Protonotaries, and other Prelates of the Holy Roman Church. By the *Rev. Peter A. Baart, S.T.L.* Milwaukee: Hoffmann Brothers Co. Received from Fr. Pustet & Co., New York. Price, \$1.25.

Every educated Catholic, and especially the clergy, ought to have some acquaintance with the methods employed by the Holy See in the administration of Holy Church. The Roman Court is the most venerable and the best organized in the world. Experience and organization enable the Supreme Pontiff, through the discipline of his army of officials, to transact the infinite variety of business involved in his divinely imposed task of governing the great Catholic Church.

We congratulate Father Baart on the skill with which he has condensed into his little volume the mass of information contained in the extensive works of canonists regarding the duties of the various Roman congregations. He has made it possible for the general American reading public to take a satisfactory mental survey of the vast field of activity summed up in the expression "The Curia Romana." The result must be, in every unprejudiced mind, an increased veneration for the venerable See of St. Peter.

No doubt, in a second edition, the author will correct several errors which have crept into his admirable little book, especially in the matter of Italian proper names.

S. THOMÆ AQUINATIS SUMMA THEOL. Diligenter Emendata Nicolai, Silvii, Billuart et C. J. Drioux Notis Ornata Ed. 16. Cadieux et Derome, Montreal.

Of the many reprints of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologica*, the present commends itself for general every-day service. Eight indexes enable the student to unlock the vast edifice of the Summa on every side. As to its Scriptural and other authoritative elements, its refutations of heresy and infidelity, its wealth of matter for the pulpit orator and catechist, its exposition of the *loci theologici*, an *index rerum* opens out the minutest details of the more than five thousand pages that make up its bulk. The notes in this edition are brief but sufficient for the average student. A not to be despised feature, by the impecunious at least, is its cheapness. In view of the latter excellencé the paper and letter press are very good. Though coming from Paris, the fact that the names of different publishers appear on the title page of different copies of this reprint, warrants the inference that, like the insides of pianos and some newspapers, it is restricted exclusively to no individual firm. It is kept constantly in stock, we believe, by this enterprising firm in Montreal, who have done and are doing so much for the spread of good literature especially amongst the French reading world both in Canada and in the United States.

STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY. By *Rev. Reuben Parsons, D.D.* Vol. II. Centuries IX-XIV. Fr. Pustet & Co.: New York and Cincinnati. 1895. Price, \$2.50.

For many years, Dr. Parsons has done excellent service to the cause of Catholic truth by his charming essays on historical subjects, con-

tributed to this REVIEW, and to other Catholic magazines. His work, as our readers can testify, bears the invariable imprint of careful thought, accurate and impartial judgment, and extensive reading. A long experience has taught the editors of the REVIEW to value Dr. Parsons' judgment in matters pertaining to Church history very highly.

We extend, therefore, a hearty welcome to this collection of monographs, to which the author has given the unpretentious title of "Studies." They represent the mature fruit of long and earnest years of unintermittent research and meditation. Some of the essays are new, others none the less acceptable because they have already appeared in one or other periodical. The old and the new form together a valuable series of studies on nearly all the important topics connected with the history of Christianity during the Middle Ages. No better book could be put into the hands of those who wish to study the workings of mediæval Christianity.

A BRIEF TEXT-BOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By *Rev. Charles Coppens, S. J.*
New York: Catholic Book Company, 28 Barclay street.

This little treatise on Ethics is a companion volume to the learned author's "Brief Text-Book of Logic and Mental Philosophy," already favorably mentioned in our columns and extensively used in academies and other advanced Catholic institutions of learning. The aim of the series is to present the true and everlasting principles of Catholic philosophy in such a manner as to be intelligible and easily digestible to those who are not permitted to enjoy the advantages of a thorough scientific training. The evil of the day is that, as the author well puts it, "questions of ethics," and also of logic, and the abstrusest parts of metaphysics, "which in former times were left to the close scientific treatment of specialists, are at the present day freely discussed among all classes of society, in newspapers and popular magazines, in the workshop and in the parlor." Hence the imperative need of popular treatises like the one before us, which we heartily recommend to those who in various ways are laboring for the extension of sound learning among our young men and women.

INSTITUTIONES THEOL. DOGM. SPECIALIS. TRACT. DE GRATIA. Auctore *Bern. Jungmann, D.D.* Ratisbonæ, Pustet. (New York). 1896. Pp. vi., 312. Price, \$1.25.

The first edition of Dr. Jungmann's treatise, *de Gratia*, appeared in 1867. A slightly improved edition was published five years later. Since that time four other editions of the work have been called for, each, however, being but a reprint of the second edition. All the other dogmatic treatises by Dr. Jungmann have passed through three or four editions, but the present tract on Grace seems to be in special demand. The popularity, if we may use the word in connection with theology, of the author's works, is undoubtedly due to the singular clearness of exposition. Another noteworthy merit of his tracts is the brief analysis appended to each. These digests do great service to the student by enabling him to get a bird's-eye view of the field covered and to revive his memory by reviewing the fuller development of the theses.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VIII. TO THE DEATH OF QUEEN ELIZABETH, A.D. 1509-1603. By *Mary H. Allies.*
London: Burns & Oates. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price, \$1 net.

In this, the second volume of her popular "History of the Church in England," Miss Allies endeavors, within the compass of two hun-

dred and forty pages, to give a picture of the melancholy condition of religion under the Tudors. It is, of course, a story of the temporary triumph of fraud and violence over truth and piety, and, as such, is necessarily forbidding, being relieved only by the heroism of martyrs and confessors. The talented writer has brought great skill and extensive reading to bear upon her task, and we cordially recommend the book to those who, with little leisure, desire to become acquainted with the spirit and main facts of the "glorious Reformation."

ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE. By *Father Humphrey, S. J.* Received from Benziger Brothers.

Twelve years ago Father Humphrey had published a digest of Saurez' great treatise *De Statu Religionis*. "That work," says our author, "was, on account of the length of it, somewhat expensive. The present volume contains the marrow of the larger work, and is published at a price which places it within the reach of all whom the subject concerns." The bare statement of the character of the book will be a sufficient recommendation of it to all our religious communities.

PETRONILLA AND OTHER STORIES. By *Eleanor C. Donnelly*. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1896.

This, if we mistake not, is Miss Donnelly's first appearance as a novelist, though her charming verse has been for many years familiar to our ears. We are pleased to notice that the highly gifted lady's venture into the realm of fiction has been, in Catholic circles, pronounced a decided success.

WETZER UND WELTE'S KIRCHENLEXICON. Zweite Auflage. Freiburg and St. Louis: Herder. 1895.

It is with no ordinary satisfaction that we announce to our readers the publication of the ninth volume of the great Catholic Lexicon, the transcendent merits of which have been by us so often proclaimed that further laudation is quite unnecessary. The work is now complete as far as the word *Pignatelli*.

BREVIARUM ROMANUM EX DECRETO SS. CONC. TRIDENT RESTITUTUM, ETC. Editio Septima post typicam. 4 vols, 18mo. Ratisbon and New York. Pustet, 1895.

Our prophecy that this admirable little edition of the breviary would be universally popular, has been fully verified, as is evidenced by the call for a second edition within two years.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

MEMOIR OF MOTHER MARY ROSE COLUMBA ADAMS, O.P., First Prioress of St. Dominic's Convent and Foundress of the Perpetual Adoration at North Adelaide. By the *Rt. Rev. W. R. Brownlow, D.D.*, Bishop of Clifton. Burns & Oates. Received from Benziger Brothers.

A ROYAL AND CHRISTIAN SOUL. A Sketch of the Life and Death of The Comte de Paris. By *Monseigneur D'Hulst*, Rector of the Institute of Paris. Benziger Brothers.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW

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ROME OR NATURALISM.

PART FIRST.

THE one and real issue, now, at the close of the nineteenth century, is between Rome and Nihilism. Is there a church, or is there no church? Is there a religion, or no religion? Is there truth, scientific and metaphysical, or is there not? Has man a spiritual, immortal soul, or is he a merely perishable animal? Is there, or is there not, a First and Final Cause, Sovereign Creator and Lord of the Universe? Has God made a revelation and appointed a way for men to know His truth, to do His will and to attain their end?

Affirmative answers to these questions furnish premises that lead directly to Rome. The only logical alternative is a universal negation.

There are, indeed, many apparent issues on the intermediate ground, but these are mere illusions. There is a pretended fortress of science, isolated from philosophy and religion, which is only a mirage having no substantial reality. There are pretended structures of philosophy, as frail and evanescent as the showy buildings of the Columbian Exposition. There are pretended religions and churches, which are no more durable than the ice-palaces of Moscow and St. Paul. The edifice of science cannot be constructed upon a solid and durable foundation without philosophy. There cannot be a philosophy separated from theology; a theology separated from revelation; a revealed religion outside of Christianity; a Christian religion separated from the Catholic Church; a Catholic Church without a foundation and centre in Rome. The denial and abandonment of the spiritual sovereignty and infallibility of Rome logically requires the denial and abandon-

ment of all Christianity, religion, science, philosophy, history, truth, and reality of every kind.

Here, at the outset, we must guard against a misunderstanding.

We do not mean that natural, rational certitude depends from divine faith. We do not assert that divine revelation, attested, proposed and defined by the infallible authority of the Roman Church, is the motive of our primary assent to facts and truths of history, science, and philosophy. This would be a gross, and even absurd error. What we mean is, that all facts and truths whatever, have their logical and ultimate outcome, directly or indirectly, in Rome. The falsehoods and sophisms brought from the arsenals of heresy and infidelity against the claims of the Roman Church, are logically destructive of all the truths held by those who use them. They are deadly boomerangs, which in their recoil kill those who throw them.

By a happy inconsistency and inability to grasp the logical relations of facts and ideas, a great multitude of the members of separated sects, during the latter age, have held fast to saving truths of religion and morals, to sound principles, to a vast quantity of common sense, philosophy, and useful knowledge. In many departments, both theoretical and practical, there has even been great progress and improvement, to the benefit of nations and individuals, a precious contribution to political, social, and private welfare. The leaven diffused among the Christian nations by the Church, has remained and wrought its beneficial results, and the evil effects of schism and heresy have been counteracted and retarded. The great mass of the people who have remained nominal Christians have continued to be implicitly or virtually to a certain degree Catholic, and in a more or less imperfect union with the Church. Hence there has not as yet taken place a general lapse into conscious and avowed infidelity, an explicit and open apostasy from Christianity and religion, and from the order and laws of Christian civilization.

But although individual men are generally illogical, the course of events and the tide of universal intellectual and moral movements in the ages and nations are governed by logical laws, so that premises and principles deposited as germs, infallibly develop by a necessary sequence. Therefore, the destructive principle, virtually contained in the Eastern Schism and in the Western Apostasy miscalled the Reformation, has gradually come into active energy, and with increasing and accelerated force of repulsion, is driving asunder and away from their centre all the satellites of the great Sun of Truth.

Thus it has come about that the statements made in the first paragraphs of this article are verified.

Separate hierarchies and hierarchical churches show plainly the tendency to break up their rings into small spheres and fly off into space. Other sects, which seemed to have a cohesive attraction in their faith in the Bible, are escaping from its control and resolving themselves into nebulous vapor.

Revealed religion necessarily rests on authority. It must be certain, complete, universal for all ages and nations. No thinking and well-informed man can believe that any religion is credible except the Christian, and no thinking man can recognize an authority competent to teach Christianity with certainty, completeness and universality in any society which is particular, confined in its limits of place and time, and which disclaims universal, supreme, exclusive, and divine authority.

"The Greek Church," so called, has no real organic existence. There are several separate independent hierarchies in the East, classed together under that name. The only powerful and united body existing under this general appellation, is the Russian Church ruled by the Czar.

No thinking man can suppose that this is the Catholic Church, having supreme universal authority in the Christian world, or capable of becoming a world-religion, an organ for teaching complete Christianity and absolute truth to all mankind. It makes no such pretension. In common with all the other self-styled "Orthodox" communions of the East, it claims for the "Holy Eastern Church," only the character of a fragment of a Catholic Church existing during the first ten centuries. According to the "Orthodox" belief, the teaching office of the Church ceased with the Seventh Council. Since that period the episcopal hierarchy can only bear witness to the faith defined in the Seven Ecumenical Councils and embodied in the Nicene Creed.

Still less can authority to teach the Christianity of the Apostles be ascribed to any imaginary "Anglican Church" composed of several separate aggregations under chief pastors styled bishops, not agreeing among themselves and much less venturing to attempt the impossible task of promulgating common and unanimous doctrinal or disciplinary decrees.

As for all the other sects which acknowledge only the Bible, they have no authority nor rule of faith external and superior to the subjective and individual judgment and conscience. The Bible does not suffice to determine its own canon, inspiration or signification, with sufficient clearness, certitude and completeness to produce unity and harmony, and to prevent the multiplication of contending doctrines. No one of these sects, and no combination of several sects has any chance of making a promulgation of Christianity which can command universal assent and convert the world to the faith and to the law of Christ.

The one lesson of the great Parliament of Religions at Chicago, was this. It is desirable to have a universal world-religion, if possible; the only religion which can possibly meet this demand, is Christianity, embodied in the Catholic Church.

The alternative is no religion, that is, no truth and law revealed by God as the way of temporal and eternal salvation for all mankind. A revelation which is not clear and certain and proposed to all mankind, is no revelation. If, at this late day, we have still to search after the genuine Christianity, it is plain that Jesus Christ is no Divine Teacher and Lawgiver. For either He did not intend and profess to possess and exercise these offices, or He attempted a work which He was unable to perform; and consequently failed.

Failing all adequate authority to teach mankind the absolute, universal truth revealed by God, we are thrown back upon reason and obliged to look to natural and rational philosophy as the guide of life. Where is this philosophy, and who are the philosophers? They are disappearing in the quicksand of Agnosticism like the last Laird of Ravenswood in the Kelpie's Flow.

The history of the world in past ages culminates in Jesus Christ, and takes all its new departures from Him. If He is taken away, it has no more value and significance than the annals of bees, beavers and seals. Mathematics, chemistry, physics and astronomy assert their autonomy; and the visible, sensible world, the political and social order, the course of events, and the facts of life, vividly and continually impress their reality upon the human consciousness. But the soul cannot live its higher life on this kind of bread alone. For a time, a partial and imperfect satisfaction may be found by many in the common occupations and enjoyments of life. Literature and science may bring their rewards to those who are able to win them. Systems of philosophy may have their votaries. The different religions may count their devotees, sincere, pious, contented with the traditions of their parents. Nevertheless there is a longing, at least an obscure and latent one, in human nature, to transcend the bounds of custom, sect, country and race, to find an absolute, universal truth, a philosophy of life, a religion of humanity. There is an impulse to search for the origin and final end of things, the first and final cause of the universe, the law of the universal brotherhood of men and fatherhood of God, the harmony and unity of science, history, philosophy, religion, reason and faith, the true centre and circumference of the perfect sphere of being, truth and goodness. It is a vague longing for the supreme good, for beatitude, for the kingdom of heaven, for God. When it comes out of the latent state into consciousness and activity in men who are awakened thinkers, one effect which it produces is a scepticism, which tends

to become universal. No religion outside of Christianity can bear historical and logical tests. No form of Christianity which is sectional, national, and destitute of a royal genealogy and authority as old and lasting as time, as wide as the world and as binding as the law of gravitation, can endure a critical and thorough investigation.

All these religions spring from a revolt against a divine revelation and authority as old as the creation of rational beings, a revolt which began in the angelic sphere from which Lucifer fell, in the Eden from which Adam and Eve were banished, and has been continued through all the ages and regions of the world. The intrinsic principle of this revolt is scepticism. Lucifer must have first doubted before he finally abjured the absolute sovereignty of God over him. Eve and Adam doubted the truth and justice of God before they determined to disobey his commandment. God can tolerate no hesitation of the intellect or will in submitting to his revelation of truths to be believed and precepts to be obeyed, after this revelation has been sufficiently made known. He demands immediate, absolute, irrevocable assent to the truth revealed, that is, undoubting faith. Doubting is an act of unbelief, a questioning of the veracity of God, which implies a doubt of his existence, the foundation and source of all that is real, that is true, that is good.

The deadly principle of the revolt against the Church in the sixteenth century was doubt, ending in the denial of the authority on which revealed religion rests. This sceptical principle undermined first the authority of the Church, next the authority of the Bible, and finally, the authority of reason. Revelation and supernatural religion are swept away. Philosophy and natural religion follow, and scepticism assails even the reality of the objects of science, the material substances of the sensible world. All is swallowed by the abyss of nothingness. There remains, however, *despair*, the pain of loss, the sense of privation of that alone which makes life worth living to a rational being, whose nature craves absolute truth and the supreme, everlasting good. Deprived of belief in this object of longing and of hope for its attainment, unhappy man sinks into an abyss lower than nihilism, the bottomless pit of pessimism. One reality remains in the apprehension of the universal sceptic, positive and universal evil, coextensive with the consciousness of existence which no scepticism can remove, from which there is no release except the extinction of consciousness, the annihilation of the entire phantasmagoria, which the phantoms who have dreamed they were men, have fancied was a real universe.

Such madness as this can only be the disease of a small number of lunatics.

The nihilistic and pessimistic conclusion, although it follows by a rigid logical sequence from the agnostic premises which are so widely diffused, is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Universal scepticism may be expressed in language, but it cannot be really and practically held by the mind, much less acted on. It is possible for a man to commit that partial suicide which extinguishes his organic life, possible for him to fall into insanity or imbecility, through his own fault, or without any fault of his own, but he cannot extinguish the life of his immortal spirit. So long as his human life continues, and he remains in possession of his reason and human faculties, he cannot divest himself altogether of the apprehension of objective truth and reality, and the desire of good. The lowest and the worst of those who have revolted against religion, the political and social order, and all divine and human laws of morality, believe in some kind of earthly and temporal good, which they strive to obtain by the destruction of Church and State, of existing order and civilization, with the most passionate vehemence. This extreme and violent sect of revolutionists has not as yet become dominant. The principles of the old Christian civilization, the ideas inherited from the Christian religion, still hold sway. England, Prussia, America, present an outward appearance of being Christian nations. There is a sceptical or agnostic spirit and tendency widely prevalent among the educated, and even among the general mass of the people, which has its philosophical expression in Kant's "Critical Analysis of Pure Reason," but it is to a considerable extent modified and held in check by the principles contained in his "Critical Analysis of Practical Reason." A great number profess some kind of rationalism and even of natural religion, often tintured with a weak solution of Christianity.

The great Protestant sects still count large numbers of adherents who make explicit profession of belief in Divine Revelation and in some creed, more or less in accordance with the traditional Catholic Creed of Christendom, even in the article of "One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic Church."

The sceptical principle in the numerous aggregate of sects and individuals professing Christianity shows itself in the form of uncertainty, doubt, and disputation concerning the authentic intent and meaning of the Divine Revelation. Dogmas are the particular opinions of individuals and associations, founded on their own private interpretation of certain documents containing a divine revelation, with more or less regard for the tradition of past ages. Happily, some fundamental Catholic dogmas, especially the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ, together with the idea of supernatural religion, have retained their place in the confessions of the sects which are called orthodox, and in the belief of their strict adherents. They have, however, widely diverged from each other in

doctrine, and the separate sects which have been formed and have become more and more subdivided as time has gone on, have often been hostile, even to the extent of internecine warfare and cruel persecutions. They have anathematized each other as deadly heretics, have imprisoned, tortured and slain each other as pestilential criminals.

All have professed to reverence the Bible as the Word of God. Yet if we take the Eastern sects into our purview, they do not agree as to the Canon of Scripture. Much less can they agree in the interpretation of its contents, and a common determination commanding universal assent, of the essential and integral nature of Christianity.

At the beginning the Reformers protested that they would restore the pure, genuine Christianity of Christ and the Apostles, which had been altered by the Roman Church. Their successors have continued to claim, each division for itself, to be in conformity of doctrine and discipline with the primitive Church, and to maintain a strict dogmatic attitude. But in process of time controversy and various other causes have produced a weakening of doctrinal and ecclesiastical exclusiveness. A sense of the failure of Protestantism has spread among them. They feel their want of authority, they weary of perpetual divisions and dissensions, they have lost credit in the world at large, and the issues which they raised at the time of their revolt are often declared to be dead, their old-fashioned so-called "orthodox" Protestantism to have become obsolete.

In this new and altered state of things, two opposite tendencies have manifested themselves. One is the tendency towards supernatural religion, and the other a tendency away from it.

Some call these tendencies a tendency Romewards and a tendency Reasonwards. For instance, Mr. Holmes, in his "Professor at the Breakfast Table:" "I don't mind the exclamation of any old stager who drinks Madeira worth from two to six Bibles a bottle, and burns, according to his own premises, a dozen souls a year in segars, with which he muddles his brains. But as for the good, true and intelligent men we see all around us; laborious, self-denying, hopeful, helpful men, who know that the active mind of the age is tending more and more to the two poles, Rome and Reason, the sovereign Church or the free soul, authority or personality, God in us or God in our masters, and that though a man, by accident, stand half-way between these two points, he must look one way or the other—I don't believe that they would take offence at anything I have reported."

Thus, Mr. Holmes considers that the alternative or true decisive issue for the active mind of the age is Rome or Reason.

Others have said the same things. They are mistaken in making Reason the opposite term to Rome, as Brownson and other eminent writers have proved. Rome is not in opposition to Reason or any kind of rational science and knowledge. The opposite term to Rome is Pure Naturalism, including a denial of the supernatural. The distorted, monstrous, irrational supernaturalism of the Reformation has awakened repugnance and disgust in the thinking, active mind of the age. Turning away from this, it has deviated in a contrary direction. But pure naturalism cannot satisfy. It does not offer a halting-place on firm and solid ground.

Reason, rational philosophy, science, are good, but not self-sufficing. Nature is good, but it needs grace for its integration and elevation, and, denuded of grace, man is spiritually a poor, naked, blind and miserable creature, even in his best physical and intellectual estate. When the active mind of the age has turned its back on the supernatural, it may wander on and on to the quicksand of nihilism. Many who are passing and moving in this direction see and loudly proclaim that if they face about they can only turn Romewards. This is hopeful.

As for the great number who have not turned their backs on supernatural religion, and who remain standing on the middle-ground occupied by the sects commonly called "orthodox"; Greeks, Anglicans, Lutherans, Calvinists and other species under the same genus, it is not easy to say how many are consciously or unconsciously looking Romewards. Some there are, most assuredly, who believe in the divinity of Christ and in a supernatural, revealed Christian religion, who are consciously and avowedly looking toward a union of all Christians with the Roman Church as a consummation devoutly to be wished.

This description cannot apply to that tendency much more general and widespread, in a direction opposite to the naturalistic movement, which Mr. Holmes and others call a Romeward tendency. When they make the antithesis of "Rome or Reason," they view Rome as a symbol of all supernatural religion. They are clear-sighted enough to see that revealed religion, supernatural Christianity, is embodied in the Catholic Church, having Rome as its centre, and the bishop of that supreme see as its head. They perceive that supernatural religion can have no other adequate authority. Believers in the divinity of Christ and the inspiration of the Gospels ought to be Catholics; and there is no real genuine Catholicism outside of Rome. Therefore, the antithesis and opposite to that pure Naturalism, which they miscall Reason, is Rome, and the active mind of the age is obliged to look to one or the other.

The Romeward tendency is a desire for unity and certainty in place of divisions and opinions which have no solid foundation. The active mind of the post-reformation period soon began to suspect and by degrees clearly to perceive that the great promises of the leaders of the Reformation were hollow and delusive. A supernatural revelation ought to make its claims on belief and its authentic meaning so clear that all just demands of reason should be satisfied in respect to the nature of the articles of faith proposed and to their credibility. It should present a Rule of Faith adequate to produce harmony and agreement among all nations when sufficiently instructed, and in all ages; to make known the way of salvation to all men without fear of error.

Truth being like God, its source, one and unchangeable, the True Religion must have in it the principle of Unity. The office of Religion being to unite men with God, who is the All-Holy, must have in it the principle of Holiness. Since the idea of Unity shuts out all diversity, the True Religion being One, must be Catholic, that is, Universal. The Christian Religion, having the Apostles for its founders and first teachers, must be Apostolic. As Being, Oneness, Truth and Goodness all blend together into a Transcendental Whole in Ontology, so do these four characteristics of the True Religion blend together into a Supernatural Whole, inseparable, though in certain respects distinct.

No one of the sects separated from the Apostolic See, in the east or the west, from the Greek to the Congregational, nor the whole collection, has all or any one of these marks. Not Unity or Catholicity, to which they make no pretensions. Not Sanctity, for they began in heresy and schism, together with other grievous crimes, and their existence is a perpetual rebellion against God. Their only claim to Apostolic succession consists in certain traditions which they have retained from the time when they were united with the Catholic Church.

The great Western sects have travestied some of the Catholic dogmas which they have retained, and mixed them with heresies of their own invention, in such a way as to completely alter the traditional Christian theology.

The Lutheran, but more especially the Calvinistic system of doctrine, is incredible, irrational, even monstrous.

Ralph Waldo Emerson is one of the best specimens of the class of educated, thinking men who have turned away from Protestant Orthodoxy to Rationalism.

Dr. Brownson describes his abjuration of the creed of his childhood in the following terms: "The son of a Protestant minister, brought up in a Protestant community, and himself for some years a Protestant minister, he early learned that the real, the universal

and permanent are not to be found in Protestantism ; and assuming that Protestantism in some or all of its forms, is the truest exponent of the Christian religion, he very naturally came to the conclusion that they are not to be found in Christianity. He saw that Protestantism is narrow, hollow, unreal, a sham, a humbug, and, ignorant of the Catholic Church and her teaching, he considered that she must have less of reality, be even more of a sham or humbug than Protestantism itself. He passed then naturally to the conclusion that all pretensions to a supernatural revealed religion are founded only in ignorance or craft, and rejected all of all religions, except what may be found in them that accords with the soul or the natural reason of all men." (Works, vol. iii., p. 424).

This may be generalized into a statement of the grounds on which the entire clan to which Mr. Emerson belongs, have lapsed into pure Naturalism.

A presentation of Christianity which has many variations, some of which are caricatures of its genuine doctrines, others incoherent and incomplete exhibitions of the same, all destitute of a sufficient guarantee of their authentic character and the requisite authority to command universal assent, is supposed to be the best face which the Christian Religion can present to the world. A revelation, a religion, of really divine origin, of divine and universal authority, ought to be something quite different from this, and much better. It is well known that Rome proclaims that she has this something. Those men of genius and liberal culture who are regarded as leaders of modern thought have perceived and acknowledged that if this claim can be proved, supernatural religion, revelation, Christianity as a divine institution, become credible ; *but not otherwise*. They see plainly and loudly declare, that they who believe in the divinity of Christ, the inspiration of the Bible, in the foundation of a visible Church by the apostles, in two or more sacraments, in an apostolic episcopate, in six or seven ecumenical councils, in the Church of the first three or five or ten centuries, in any form of orthodoxy according to the type of New England, Scotland, England or Russia, are logically bound to believe all Roman doctrine.

All or none, they say. It must be either Rome or what they incorrectly call reason, meaning by this term pure Naturalism. There is no firm and permanent halting ground between the two. As for Rome, with few exceptions, the men who have taken this view have begun and continued with a foregone conclusion that her claim is incredible ; wherefore, for them, it is unavoidable that they should abandon every form of supernatural religion, abjure Protestantism as well as Catholicism, and renounce altogether Christianity.

Dr. Brownson in his early days was one of those who embarked in these speculations, in Boston. Abandoning the Calvinism of the Puritans to search for a more rational religion, he was one of the few who after exploring the coasts of truth, steered his bark into the broad haven of Catholicism. We have quoted above his description of the mental process by which his friend, Mr. Emerson, freed himself from the bonds of the Calvinism of the Puritans. The genial and gentle Emerson would not have used all the trenchant language employed by Dr. Brownson in speaking of the religion of the Puritans and other Protestants, if it be understood as affirming that this religion is all charlatanism, that no Protestants can have any basis for faith or grounds for hope in Christ. It is indefensible and is not reconcilable with many things which Brownson himself said elsewhere, when he distinguishes between the Catholic truth retained by Protestants, and the Protestant errors which they have adopted. No doubt, the authors of that revolt which is miscalled the Reformation, were schismatics and heretics, had denied the faith, and were wicked men, on a level with Pilate, Caiphas, Judas, Arius, Wicklif and Huss. Such were Luther, Calvin, Cranmer and Knox, whose characters have been painted by Protestant writers in darker colors than those which most Catholic authors have made use of. How many of their successors have been formal heretics we cannot say or know. But we cannot justly impute formal and culpable heresy to all and singular of the sincere, virtuous and pious members of the Protestant sects. In like manner, one must discriminate in the separated Eastern sects between those who are formally guilty of schism and those who are involved in it by a misfortune for which they are not to blame. Nestorius, Eutyches, Photius, Michael Cerularius, Mark of Ephesus, were guilty of formal schism and heresy. The same is probably true of many of their disciples. Yet we cannot doubt that many others, born and brought up in the Eastern sects have been free from all personal guilt of the kind, have had sanctifying grace, and have obtained eternal salvation. In that communion which is called the Orthodox Greek Church, the Creeds, the Catholic tradition of the first ten centuries, the Scripture, the Sacraments, Sacrifice and Priesthood have been preserved.

With the exception of their particular heresies, the Nestorian and Monophysite sects are in the same category.

The Protestant sects have the sacrament of baptism, a large portion of the Bible, more or less Catholic tradition, and sufficient means of grace and salvation, so long as they are in good faith and diligent in making use of these means. Many of them are truly Christians and children of God. Those who have actual acquaintance with the best class of Protestants, especially if they

have been brought up among them, cannot shut their eyes to the evidences of faith, charity, genuine Christian piety and virtue which are not uncommon.

Some may ask how these statements can be reconciled with the axiom, "There is no salvation out of the Catholic Church?" This question can be answered in a clear and satisfactory manner after a proper explanation of the true meaning of the axiom. *Salus*, or salvation, may be taken both in an objective and a subjective sense. Objectively, it is that which God has ordained for the sanctification of men. Subjectively, it is the spiritual good, the welfare, health and life received in the soul from this divine ordinance. The fundamental and chief-saving ordinance of God is the Church, Catholic from the foundation of the world to the end of the world. It is but one, and there can be no other. In it are placed all the gifts of God, and, therefore, out of it there are none, and can be none. To the Church God has given revelation, the written and unwritten word of truth, the faith, the law, grace, the sacraments, the promises. If we say that out of the Church there is no Bible we mean that there are no inspired Scriptures except those which God has given to her. If we say that out of the Church there is no baptism we mean that there is no other regenerating sacrament except that which Christ instituted in the Church. There is no other faith, no other grace, no other promise of pardon and life, no other way of salvation distinct from and independent of the Catholic Church.

All truths of faith, all genuine Scripture, all sacraments which the sects have preserved they have received from the Catholic Church. They have received or originated nothing that is good and salutary, as sects. As sects there is no salvation in them. They have nothing of their own except their rebellion, their heresies, their counterfeit rites and ordinances, their councils and confessions of no authority, their immoral divorce laws, their divisions and dissensions, the ruin and misery which they have caused in the world. Whatever is good among them they have not received from Photius, Luther, Calvin, Cranmer or John Knox. Schism is a mortal wound and heresy is a deadly poison. A man who has been mortally wounded may survive for a time by virtue of the vitality which has not been totally killed. A poison may be a slow poison. The life which remains comes from the vital principle animating the body, while from the wound or poison death must follow.

Those metaphors which are used when the members of the Church who are separated by schism and heresy are represented as branches of a tree or limbs of a body which are lopped off are only metaphors, and are not to be taken literally or as exact de-

scriptions. Schism, pure and simple, deprives the schismatics of their normal relation to the Supreme Authority of the Apostolic See and the ecclesiastical kingdom over which it rules. Schismatical bishops have lost their jurisdiction, and their provinces are no longer parts of the legitimate ecclesiastical order, but illegal, irregular polities, like regiments in mutiny or revolted provinces in an empire. They are not, however, like branches lopped from a tree and lying dead on the ground, or like amputated limbs which are carried out and buried. Schism is not complete severance of continuity with their own past history, nor of union with the bishops and faithful of the Church universal. They are one in faith with their ancestors and their fellow-Christians throughout the world. They have the same liturgy, their priesthood is from the same source, their sacrifice and sacraments are the same. Let them once acknowledge the supremacy of the successor of St. Peter and one word from his mouth will restore them to their orbits and set them revolving around the central Sun.

Heresy is much worse than schism. It separates not only from the Church as a governing power and an ecclesiastical organization, but from the same also as a teaching authority. Heretical sects may preserve, however, some creeds, a part of the faith, the whole or a part of the Bible, even the sacraments, the priesthood and the sacrifice. The Lutheran and Calvinistic sects have retained a considerable number of Catholic doctrines and traditions. All that is true and good and Christian among them is Catholic; what is false, evil and anti-Christian is Protestant.

The Church as One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic, although not formally and organically extended in the domain of schism and heresy, is virtually present to the denizens of this domain as the medium through which they receive all the light and grace, all the saving influence which comes to them from God. A heretic, Jew, or infidel, may teach the catechism to a Catholic child, but it is really the bishop who teaches in the name of the Church by the mouth of the tutor or governess who acts as catechist. A heretic may baptize, a schismatic may consecrate or ordain, but it is Christ who regenerates, offers and impresses the sacerdotal character, as Head and High-Priest of the Catholic Church. In the objective sense, therefore, there is *nulla salus extra ecclesiam*. Subjectively, no one who receives saving grace is *extra ecclesiam*. Every infant who is baptized is baptized into the Catholic Church, and remains a member of it so long as he preserves the grace of baptism. All who have faith are implicitly and virtually Catholics in that respect, and if they have also charity, being united spiritually with Christ, they are joined in spiritual bonds with all the children of God in Christ, with the whole Catholic Church. They

have inchoate salvation, and if they persevere will obtain finished and everlasting salvation in heaven.

One may object: That if these statements are true, we cannot preach to Greek schismatics, or to members of Protestant sects, that they are bound to enter the fold of the Catholic Church in order to be true and genuine Christians, and to save their souls. If they have the means of grace where they are, what need is there to leave the society in which they have been brought up, and perhaps to make great personal sacrifices, when there is no adequate motive? The only sufficient reason for preaching to all men the duty and necessity of joining the Catholic Church is: That grace and salvation cannot be obtained by any who are not in full external communion with the Church.

The objection, however, is inept and groundless. For, since schism and heresy are deadly sins, only those who are guiltless of wilful unbelief in the teaching of the Church, and disobedience to her authority, can be spiritually united to her communion and partakers of sanctifying grace. So soon as they know that they are in schism or heresy, their good faith ceases, and they become inexcusable. When the Catholic Church is sufficiently proposed to them, the only way in which they can save their souls is by submission to the teaching and rule of the lawful pastors.

When our Blessed Lord was a child at Nazareth, when He came forth with His head wet from the baptism of John, and began to preach the kingdom of God, all good Jews had the faith and did the works necessary to salvation, before they knew that He was their Messiah. As soon as they did know it they were bound to believe in Him. As soon as they knew Him to be God, they were bound to worship Him. When the commandment came they were bound to be baptized. When the Apostles' Creed was promulgated, and the Apostolic Church established, all Jews and Gentiles were bound to profess that creed, and to join that communion as the only means of salvation, as soon as they were sufficiently proposed to them—*but not before*.

It is the same now; and always has been since the creation of man. God gave the faith and the law to Adam and Eve in Paradise. After their fall, he gave them them the inchoate Gospel of Redemption. For the first thousand years, mankind had the primeval revelation, or religion and church. The tradition was handed down in the society of the children of God, until He came who was to be sent, the Expectation of nations. The nations who wandered away into all parts of the earth preserved some elements of this tradition. It is visible in their civilization, their culture, their philosophy, in all that is really good and great in their historical development. Two tendencies and movements are exhibited

in these pagan nations—one upward, the other downward. One is an aspiration and a striving after truth and virtue, a preparation for the Gospel which would be preached to them in due time. The other, a progress in degeneracy both intellectual and moral. For these nations, the only way of salvation was obedience to what faint light they had and to the law of their conscience. It is the same now for all who are beyond the pale of Christianity.

In that multitude who have wandered away from the Catholic Church, the same two tendencies and movements—one upward and the other downward—are manifested; one toward Catholicity, the other toward scepticism, nihilism, in the road of pure naturalism.

Of those who see the alternative, more or less dimly or clearly, between Rome and pure naturalism, some go upward, others in the opposite and downward direction. Those who go upward, follow that light and truth which still remain to them from the old Christian tradition. Those who go downward, follow the false principles and heresies of their schismatical position, and their sects, to their logical conclusion. Both are abandoning, in increasing numbers, the middle ground of what we may call by a sort of euphemism, Greek and Protestant orthodoxy. The most sagacious and important thinkers perceive and avow that this middle position is untenable.

When we say that the middle position is untenable, we do not mean to assert that those who occupy it have no good reasons for holding any positive truths, and have no certitude about anything. We mean that they are inconsistent, and hold two different and mutually contradictory sets of principles. One set, if consistently followed, leads to universal truth, to certitude of knowledge and faith within the utmost bounds of human capacity. The other set leads, logically, to error, uncertainty, universal doubt, nihilism, in the entire sphere of thought.

This set of principles has run its course to the end of its speculative and logical development. Protestantism is a failure, and is moribund. Infidel philosophy is dead and buried. No intelligent man can fancy for a moment that there is any vital principle adequate to cause the resurrection and revivification of mankind in Judaism, Mohammedanism, or in any form of heathenism. The Catholic Church is very much alive, and needs no resurrection.

Among that portion of the nominally Christian people who are separated from the communion of the Catholic and Roman Church, particularly the adherents of Protestantism, the principles of scepticism and denial have run their course. There is no further movement now possible for them except toward extinction or back again to the Catholic Church. Even those who choose to

follow the downward road toward absolute scepticism cannot possibly follow it to the end, since they cannot annihilate the world or themselves. They can go pretty far in denying or doubting truth and facts. They can even in words express universal doubt and denial. But they cannot really believe or even think what they say, much less can they convince other men that everything is a falsehood and an illusion or persuade them to pretend that they are convinced. However general and prevalent error and unbelief may have become, a vast quantity of truth and belief remains as a tradition of Christianity and civilization. And, consequently, as the trend of the sceptical principles of Protestantism has become manifest, a reaction has set in—an opposite and upward movement.

This movement can only be, as it actually is, toward unity and Catholicity. Let it be distinctly noted and remembered that the two opposite mental goals are knowledge and nescience, certitude and scepticism.

A characteristic mark of knowledge and certitude is always unity. There is but one mathematics, one logic, one geography, one astronomy, in so far as it is certain science, and not hypothesis. It is the same with other sciences in so far as they are certain.

Outside of this unity there is only ignorance. Unity implies Catholicity. It is the same knowledge and certitude for the universal world, for all mankind and for all time. There is also the mark of a certain something which has an analogy with sanctity. What is the sanctity of God? It is the agreement of His intelligence and will in the same term, the one absolute being which is named the True as the object of intelligence, the Good as the object of will, and is identical in both. God loves that which He knows to be the Best, and all His acts proceed from this source of knowledge and love.

The sanctity of the Church consists in knowing and willing what is best for mankind.

The end of all knowledge and science is the welfare of mankind. The devotees of even physical science are fond of calling it sacred, and assuredly a knowledge of geometry brings a man intellectually nearer to God. There is even something analogous to the note of apostolicity. In all branches of science, knowledge, art, culture, there are founders, masters, teachers, men of genius, who have had a mission, and are regarded with reverence. There is an authority in these matters which in some cases demands and receives an assent, a belief, which is unquestioning.

The laws of unity, universality, subordination to a moral and spiritual end and to a hierarchical order, pervade all creation.

The creation is a universe, it is one universe, it culminates in spiritual beings, it is constructed in gradations on a scale of ascent from the lowest to the highest, in a regular series of mutual interdependence. The human race is one, universal, descending from common ancestors, having common traditions, subject to a hierarchical order and authority. The foundations of the Catholic religion and Church, the supernatural order, rest upon this ground of nature. The Church is the human race raised to a higher plane, exalted to a higher life, organized under a more perfect hierarchy, transformed into a celestial kingdom; it is supernatural, but it has not superseded nature. Nature underlies it everywhere. Faith is supported and sustained by reason. Unbelief and scepticism are irrational and unnatural.

The strongest barrier against the philosophy—or, rather, sophistry—of doubt and nescience is in the world of nature by which we are environed. It forces its reality upon us with all the power of a thumb-screw or a red-hot iron. A man who is extremely anxious for his breakfast, or very fond of a glass of hot toddy, may talk or write against the reality of things; but it is, as Carlyle called Emerson's dreaming transcendental nonsense, "bottled moonshine." It has no effect on the minds of men and their practical common-sense.

The axioms and demonstrations of mathematics compel assent. The affirmations of the experimental sciences secure at least, if they do not compel, the assent of all reasonable and well-informed men in so far as they are only scientific inductions, and not mere hypotheses.

There is, therefore, a certitude which is universal in what we may call the philosophy of common-sense, and in the sciences which deal with the phenomena of sensible experience and the principles or laws upon which that reality to which sensible phenomena appertain is constructed. In the common mind this philosophy is practical, implicit and virtual, and in so far as it reaches into that domain of science which is beyond the ken of the common mind, it is founded on faith in the authority of the teachers of science. In the scientific mind it is explicit, speculative philosophy and knowledge.

The same remark may be applied to the fine and the useful arts. In these also there are certain and universal principles, tending to produce a catholic unity in judgment upon works of art and also in complacency in their excellence. Masterpieces in architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, music, eloquence and literature command a universal assent to their excellence and give pleasure in all ages and countries to all who have the intelligence and taste to appreciate their beauty. The best ships, the best guns, the

best bridges, the best machines, secure the universal verdict in their favor. In all things humanity tends to unity and catholicity, aspires after them, to a great extent attains to what it aspires after. Moreover, the end is always recognized as being in the moral order. And reverence is paid to all the great men who are the teachers and leaders of the human race, who are in some sense its apostles.

In all these things it is reality—objective truth—which the rational nature of man seeks after. When this is found, the subjective state of the mind is certitude, knowledge without doubt, rest and complacency in its proper good.

Scepticism undermines and overthrows the whole fabric; that is, in words and not in reality. For practically it is impotent.

The verbal formulas and shadowy theories of scepticism which are put forth by some scientists under the name of science are not really scientific and have nothing to do with science. They are the foolish utterances of men who wander out of their own proper domains to attack the principles and truths of metaphysics and theology. They recognize nothing as knowable except the phenomena of external nature with which they are conversant. For them the *noumena* are nullities—mere phantoms of the imagination. First cause and final cause are mere names, signifying nothing. The only excuse for them is that the men who have figured in the world as philosophers during the past three centuries have been charlatans and sophists dressed in the philosopher's cloak, by whose manipulations metaphysics and theology have been made to evaporate in a cloud of scepticism.

Descartes, Locke, Hume, Spencer, Kant, Fichte and Hegel have done their best or worst in this work of destruction. One effect has been to bring metaphysics and philosophy into contempt. Such philosophy is indeed contemptible. Its principles are sceptical, and therefore common-sense, everything that is real in the world, and all science cry out against it.

It is most extraordinary and inconsistent in scientific men to exclude the noumena from science into the unknowable, to deny and decry the value of Logic and Metaphysics. Logic and Metaphysics underlie all the sciences, furnish their principles and laws, and hold them in dependence. The noumena are the basis of the phenomena. Men and even scientists are rational beings; they possess the *ingenium curiosum* which seeks for the knowledge of things in their deepest causes. The more they learn of sensible phenomena, the more eager is their desire to find out their first and final cause, the more stringent is the necessity for a philosophy which is deep and high, solid and all embracing; the more imperative is the intellectual demand for logical and metaphysical certitude.

Philosophy has been, indeed, at a low ebb, wherever the disastrous influence of Protestantism has prevailed. A latent scepticism pervades it, even where sceptical doctrines have not been formally avowed. Nevertheless, many sound doctrines and conclusions have survived, and there has been a continual struggle and effort after a rational philosophy.

There is a rational philosophy. There is logical and metaphysical certitude. This rational philosophy culminates in a Theodicy or Natural Theology, a demonstration of the Being of God as First and Final Cause. It is not within my scope to develop and prove this thesis. For it is admitted and affirmed by all those with whom chiefly my argument is concerned. They are professed Theists and Christians. They believe in God, in Christ, in Christianity as a supernatural revealed religion. For them, therefore, the only question can be, how can we know and believe with certitude the genuine and authentic Christian religion? This is the anxious questioning of all those who in an imperfect sense are already Christians, who wish to be Christians in the full and perfect sense, and who are not at rest within the fold of One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, under the sovereign, infallible authority of the Holy Roman Church, the Mother and Mistress of Churches. And it is this question to which I intend to give the true and only rational and possible answer. All that I have hitherto said is only preliminary.

In nature and the entire domain of nature, reason and knowledge, the human mind finds essential certitude as the basis and centre of all that is knowable and thinkable, imaginable and conjectural, within the infinite space of the unknowable which surrounds it and extends to a boundless distance beyond it. This realm of nature is One, Universal, subject to a Moral and Hierarchical Order.

The Creator and Universal Sovereign of the world is One God; subsisting in a Hierarchy of Three Persons; Holy, the Infinite Good in himself; and in His creative act diffusing a participated good among all his creatures.

Whoever believes in One God, in whom is the infinite eternal plentitude of being, must believe that He is the First and Final Cause of the universe. All that He creates as First Cause He must by the necessity of His nature govern with goodness and wisdom by a divine providence for worthy ends, terminating in the chief and final end, in Himself. He must take the most care of His rational creatures, giving them a destination congruous to their exalted nature, and furnishing the means which are suitable to secure the attainment of their end, the fulfilment of their destiny.

If mankind had been placed in an order of pure nature, destined

to a purely natural beatitude, Divine Providence must have made ample provision for men that they might by the exercise of their reason know the highest truth and good within their scope, and by the exercise of their will be able to fulfil the purposes of their existence. God has actually created mankind for a supernatural destiny and beatitude, and placed them in a supernatural order.

This is negatively proved by the manifest fact that naturalism does not suffice for the aspirations of nature, or answer the questions of the soul. It is positively proved by the whole history of the human race from the beginning, bearing testimony to the existence of a supernatural order.

There is no need of reviewing that part of human history which went before the appearance of Jesus Christ on the earth. It suffices to look in the face this unique and most extraordinary phenomenon, the appearance of the supernatural and divine in a human form and environment.

The supernatural order evidently requires a supernatural religion. A supernatural religion requires a supernatural revelation. It is evident that such a revelation is not made to each and every individual singly and for himself. It must, therefore, have been given to the race as a common possession, through the medium of a divinely appointed teaching authority, and received by faith. In order that faith should be reasonable and obligatory, the authority which proclaims and proposes the revelation must be qualified to give reasonable and indisputable evidence that the revelation is truly divine and credible, and must make clearly manifest what the revelation is, *i.e.*, what are the truths revealed and proposed to belief.

The mind necessarily and justly demands certitude in faith as well as in science. And since faith is belief on authority, the authority which demands unquestioning faith must be infallible.

It is altogether congruous to the wisdom and goodness of God, that he should give a revelation intended and adapted for the whole human race; a supernatural religion adequate to the purpose of conducting entire humanity in all times and places on the road of its destiny to its final consummation. All Christians believe that Christianity is such a religion. They confess that the genuine Christianity must be One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic. That the professors of Christianity should be divided into differing and disputing sects, as if it were uncertain what the Christian revelation and religion really is, is plainly a great disorder and an abnormal state of things. Therefore it is, that the desire and the demand for Catholic Unity has become so general and imperative among those who have lost it. It is incredible that Jesus Christ should have come into the world as the Teacher and Saviour of

men, and that after nineteen centuries it should still be necessary to inquire, to search, and to dispute, in doubt and uncertainty, respecting the faith which He promulgated and the way of salvation which He established. Those who are divided, disputing, searching, and uncertain, must have wandered away from the genuine, authentic religion promulgated by Jesus Christ. That religion must contain within itself an infallible authority, and those who are taught by that authority must have certitude.

If God has constituted the human race in a supernatural order and given them a supernatural destiny He must give them a supernatural revelation. That revelation, in order to suffice for its purpose and to be obligatory on men, must have motives of credibility, such that it is certain—first, that it is truly a divine revelation, and, secondly, what the truth is which it discloses.

The primitive revelation was given to the patriarchs for all mankind. The nations having generally wandered away and lost themselves in the darkness of heathenism, it was necessary to provide a special revelation and religion for a chosen and peculiar people through Moses and the prophets. The Jews had infallible certitude in their faith and a perfect security that they were in the way of salvation; it was their mission to preserve the pure and genuine traditions of Monotheism and the Messianic Redemption until Shiloh, the Expectation of nations, should appear on the earth, found a Catholic Church and promulgate a world religion.

He did appear, and in His person the supernatural elevation of human nature and revelation of God and all divine truth was consummated in its ultimate perfection.

The historical evidence and the whole array of motives of credibility for the truth of the Gospel and of Christianity are very useful—but they are not absolutely necessary—in order to prove that Jesus Christ is the divine mediator between God and man. He accredits himself by simply showing his countenance and figure.

If a masterpiece of sculpture or painting be discovered, no matter when or where, it is enough to look upon it to see that it is a masterpiece and the work of a master. It may even be evident that it is the work of some one of the great masters whose manner is known by other works, so that all competent judges will agree that a mistake is impossible. It is the same if a poem, an oration, a metaphysical treatise be discovered, manifestly a work of genius of the highest order. If we suppose any masterpiece of whatever kind to be thus discovered, manifestly, and by the agreeing verdict of all competent judges vastly superior to all other works of its kind already known, it is plain that its author was a man of transcendent genius, superior to all other men who have produced works of the same kind.

The countenance and figure of Jesus understood in the ideal sense are actually present to our contemplation as reflected in the Gospels and in the faith of all of His disciples from the beginning. The form is human; but it is a humanity free from all that is peculiar to any race or time or type of human nature. It is an ideal type of sinless, spotless innocence, moral perfection, spiritual beauty, of transcendent loveliness and charm, having nothing similar to it in the picture-gallery of history.

We have found the masterpiece, but who is the master whose work it is? It is no creation of mere human genius, for it surpasses the highest capacity of the mind and imagination of man to conceive such an ideal.

The four evangelists were singularly unequal to the task of any original poetic invention of a high order, transcending the limits of their Jewish environment; and St. John is the only one of the four to whom we can ascribe in even a lesser degree the possession of genius. Moreover, the ideal presentation of the Life and Character of Jesus, the Divine Tragedy, set before us in their pages, is neither in either one of the gospels, or in all together, the original masterpiece. It is a copy or reproduction of the original, which the church of the first disciples had before them, either in their memory of what they had seen and heard, or in the narrative of the eye-witnesses who had seen the person, the life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus and heard His words. It is a portrait from life, a masterpiece which proves itself, without any need of identification, wholly above the highest flight of human genius, manifestly the work of God, as truly as the sun in the heavens.

The sinless innocence and consummate wisdom and sanctity of Jesus are manifestly supernatural. His human perfection and sublime character demonstrate His true and proper divinity, because He proclaimed it explicitly, died and rose again in attestation of His claim. It would be easy to enlarge on this theme and to place in the most brilliant light the evidence of the divinity of Jesus Christ from His human excellence. We need not attempt it, because we are addressing those who firmly believe it.

In Jesus Christ we have the Eternal Word of God proclaiming in person the divine revelation, the supernatural religion, previously made known by the prophets, who were His ambassadors and precursors from the beginning of the world. He is the infallible Teacher of mankind, and, having once come in person to supersede all subordinate messengers, He must remain forever the one Apostle and High Priest of God for all ages and nations, having no successor.

But although Jesus Christ could have no successor, He could

have a vicar, a vicegerent and representative on the earth. He must have, indeed, since He removed His bodily presence from the earth and has continued to exercise the office of Mediator, which He began here, in Heaven.

As Mediator, Jesus Christ is the sovereign of a mediatorial kingdom, over which He is sovereign prophet and sovereign pontiff, as well as sovereign ruler, because His kingdom is not only a political but also a spiritual order. The Incarnation was not a transitory act, but a permanent and eternal fact, the culmination of the plan of God, as First and Final Cause of the universe, the creative act carried up to the summit of metaphysical possibility.

The eternal Word came into the world in human form by His conception and birth from the Virgin, to remain in it. His work as mediator between God and creatures will be complete, in the consummation of His kingdom in the heavens, when the glorification of all the elect is accomplished. Until then, He must carry on the work which He began at his conception, continued by His life and death, resumed at His resurrection; He must carry it on, upon the earth, not by His immediate, visible presence and action, but by a mediate, virtual presence and action, through the apostolic church which He founded. The supernatural revelation of God culminated in the Incarnation. When this had been accomplished, there could be no regression to the elementary, imperfect methods done away with once for all. The Lord of the world having come in person to teach all truth, to finish the redemption of mankind, to impart the fulness of grace, He must remain on the earth until the end of the world, fulfilling the offices of Prophet, Priest and King. His visible presence being withdrawn, He must teach as Prophet through an infallible representative, offer sacrifice and impart sacramental grace as Priest through a sacerdotal order, and rule, as King through a hierarchy endowed with vice-regal authority. This is all summed up in the one terse expression, that the Incarnation must extend and complete itself. It is the joining of created to divine nature in unity of person. The strict and proper personal unity can subsist only in a singular and individual mode in Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word. But in a larger and analogical sense, there can be a specific and generic union of rational creatures to the Godhead, by grace, a union which is a sort of deification, completed in the glorified state of the adopted sons of God, both angels and men. The unity of this kingdom of God, the Church Triumphant, is an image of the unity in essence of the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, and of the unity in person of the two natures of Jesus Christ. The kingdom of God on the earth, the Church Militant, must resemble the kingdom of Heaven. It is the continuation and extension of

the Incarnation. Under one figure, it is the body of Christ, under another, His bride and spouse. It is and must be one, and its unity must be indivisible and indefectible. That it is Holy and Catholic no one will dispute. It is Apostolic, because Christ formed it by calling the apostles, and commissioning them to continue His work after His ascension.

The Church is the continuation of the Incarnation. It is the medium and instrument of the Incarnate Word, through which He continues to teach and sanctify, to redeem and save mankind, giving power to true believers to become sons of God by adoption. The mark of the true Church must be Unity, which includes Sanctity, Catholicity and Apostolicity. There is one God to the exclusion of a plurality of divinities, who are all either demons, or mere human heroes, or imaginary beings. There is one mediator, Christ, to the exclusion of all partners or rivals, whose pretensions are all a mere imposture. All duality of person in the true Christ is also excluded. The only-begotten Son of God is also the Son of David and Abraham and Adam, through Mary; One Person in two Natures.

In like manner the Church is One, to the exclusion of all sects pretending to be churches, singly and collectively. Without unity, it is an inconceivable entity. Given the circumference of a circle, there is but one possible centre. Given the centre and one radius, there is but one possible determination of every radius and diameter and of the circumference.

This unity is not a mere agreement in opinion and a concurrence in action among individuals or distinct societies. It is not a mere specific similitude in polity or relation through a common origin. It is organic unity, like that of a building, of a regiment, of a kingdom, of an animated body. It is the cause and not the effect of unanimity in faith, of concurrence in action, of the union of minds and hearts in different ages, among different nations, in the distinct but not separate parts of the entire sphere.

This organic unity is determined by the essentially Catholic, *i.e.*, universal nature of the Church, created to exist and be everywhere and in all ages; by its apostolic origin and polity, depending on an hierarchical authority which is all-pervading and perpetual; and by its inviolable sanctity as the indefectible, infallible teacher of the faith and law of Jesus Christ.

It is the Apostolic Church which is One, and which cannot therefore subsist in several separate, independent episcopal churches, united only by a merely human, ecclesiastical law.

It is the Catholic Church which is One, inasmuch as it is Catholic, and therefore one by an organic law of its essence which is divine and dominates through its universal extension.

It is the Holy Church which is One, and therefore its unity is

inviolable, indivisible, indefectible, perpetual, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the indwelling, animating principles of its life.

This One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church exists as a historical fact, from the date of its creation by Jesus Christ, the Lord, until now. It proves itself by its very existence, by its own self-evidence. As Jesus Christ manifests himself by merely becoming visible, without any need of extrinsic evidence, so the Church is its own witness by being visible as One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic, and having no rival claimant. For, although sects pretend to sanctity, to a share in catholicity, to apostolic doctrine and succession, no one of them pretends to be the One Catholic Church, having supreme and infallible apostolic authority.

They have no idea of Unity. What they call unity, is only union, and they complain that it is lost by division. They cry out for reunion, by compromise, for an alliance of churches, unless they have sunk into sectarian apathy and a dull indifference to the universal interests of Christianity and humanity.

In the very highest idea prevalent among them of the Church, there is no principle adequate to the creation and preservation of Organic Unity. That principle is a universal, supreme and infallible authority, to which all parts and members of the church are subject.

Even that lower kind of unity which binds together, *e.g.*, the Protestant bishops of the British empire, demands the subjection of particular dioceses to a general authority. Metropolitan bishops and sees have always been the centres of ecclesiastical circles, *i.e.*, of provinces and patriarchates. These provinces being provinces of an ecclesiastical empire, coextensive with the world, must be subordinate to some supreme authority, to a primacy vested in a supreme see and bishop, or in a council. An ecumenical council, sitting in permanence or at frequent intervals, is a manifest impossibility, and such a parliamentary regimen for the ordinary, constant government of the church is utterly inadequate. A primate see, and a primate, seem to be as appropriate and as necessary for the universal Church as for a province or a patriarchate. But, if it had only authority and power from the grant of the universal episcopate, or the sovereign state, it would not answer its purpose. A confederation of churches throughout the world could not have been made, a primacy could never have been conferred upon one episcopal see; and if such an extraordinary enterprise could have been undertaken and accomplished during the period which elapsed between the middle of the first and the end of the third century, it could not have been permanent. Much less could it be possible to form a confederation of the Roman Church with the Greek and

Protestant churches ; with a common faith, a common law, governed by a universal authority. If it could be done, such a church would be totally inadequate, because it would lack divine authority. It could not enforce supremacy over the reason and conscience. Such a religion would not be Catholicism, it would be Protestantism. Protestantism, it has been proved over and over again, must revert into Naturalism, and Naturalism rests on a thin crust over the abyss of Nihilism.

There is a Church, One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and *Roman*, which has subsisted in individual unity since the first mission of the Apostles. Its continuous existence is a miracle, and the evidence of its divine origin and authority. Great numbers of its prelates and members have fallen away from it, but it has never been divided or suffered a loss of its integral unity. The dangers from within and without, which have threatened its destruction, have only served to prove that it is a supernatural creation. Rome is the true antithesis of Naturalism. And this topic we hope to treat more fully in another article.

AUGUSTINE F. HEWIT.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

1. His Religious Character. 2. Champion of Religious Liberty. 3. History and Effect of the Religious Liberty Clauses in the Constitution, in the enactment of which Washington took a leading part.

THE union of purity of character with splendor of achievements wins our admiration. When to this rare combination are added great personal virtues, even in the natural order, elevation of thought and action, dignity of manner and carriage, simplicity of life, lofty aspirations, true and active yet modest patriotism and loyalty, every civic and moral virtue characteristic of the sage and of the Christian hero, then the sentiment of admiration matures, fructifies into manly desire for active imitation. When, still more, to the splendid combinations of mind, soul and heart are superadded eminent services to country and to race, the noble duty of gratitude pervades a nation and its citizens. The world unites in the general verdict. It is thus that are attained the honors of human and civic apotheosis.

These qualities of perfect character and exalted life were singularly blended in George Washington.

It is thus that his character is studied by sage, historian and philosopher. To Americans his life is the lesson of the nursery, the college, the field, the cabinet, the forum and the deathbed. Admiration, imitation and gratitude mingle in one blended pæan. We of the present generation see historically at once a nation emancipated; a government founded on the principles of justice and equality; an administration conducted with wisdom, vigor and benevolence; resulting in the perpetuation of human liberty and the blessings of law, security, prosperity and happiness. The principal author of all this, under God, was Washington. All is summed up in the tribute of a nation's love—Father of his Country:

PATER PATRIÆ!

In ancient Greece and Rome such a man would have been worshipped as a god; with us he is venerated as a Father. He may belong to a nation while accomplishing his providential mission; when his mission is accomplished, his example, his virtues, his maxims become the common heritage of mankind.

An anecdote is told to illustrate how the world claimed this priceless boon. A distinguished citizen of France, a country whose gallant sons had fought and triumphed under Washington, when sending an official communication to this illustrious American, disdained to put the address of any post-office, or city or country on the document; he addressed it simply to George Washington. It reached its destination.

It was in this same spirit of universal appropriation of Washington that a pre-eminent countryman of Washington said: "At an early stage of the American Revolution, while Washington was considered by the English Government as a rebel-chief, he was regarded on the continent of Europe as an illustrious hero." Such was the language of Daniel Webster, addressed to the Austrian Government in the famous Hulsemann Correspondence. Such was his universal adoption by the human race that Fisher Ames said of him, that "he changed mankind's ideas of political greatness." So, too, on February 22, 1832, Daniel Webster, at the celebration held at the City of Washington, again said of him: "That name, descending with all time, spreading over the whole earth, and uttered in all languages belonging to the tribes and races of men, will forever be pronounced with affectionate gratitude by every one in whose breast there shall arise an aspiration for human rights and human liberty."

Senator Robbins, of Rhode Island, on the same occasion, said:

"I believe there is no people, civilized or savage, in any place, however remote, where the name of Washington has not been heard, and where it is not repeated with

the fondest admiration. We are told that the Arab in his tent talks of Washington, and that his name is familiar to the wandering Scythian. He seems to be the delight of human kind, as their beau ideal of human nature."

There is another man, a contemporary of Washington, one who knew him well, a witness of his life and services, whose estimate of the Father of his Country, upon the broad basis of cosmopolitan appreciation, we should here cite—that witness is the first American Catholic Bishop, John Carroll. In his eulogy, delivered in St. Peter's Church, Baltimore, on the first 22d of February following the death of Washington, the patriot-prelate, after saying that the most sanguine American "dares not promise again to his country the union of so many splendid and useful virtues as adorned this illustrious man," says further: "Whether we consult our own experience, by bringing into comparison with Washington any of our contemporaries most eminent for their talents, virtues and services, or whether we search through the pages of history to discover in them a character of equal fame, justice and truth, we will acknowledge that he stands supereminent and unrivalled in the annals of mankind, and that no one before him, acting in such a variety of new and arduous situations, bore with him to the grave a reputation as clear from lawless ambition and as undefiled by injustice or oppression; a reputation neither depressed by indolence nor weakened by irresolution, nor shadowed by those imperfections which seemed to be the essential appendages of human nature, till Providence exhibited in Washington this extraordinary phenomenon." Again, in 1794, writing to Archbishop Troy on the intrigues of French revolutionary agents in the United States, Archbishop Carroll says: "To expose the mischief meditated by and fomented through the machinations of these societies, we stand in need of the firmness, the undaunted courage, the personal influence and consummate prudence of that wonderful man, our President. It is impossible for a person not thoroughly acquainted with our situation to know how much depends, at this time, on one man, for the happiness of millions."

These passages are not quoted as so many eulogies on Washington—none ever spoke of him except in eulogy. His praises are in every mouth. His fame has passed beyond the realm of eulogy. But it will be readily perceived how important this is in holding Washington up to our own generation for imitation and gratitude, to show how the ideal man, the model citizen, the peerless patriot, challenges our highest admiration and gratitude in the exercise of certain qualities and the practice of certain courses, resulting, it is true, logically from that broad humanity, from that just and unerring judgment which made the world claim him for its own, but which now and here have a cru-

cial bearing upon our theme. I claim, therefore, that this great man so thoroughly in touch with our common humanity, so pre-eminently capable of judging of the highest duties, interests and rights, was :

1. A sincerely religious and devout man.

2. That, while he was the champion of human liberty and a sincere Christian, he was also free from all religious or sectarian prejudice and bigotry and an equal and unequalled champion of religious liberty and of the rights of conscience.

The most graceful and imposing feature in every great character is its symmetry. It adds a charm to human personality and individuality, just as unity of design, correspondence, due proportion, adaptation of form and color of each member to the whole, in majestic temples, like St. Peter's, at Rome, convey an indescribable sense of harmony, consistency, truth, repose, grandeur. Washington's character was remarkable for its symmetry. Napoleon's was remarkable for the absence of this quality. Washington's symmetry of character is grandest in the union of a sincere sense of religion with strong convictions in favor of religious liberty and its consistent logical and magnanimous practice. It could not be otherwise. For the man who feels the obligations of religion upon his own conscience must see the same obligations upon the conscience of his neighbor. It is thus that the truly religious man must logically be a respecter of religious liberty in the circumstances in which Washington was placed. Because if he feels bound to worship God according to the convictions of his own conscience other men are equally bound to do the same. Hypocrisy, or constraint, is equally abhorrent to religion. The obligation to do a thing, such as to worship God, carries also the right to do it. This is religious liberty accorded under the constitution framed by the convention over which Washington presided.

Much as has been written and said, many as are the monuments and statues, in commemoration of Washington, his religious life and character are but little known and appreciated. And yet this was the foundation of his greatness, the source from which his many noble traits and virtues flowed, the power that ennobled his motives, strengthened his will, guided his judgment, enlivened his actions, and secured his success.

From his earliest youth a deep sense of religion pervaded the character and actions of Washington and he manifested extraordinary sentiments of honor and duty. Parental obedience and filial love were beautiful traits in his life. His love of truth has become proverbial. At the age of seven, while he joined with hearty zest in the games and sports of his companions, he became their model by his good example. He was a natural leader of

men. He organized his schoolmates into juvenile military companies and led them through parades, reviews and battles. He was always elected their captain. The highest tribute his companions could pay to his worth was to be chosen the judge and arbiter in their youthful disputes. He was companionable and cheerful, yet grave and dignified. He was a swift runner, a long leaper, expert at quoits and at tossing the bars. He could ride and control the most fiery horse and was an accomplished horseman. He was methodical, observant, studious, painstaking and industrious. At the age of eleven years such was his desire to do what was right and avoid what was wrong that he prepared a remarkable code of conduct for himself, which he entitled "A Hundred and Ten Rules for Behavior in Company and Conversation." These maxims of the boy of eleven years have been preserved as a wholesome, though quaint, admonition even for men. I will repeat a few of them :

1. "When a man does his best, tho' it succeed not, blame not him that did it."
2. "Play not the peacock, looking everywhere about you to see if you be well decked, if your shoes fit, if your stockings set neatly and clothes handsomely."
3. "Think before you speak; pronounce not imperfectly, nor bring out your words too hastily, but orderly and distinctly."
4. "Be not curious to learn the affairs of others."
5. "Speak not evil of the absent—it is unjust."
6. "Make no show of taking great delight in your victuals; feed not with greediness; lean not on the table; neither find fault with what you eat."
7. "Be not angry at table, whatever happens; and if you have reason to be so, show it not." "Put on a cheerful countenance, especially if there be strangers; for good humor makes one dish a feast."
8. "Let your recreations be manful, not sinful."

It is no wonder that with so remarkable a boyhood Washington became supereminent among the great and good—"the boy was father to the man."

Natural religion, enlivened by his belief in a personal God, his profound recognition and worship of Jesus Christ as his Saviour, a conscientious correspondence with the lights he received, made his youth a model for his companions, an example for the youth of our Republic. He conformed to the Protestant Episcopal ritual, for from his youth he knew no other. He attended the public services of that church, and went with his grandmother and afterwards with his mother as a boy to partake of the Episcopal communion. During his whole life he was exact in attending some form of public service, and in the midst of his military campaigns he was known to be in the habit of riding ten or twelve miles to church. Habits of prayer were marked throughout his whole career, both in time of war and in his retirement at Mount Vernon. In 1764, at Fort Necessity, during the French and Indian War,

Aaron Bancroft says that he rode regularly on Sundays a great distance to church ; and one of Washington's aids related that the commander read the prayers and passages from the Scriptures himself on Sundays in the absence of the chaplain. It was of this early period of his military career that Washington Irving writes the following passage : " William Fairfax, Washington's paternal adviser, had recently counselled him by letter, to have public prayers in his camp, especially when there were Indian families there ; this was accordingly done at the encampment in the Great Meadows, and it certainly was not one of the least striking pictures presented in this wild campaign—the youthful commander, presiding with calm seriousness over a motley assemblage of half equipped soldiers, leathern-clad hunters and woodsmen, and painted savages with their wives and children, and uniting them all in solemn devotion by his own example and demeanor."

In the midst of defeat and disaster, at the fall of General Braddock, Washington buried his dead commander at night, and by the light of a torch he read the funeral service over his remains. At Valley Forge and at other critical points in the Revolutionary War, Washington was known to retire frequently to his tent for private devotions, and members of his military staff on entering his marquee, were known to have found Washington on his knees, beseeching the God of battles to bestow victory on the patriot arms. On one occasion, if not more, Washington was seen in the field of battle, availing himself of a moment's respite from the immediate direction of the troops, on his knees behind a tree, engaged in prayer. Jared Sparks unites with Washington Irving in the testimony as to Washington's custom of having public prayers in camp during his military campaigns. His efforts for the improvement of the morals of his officers and soldiers were zealous and untiring. " Avoid gaming," was one of his constant maxims to his companions and followers in arms. Of his own efforts to suppress vice in his armies, Washington has himself said, " I have, both by threats and persuasive means, endeavored to discountenance gaming, drinking, swearing, and irregularities of every other kind." Again he addressed to his army these words, " At this time of public distress, men may find enough to do, in the service of their God and their country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality."

The religious character of Washington is strikingly illustrated not only in the devout actions and practices of his whole life, but also in a most remarkable manner in his writings, conversations, correspondence, speeches and official documents. Whenever he alluded to God it was in terms of edifying reverence and piety. He seemed from his writings and maxims, no less than by his conduct, to walk always in the conscious presence of the Deity. In

alluding to God he was constantly in the habit of using such terms as "Omnipotent Being," "Great Ruler of Events," "Divine Government," "Almighty God," "Great Ruler of the Universe and Sovereign Arbitrator of Nations," "Great Lord and Ruler of Nations," "God our Benign Parent," "Great Author of every public and private good." Among the constantly recurring sentences and speeches showing that he walked always in the presence of God, were the following sublime words: "I feel myself oppressed and almost overwhelmed with a sense of Divine Munificence." How sublime was his religious sense, when he said, "Let one with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion." Again he said, "When you speak of God, or his attributes, let it be seriously, in reverence." And again, "The ways of Providence are inscrutable, and mortals must submit." Those scientists of our day, who refer all things to physical and natural causes or chance, should read the following tribute of one of the greatest of men and clearest of intellects to the Creator. "It is impossible to account for the creation of the universe without the agency of a Supreme Being. That great and glorious Being is the beneficent Author of all good that was, that is, or that will be." "It is impossible to govern the Universe without the aid of a Supreme Being, it is impossible to reason without arriving at a Supreme Being." Mr. Shroeder, in his "Maxims of Washington," has preserved for posterity the following among the noble Christian lessons from the Father of our country: "There is no truth more thoroughly established than that there exists, in the economy and course of nature, an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity." "The consideration that human happiness and moral duty are inseparably connected, will always continue to prompt me to promote the progress of the former by inculcating the practice of the latter." "Labor to keep alive in your breast that little spark of Celestial fire, called conscience." "A good moral character is the first essential in a man. It is, therefore, highly important to endeavor not only to be learned, but virtuous." The ascetic aspirations of saintliness could not give utterance to more spiritual maxims than the following ones: "Speak not evil of the absent, it is unjust." "To persevere in one's duty and be silent, is the best answer to calumny." "Under such discouragements the good citizen will look beyond the applause and reproaches of man, and, persevering in his duty, stand firm in conscious rectitude, and in the hope of approving Heaven." These numerous maxims are taken from his various writings.

While posterity seems to have been dazzled by the splendor of

Washington's military and civic career, it must be acknowledged that they have greatly overlooked his private virtues and Christian character. The fame of the general and the statesman seems to have shut out from our view the extraordinary purity of life and the virtues of the Christian. While historians have dwelt upon his public career, I feel a special pleasure in reproducing, for the good of our own age, the testimony of his illustrious contemporaries to his high moral sentiments and his religious convictions and observances. Men, who lived when he lived and felt the charm of his ethical and moral maxims and conduct, statesmen, moralists, jurists and philosophers, have united in paying the highest tributes to Washington as a good man and a conscientious Christian; one who availed himself earnestly and conscientiously of the lights he enjoyed and of the education he had received; while he, by his own self-culture, self-instruction and self-discipline, developed the exemplary practice of a high and admirable religious life. Such was the spontaneous testimony of all his most eminent contemporaries of every faith, including eminent Catholics. A few only of the citations from distinguished sources need now be cited from the countless authorities at hand.

Chief Justice Marshall, an intimate friend of Washington, wrote of him: "Without making ostentatious professions of religion, he was a sincere believer in the Christian faith, and a truly devout man." The Rev. J. Freland, in December, 1799, said: "The virtues of our departed friend were crowned with piety. To Christian institutions he gave the countenance of his example; and no one could express more fully his sense of the Providence of God, and the dependence of man." Lord Erskine, the eminent English jurist, in 1795, wrote to Washington himself: "I have a large acquaintance among the most valuable and exalted classes of men, but you are the only human being for whom I ever felt an awful reverence. I sincerely pray God to grant a long and serene evening to a life so gloriously devoted to the universal happiness of the world." The Marquis De Chastellux, a distinguished French officer, who served in our Revolution with Washington, and afterwards corresponded with him, said of his illustrious chief: "Soldiers, magistrates, and people, all love and admire him; all speak of him in terms of tenderness and veneration." General Henry Lee, one of his own officers, a patriot, and an illustrious Virginian like himself, used these remarkable words on December 26, 1799, shortly after his death, in regard to his peerless commander-in-chief: "Vice shuddered at his presence, and virtue always felt his fostering hand." Jared Sparks calls him "a Christian in faith and practice." The Rev. Samuel Stanhope Smith, D.D., President of the College of New Jersey, and a contemporary of Wash-

ington, thus describes his death: "Our hero was the same at that moment, as in all the past, firm; confiding in the mercy and resigned to the will of Heaven." Mr. Schroeder, who collected and published the maxims of Washington, political, administrative, military, moral and religious, speaks of Washington's life as having been marked by Christian charity, and kindness to the widow and the orphan. Washington, from the beginning of the serious attack of his last illness, which only lasted a few days, felt that he should die; he united with that illustrious lady, his wife, Martha Washington, in many acts of devotion in preparation for death; he thought of every member of his family, and blessed them all; and at the supreme moment he closed his own eyes and disposed his body with dignity in death. Mr. Schroeder mentions Washington's last prayer, at the moment of giving up his great soul: "Father of Mercies, take me to Thyself."

The benevolence and charity of his nature were manifested in his views on slavery. He lived in the heart of the slaveholding interest, and the whole community was pro-slavery. As early as 1786, before we have any record of an abolition society in Massachusetts, he wrote to Mr. John F. Mercer: "I never mean, unless some particular circumstances should compel me to it, to possess another slave by purchase, it being among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery in this country may be abolished by law." Again, in 1794, he wrote to Mr. Laurence Lewis, his nephew: "I wish from my soul that the legislature of this State could see the policy of a gradual abolition of slavery. *It might prevent much future mischief.*" Surely, nothing could be more prophetic than these words. Would that we had taken the warning in time. In his will, he provided for the manumission of his own slaves, and he made provision for the support of such of his slaves to be manumitted, who, from age, infirmities, or infancy, might not be able to support themselves. Thus, he resembles the illustrious Las Casas, the Catholic bishop of Chiapas, in Mexico, in 1544, the protector and liberator of the American Indians, in the sixteenth century; both were slaveowners; Las Casas by the gift of his father, Washington by inheritance. History shows that the greatest liberators have sprung from times, countries, and states of society, in which slavery prevailed. It is an evil which, when left alone, will abolish itself. But the slave trade, which still in Africa disgraces our century, needs a different treatment. That must be prevented by the united armed intervention of all Christian nations. In the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, for January, 1890, we have given a detailed account of, and plans for, the accomplishment of this result. We have ventured to call the good cause *The New Crusade of the Nineteenth Century*.

As Americans and Catholics, we can but feel profoundly interested, and proudly gratified at the appreciation and opinion entertained and expressed concerning George Washington's religious character by his illustrious contemporary and friend, our own patriot-prelate, the patriarch of Catholicity in America, the first American Bishop, John Carroll. When the patriot cause in America made issue with British oppression, and the struggle was inevitable, Dr. Carroll, then in England, hastened home to Maryland to join common cause with his countrymen, and to share their uncertain fate. You know the services he rendered to the struggling cause of liberty. It is a pleasing circumstance that the beginning of the American government under the Constitution and the foundation of the American Catholic Church Hierarchy occurred near about the same time, twin giants of liberty and religion. Washington and Carroll! The inauguration of General Washington as first President, and the consecration of Dr. Carroll as first Catholic bishop occurred near together. Those memorable years, 1789 and 1790, are now, and forever will be, hallowed years with our country, and our Church. George Washington was inaugurated as first President on March 30, 1789; John Carroll was appointed first Catholic bishop by Papal Bull dated November 6, 1789, and was consecrated on August 15, 1790. Who so competent to pass judgment on the excellence of Washington's religious character and virtues as Archbishop Carroll, himself a patriot and a man of God?

On February 22, 1800, Archbishop Carroll, in compliance with the general recommendation of Congress, delivered an oration on Washington, at St. Peter's Church, Baltimore, then the pro-Cathedral. In his oration the great bishop found language unequal to the excellence of Washington's character; eloquence was inadequate to describe such virtue. He speaks of the veneration of Catholics for Washington's exalted virtues, and pays a glowing tribute to his "virtuous life." He said that Washington's uniform language, publicly and privately, was an "acknowledgement of a superintending Providence, preparing, regulating and governing all human events for the accomplishment of its eternal purposes, and predisposing the instruments by which they were to be effected." He contemplated human events "in the Christian piety and the philosophy of a sage." A practical belief in "a supreme intelligent Being," became "the polar star" of Washington's life and administration. "He was to himself a luminous proof of Providence in preparing and adapting his body and mind to suit the destinies of his life." "Contemplating," said the illustrious prelate, "as much as is allowed to feeble mortals, His divine agency in preparing the means and conducting the progress of the

American Revolution, we may presume to say, that heaven impressed a character on the life of Washington, and a temper to his soul, which eminently qualified him to bear the most conspicuous part, and be its principal instrument in accomplishing this stupendous work." The good prelate then traced in every part of Washington's life from his birth to his death "the evidence of this providential interposition," and then states that "such was the training and education by which Providence prepared him for the fulfilment of his future destinies." He said that the guardian angel of Washington infused into his soul the sweet spirit of benevolence together with heroic fortitude," and he exclaimed "Would to God that the principal authors and leaders of the many revolutions through which unhappy France has passed . . . had been influenced by a morality as pure and enlightened as that of Washington." "It remained for him, after abdicating public employments, to exhibit in the shades of retirement those private virtues which are the true foundations of national prosperity." "Washington fulfilled the destinies of that Providence, which had formed him for the exalted purpose of diffusing the choicest blessings over millions of men, and preparing the same for millions yet unborn." The sacred orator then applied to Washington the language of inspiration and of prophecy, as found in those majestic and sublime passages of the eighth chapter of the Book of Wisdom, concluding with these striking words, which, together with the whole passage, the eloquent preacher now placed in the mouth of Washington, "*to be allied to wisdom is immortality.*"

Advancing to our second proposition, we would ask how could such a man, such a Christian, such a statesman, as illustrious contemporaries have thus described him for us—how could such a man as Washington be a bigot? Impossible! How could such a man, already the champion of civil, political, national and personal liberty—how could he be otherwise than the champion of religious liberty?

We would like to see Archbishop Carroll's admirable eulogy of Washington committed to memory and pronounced in every Catholic school in America on every 22d day of February, until the end of time. In it the reverend prelate traces, in the many circumstances of Washington's youth and education, the hand of Providence preparing him for his country's liberation. So, too, do we find most remarkable incidents in his youth and later life, by which his mind and character were so broadened, enlightened and inspired with that wisdom, which he so cultivated in the manner set forth in the Book of Wisdom, that he was prepared to lead as the champion of religious liberty. The most generally oppressed and disfranchised religious body in America at the time

of the American Revolution, and of the formation and adoption of the Constitution, was the religious body of which we are members—the Catholic Church. All odious and unjust vestiges of religious bigotry and of unchristian legislation were swept away by the combined influence of the American Revolution, the leadership of Washington, of public opinion, the Constitution of the United States and the presidency of Washington over the Constitutional Convention. Catholics even now have to struggle for religious liberty and freedom of worship bills for children and prisoners in public institutions of the States. The principles of freedom of conscience and of religious worship, inasmuch as all men were endowed with souls, consciences and rights, apply equally to all men, whether prisoners and convicts, to children and juvenile delinquents in houses of refuge, of correction or reformatories. The right is inalienable and non-forfeitable. No crime *whatever* can forfeit this right. How, then, does it comport with our traditions, our veneration for the principles of Washington, our bills of rights and constitution, that at this day, more than a century after the American Revolution and the adoption of our national and many of our State constitutions, there is need for demanding liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship in behalf of prisoners or children confined in institutions on American soil. A religious liberty bill, after repeated defeats, has just passed the Legislature of New York. A person by crime may forfeit his liberty, his property, his offices; but he can never forfeit the right, any more than he can escape the obligation, of saving his soul. He can never forfeit his right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. God demands the homage of His creatures; they must be free to render it.

The influences and training in the school of religious liberty commenced with Washington when he was a boy. His father died on April 12, 1743, when George was only twelve years old. His oldest brother, Lawrence Washington, took the place of his father, and George looked to that noble and generous brother with unbounded respect, veneration and love. Washington Irving said that George owed to his brother "much of his moral and mental training." The intolerant law of Virginia, which had, in 1629, driven Lord Baltimore from its shores because he was a Catholic, and had practically restricted its population to members of the established church, drew from Lawrence Washington, the foster-father of George Washington, the following declaration of his views on that subject: "It has ever been my opinion, and I hope it ever will be, that restraints on conscience are cruel in regard to those on whom they are imposed and injurious to the country imposing them. England, Holland and Prussia I may quote as ex-

amples, and much more Pennsylvania, which has flourished under that delightful liberty so as to become the admiration of every man who considers the short time it has been settled. . . . This colony (Virginia) was greatly settled in the latter part of Charles the First's time and during the usurpation of the zealous churchmen, and that spirit which was then brought in has ever since continued ; so that, except a few Quakers, we have no dissenters. But what has been the consequence? We have increased by slow degrees, whilst our neighboring colonies, whose natural advantages are greatly inferior to ours, have become populous."

The enlightened preceptor had passed to his grave, the thirteen colonies had struggled for their liberties, George Washington had become the foremost man in the great drama of American emancipation—true to the traditions of his family, to the lessons of his elder brother and to his own nature and convictions, he uttered these noble words: "While just government protects all in their religious rights, true religion affords government its surest rights." This comprehensive declaration of Washington proclaims at once the obligations of the conscientious citizen to his government, and the duty of the government to protect the citizen in his equal rights of conscience, religion and the free worship of God.

We next see Washington, as commander-in-chief of the American army, publicly exerting his whole military power to protect the Catholic soldiers in his army from the insults of a bigoted and ignorant populace—a beautiful incident, to which I will more particularly refer in another article, on Washington's relations with Catholics.

The next signal service of Washington as a champion of religious liberty was when he presided, as its president, over that august body, the convention, that framed the Constitution of the United States. It is well known that he took a profound interest and impressed his liberal views on every provision of the Constitution, was in counsel with the members, and greatly influenced the decisions of the convention. The result was the declaration against all religious tests under the government of the United States. "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." This clause was adopted by a large majority and with but little debate. This great result, the throwing open of the doors of Congress, the office of President, of the Supreme Court, and the whole of the Federal offices of the government throughout the Union, to Catholics and to the members of every religious society in the land was the voluntary act of a just and free nation. Catholics were entitled to it and through Washington and his colleagues they obtained it. It was fifty years later, and only after the gi-

gantic and herculean efforts of Daniel O'Connell and of the Irish people at his back, that the doors of the British Parliament were opened to Catholics and to the members of every creed by the famous British Emancipation Act.

The broad mind of Washington went further than the Constitution on the question of religious liberty. During the sittings of the Constitutional Convention, on August 15, 1787, Washington wrote to Lafayette: "Being no bigot myself to any mode of worship, I am disposed to indulge the professors of Christianity in the choice of that road to heaven which to them shall seem most direct, plainest, easiest, and least liable to exception."

In addition to the clause against all religious tests for office some members of the Constitutional Convention were in favor of introducing a clause in favor of religious liberty into the original Constitution. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina—honor to his name—proposed it to the convention, and some debate took place thereon. But the result was simply the insertion of the anti-religious test clause. After the adjournment of the convention that instrument was submitted to the thirteen States for ratification, and the ratifications of nine States were made sufficient to carry the Constitution into effect. The subject of the Constitution now became the burning question of the day throughout the country. It was a sublime spectacle to see an infant nation, great in its infancy, which had just achieved its liberties, engaged in the great work of devising the best plan for their preservation. All the States united in supporting the clause against a religious test for office; but some earnest and devout Christians thought that the Christian religion should at least have received some recognition in the Constitution. Thus, when Washington visited New England in 1789, the Presbytery of Newburyport addressed these words to him:

"Among the objections to the Constitution we never considered the want of a religious test, that great engine of persecution in every tyrant's hands; but we should not have been alone in rejoicing to have seen some explicit acknowledgement of the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom He hath sent, inserted somewhere in the Magna Charta of our country."

Washington replied to this suggestion with characteristic frankness:

"The path of true piety is so plain as to require little political direction. To this consideration we ought to ascribe the absence of any regulations respecting religion from the Magna Charta of our country. To the guidance of the minister of the gospel this important object is perhaps more properly committed."

Neither the first temporary form of union among the colonists, which was the Federal Convention, nor the second, which was the

"Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union," contained any mention of religious liberty or a religious test. Upon general constitutional grounds we should say that under neither of those forms of union could any legislation have taken place by Congress on these subjects. So also it would have been equally unconstitutional for Congress under the Constitution, even without any provisions on the subject, to have passed any such laws; because the Constitution was a specific grant of delegated powers, and unless such a grant of power to legislate on the subject of religion or a religious test was expressly made, it must necessarily be understood as not granted, but as reserved to the granting power, the States, or the people thereof. This principle was afterwards expressly embodied in the Constitution by the Tenth Amendment, which provides that

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States respectively, or to the people, are reserved to the States."

The further effect of this article upon the question of religious liberty will be noticed hereafter. One thing, however, is certain, that unless the power were expressly given to Congress to legislate on religion or a religious test they could not do so; and no such grant of legislative power was given, or ever proposed to be given, to Congress by the Constitution.

But not content with this implied, though quite certain state of constitutional law, the States when voting on the Constitution, decided to introduce an amendment into the Constitution expressly prohibiting all legislation on the subject of religion. The First Amendment of the Constitution, accordingly, as it now stands a part of the organic law, reads thus:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This was not in the original *Constitution*. It is there now by amendment.

Now it is very interesting to trace the history of this clause, the First Amendment of the Constitution. Various origins have been attributed to this noble provision of the Constitution. The late learned and Revd. Dr. Charles I. White, in his appendix to Dar-
ras' "General History of the Church," which was published with the sanction of, and with an introduction by the late Archbishop Spaulding, of Baltimore, traces its origin to a Catholic source. Dr. White stated that the Catholics of the country at that time, through the Right Rev. John Carroll, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, George Meade (the father of the late and distinguished General Meade of the United States Army, the hero of Gettysburg), Thomas Fitzsimmons and Dominick Lynch, all representative Catholics, presented through Bishop Carroll to the first Congress

assembled under the adopted Constitution a memorial "representing the necessity of adopting some constitutional provision for the maintenance of civil and religious liberty, the purchase of which had cost so much blood and treasure among all classes of citizens." Rev. Dr. White states that this action of the Catholics was suggested and stimulated by their "calling to mind the trials and persecutions of former times"; that through the influence of General Washington the memorial was favorably received, and that "it resulted in the enactment of the first article of the Amendments to the Constitution." He adds that "it was the most effectual barrier that could be raised against the revival of the persecuting spirit which had disgraced nearly all the colonies." After a careful search for the truth of this account, however gratified we should feel at verifying it, we must concur with such learned Catholic historical scholars as Dr. Shea and Father Lambing that the account of Dr. White lacks historical confirmation.

We will now give the origin of the Religious Liberty Clause. We feel no little pride in finding that Catholics had a share in it—at least by swelling the current of public opinion in its favor. All prominent Catholics publicly advocated it. The Right Rev. John Carroll, our first bishop, and Charles Carroll of Carrollton made public declaration of their advocacy of religious liberty. The former, in his published defence in the *New York Gazette*, declares that if religious liberty is not guaranteed, "in vain then have Americans associated into one great national union under the express condition of not being shackled by religious tests, and under a firm persuasion that they were to retain, when associated, every natural right not expressly surrendered." Charles Carroll of Carrollton, just prior to the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, expressed similar sentiments in answer to Daniel Delany, who taunted the distinguished Catholic with his being a graduate of St. Omer's, and with his inability to vote for the smallest officer in the very state where Calvert had proclaimed religious liberty for all Christians. In the Constitutional Convention the two Catholic members, Thomas Fitzsimmons and Daniel Carroll, sustained every movement in favor of religious liberty. Thus the position of Catholics was as well known in relation to religious liberty as it was in relation to independence, when Charles Carroll, signing the Declaration of Independence, added to his signature the name and title of his own homestead, and signed Charles Carroll, of Carrollton.

The convention which framed the Constitution assembled in Philadelphia, under their elected president, George Washington, in May, 1787. At the organization of the convention, in which there were two Catholic delegates, one of them, Thomas Fitzsim-

mons, from Philadelphia, was present, and Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, a few days afterward entered the hall. The first movement towards religious liberty came from South Carolina, through its delegate, Charles Pinckney, whose proposed form of government for the United States embraced a clause that "The legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the subject of religion," which elicited no opposition, but which, however, was actually omitted from the adopted Constitution. But when the convention reached the sixth clause, prescribing the official oath for Federal and State officers, this same noble delegate from South Carolina proposed the clause requiring no religious test for holding office under the United States. This led to debate, but not to opposition, for many thought such a clause unnecessary, as in fact and in constitutional law it was not necessary. But in the mother-country a religious test was required which excluded Catholics, and even in New York at that time Catholics were excluded from office, not by name, but by an oath which, as they could not conscientiously take it, excluded them from office under the government of that State. The introduction of the clause, therefore, was carried as a wise precaution or preventive. There was but one State that voted against it, North Carolina, while Maryland, by a majority of its delegates, refrained from voting, the Catholic delegate from Maryland, Mr. Carroll, however, being in favor of it. While most of the States adopted State Constitutions excluding all religious tests, it was not until recent years that all vestige of this disgraceful test entirely disappeared from our State Constitutions.

New Hampshire, a State distinguished by the illiberal character of its statutes against Catholics, then and for many years afterwards, and even to our own days, took a leading part in originating this clause. This State ratified the Constitution with the clause against religious tests in it by a small majority, on June 21, 1788, and Virginia, whose colonial legislation against all religions, except that of the English Church, as already mentioned in the quotation from Lawrence Washington, now, under the influence of public opinion, guided by George Washington, her first citizen and President of the Constitutional Convention, ratified the Constitution on the same day. New Hampshire has the honor, by an hour or two in advance of Virginia, of being the ninth State to ratify, and thereby her vote completing the requisite number for making the Constitution the organic law of the land. Virginia, though ratifying on the same day, but an hour or two later, became the tenth ratifying State. New Hampshire on her ratification went further, and, fearing that at some future day Congress might legislate against the religion of New Hampshire, recommended that "Congress should make no laws touching religion, or infringing the

rights of conscience." Thus a State, whose statute book contained "laws touching religion or infringing the rights of conscience," desired to monopolize this odious distinction, and to prohibit that power to Congress. The motive attributed to New Hampshire for this singular but good action, is the fear that some other religious body different from or opposed to the religion of a majority of its own inhabitants might gain a majority in Congress, set up a State religion, and persecute the religion of New Hampshire. In Maryland there was a Catholic minority in the Legislature, and they proposed the same amendment, but with them religious liberty was traditional and formed the basis of their original colonial government under Lord Baltimore in 1634 and 1649, one hundred and fifty years before. So, too, in the Pennsylvania Legislature there was a minority, who proposed the same amendment, and they too found both the principle and the example for it in the religious toleration proclaimed by William Penn. New York also proposed that an amendment be inserted in the Constitution for securing religious liberty, free speech and a free press. When the first Congress met, proposed amendments were sent in from the States to the number of two hundred and one; Congress reduced the number to twelve, and the States afterwards ratified ten, the first of which was the article in question, in favor of religious liberty. I feel some satisfaction in the fact that New York, my own city, was the place where this glorious statute of religious liberty was passed by Congress. I feel each day a thrill of patriotism as I pass the spot where Congress then assembled; and there, too, on that same hallowed spot, the corner of Wall and Nassau Streets, Washington was inaugurated as first President. A beautiful bronze statue of Washington representing him in the act of taking the oath as first President, has been erected there by the City of New York.

What then is the present status of religious liberty under the Constitution of the United States? If the anti-religious test clause and the clause against legislating on religion had been omitted altogether from the Constitution, it would still have been unlawful and unconstitutional for Congress to have done what is forbidden by these clauses; for the reason that the Constitution, being an instrument of specific powers granted, these powers thus prohibited could not have been exercised unless they had been among the express grants of power. But no one ever proposed to give Congress the power to require a religious test oath, or to establish or restrict religion; and even if it had been proposed, the Convention would not have considered them; and even if the Convention had adopted them, the Constitution with such powers granted to Congress would never have been ratified by the States. It would seem,

therefore, to follow, perhaps, that it was an act of supererogation to insert such clauses in the Constitution. No; this is not entirely so. The first advantage gained by inserting them was to guard against any however improbable usurpation of such powers by Congress as might be possible under a representative government in times of great religious excitement or delusion. The second advantage was that the insertion of them would prevent such powers being exercised by Congress under any of the constructive grants of power; in other words, such powers could never be regarded as constructively granted, since they were expressly prohibited. The third advantage consists in the insertion of a declaration of the great principle of religious liberty in the Magna Charta of the country; it committed the government and the people of the United States to this principle of religious liberty; it created a moral sentiment in favor of religious liberty; its fruits were afterwards witnessed in the repeal of proscriptive legislation against Catholics in the States.

But as we have already seen that all powers not granted by the Constitution to Congress were reserved to the States or to the people thereof, the power to enact a religious test for holding office under the States and the power of establishing State religions and of interfering with the free exercise of religion in the States, though we Catholics hold it to be against natural right, was claimed as still existing in the States and in the legislatures thereof, and such powers had in most of the States been actually exercised to a greater or less extent, at the very time the Constitution was framed. This certainly proves that the guarantees against religious persecution were very imperfect and very limited. Catholics might hold office under the United States, while they might be, and were in fact, in some cases, excluded from holding office in the States; a Catholic might be President of the United States, while he was or might be disqualified by his religion under State statutes for the lesser office of Governor of a State, or even of a constable. It is surprising, humiliating, to recall how much was done in some of the States against religious liberty. But, could the Constitution have prevented this? Yes, it could. If the clauses relating to this subject of religious tests and religious liberty had been so worded as to read thus: "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States, *or any of the States*; neither Congress, *nor the States*, shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"; then the work would have been complete, and all men in this land of liberty would have stood upon a perfect and guaranteed equality before the law in respect to their religious faith and worship. The omission consisted in not prohibit-

ing the States to do what the United States was forbidden to do. Many other powers were thus prohibited both to Congress and the States, and these powers in regard to religion might have equally been so prohibited to the States. Prudence alone dictated abstaining from attempting to do too much at once. In the then state of the public mind against Catholics, the insertion of such a prohibition in respect to the States, might have endangered the ratification of the whole constitution. We might here mention a fourth advantage in inserting these clauses in the constitution as they are—such insertion so moulded public opinion as to lead to the repeal in almost every State of all laws requiring a religious test, or legislation concerning religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Washington was president of the convention. All knew where he stood. Thus, Washington and his wise colleagues secured, by means the most direct then possible, by means most effectual in actual results, the glorious boon of religious liberty for all who tread the sacred soil of America. Citizenship is not necessary to the enjoyment of religious liberty in America. Whoever comes to our hospitable shores, from whatsoever land he may come, and whatever may be the law of his own country, and whatever may be his condition, even prisoners and convicts, and whatever be his age, sex, color, faith, or nationality, as soon as he lands on American soil, is protected by the broad ægis of universal emancipation.

Washington's diary, September 17, 1787, states, that on the completion of the constitution and the adjournment of the convention, he, the president of the convention, "retired to meditate on the momentous work." To Lafayette he wrote that he regarded the constitution, adopted under such circumstances, as "little short of a miracle."

With Judge Story, may every American repeat the dying prayer of Father Paul, "*Esto Perpetua*," May it be perpetual!

A century has tested the wisdom of that constitution. What greater boon could our country have won by its free suffrages? What grander spectacle does history present? He who presided at its creation, as first president, proved its wisdom by its practice. Such was the Father of our Country—George Washington!

RICHARD H. CLARKE, LL.D.

RIMES CLÉRICALES.

THE Abbé Ludovic Briault produced, a few years since, a volume of verse bearing the above title, which will serve here as a thread to connect a few extracts from his volume done into English verse, with some rambling remarks suggested by their titles and treatment. Does the reader ask, Who is the Abbé Briault? If so, let him be answered in the rather naive language found in an advertisement (on the cover of the same volume) announcing the early publication of a prose work by the same author: "Au Lecteur: M. Ludovic Briault, qui est poète et fin littérateur à la fois, a voulu consacrer au service du bien, du vrai et du beau les nobles facultés que Dieu lui a données en naissant. Soit qu'il parle en vers, soit qu'il écrive en prose, il est un maître en l'art de bien dire. Ses peintures agréables, chaudes et faciles, égayent, enchantent, délassent l'esprit et le cœur. . . . Son livre, "Rimes Cléricales," rempli d'une humeur toute Française, curieux déjà par son titre si piquant, abonde de ces surprises. C'est bien là le poète toujours aimable, toujours élevé, parce qu'il reste toujours profondément Chrétien. . . ."

It is quite true, as this notice informs us, that the title does not lack a certain piquancy. Without venturing to anticipate the opinion of the reader, we may also confess that the poems have exercised not a little attractiveness for us—sufficient, at least, to impel us to the drudgery of translation. A larger apology, however, for the work of translation lies in the fact that there is little or no verse in English of precisely the same character as these verses of the Abbé. It may be, that, as the above advertisement hints, it takes a Frenchman to be able, with the charming brilliancy of his style, the open freshness of his heart, his sublime confidence in the power of a wholly personal theme to interest a host of unknown readers, and his bonhomie in general, to write such poetry. Émile Souvestre, in his "Un Philosophe sous les Toits," dashed off a simple record of his bird's-eye view of the street, of the scanty furnishings of a poor attic, of the kindly, but very common, impulses of the human heart, and his unpretentious little volume forthwith became a classic. Its English translator very happily styled it, with an entirely justifiable play upon words, "An Attic Philosopher," for the Attic salt of genuine wit, in its old sense, is what gives the appetizing savor to this simple repast. Xavier de Maistre knew how, by a similar freshness in title and treatment, to make of his "Voyage autour de ma Chambre," a delightful classic. It would prove, doubtless, an interesting study to inquire into the elements of such a peculiarly French wit and literary felicity in

the choice of subjects and styles. The fact of its existence is noted here in passing, in order to call attention to its general absence in English. Our literature will furnish us with the names of many exquisite versifiers and poets who have been clergymen; but it will give us hardly one name to illustrate the English equivalent of this French possession. Our Abbé writes a poem on "Mon Église." George Herbert, the melodious Anglican parson, who sang such sweet religious strains in the early part of the seventeenth century, wrote poems on "The Church Porch," "Church Lock and Key," "Church Floor," etc. But the Abbé writes *literally* of his church, an old half ruined relic of the times of the Templars, visited within as well as without, of every wind and rain of heaven; while the parson uses all his titles alone in a figurative sense. The one sings of concrete realities, the other of abstract ideals. The one seems to take it for granted that his unknown, and not very inviting ruin, will prove interesting to the reader, albeit only in a pen-picture; the other preaches a poetical homily (always a dangerous experiment in literature), on a rather prosy text. The Abbé tells us all about himself in a charmingly unconstrained fashion, without the slightest suggestion of self-consciousness. He is a priest, but he is not preaching—just now. He wants to interest you, and somehow he succeeds, in his own little cares and duties, in his financial embarrassments, in his house, in his kitchen, in his parlor, in the dear old fellow that watches over his establishment—his dog Black, and in the lightfooted pony, trained by his own care, in whose honor he writes his prettiest poem—his "Bichette." He is a *curé de campagne*—a pastor in the fields! When he invites you into his parlor, it is for the purpose of a chat, not of a sermon.

We have too little of this fresh sweetness in English. The clergyman sitting down to write verse, finds it hard to realize that he is not in the pulpit. Lacking all the frigidity of self-consciousness, he is, in his private character, the most engaging personality; but, worshipping at the shrine of the Muses, he is too apt to don the learned sock, and do some unconscious strutting. Father Ryan could have avoided this tendency, if he had chosen such simple themes as the Abbé; but his subjects were generally conceived in too "poetic" a mood. In much of his verse he managed to reach the heart in his very simplicity of feeling and diction; but not seldom did his love for the jingle of continuous rhyme, and his free use of "purple" words, defeat the quasi-careless style required for simple description. Strange to say, the nearest and best approach—indeed, we should call it rather realization than approach—to this charming carelessness and exquisite simplicity of clerical verse, is found in "The Country Pastor's Week," written,

not by a cleric, but by a layman—the gifted and polished littérateur, Mr. Maurice Francis Egan. This series of realistic poems does in truth “hold the mirror up to nature,” with just enough of the sublimating touch of the poetic instinct to relieve the crudeness of mere description.

Perhaps the reason why such poetry is so rare is because it is, in reality, difficult. It will not admit of the ordinary poetical “properties.” Purple patches are especially irritating, if seen there; any straining after rich phraseology especially repelling. And still the poetry may not degenerate, for lack of ornamentation, into crude prosiness, but must receive just sufficient, but very delicate, finish, to warrant clothing the thought in a metrical form which advertises to the reader that he may reasonably expect poetry and not prose, in thought as well as in expression. The following translations are offered, not in the vain supposition that they will supply the need, or even help to supply it, but that they may serve as faint suggestions of the manner in which such themes might be treated—as sign-posts to indicate pathways still untrodden by the clerical verse-maker.

The Abbé prefaces his volume with a few verses “to the reader,” somewhat after the fashion of a man who has securely button-holed you, and with undoubting faith in his power to interest you, tells you who he is, and what he purposes doing. He quietly lets you into the secret of the criticism he deprecates, as well as the plea he offers in defence. There is something touching in the necessity he surmises, of protecting himself against the raillery of his friends. Human nature is human nature the world over! And men will forever find in the poetic efforts of the clerical tyro the first evidences of a weakening intellect—until success justifies his Jamesonian raid into the gold-fields of the jealous muses. This is the only subject, as far as we have read his verse, that can disturb his equanimity into a slight approach to polemic bitterness. But it was quite unnecessary for him to string together so many illustrious names of priestly and lay poets: he might have contented himself with the simple assertion of the splendid fact that nearly all of the Fathers of the Church wrote verse, or quoted it with approbation. The finest literary treasures of the elder, as well as the mediæval, Church, are in verse. Almost the whole Divine Office is poetry, either Hebrew, as in the Psalms, or Christian, as in the vast treasury of the Hymns. Indeed, it seems to be a beautiful characteristic of the tenderest and best asceticism, to express itself always in poetry, and very frequently even in verse. And this is reasonable; for the Saint looks upon man and nature with the uncontaminate mind of childhood, and sees Heaven everywhere. St. Francis of Assisi calls on the

feathered songsters to praise God in their grateful choirings. St. Francis of Sales reads sweetest lessons of piety in the widely opened page of Nature. St. Ambrose writes imperishable lyrics, and proves their inspiration by the endless poetry which followed his metrical form, and, as far as possible, his style, in the hymns called *Ambrosiani*. St. Venantius Fortunatus contributed poems to the Breviary, and the pious Sedulius a verse even to the Missal. The composers of the grand Sequences wrote their fine spirit over the sweetest pages of Catholic devotion. The great mediæval song of praise, rising from every monastery, and glorifying every cell, shall be a monument to the power of piety, more enduring than brass. The poetic temperament is a sign, not of a maudlin piety, but of a vigorous love. It is the product of a faculty which De Quincey bids us trust even against the utterances of the intellect itself. The history of the intellect has been far removed from a narrative of triumphs. It has been a demonstration, as well within as without the Church, of the narrow limitations of intellectual investigation. The "philosophers" of all lands and of all ages, have been as so many children at play,—building up and pulling down their own little fabrics. They shout with delight, and advertise to all their success in the building process with a vanity truly childish, and gnash their teeth and beat the earth with a frenzy of rage also truly childish, when the insecure fabric has fallen to ruins at the first unfavorable gust of wind. The theologians have not been at all times more happy. Authority has been compelled to step into the arena of heated disputation, not for the purpose of awarding the laurel of victory, but as a bystander would, to part the angry combatants. The pathway of the imagination, on the other hand, has not been marked by ruins. It builds palaces of thought which endure, which age after age seem only to find a firmer foundation, which grow still more lovely in the mellowing autumns of the centuries. Though the Sophists die, Sophocles shall live. Though the strife of Thomist and Molinist be forgotten, if they have sung songs, their names shall endure. Though the disciples disagree over the theses of the Angelic doctor, they will join voices in the chanting of his Eucharistic lyrics. If intellect speak in ambiguous terms to intellect, the heart speaks to the heart in no uncertain tongue. This thought has been beautifully crystallized in the motto of Cardinal Newman: *Cor ad cor loquitur!*

The translations are printed here beside the originals, for a double reason: first, because it would be an injustice done to the author's muse if a weak version in English should be thought to adequately represent the felicity and grace of the original; and secondly, because the present writer confesses to not a little appre-

hension lest his thesis be rather disproved by the awkwardness of a too great literalness crowded into a metre and a rhyming identi-

AU LECTEUR.

Je ne suis duc, prince, ni roi,
Mais un personnage très mince ;
De par l'évêque de l'endroit
J'occupe un tout petit emploi
Au fond d'une pauvre province.

Je suis curé : le titre est beau,
Et la mission est sublime ;
J'ai charge d'âmes, lourd fardeau !
Pour conduire à Dieu mon troupeau
Contre le diable je m'escrime.

Ne pouvant toujours baptiser,
Prêcher, marier, mettre en terre,
Ni sur mon prochain dégoiser,
N'allez pas vous scandaliser—
Je fais des vers . . . pour me distraire.

Faire des vers . . . c'est indécent,
Disait Veuillot, plaidant sa cause :
D'aucuns, sur un ton moins plaisant,
Répètent ce mot innocent
De ce grand maître de la prose ;

Et prétendent—ah ! les bons clercs !
Comme ils savent parler sans voiles !—
Qu'il faut, pour composer des vers,
Avoir la cervelle à l'envers
Et vivre un peu dans les étoiles.

Bossuet, qui pensait autrement,
En composa des myriades,
Et Fénelon, esprit charmant,
Bien des fois se surprit rimant :
Etaient-ce des cerveaux malades ?

Corneille, Racine, Boileau
Vécurent-ils dans les nuages ?
Musset, Laprade, Violeau,
Lamartine et Victor Hugo,
Sont ils fous dans tous leurs ouvrages ?

Après ces petits hommes-là
Honneur de la langue française,
Je puis bien me passer cela :
Faire des vers par-ci, par-la,
Et les chanter tout à mon aise.

Donc, aujourd'hui comme autrefois,
Parmi les gazons et les mousses,
J'aime à rimer au fond des bois,
Dât dame critique aux abois
Mettre tous ses chiens à mes trousses !

cal with the originals. If the English rendering fail, he wishes to rest his contention on the happy genius of the gifted Abbé.

TO THE READER.

I am not duke nor prince nor king—
A lowly man of little worth!
Beneath my bishop's folding-wing,
At times I work, at times I sing,
In this poor corner of the earth.

I am Curé—a title fair;
But fairer is my shepherd's rod!
The charge of souls—a weight to bear!
And so I strive, with all my care,
To lead my little flock to God.

Yet can I not forever be
Baptizing, marrying, burying;
And so, sometimes (don't laugh at me
While I confess it fearfully),
To while an hour away—I sing!

"Guilty of rhyme! Why, that's absurd!"
Said Veuillot, arguing its cause;
But others take him at his word,
And gravely echo what they've heard
From the great master-voice of Prose.

They say, good men, nor ever doubt,
(No mincing word their meaning mars!)
That all who poetize must rout
Their little brains just inside out,
And live awhile amidst the stars!

Bossuet, who reasoned otherwise,
Did many a rhymic theme rehearse;
And Fénelon, of gentle guise,
Found sometimes, to his great surprise,
He had been guilty, too, of Verse!

Corneille, Racine, Boileau—did they
Build habitations in the clouds?
Laprade and Violeau, Musset,
And Lamartine, and Hugo—pray,
Are they the jest of jeering crowds?

After such little men as these—
The honor of our Gallic tongue—
I well can bear your pleasantries,
And, feeling perfectly at ease,
Leave not a single thought unsung!

And so to-day, as yesterday,
When grassy perfume round me steals,
I love to rhyme my soul away,
Keeping Dame Critic still at bay,
Though all her hounds yelp at my heels!

Now, let us hear the good Abbé describing his church. He does this duty with even more detail than the impatient tourist would brook from his native "guide." The age of the edifice, its historical and romantic associations, the "ruined cause" it declares in its blazonry of Fleur-de-lis, the poverty of the hamlet written broadly in its desolate and crumbling fabric, the patient despair of its anointed minister at his own inability to embellish the beauty of God's House and "the place where His glory dwelleth," and, last of all, the sombre moral he draws from the far-off years of his youthful purpose and the faded hopes of his youthful dream-

MON ÉGLISE.

C'est une modeste chapelle
Adossée à quatre piliers,
Où la vent passe, où l'eau ruisselle,
Et qui remonte aux Templiers.

Le portail mérite une halte ;
C'est un beau cintre surbaissé
Surmonté d'une croix de Malte
Et d'un blason fleurdelisé.

Ses colonnettes à volutes
S'élancent gracieusement
Le long de pierres presque brutes
Dont est construit le monument.

Mais à part cela, tout le reste
Est vulgaire, nu, délabré,
Au grand chagrin, je vous l'atteste,
Des paroissiens et du curé.

Jamais les riches de la terre
N'ont fait ici le moindre don :
C'est la tristesse et la misère,
La solitude et l'abandon.

La voûte, sorte de soupente,
Est faite de bois vermoulu ;
A travers on voit la charpente
Et même un peu le ciel à nu.

Seule, une longue nef existe,
Sans sculpture et sans chapiteaux :
C'est froid, c'est humide, c'est triste,
Plein de silence et plein d'échos.

Les fenêtres n'ont plus d'assise,
Elles ont perdu leurs applombs ;
La lumière entre dans l'Église
Par deux vitraux veufs de leur plombs.

ing—the Abbé tells us the whole story with a sublime confidence that he will interest us and win our sympathy as well as our attention. Bleak and forbidding as the ruin must be in reality, we feel that we could worship there with more devotion after the perusal of this poem than we should have been able to do before. He has made the ruin picturesque; he has clothed its desolation with the glory of his long ministry at its altar, and has led us to behold its rude present in the glamour of its romantic past. If our wealth were commensurate with our sympathy, “*Mon Église*” should beckon the traveller from far-off journeyings to rest a little in its silent shade.

MY CHURCH.

'Tis a modest little church,
 Leaning on its pillars four;
 Rain and wind the ruin search
 Which the Templars thronged of yore.

At the portal let us pause:
 On the oval arch you see
 Malta's Cross; and (ruined cause)!
 Blazonry of fleur-de-lis!

Its voluted columns small
 Burst in gracious symmetry
 From the inward curving wall
 Built of heavy masonry.

But, apart from this, the rest
 Common is, and unadorned;
 The sad truth I here attest,
 Priest and people long have mourned!

Never have the rich of earth
 Left within a single gift!
 Sadness reigns supreme, and dearth;
 Want alone its head may lift!

Worm-eaten planks and patchy moss,
 Such is the vault that bendeth nigh:
 You see bare timbers stretch across,
 With here and there a glimpse of sky!

Here in this single gloomy nave,
 Where neither grace nor art is found,
 But cold and damp—a very grave—
 Broods Silence, echoing every sound!

The casements, leaning from their course,
 Have now quite lost their olden plumb:
 While rays of light, with feeble force,
 Through the ancient windows come.

Trente bancs et soixante chaises
Y sont offerts à tout venant ;
Les tenons sortent des mortaises,
Et le reste est à l'avenant.

Le tout est d'aspect lamentable,
D'un effet tragique, émouvant,
Plus encore que l'humble étable
Où naquit le divin Enfant.

Sur l'autel un grand Christ se penche,
Si beau, si résigné, si doux,
Qu'on croit sentir sous sa chair blanche
Son cœur encore battre pour nous.

A voir cette tête meurtrie,
Ce flanc percé, ces bras en croix,
Emu, malgré soi, l'on s'écrie :
" Mon Dieu ! je vous aime et je crois ! "

Parfois le rouge au front me monte,
Lorsque j'entre dans le saint lieu ;
J'ai comme une sorte de honte
D'être mieux logé que mon Dieu.

Ah ! que n'ai-je de la fortune !
Je voudrais si bien restaurer
Ma pauvre Eglise que pas une
Ne lui serait à comparer.

Je le rendrais une merveille,
Digne des plus nobles cités,
Une chapelle sans pareille
Qu'on viendrait voir de tous côtés.

Hélas ! durant ma vie entière,
J'ai vécu si peu prévoyant,
Qu'après vingt ans de ministère
Je n'ai pas un denier vaillant.

Et qu'il faudra que le beau rêve
Dont mon cœur aime à se bercer,
Ici-bas tristement s'achève
Sans jamais se réaliser !

Having with all appropriateness first shown us his church, the Curé next invites us into his modest rectory. We shall perhaps feel, before he has led us to inspect the upper story of his house, that it is rather himself than his rectory which interests us. For in truth, he has little to show us ; but his confidence in our amusement does not bate a hair-breadth of its old vigor. But whether or not it be his rectory which rewards our curiosity, certain it is that we find ourselves not unwilling to see its every nook and corner. One-half of the world knows not how the other half lives—but not for lack of curiosity, It may be that the Curé attracts us

Thirty benches, sixty chairs—
One more or less I shouldn't miss :
The tenon from its mortise tears—
The rest is of a piece with this !

The tout ensemble, foot to head,
Pew to ceiling, seems forlorn :
Yea, more so than the humble shed
Where the dear infant Lord was born !

Above the altar a large Christ
So sweetly bending downward thus—
Beneath that white flesh sacrificed
I dream His Heart still beats for us !

His wounded head, His piercèd side,
His arms extended—all can give
Lessons of love for Him that died—
“ My God, I love Thee, and believe ! ”

How often did my face confess,
As in this holy place I trod,
A heartfelt shame, that I possess
A better dwelling than my God !

Ah ! had I gifts of fortune won,
Not idly should I dreaming sit :
This lowly church—there would be none
In all the land to equal it !

How should its form majestic swell—
Worthy to grace some city grand :
A chapel without parallel,
The envied glory of this land !

Alas ! I could not quite foresee—
So blind are they that tread the earth !
That twenty years of ministry
Should win me not a penny's worth !

So ends my lay, so dies my song :
The visioned hope, the golden gleam
I cradled in my heart so long,
Must die in nothing but a dream !

because he is so open and candid ; he so freely tells us all about himself and his house—“ *décrit sans mystère*,” as he ingenuously remarks towards the end of his verse. He is bubbling over with good humor and genuine hospitality. Our friends in New York could not pursue a surer path towards opening the inhospitable eyes of the typical Philadelphian, than by furnishing him with a letter of introduction to the Abbé. We should then begin, after the fashion of the French and the cosmopolitan New Yorker, to live outside of our castles in the open air, and the broad daylight.

MON PRESBYTERE.

La maison est vaste et haute,
On dirait presque un couvent;
Elle est construite à mi-côte,
Et bien a l'abri du vent.

Une grand'porte cochère
Y donne accès par la cour
Où picore, familière,
La volaille, tout le jour.

De belles treilles vermeilles
En tapissent les vieux murs
Où frelons, guêpes, abeilles
Font les yeux doux aux fruits mûrs.

Ma cuisine est sombre et basse,
Aussi mon vieux cordon bleu
N'y peut-il rester en place
Auprès de son pot-au-feu.

Il lui faudrait tant, par mètre,
De grand air et de soleil;
"Le bon Dieu peut-il en mettre
Dans un galetas pareil?"

C'est donc pour en faire emplettes
Que dame Félicité
Va tailler tant de bavettes
Chez les voisins d'à côté.

Mon salon a deux fenêtres,
Comme un salon de bourgeois;
C'est au premier de ses maîtres
Sans doute que je le dois.

C'était un ancien notaire
Très myope, a ce qu'on m'a dit,
Lequel ad hoc le fit faire,
Quand la maison se bâtit.

Il n'a ni cachet, ni style,
C'est un salon villageois;
Quelques tableaux peints à l'huile
En sont les pièces de choix.

L'ameublement se compose
D'objets pris je ne sais où;
D'un bahut en bois de rose,
De deux fauteuils d'acajou;

D'un canapé Louis seize
De vieux damas recouvert,
Et d'un pouf sur chaque chaise
Garni de reps a fond vert.

MY RECTORY.

My house is high and long and wide—
 A convent, you would almost say :
 Here, built half-way up the hill-side,
 The roystering winds have little play.

A gate that spans the carriage-drive
 Will give you entrance to the yard,
 Where undisturbed the poultry strive
 To live their lives by picking hard !

Through knotted vines one hardly sees
 The arbored wall, from head to foot :
 Where hornets, wasps, and honey-bees
 Cast longing glances at the fruit.

Dark the kitchen lies, and low,
 Where my chef (!) my cook so neat,
 Never will her time bestow
 On her soup and boiling meat !

She must have, by measurement,
 So much sun, and so much air !
 " Which the good Lord never sent
 Into that old cellar there ! "

She has purchases to make !
 So the old crone hies away,
 And, for "auld acquaintance sake"
 Gossips through the livelong day !

My parlor two grand windows has—
 A parlor fit for bourgeoisie !
 No doubt, its earliest master was
 One of the rich fraternity.

I'm told by members of my flock
 That some near-sighted notary
 Caused it to be built ad hoc
 And let in lots of light to see !

Now, nor "style" it has, nor "seal,"
 Racy, rather, of the soil !
 Now, the walls alone reveal
 Some poor paintings done in oil.

Hear, then, how the room is dressed !
 Objects bought I know not where.
 Here's an ancient rosewood chest,
 A mahogany arm-chair ;

Here's another ; damask there
 Lines the sofa *Louis seize* ;
 While a reps-puff on each chair
 An inviting seat displays.

Ah ! j'oubliais la pendule,
Présent de mes écoliers,
Et, dans leurs fourreaux de tulle,
Deux paires de chandeliers.

Non loin du salon, à droite,
Et donnant sur le verger,
Se trouve une pièce étroite
Qui sert de salle à manger.

L'étiquette en est bannie,
On y mange sans témoins :
Si la vaisselle est unie
Les coeurs ne le sont pas moins.

La salle est toute petite,
La table est faite pour six,
Mais les grands jours où j'invite
On s'y loge jusqu'à dix.

Ah ! si peu qu'elle en contienne
Quand tous les couverts sont mis,
La verrai-je jamais pleine
De véritables amis ?

En haut se trouve ma chambre,
Bien exposée au levant,
Où, de janvier en décembre,
L'ennui n'entre pas souvent.

C'est là qu'avec un bon livre,
Ma plume ou bien mes pinceaux,
Je me sens heureux de vivre
Loin du monde et loin des sots.

Enfin, auprès de la mienne,
J'ai deux chambres à donner
Où, dans de grands lits d'indienne,
On dort bien après dîner.

Tel est, décrit sans mystère,
Dans ses détails importants,
Le modeste presbytère
Où je vis depuis vingt ans,

Où j'ai passé ma jeunesse
En me contentant du peu
Qu'en sa divine sagesse
Me mesurait le bon Dieu.

Où sans regrets, sans alarmes,
Sans souci de l'avenir,
Soldat tombant sous les armes,
Un jour j'espère mourir.

Our charming host has hardly finished dragging us through his modest dwelling, opening at once to our inspection both his

Ah ! my pupils' present-clock !
Hear how amiably it ticks !
And here, in an old tulle frock,
Stand two pairs of candlesticks,

Not far from here, upon the right,
And looking toward the garden-wall,
A little room will meet your sight,
That serves us as a dining-hall.

No critics there, with high disdain,
Shall mark your lack of etiquette ;
For, if our crockery is plain,
Why, all of us are plainer yet !

The dining-room is little, quite ;
The table—it was made for six.
But on "great" days, when I "invite,"
Around it ten or so I fix.

Though small, yet may I ever find,
When all the covers have been placed,
The tendrils of my love have twined
Round friends whose love is pearl—not paste !

Now, if up-stairs you will ascend,
You'll find my eastward-facing room,
Where, from the new year to its end,
Dull *ennui* cannot often come !

For here with pleasure books can give,
(And scissors handy—writing tools),
I feel I am content to live
Far from the world and from its fools.

And last, two rooms where friends may make
Themselves at home ; and snugly wrap
Their drowsy forms in quilts, and take
A quiet after-dinner nap.

Such is, with naught of mystery,
Just as to me it now appears,
The building that has been to me
A dwelling-place for twenty years.

Where I have passed my youth, and where
With little I have been content—
The humble life and frugal fare,
Which in His wisdom God has sent ;

And where, without regrets, alarms,
Or care for what may come, shall I,
A soldier, bearing still my arms,
Fall spent and worn some day, and die !

home and his heart, till he is seized with the idea of opening as well his ledger! Was ever "openness" like to this? Plainly,

he does not dread, à l'Américaine, the publishing of his accounts to the world—civil, social, or clerical. No spectre of income tax glowers at him from the office of the Minister of Finance—he is too securely within the limits of any possible exemption, his balance-sheet showing only debts! His frankness overpowers us; not so completely, however, as to stifle a small but kindly voice within us that whispers pathetic things. Our Abbé is a gentleman, both by instinct and by training; he is a scholar, both by sympathy and by culture. Refined and scholarly tastes require, nevertheless, ministrations doubtless far removed beyond his humble means. His day-dreams fade into vulgar realities; the commonplace everywhere and always jostles rudely the ideal. We are reminded of the Abbé Roux dreaming Provençal epics, and uttering his classic soul in polished epigrams, in the midst of a rude speech and a ruder people. The peasants of the Bas-Limousin were certainly a poor stimulus to his literary enterprise.

LE BUDGET D'UN CURÉ DE CAMPAGNE.

Neuf cents francs du gouvernement,
Trois ou quatre cents francs de messes,
Moins de présents que de promesses,
Tel est tout notre traitement.

Douze ou treize cents francs, en somme,
C'est peu pour joindre les deux bouts :
Si l'on n'a pas d'autres atouts,
On risque fort d'être un pauvre homme.

Et de traîner péniblement
Une vie en jeûnes seconde,
Et dont les heureux de ce monde
Se moquent agréablement.

Un curé qui veut rester libre,
Et ne pas grever son budget,
Doit savoir faire, à son sujet,
Mille et mille tours d'équilibre.

Hélas ! dure nécessité !
Tous ne sont pas nés acrobates,
Et pour retomber sur les pattes
Du chat n'ont pas l'habilité.

Quand ils auront pris sur la masse
De leur modeste traitement
Tant pour les frais du vêtement,
Tant pour aux impôts faire face,

Tant pour le boire et le manger,
Le charbon, le bois de chauffage,
Les frais de bureau, l'éclairage,
Tant pour la servante à gager,

Peccata, the people of Tulle call them—a nickname, as M. Roux remarked in his “Thoughts,” containing an admirable meaning; for his peasants were, indeed, “sin, original sin, still persistent and visible.” There is probably only one Bas-Limousin in France; and the Abbé Briault is doubtless more happily placed with respect to surroundings. But although *ennui* rarely visits him

Ou, de janvier en décembre,
L'ennui n'entre pas souvent,

we begin to suspect that this blessed exemption is due, not to his good luck, but to his strong will. It is somewhat difficult to look upon one's own pecuniary embarrassments with a humorous eye; but a strong will usually finds a sure way. And so the good Curé snaps his fingers at fortune, and moralizes on the wonderful feats of equipoise displayed by cats; it seems difficult to understand, but the cold fact remains, that they do manage to land always on their feet!

BUDGET OF A COUNTRY PASTOR.

Francs nine hundred from the State;
Masses, add three hundred more;
Gifts, I guess they're all in store;
That's my income, up to date!

Twelve or thirteen hundred francs—
Little 'tis to make ends meet:
Surely, if the sum's complete,
I shall join the poor-men's ranks!

Methinks already I've begun
To feel the pangs of fasting-fare,
Whereat the rich, with curious stare,
Are quick to poke their little fun.

Is there a Curé that enjoys
The knack of living? I begin
To think he is an adept in
Ten thousand feats of equipoise!

Now, that's not pleasant, I repeat,
For men that are not acrobats,
And still must grudge the power to cats
Of always landing on their feet!

The budget of receipts is small:
Now, from this modest salary
Deduct expenses—let me see—
So much for taxes, first of all:

So much for food, for poor attire,
So much for coal and wood;—then write
“Office expenses”; and then “light,”
And then so much for servant-hire;

Tant pour les charges de famille,
 Pour les aumônes à donner,
 Et pour empêcher de jeûner
 Le pauvre qui près d'eux fourmille ;

Alors, vienne le bout de l'an,
 Comptant dépenses et recettes,
 Que leur restera-t-il ? . . . Des dettes !
 Tel est, hélas ! tout leur bilan.

Having told us all about himself, he next bethinks himself of introducing to our favorable notice his dear friends. "Black" is one of them—the first he mentions by name in his book. We can well fancy that Black is like his master—a good-natured fellow that at once makes himself at home with you, and expects you to favor him with a similar good comradeship. But he proceeds by a different method from his master's, to establish an *entente cordiale*. The master lets you nose about his house, while the dog noses about you. If you are a Martin Chuzzlewit, he will be your Mark Tapley, determined to restore you to good humor, and to a proper understanding of the unselfishness demanded of you by his own unobtrusive and inalienable devotedness to your person. The Abbé comments as feelingly as Dickens on the fine object lesson :

Près de lui les hommes,
 Au temps où nous sommes,
 Vraiment font pitié.

BLACK.

C'est un chien fidèle,
 Un type, un modèle,
 De tendre amitié :
 Près de lui les hommes,
 Au temps où nous sommes,
 Vraiment font pitié.

Sentinelle sûre,
 Sa voix me rassure,
 Et quand vient la nuit,
 Il est là qui veille,
 Et dresse l'oreille
 Au plus faible bruit.

C'est la bonté même,
 La douceur extrême,
 La docilité :
 Bête sans pareille,
 C'est une mervielle
 Aussi de beauté

Sa tête allongée,
 De noir ombragée,
 S'éclaire au milieu,

Add to this household summary,
 So much for alms from day to day,
 To keep the hunger-wolf away
 From the poor throng that waits for me.

So, add it up—expense, receipt—
 And when the year is gone, I get
 What's left of all—and that is—Debt !
 So now you have my Balance-sheet.

The poet writes beautifully of his comrade. But he does not let his affection and his admiration for the beast bore you with long "dog-stories." He tells you just enough to interest you, and then brings you out once more into the open air to show you his second friend, his "Bichette." His enumeration of the good points of the pony is, however, not that of the jockey, but that of the gentleman who knows a good thing when he sees it, and takes it for granted that you can do the same. O that there were a few more such gentlemen in this boredom called life !

In his poem on "Bichette," he employs a pretty metrical device which was perhaps suggested to him by Victor Hugo's "Les Djinns." As the movement of thought becomes more rapid, he increases the syllabic length of the lines, and ends with a double quatrain, as if all barriers were overthrown in the wild course of his winged steed. The allusion to the Prophet's Mare would seem to indicate that if he had not Hugo's volume before his eye he had it at least before his mind.

BLACK.

That's my dog you see,
 Faithful type, to me,
 Of affection deep ;
 Side by side with Black,
 There are men, alack !
 Who could make me weep.

He's my sentinel,
 Ever watching well ;
 In the night profound,
 Seems he sleeping here,
 Yet one wakeful ear
 Notes the slightest sound !

He is true to me,
 Full of sweetness, too
 And docility ;
 Neither does my Black
 Aught of beauty lack,
 As you now shall see !

His long slender snout
 Darkly stretches out,
 Save one whitish shot ;

Sur sa robe blanche
Il porte à la hanche,
Trois marques de feu.

Sa forme est splendide,
Son œil est limpide,
Son regard si doux
Qu'il semble, ô mystère!
Le regard d'un frère
Se fixant sur vous.

Ardent à la chasse,
Quelque temps qu'il fasse,
Il est toujours prêt,
Oubliant sa peine,
A battre la plaine,
Bois, chaume ou guéret.

Quand déboule un lièvre,
C'est comme une fièvre
Qui saisit son corps ;
Il franchit l'espace,
Et flairant la trace
Du gibier retors.

Le suit, hors d'haleine
L'atteint, le ramène,
Après maints détours,
Et malgré la ruse
Dont le lièvre abuse
Le poursuit toujours.

Enfin, le harasse,
Jusqu'à ce qu'il passe
Auprès du chasseur
Qui, soudain, l'ajuste
D'un œil sur, et juste,
Lui perce le cœur.

Tel est Black, en somme,
Qu'au loin on renomme,
Certes, pas à tort ;
C'est un chien de race,
Vaillant et sagace
Qui vaut son poids d'or.

Un gardien fidèle,
Un type, un modèle
De tendre amitié ;
Près de lui les hommes,
Au temps où nous sommes
Vraiment font pitié.

BICHETTE.

La voyez-vous passer ma ponette légère ?
Docile, elle obéit à la voix d'un enfant ;
S'indignant du repos, elle frémit, et, fière,
Frappe et pétrit le sol d'un sabot triomphant.

White his breast and paunch ;
The brand on his haunch.
Marked a triple spot.

Splendid is his form !
Limpid, tender, warm—
If his eye alone
Fix itself on you,
Why, it seems as true
As a brother's own !

If the sport have place,
Eager for the chase,
He is ready, steeled
To forget his pain,
Beating up the plain,
Wood, or stubble-field.

If he starts a hare,
Ecstasy is there ;
Trembling is his frame :
See him swallowing space !
Scenting well the trace
Of the twisting game.

Where it leads, with breath
Spent, he followeth ;
Though the tortuous run
And the doubling ruse
His mad strength abuse,—
Follows hard upon !

Till at last the prey
Drags its weary way
Towards the hunter's gun ;
Who, with nicest art,
Pierces the spent heart,
And the sport is done.

Such is Black, my hound ;
Let his praise resound,
And his worth be told !
Of a famous breed,
Strong and bold—indeed,
Worth his weight in gold !

Faithful dog is he,
And a type, to me,
Of affection deep ;
Side by side with Black,
There are men, alack !
Who could make me weep !

BICHETTE.

You see her passing there—my pony, light and swift ?
Her quick ear questioning the very slightest sound !
She hates the restful stall, and rather loves to lift
Four dainty shoes to beat the crisp and level ground.

Qu'elle est belle
 Ma gazelle !
 Tout en elle
 Me ravit.
 Quand je passe,
 Sur sa trace,
 On s'entasse,
 On la suit.

La voyez-vous passer ma vaillante alezane ?
 Elle sent ma présence et reconnaît ma main ;
 Que je parle, soudain, son bel œil diaphane
 S'illumine et me jette un regard presque humain.

C'est la compagne
 Qui m'accompagne
 Sur la montagne,
 Dans le vallon ;
 Nerveuse et fière,
 Frappant la terre,
 Broyant la pierre
 Sous son talon.

La voyez-vous passer, l'œil en feu, ma cavale ?
 La crinière agitée, ain si qu'un flot mouvant,
 Elle hennit d'orgueil, car elle est sans rivale
 Pour dévorer l'espace et pour fendre le vent.

Va, mon hirondelle,
 Rapide et fidèle,
 Vole à tire d'aile
 Par monts et par vaux,
 Docile à la rêne,
 Dévore la plaine,
 Montre toi la reine
 Des autres chevaux.

Courage, courage !
 Sur notre passage,
 Les vents faisant rage,
 Hurlent, éperdus.
 Vole, vole, vole,
 Que les fils d'Eole,
 Dans leur course folle,
 Par toi soient vaincus !

C'est le poudre, l'éclair, le torrent, le tempête,
 L'avalanche tombant du sommet d'un grand mont,
 L'ouragant déchainé, la jument du prophète,
 Un rêve, un Djinn, un sylphe, un fantôme, un démon. . . .

C'est tout cela ! c'est mieux : c'est ma ponette aimée,
 Ma joyeuse alezane, au corps luisant et fin :
 C'est l'élève applaudie et par mes soins formée,
 Ma gloire, mon orgueil, c'est ma Bichette enfin.

You can tell
None excel
My gazelle,
My delight!
In their track
Men turn back
Not to lack
The rare sight!

My chestnut pony—there! you see her passing by?
She feels my presence here, she knows the guiding hand!
And if I speak, at once her limpid, flashing eye
Sends such a glance at me as lovers scarce command!

Where'er I wend
This faithful friend
Will me attend,
Nor keep aloof:
With joyful bound
She beats the ground
Till it resound
Beneath her hoof.

You see her passing now, with flaming eye—my mare?
And flowing mane that seems to leave long waves behind—
She whinnies in her pride, for she's beyond compare,
To swallow space, and cleave the soft reluctant wind.

Go, my swallow, go!
Speed thy course as though
Wings had borne thee so
By the hill and vale:
Docile to the rein,
Swallowing the plain,
Let thy flying mane
Mark a meteor-trail!

Courage, courage, now!
Show the breezes how
Helpless from thy brow
They must quick rebound:
Fly and fly and fly
Till the winds shall sigh
In their course, and die
In the vast profound.

Like dust, or lightning-stroke, or torrent, or the glare
Of some white avalanche that pours its tide of death,
Like hurricanes unchained, or like Mahomet's mare—
A dream, a djinn, a sylph, a demon, or a wraith!

She's all of that, and more! my pretty chestnut mare!
My glossy-coated friend, my pony and my pet:
She is my scholar—trained with an exceeding care:
My glory and my pride: in short—she's my Bichette!

LE SOUVENIR.

Malgré le sombre oubli dont la nuit m'environne,
 Malgré les rêves d'or envolés de mon cœur,
 Malgré l'astre fatal qui dans mon ciel rayonne,
 Malgré l'espoir qui fuit, pour moi spectre moqueur,
 Malgré ce que j'entends dans mon âme immortelle,
 Malgré mes ans passés pour ne plus revenir,
 Malgré ce que je sais, moi je reste fidèle
 Au souvenir !

Oublie ! avez-vous dit à mon cœur en délire,
 Les serments d'ici-bas sont ignorés des cieux ;
 Brise sans murmurer les cordes de ta lyre,
 Poète, que ton luth reste silencieux !
 Qu'importe le passé pour ton âme immortelle !
 Le présent, c'est la vie éclairant l'avenir.
 Oubliez ! oubliez ! moi je reste fidèle
 Au souvenir !

Les ans pourront passer sur ma tête flétrie,
 Mais sans vieillir mon cœur, mystérieux flambeau ;
 Qu'importe le trépas à tout homme qui prie,
 Pour lui le dernier jour n'est-il pas le plus beau !
 Sur la terre tout meurt, l'âme seule immortelle
 Comme Dieu qui la fit ne doit jamais finir ;
 Tout revit dans mon âme, et je reste fidèle
 Au souvenir !

As an example of his more stately verse, we have included a short poem, "Le Souvenir." It reads prosily enough. But it will serve as a foil to the preceding extracts, and will, perhaps, emphasize our contention, that an appropriate outlet for the clerical poet shows itself in the selection of distinctively clerical (not

LE SOUVENIR.

Despite the shadowing glooms that round my pathway close,
 Despite the golden dreams gone fleeting from my heart,
 Despite the fatal star that in my heaven glows,
 Despite the hope that plays a spectre's mocking part,
 Despite the long laments that in my soul I hear.
 Despite the years fled past, that may no more appear,—
 Whether I dream or dree, yet shall I faithful be
 To Memory!

"Forget!" you bid my heart in its affliction dire;
 The vow sworn upon earth shall never pierce the skies;
 Break without murmuring the strings of thy poor lyre:
 Poet! no more thy lute shall laughter sing, but sighs!
 What boots it now—the Past—unto thy living soul?
 The Present, neither Past nor Future can control:
 "Forget! Forget!" you say; yet shall I faithful be
 To Memory!

The years may wing their flight over my blanching hair,
 My heart shall not grow old—mysterious lamp of life!
 What boots the passing hour to them that bow in prayer?
 For they shall smile on Death that comes to end the strife.
 All dieth upon earth; but mine immortal soul,
 Like Him who made it, lives, though endless æons roll—
 In it shall live again all that is dear to me
 In Memory!

necessarily devotional) verse. The field of poesy is wide enough to include all phases of life and sentiment. There is a place vacant in our literature, and verse which unpretentiously describes the engaging human side of priestly activity can fill it and adorn it with modest flowering of thought and feeling.

H. T. HENRY.

OVERBROOK.

BALFOUR'S PHILOSOPHY.

PART II.

(SOME REASONS FOR BELIEF.)

THE first part of Mr. Balfour's philosophy (*Some Consequences of Belief*) consisted, as we saw,¹ of a singularly able and brilliant exposition of the consequences inevitably resulting from the acceptance of that system which he calls "Naturalism," and we "sensism," as regards morality, æsthetics and reason. Therein it was clearly shown that our ethical sentiments could be nothing but a fraud, our sense of moral responsibility an utter delusion, our artistic perceptions merely ludicrous, and our trust in reason without a shred of justification, if sensism were true.

But it was only the *results* of that system which were treated of. No attempt was made to examine into its foundations or to see whether it formed a self-consistent and intelligible whole. The author was for the time content with refuting "Naturalism" by a process of *reductio ad absurdum*, brought about by his demonstration of its tendency to "eat all nobility out of our conception of conduct and all worth out of our conception of life." Apart from this indirect assault, the system was, for the nonce, taken for granted.

This course was pursued as the most useful for the author's purpose, and was, indeed, in harmony with the aim of his whole work, which, as he tells us,² is not

"Concerned with any mere curiosity of dialectics, with the quest for a kind of knowledge which, however interesting to the few, yet bears no fruit for ordinary human use. On the contrary, the issues that have to be decided are practical, if anything is practical. They touch at every point the most permanent interests of man, individual and social, and any procedure is preferable to a complete acquiescence in the loss of all the fairest provinces of our spiritual inheritance."

In the second portion of his book Mr. Balfour proceeds to examine the philosophic proof, the intellectual foundations, of the different systems which have most influence on the thoughts of the present generation of the English-speaking races.

His first chapter is occupied with testing the foundations and rationality of "sensism," with the result that he declares it to be "speculatively incoherent." Afterwards (in the second chapter)

¹ The AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for 1896, p. 53.

² *Foundations of Belief*, p. 81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

he passes on to the not less important question which concerns the coherence and tenability of idealism in that form most commonly accepted in England now.

The doctrine which is everywhere promulgated by sensists is that all our knowledge consists of experience, and is made up of groups of sensations, vivid and faint, with, at most, the addition of enigmatical "feelings," of "relations between sensations." Of intellectual intuitions revealing universal and necessary *objective* truths, or of facts concerning the objects about us—known by intuition as "things in themselves," of reason as the basis of our mental life, or, as at the foundation of, and actually pervading, the material universe, they will hear nothing.

The sensist school is divisible into two sections. In the first (A), the materialistic section, the truth and reality of the ordinary "common-sense" apprehension of the material world (with its notions respecting the extension, etc., of the bodies which compose it, with their various other qualities and with physical forces acting on them) is accepted without question and without inquiry as to what, if any, philosophical truth justifies that acceptance.

This view is adopted with blameless simplicity by followers of every physical science who are not "sensists," because they are not consciously adherents of any kind of philosophy, and there is no need whatever that they should be such, since they can be admirable men of science without it.

Members of the second section of the sensist school (B) on the other hand, scorn the "common-sense" way of regarding the universe, holding that nothing is really and directly knowable by us but "sensations and sense-impressions and feelings of relation between them." Nevertheless, they freely employ the language made use of by the materialistic members of the former section and by unsophisticated "common-sense" followers of science, always, however, with the understanding that such expressions about things external to the mind should be taken to really denote nothing but complex groups of past and present "feelings." They are thus Janus-like, and can confront opponents with either one of two very different faces. While ordinarily employing the language and having the appearance of materialistic sensists of the first section, they are ever ready to turn and present to objectors their idealist countenance, and meet their objections with idealist phraseology. They, however, like the materialistic sensists, refuse to acknowledge the objective validity of those intuitions without which science is logically impossible, while they likewise affirm that sensuous experience is the exclusive source of all our knowledge.

Rational philosophy (*intellectualism*), on the other hand, far from slighting, or tending to undermine, the truths of physical science,

provides them with the best possible foundation and most complete vindication they can possess, and so satisfies the inquiries of those who seek to penetrate to the foundations of all thought and obtain a consistent *epistemology*, or science of the ultimate grounds of knowledge.

At the basis of all science must lie (1) self-evident, necessary and universal principles recognized as of *objective* as well as *subjective* validity; (2) the clear perception of the certainty of reasoning logically conducted; (3) the intuition (direct or reflex) of some facts as evident and objective—such as the existence of ourselves and an independently existing, extended, external world. Without the explicit or tacit (possibly unconscious) admission of these truths, science cannot advance one step.¹ Without them the truths of science, having no rational basis, can only be accepted through a blind, unreasoning credulity. By a singular retribution—one example amongst many of a Divine² irony—sensists are condemned to make appeal to a groundless “act of faith” in support of doctrines for which true philosophy provides a well-grounded basis of irrefragable reason.

Thus physical science becomes impossible, if we have no knowledge but what exclusively consists of sensations and sense-impressions.

Mr. Balfour well points out the impossibility, on such grounds, of giving a rational basis to the law of causation. Similarly, a conviction of the uniformity of nature is a necessary basis for all physical science. But that conviction can never be justified by any one's individual experience. As well might the experience of a butterfly's brief life enable it to obtain a conviction as to the working of the American constitution.

But, more than all this, science even refutes itself, if it has no better basis than actual and faintly revived sensations, for it tells us that our ordinary judgments as to the colors which objects display, or the sounds they emit, are mistaken judgments. Yet what better ground have we for trusting to our similar judgments as to the extension and other primary qualities of objects, if we possess no true intuition about them, and have nothing but “the evidence of the senses” to trust to? In that case, also, such words as time, space, cause, quantity, quality, relation, mental conviction, or perception, necessity, possibility, etc., would all be absolutely meaningless.

¹ As we have very distinctly pointed out more than once. See *Nature* for 1893, and *Natural Science*, vol. i., pp. 497–501 (1892).

² He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh. The Lord shall hold them in derision. The late Professor Huxley candidly avowed that all science was based upon a mere assumption.

Once grant, however, that we have "intellectual intuitions," and immediately the teachings of æsthetics, ethics, science, and religion, become alike upheld and justified. Deny them, and all these, and the physical sciences also, alike fall logically into utter ruin. Indeed, as we have elsewhere pointed out,¹ physical science is far more dependent on religion for support than is religion on every or any branch of physical science.

The intuitions and self-evident axioms which every consistent man of science is compelled to admit (if he would not stultify himself by basing all his knowledge on gross and palpable assumptions which he is utterly unable to justify), afford, as before said, a solid and ample support for science, art, morality, and religion, as we hope clearly to show in despite of Mr. Balfour's sceptical arguments, which we shall be compelled forcibly to controvert later on.

So far, however, we entirely agree with, and are very grateful to, Mr. Balfour, for the help afforded to rational philosophy, in this first chapter, entitled *The Philosophic Basis of Naturalism*, of the second part of his book. Its upshot and outcome, we believe ourselves to have already stated; but, modern mistaken views so largely repose upon a rash, and often unconscious, acceptance of sensism, that we think it well worth while to offer to our readers a more detailed consideration of his words.

Mr. Balfour well points out that the advocates of "Naturalism" seem blind to the need for a fundamental theory of natural knowledge, and appear to think they have done all that can be required of them by giving us theories about the growth of knowledge. They have dwelt on the *origins* of the convictions men entertain rather than on the *grounds* which justify such convictions.²

"They have substituted psychology for philosophy; they have presented us, in short, with studies in a particular branch or department of science, rather than with an examination into the grounds of science in general."³

¹ See *The Nineteenth Century* for August, 1895.

² Pp. 95 and 97.

³ At p. 94, he says: "I doubt whether any metaphysical philosopher before Kant can be said to have made contributions to this subject, which at the present day need be taken into serious account." Here we think Mr. Balfour is singularly unjust to the scholastics. They could not possibly have known *facts* which are quite familiar to us at the present day; but what a mere fragment of scientific knowledge have we gained since the thirteenth century compared with the vast whole? What do we know even now of the Cosmos beyond the reach of our senses with all the adventitious aids we can obtain? How little can be said to be evidently true or even practically certain about it beyond vague and general conclusions based upon analogy? Cardinal Newman said truly enough that the Church is ever occupied in laying down and sustaining the first principles of religion and ethics. Philosophy is similarly occupied in laying down and sustaining the first principles of all science. Such first principles have been carefully studied by the schoolmen. They discussed fully and fearlessly the *fundamental* questions which alone strictly belong to the sphere of metaphysics, and as to the *nature* of corporeal things we have made no advance since their time. The schol-

"Admirable generalizations of the actual methods of scientific research, usually under some such name as "Inductive Logic," we have no doubt, had in abundance. But a full and systematic attempt to enumerate and then to justify, the presuppositions on which all science finally rests, are still wanting. The result of this is that when they are brought face to face with such problems, their proceedings become either pitiful or ludicrous according as onlookers may be more tender-hearted or more keen-witted. As Mr. Balfour says:¹

"Can anything, for example, be more naive than the undisturbed serenity with which Locke, towards the end of his great work, assures his readers that he 'suspects that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science'; or, as I should prefer to state it, that natural science is not capable of being made a philosophy. Or can anything be more characteristic than the moral which he draws from this rather surprising assertion, namely, that as we are so little fitted to prove theories about the present world, we had better devote our energies to preparing for the next."

Hume led on to similar results, save that they were greatly exaggerated and naturally less pious. He affirmed (as every one knows) that our knowledge consisted ultimately and exclusively of an unrelated series of vivid impressions (sensations) and faint revivals of them (ideas) and thence drew the logical but startling conclusion that we could know nothing more of our own continuous, substantial existence, than we could know of an external independent world—our asserted ignorance as to which had already been made familiar to speculative minds, by Bishop Berkeley. Of any objective, universal and necessary truths, we could know (according to Hume) absolutely nothing. Nevertheless as he, with curious inconsistency, professed an interest in experimental science, he proceeded to frame a fictitious basis for it by conjuring with two magic words (1) "association" and (2) "custom." The first denoted an alleged tendency in each individual to join together feelings which had been contiguous in time or place, and so to produce a sense of inseparability between feelings which had been invariably experienced together or in immediate succession. "Custom" was for him a collective term, denoting such association considered as not that of an individual, but as existing socially. We beg our readers carefully to note, these "associations" were supposed to be hung together on no string, and to be connected by no tie, since, according to him, there is nothing to serve as a basis of "associ-

astics clearly laid down the important truth of an intuitional knowledge of extension, the denial of which has logically resulted in the various absurdities of idealism. See St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, P. I, from Quest. 65 to 75. St. Bonaventure in *Li-bros Sent.*, L. II, from Quest. 12 to 15, and Richard Middleton, Scotus, Roger Bacon, *Opus Majus*, Vincent of Bauvais, *Speculum Naturale*, etc.

¹ P. 95.

ation" and no persistent realities to act as a maintenance of "custom."

Who can believe that so acute a thinker as Hume could have failed to see through the fallacy with which he deluded so many minds. Surely he well merits to be called *The Mephistopheles of Metaphysics*. As to his followers, Mr. Balfour says:¹

"Nothing in the history of speculation is more astonishing, nothing—if I am to speak my whole mind—is more absurd than the way in which Hume's philosophic progeny—a most distinguished race—have, in spite of all their differences, yet been able to agree both that experience is essentially as Hume described it and that from such an experience can be rationally extracted anything even in the remotest degree resembling the existing system of the natural sciences. Like Locke these gentlemen, or some of them, have, indeed, been assailed by momentary misgivings. It seems occasionally to have occurred to them that if their theory of knowledge were adequate, 'experimental reasoning,' as Hume called it, was in a very parlous state; and that, on the merits, nothing less deserved to be held with a positive conviction than what some of them are wont to describe as 'positive' knowledge. But they have soon thrust away such unwelcome thoughts. The self-satisfied dogmatism which is so convenient, and indeed so necessary a habit in the daily routine of life, has resumed its sway. They have forgotten that they were philosophers, and with true practical instincts have reserved their 'obstinate questionings' exclusively for the benefit of opinions, from which they were already predisposed to differ."

After sketching² the popular scientific views of physicists about atoms, molecules, etc., he then states the line of inquiry he proposes to pursue:

"Instead of asking what are the beliefs which science inculcates, let us ask why, in the last resort, we hold them to be true. Instead of asking how a thing happens or what it is, let us inquire how we know that it does happen and why we believe that so in truth it is."

He proposes, therefore, to inquire into the validity of the grounds supposed to justify assent, not into the *origin* of such assent as may have been given.

He points out,³ truly enough, that the ultimate ground, as well as origin, of every truth, recognized as such, must be the individual reason of the man who considers it. It is

"His grounds of belief in his reason. . . . Must sit in judgment and try the case."

The empirical philosophy teaches that scientific theory of the world rests on "experience"—that is to say, the "evidence of the senses" behind which, it tells us, it is as impossible as unnecessary to go.

Here we feel it needful to enter a provisional *caveat* against the root of idealism, a further consideration of which will occupy us

later. About "sensations felt" there can, of course, be no controversy. Nevertheless by themselves they are utterly unknown and unknowable. To know them so as to recognize that we have any given sensation at all we must make use of *reflex cognition*,¹ which needs the intervention of what is altogether above our sensitive faculty, namely, the *intellect*.² The intellect in every such perception emits an implicit judgment (though it certainly does not draw an inference),³ and thus the superior constituent of every one of our sensuous experiences is not sensuous, nor is there, strictly speaking, any such thing as "evidence of the senses," though there is plenty of "evidence *through* the senses." Sensation can neither "give" nor "appreciate" *evidence*, though it can become *evidence* which the intellect apprehends.

Mr. Balfour having stated that "Naturalism" founds all our knowledge on individual experience—"the evidence of the senses"—goes on to show that it stultifies itself by declaring that very evidence to be not only false but also necessarily and universally untrustworthy because of its "habitual inaccuracy."

He says: ⁴

"We are dealing, recollect, with a theory of science according to which the ultimate stress of scientific proof is thrown wholly upon our immediate experience of objects. But nine-tenths of our immediate experiences of objects are visual; and all visual experiences, without exception, are, according to (the empirical philosophy)⁵ erroneous. Color (as we feel it) is not a property of the thing seen; it is a sensation produced in us by that thing. The thing itself consists of uncolored particles, which become visible solely in consequence of their power of either producing or reflecting ethereal undulations, . . . the qualities of color . . . are mere feelings produced in the mind of the percipient by the complex movements of material molecules, possessing mass and extension. . . . When considered in transit (they are) at one moment nothing but vibrations of imperceptible particles, at another nothing but periodic changes in an unimaginable ether, at a third nothing but unknown, and perhaps unknowable, modifications of nervous tissue. . . . But what are we to say about these same experiences when we discover, not only that they may be wholly false, but that they are never wholly true? . . . By what possible title do we proclaim the same immediate experience to be right when it testifies to the independent reality of something solid and extended, and to be wrong when it testifies to the independent reality of something illuminated and colored?"

Now this contention is perfectly valid *against sensists*, but not against a rational philosophical system. What we regard as rational philosophy affirms indeed that the intellect is first roused to activity by the senses, of which it thenceforth continues to make use, but that it has the following essential powers:

¹ See AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for January, 1896.

² It is the absence of this faculty in brutes which renders it impossible for them to recognize any pain they feel and so reduces their sufferings to a category altogether different from that of human feelings.

³ See *On Truth*, pp. 92-96, 105.

⁴ P. iii.

⁵ As to color see our *On Truth*, pp. 97-129.

- (1) Of acting as a criterion of sense-perceptions.
- (2) Of recognizing its own activity.
- (3) Of knowing its powers of external perception, intellectual intuition, and ratiocination.
- (4) Of perceiving the objective as well as subjective validity of necessary and universal truths and their self-evidence.
- (5) Of knowing its own persistent, substantial existence.
- (6) Of apprehending extended, external, independently existing objects, known by it as things in themselves, and of recognizing its own intuition of extension.

Mr. Balfour proceeds to consider¹ the position of those empiricists who affirm that we can know nothing directly but mental changes. As this is manifestly a form of idealism, we will defer what we have to say about it till we examine our author's second chapter which deals with idealism.

The only remaining question which Mr. Balfour considers in his first chapter concerns the *principle of causation*. Can it be arrived at through sensuous experience, individual or general?

We cannot appeal to "experience" in general, because in so doing we should take for granted the existence of the world, of mankind, and of the testimony of mankind. According to sensism and the views of Spencer, Huxley, Mill, etc., they cannot be axiomatic or intuitive truths, but must be known by experience.

"But whose experience? Mr. Balfour asks.² 'Plainly it cannot be *general* experience, for that is the very thing whose reality has to be established, and whose character is in question. It must, therefore, in every case and for each individual man be his own personal experience. This, and only this, can (on the principles of sensism) supply him with evidence for those fundamental beliefs, without whose guidance it is impossible for him either to reconstruct the past or to anticipate the future.'

But is it possible that an individual can, not from his intellectual intuitions, but merely from the past series of his feelings, vivid or faint, arrive at the law of universal causation and certainty as to the uniformity of nature? The question is absolutely absurd. Our actual sensuous experience, if it could by itself teach us anything, would, according to Mr. Balfour, seem to teach us the very reverse. Often enough sensations succeed each other apparently at random.

In fact, however, we do not notice this irregularity because we habitually attribute want of uniformity to some defect of observation. But, as Mr. Balfour asks:³

"What does this imply? It implies that we bring to the interpretation of our sense-perception the principle of causation ready made. It implies that we do not believe the world to be governed by immutable law because our experiences appear to be

¹ P. 113, section v.

² P. 127.

³ Page 132.

regular; but that we believe that our experiences, in spite of their irregularity, follow some (perhaps) unknown rule, because we first believe the world to be governed by immutable law. But this is as much as to say that the principle is not proved by experience, but that experience is understood in the light of the principle. Here, again, empiricism fails us. As in the case of our judgments about particular matters of fact, so also in the case of these other judgments, whose scope is co-extensive with the whole realm of nature, we find that any endeavor to form a rational justification for them based on experience alone breaks down, and to all appearances breaks down hopelessly."

Mr. Balfour admits that his criticisms are incomplete because for want of space and to avoid unsuitable technicalities, much has been left out he might have urged. Nevertheless, he is confident, enough has been put forward, and he feels justified in assuming that

"A purely empirical theory of things, a philosophy which depends for its premises in the last resort upon the particulars revealed to us in perceptive experience alone, is one that cannot rationally be accepted."

But this reasoning, though fatal to empiricism and sensism, is in no way hostile or prejudicial to physical science which can quite as well be pursued and developed by adherents of another philosophy, or, consciously, of none. Most certainly, as Mr. Balfour says,¹ the man of science is in no way "obliged to take his first principles from so poor a creed" as sensism, Mr. Balfour's "Naturalism." The philosophy of sensism and physical science have no real bond between them, nor does the former at all aid to support or promote the latter. Our author is mainly indignant with this inane system, the baselessness of which he so well exposes, because it is ever seeking to obtain influence on the false pretence that it is allied to and has subserved science. He declares it to be "altogether intolerable" that it should claim credit

"on the strength of labors which it has not endured, of victories which it has not won, and of scientific triumphs in which it has no right to share. Who would pay the slightest attention to Naturalism if it did not force itself into the retinue of science, assume her livery, and claim, as a kind of poor relation, in some sort to represent her authority, and to speak with her voice? Of itself it is nothing. It neither ministers to the needs of mankind, nor does it satisfy their reason."

The arguments and upshot of this first chapter may be shortly summed up as follows:

The system which affirms there is no evidence that the universe is the outcome of reason or love, but that the ceaseless flux of phenomena (including organic and social development), is due to a blind and aimless determination,² and that the only source of all our knowledge is sensuous experience, is a system which is utterly

¹ Page 134.

² P. 84.

devoid of every possible philosophic basis, and necessarily refutes itself.

Even physical science is impossible if we have no knowledge which is not exclusively due to sensations and sense-impressions. If it were deprived of other aid, not only would it be struck with paralysis, so that it could advance no further, but it would be entirely disintegrated—like a world in which the force of gravity had been suddenly annihilated.

If, on the other hand, we admit the principle of causation and the uniformity of nature to be truths which our minds apprehend from sources which are mainly not sensuous but purely intellectual, and which, when we apply them to the world of experience, reveal an orderly universe, a most important consequence follows. For thus we are forced to read an order and a reason into the profoundest depths of the essence and being of the universe, and when to these truths we add those which the intellect apprehends in the region of ethics (that right, wrong and moral responsibility exist), that order and reason must be acknowledged by every competent and unprejudiced mind to be nothing less than clear manifestations of God—a God of wisdom, power, majesty and judgment beyond all human conception, to adore and worship whom must be the highest privilege, and should be the greatest happiness of a rational nature.

Mr. Balfour's second chapter treats of idealism with special reference to some recent English writers, and especially to the writings of the late Mr. T. H. Green.

It is by no means an easy matter to make plain to men unacquainted with philosophy the main features of the idealism of the present day. It is, however, a most important subject on account of its powerful and widespread influence amongst minds of the highest culture, and the life of any Catholic might usefully be dedicated to the task of showing the curious and involved relations which exist between it and the rational philosophy of "Intellectualism."

The power latent in the English race of four centuries ago is made manifest to all the world by the existing English Empire, the wonderful republic of the United States, and the English-speaking nations now rapidly developing in Australia and South Africa. But perhaps the influence of English thought in the domain of intellect is more wonderful still. It was at one time commonly said that the ideas of the French philosophers revolutionized the world. They were really, however, little more than the disseminators of ideas which had their birth in England, which were really the intellectual offspring of Locke (however indigantly he would have disowned them), and which had great influence in forming the views and principles of Voltaire. German

speculation, again, has been a frequent theme of marvel and laudation. It has certainly been very remarkable and very thorough in developing the ultimate consequences of admitted principles.

But, after all, the whole of the philosophy of Germany and Holland, from Spinoza to Hartmann, has been a result of the mental seed first planted in men's minds by Berkeley. When we call to mind that Berkeley begot his parricidal child, Hume; that Hume set going the partially antagonistic, yet largely similar, system of Kant; that Kant begot Fichte, and Fichte produced Schelling and Hegel, and these again Schopenhauer and Hartmann, it seems impossible to deny that English thought, from Locke through Berkeley, has been far more influential than aught else in the domain of philosophy, save the Greek mind as manifested in Aristotle.

It is easy to laugh at idealism (which has a special attraction for philosophic youth) as it is easy to laugh at Dr. Johnson's refutation of it by the process of kicking a stone. Yet just as Johnson's act was the mute expression of a profound philosophic truth—the truth that we have an intuition¹ of extension—so the wide acceptance of idealism is partly due to the profound truth that our apprehension of the world above us is fragmentary and imperfect. "Grace supposes nature," and as the immortal Butler so well taught us, there is a deep harmony between what revealed religion teaches and what the calm and patient study of the world and its ways makes known to us.

Though God in revelation has amply taught us sufficient for our religious needs, yet we so learn but a minimum of religious truth as He knows it; similarly with respect to the world (which he has delivered to the disputes of men), he has provided us with all the faculties indispensable for its study and for our intellectual and moral welfare, yet we remain utterly unable to fully apprehend the meanest mass of matter. Our knowledge is quite inadequate to supply us with a complete knowledge of nature which, to our eyes, must be different indeed not only from what it is known to be by God, but from the aspects it may well present to intelligences far higher than our own.

It is certain that the material bodies about us must possess powers and qualities our senses are entirely unable to detect. Had

¹ Of course the completeness and facility of our intuitions about extended bodies, which we have in adult life, are very largely due to the experiences we have continually had since childhood. This evident truth may be at the bottom of the contention of those who affirm that our knowledge of such objects is mediate and inferential. But as soon as a child can be said to have any intellectual perceptions at all, it has an intuition of extension. Were this not the case, no subsequent combinations of sensations could ever give us such a perception at all; as *no* inference is trustworthy unless it rests ultimately on intuition.

we a sense which would serve us with respect to "magnetism," as our eye-structure serves us as to "light," how modified might not the aspect of the world become? We rejoice in the beauty of wild-flowers and the gay plumage of birds, some of which delight us with their song; yet their colors and notes are not what they seem to us to be. Many persons fancy that in the absence of sensitive creatures there would be nothing but "darkness and silence," as if "darkness and silence" were not as truly subjective and as relative to us as are light and music. We will not take up space here by dilating on the substantial and objective truth which underlies such sense-perceptions because we have more fully gone into the question elsewhere,¹ but at once return to the consideration of Mr. Balfour's book.

We doubt if he sufficiently enters into the views of modern idealists to judge them quite fairly. It is true idealism began with the assertion that we could know nothing but sensations and ideas—generally interpreted as faintly revived sensations. Still it must always have been manifest to any one who would carefully examine his own mental state that his sensations were very rarely noted or attended to as such, but that his mind was almost always occupied, not with "feelings," but with "things." So it is not surprising to find that even Berkeley allowed that we might reasonably speak of "things" and habitually employ our notions of what we so spoke of as if they were what he said they were not—that is, absolute, external existences independent of any mind. Things were for him and are for most modern idealists stably associated groups of past sensuous experiences and not by any means the mere passing feelings of the moment. Berkeley denied, and idealists deny, that we can have any notion of an object save in terms of sense-perception, and this is so far true that we can have no conception of anything, however abstract, save by the aid of imaginations—*phantasmata*, as the schoolmen called them. The schoolmen, however, rightly and rationally distinguished between the intellectual idea, and the sensuous images we need in order to be able to entertain it. The idea "horse" does not consist of past feelings, though, without images of such, it cannot be sustained before an intellect which has its home in a material organism, of which it is the *form* or *principle of individuation*, in the Scotist sense of that term.

Nevertheless, idealism is, as Mr. Balfour says, a tempting system for the beginner in philosophy. He expresses a truth when he says:²

"It is, I suppose, one of the earliest discoveries of the metaphysically-minded

¹ See *On Truth*, chap. x., pp. 114–116.

² P. 115.

youth that he can, if he so wills it, change his point of view and thereby suddenly convert what in ordinary moments seem the solid realities of this material universe into an unending pageant of feelings and ideas, moving in long procession across his mental stage, and having, from the nature of the case, no independent being before they appear nor retaining any after they vanish."

What he elsewhere¹ urges is also really undeniable—namely, that idealism is fundamentally out of harmony with physical science, although, of course, we do not for a moment pretend that idealists, remaining idealists, may not be first-rate scientific men. We strongly suspect, however, their intellectual nature to be too strong for them, and though they may be ever ready to represent the objects of their study and experience as complex groups of feelings, that they habitually, when at work or reasoning about them, really regard them as independent extended objects with special qualities and powers. We think so because, though it is easy enough to translate objects perceived into groups of feelings and relations between them, it is much more difficult to investigate and describe the actions of objects on each other (as *e.g.*, of the sun and moon on the tidal wave) as only relations between ideas and not as activities of external absolutely independent extended things which really affect each other.

There can be no question about the fact that observations and experiments are accepted by scientific men as real *objective* facts and occurrences, and the whole of physical science understood, as men of science themselves understand it, is based upon that way of regarding them. It would be ridiculous to pretend that when astronomers, chemists, and anatomists are tracing the motions of the heavenly bodies, or analyzing minerals, or ascertaining the course followed by a nerve or an artery, they remain all the time convinced that they are really investigating the relations borne by groups of past and present feelings to other such groups, and nothing more!

It is very certain, that, but for their conviction that they were dealing with independent realities, and discovering really objective truths, the physical sciences would never have attained their present degree of development.

Were this widely prevalent idealistic interpretation of experience true, the advance of science must have been simply due to a profound mistake. That error being cleared away, can we re-establish science on a basis of sensations and sense-impressions?²

It may be asserted, as Mr. Balfour says, (1) that "such feelings must have a cause," but the assertion cannot be accepted, for how

¹ See Mr. Balfour's earlier work, chap. ix., and our *On Truth*, chap. viii., pp. 79-96.

² No one has more perseveringly tried to do this than Professor Karl Pearson, and no one has more signally failed in the attempt.

can the principle of causation be extracted out of a mere succession of individual experiences, when no intellectual intuition about causation is admitted? (2) It may be added that, "the hypothesis of a material world, as an occasion for our sensations, harmonizes with our natural convictions," but that must go for nothing, if, as idealists assert, the real world is not congruous with our natural beliefs. (3) The hypothesis is acceptable, because it "enables us to predict"; but such prediction is a consequence, or effect, and it is impossible for us to reason back, legitimately, from effects to causes, if we have nothing but a string of groups of feelings to go upon.

Mr. Balfour's conclusion is, that if nothing can be perceived beyond our mental modifications, then the result ought to be *Solipsism*. I am the world. Beyond me there is nothing, and I find that I am, myself, the creator of a universe of feelings; knowledge is wholly subjective, as Fichte taught, and it consists of a world of delusive dreams—dreams that can torture, since those who recognize them for what they are, know that from such dreams they can never wake.

Mr. Balfour begins his second chapter as follows:¹

"The difficulties in the way of an empirical philosophy of science, with which we dealt in the last chapter, largely arises from the conflict which exists between the parts of a system, the scientific half of which requires us to regard experience as an effect of an external and independent world, while the philosophic or epistemological half offers this same experience to us as the sole groundwork and logical foundation on which any knowledge whatever of an external and independent world may be rationally based. These difficulties and the arguments founded on them require to be urged, in the first instance, in opposition to those (1) who explicitly hold what I have called the 'naturalistic' creed; and then to that (2) general body of educated opinion, which, though reluctant to contract its beliefs within the narrow circuit of 'naturalism,' yet habitually assumes that there is presented to us in the sciences a body of opinion, certified by reason, solid, certain, and impregnable, to which theology adds, as an edifying supplement, a certain number of dogmas, of which the well-disposed assimilate as many, but only as many, as their superior allegiance to 'positive' knowledge will permit them to digest." Besides these, "there is (3) a metaphysical school, few indeed in numbers, but none the less important in matters speculative, whose general position is wholly distinct and independent. . . . In their opinion, all the embarrassments which may be shown to attend on the empirical philosophy are due to the fact that empirical philosophers wholly misunderstand the essential nature of that experience on which they profess to found their beliefs. The theory of perception evolved out of Locke, by Berkeley and Hume, which may be traced without radical modification through their modern successors, is, according to the school of which I speak, at the root of all the mischief. Of this theory they make short work."

"An unrelated 'thing,' one which is not qualified by its resemblance to other things, its difference from other things and its connection with other things, is really, so far as we are concerned, no 'thing' at all. It is but an object of possible experience."

These opponents of Hume's views maintain the system which

¹ P. 137.

Mr. Balfour names *Transcendental Idealism*, according to which there is "a thinking subject" (the individual mind) which is the source of "relations" and a world constituted by those "relations," and so, it may be said, created by that mind. This, according to Mr. Balfour, is "the central position of transcendental idealism."

Now what is said about "relations" is most true. No object can exist without "relations," nor indeed without "relations" due to its own activity.² But there are real objective "relations" the immense majority of which exist in independent objectivity and would continue to so exist were every mind annihilated. On the other hand it is surely absurd to regard the world as made up of relations without objects which are related.

The mind, in perceiving these objective relations, necessarily possesses corresponding mental acts perceiving such relations. These acts are "subjective relations" corresponding with the real and actual external objective relations which they represent (*i.e.*, made present) to the mind. Of course, such objective relations cannot be known by us without our having corresponding subjective mental perceptions of them, but our perceiving or not perceiving them is a mere accident of such relations and in no way affects them save as regards their being, or not being, perceived. A definite relation exists between a piece of rock and a volcano in eruption which ejected it, but this relation is substantially similar between a rock and volcano *perceived*, and a rock and volcano of the Antarctic continent which never have been perceived, or between a rock and volcano on the averted surface of the moon, if such things there exist. Multitudes of relations probably exist between heavenly bodies which existed before the formation of our solar system.³

But a claim is made for the idealism which Mr. Balfour here discusses, on the ground: (1) that it frees us from scientific and theological scepticism; (2) that it makes reason the very essence of all that is, or can be, the origin and goal of the world process;

¹ Since he says (p. 140) that these "ideas of relation, which are required to convert the supposed real or external experience into something of which experience can take note," are "unintelligible, except as the results of intellectual activity of some 'self' or 'I.' They must be somebody's thought, somebody's ideas."

² All the scholastics say that there is no being existing in the concrete which is merely passive.

³ Mr. Balfour asks (p. 144): "On what ground is it alleged these constitutive relations are works of the mind? If ordinary usage describes the more abstract thoughts (being, not being, causation, etc.), as mental products, . . . Shape and position are always considered as belonging to the external world. . . . not created by thought in itself." But real being, real causation, etc., are not products of thought only but have a real foundation in actually existing things.

and (3) that it establishes the moral freedom of self conscious agents.

Mr. Balfour, however, with reluctance criticizes¹ destructively these asserted advantages.

(1) As to theology, it makes of God either (when considered apart from nature), "a mere metaphysical abstraction, the geometrical point through which pass all the threads of possible experience (or as including nature, and so forming the absolute), having a part in all that is ignoble, base and bad, as well as their opposites—the inevitable outcome of Pantheism.

(2) As to our moral freedom, it is true that the "I" thus conceived of, is above causation, not in space or time, not subject to decay, nor simply passive with respect to its feelings and impulses. Nevertheless, it can never act or will otherwise than it is absolutely determined to act by its immediately anterior state, and ultimately by influences acting before it even existed. Such "freedom" is utterly devoid of "responsibility," and of every shred of ethical value.

(3) As to science, assuming that the world is constituted by relations (categories), we are supplied with no rules for applying one principle rather than another within the field of experience. As to the law of causation (for science, the most important category of all), "it cannot give us information as to what portion of that field, if any, is subject to it, nor tell us which of our perceptions, if any, may be taken as evidence of the existence of a permanent world of objects, such as is implied in science."²

From all the foregoing considerations Mr. Balfour concludes that idealism restates, but in no wise solves, the old questions, though it states (if it does not also shroud) them, in a new terminology.

But idealists may well be asked to account for the following remarkable fact: If the basis of all *truth* consists in relations perceived by the mind, and essentially "mental," how comes it that the result of their work is the production of what idealists must term the greatest *falsehood* and universal *delusion*? For the common, the practically universal, belief of man is that there is a universe of real independently existing, objective, extended bodies, that they know many of them very well and are absolutely certain about the truths of their knowledge. Yet so to believe is, on idealist principles, to believe the most utter and baseless of lies! A philosophy with such a practical result hardly commends itself to the inquirer into ultimate tests and grounds of truth.

Mr. Balfour makes some remarks³ which appear to us to call for a few words about the "self," the "I" or ego, in the double aspect

¹ Pp. 145-151.

² P. 155.

³ Pp. 141-143.

of (1) presence in experience (the empirical ego), and (2) an underlying principle of unity, which is outside time, and can, therefore, have no history (the pure ego). We cannot, he says, affirm that they are the same, because they are divided by the whole chasm which separates "subject" from "object."

But one really distinguishing character of the ego is that it is *both* "subject" and "object." It is, in a sense, *subject and object identified*, though generally more thought of in one or other of these two aspects of its being at each successive moment. This character of the "self," the intuition of "extension" and the objective nature of "relations" are three of the most important truths of philosophy, and are utterly fatal to every form of idealism.

Mr. Balfour speaks of those who, in trying to evade difficulties (though they cannot thus solve them), "always speak of thought, without specifying *whose* thought." This seems to imply that the thought is God's, and that this we in some sense share if our being is not rather a mere mode of the Absolute or Divine existence.

Yet it seems certain, as Mr. Balfour says,¹ "that the very notion of personality excludes the idea of any one person being a 'mode' of any other."

He maintains that on idealist principles each one of us must "be driven to the conclusion that in the infinite variety of the universe there is room for but one knowing subject, and that this subject is 'himself' *i.e.*, 'Solipism.'"

He very adroitly refutes a position taken up by Prof. Caird² to the effect that the world of objects and the perceiving mind are opposites which require a higher unity, namely, God, to keep them together.

But on Caird's own principles God is a subject distinguishing himself from, while giving unity to, a world of phenomena. But if a subject and a world cannot be conceived of without postulating some higher unity in which their differences vanish, such a higher unity is again required for God and the world, and so again once more, and on and on in a *regressus ad infinitum*.

The outcome of idealism for Mr. Balfour, as we have already said, is "Solipism," which is obviously as inconsistent with science, morality and common sense as other forms of idealism, and this our author admits. He closes the chapter by professing himself unable "to find in idealism any escape from the difficulties which, in the region of theology, ethics, and science, empiricism leaves upon our hands."

Nevertheless in modern idealism we have a great advance and improvement upon the *practical* materialism of such teaching as

¹ P. 150.

² In his lecture on the "Evolution of Religion."

that of the late Prof. Huxley, the still surviving Mr. Spencer, and upon all forms of philosophy which do not differ in essence from that of Hume. It enlists our sympathies by what are often its lofty and noble aspirations, and its efforts, however fruitless, to find a firm basis for ethics, æsthetics, and religion.

There is also another aspect, under which, in spite of its fatal defects, the spread of idealism may be regarded with a modified favor. It is a revulsion from the implicit materialism of Locke and the sensists, towards (in certain respects) the scholastic philosophy. ■

It would be very wonderful and very consoling if the English-speaking race after initiating a philosophic impulse (three centuries and more ago) of such enormous force and spreading so far, should in the twentieth century, set going an analogous wave of rational philosophy.

Idealism has been and still is useful, possibly necessary, because a direct return from sensism to the system of the schoolmen is not to be thought of or, indeed, desired.

The faults of the later scholastics produced the revolt of "Sensism," and their failings must for the future be very carefully eschewed. The change from sensism to idealism is, so far as it goes, a vindication of reason in many important respects, and we may hope that when it comes to be seen how the truths it vindicates really demand those complementary verities which idealists do not yet see their way to accept, there may come for mankind (and for the Church) a glorious outburst in the field of intellect even exceeding that which produced and was carried further by the men who bore the glorious names of Thomas and Scotus, and who may be termed the Peter and Paul of the mind's mediæval efflorescence.

Mr. Balfour refers in a note on the first page of his second chapter to Dr. Bradley's interesting volume entitled "Appearance and Reality." We hail its publication as one sign of that restoration we desire and expect. It is most certainly not to be found there explicitly, for his assertion is that all things are forms and modifications of the ideal absolute, and his system is a bad form of Pantheism.

Nevertheless it contains many remarks which point in the direction we have indicated, and we hope one day to be able to treat of it at length, and endeavor to point out both its extraordinary shortcomings and its many merits.

We have before remarked, more than once, on the unsatisfactory nature of the constructive part of Mr. Balfour's philosophy, which is strongly inspired by the spirit of negation in spite of his sincere desire to affirm and uphold religion.

In his third chapter—entitled *Philosophy and Rationalism*—the cloven foot begins to appear.

He commences the chapter by referring to various ancient and modern systems of philosophy—those of Plato, the Stoics, the Neo-Platonists, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann, which he puts aside as now uninfluential.

But he makes one very strange remark :

"It would be difficult, perhaps impossible," he tells us,¹ "to sum up our debts to Aristotle; but assuredly they do not include a tenable theory of the universe."

Of course, as we said before, Aristotle, even as presented by the Scholastics, could not suffice to represent modern physical science, but "assuredly" he laid down the principles upon which alone "a tenable theory of the universe" can be created. But he proceeds at once from the Neo-Platonists to Descartes, without taking any account of the schoolmen, by which neglect he falls far behind even Huxley.

The manner and rapidity with which their work has passed in this country from utter contempt to a high degree of estimation is wonderful.

We are persuaded, however, that this is but the beginning of the appreciation they will ultimately receive as prejudice recedes and more general and intimate acquaintance is made with their work. Long ago the late Sir Richard Owen said to us, "I do not think the human mind will ever get much beyond Aristotle." We are profoundly convinced that as regards *the principles* of science and philosophy, the human mind will never get beyond Aristotle as expounded by the Scholastics.

Mr. Balfour assures us² that the great historic systems of philosophy are full of interest for him, both on historical and æsthetic grounds and serving as by their failure to show that some proceedings are useless, they are well worthy of esteem.

But his more immediate business, he says,

"is to bring home to the reader's mind the consequences which may be drawn from the admission that we have at the present time neither a satisfactory system of metaphysics nor a satisfactory theory of science."

We deny, as strongly as possible, *both* these admissions, and unhesitatingly affirm that we *have* a satisfactory system of metaphysics and a satisfactory theory of science. Nevertheless, it is most true that the theory of science generally received and popularly accepted is *most* unsatisfactory:³

"The first man one meets in the street thinks it quite natural to accept the opinion

¹ P. 157.

² Pp. 157-163.

³ P. 164.

that sense-experience is the only source of rational conviction; that everything to which it does not testify is untrue, or, if true, falls within the domain not of knowledge but of faith."

This widespread readiness amongst us to accept these absurdities is the combined result of the teachings of such men as Mill, Bain, Comte, Huxley and Spencer, and of the inexpressibly baneful effects and fearful moral and intellectual havoc made by that vile heresy, "Protestantism," which has depreciated and discredited human reason and destroyed the rational basis for morality.

Mr Balfour continues :¹

"If faith be provisionally defined as conviction apart from or in excess of proof, then it is upon faith that the maxims of daily life, not less than the loftiest creeds and the most far-reaching discoveries, must ultimately lean. The ground on which constant habit and inherited predispositions enable us to tread with a step so easy and so assured, is seen, on examination, to be not less hollow beneath our feet than the dim and unfamiliar regions which lie beyond. Certitude is found to be the child not of Reason but of Custom."

Custom! Here we have, indeed, a retrograde step—a retrogression to Hume! The passage quoted is also pervaded with error from the beginning to the end. "Faith" is *by no means* "conviction apart from or in excess of proof." The maxims of daily life, our spontaneous actions which we vary according to circumstances, do *not* lean on "faith" (in *any* sense of that word) or upon any blind faculty, such as "instinct" or any kind of non-rational impulse, but on definite and certain first principles and necessary and evident truths to which the competent philosopher can always trace them. This does not mean that they are evident *as* such principles and truths to the mind of every man who sees them, but their truth is quite well seen without that. In vain will the village grocer try to persuade the farmer's wife that if from sixteen ounces of tea two ounces are removed, the rest is none the less equal to a pound. She will be quite sure such is not the case, though she may never have heard the axiom that "a whole is greater than its part." Similarly, if a rustic has put his cart-horse in the stable, he will be quite sure it is not still between the shafts, though he may never have heard of the principle of contradiction—that "nothing can at the same time both be and not be." The intellectual light of such first principles illuminates the intellect of every sane man, be he civilized or savage—not, most certainly, as abstract truths, but as principles which reveal themselves to the mind in the concrete facts of everyday life, as practical motives for judging and acting. It is true that we cannot explain *how* these truths become thus practically apprehended in the objects and

¹ P. 164.

actions we perceive through our senses; but then we are no less ignorant as to *how* we feel from sugar a sensation of sweetness, or from the vibrations of a violin a sensation of musical tone. We must never forget the adage *Ignorantia modi non tollit certitudinem facti*.

As we have said elsewhere:¹ How we get any knowledge at all, how we see objects, how we feel anything is most mysterious, and all our knowledge deeply considered is very wonderful. We know things and we know that we know them. *How* we know them is a mystery indeed, but one about which it is idle to speculate, as it is absolutely insoluble. The mystery of intellectual knowledge runs parallel to the mystery of sensation; we feel things savory, or odorous, or brilliant, or melodious, as the case may be, and with the aid of the scalpel and the microscope we may investigate the material conditions of such sensations. But how such conditions can give rise to the feelings themselves is a mystery which defies our utmost efforts to penetrate. Similarly, our experience of bodies, their qualities and powers, calls forth in us perceptions and inferences which are profoundly rational (not blind impulses), and their rationality is capable of being drawn out and explicitly shown to depend on principles, inferences and known facts which the mind perceives to be both objectively and subjectively certain because they contain their own evidence and need no proof. They are therefore undemonstrable—not “undemonstrable” because, like matters which have to be taken on trust because we can obtain no evidence for them, but because they are so luminously self-evident that they admit of no demonstration, nothing else being so clearly and necessarily true as they are. Mr. Balfour does not appear to see the force of these truths, and yet few have asserted more forcibly than he the necessity of self-evident truths as a foundation for all other truths.

Not recognizing that we have “a body of doctrine,” which is not only itself philosophically established, but to whose canons of proof all other doctrines are bound to conform, he asks:²

“Are we arbitrarily to erect one department of belief into a law-giver for all the others?”

After remarking the improper use here of the word “belief,”³

¹ See *On Truth*.

² P. 165.

³ The almost constant use by English metaphysicians of the term “belief, to denote knowledge,” leads on to the objectionable saying that we should “trust our intellectual faculties.” We do not *trust* that we feel what we feel, we *know* it with absolute certainty; and so when our reason tells us that “the whole must be greater than its part,” or that “nothing can at the same time both be and not be,” we *know* with absolute certainty that so it is, and there should be no more “trust” than when we have a piece of pudding in our mouth we should “trust” that it is there, or make an “act of faith” to that effect.

which should be exclusively used to denote the acceptance of testimony, we reply that most certainly we ought to erect one department of knowledge as our law-giver for all else, in the natural order, and that is the department of philosophy, which knows itself to rightly occupy that sovereign position.

Mr. Balfour begins this, his third chapter, by asking¹ the very necessary question: "*What is rationalism?*" Under that single term we shall see that he confounds together two things which are antagonistic and really poles asunder.

In the first place, he means by it:

"A special form of that reaction against dogmatic theology which may be said with sufficient accuracy to have taken rise at the Renaissance,² and culminated in Naturalism. 'Rationalism,' he tells³ us, is 'Naturalism' in embryo as Naturalism is rationalism developed."

He also defines⁴ "rationalism" as consisting

"essentially in the application, consciously or unconsciously, of one great method to the decision of every controversy, to the moulding of every creed. Did a belief square with a view of the universe based exclusively upon the prevalent mode of interpreting sense-perception? If so, it might survive. Did it clash with such mode, or lie beyond it? It was superstitious, it was unscientific, it was ridiculous, it was incredible."

Thus understood, rationalism is but another word for sensism and is at least practical materialism, though by no means all who have favored it have been conscious of its real tendency and final outcome. Rationalists, as a rule, Mr. Balfour observes,⁵ eschew the search for first principles:

"The general body of rationalisers have been slow to see and reluctant to accept the full consequences of their own principles. The assumption that the kind of 'experience' which gave us natural science was the sole basis of knowledge did not at first . . . carry with it the further inference that nothing deserved to be called knowledge which did not come within the circle of the natural sciences. But the inference was practically, if not logically, inevitable. Theism, deism, soul, conscience, morality, immorality, freedom, beauty—these and cognate words associated with the memories of great controversies made the points at which rationalists who are not also naturalists have sought to come to terms with the rationalising spirit. . . . It has been in vain. . . . For these ideas are no native growth of a rationalist epoch. . . . They are the products of a different age . . . and however stubbornly they may resist the influences of an alien environment, if this undergoes no change, in the end they must surely perish."

This is one meaning he gives to the term "rationalism"—the exclusive dependence on sense-perceptions as the sole fountains of knowledge and building a deductive system thereon. In the

¹ P. 167.

² P. 168.

³ P. 185.

⁴ P. 170.

⁵ P. 171.

next chapter, however, he makes use of it in a very different sense. He applies it to denote truly rational philosophy—a philosophy which probably recognizes that cognition has in one respect a sensuous origin, since the mind is first aroused to intellectual activity through feeling, and throughout life carries on that activity by the aid of imaginations derived from sense perceptions. But that philosophy, though thus initiated and aided, is based (as we have again and again pointed out) not on the sense-perceptions but on *first principles* and self-evident perceptions of truth and fact which constitute its ultimate court of appeal.

Such “rationalism” rightly promoted the advance of knowledge in the sixteenth century by directing attention to observation and experiments as efficient means of attaining truth (as Roger Bacon had done three hundred years before), and subsequently presided over the development of all the sciences whereof it is still and must ever continue to be (while human life lasts) its sole ultimate basis and support. But the same “rationalism” has played from old time and still plays a far more important part, for it is the ultimate basis of religion no less than of science. It supplies the absolutely necessary prolegomena of faith. If our reason was not valid and did not clearly show us its own validity, no one simple truth of religion, natural or revealed, could even be reasonably accepted by us.

The fourth and last chapter of this second part of Mr. Balfour's book is entitled *Rationalist Orthodoxy*, and is by far the most objectionable we have yet met with in our review of his work, as it is an attack on the basis of natural, and, therefore, also that of revealed, religion. Not that it is so meant. The one object of Mr. Balfour is to sustain both; but the basis he attempts to build upon is far too narrow and circumscribed for that temple dedicated to the divine wisdom which he so much desires to erect, seeing, as we before said, he does not build upon first principles but upon a mere inductive process. He begins by saying that it may be thought he has too closely connected rationalism and Naturalism and says¹ he may be asked:

“Why is there any insuperable difficulty in framing another scheme of belief which shall permanently satisfy the requirements of consistency, and harmonize in its general procedure with the rationalizing spirit? Why are we to assume that the extreme type of this mode of thought is the only stable type? Such doubts would be the more legitimate because there is actually in existence a scheme of great historic importance, and some present interest, by which it has been sought to run modern science and philosophy together into a single coherent and self-sufficient system of thought, by the simple process of making science supply all the premises on which theological conclusions are afterwards based. If this device be really adequate, no doubt much

¹ P. 175.

of what was said in the last chapter, and much that will have to be said in future chapters, becomes superfluous."

It *is* superfluous; and the way he seems to sneer at "our ordinary method of interpreting sense-perception" is highly objectionable. Although men who are not metaphysicians trouble themselves little about "secondary qualities," and take their sensations to be more adequate than they are for revealing to us the whole truth concerning external objects, nevertheless, their interpretations form an amply sufficient basis for both science and religion.

The system he criticizes, he tells us,¹

"divides theology into natural and revealed. Natural theology expounds the theological beliefs . . . arrived at by a consideration of . . . nature as . . . explained by science."

—dwelling on instances of adaptation, etc., following the lead of Paley.

But this is not at all the mode in which we Catholics arrive at the main truths of natural theology. We do so by building on first principles, and especially on ethical intuitions, including the freedom of the will. With the light thus gained, we survey the Cosmos, and perceive it to be orderly and instinct with that Reason and Purpose which our first principles lead us to expect, including the principle of causation.

We see the universe is one, and therefore could never have gained its orderly adjustment by any process of natural selection; and we see, also, that within it, is the goodness, intelligence, will, and purpose, we know ourselves to possess, and which must therefore, pertain in an inconceivably higher degree to that cause which must have preceded the existence of the Cosmos, or ever have pervaded it, if that cosmos had been eternal.

Thus we come not only to the knowledge of God, but to a reasonable expectation that he will have granted some revelation of Himself to His rational creatures. We therefore look out to find such a revelation, determined to accept with the most profound gratitude a religion, should we find one which contradicts nothing we otherwise know to be certainly true, which tends to perfect our moral nature and to promote the welfare of mankind, and which is authoritative—asserting its right to guide and its power to guide us rightly. Knowing that by our power of free-will we can intervene and change the whole course of physical causation, which is for sensists a miraculous action, we naturally expect some such intervention—some miracles—to have attended and to attend such a revelation, nor should we be disposed to cavil at

¹ P. 176.

any of its doctrines which go beyond what our unassisted reason could have attained to, if only they do not contradict anything which our intellect tells us is evidently true. We look abroad, and we see the Catholic Church conspicuous and teaching with no faltering voice. We examine its doctrines, and find them self-consistent, not contradicting our intellectual intuitions or logical deductions, while, as we submit ourselves and fall under its guidance, we find in it a sure and certain aid for all that is highest and best in us and a most efficient shield against debasing or otherwise evil influences. Thus the Catholic Church in its living power proves its own truth and affords us the best evidence in and by itself; not but what that evidence is further reinforced by the teaching of history and the voice of tradition.

Very different is the evidence of revelation as put forward by Mr. Balfour,¹ which he represents as based on written evidence—apart from any antecedent presumption—"for certain events which took place long ago in a small district to the east of the Mediterranean."

He adds that this religion is considered as revealed because promulgated by inspired teachers, shown to be such because they worked miracles, which are believed because of the historical evidence they possess.

Such arguments, he declares, "are not equal, by themselves, to the task of upsetting so massive an obstacle as developed Naturalism."²

They certainly are not; that obstacle is only to be upset by rational philosophy. Finally, he puts into the mouth of a disciple of Naturalism a series of very obvious objections to the Christian religion as supported by the feeble and doubtful arguments he puts forward as those of "rationalism"—the only arguments which the terrible curse of Protestantism has left at the service of those who are unhappy enough to have become its victims.

With respect to his supposed objections he asks:³

"And as against the rationalizing theologian, is not his answer conclusive? The former has borrowed the premises, the methods, and all the positive conclusions of Naturalism. He advances on the same strategic principles, and from the same base of operations, and though he professes by these means to have overcome a whole continent of alien conclusions with which Naturalism will have nothing to do, can he

¹ Pp. 177-182.

² Mr. Balfour, however, declares (p. 178) that his personal opinion is that these arguments are good as far as they go. "An argument from design" will always have value, while the argument from testimony must always form a part of the evidence for any historical religion. The first will survive "natural selection," and the second "critical assaults." "But," he adds, "more than this is desirable."

³ P. 18a.

permanently retain it? Is it not certain that the large expanse of his theology, attached by so slender a tie to the main system of which it is intended to be a dependency, will sooner or later have to be abandoned; and that the weak and artificial connection which has been so ingeniously contrived will snap at the first strain to which it shall be subjected by the forces of either criticism or sentiment?"

With these despairing and profoundly misleading words Mr. Balfour terminates his fourth chapter, and thus they form the actual conclusion of the second part of "The Foundations of Belief." Truly they might rather be called *the foundations of unbelief*.

His conclusions are utterly wrong, because of a profound error in his premisses. Natural theology does *not* borrow "the premisses, methods, and positive conclusions of Naturalism." It does *not* advance "on the same base of operations."

Natural theology is firmly planted on clear principles, which are universal and necessary, and carry with them their own evidence. Physical science ultimately reposes on the same evidence, but neither one nor the other is founded on or is logically consistent with the rationalism, which Mr. Balfour rightly repudiates as "Naturalism in embryo," the logical outcome of which is absolute scepticism and utter mental paralysis.

In the third part of his work Mr. Balfour proceeds to consider the *causes* which have practically resulted in the beliefs which men have accepted or now accept. And *practical* causes are indeed *most* important things. The human mind does not exist to contemplate itself, to recognize that it thinks, etc., and its powers were not given it as objects for reflection, but as impulses to elevate it to what it is called to.

To concentrate the mind upon itself altogether apart from any purpose thereby to serve higher practical ends, would seem to partake of the sin of pride, and its natural result is blindness. All great discoveries have been made in the objective, not the subjective order. Nevertheless, it may be most important that we should apply our minds to self-contemplation as an indispensable means of combating the opponents of philosophic truths, whether they be sensists or idealists.

And self-inspection is our necessary ultimate means, and our only means, of knowing what we know. But the "that" must ever be final. The "how" can never be so, for the answer to every "how?" must be a "that." Therefore, the question "how is knowledge possible?" is an absurd one, since after every explanation, it may be again asked, how is *this* knowledge possible, and so again we get a *regressus ad infinitum*.

We cannot get behind the intellect, and therefore no ultimate criterion of our intellectual powers is possible.

We can never justify reason, because we must employ reason in criticising and seeking to justify it, and so work in a circle. Not to trust our reason before we have justified it, is to be, as Hegel said, like the prudent *σχολαστικος* who would not enter the water till he had first learned to swim.

But the validity of our reason can be called in question by no one who sees the force of the assertion that "if we are deluded by our faculties, then our judgments cannot be trustworthy."

We cannot, however, *infer* Reason's validity from this or any other argument, because the self-evidence of the inference can be no greater than the self-evidence of our fundamental truths and first principles. On the solid basis they supply, science and religion both securely repose, as we hope to make still plainer in our review of the third part of Mr. Balfour's volume.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

SCOTLAND'S SERVICES TO FRANCE.

THE SCOTTISH GUARDS, AND THE SCOTTISH MEN AT-ARMS IN THE FRENCH SERVICE.

THE historic renown and the memorable achievements of the Irish brigades in the service of France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, down almost to the period of the French revolution, has long been a fascinating subject, especially for the Irish historian and annalist. The chronicle of the deeds of these exiled Irish soldiers forms one of the most unique chapters in European history. It is equally animating and pathetic. Naturally familiar to Irishmen at home and abroad, the story of the brigade never fails to enkindle in their hearts emotions of pride and patriotic ardor. Fired by the narrative, and inflamed by the memories aroused by the soul-inspiring career and exploits of these brave warriors, poets have wedded to immortal verse the story of their heroism and devotion. In it is blended the fury of war and the pathos of exile; the glamour of camp and court; the overpowering and passionate devotion to the old land, and the not less enduring hatred of their country's unrelenting foe; and through all these pages we see the characteristic qualities of the race—religious fervor, military ardor, patriotic devotion, commingled with the fun and joviality, the daring and love of adventure, the pride and the passion, the loyalty and fidelity which constitute the traditional inheritance of the race.

Fascinating though the chapter is, which brings before us the record of the services of these Irish soldiers on foreign fields in the armies of France, our self-imposed task leads us to recall the less familiar story of the Scottish Guards, known as the "Scots Men-at-arms," and "Scots Life Guards," who fought under the French king's banner two hundred years before the famous Irish brigades entered the same service and were enlisted under the same flag. The organization and identity of the Scots Guards on the muster-rolls of the French armies was maintained during nearly four hundred years, and extinguished only when the last of the defenders of the ill-fated royal family fell on the steps of the *Tuileries* before the furious mob in the revolution of 1791, in the attempt to save the king and dynasty to whose fortunes the gallant Scots Guards had ever shown the most unswerving loyalty. As was said of them by a French military writer: "Under the title of 'Scots Men-at-arms' one might write the history of the wars

waged by France from the days of Joan of Arc to the revolution."¹

Unlike the Irish brigades, the Scotch troops were first ranged under the French banner, not as exiles, but as friendly auxiliaries and allies.

They came to the aid of France at a period of great and imminent peril to the life of that nation; when internal feud and English invasion exposed it to the danger of conquest and political extinction. The factions in France at the time of the invasion of that country by Henry V., of England, and the paralysis in the French royal councils, conspired to render the kingdom an easy prey to the resolute and valiantly-led invading forces. It was at this critical juncture that the French king appealed to the Scottish court for assistance; and accordingly, we find that in 1419 the first Scottish contingent was dispatched to France, under the command of Sir William Douglas; this force comprised 150 men-at-arms and 300 archers. Later in the same year, a more formidable force was organized under the Earl of Buchan, who landed 7000 Scottish troops—some writers say 10,000—at La Rochelle, in September 1419. This large and welcome force was transported in a Spanish fleet engaged by the French monarch for that purpose.

The English invading forces swiftly overran the country, overcoming all opposition; nor was it long before King Henry had made himself master of Paris. Indeed, he succeeded in forcing the imbecile Charles VI. to sign the disgraceful treaty of Troyes, by which Charles gave his daughter in marriage to King Henry, disinherited his son, and agreed to the union of the French and English crowns in the person of Henry V. and his descendants. Was ever national humiliation more complete? The cause and hopes of France rested with the young dauphin, afterwards Charles VII., who repudiated the treaty and engagements made by his royal but incapable father.

It was, moreover, at the request and in obedience to the urgent entreaties of the dauphin and his counsellors, that the Scottish regent and parliament decided to succor their ally across the sea against their, and France's, hereditary enemy—England.

Another Scottish contingent force of 4000 to 5000, under Sir John Darnley, crossed over in 1421—likewise landing at La Rochelle, then the only seaport in the possession of France.

The Scottish troops were not long in the field until they had an opportunity to confront in battle their ancient enemies. At the

¹ As early as 1295, a treaty had been arranged between Scotland and France, by which each country bound itself to assist the other against England. This league was renewed in 1371. These, and subsequent alliances, were usually strengthened by marriage. The king of Scots generally accepting a French princess for wife.

siege of Le Mans, but more notably at the bridge of Baugé, the English, under the Duke of Clarence, met with a bitter defeat, the duke being killed and many of the chief captains taken prisoners. The Scottish forces were the principal combatants on the French side, and it was by the sword of the Earl of Buchan the Duke of Clarence was despatched in the battle.

It is said of these Scottish auxiliaries—as it was afterwards, two centuries later, said of the Irish—that they gave much trouble in camp and city.

When the news of the battle and of the gallant conduct of the Scottish troops reached him, the dauphin rebuked the maligners of his allies by asking, "What think you now of these Scots—mutton-eaters and wine-bags?" these latter epithets being the terms employed by the fault-finders. The dauphin capped the rebuke by conferring the baton and office of *constable*—the first military rank in the kingdom—on the Earl of Buchan, the Scottish commander. Henry V., having again invaded France—this time with the greatest army ever assembled under his banners—carried with him his prisoner, James I. of Scotland, thinking, doubtless, that he could thereby detach the Scottish forces from the French service. But to the summons from the Scottish king to cease hostilities the Earl of Buchan made answer that while their king was a prisoner they were not bound to obey him, and would not. This reply inflamed King Henry so much that he declared the Scots should be treated as rebels, and if they fell into his hands would be given no quarter.

After ravaging the country and achieving various successes in battles and sieges, Henry was prostrated by fever, and his death followed just as his army was in the full tide of conquest. This was swiftly followed by the demise of the crazy French king, Charles VI. The war was continued by the English under the Duke of Bedford, who defeated the French and Scottish forces at Crevant.

Three thousand of the latter were left dead on the field. The invasion was prosecuted with varying fortune. In 1424 Lord Douglas brought over another large army from Scotland to the aid of the falling fortunes of the French monarch—no less than 10,000 men-at-arms, with knights, barons and lords "splendidly equipped."

On his arrival in France, Lord Douglas was appointed lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and the French king further conferred on him the duchy of Touraine "for himself and his male heirs forever," and other dignities and domains were assigned to different Scottish lords and chiefs.

In a great and hardly-contested battle fought at Verneuil the

Scottish forces constituted the chief part of the French army, and although they performed prodigies of valor—suffering terrible losses—the English were victorious.

In this disastrous battle the Earl of Buchan was killed with the great Earl of Douglas and his son, and a considerable number of the Scottish nobility. Here, as at Crecy and Agincourt, the English archers and the terrible “cloth-yard shafts” decimated the ranks of the French army.

So signal were the services of the Scottish contingent, and so conspicuous the bravery and devotion of that nation in this last battle, that Charles conferred on the Scots Guards the highest honors and the most coveted privileges in testimony of his and the country's gratitude. By formal “letters patent,” under the seal of the kingdom, 8th July, 1425, he appointed the Scots Guards “la garde du corps du roy”—the king's royal body-guard—a distinction which carried with it special increased pay and many immunities and privileges. This distinction and these privileges continued the uninterrupted inheritance of the Scots Guard in France for upward of three hundred years. How faithfully and devotedly the trust was discharged during that long period the battle-fields of France and the continent, on which Scottish valor was conspicuous and Scottish blood freely poured out in the cause of the monarchy, shinningly demonstrate. In consequence of the exigencies and falling fortunes of the French king, new appeals were made to Scotland for aid. In the year 1428 a treaty was entered into between the French and Scottish rulers, by the terms of which Princess Margaret of Scotland was affianced to the French dauphin, and according to the treaty, 6000 men-at-arms were to be sent over to aid the French king; in that year the fortunes of France and the monarchy were at the lowest ebb. The armies and power of England were in possession of the chief cities and principal fortresses of the kingdom. Orleans alone resisted and held out against the English. With its fall, there would remain no hope for France, and the conquest of the country by England would be complete and, to all appearances, final. How the French king lost hope and heart, how he dawdled away time and opportunities, is well known. Never was France in greater danger of falling ingloriously before British prowess and becoming a permanent continental appanage of the English crown than at this juncture.

It was in this critical hour of despair and irresolution that Joan of Arc, the immortal “Maid of Orleans,” appears upon the scene to arouse by her enthusiasm and inflame by her example the spirits and warlike efforts of court and people.

In the beleagured fortress and city of Orleans were great num-

bers of Scottish men-at-arms, who had been drawn to the defence of the place chiefly through the efforts and appeals of their countryman, John Carmichael, who had been appointed bishop of that see. This ecclesiastical nomination was likewise made in recognition and testimony of the great services rendered by the Scots to France. From the beginning of the siege, Sir John Stewart, who had returned from France with reinforcements, Sir John Wishart, Sir William Douglas, and other Scottish nobles rendered important aid and were amongst the most courageous defenders of Orleans. In the course of the siege Sir William Douglas and his brother were both killed in repelling an assault made by the English. Their bodies were honorably buried before the high altar in the Church of Sainte Croix. A Scottish force under the command of Sir Patrick Ogilvy, of Angus, succeeded in bringing a convoy of provisions into the hardly pressed city. These troops, says the chronicle, "were so well-equipped for war that it was a pleasure to look on them." Shortly following the arrival of this welcome reinforcement, an attempt was made on the English camp at Rouvray where a fierce battle was fought, ending disastrously to the French—the Scots and men of Orleans being cut to pieces.

In this battle, as we find it related, two brothers, John and William Stewart were killed, one brother having sacrificed his life in endeavoring to rescue the other when wounded and about to fall into the hands of the enemy. The two brothers were buried in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, Orleans. John, in his will had thoughtfully made provision for a daily Mass to be said in the chapel of Notre Dame Blanche in the same cathedral.

It is said that when Charles received the news of the disastrous battle of Rouvray he was so disheartened that he determined to give up any further efforts and proposed to abandon his country, fly to Spain or to Scotland. He looked especially to the latter as a place of refuge, because "the Scots had been brothers-in-arms and allies of his royal house from time immemorial." Orleans was at the last extremity and could scarcely hold out longer. A victorious English army was on the road to complete the hostile environment and to force its walls.

There were no reinforcements or supplies in prospect for the besieged; there was no money, no friendly help anywhere, from any quarter for the beleaguered city or for the disheartened king. It was in this hour of peril and universal dismay that, as the historian Hume says: "One of the most singular revolutions which has confounded the vain projects of man was effected by a young country girl of Lorraine."

It is said that on the very day of the disastrous battle of Rouvray Joan of Arc went to the Captain of Vaucouleurs and said to

him: "In the name of God do not tarry but send me to the dauphin, for to-day the noble dauphin has suffered a great defeat near Orleans, and he is in danger of greater if you send me not to him." Now commenced the well-known career and mission of Joan of Arc. We are now concerned with her history and achievements in so far only as the Scottish auxiliaries had part therein. Their share in Joan's marvellous successes was not slight, nor inconsiderable, as will be seen. One of the first enterprises undertaken by the Maid was to convey provisions to the distressed garrison of Orleans, and this she accomplished, according to her assurance. The convoy was composed of a body of Scottish men-at-arms (100) and four hundred archers under the command of Sir Patrick Ogilvie. It was following this event that Joan made her entry into the city. The banners which were carried before her in the procession were painted for her by James Power, a Scotsman.

It is related of this Power that he had a grown-up daughter, who was taken under Joan's protection. When this daughter, Heliote, was about to marry, Joan, who was then at court, wrote to the municipality of Tours, asking them to grant a dowry to her Scottish *protégée*. This the city or municipality declined to do on account of poverty, but it did provide the wedding feast, and the chief magistrate presided officially—"pour l'amour et l'honneur de la Pucelle."

After her triumphant entrance into Orleans, the Maid followed up the achievement by swiftly driving the English before her at every point.

We will not have forgotten the Scottish Bishop of Orleans, who was the first to receive and welcome the Maid at her entrance, and who organized the procession that escorted her to the cathedral that memorable day, 8th May. This was the origin of the annual solemnity, since kept up from age to age in the city of Orleans in honor of the heroic Maid who saved the city from capture and the nation from political extinction. Following the relief of the city and the defeat of the English, the Maid pursued her wonderful campaign. She had with her a body of Scottish auxiliaries; they had an important part in the battle of Patay, where the English met with a crushing defeat, leaving upwards of 2000 of their own forces dead on the field, not counting their Burgundian auxiliaries.

At the great event of the coronation of the king at Rheims, John Kirkpatrick, Bishop of Orleans, was one of the consecrating prelates, and the names of many Scottish lords and captains appear in the list of those who assisted at the ceremony, some of the names curiously Frenchified.

When the king, after much hesitancy, marched on Paris, he encountered the English at Montepillay, and attacked them with great impetuosity. "By the side of King Charles," says Monstrelet, the French chronicler, "were a great number of Scots, who fought hard and fiercely." The victory was claimed by the French, but it was no way decisive. In her subsequent movements, the Maid met with varying fortune. She praised the Scottish auxiliaries, whom she declared "she knew to be men who made good war against the English." The Scottish troops, commanded by Sir Hugh Kennedy, had already fought by her side at Orleans and Patay. It was shortly after an encounter, in which these same troops, under the same commander, defeated the English, that Joan was taken prisoner at Compègne, from whence she was transferred to Arras. At this place a Scotsman showed her a portrait of herself which he carried; perhaps he was the same who had painted her banners at Orleans. Another Scot, who had followed her fortunes, and who was present at her death, subsequently returned to Scotland and entered a monastery. He left a testimony, which appears in Scottish annals, that he had seen and known "the marvellous Maid, who brought about the recovery of the kingdom of France, and in whose company I was present during her endeavors for the said recovery up to her life's end."

In the siege of Paris, Kennedy commanded one of the principal outposts of the army, and in a decisive battle at Lagny the French and Scots gained the day.

In another engagement at St. Denys, La Hire and Sir Hugh Kennedy captured the place from the English, while another Scot captured the Castle of Vincennes.

At this time Charles VII. awaited the arrival of Margaret, eldest daughter of James of Scotland, to whom he had been for some time affianced.

She was escorted to the shores of France by a fleet of 46 ships, under the command of the Earl of Orkney. The admiral was accompanied by the Bishop of Brechin, and the young princess had in her suite a brave company of knights and esquires.

There were in her train "140 ladies and young gentlewomen, with a guard of 1000 armed men in three large galleys and six barges." Before the expedition reached the French shores it was attacked by an English fleet of 180 ships, which had been sent out to intercept them. The English were, in turn, assailed by a Spanish fleet, but meanwhile the princess was safely landed.

The marriage in the Cathedral of Tours was, of course, a splendid pageant and ceremony. The greater part of the Scots who accompanied the princess returned to Scotland, but numbers remained, some to marry French ladies, and those of the opposite

sex to find French husbands. In subsequent movements against the English, Charles was accompanied by his Scottish auxiliaries. At Montereau, where he defeated and expelled the invaders, he had with him Lord Darnley, constable of the Scottish forces, and other Scottish leaders.

When the English forces were finally driven out of France, retaining only the port of Calais, and peace was once more restored, there was no longer employment for the large force of auxiliaries and adventurers that had been drawn into the service of France. An outlet was found for the ardor and military talents of these forces in an expedition against the Swiss. The Scots are said to have formed an important part of the invading forces. The Scottish leaders were Sir Jno. Montgomery, Lord d'Azay and Robert Petit (or Patillot). It is impossible, of course, to follow in detail the campaigns and fortunes of these Scottish soldiers. When, in 1445, the French army was first placed on a permanent footing, *two companies*, entirely composed of Scots, were included in the reorganized royal forces. The first was the company of John Stewart, Lord of Aubigny, which was brought into France in 1422, and afterwards, down to 1788, known in the army register as "Les Gendarmes Ecosais" (Scots Men-at-Arms). The second Scots company became the *first* company of the Royal Life-Guards, called "Compagnie Ecosaise, de la Garde du Corps du Roi."

This was the origin of the celebrated Scots Guards, whose bravery and fidelity in the cause of France and the royal house were conspicuous through more than three centuries, down to the last days of the monarchy.

According to the declaration of Louis XII., in 1513, "the institution of the Scots men-at-arms and Scots Life Guards was an acknowledgement of the services the Scots rendered to Charles VII. in reducing France to his obedience; and of the great virtue and loyalty he found in them."

At the siege of Rouen in 1449, the Scots commanded by Robert Cunningham, greatly distinguished themselves by their intrepidity, and at the siege of Bayeux the Scots under the same commander performed many brilliant feats of arms. In a subsequent campaign for the recovery of the district of Guienne—the Scots under Robert Patillok (as the name appears in the Chronicles) accomplished wonders. Patillok was rewarded by Charles VII. in 1448 with the castle and Lordship of Sauveterre, and praised for his "gallant behavior and inestimable services to the kingdom. As an encouragement to others to follow his noble example the king bestows on him a residence in the kingdom."

The newly created lord so won upon the people by his address

that he was called by them "the little king of Gascony," and after his death his statue was placed in the royal palace. The death of Charles VII. in 1461 caused great sorrow amongst the Scottish soldiers who had followed his fortunes with unshaken fidelity and fought his battles with unsurpassed bravery.

The succeeding monarch, Louis XI., had, while yet the dauphin, vainly sought to tamper with the fidelity of the Scots Royal Guards; now that he was king he trusted to their loyalty, nor had he ever occasion to regret the confidence—on more than one occasion the faithful Scots saved his life.

In the memorable interview between the king and his powerful rival, Charles, Duke of Burgundy, the French king was for a time in great peril by reason of the treachery of his rival. A French historian describing the scene, praises the royal guard. "These Scots," he says, "behaved valiantly, maintained their ground, would not stir one step from the king, and were very nimble with their bows and arrows." The danger from which he had escaped caused Louis to provide for an increase of the royal guard, and in 1474 he authorized the formation of an additional company of a hundred guardsmen—none to be admitted save "such as could furnish undeniable proof of good descent." The king conferred the command of this body on Archambault Kniston ("cousin du roi d'Ecosse") having under him as lieutenants Blanchet d'Aubigny (Stewart), Robert Montgomery, and Alex. Monipany.

Amongst the counsellors of the king we find the names of the Bishop of Aberdeen, Sir William Monipany, and Patrick Flockart, who had commanded the life-guards under Charles VII.

On his deathbed Louis XI. entrusted to the care of the faithful Scots Guards his son Charles.

When, under the new king, the illustrious Bayard, the chevalier *sans peur et sans reproche*, commenced his career, he provided a high festival and tournament at Aire. Cuthbert Carr, lord of St. Quentin, was one of the judges of the field. David Fagga, a Scots Guard, distinguished himself in the lists and carried off one of the chief prizes. In 1494, when Charles undertook his campaign into Italy, he was surrounded during his march by the Scots Guards, who were then said to be conspicuous by their great size and splendid accoutrements. In Rome, which the king entered December 31, 1494, his Royal Scots Guard attracted much attention; and so likewise at Naples, Florence, and other cities.

The adverse fortune attending the French king throughout the subsequent campaign in Italy put the bravery of his Scottish defenders to the severest test, but they never flinched, and on the field of Fornovo the Scots Guard saved the king's life when desperately assailed by the enemy. In one engagement during this

campaign, the Scottish auxiliaries under Stewart of Aubigny defeated the renowned Gonzalvo de Cordova at Seminara.

The ill result of the campaign in general forced the king to return to France, where he shortly after died.

Under his successor, Louis XII., the Scots found ample warlike employment. In the invasion of Lombardy, in 1499, half the army was placed under the command of Bernard Stewart, *Lord of Aubigny*. With him fought his brother John Stewart, *Seigneur d'Auzun*, his nephew Robert Stewart, and Cuthbert Carr, Lord of St. Quentin.

They encountered the "invincible" Spaniards in many engagements with varying fortune, but always with unflinching bravery. In the great battle of Cerignolo the tide turned in favor of the Spaniards. The Scots Guards and men-at-arms were surrounded and overwhelmed, 306 men-at-arms and 60 archers met their death on that fiercely contested field. One of the historians describing the desperate onslaught says: "Who shall chronicle higher fidelity than that of their (the Scots) standard-bearer, Gilbert Turnbull, whose arms stiffen in death as they grasp the lance with unfaltering loyalty, while he seizes the much loved banner with his teeth as he lies cold and motionless, with six clansmen extended lifeless beside him." "Well are those worthy of praise," adds the narrator, "who love rather to die for honor's sake than to live in shame marked with the brand of cowardice."

The rest were found stretched out, one here, one there, with their horses dead under them; if a Scotch corpse was discovered on one side, one or two Spaniards were found dead on the other. It was in vain that Stewart of Aubigny, almost bereft of reason by this sudden and disastrous rout, exhausted threats and entreaties in his endeavor to rally the French fugitives; they did not recognize him, and remained deaf to his expostulations. None remained on the field except some wounded captains, who endeavored, at first unsuccessfully, to persuade him to accompany them. "No," cried the despairing veteran, "rather let me die by the hands of the enemy than return to my friends like a vanquished fugitive." Nevertheless he was saved, and on his return to France Stewart was appointed by Louis XII. ambassador to the Scottish court, where he was received by James IV. with distinguished honors. In another Italian campaign undertaken by King Louis, he was accompanied by another Stewart, John, Duke of Albany, who had brought over reinforcements to France from James IV.

He was present with the king at the capture of Genoa in 1507. Upon the king's entrance into the captured city, Stewart preceded the column, sword in hand:

"Close to the king carrying their halberds and richly accoutred, marched twenty-four Scots Guards; in the midst of them rode his majesty, followed by the four hundred archers of the guard on horseback, their bows ready for action, and wearing coats of mail."

In a later embassy to the Scottish court to engage additional support for the French monarch, Stewart of Aubigny, the veteran hero of many campaigns, was again chosen to represent the French king.

It was his third and last embassy to Scotland. Arriving at Edinburgh in 1508 in an infirm state of health, he died there shortly afterwards, honored and lamented in both countries. When Louis XII. again crossed the Alps the vanguard of his army, which included the Scots Guards, was commanded by Robert Stewart of Aubigny, doubtless a son of the Ambassador.

On his return to France, Robert Stewart, was raised to the dignity of Marshal. In September, 1513, the king gave this memorable public testimony of his regard for and appreciation of the fidelity and devotion of his Scottish auxiliaries: "Considering the great services rendered to France by Scotland, principally against England, the king, exempts in future Scots denizens from having to apply for special letters of naturalization, and grants them generally the right of devising property, of inheriting, and of holding benefices, as if they were Frenchmen."

Moved partly by consideration of friendship for France, the gallant James IV., declared war against England, and fought and fell with the flower of the Scottish nobility on the disastrous field of Flodden.

A Scottish contingent of 3000 men had been previously despatched to France under the Earl of Arran.

During the last illness of Louis XII. (1515), he made Marshal Stewart of Aubigny and John Stewart, his lieutenants, swear on the Gospel that they would execute his last will. The marshal swore that he and his hundred archers of the Royal Guard would execute the promise he had made, or lose their lives.

One of the high dignitaries of the royal court left on record a testimony of the great esteem in which the Scots Guards were held at this period in the following language:

"For so long a time as they have served in France, never hath there been one of them found that hath committed any fault against the kings or their state, and they can make use of them as of their own subjects."

Under the chivalrous and adventurous Francis I., the Scots were again in demand for warlike service.

At his entry into Paris, following his coronation, the Scots Life-Guard and archers held the post of honor around the person of

the king. A few days afterwards, Lord Robert Stewart of Aubigny, was created one of the four marshals of France, who thenceforward were called "Cousins du Roi."

Besides the officers of the guards, many Scottish gentlemen served or held places in the royal household troops, as the Earl of Lennox, the Duke of Albany, Gordons, Stewarts, and other familiar Scottish names and titles.

When Francis invaded Italy, it was Robert Stewart who, along with the Chevalier Bayard, led the vanguard of the army. At the news of the first victory of the campaign, there was great joy in Edinburgh, and the governor ordered bonfires to be lighted and cannon to be fired to celebrate the French victories in Lombardy—in which the Scots had maintained their traditional renown.

On the disastrous field of Pavia, where Francis was taken prisoner, the Scots fought bravely for the protection of the king. French historians testify that the king was not taken till the Scots Guards had been all cut to pieces. It was in writing to his mother, following the disaster to his arms and fortunes, the king employed the now familiar phrase: "All is lost save honor."

In 1543 the Scots men-at-arms distinguished themselves at Landecies against Charles V.; and in 1544 under the leadership of the Duc de Enghien they twice broke the Spanish ranks, and contributed largely to win the battle of Cerisalla, the last victory of Francis I. who died 31st of March, 1547.

We have now reached the turbulent period of the Reformation, when, from causes easily understood, the hitherto close alliance between Scotland and France was seriously menaced: but sympathy and mutual interests yet bound for awhile the two countries. It was during the reign of Henry II. of France, that the infant Queen of Scots—the afterwards unfortunate and grievously maligned Mary Stuart—was affianced to the French dauphin.

A large army had been sent to Scotland by the French king to aid the queen regent of that country against the threatened English invasion. The young queen was conveyed to France, according to the terms of the treaty, to receive her education as well as the better to assure her safety.

She was accompanied by four young maidens of her own age known in history and romance as the "four Marys." Her reception in France was made a national event, and the alliance cemented for the time the intimate union of the two nations. When war was declared against the Emperor Charles V., the Scots were as usual sent to the front. In almost every engagement there is to be found mention of the Scottish troops and Scottish leaders—and always with honor. Two incidents of war will illustrate this assertion. During the siege of Dinan, a Scottish volunteer, Archi-

bald Mowbray, had sprung, sword in hand, on the crown work of the rampart, and had made good his retreat unscathed. Another Scot, Norman Leslie, Master of Rothes, had done more: at the siege of Renty, with thirty of his countrymen, he had charged sixty mounted musketeers, and had unhorsed five; his lance being then splintered, he rode among them sword in hand, and wounded several of his adversaries without heeding in the least the shots aimed at him. Then, seeing a company of pikemen advance against him he dismounted, and gave up his horse and spurs to one of his men, who fell dead as he delivered them to the Constable de Montmorency. Covered with wounds the gallant Scotsman was carried to the royal tent, where the Prince de Condé and the Duc de Enghien awarded him the palm of valor. The gallant soldier did not long survive the exploit. He died of his wounds. At the siege of Saint Quentin, where the Scots men-at-arms were actively engaged, Admiral Coligny avowed publicly that "during the whole time the siege lasted he never saw officers or men display a more soldierly spirit or act more efficiently." By a sad fatality it was a Scotsman, Gabriel Montgomery, son of the captain of the Scots Guards, who involuntarily caused the death of the French king, Henry II., in a friendly tournament in which the king himself entered the lists. His opponent in one of the jousts was the young Scot, who being very powerful almost unhorsed the monarch, and in a second encounter, which Henry insisted on, he was struck by a splinter from the lance of his antagonist. The wound, though seemingly trivial, resulted fatally. No proceedings were taken against the involuntary regicide. Through the death of the king, Mary Stuart's husband became king, and she herself Queen of France, as well as of Scotland, with new claims to the English throne. But the young king did not long survive his royal father. He died within a year from his accession, leaving Mary a sadly disconsolate widow under circumstances of painful, personal and political trials—the particulars of which do not enter into the plan of this narrative.

Her return to Scotland, and the altered condition of affairs in France and Scotland, was a serious blow to the fortunes and expectations of the many Scottish retainers at the French court. Religious divisions and dissensions powerfully contributed to disturb the confidence and esteem previously entertained by the French court for the Scots Guards and auxiliaries. Many of these latter went over to the new religion, as did their countrymen at home. The court entertained a proposal to disband the Scottish cavalry of the French army. Many of the Scots Guards, especially those who had embraced the Calvinist belief, were dismissed,

and their places filled by Catholics approved by the Archbishop of Glasgow.

In consequence of the troubles in Scotland a great number of Queen Mary's adherents sought refuge in France. Mary recommended them to the protection of her uncle, the Cardinal of Lorraine, giving pensions to many while her means would allow. Henry III., though disinclined to favor the Scottish queen's interest in the unfortunate exiles, because of his hatred of her French relatives of the house of Lorraine, for the the same reason, as well as for others of international entanglements, made no strenuous effort to save the unfortunate queen when her life, and more than that, her honor, were at stake. He did, however, on one occasion, pay a tribute to his Scottish defenders. Replying to a petition from Lord Seton, he said: "As for my Scots Guards, as I had found them on my accession to the throne, I had allowed them to continue; and in such high esteem did I hold the Scottish nation for their unswerving fealty to the crown of France that they would receive from me the same honors and kind treatment that were exhibited to them by my predecessors." But, as we said, it was little he did for them or their persecuted queen. He did not have much luck. He was murdered the 2d of August, 1589. The Scots Guards were the first to welcome the new king, the gay and gallant Henry IV.

From James VI. the French king received important assistance when hard pressed by the rebellious forces in his own dominion. A large Scottish force was landed at Dieppe. They fought by the side of the king at the momentous battle of Tory and were engaged at the siege of Rouen.

Like his predecessors he retained the Scots Guards, and he sought to reinstate the Scots men-at-arms, who had been disbanded in the previous reign; but the new company was not actually organized until ten years later. He confirmed the immunities formerly granted to the Guards and to the Scots in France: "the graces and privileges whereof they have rendered themselves worthy, through the affection and fidelity which they have borne this crown." Indeed, Henry IV. conferred advantages on the Scots which they had never enjoyed in the time of his predecessors. Henry IV. was assassinated 14th May, 1610.

During the reign of Henry's successor, Louis XIII. the position of the Scots Guards was grievously altered for the worst. They were curtailed of many privileges the Guard had before enjoyed; nor did remonstrance secure redress. King James interfered in a memorial on their behalf insisting on the restoration of the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by them. There is a curious pe-

tition on record, dated 20th February, 1623, addressed to King James and signed by a number of leading Scots in Edinburgh pleading for the king's intercessory efforts with the French monarch in behalf of the Scots Guards and the Scots men-at-arms in France. It is too long to quote here in full.

The command of the Scots Guards had for centuries been the prerogative of the families of Lennox and the Stewarts of Aubigny. In 1625 it passed to the house of Gordon. Lord Gordon and his company took an active part in the conquest of Lorraine for France. The great statesman, Cardinal Richelieu, favored the employment of foreign troops in the French service, and so the services of the Scots, as of others, was willingly availed of. Under the renowned Turenne, besides the Scots Guards and the Scots men-at-arms, there were also "Les Gardes Ecossaises," a Scottish regiment organized in 1642 by the Earl of Irvine; Sir John Hepburne's Scotch regiment; Forbes regiment and regiment of cavalry; and the regiment of Colonel Douglas, 1000 strong.

Sir John Hepburn, known to the French as "Chevalier d'Hebron," had served under Gustavus Adolphus, and after entering the French service gained the esteem and confidence of Richelieu. Hitherto the Scots who had found service in France had stood in the position of allies and auxiliaries, bound and protected by national interests and mutual national friendly alliances. The revolution in England which dethroned Charles I. and brought the king to the scaffold, changed all this. The Scots who now sought service in France, like their Irish brethren of kindred race and faith, came now as exiles and adventurers; but they remembered that their ancestors had made a glorious record in French annals.

Louis XIV. retained the Scots Guards and the Scots men-at-arms in his service, allowing them their ancient privileges. One of these privileges entitled the Guards to take precedence of every other corps in the French army. This exceptional distinction frequently got the members of the Guard in troublesome controversies, and subjected them to jealousy and opposition from many quarters.

At the marriage of Louis XIV., in 1660, some members of another royal guard attempted to place themselves on the platform reserved for the royal party, but were opposed by the Scots guards, who claimed their privilege of standing alone near the king. Louis had to leave his place to restore order, and having heard both sides, he allowed four of the *Cent Gentilhommes* to remain on the platform, but in a lower place than that of the four Scots Guards.

It had always been considered a great honor to be admitted to

membership in the Guards. Under Louis XIV. the privilege was still more highly esteemed and greatly coveted. After a time the company, though retaining always its Scottish name, was recruited principally from among French applicants—chiefly the sons of poor noblemen, who sought through this service to advance their fortunes. The Scots Guards were at the head of the army in all the great battles fought under Louis XIV. In 1709, at the battle of Malplaquet, Prince James Stewart marched at their head. The chronicler says, "They fell with irresistible impetuosity on the first line of the enemy, and pierced in succession the second, third and fourth lines, picking off at leisure unlucky horsemen unable to effect their retreat in time."

The prince is said to have exposed himself with the greatest coolness, and was wounded at the same time with Stewart D'Aubigny, who commanded the *Royal* regiment.¹ The battle of Lauffeld, in 1747, was the last in which the Scots Guards were engaged, and the final battle-field for the Scots men-at-arms was that of Minden, August 1, 1759—the same battle in which fell the renowned Irish leader Sarsfield, Earl of Lucan, at the head of the Irish brigade, in the same service.

The sadly-pathetic words of the Irish soldier as he lay fatally wounded on the battle-field are a treasured remembrance in Irish hearts—"Would that this were for Ireland!"

Among those who followed the fortunes of King James II. into exile, as, later, they loyally stood to his son and grandson, were great numbers of the Scottish adherents of the royal cause. The large emigration of these Scottish royalists enabled the formation of the regiments known by the name of the colonel—Hamilton, Campbell, Ogilvy, Douglas and Albany; besides these, there were the "Royal Scots." Of their devotion to the cause and fortunes of their exiled king these gallant gentlemen gave the most striking and pathetic proofs. When no longer able to maintain even the semblance of a royal court and state, the Scottish gentlemen in his service asked the king's permission to allow them to form a company of volunteers and enter the French service. The scene of their last interview with King James is told by Sir James Dalrymple in touching language:

"Having obtained the king's consent, they went to St. Germain's, in order to be reviewed for the last time by the exiled monarch. On the appointed day the king came down into the court, passed through the ranks, wrote down with his own hand in his pocket-book the name of every gentleman, and thanked every one of them by name. Then, passing along the company drawn up in line, he took off his hat and bowed to them.

¹ At the battle of Fontenoy, fought in 1745—where the "Irish Brigades" won immortal renown, saving the fortunes of the day for France—the Royal Scottish regiment had an important share in the glory of the victory.

"Again, as he was retiring, he turned back, bowed to them once more, and burst into tears. Then, the whole company knelt down, bowed low, and rising simultaneously, gave their sovereign the royal salute." "These gallant men," says the same author, "were always the foremost in battle and the last to retreat. Often in want of the first necessities of life, they were never heard to complain, save of the misfortunes of their exiled sovereign."

The names and rank of Scots who distinguished themselves in the French military service during the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV., frequently occur in the histories of the campaigns of these reigns. In the grade of generals we find the names of Lord James Douglas, killed in battle; Maxwell, killed at Marsaglia; Lord George Douglas; Andrew Rutherford, who rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General; James Galloway, Lord Dunkeld, John Montgomery, Lord Lockhart, Richard Hamilton, Louis Drummond, Lord Ogilvy, Francis Wauchop. During the retreat of the French army in Italy, in 1734, a Scots officer, Colonel Cunningham, greatly distinguished himself. In order to protect the retreat of the army, he charged the advancing enemy with a body of troops with exceptional dash and gallantry. He was rewarded with the Cross of St. Louis, a pension, and raised to the rank of brigadier.

With the reign of Louis XV. the distinctive national identity of the Scots Guard may be said to have lapsed. The title was still preserved in the army and in the court registers; the company, in fact, continued to exist down to the overthrow of the monarchy, but the ranks had long been filled by native Frenchmen, and the command given over to members of the court nobility. Descendants of the Scots who had officered or served in the Guards were, nevertheless, still to be found in the ranks down to the revolution; and they were amongst the devoted troop who gave their lives in the effort to save the king and his family on the steps of the royal palace in 1791.

When the Bourbons were restored, in 1815, Louis XVIII. re-established the Scots Guards, and confirmed their ancient privileges; one of the most honorable of these deserves mention. That was the right of carrying the coffin of the king to the grave. When the remains of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette were recovered after the restoration, and conveyed to the royal chapel at St. Denis, it was to the Scots Guard the duty was committed of bearing them thither. From thence, twelve of the same Guards carried the coffin to the royal vault.

Once more, the last occasion, the Scots Guards paid the same homage and duty at the funeral of Louis XVIII.; and so with the disappearance of the ancient monarchy, the name, title, and services of the illustrious Scottish Guard and Scottish Men-at-arms was extinguished.

WILLIAM J. ONAHAN.

THE LESSON OF LANDSCAPE.

WE read in the life of St. Bernard that, after travelling during a whole day by the shores of the Lake of Geneva, when in the evening he heard his companions conversing about the lake, he surprised them all by asking, "The lake! what lake?"

If we ourselves were to notice in a fellow-traveller such blindness as this to the beauties through which he was passing, we should, doubtless, set it down to natural insensibility of character and dreamy vacancy. But in human conduct the same actions often spring from very different causes, and a disregard for natural beauty, which in an ordinary man is the result of dulness or indifference, may, in a saint of God, be an effect of the very delicacy of his perceptions and of the very lovingness of his heart. Many of the saints have so clear an idea of God's perfections, and are so accustomed to converse with Him, as it were, face to face, that they stand in less need of creatures to remind them of the Creator. They can do without created beauty, because they possess the Source of all beauty; all that is given them over and above this can add nothing to their riches, and the desert of the Thebaid is as productive for them as the vineyards of Palestine, and as populous as the streets of Alexandria.

Yet it must not be supposed that the saints disregarded the loveliness of nature, or that, if some of them made comparatively small use of creatures in rising to the Creator, that this was the case with all. It is only by means of ideas gathered from what is fair and lovely in the created universe that we can form any idea of the beauty and loveliness of God. The love of creatures is the means, the love of God the end; only some there are who, so soon as they have attained the end, care not to dwell any longer upon the means. Others again, according to their varying moods, will sometimes look for God in His works, and at other times seek Him face to face. St. Bernard himself, in spite of what we have just related of him, in spite of the constant union of his soul with God, was an ardent lover of the woods and fields. "Believe me," he says, "for I speak from experience; you will find in the woods something more than in books. Trees and stones will teach you what you can not learn of a master. Think you not that you can suck honey from the rock and oil from the hardest stone? Do not the mountains distil sweetness and the hills run with milk and honey, and the valleys abound with corn?"

St. Francis of Sales, as he looked out from his window on to the lake at Annecy, exclaimed, "What a place of delights! Here great and beautiful thoughts will fall thick and fast upon us like the snows that fall here in winter."

It would not be difficult to multiply quotations of this sort to show how the saints, detached as they were from created things, yet saw and loved the reflection of God's countenance in all that He has made.

Having thus briefly seen how men of right and perfect soul regard the physical beauty of the world, let us now examine that peculiar feeling towards external nature which has sprung up in modern times. The feeling itself is too deep and complex for close analysis, but some of its characteristics stand out with sufficient clearness. First of all, we find in it a sense of awe and reverence as for some all-pervading presence which is, as it were, the soul of nature manifesting itself in the changing moods and manifold phases of earth, sea, and sky. Secondly, there is a passionate love and affection for nature, and a joy in her presence which is, in the words of Mr. Ruskin, "comparable for intensity only to the joy of a lover in being near a noble and kind mistress, but no more explicable or definable than that feeling of love itself." This love, especially in the days of boyhood, often takes the form of a feverish longing to be at liberty among the hills and woodlands, a rebellion against restraint, and often enough a lurking desire to escape from self and from the whisperings of conscience. Thirdly, there is a sense of light-heartedness and rejoicing subdued, in some measure, by an undercurrent of melancholy. In later years when unreflected feeling is altered by our thoughts and beliefs, this melancholy may come to predominate, but in the Christian of pure life and simple faith it will be kept under the control of peacefulness and joy.

This peculiar regard for nature is a motive which largely inspires the work of some of our greatest modern authors, and finds its noblest expression in such writers as Scott, Wordsworth, Tennyson and Mr. Ruskin. Wordsworth, in his lines on the Wye near Tintern Abbey, thus describes the impressions of his own early manhood, and his words give a sufficiently accurate description of the modern feeling towards nature. He tells us:

"Like a roe

I bounded o'er the mountains, by the sides
Of the deep rivers, and the lonely streams,
Wherever nature led: more like a man
Flying from something that he dreads, than one
Who sought the thing he loved. For nature then
(The coarser pleasures of my boyish days,
And their glad animal movements all gone by)

To me was all in all,—I cannot paint
What then I was. The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colors and their forms, were then to me
An appetite; a feeling and a love
That had no need of a remoter charm
By thought supplied, nor any interest
Unborrowed from the eye.—That time is past,
And all its aching joys are now no more,
And all its dizzy raptures.”

Later on, he tells us how his youthful passion became softened, and the character of his affection for nature modified and deepened by the reflection of maturer years.

Painting amongst us has naturally been inspired by the same prevailing spirit as poetry. Turner, the greatest of our English painters, seems to make the very soul of nature sigh in his canvas, as he expresses and interprets that peculiar melancholy which we have mentioned as one of the characteristics of the modern feeling towards nature.

Our leading writers of fiction, too, from Scott downwards, have spent much pains in observing and describing the character of the places chosen for the scene of their plots. Nature has been studied by them in her joy and in her anger, in the varied moods of the unrestful ocean and the serene grandeur of the changeless mountain-top. Her manifold changes and passions are usually brought into connection with some human feeling, as if the heart of man beat in unison with that of nature. Lovers in fiction meet by moonlight, not merely because they can see one another better, but because the subdued light of the moon is associated in our minds with all that is mysterious and all that is restful in satisfied love.

The ancient and the mediæval poets did not look upon mountains and woodland scenery as worthy of very close attention. The Greek loved a grove of trees because it was shady and pleasant, and the mediæval monk loved the mountain-top because it left him undisturbed in his converse with God; but neither of them felt for the mountains and forests any feeling approaching to deep affection or reverence. In mediæval pictures, too, the landscape is always conventional or inaccurate. Little trouble is taken over the correct drawing of trees and rocks, clearly not altogether from want of power, for the religious painters of Italy display the perfection of power in depicting the human countenance, but because they thought that human life, rather than inanimate matter, was worthy of affectionate study. Moreover, the men of mediæval times, as Mr. Ruskin points out, as lovers of order and symmetry, looked upon the wildness of nature as a thing to be tamed and

shorn and trimmed for the purposes of man. The effect of their supreme care for human beauty was "to turn their thoughts and glances in great part away from all other beauty but that, and to make the grass of the field take to them always more or less the aspect of a carpet to dance upon, a lawn to tilt upon, or a serviceable crop of hay. . . . All that was rugged, rough, dark, wild, untempered, they rejected at once, as the domain of 'salvage men' and mountain giants."¹

We shall now consider whether the modern love of nature is entirely right and healthy and in keeping with the spirit of the Church, or whether it needs purifying and guiding. For it has always been the practice of the Catholic Church to use the method of correction and guidance rather than that of repression, to direct new tendencies and to distinguish between the true and the false in new systems of thought. She would not have her children set their face obstinately against the movements of their time. On the contrary, she bids them follow the current of opinion where they rightly can, and, when that current takes a dangerous direction, she marks out for it a safer course. It is in this spirit that we Catholics, who look for a great religious revival in the near future, must sympathize with the tendencies of our age and become all things to all men if we wish to gain all, showing kindly appreciation wherever we can, and criticizing without bitterness where we cannot commend.

In examining the modern feeling towards nature it is necessary to distinguish at the outset between the spontaneous emotions of early youth, and those same emotions as they are altered in later life by the influence of the reflecting intellect. In our later childhood and early manhood we are often strangely and deeply fascinated by the beauty of natural scenery. The order and the studied harmony of colors which is worked out so precisely in a garden of carpet-beds and artificial fountains, and which would have delighted the fancy of a mediæval poet, have for us nothing like the attraction with which we are drawn to the untamed loveliness of wooded mountain-side and falling cataract. In early youth we do not examine the nature of our love, nor connect our emotions with any pleasure "by thought supplied." We simply feel, while of thought there is little or none, and so far our emotions are pure and healthy. But when we reach the thinking age the feelings of youth are modified by our habits of thought and by the bias of our moral character. What was originally good is altered for better or worse by the good or evil bent of the will. The selfish and the sensual will see in their fair surroundings nothing but a

¹ *Modern Painters*, vol. iii., c. 14, p. 203, 2d ed.

fitting scene for their own pleasures, while the contemplative and the religious will find that nature is a temple where deep and prayerful thoughts are distilled like honey from the trees and flowers. All the ideas we have assimilated from the society about us, the whole spirit of the times in which we live, will enter into and materially alter our manner of regarding that face of nature which is always the same as of old, while we are forever changing. Our task then will be to recall to mind the characteristics chiefly prominent in the spirit of our age, and to see how far they have severally affected our love for landscape.

Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the modern spirit is its want of faith. Even we Catholics who have kept the faith are deeply infected by this spirit of faithlessness which prevails in the atmosphere about us. Not that we disbelieve the Scriptures and the teaching of the Church, but that, in the first place, our assent often requires a violent impulse of the will, and secondly, our faith is far less vital and influential over our speech and actions than was that of the mediæval Christian. Our ideal of the perfect man, little as we may acknowledge it, is a humanist or even a pagan, rather than a Christian ideal, and though we profess the humility of the gospel in the hours we set apart for religion, we are ashamed to practice it in our every-day life. Even religious people are so greatly influenced by the spirit and tone of the times, that they are shy of speaking with one another of things which, in their heart of hearts, they hold nearest and dearest, *viz.*, their relations to God and those truths of religion which are vitally concerned with all the really important issues of life.

It is scarcely surprising that modern faithlessness has entered largely into the modern love of landscape. We have lost the light of the gospel and the sense of God's presence in the world, and we must needs go seek for new light and a new God. We have found them in nature. In the majesty of the mountain, the energy of the sunlight and the beauty of the May-day landscape the pantheist sees the changing moods of the one great soul of all things, and from studying nature's laws the theosophist finds out, so he thinks, that evil is punished and good rewarded by a mechanical process which is directed by no living personality. The result of this general unfixedness of purpose and belief is a widespread tendency to doubt about the profitableness of life, together with much of that gloominess, undefined yearning and comfortless mourning which is a common feature of our modern poetry. Dante, in spite of his sternness, and in spite of his close familiarity with misfortune and suffering, is invariably glad; but who can say this of Scott or Tennyson?

Now, serious and definite faith is necessary to art, and necessary

to all those who would take a right and noble pleasure in the joyful beauty of the world. All the highest art of the past was inspired by religion, and was the expression of strong religious feeling. The art of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was great because it was religious, and because the religion of the mediæval Christians was intimately connected with their every-day life. But now, since the majority of men have no religion, and since those that have any keep it like an exotic plant sheltered under glass, from the four winds of heaven, our art has lost its vivifying principle. It is inspired by a confused medley of fugitive creeds and fashionable philosophies, Paganism, Agnosticism, Islamism, Evolution and garbled Christianity. Our modern epicures of literature and art do not seriously believe in or love the themes of their choice. They look upon religion as a hunting ground for æsthetic effects. Exquisite finish there is in their work, together with delicate appreciation of smaller beauties and a passionate and almost feminine love of nature. But we find no consistency, no genuine seriousness unless it be such melancholy seriousness as belongs to a light-forsaken soul that feels its own darkness.

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain.
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and fight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.¹

Protestantism has at last almost finished the work that was given it to do by the hidden powers of evil. After detaching Christians from the centre of truth and from the source of fixed and clear teaching which exists only in the Catholic Church, it has bidden them discard dogma after dogma, belief after belief, until the idea of God and of His relation to His creatures is wrapped up in vagueness and doubt. But thinking men perceive the need of religion and feel compelled to worship something. They therefore pay their adoration to nature; culture, for those who can get it, takes the place of religion, while indiscriminate sympathy and sickly sentiment serve instead of masculine piety.

The word "culture," in our days has almost an unholy ring about it, as if culture were in some sort opposed to religion, and too much identified with the pride of life to have any relish of sanctity in it. We are inclined to connect it with that spirit of paganism which sings, "*odi profanum vulgus*," and looks upon re-

¹ Matthew Arnold, *Dover Beach*.

finement and polite learning as that which divides mankind into two distinct classes, the contemptuously enlightened and the hopelessly ignorant. Now true culture implies charity, and a cultured Christian is one whose refinement springs chiefly from a full and practical application of the principles of the Gospel to every-day life. He behaves with equal charity to high and low, and though he scrupulously observes all distinctions of rank and social standing he never forgets that in matters of real and abiding importance, all men are upon an equality. In short he does not set culture above religion, but regards it rather as an ornament and exterior finish of religion which, in the absence of charity and the supernatural life, is merely a deceptive veneer hiding the foul reality of moral worthlessness.

Just as beauty, when pursued for its own sake, infallibly escapes its pursuer, so culture, when it becomes an end in itself, brings only disappointment and a sort of wisdom in which there is much indignation and little joy. For joy is found only where there is peace, and "peace," says St. Thomas, of Aquin, is "the tranquillity of order and has its seat in the will." Now order implies a definite end in view together with definite principles of action and, being seated in the will, it is entirely inconsistent with that idea of a noble character which is gradually coming into acceptance. For in our days we seem to regard a hero not as one whose life is ruled by high purpose and noble resolve, but as the fortunate possessor of a number of right impulses which come into play of themselves when they are wanted. Free-will our scientific philosophers would have us discard as an assumption both unnecessary and unwarranted, since everything can be accounted for without it.

Faith and a practical belief in the higher life to come, is as necessary in the æsthetic order as it is for religion, morality and sound philosophy. Without faith there will always be disorder, hopelessness and the prevalence of gloom in art; without faith life is robbed of its motive, love of its meaning and mystery of its inner reality. The hope of the higher life is the key to all the noblest inspirations of genius; it is the key too, to all tranquil enjoyment of nature's noblest gifts. But our faith must be lively and practical, and not merely a matter of dry intellectual persuasion. We may give our unwavering assent to all the teaching of the Church, and yet remain without the Church's spirit; without being heretics we may be entirely wrong in all our practical views of life.

Instructed Christians are only too often at fault in their attitude towards nature. They do not, of course, regard it as one semi-conscious being whose spirit is the soul of all things, or at least if they do so, this Being has in their minds a merely poetical and

imaginative existence; but they regard nature apart from the Lord and Creator of Nature, and look upon the pleasure caused by the sight of a beautiful landscape as a sentiment to be cultivated and made the most of for its own sake. They feel a kind of shame when fair scenery does not make upon them that strong impression which they covet, and often they try to persuade themselves and others that they are in a very ecstasy of "cosmic emotion." They will strain the fancy in trying to call up the fauns, naiads, water-nymphs and satyrs which have been dead and buried long ago. The labor ends in nothing and they are disappointed; and if they put their thoughts in words or on canvas, the work is pronounced labored and lifeless.

Another influence which has shaped the character of our modern love of landscape is our modern love of freedom. Now true freedom, which implies self-restraint, increased responsibility, and lovingness in obedience, is very different from license and absence of due restraint. The modern mind is in rebellion against authority, and with it freedom means the right of men to think what they like, say what they like, and do what they like, in the fond hope that, when they have enjoyed their freedom long enough, they will learn how to use it, and will infallibly say, think, and do the right thing by instinct. For they tell us that false beliefs and bad habits will follow the law of the destruction of the unfittest and only what is Utopian will survive. Just as the modern man of culture does not wish to be interfered with himself, so does he like all other creatures to go their own way. He therefore prefers the wildness of the woods to the formality of the garden; he loves the primroses and harebells of the field better than all the formal array of the Dutch flower bed, and regards the double dahlia as a vulgar monstrosity. He will sometimes even spend vast sums of money to make his private grounds wilder and less uniform than nature originally formed them, and the art of the landscape gardener will correct nature's tameness.

The mediæval mind, on the contrary, knowing as it did from the Church's teaching that grace and nature are at war with one another, and that man's term of life was given him to subdue nature in himself and bring his passions under the dominion of reason, was inevitably led to admire what was fashioned and rendered serviceable in the rocks and forests. Dante, says Mr. Ruskin, "does not show the smallest interest in rocks except as things to be conquered."

It should not be thought, however, that in these feelings towards untamed nature, our mediæval ancestors were right and we are wrong. Neither attitude is necessarily connected with right or wrong ways of thinking, or with good or bad dispositions of mind.

Mountains and woods were made for our good, and we are always free to dwell upon that aspect of them which we find most helpful, whether we associate them with what is nobly free or irredeemably savage. There is much that is noble and holy in the modern landscape feeling. In our childhood, when the affections are pure and vigorous, and most free from the influence of the reflecting intellect, it is indeed a gift of heaven for which those who have it in its fulness may well be thankful. But the youthful passion is capable of being used for good or ill according as it is prayerfully sobered into a source of life-long joy, or, by being selfishly indulged and vitiated by an unwise mind, it is made to produce only aching pleasures and disappointed hopes.

Our love of nature, then, must receive its chief training when it first becomes influenced by reflection. But how is this training to be effected?

Before answering this question, let us lay it down as a principle that all matters connected with the criticism of art, as well as our whole attitude towards what is beautiful in created things, should be regulated according to the far-reaching and necessary rules of Christian life which are contained in the gospel. In other words, criticism and æsthetics must be ruled and judged by theology. This assertion may at first sound startling, but, after all, it merely means that our art and our appreciation of the beautiful must be directed according to the laws of truth and goodness, as they apply to the life of fallen man, for whom there can be no abiding joy of the present, but whose peace must be in the hope of the life to come. Moreover, the application of the principle will often be entirely negative, so that whatever is merely not contrary to theological teaching may satisfy all the requirements of our rule.

Now a leading point of Christian teaching is contained in the words of St. Paul, "Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say rejoice," so that all melancholy which is associated with hopelessness and weak resolve, which loses sight of the unremitting watchfulness of God's providence and of the high spiritual issues of human life, is at once to be set down as æsthetically wrong and morally mischievous. Not but that there is a kind of melancholy which must be prayed for and cultivated, for the Master of life has said: "Blessed are they that mourn." But this latter species of sorrow is healthy and desirable, precisely because the end of it is joy, for the text goes on with the promise, "for they shall be comforted."

Our modern melancholy and prayerless lamentation, our unreasoning regret for the past, is due in great measure to the fact that our faith in the after-life is practically weak where it is not entirely lost. We have built our hopes in the present, we have

looked for high performances and the present realization of great ideals, and our disappointment has been bitter. The art and the literature which we have set up in the place of religion are appreciated only by the few, and the general sense of the age is becoming less and less alive to what is really great and elevating in the productions of our master minds. We had hoped that culture would leaven the world, and we find that the world has leavened culture.

Our culture is becoming more and more impregnated with the spirit of paganism. Pagan culture was contemptuous and exclusive in its pride; so is ours. Paganism worshipped intellect and scorned the virtue of the simple; so do we. The greatest sin in the pagan code of morality was dulness, and the greatest sinner the bore; and we, too, while we become every day more callous to sins which do men no visible harm, are growing delicately sensitive to any offence against what is called "good breeding," and will brook no infringement of the arbitrary rules of "society." At the same time, while we worship intellect and refinement, the practical aims of our life are in their nature sensual. We love our conveniences far more than our ideals; and small wonder, for our ideals are not intended for attainment, but merely to amuse our fancy. We are "children of the soil," and, being of the earth, we are earthy.

If we are ruled by the same spirit as the pagans, we shall meet with the same failure. Pagan civilization failed, because paganism could not offer to mankind any adequate idea of the higher life. Even the most spiritually minded of the Greeks and Romans scarcely dared to hope for any future existence better than the present. The most that they looked for was the sorry consolation of being remembered by their friends after death, and, if they failed of that, life itself was a failure. With the great mass of mankind, on their principles, life was indeed a failure, for the life of most men is hopelessly commonplace and unheroic. But when Christianity came into the world, men began to learn that commonplace actions need only a good will to give them an infinite value, while the failure of worldly aims and worldly ideals does not necessarily imply failure in the spiritual order. The spiritual order is paramount; the temporal stands on an altogether lower level. Hence, to the vigorous faith of the consistent Christian all decadence in art, all desecration of natural beauty, all ignorance or vulgarity in taste are evils to be lamented indeed, but small in comparison with the moral evils with which they are connected, and small, too, in comparison with that moral beauty of righteousness and its ultimate reward, from which even the uncultured many are not excluded. The cultured Christian values

his culture and the many advantages which culture brings along with it, but he regards them as we regard the tastiness of bread or the bloom upon the grape. Bread is not more nourishing for being tasty, nor the grape more delicious because of its bloom, yet life would be shorn of many a minor joy, if we lost the flavor of the one and the bloom of the other.

Culture is a blessing of which we cannot have too much, but, at the same time, it is possible for us to bestow too much attention upon it. We may, for instance, esteem it as much as, or more than, our religion by setting refinement and politeness above devotion and charity. Such over-attention will always defeat itself, and end in destroying those higher sensibilities which are necessary for true culture, and without which culture becomes "the bloom of decay." There are signs that this decay has set in. It is often said that in our days first-rate work in painting and in poetry is exceedingly rare, if it is to be found at all, while there has been no time when art has been so much talked about and so eagerly cultivated as it is in the present. It is true that there is abundance of good second-rate work and much highly trained mediocrity, but of distinction, high earnestness and inspiration there is little or none. The causes which have produced this effect are too deep-rooted and interwoven with one another for anything like clear analysis. But there is little doubt that, if we observed the relative importance of things, if we paid less attention to art and to the beauty of the created universe, while we fixed our thoughts and yearnings on the Great Source of natural and artistic beauty, then we should be much nearer to the attainment of these latter than we are now. "Is not the body more than the raiment?" and is not human life itself and the life-service of God in the world of more account than the adjuncts of life and the ornaments of the temple in which the purpose of life is worked out? "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice and all these things shall be added unto you."

It is because we have lost sight of the relative importance of the spiritual and temporal orders that our age is one of conflicts—of conflicts in science, of conflicts in art, and conflicts in the social world. Science is perverted into a weapon against religion, art is separated from religion, and is often at variance with morality; while in the human commonwealth, wealth and leisure are at war with the labor that supports them. And all this because there is no leading principle under which all human activities are united. Mankind has rejected the authority of the Catholic Church which, besides maintaining her own unchangeable unity of dogmatic teaching, has, moreover, extended her unifying influence into every department of life, by always fostering

the growth of powerful and united schools of thought, and by securing the observance of consistent principles and traditions in art. Theology, the nurse of Dante and of Fra Angelico, and once held to be the queen of sciences, and the moving spirit of art, is now scarcely dignified with even the name of science. And have art and science gained by the change? That there has been any gain to art few will maintain; while, in the case of science, an answer is not far to seek.

Theology, owing to the intimate relations between man and his Creator, is a science which, beyond all others, bears upon human life and human actions under their most important aspects. It teaches men how to *live* in the highest sense of the word; for it is that which reminds them why they live. It was the practice of Socrates, who held that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, to banish physical science entirely from his teaching. He considered that only such knowledge is worth the having as is connected with the practice of virtue, and has for its purpose to make men better than they are. The Catholic Church, taking men as she finds them, has always been more liberal in her allowances, and has never forbidden the teaching of anything except what in itself, or from circumstances, is dangerous to faith or morals. Hence, the physical sciences have the Church's fullest sanction and encouragement. At the same time, she requires that scientific men should set religion above science, the knowledge of God above the knowledge of animals and stones, and the discipline of Christian life above all the rules of science and art. This observance of due order and subordination in human pursuits is so far from degrading science that it gives it a new purpose and meaning. An infidel scientist, let us suppose, who has spent the best years of his life in working out some theory of planetary motion, is already near his death, when he finds out that he has been starting from wrong data, and his end is embittered by the thought that his life has been thrown away. Not so the instructed Christian, in like circumstances; knowing as he does the Catholic doctrine of intentions, he has every reason to believe that his labor, though scientifically lost, has been morally productive of results unspeakably more valuable to himself than the most astounding discoveries in the physical world. He has worked for the love of God, and in the service of God there is no failure.

Having shown that the spirit of our times is in need of a strong ruling principle to give it consistency, seriousness and a hope that is founded on faith; having seen, moreover, that such a principle may be secured by giving to theology its due place as the queen of sciences, we may pass on to consider how the saints have followed out the principles of theology and religion in their attitude

towards external nature. But here it may be objected that the saints are not our best guides in a matter of this sort, that as we are looking for natural rather than supernatural light, it is to the painters and poets that we should go rather than to the saints. For the saints, it will be said, were so detached from earthly things, so taken up with the thought of what transcends nature, that all the natural light that was in them was overwhelmed by the supernatural, as completely as starlight is overwhelmed by sunlight. It might even seem that faith and the light of grace were a hindrance rather than a help to the appreciation of landscape. The purely religious painters paid scant attention to natural scenery, and it is only in our days of darkness, when nature-worship has supplanted the rational service of God, that landscape has been studied with a closeness and loving attention which a mediæval artist would have reserved for something higher than inanimate matter. We are living, as it were, in a long, dark night of winter, when the smallest stars are visible in the far-off absence of the sunlight.

It is true that many of the saints paid scant attention to physical beauty, but this was by no means the case with all. It was not the case with St. Catherine of Siena, who, by the way, seems to have been familiar with the writings of Dante, and was herself a poetess of no mean merit. Her keen sense of natural beauty was elevated and intensified by faith. She loved nature because in the external forms of it she saw the symbols of divine truths. One of her disciples tells us that "she sought God in all that she saw. I remember how, when she saw the flowers in the meadows, she would say to us, 'See how all these things speak to us of God! Do not these red flowers remind us of the rosy wounds of our Jesus?' And if she saw an ant-hill, she would say, 'Those little creatures came forth from the mind of God. He took as much care in creating the insects and the flowers as in creating the angels!'"

The saints often appear to us as lovers of nature, but never as nature-worshippers. Their affection for their inanimate fellow-creatures was deep, peaceful and entirely exempt from that unrestful attachment to created beauty which so often embitters the parting from it. In reading St. Francis of Assisi's "Cantic of the Sun," we enter into the feelings of one who loved what was in the world simply because it was all made by God. God is the primary and direct object of his love; everything else is loved in God and for God's sake.

"Praised be my Lord God with all his creatures; and especially our brother the sun, who brings us the day and who brings us the light; fair is he and shining with a very great splendor: O Lord, he signifies to us Thee!"

* * * * *

"Praised be my Lord for our sister water; who is very serviceable unto us, and humble and precious and clean."

Even the unlovely and painful circumstances of life are made the motives of equal praise with what is beautiful and pleasant.

"Praised be my Lord for all those who pardon one another for His love's sake, and who endure weakness and tribulation; blessed are they who peaceably shall endure, for thou, O Most Highest, shalt give them a crown!

"Praised be my Lord for our sister, the death of the body, from whom no man escapeth."¹

Of this canticle Matthew Arnold truly says that it is "poetry treating the world according to the demand of the heart and imagination," that it takes the world "by its inward symbolical side," whereas the poem of the pagan Theocritus "is poetry treating the world according to the demand of the senses" and taking "the world by its outward, sensible side."

Nature is like a book written in exquisitely beautiful type. The pagan sensualist loves the letters of the book because of their own inherent beauty, while the Christian saint loves them for the beauty of the supra-sensual things which they symbolize. It is the meaning conveyed by the letters which he regards rather than the letters themselves. The brightness of the sun and of the stars, the complex working of the powers of the universe, "fire, hail, snow, ice and the breath of the storm," are in themselves beautiful to contemplate in the soul of a saint; but their beauty is overwhelmed by the thoughts which they suggest of the Divine Being who made them after the image of His own original uncreated beauty. "For He spoke and they were made: He gave the word and they were created" (Psalm 148). Nay more, since the being of all created things depends absolutely upon the will of their Creator, and since of themselves they are nothing, it follows that of themselves they have no value except in so far as they manifest to us God.

It is this spirit of intense love for, yet perfect detachment from, creatures which is peculiar to the supernaturalized vision of the saints. St. Ignatius, in his "Spiritual Exercises," bids the exercitant contemplate all the circumstances of life, all creatures lovely and unlovely, as instruments to help out the purpose of life. Some are directly helpful in our use, others indirectly so in our avoidance of them. The beauty of nature is to be dwelt upon when we wish to excite feelings of spiritual joy, while it is to be banished from our thoughts when the emotion which we wish to arouse is sorrow for sin and a realization of the unseen

¹ From M. Arnold's translation.

and untold evil which sin involves. In the *Contemplation for Obtaining Divine Love*, which forms the conclusion of the "Spiritual Exercises," we are told to consider "how God dwells in His creatures; in the elements, giving them being; in the plants, giving them growth; in the animals, giving them feeling; and in men, giving them understanding"; and again "how God works and toils, so to speak, on my account in created things, as in the heavens, the elements, plants, fruits, the flocks of the field, and so on, giving them their being and maintaining them therein."

We are led to conclude, then, from these and other examples of the saints that their view of nature was largely taken up with the deeper theological truths which underlie all the phenomena of the universe. Their thoughts when not uttered in the poetic form are at least matter for the highest poetry. With them there is none of that waywardness of the fancy which we find in secular poets who look upon things out of their relation to their Maker. He was a poet but not a saint who wrote:

"Even as the sun with purple-colored face
Had ta'en his last leave of the weeping morn,"

Here we have an example of that sweetly wanton imagery and graceful trifling which abounds even in the greatest poets. With it we may compare a stanza of St. Ambrose's hymn, "In Aurora:"

"Christusque nobis sit cibus,
Fortusque noster sit fides,
Laeti bibamus sobriam
Ebrietatem spiritus:"

where we still have the same beauty of imagery rendered yet more beautiful by the sublime purpose which it serves. In Shakespeare's poem the imagery adorns a frolic of the imagination, in St. Ambrose it is part of a prayer. And so with all the saints the idea of nature was included in the idea of something still grander and more absorbing, and that was the idea of God.

This unity of conception is clearly, although implicitly set forth by St. Ignatius in the *Foundation* of the "Spiritual Exercises." He says: "Man has been erected that he may praise, revere and serve God, and by so doing save his soul; and all other things upon the face of the earth have been created for man to help him in the attainment of the end for which he was made." Mr. Ruskin makes a right application of the same truth when he tells us that the aim of all true art is the glory of God.

In this fundamental principle so clearly set forth by St. Ignatius, we see declared in general the relations in which mankind, nature and art are related to one another and to God. It is this principle which makes for the harmonious blending of all things in one; of

the sciences in one circle the centre of which is theology; of all the arts in one harmonious choir united together for the one object of service and praise.

We depart from this principle if we habitually contemplate nature in an unprayerful frame of mind. For nature has been made lovely precisely in order that we may easily fulfil the precept, "Pray always" and "Take thy joy ever in the Lord." And the joy will come all the more readily, and the barren trees of the forest will cease to be fruitless, when the thought of personal enjoyment gives way to that of praise. Not but that the fancy must sometimes have its toys, and that we may people the woods with all the sylvan deities of old if these can recreate our mind, but we must recognize these fancies to be the toys that they are and not as worthy of our serious thought. We should bear in mind what the universe really is—a temple built for the life-service of God. Its beauties make that service joyful and build up for us a vision of the eternal beauty which we look for in heaven. The unlovely aspect of life, its failures, its frustrated aims and the widespread evil which we meet within the world are intended, as far as we are concerned, to hinder us from becoming unduly attached to our temporary abode, and from luxuriating in the light that was intended for our guidance. Our joy is to be in the hope of what is to come; our disappointments, except at the loss of grace, are never, strictly speaking, material, and faith tells us that we ought to be the better for them, since they are all "instruments of love." The melancholy of autumn, the "idle tears" that "rise from the heart and gather in the eyes," when we think of "the days that are no more," never need bring with them any vital or enervating sadness. Sorrow there is and pain, for these shall last as long as there is sin to bewail and flesh to endure, but they shall rest upon a foundation of peacefulness and of a joy that blends with and leavens the sorrow into something that differs in kind from the comfortless mourning of such as have lost their hope.

In conclusion, our love of nature, in order to be a deep and permanent source of joy, must be prayerful, and directed primarily to that function of praise which is the chief end for which we, with all living things, were placed in this world. With the saints to live is to love, and every action is an act of love. With them religion and every-day life are one and the same. Every forest-path is their cloister, every solitude their place of prayer, and their love of nature is an aspect of their love of God. It is because their attitude towards nature has been banished from the modern landscape feeling, that that feeling is less joyful, less helpful and less profound than we hope it may one day become.

JAMES KENDAL, S.J.

THE CHIPPEWAS OF LAKE SUPERIOR.

OF all the North American Indian races, there is no nation about whom, and of whose language, customs and history, so much has been written, as the Chippewa, or, as Father Baraga wrote, the Ochipwe, of Lake Superior.

James Constantine Pilling, in his greatest work, "The Bibliography of the Algonquian Language," describes, pages 86-89, under Chippewa caption, three hundred and ninety-six distinct works.

Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, who for thirty years was officially connected with Indian affairs in Michigan, was an extensive contributor to what relates to Chippewa history, to the national traditions, to the customs and to the cult of the Chippewas, as well as to the romance of their history.

If his voluminous works were reduced to 12mo. pages, they would be equal to thirty-five or more volumes of the size of Cardinal Gibbons's "Faith of Our Fathers." Schoolcraft's works contain about all that is authentic, and much that is traditional, of the history of the people of this Indian nation.

Their historical renown belongs to the past, while their present status is a melancholy one.

For two hundred years the Chippewas had been at war with the Sioux; these two nations "buried the hatchet" in 1825, at the treaty of Prairie du Chien, negotiated by General Cass.

This treaty was supplemented by the treaty of Fond du Lac, negotiated August, 1826, by General Cass and Colonel Thomas L. McKenney.

The most glorious, as it is also the most bloody event in Chippewa history, was the complete annihilation of the Iroquoian army, which, about the middle of the seventeenth century, in a gigantic fleet of war canoes, invaded Chippewa soil and encamped on a point fifteen miles above Sault Ste. Marie.

This camp was surprised by the Chippewas during a great storm, and the Iroquoian army, which had come more than one thousand miles from the council fire of the Iroquoian Confederacy at Onondaga, was butchered in the darkness and confusion of the attack without mercy, while but a few stragglers escaped to carry the story of the bloody disaster to the cantons of the Confederacy.¹

¹ The scene of this bloody tragedy is known as "Point Iroquois." Its Indian name translated is: "The place of the Iroquois bones."

Had the Iroquoians subdued the Chippewa nation, the back bone of the great Algonquian Confederacy, comprising more than one hundred Indian nations, would have been broken; the colony of New France would have been without Indian support in the Northwest, while the political supremacy of the Confederacy of the Five Nations, of the "Country of the Lakes" of New York, would have been established over all the Indian nations inhabiting the territory between the Mohawk River and Hudson's Bay.

The Chippewa, the oldest and most powerful of the Algonquian Confederate Nations of the Northwest, had for centuries lived upon the coasts and islands of Lake Superior. Chippewa tribes had been domiciled on the shores of St. Louis Bay, Bois Brulé River, the Apostle Islands, La Pointe and all along the coast down to Sault Ste. Marie; the islands of Lake Huron, Lake Michigan, the Georgian Bay, and below Lake Huron down the St. Clair to within twenty-five miles of Detroit, where, on Walpole Island, six hundred Chippewas and several hundred Ottawas live semi-civilized at the present day, under the protection of the British flag.

But the chief canton of the Chippewas, according to General Cass, was at the head of Lake Superior, where the National and Confederate council fire had been burning for centuries. According to the same eminent authority, this locality was the centre of the intelligence, as it was of the power, of the Indian nations of North America, before the advent of the Iroquoians on the St. Lawrence, and long before the whites had "squatted" upon Indian soil.

It is not, therefore, without significance the phrase we have made use of: "the renown of the Chippewas belongs to the past!"

As at present constituted, the State of Michigan includes within her boundaries an Upper and a Lower Peninsula.

A glance at the map of the Western States will show that the Lower Peninsula is surrounded on all sides by lakes and rivers, having, as its frontier, the British boundary line, extending from Sault Ste. Marie down to the headwaters of Lake Erie, while the Upper Peninsula is washed by the waters of Lake Superior, along its northern, its eastern and its western coast, from Ontonagon County down to Sault Ste. Marie. It is bounded on the south by Wisconsin, by a line drawn from Menomonee on Green Bay, and running north to Montreal River, in Ontonagon County.

When, in 1836, the pioneer statesmen of the Territory of Michigan applied for her admission to the American Union, the Lower Peninsula, stripped of ancient appendages, with Lakes Huron, Michigan and Superior as her northern, eastern and western boundaries, as formed by nature, and with a well established

southern boundary line dividing the territory from Ohio and Indiana, was offered as the domain of the postulant for admission.

Ohio objected to the southern boundary line because it included Toledo in Michigan. The latter determined to hold Toledo; hence the story of the "Toledo War." President Andrew Jackson did not like the prospect of a conflict over so small an object as was Toledo in 1836. For political reasons he wanted the question settled, and Michigan was admitted a State on the conditions that Toledo was to be restored to Ohio, and in its place the Upper Peninsula, commonly known as the "Lake Superior Region," was to be included within her northerly boundary lines. While the Lower Peninsula combines great advantages of soil and climate, the Upper Peninsula, during a decade of years or more, was considered as an annex like Alaska, even at the present day, offering no climatic or residential advantages to induce immigration.

Had her mineral richness been known at Washington at the time, it is probable Wisconsin would have claimed the rocky and sterile region as being within her natural boundary lines.

It has been stated that Lake Superior is the largest lake of fresh water in the developed regions of the Western Hemisphere.

Its coast line, from the "Sault" to its headwaters at Fond du Lac, is stated to be 529 miles long. It is 170 miles wide, and it has an elevation of 630 feet above the level of the Atlantic Ocean at the mouth of the St. Lawrence.

Viewed from the deck of a modern Lake Superior passenger steamer, during the months of July or August, the coast appears attractive. One can see wonderful examples of castle-shaped rocks, monumental urns of great size, pictured rocks and beautiful bays.

The mirage in the upper waters on a fine sunny morning is bewildering, especially in the vicinity of the Apostle Islands.

What seems attractive to a tourist loses all charm by closer contact.

After you have "coasted" in an open boat during the most favorable¹ month in the year, which is July, from the Sault to

¹ The itinerary of a canoe trip on Lake Superior coast from the "Sault" to Fond du Lac, in the nomenclature of 1826, is: From the "Sault" to Point aux Pins, miles, 6; to Point Iroquois, scene of the massacre of the seventeenth century and entrance to Lake Superior, 9; Tonquamenon river, 15; Sheldrake river, 9; White Fish Point, 6; Vermilion Point, 9; Twin river, 12; Sucker river, 10; Grand Sable Point, 20; Pictured Rocks, 12; Miner's river, 9; Grand Island, 6; Rivière aux poissons qui rit, 15; Chocolate river, 15; Rivière mort, 9; Point d'aise, 21; Burnt river, 15; Huron islands, 9; Traverse island, 21; Tobacco river, 9; Rivière bête gris, 12; Point Kewewana (sic), 15; Grand marais and Clemen's river, 21; Portage, 19; Gravat's river, scene of his murder, 15; Rivière aux misère, 9; Fire Steel river, 18; Ontonagon river, 6; Little Iron river, 12; Great Iron river, 3; Porcupine mountains, 6; Presque'isle, 21; Black river, 6; Petite fille noyé (point), 15; Grande rivière Mon-

Fond du Lac, camping at night on some sandy beach, where the mosquitoes have their nests, and where the incessant splashing of the breakers of the angry waters of this "great inland sea" remind you of your impotence to brave its power, while the midnight frigidity which settles upon the scene chills all poetic emotion, the real ugliness of the shores of Lake Superior will have been thoroughly appreciated, when, after a journey lasting three weeks, you land on some one of the picturesque islands in the more agreeable atmosphere which prevails in the vicinity of its headwaters. Colonel Thomas L. McKenney, United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, who made such a journey as we have referred to, nine years before the advent of Father Baraga in the upper peninsula of Michigan, writes, as to these shores:

"It would defy the art of the most skillful to make this region productive; it is barrenness intensified. Even if the soil was more fruitful, summer flies over it like a bird, and leaves so little of the fruitful season as to forbid the hope that anything would be made to grow there. I consider this whole region doomed to perpetual barrenness."¹

The quotations we propose to make from Colonel McKenney's letters will give a fair idea of the condition of the people of the Chippewa tribes at the time of the negotiation of the treaty of Fond du Lac, in 1826. Among the party who accompanied him were some of the most eminent authorities in the West in all that related to Indian affairs.²

"The Indians of Lake Superior," writes Colonel McKenney, "are Chippewas, and from Michilimacinae, which, in a direct line, may be eighty or ninety miles east of Lake Superior, and westward to Fond du Lac, they number about 8000. They are divided into tribes, and to each band there is a chief. Of their extreme poverty, and the wretched and miserable condition in which they exist, *I have not language to give you an adequate description.*

"Something of what relates to their sufferings you may have gleaned from my letters and journal. I have no wish to dwell upon these, nor will I.

"These Indians draw their subsistence from the lake and rivers, from the forests and from the earth. From the lake and rivers they take fish, from the forest furs, and from the earth roots and berries.

"But their improvidence is such that they are three-fourths of their time starving, and many of them, as I have often repeated, die annually of want! The fish of the

trear, 6; Bad river, 12; Isle St. Michel, 9; Point au Sauble, 9; Rivière detour, 3; Rivière Framboise, 6; Lis-ca-na-con river, 18; Cranberry river, 12; Iron river, 12; Grand brûlé river, 6; Rivière aux peupliers, 9; A-ma-ne-con river, 3; Fond du Lac and mouth of Rivière St. Louis, 9—529 miles.—*Tour to the Lakes*, pp. 271-3.

¹ *Tour to the Lakes*, p. 378.

² The expedition comprised: General Lewis Cass, Colonel McKenney, U. S. Commissioner; Henry Rowe Schoolcraft; Colonel Edwards, Secretary; Colonel Croghan, U. S. A.; John Hulbert, "Sault"; George B. Porter, subsequently Territorial Governor; Major Whipple and E. A. Brush, of Detroit; Henry Conner, of Detroit, interpreter; Captain Boardman, with troops; Dr. Zina Pitcher, Surgeon, U. S. A.; Commissaries, *voyageurs*, Indian pilots and guides.

lake are fine and abundant, but as none of these Indians ever think of to-morrow, they make no provision in summer against the wants and the rigors of winter.

"In winter the lake and rivers are frozen, and the fish are not taken; in winter, therefore, which reigns over all this region for five months out of twelve, these destitute people derive no support from the lake and rivers. The same providence leads them to kill the game in seasons when it is destructive to its multiplication, and hence the entire amount of furs on the whole coast of Lake Superior may now be estimated as not exceeding annually in cost \$23,500; and supposing this to be equally distributed by the American Fur Company among the individuals of the tribes, each one would receive less than \$3 per year, which is not enough to buy a blanket of the most ordinary quality.¹

"There is, therefore, little left for the Indians for the greater part of the year except roots and berries. The principal of the former they call *wanb-es-see-pin*. It is a root like a potato, only smaller, and grows in wet, cold ground, is mealy when boiled or roasted, and no doubt nourishing."

This outline of the status of the Chippewas was written at Fond du Lac in 1826, and published in 1827.

The climate of the Lake Superior region, so long the home of the Chippewa nation, and where the remnants of its tribes still remain, is fairly well described by a contributor to "Harper's Magazine," who, writing of the copper and iron mines, says:

"Mining regions are proverbially barren and rocky, and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan—at least that portion of it which is so productive of iron and copper—forms no exception to this rule. It is old—older than most of our hills, for it was the first land that was attached to the original Laurentian nucleus about which our continent has been formed. The face of the country is rugged and seamed and worn. Were it not for its mineral wealth it would remain permanently a wilderness. Lumber

¹ During the year 1825-6 the American Fur Company bought at their lake posts furs, varying according to quality, in value of each pack, at

	Packs.	Value.
Fond du Lac,	150	\$10,000
Folle Avoine (Green Bay),	30	2,000
Cote Royale,	30	3,000
Lac Flambeau,	80	3,000
Isle St. Michel,	10	1,500
Ontonagon,	20	3,000
Sault Ste. Marie,	10	1,000
Total,		\$23,500

It was on the above results, which he gives, that Col. McKenney arrives at his \$3 per capita estimate.

It will be observed that most of the packs were from Fond du Lac and vicinity.

Col. McKenney overlooked the operations of the North West Fur Company, of London, whose factory was at the British side of the "Sault," and whose operations, extending from Montreal to Hudson's Bay, were greater than any other fur company in North America. Not only was their stock at the "Sault" larger than that of their competitor, but their goods were better and their prices lower. Besides, their commandants and agents were not sectarian propagandists like those of the American Fur Company. The North West Company probably shipped furs double in value to those of the former. Taking into account, also, the operations of individual fur traders, the aggregate sum to be paid each Chippewa was probably \$12.00.

companies invade it here and there, and retire after having robbed the forest of the pine which is to be found in a few scattered localities. It would be an eddy where the stream of Western emigration had left a few Indians and woodsmen to subsist by the methods of primitive life.

"The land is generally valueless from the farmer's point of view, for the soil is a light drift—too light for wheat,—and the climate a winter modified by a season of summer weather too short for Indian corn to ripen. Hay, oats, and potatoes yield the farmer a fair return, but the climate is so rigorous that the securing of shelter and fuel calls for so large an amount of energy that little is left to devote to cultivation. It is a proof of this that a very inconsiderable fraction of the population attempts to subsist by farming, although the freight from Chicago is added to the price of all the staple articles of production—hay, for instance, being from \$20 to \$25 a ton, and milk 10 cents a quart. Curiously enough, strawberries and currants reach a perfection unknown in more hospitable latitudes, a Marquette strawberry resembling in size a Seckel pear, and in flavor a wild strawberry. This is owing, no doubt, to the fact that in northern latitudes—Marquette is about as far north as Quebec—the few summer days have from eighteen to twenty hours of sunlight and after glow, and vegetable growth is virtually uninterrupted by darkness. Light, the botanists tell us, bears the same relation to aroma that heat does to sweetness. Such strawberries as these must be visited to be seen, for they are too large and too delicate to bear travel themselves. I have spoken of the climate as a winter modified by a short summer.

"In July the monthly range was 50°, and the lowest recorded temperature 38°.

"Near the lake the presence of so large a body of water, which at Marquette never falls below 52°, and on the extreme northern end of the peninsula never below 48°, acts as an equalizer, and restricts the range within comparatively narrow limits.

"This low temperature of the lake water, which is higher than that of any of the streams entering it, precludes the idea of bathing.

"As a consequence few of the native lake sailors can swim, and it would be of little avail to them as a means of preserving life if they could, for the most robust man if he falls into Lake Superior chills and dies in a few moments. The numerous trout streams in the woods are of an icy coldness. The snow which falls to a depth of six or seven feet, melts and sinks into the sandy ground, to reappear in deep seated springs with a temperature of 39°, which is exactly equal to the average annual temperature of the locality.

"There is one short period of the June day when this northern forest region loses its wild, stern character.

"It is when the long twilight of the summer evenings passes through the beautiful modifications of the after-glow.

"The setting of the sun is followed by the usual grayish light, but instead of fading gradually into darkness, the western sky for a space of ninety degrees on the horizon, and to a height of fifteen degrees or more, becomes filled with a soft yellow radiance. This lasts till 10 o'clock or later. At half past 9 one can read easily.

"The light is evenly diffused, and there are no shadows. It is as mystic as moonlight, but warmer, more kindly sympathetic.

"The thick forests prevent the sun from warming the ground or the water. And finally the lake is so deep, its bed reaching several hundred feet below the level of the sea—that the summer air has little effect upon it before it is again covered with ice.¹

"There is no other place on the globe where so large a body of cold fresh water lies at an elevation of 600 feet above the sea. The air in contact with this deep chilly water seems to acquire a peculiar vivifying and refreshing quality, quite impossible to describe, but very easy to appreciate. The forest southwest of Portage Lake is more than 100 miles long; it extends into Wisconsin and consists principally of hard maple. It is capable of supplying the continent with sugar. Until some discoveries of copper are made in it, it will remain one of the finest bodies of woodland in the country.

¹ It is not an unusual occurrence to find large blocks of ice which had been cast on the shore of the lake, in the months of July and August.

"There are many lovely little lakes and streams abounding with trout scattered through it. The eastern portion contains many impenetrable swamps overgrown with tamarack and cedar. The western portion of this great forest has less of the savage and forbidding aspect peculiar to Northern woods, and is comparatively open.

"The road to Ontonagon passes through it in one direction and is barely practicable for uncovered wagons. It is worth enduring a long railroad journey to be able to drive 40 miles through trees with the consciousness that you are leaving human habitations farther behind you at every step. The forest is singularly devoid of animal life.

"Mile after mile is uncheered by a solitary bird. The few Indians who are left on the Upper Peninsula are a peaceful harmless folk. They live by hunting and fishing, acting as guides for exploring parties (in search of mineral deposits), and a few work in a desultory way in the pinneries. Many of them own boats, and live in framed houses, and have adopted the white man's clothes. The priest in charge of the Catholic mission at L'Anse, whose knowledge of them is perhaps as accurate as that of any other person, puts their number at 2000, nearly all of whom can speak English imperfectly. Their tribal relation is slowly decaying—in fact, exists only as a tradition. He says they cannot resist the fatal effects of the vices of the lower classes of the whites with whom they come in contact, and that the numbers of the full-bloods are gradually shrinking.

"It is fortunate that the Jesuits came into the country before the Americans, so that the Indian and French local names were firmly fastened before our people took possession; and instead of the eternal Jackson and Madison and Adams, and North this and New that, we have Escanaba, Negaunee, Marquette, Isle Royale, Grande Portage, Allouez, Pewabic, Ontonagon, Menomonee, and Michigamme, the last a beautiful word, pronounced as it is with the broad *a*. It is the name of a river, a canoe trip down which has all the charm of wood life without its discomfort.

"Pewabic, signifying iron, is the Indian name of a range of hills, which has been given to a mine, which we trust may immortalize it."

The wretched condition of the Chippewa Indian of Lake Superior during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, may be traced to his condition in the past, and to his surroundings during these decades. The Chippewa is of a high caste Indian race. In the plenitude of Indian power in the Northwest, he was trained in his youth to the war path, to be an expert hunter, and to excel in the athletic field. No attention was paid to the tillage of the soil; while to labor for the support and comfort of himself and of his family, except in the hunting field, was considered degrading to his standing as a chief or a warrior. All the toil and drudgery of his social existence fell to his squaw, his domestic slave. When civilization had closed the war path, the greatest incentive to the ambition of one trained to the excitement of Indian war, was ended. Like Shakspeare's Moor, Othello's occupation had in reality gone. There was left the hunting field.

But the same cause which had closed the war path to the Chippewa brave, gradually made the hunting field less available to the Chippewa hunter's skill. The proximity of the white races to the forests, alarmed the nobler animals, accustomed to solitude, and they have fled from the hunters' range.

There remained none of the bison; but few families of the elk,

and diminished numbers of deer, which latter became gradually less, because the animals were slaughtered contrary to Indian law, during the season when they should have been left to reproduce their species. The bear had become more wary and more difficult to capture or kill; although he was of a sort of game prized for his fur, his fine lard, and for his excellent meat. The smaller wild animals still remained; but their fur was not so valuable; while their meat, except that of the raccoon, was unfit for food. No more excellent fish may be found in the world, than in the waters of the bays which abound in the coast of Lake Superior. The salmon, the trout, and the white fish especially, which are caught in these semi-chilly waters, have solid flesh, few bones, but little oil, and are of exquisite flavor.

Practically, the fisherman cannot take fish in these waters during six months of the year; for winter begins in October and lasts until May. Why the Indian should not secure during the more favorable months, a supply of such excellent food as this fish, cured, dried, and smoked, would have been for the long winter, for himself and for his family, is a question to which there is but a simple answer: Labor was considered degrading according to the code of a Chippewa warrior.

He would not work for his own and for his family's support. Long continued idleness had made him improvident.¹

Had his squaw attempted to fish from the abundant supply nature had provided so near, she would have perished from cold.

But given the fish, she would have cured them with sugar, and hung them to dry, and to be smoked from the rafters of her lodge.

While nature has provided the Indian races of more agreeable climates than that of the Lake Supérieur region, with a soil which yields abundant crops of Indian corn, which is the great solace, as it is the staple food, of the Indian household, the Chippewa was deprived of this nourishing food; but in its stead, the fish, which is so excellent, was given him in the place of Indian corn. He might have secured all that was requisite as a food supply during the winter, but he would not, for the reasons stated: and himself and his family starved in consequence.

There was another, if not a more fatal evil operating all through these decades against the Chippewa's welfare; this was whiskey. It was bad in quality, comparatively cheap, and to be had in unstinted quantity, when means for its purchase was available. It has been stated, that at Drummond's Island below the Sault, the

¹ If the Chippewas had not been so improvident and lazy—they might have produced thousands of tons of maple sugar annually, in the great maple forest southwest of Portage Lake, which is, as stated, 100 miles long, "large enough to supply the continent" with this kind of sugar."

Chippewas and Ottawas assembled in July and August, thousands of the former, to receive their annual presents from the British government. Among these, were "Mackinac blankets," the best and warmest known in North America, for the Indians; and warm strouds for the squaws.

"We saw a log house on the island," writes Colonel McKenney, "where a sutler had fixed himself, and I counted on the shore seventeen empty whiskey barrels. For their contents, these poor wretches (the Chippewas) had exchanged their fine 'Mackinac blankets,' and strouds, and kettles, and knives, and calicoes, that had been distributed to them."

"It is not possible," he continues, "to give a description of the appearance of these staggering and besotted Indians."

The most profitable article in the stock of an Indian trader, was whiskey. And, generally, the annual result of a Chippewa's hunting campaign, when disposed of to the trader, was invested in whiskey.

But the traders were not the only factors of the Indian's misery.

The American Fur Company sold more whiskey to the Indians in exchange for their furs, than all the traders; while the preliminary method of the latter was to make the Indian drunk, and then buy his pack for whiskey, the company's agents acted fairly, paying the current value for the Indian's furs, in such articles as he named, but the greater part of the equivalent was whiskey.

Here is Colonel McKenney's apology for the whiskey traffic of the American Fur Company with the Chippewas:

It would be doing injustice to those who have attended the Indians to this treaty and who are connected with the American Fur Company,² and I will name Mr. Dingle for an example, were I not to say of them that they appear in all respects to be worthy of their trust, and kind in their disposition towards the Indians.

"But even these meritorious men confirm the existence of the evil of the whiskey traffic and deplore it, as at war with the happiness of the Indians, and the peace of our borders."

They say, however, "whiskey does get into the Indian country, and it is dealt out to the Indians; unless we can compete with those who will employ it as an article of trade, we can do nothing."

Colonel McKenney might have gone further in the same direction, had he induced the sanctimonious Methodist promoter, Mr. Dingle, to explain what proportion of the \$23,500 worth of furs purchased from the Chippewas in 1825-26, by the American Fur Company, had been paid for in whiskey.

¹ These blankets imported by the North West Fur Company, and supplied to the British Indian Department, were probably the best of the kind known in commerce.

² The Colonel probably refers to the officials of the company who came to the treaty of Fond du Lac, and opened additional trading booths.

It would seem from what we have quoted, that during the decades under consideration, the fur-trade was in reality, so far as the unfortunate Chippewas were concerned, a whiskey traffic; but, not only did these Indians part with their furs for the white man's *fire-water*, but their warm blankets and comfortable clothing given them by the British government each year at Drummond's Island to protect them from the rigor of a Lake Superior winter, as stated, went to the remorseless trader for the same evil factor. "Could our citizens," writes Colonel McKenney, "see the degrading effects which whiskey produces upon this already hapless race, their humanity might be relied on to interfere and stop its further introduction among these wretched people. The evil to be felt, must be *seen*."

"No description can convey any adequate conception of the degraded and wretched condition in which the use of this drink has involved the Chippewa people."

The American Fur Company, having posts at Mackinac, Sault Ste. Marie, L'Anse, Ontonagon, Isle St. Michel, Lac Flambeau, Cote Royal, Green Bay, and Fond du Lac, patronized sectarian missions at most of their posts.

The most extensive of these was the Presbyterian mission on the island of Mackinac; the missionary was one of the pioneer Presbyterian ministers of Michigan, Rev. Mr. Ferry, an exemplary and a zealous man; it was conducted under the auspices of Robert Stuart,¹ agent of the American Fur Company, at the expense of the Presbyterian Board of Missions.

"What shall I say," writes Colonel McKenney, "of Mrs. Stuart, of this excellent and accomplished lady whose whole soul is in this work of mercy. The mission school is, in her eye, the green spot of the island; and she loves to look upon it. But this is not all. With her influence and means, she has held up the hands that were ready, in the beginning of this establishment, to hang down.

"I do wish you could see this school, and hear Mrs. Stuart talk about it. She is always eloquent, but when the missionary establishment is the theme, she is more than eloquent."²

There can be no question raised as to the merit of Mr. and Mrs. Stuart's missionary work on the island of Mackinac, there being at the time no resident Catholic missionary on the island. It was beneficent work while it lasted. When, in time, the mission was abandoned, after the American Fur Company had discontinued

¹ Mr. Stuart, during the "forties" was United States Indian agent. He was an old-time resident of Detroit, of high standing and of rank in Presbyterian circles. His brother David, a bachelor, is mentioned in Irving's *Astoria*: both were "gentlemen of the old school."

² *Tour to the Lakes*, letter from Mackinac, August 29, 1826, p. 388.

operations at all their lake posts,¹ the "mission house," over which Mrs. Stuart presided, remained for several years vacant.

It was subsequently changed into a hotel, and managed as such under the name of the "Mission House." It was our quarters during the summer for several years. It is located on rising ground, overlooking the bay and surrounding waters, and it is a charming retreat during July and August. It has been enlarged, and it is generally filled with guests during these months.

There was an Episcopalian mission under similar auspices at Sault Ste. Marie, and a Methodist mission at L'Anse, under the patronage of the company's agent, Mr. Dingle, whose name has been mentioned by Colonel McKenney. Of the missions at the other posts of the American Fur Company we have no authentic information. It is evident that while this great company was providing the principal element so fatal to the welfare of the Chippewas, it, at the same time, patronized sectarian missions for their regeneration and conversion to Christianity. The Sault Ste. Marie, "Leap of the St. Mary," as named by the Jesuits, is a historic locality in American Catholic annals. The standard of the Cross was raised here and the Chippewas baptized by the Jesuit missionary, Charles Raymbaut, in 1640, before Eliot had begun to preach to the unfortunate Massachusetts at Nonatum.

The river at the "Sault" is about a mile and a quarter wide, and the rapids or cataract, whose bottom is formed by huge bowlders, over which the waters leap and rush madly down to the level below, roaring and foaming for three-quarters of a mile, through a breadth of over 1000 feet, create an atmosphere of freshness which can be compared only to that of Niagara, where these same waters take their grandest leap on their way to the Atlantic. The scene is a wild one, and it has but little changed during more than two and a half centuries. But geologists will tell you that in ages remote from the visit of the missionaries in 1640, the overflow of Lake Superior did not descend to the lakes below, as it has for centuries. They will point you to a range of large bowlders in the rear of the "Sault," over whose polished surface the waste of the waters of this "great inland sea" coursed in torrent and foam on their way to the Mississippi River.

"The staples of this place are white fish and maple sugar," wrote Colonel McKenney, while visiting the "Sault" in 1826, "and some, but not many, furs."

"The fish are taken in great quantities in two seasons; the first commences in May

¹ The foundation of John Jacob Astor's great fortune was laid during these decades, by the profits of the American Fur Company in these lake regions, and westward to the Pacific.

and ends in July; the second, which is the season when the white fish is in its prime, begins with September and ends with October. This fish taken here being in the universal estimation the finest that swims. Were it not for this beneficent and prolific provision of Divine Providence, it would be impossible to sustain life in this locality.¹

"Sugar, made from the sap of the maple tree, is the next great staple. Nearly all the Indian and half-breed women in this locality manufacture maple sugar, as light in color but far richer than Havana sugar. The family of Mr. John Johnston, among others, produce several tons each year."

The commercial value of "Indian sugar," while it was supplied in such abundance as late as the "forties," was in Detroit from \$9 to \$10 per 100 pounds. It was preferred for family use to cane sugar. It was packed in "mococs" of birch bark, containing about 40 pounds, the cover fastened, and it was always a current medium of commercial exchange. The Chippewa squaws were accustomed to come down from the lakes to Detroit in the summer season, in their bark canoes, with a cargo of "mococs," which they exchanged with the merchants for other essentials.

Prior to the advent of Father Baraga in the Lake Superior regions, the "Sault" village derived importance from the military establishment of the government, from the American Fur Company's post and depot, and from its being the seat of the United States Indian Agency for the upper lakes and waters.

Outside of these were fifty or more one-story log-houses, more than half of which were vacant.

There were five Indian traders, while the entire population, including voyageurs and half-breeds, numbered less than one hundred adults, with more than twice as many children. The military reservation grounds were maintained in fine condition; the fort was protected by mounds and block-houses and inclosed with pickets, the garrison numbering about two hundred and fifty offi-

¹ Colonel McKenney writes: "White fish are taken by half-breed and Indian experts in the rapids at the 'Sault' with scoop nets, and in bark canoes so light they might be carried by one's hand, generally below the torrent. One sits near the stern, paddle in hand; the other with a pole ten feet long, with a scoop net at the end, stands in the bow, and with his feet steadies the frail craft. As the glistening scaled fish dashes through the water, he is seen, and by a signal the canoe is instantly paddled to the vicinity. The water is as clear as crystal, and with great dexterity, while keeping the canoe steady, the scoop net is plunged, the fish caught and thrown into the canoe."

"To one not accustomed to such a scene, where the frail shell in which are two human beings is tossing amid the spray and rush of the waters, the movements of the fishermen seem imminently perilous, but fatalities are of rare occurrence. Such is the abundance of the catch that these splendid fish are sold as low as two or three cents each. Delicious brook trout are taken in the same manner.—*Tour to the Lakes*, p. 193. During our visits at the 'Sault,' in 1855, the same method of fishing in the rapids was a source of daily interest.

We do not believe there is a place in America where such fine fish are taken, and where they may be eaten with so much relish, as at Sault Ste. Marie.

cers and men. The finest residence and grounds outside the fort was that of Mr. John Johnston, an Irish gentleman, the former United States Indian Agent, who, through his Chippewa wife, exercised great influence over the Indians of the Lake Superior region.¹ Across the rapids on the British side was the Northwest Fur Company's post and depot, with warehouses and dependencies.

There were eighty or more small houses along the Canadian shore, and the appearances indicated more life and prosperity than was apparent on the American side.

The miserable condition of the Chippewa people during the third decade of this century is further described by Colonel McKenney in his subsequent letters. The government party left the "Sault" in batteaux July 11th, and arrived at Fond du Lac, where the treaty was to be held, July 30, 1826. On the route a halt was made at Montreal River, 421 miles from the "Sault."

Of this locality, the Colonel writes:

"Under the eastern bluff was an Indian lodge, in which were one man and several women and children in a wretched state of poverty and starvation!

"The poor Indian had some powder, with which he saluted us, but no shot; he had no twine to make a net, nothing out of which to make a spear, and no canoe.

"When we fed them, it was like feeding a hungry mastiff, scarcely time was taken for mastication. The wrinkled and aged grandam wore a leather skirt that came only to her knees and a leather jacket open in front; both "garments" were black and greasy from age. They had been living on roots for a week! We promised to send them food."²

Colonel McKenney describes the assemblage and formalities of the council in detail, the signing of the treaty and the wind-up, when presents were distributed to the Indians in attendance as follows:

"At the signal of the discharge of three cannon shots, the multitude assembled—men, women, and children. This was the first time we had had before us the entire

¹ It is among the romantic coincidences in American history that two Irish gentlemen of similar name, but in widely separated localities, at important epochs in this history, mainly through their respective wives, influenced great Indian combinations toward American colonial and national supremacy. These were the Irish Mohawk chief and British baronet, Sir William Johnson, whose Mohawk wife was Mollie Brant, sister of the chief Tha-yan-da-ne ga, whose influence with the Iroquoian League prevented a French alliance with the latter in the struggle for British supremacy in North America, which ended with the death of Montcalm; and John Johnston, whose Chippewa wife was Os-ha-gus-co-da-wa-gua, daughter of Wa-ba-jeck, one of the head chiefs of the Chippewas of Lake Superior, whose influence over the Algonquian League, at a critical period in American history, during the War of 1812, defeated the machinations of Tecumseh to draw the lake tribes to the side of the British in their attempt to subdue the American colonies, but which ended so disastrously at the battle of the Thames, in which Tecumseh was killed and his followers dispersed.

² *Tour to the Lakes*, p. 260.

collection of Indians." As the chiefs of the respective tribes, from Sault de Ste. Marie, along the litoral of Lake Superior to the headwaters of this lake; and from the islands and rivers above and below, were only entitled to seats in this council, these chiefs and their families present, may be taken for our purpose, as representatives of their respective communities. "Never before," writes the colonel, "had I witnessed such a display, nor such an exhibition of nakedness and wretchedness, nor such varieties of both. From the infant tied to its cradle, and to the back of its mother; from the little fellow clad in a dress made of raccoon skins, to one of the Sandy Lake chiefs dressed like a King Saul."

Ejected from the field of his missionary work in the Grand River Valley by the United States Indian Agent,¹ Father Baraga returned to Detroit in the winter of 1834, determined to enter upon the more extensive and hazardous field of missionary work among the Chippewas of Lake Superior. As the upper lakes were not open to navigation, he was, at his own request, sent by Bishop Résé to look after the straggling members of the Catholic faith in Saint Clair County.² He worked in this locality for five months, doing much good, and then returned to Detroit; in the mean time he had acquired a fair knowledge of the Chippewa language. Father Baraga's relations with the chiefs of the Ottawa nation was such that he became fully posted in regard to the economic status of the remnants of the Chippewa tribes on the Lake Superior coast, their utter paganism, and their woful condition. This knowledge, however, moved his charitable soul to undertake their regeneration and conversion to Christian life. This is evident from a letter to his sister, written during his missionary labors among the white settlers on the Saint Clair River.

"It appears strange to me," he writes, "to be in a congregation of whites. I live here in peace, and I am much more comfortable than among my Indians, but I feel like a fish thrown on dry land.

"The Indian mission is my life; now having learned the languages tolerably well, I am firmly resolved to spend the remainder of my life on the Indian mission, if it be the will of God.

"I am longing for the moment of my departure for Lake Superior. Many I hope will be converted to the religion of Christ, and find in it their eternal salvation. Oh! how the thought elevates me! Would that I had wings to fly over ice-bound lakes, so as to be sooner among the pagans. But what did I say? Many will be converted? Oh no! If only one or two were to be converted and saved it would be worth the while to go there and preach the gospel. But God in His infinite goodness always gives more than what we expect."³

These lines mirror the aspirations of the soul of Frederick Baraga. He was then in his thirty-eighth year.

¹ See "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," AM. CATH. QUAR. REVIEW, January, 1896, p. 129.

² This county borders the river and lake of this name, and is from twenty to sixty miles from Detroit.

³ Manuscript of Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

July 9, 1835, Father Baraga embarked on his voyage to the upper lakes by way of Mackinac; from this island he sailed by open boat to Sault Ste Marie, and thence by batteau, coasting the shores of Lake Superior he finally reached La Pointe, near the headwaters of Lake Superior, July 27, 1835. His reliance upon the aid of divine providence must have been great, for when he arrived at this island, where he intended to commence his missionary work, he had but \$3 in money! There were no postal arrangements available nearer than the "Sault." He found a mixed population on the island; French and American Indian traders, half-breeds and native Chippewas.

Having located the site of his mission near a log cabin, which he had procured for his residence, he began the building of a log church, 50 by 20 feet, and 20 feet high, which he completed in seven days, and then dedicated it to St. Joseph. By what means he was able to build, to furnish his little cabin, and to provide the requisites for the installation of his missionary work, we have no definite knowledge. It is, however, probable that the traders on the island gave him credit for some essentials, while there were some well-to-do Catholic families at La Pointe and at St. Michel's, an island of this group, on which was a trading-post, who would not be likely to withhold any assistance *acceptable*.

As a foretaste of the rigor of the climate, thin ice was formed on the lake shore a few days after the dedication of the mission church; while the first fall of snow occurred during the third week in September. The Indians were rejoiced at his coming and he soon induced a considerable number to assemble in the morning, when he offered the Holy Sacrifice in his little church; after Mass he gave an instruction, and he soon had a class of catechumens, who, when properly prepared, were one after another, baptized. He continued this work, and by the end of the year 1835, he had baptized 186 Chippewas, most of whom were adults. This was the inauguration of the apostolate of Father Baraga among the Chippewas of Lake Superior. What we have outlined of the climate, of its lands, of its waters, and of the condition of the unfortunate race of people living, or rather starving, upon the shores of Lake Superior, may enable our readers to form a faint conception of the crucial task this saintly man had set before him.

But of that first winter at La Pointe, during all of which he was utterly penniless, the hardships he endured are known only to God.¹ His diet was scanty, fish and bread at first, and as the season progressed, oftentimes only bread. He had but a scant supply of clothing, which he managed with great care to keep in wearable condition, and which, whenever necessary, this high born

¹ Manuscript, Rev. W. Elliott; C. S. P.

Carniolan nobleman mended with his own hands. There was a Chippewa hamlet three miles distant, whose people were sober and industrious; the men during the day time were usually absent trapping or hunting; in the dead of winter, Father Baraga made regular visits to this village on certain evenings of each week, so as to instruct the men at night. These journeys were made on snow shoes, while the cold was intense.

He baptized twenty-two in this village, all but two of whom were adults. During 1835 he extended his missionary visitations to other Chippewa villages on the island, with the most consoling results. The wretched condition of the people of these villages, especially during the winter season, moved the soul of Father Baraga. The habitations of the more provident were the traditional Chippewa lodge or cabin.

A Chippewa lodge, during Father Baraga's time, was about 18 feet long, 12 wide, and 14 high. Its framework was of saplings long enough to be firmly fastened in the ground, and to reach the centre of the roof from each side, where they were fastened. The ridge pole rested in the crotch of three young trees, on which the framework of the roof rested. Similar trees supported the poles of the eaves. The roof was oval and the whole exterior covered with uniform lengths of bark overlapped so as to shed rain and defy the winds.

The interior was lined with smooth-faced bark and floored with the same material, on which were generally mats. On each side were rows of lockers serving as receptacles of household articles, and on which were spread mats and furs for beds.

A circle at one end was left for a fire, over which a hole in the roof was made for the escape of smoke, ventilation, and light. Around this hole were poles from which hung articles of food, fresh or cured fish, and meats. An aperture in the front of the lodge served as a door, which was closed either by a curtain of bark, or of tanned buckskin, or by a bearskin retaining its fur.

The arms and equipment of the Indian, the belongings of the cuisine, except the kettle, hung from the walls. One or two families might occupy such a lodge. But where only one or two persons lived by themselves, a circular lodge, 12 feet in diameter was occupied. No nails or iron of any kind was used in the construction of these lodges.

But, as has been stated, the high caste Chippewa, as a rule, was improvident.

During the long winter months, after the slender store of dried fish, meat, and roots had been exhausted, the supply of food for the Chippewa household became limited, and barely sufficed to sustain life. But this was not the worst.

In these lodges, when visited by Father Baraga during the winter of 1835, he found men, women, and children subsisting on a scanty supply of food, some indeed starving; while naked children were grouped around the fire, shivering with cold; for the average temperature was several degrees below zero.

Can it be imagined, that the men and women he found in these lodges, could look upon him with indifference, when he, poor as themselves, came to console and to teach them the truths of Christianity; and when they could comprehend what this meant, and they were made fully acquainted with the sublime mission of the Saviour of mankind, and laid at the feet of the Blessed Mother of the Redeemer their own sufferings?

Appalled and soul sick by the close contact of such misery, Father Baraga determined to go to Europe, where he knew his appeal for aid would meet with substantial response. In 1836 he crossed the ocean and he was warmly welcomed in his paternal home; but he tarried there briefly. In his native country he was received with great distinction, and wherever he preached he was greeted by crowds of sympathetic hearers.¹

This was especially the case at Laibach and Vienna. He then went to Paris, to have printed a revised edition of his Ottawa Prayer-book, a work of 300 pages, which was published by Bailly in 1837. He had, while at La Pointe, and in the midst of his missionary work, translated this work into the Chippewa language, for the use of the Christian people of this nation.

This book was also published by the same house in Paris in 1837.

While correcting the proof, and watching the publication of these books, ever mindful of the value of time, he devoted his leisure hours to missionary work among the German residents of Paris, of whom there were numbers in great need of spiritual instruction. He returned to his mission in 1838.

With renewed vigor, and well supplied with means—for the response to his appeal for aid had been liberal—Father Baraga returned to La Pointe and resumed apostolic work. He taught his neophytes to read so readily that, with prayer-book in hand, they were able to assist intelligently at the religious services in their respective chapels. He made regular visits to Isle St. Michel, Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, L'Anse and other places where there were Christian families to care for, neophytes to instruct or pagans to exhort. He went to these localities during the summer season in his own boat, which was about fifteen feet long, without keel or centre-board, and unfitted for lake service during stormy weather.

¹ Manuscript, Rev. C. Verwyst, O. S. F.

He generally had but one attendant with him, who sat in the stern, managing the small sail and guiding the little craft. Father Baraga, who never wasted time, usually lay on his side in the bottom of the boat, and either read his office or occupied his mind to advantage.

On one occasion, when bound for the north shore, his attendant was a faithful Chippewa half-breed, whose Indian name was "Winzon." After leaving La Pointe the wind increased and the waves tossed the missionary's boat on their crests as if it were a mere cockle-shell. The lee of Sand Island, one of the Apostle group, was made a temporary shelter. When the wind subsided, the little sail was again hoisted; the breeze was stiff, and the boat was steered for the Grand Portage, a distance of forty miles, with a rough coast in the vicinity. When about in mid-lake, a storm arose, which rapidly increased to a regular Lake Superior tempest. The boat was driven leeward toward the coast thirty miles east of Father Baraga's destination, and it was tossed over the crest of the angry waves with every prospect of its being swamped; in which event there would not have been the slightest chance for the safety of the missionary or of his attendant—the frigidity of the water would have ended their lives in a few minutes.

In the meantime Father Baraga had been lying in the bottom of the boat, reciting his daily office of prayer, with occasional intervals of meditation, as unconcerned as if he was seated in his missionary cabin. When the tempest was in its most angry mood, poor "Winzon," who had given up all hope, exclaimed, in the Chippewa dialect, "Perhaps we are going to die, Father!" "Don't be afraid, Winzon," and he continued his devotions. As the frail boat approached the surf-bound shore, "Winzon" again exclaimed, "Which way shall I steer, Father?" "Straight ahead," replied the missionary, who continued his prayers. On went the little craft over the breakers and into the calm waters of a small river which had its outlet "straight ahead," where the frightened half-breed had been directed to steer.

When Father Baraga landed, he selected a sapling, and had "Winzon" cut off the branches, leaving the trunk about ten feet high.

A few feet from the top a mortise was cut, into which a piece of the sapling three feet long was fitted and thoroughly fastened, "Indian fashion," making an indestructible cross, anchored in the soil by the roots of the young tree.

Father Baraga held the cross in the highest veneration; when he sought shelter from the storm in mid-winter, in the forest, in some tenantless cabin, he marked the sign of the cross in the snow before he entered the dreary enclosure, and when, after the night had passed, he emerged from such temporary shelter, he again

marked the venerated outline in the snow as a token of his gratitude for the mercy which had been vouchsafed him. He appreciated the miracle by which his own and his attendant's life had been spared during the violent tempest, where, under ordinary circumstances, such an escape from death could not have been expected; and, as a token of his gratitude for such miraculous delivery, he planted this cross in the locality which had been the scene of his miraculous delivery. This cross has been cut into fragments, which are now treasured as relics by red and white Christians, who venerate the memory of the saintly missionary; while the river whose tranquil waters received the storm-tossed boat,¹ and which before this event had been without a name, has since been named and always will be known as Cross river on the map of the coast of Lake Superior.

The half-breed "Winzon" still lives at La Pointe, to tell the story of this miracle wrought by Father Baraga. Father Chrysostom Verwyst, O.S.F., Indian missionary at Ashland, Wisconsin, near the vicinity of Father Baraga's labors, is our authority for the story we have outlined. From the same venerable source we have the relation of the Rev. John Chebul, of Newberry, Michigan, the authenticity of which may be relied on, of another miraculous escape of Father Baraga while travelling on the ice from La Pointe to Ontonagon river. Father Chebul is a veteran Indian missionary of the Lake Superior regions, and a native of Carniola, the family seat of the Baragas. Toward April the solid ice between the Apostle Islands and the main shore weakens and becomes honey-combed. Strong winds upheave its level surface and great fissures divide it into sections, which are moved by the same cause into the greater waters, where they are finally broken into fragments, which are tossed to and from the coast, until they are finally melted by the August temperature.

Before separating, such ice fields may be miles in extent and several feet thick; they are traversed by the Indians and half-breeds while still remaining in the bays, but in calm weather, and in daylight only. Travel on them after a storm upon the lake proper is exceedingly hazardous. The eye may take in a surface of many square miles and yet not see a fissure too broad to leap, which may make the field movable and subject to the agitation of the winds.

Woe to that traveller upon such a field, should it be set in motion toward the lake, or should it break from pressure below. He is doomed to perish from cold, either on the ice, or in the open water; no human power can save him.

The duties of his mission made a visit to the vicinity of Ontonagon River necessary, and *to save time*, so precious to Father Baraga, he determined to cross the bay on the ice, instead of

¹ Father Baraga's boat had been driven a distance of seventy miles before landing.

crossing the short distance dividing the island from the main shore, and marching along the shore, a distance several times greater, more difficult to travel on account of the snow still remaining, and three times longer in the time required for the journey. It was in the month of April and the ice, although cracked in some places, was apparently firm in its place; walking on its surface was comparatively easy when compared with the shore, but there was danger in the former, and safety, however toilsome, in the latter.

Taking a half-breed, in whom he had confidence, as an attendant, Father Baraga with his pack on his shoulders containing his sacred vessels, his vestments, his breviary and other essentials for his mission, his attendant carrying blankets, tools, and food in his pack, began his journey on the ice from the shore of La Pointe toward the main shore near Ontonagon, and travelled without thought of danger until he suddenly came to the edge of the field, which was separated from the shore by an expanse of clear water.

The field had moved from its place during the transit of the missionary, and it continued to move rapidly toward the great sea whose waves would soon break it into fragments and engulf the wayfarers in its icy waters.

The situation was critical. The half-breed became wild with terror, for he fully appreciated that they were doomed.

But Father Baraga remained unmoved, being apparently absorbed in prayer.

Onward moved the field, nearer and nearer to the main waters of the lake, and with a velocity which paralyzed the poor half-breed. Suddenly the wind shifted, the movement of the field of ice changed from seaward to landward, and it was soon driven ashore and remained as if anchored to the bottom.

A landing was made at a point recognized to be twenty-five miles from Ontonagon River. The field of ice had carried them a distance of sixty miles toward their destination.

"See," said Father Baraga to the half-breed, "we have travelled a great distance and have not labored."

The average reader may not realize the hopeless situation in which the missionary and his half-breed attendant stood, as the field of ice on which they had been travelling was driven seaward.

And to such a sea! Frigid over its waters, and in its waters, over which neither gull, nor hawk, nor heron, dared brave its prevailing temperature.

Those only familiar with the Lake Superior region, familiar with the wildness of its waters, and who well know the impotency of human beings so unfortunate as to be exposed to its dual elements of death, to escape being frozen or drowned, may fully realize the miracle by which Father Baraga and his half-breed attendant were delivered from their apparent doom.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

CARDINAL MANNING.¹

THE greatest funeral in England since Wellington's was that of Cardinal Manning. The enormous crowds that attended it were a spontaneous testimony of affection and respect from every class that could assemble its volunteer representatives in the British capital. Not in England alone, however, but throughout the civilized world Manning's death aroused a feeling of regret. As in the British isles, so here in the United States and elsewhere, there was a sense of a great loss to the cause of religion and humanity. For a very long while Manning's career had been sympathetically observed and almost universally approved, even by those who differed with him in some of his aims or his methods. That he was a great man, and equally a good man, was the consensus of opinion not only of his co-laborers and the well-wishers of his enterprises, but also of his honorable opponents. In the four years that have elapsed since his death there has been a strong desire for a biography that should bring together in an orderly way the events of his life—what he said and did, and what he wished to do.

At last a biography of Cardinal Manning has appeared, and a considerable part of the reading world have been cast by it into a state of utter bewilderment and cruel doubt. Why was this "Life" by Mr. Purcell written, and why was Purcell selected at all? Yet Mr. Purcell was chosen for this task by Cardinal Manning himself, and was by him provided with the various documents, such as diaries and other memoranda and correspondence, to make the work complete. When one has finished reading the two remarkable volumes that are put forward as Cardinal Manning's "Life," he must come to the conclusion that, just as great lawyers have often displayed a singular incapacity to draft their own last will and testament, so Manning has not escaped the fate of most great men in our day, to be unfortunate in their biographers, even when of their own choice. Was it Manning's intention that every detail of his life—the most private and sacred relationships—should be laid bare by this biographer, even to the extent of involving the good name and good faith, both of himself and brother ecclesiastics? Can it be believed, for instance,

¹ *Life of Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of Westminster.* By Edmund Sheridan Purcell, member of the Roman Academy of Letters. In two volumes, 8vo. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1896.

that he desired or intended that his confidential correspondence with Mgr. Talbot, in which Newman and other topics were discussed in a way that seems, to some people, impossible of reconciliation with his declarations to Newman and others, should be given word for word as it is in these volumes—a correspondence, as said in the “Preface,”¹ “to which Cardinal Manning especially directed the attention of the biographer, as forming materials essential to the true presentation of his life.” Now this little passage from Purcell’s Preface is worth noting, for it offers, perhaps, a key to Purcell’s whole method. Almost any one reading that direction from Cardinal Manning for the use of the correspondence would understand it to be a direction to read and study it, and then to make such use of it, without violating the sacred rights of the living and the dead, as would illustrate all of Manning’s life with which the world can properly have anything to do. Probably not one in a thousand would understand that to be a direction to print all of the correspondence that has here been printed, and thus to make, as is done thereby, an apparent avowal by Manning of insincerity and deceit on his part.

Was there any present or prospective reason why Manning should be lowered from the plane of respect in which the world saw him, and have his motives impugned? It cannot be for a moment supposed that it was Manning’s purpose really to give the world, under the guise of a “Life” by Mr. Purcell, his “Confessions,” as it were, and yet that is the effect produced by Mr. Purcell’s curious method of setting forth the facts of Manning’s career and of his explanations, or attempted explanations of Manning’s motives. Even when Mr. Purcell indulges once in a while in reflections expressed as if favorable to Manning, there is all the time a lurking suspicion of a very subtle irony derogatory of him. But on almost every page the reader is tempted to ask, What does Mr. Purcell mean? And this brings us to consider whether Mr. Purcell’s attitude of mind towards his subject was such as would allow fair treatment. At first the thought comes up that no man is a hero to his valet, and that familiarity breeds contempt. Yet Purcell was not valet to Manning either figuratively or really, and then we have the instance of Boswell, who only grew warmer in his love, and more and more generous in his admiration for his hero in proportion as he became more intimate and familiar with him. Boswell, however, did love and admire Dr. Johnson, and he has made thousands of readers do the same. No one can read Purcell’s volumes and believe that he either loved or admired Manning. Quite the contrary, one is inclined to exclaim

at almost every page. Mr. Purcell, it is clear, however, did admire Newman, and he seems impelled by this fact to a sort of badly suppressed resentment against Manning for the lack of cordiality between these two great men. The writer of this article may be permitted to remark that having always been an admirer of Newman rather than of Manning, he is, therefore, not aware of any bias of his own in pronouncing Mr. Purcell to be entirely too much out of sympathy with Manning to be qualified to understand and describe Manning's life.

In some senses biographical writing is the very highest form of literary composition. Human life is the most wonderful, certainly the most interesting, phenomenon of nature. Every man's character has two parts, the one by nature inherited from thousands of ancestors, the other acquired, partly dependent on his environment and partly on his will; and upon this character, thus compounded, and upon its fortunes good and bad in contact with the world, depends what is called the life of a man. And then into each of these complexities called a life there enters the grace of God to help the will, and that effect of the providence of God brooding over all creation and causing in His own way all things to work out finally according to the plan of the Infinite Will. To write the life of any man is difficult; but to write the life of one who has played many eminent parts on the world's stage requires a special genius such as is possessed by few in a generation. A human life is an intricacy of things good and bad, ugly and beautiful, wise and foolish, which, if brought too close to the eyes, is made to seem out of proportion, unbalanced and uncouth, like some photographs of grand edifices near at hand. The very noblest life, if too minutely examined as to all the motives that actuate it in the successive hours of its everyday routine, cannot but appear commonplace, if not ridiculous. It is just this sort of distortion that is produced in biography by the affectation called realism, a destructive analysis that has spared nothing and that has within recent years given some shocking examples of what it can do in biography, among them Froude's "Life of Carlyle." In the older or classical style of biography in its decadence the subject of the biography was too often presented in an inflated form, excessively endowed with virtue. Religious biography especially was infected by this excess, and as a consequence the life of a saint was often so described that it was scarcely possible to understand it as the life of a human being, though of a human being struggling towards God, and not as the life of an angel. Reacting from this, the realists have gone to the other extreme and their endeavor is to give the life of an eminent person not by the general effect of it as a whole and as governed by certain predominant

motives—the ultimate aspirations that move to some extent every life, even the most sordid—but by its every act, however trivial, that has become known, and by its series of small efforts to keep a place on earth and earn its daily bread and butter. Under this kind of treatment no one life is intrinsically better than another; it is all a matter of heredity and environment. It must be admitted that this is, partly at least, the method followed by Mr. Purcell in his “Life” of Manning.

No unprejudiced reader can blind his eyes to Mr. Purcell's faults as a biographer, his want of sympathy with his subject, and, perhaps, his dislike for him, and his lack of discrimination by means of which various sorts of rancor and suspicion will be aroused among persons and parties previously friends, or at all events at peace; and no reader can fail to discern the evident pleasure with which he delves into ancient documents and private journals to arouse a spirit of dissension over the peaceful ashes of the two foremost Catholic Englishmen of our day. In his attempt to place Newman and Manning in antagonism, he seems to be governed by a species of real malice, or *malice* in the French rather than in the English sense of the term.

Manning was so many-sided that he was indeed “all things to all men to win all men”; he was “a man never happy unless absorbed from brain to finger-tips in work,”¹—“quivering to the finger-tips with restless energy.”² Such a man, it is easy to understand, was bound by force of his very nature and altogether independent of any deliberate action of his will to run afoul of many other men, some of them equally intent with himself on doing good, but having different ideas from his of what to do and how to do it. It is important at this very point to note that Manning's ultimate aims were good; nowhere, even in Mr. Purcell's depreciatory pages, is there even an insinuation that he sought or desired power or influence for any other purpose than that of doing good. He had great will-power, was most tenacious of purpose, was ever ready of resource, and possessed a rare capacity for making the most of his talents and his opportunities. Because of these combined qualities he was self-confident to a degree that proved a constant source of exasperation to men more infirm of purpose or weaker of will who wished to oppose or retard his course but found themselves figuratively brushed aside by his whirlwind movements or left far in the rear. From first to last, as Anglican and Catholic, he displayed in his methods and manner the workings of his nature, which contained a great deal of what has been properly ascribed from time immemorial to the character

¹ *Life*, vol. i., p. 160.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 356.

of "John Bull" as a national type, though the aggressiveness of this character was at all times tempered by Manning with the *suaviter in modo* of the ecclesiastical habit.

When one considers Manning's nature, and the circumstances of his life, as associated with the religious and social movements of his time, the believer in the Providence of God must perceive what a pregnant share Manning was led, by the exercise of his own will, to take in the divine scheme of the progress of his nation. He began as an ardent adherent of the ultra-Protestant, or Puritan, notion of the Christian religion and of the office of the Christian Church, and he ended as the successful champion of the definition of papal infallibility. As a young man, and a Protestant, he was "driven against his will, to take up the Church as a profession,"¹ and he ended as the Archbishop of Westminster, and a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church. His sincere personal piety was one of his beautiful traits, both as an Anglican and a Catholic, and he accompanied it with so much austerity, particularly in his Catholic days, as to excite wonder. To him food and sleep were of slight importance, except as they interfered with his time for work.

Manning was fitted by nature to be a leader of men, and a leader he always was wherever he went. His handsome presence and graceful and dignified bearing commanded and received of themselves marked attention upon all sides. He always achieved whatever he seriously set about, no matter how difficult its accomplishment might seem, but his success was not the result of aggressiveness, but of his great persuasive force. He was essentially a man of peace. He was by nature not a soldier but a diplomatist. As a boy his ambition was to enter the field of politics and he cherished hopes in this direction long after having entered upon his course at Oxford; it was not until urged again and again by his relatives, and finally decided by his father's business reverses, that, realizing that he no longer had a fortune to rely upon, and that in England, then at least, there was no career in politics for a poor man, he entered the Church. But up to the last moment of his life this interest in politics never lost its hold upon him. Not even that "old parliamentary hand," his friend Gladstone, was keener than he, or more skilful, in the search for votes at a critical emergency, or more able to see in advance the time and place when an emergency would arise. This political genius Manning displayed on various interesting occasions, while Dean of Winchester as an Anglican, and in many a school-board or similar meeting, while as a Catholic caring for the poor and neglected of

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 87.

his great diocese of Westminster, and especially in the Vatican Council.

It is probable that no Englishman in this century has had fuller apprehension than Manning of what Protestantism really is and means. In his undergraduate days he fell under what are called Evangelical influences and became pretty thoroughly impregnated with the Puritan spirit. Afterwards, while still a Protestant he recognized the error of this intense individualism in religion and in time was popularly regarded as a High Churchman. "In after life he disclaimed the title of Tractarian, of High Churchman, and of Low Churchman alike; if he is to be called by any religious party name, we can not do better than accept his own definition. As a Catholic he said of himself: 'I was a Pietist until I accepted the Tridentine Decrees.'"¹ He had met with British Protestantism under probably all its many forms and he sums in this pregnant way the judgment passed by his intensely practical mind: "I have always believed that Anglicanism and Puritanism are the ruins of the outer and inner life of the Catholic Church, from which they separated at the Reformation and then split asunder. This accounts for the dryness of Anglicanism, and the disembodied vagueness of evangelical pietism."²

But though Manning unwillingly embraced the ecclesiastical state, as we have seen, once entered upon that state he devoted to it all the unwearying vigor of his nature. As the Anglican rector of Lavington he never spared himself in his visitations among the suffering and needy of body and soul in his parish, and it was probably during that time that he acquired the habit of penetrating into the most wretched and repulsive abodes of poverty and distress and threw off from himself forever that super-refinement of the senses that often makes even the most tender-hearted and charitable Christians recoil in practice from what has been called the "smell of the poor." Manning learned by daily contact with them really to love the poor, and perhaps it was this as much as anything else that helped to bring that perfect reconciliation of himself with the ecclesiastical state.

"His zeal for religion, known unto all men, his untiring energy, his capacity and love for work were surpassed by none of those over whom he was set as ruler. His example, which never fell short of precept, was a spur to the heart and a light to the steps of every priest in his diocese. All through his life—as priest, as archbishop, as cardinal—Manning's home by predilection was not in the houses of men, where as he has himself recorded, he ever heard a voice saying unto his soul, 'What doest thou here, Elias?'

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 68.

but in the House of God. He was most at home at the altar, in the confessional, in the pulpit."¹

Manning abandoned Anglicanism at the height of the Oxford Movement, yet he cannot with accuracy be deemed to have been swayed by that movement in taking this step. Starting out as a Puritan, that is, as an individualist, in religion, he had, long before becoming a Catholic, convinced himself that religion, to be effective, needs a visible organization with authoritative direction under, of course, the guidance of the Holy Ghost, and then he convinced himself that the Anglican establishment must be such an organization. But the Gorham Judgment, to which the Anglican establishment cravenly submitted, could not by any jugglery of argument be reconciled in Manning's mind with the guidance of the Holy Ghost; and Manning thereupon came out of Anglicanism into the Church that had always claimed and always exercised, when the occasion befell, the infallible authority of the divinely appointed teacher of mankind. It was the note of infallibility that drew Manning over, and that doctrine became for him, therefore, one of supreme importance; and he was amazed, on the other hand, to observe that most Catholics, while believing in it, nevertheless practically regarded it with indifference.

Every sincere convert to the Catholic Church comes along lines of his own. One class of converts are attracted by historical claims in some one of the many phases; another class by the holiness, and devotion, and heroism, and charitableness of the canonized and uncanonized saints and martyrs of the Catholic Church, living and dead; another by the artistic or æsthetic sensibilities to which the beauties of the Catholic religion appeal. The reasons, all good, for these conversions are too many and too various to enumerate. In two respects, however, all converts are likely to bear a resemblance to one another and to differ from those Catholics who are "native and to the manner born." In the first place, the convert, if he was before a religious man and a member of a religious sect or establishment, is apt to yearn in a particular manner for the conversion of his former religious associates, and to believe that they, if only they take the step that he has taken, would become eventually illustrators of the beauty and holiness of Catholic truth, and in a manner to make them better Catholics than any Catholics hitherto discovered. Of course, converts are not all conscious of this feeling, yet it is pretty sure to be with them nevertheless. A priest who is a convert is inclined to trust the soundness, the orthodoxy and the correct apprehension of Catholic truth of the layman converted from the same or a similar sect

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 234.

to which he himself once belonged rather than of the layman, who never knew what it was to be anything but a Catholic. His idea is, perhaps, that one who has passed a part of his life in ignorance of the truth, and has approached it by slow, devious and difficult paths understands and appreciates the truth better than one who has known it and leaned upon it all his life. But let that pass. In the next place, converts are nearly all alike in laying great stress on that particular feature of Catholicity which exercised the most powerful influence over their reason or sentiments, or both, in leading them into the unity of the one fold of Christ.

Between Manning and Newman, both converts, there was little other resemblance to one another than that referred to above as subsisting generally between converts. Both of them looked back with a certain fondness to the Anglicanism that they had given up. But while the infallibility of the Church was what attracted Manning, it was on quite other grounds that Newman became a Catholic. Newman was ready to receive a clear definition of that doctrine which, like other Catholics, he believed, but, like many other Catholics, he did not think such a definition opportune at that time. His own treatise on development showed that the entire scroll of the truth had been held by the Church free from injury from the very beginning, but that it was unfolded by the Church during the ages only just as fast as intellectual progress and denials or discussions brought each several phase of the truth more and more into intimate relation with the thought or the needs of the time. Like many other Catholics whose faith was absolutely unimpeachable, he dreaded the effects that would follow, as he believed, on the definition of infallibility among the great masses of non-Catholics who did not understand the meaning of papal infallibility as held by Catholics, and would perversely persist in misunderstanding it. In 1866 he wrote that he thought "its definition inexpedient and unlikely."¹ Manning, at this time, was quite sure of the contrary, and was fretted by the attitude of Newman and those in England who thought with Newman. Both were Catholics of sound faith, but each placed a particular emphasis on that by which he had been drawn to the Church. Newman recognized, of course, the teaching office of the Church, but it was its historical aspect that had stirred his sentiments of respect and love and captivated his intellect. His habits of mind recoiled from anything that could give rise to a supposition of innovation in religion. Manning, equally with Newman, understood and appreciated the venerable historical claims of the Church in its continuity and freedom from error, but it was of the present and the

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 322.

future, and not of the past, that he thought. At the very time that Newman declared that the definition of papal infallibility would be "inexpedient," Mgr. Talbot, in Rome, was writing to Manning that "*sentire cum Petro* is always the safest side," and so thought Manning, who, however, unlike the cautious Talbot, wanted the entire truth brought out and set before the world whether "safe" or not. Newman was by nature and choice a recluse. He touched the world merely as a teacher to men of learning and intellectual endowment. He loved the truth, and the whole truth, for itself, as he so brilliantly proved in his "*Apologia pro Vita sua*." He was direct in his methods, transparent in his motives, always and altogether a scholar. Manning was only incidentally attracted to learning, as a means to an end. He was a teacher also, but his teaching was of a kind to reach the ignorant poor, and that particularly slow-witted order of humanity, the middle-class English, as well as those of higher attainments. Newman might be said to have never changed, but to have made progress. Manning changed again and again. He was much of the time indirect, now cautious, now venturesome, and always having motives in reserve that sometimes did not appear until after the accomplished fact, and sometimes did not appear at all. No recluse was Manning, and it will always be a mystery how he found time, while scrupulously attending to all his ecclesiastical duties, to attend to so many other things as well.

Newman on becoming a Catholic, being what he was, became associated to some degree with that highly respectable element of the Catholics of England who had kept the faith unsullied through the centuries of persecution, exclusion, and annoyance generally that had beset them since the Reformation. Their past bitter experiences had cultivated in them a retiring disposition. They drew in very much to themselves and held fast to the faith, and held it so tightly that it would not obtrude its notice unsought upon their Protestant neighbors. Most of these native Catholics were of the nobles or the landed gentry, their tenants, servants or other employees, and a few of them were professional men. In London and the other commercial and manufacturing towns were the Irish Catholics, mostly poor and holding their faith boldly in sight, not so much because they regarded it as an inheritance to be proud of, but because they believed it to be God's truth, for which they had not only suffered but at times had fought with all the desperate courage of their race. But the poverty of circumstances of most of these Irish Catholics huddled the most of them in the slums of the cities, somewhat as we have known here in the United States, and the consequence was that a great many of them and their children yielded to the degrading and corrupting influences ex-

erted upon them. Yet it was really these Irish Catholics, rather than the native element, that finally made Catholicity a factor of modern England, a great religious and moral force to be counted on in the interests of peace, purity and good order. When Manning became a Catholic it was naturally to the native element that he turned rather than to the Irish Catholics, who to him, as to all Englishmen of that day, were as much "foreigners" as though they were Frenchmen or Dutchmen. But between him and the native Catholics there was mutual repulsion for awhile. Some years later he wrote of them as having been dominated by "an old narrow spirit which made the Catholic Church in England act and feel like a sect of dissenters." We have witnessed in the United States something of this Catholic exclusiveness that in its extreme form looks very much like what Manning regarded as characteristic of a "sect of dissenters." Manning would have had the Catholics come out and hold up their heads and assert themselves in the manliness of their Christian faith. The Irish element were willing enough, but many of the old native element looked askance at Manning, the recent convert, who could not remain still an instant and seemed averse to allowing others to remain in quietness and peace. They preferred the conservative way to which they had been accustomed. The cruel memories of "Popish Plot" days made them almost shudder at the thought of their religion being made a subject of discussion again.

Among these native Catholics, and more with the clergy probably than with the laity, there was a considerable survival of what is called Gallicanism, a sort of national pride and tendency in religion, as opposed to the other extreme known as Ultramontaniam. Manning described himself as an Ultramontane, and Newman as a Gallican. Of course, there is between these two views no disagreement in faith, though one would sometimes suppose differently from the heated language occasionally indulged in by one or the other towards the opposite party. It is analogous to the difference between good Americans who, in the interpretation of the Constitution, became arrayed against each other as State-rights men and Federalists, the difference, in other words, between home-rulers and centralizationists.

In the years next preceding the Vatican Council great bitterness of spirit between the two parties, the Ultramontanes favoring the definition of papal infallibility, and the Gallicans, so called, opposing the definition, not, for the most part, because of want of belief in the doctrine but because they thought the definition inexpedient at that time, was caused by the intemperate zeal of some extreme partisans on each side. Newman, for exercising in his scholarly way the liberty that the state of the question then per-

mitted him, was denounced in unsparing terms. Later on, Manning was made a cardinal, and Newman, for whom the same honor had generally been expected, was passed by. One of the present great Pope's first acts, and one that received the applause of the civilized world, Catholic and non-Catholic, was to confer the belated dignity upon Newman. It had all along been popularly supposed that Pius IX. had not given the hat to Newman because of displeasure with his course. Purcell now insinuates that it was Manning's "adverse influence" that had kept Newman "under a cloud" at Rome.

It is well known that Bismarck, for political reasons of his own had the intention of calling upon the European powers to interfere with the Vatican Council so as to prevent it from defining papal infallibility. Negotiations to this end had been begun with the British ministry, of which Mr. Gladstone was then a member. One of Manning's most brilliant and useful achievements was the checkmate he put to Bismarck's play, and the manner in which he brought this about is highly amusing when it is considered in all its bearings. Like nearly all non-Catholics, even to-day, a quarter of a century after its definition, the members of the British ministry of that day, with the possible exception of Mr. Gladstone, seemed to think that by the infallibility of the Pope, Catholics meant that the Pope can do no wrong, that he can not err in any way, and that if, therefore, he should in some crisis pronounce for the dethronement of a monarch, or any other political or temporal policy, Catholics would feel themselves bound in conscience to adhere to him and his views in despite of their temporal allegiance or other obligations as citizens. Of course, all this is ridiculous from our point of view, but really it is a sad fact that outside the Catholic Church very few, even of the best informed, really know what the Catholic Church is and what it believes and teaches. In this emergency Manning, as ever, was at hand and ready, and he undertook the strange task of putting the British cabinet through a course of instruction in that part of Catholic doctrine which relates to the Pope. But how? At that time the British government maintained a diplomatic agent at the Vatican in the person of a Mr. Odo Russell. Mr. Russell was not a Catholic, but he understood the doctrine of Papal infallibility, and thought it ought to be defined, because he could not see any other logical course from the Catholic point of view. Day by day Manning in Rome met Russell, and with him went over the doctrine and all the arguments in its support, from the Holy Scriptures, the Fathers, and the long tradition generally of the Church,

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 553.

and day by day, or nearly so, Russell sent off to the cabinet sitting in London a synopsis of Manning's array of the arguments, until finally the cabinet became convinced that the proposed definition concerned them not, that it was a matter of theology, and not of politics, that touched the faith and consciences of Catholics alone. They kept their hands off the Council, and Bismarck was made to understand that it would be wise for him to do the same.

Cardinal Manning was a thorough ecclesiastic. He was in the Church and of it, a part of its organization, minute in his conscientious attention to every requirement of his priestly and episcopal duties. He realized that the Catholic Church is not a select body of saints to keep themselves in seclusion from the rest of the human race, but an organization of divine origin intended by its Founder to reach out to win all men. Essentially then, as he saw, the Catholic Church is the most democratic institution on the earth. But the vagaries of some of the Protestant sects, and the horrors that accompanied the French Revolution had shocked many of the Catholics of the Continent and of England, and had brought about with them a perceptible sensitiveness as to the aspirations of the common people. The dry rot of sham respectability and a feeble-minded species of daintiness were threatening to paralyze the healthy energy of Catholic thought and action. Other Catholics before Manning had observed and deplored this. Ozanam, Montalembert, and Lacordaire had tried to check it in France, but their efforts had, in their results, proved to be of the kind that is called "academic." But Manning boldly took up with the democracy. There were those, both Catholic and non-Catholic, who sympathized at a distance with the wretchedness of poverty. It was becoming fashionable to discuss the slums, but Manning was already familiar by actual personal contact with the dingiest and foulest corners of "darkest England." Refined himself by nature, and delicate in all his tastes and inclinations, clean of heart, and sweet as running water, he loved the poor and suffering, and loved them to that degree that he went after them, despite surroundings so brutal and nauseous as to repel many a brave and charitable man. He put himself into sympathetic touch with every movement of whatever origin that gave promise of bringing to the pauperized classes of England some alleviation of the miserable condition of things. He extended his hand in fellowship to the strange bands that, under the name of the "Salvation Army," beat their drums and cymbals, and sang hymns to concert hall tunes, in order to attract to their prayers and exhortations the abandoned reprobates that no Christian churches had yet been able to bring within their doors. In the same line of activities was his identification of himself with the propaganda of total

abstinence. He had always been abstemious. His splendid constitution was susceptible of almost endless endurance on the smallest possible modicum of food. As for stimulants, his energy needed none, and would have none. When with his emaciated but steady iron frame he spoke to the bloated and trembling victims of alcoholic indulgence, his own person and experience furnished powerful reinforcements to the eloquence of his appeals. God alone knows how many thousands of homes in England were rescued by Manning, and by the temperance agitation that he encouraged and sustained, from the curse of over-indulgence in drink.

Certain rigorists in morals made much at the time of a remark by Manning to the effect that a starving person would be justified before God and free from sin in appropriating a rich man's loaf. The fact that such a criticism was made shows how deep was the resentment of certain classes against his exerting his powerful influence in behalf of God's poor. What starvation was he really knew. He knew intimately the poor of London, and he had seen starvation waiting at the doors of the poor laborers whose ill-fed bodies were piling up wealth for smug respectabilities, stockholders in corporations—"bodies without souls," as Lord Denman defined them—that had grown rich on "small margins," which meant small wages to the actual labor that is the real foundation of all wealth. He threw himself into the struggle of the workingmen to secure the same right to combine in defence of their wages that had always been accorded to their employers to combine to keep up prices and increase their dividends and profits. He intervened in one great strike that threatened serious trouble, and so great was the respect for him by the rich employers and the poor employed that he was able to compel, for the first time on a large scale, the adoption of the principle of arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes. There was not in his time as Archbishop of Westminster a great movement for the public good in which he had not a prominent share. He did not seek prominence. He sought good work and then prominence was thrust upon him.

With regard to the Irish and their national aspirations, Manning's opinions underwent a change that was a real progress. When he became a Catholic there were indications that he was displeased to find that the Irish residents constituted the chief stay of the Catholic cause in England. He was not the only convert that experienced the same species of disgust. His prejudices as an Englishman at first, it may be supposed, revolted at the thought that his religion was now, in a manner to throw him for a large part of the time among what seemed like a "foreign" element, but as his acquaintance with the Irish Catholics in England increased

his dislike for them wore off, and finally seems to have wholly vanished away. Fenianism he utterly and uncompromisingly condemned for several reasons; that it was the work of a secret society whose principles appeared to be similar to those of the infidel movement on the continent called in those days Red Republicanism; because it favored the complete separation of Ireland from England, and this he would not tolerate, either as an English patriot, for he believed that such a separation would be a prelude to the downfall of British power, or as an English Catholic, for he now recognized that the cause of Catholicity needed the help of Ireland, of which it would be deprived by Irish independence. But once Fenianism had ceased to excite apprehensions, and the milder and feebler programme of Mr. Butt's Home-Rulers began to be sleepily debated in the British Commons, whenever that body had nothing else to do, Manning took up the cause of Irish home-rule as an adjunct to the various other schemes then on foot for benefiting the oppressed classes in the British Empire. When the irrepressible and irreverent Obstructionists had thrust unceremoniously aside Mr. Butt and his respectable and respectful little band many of the English so-called "friends of Ireland" were scandalized at the doings of the new party, and when that party, now grown to eighty determined Irishmen, stood together and boldly proclaimed that they would demand home-rule, and not beg for it, some of the English Catholics were horrified. England out of deference for Protestant susceptibilities has not for centuries had an ambassador at the Vatican; but diplomatic agents, under various guises and disguises, she has constantly employed whenever it has been her policy to cajole or suppress in any way the Catholics of the British Isles, and, especially of Ireland. The Irish have always had reason to be suspicious of the purposes and methods of these gentlemen. One of the cards which Mr. Gladstone, then the premier, sought to play was to secure papal condemnation against the excesses committed by some of the exasperated Irish in the midst of their dire distress, with the politician's hope that such condemnation could be made to appear condemnatory of the whole Irish programme of that day. A person of no particular importance except that he was a Catholic of English name with a residence in Ireland and the approval of Cardinal McCabe, the Archbishop of Dublin, was selected by Mr. Gladstone in answer to the very natural suggestion of Pope Leo XIII. that some accredited representative of the British government should be in Rome. But this Mr. Errington was known to be as little Irish in sentiments as he was in name, and the Irish people were indignant naturally at the impertinence that would intrude him at the Vatican under false pretenses. Here was another emergency in which

Manning's skilful hand was seen. Manning was then in Rome and Mr. Errington received orders from the Pope "not to come again." Gladstone had the man made a baronet and that ended the ridiculous affair.

As soon as Manning became convinced that the new Home-Rule party had not in concealment an ulterior purpose of securing the complete independence of Ireland as a sovereign nation he entered with warm and sincere sympathy into their plans. When Mgr. (afterwards Cardinal) Persico, once upon a time a member of the American hierarchy, as bishop of Savannah, was sent as papal delegate to Ireland to examine into the morality of the Irish agrarian policy called the "plan of campaign," boycotting and matters of the kind, it was again Manning who labored, though not with complete success, to prevent Persico from falling under the influence of the anti-Irish element among the English Catholics. The disastrous and disgraceful collapse of the most efficient political leader that Ireland has had since O'Connell seemed to blight for awhile the hopes of the Irish people. But to the last Manning never lost heart for their cause, and was always ready with tongue and pen and action to give it his help. Manning saw that the future of civilized nations as soon as they shall have become intelligent and moral enough is with democracy "the masses," not "the classes," as Gladstone had put it, that self-government—government of the people, by the people, for the people—as our own Lincoln defined it—is better adapted for an enlightened, Christian people than any monarchical or aristocratic form of constitution. As an Englishman he naturally rated England as coming nearest of all the great European nations to the requirements for the establishment of a successful democratic popular government, and with his actual political intelligence he probably perceived that the most Christian people of Ireland possessed in themselves, by their instincts and traditions, that had never been marred by Roman military conquest or mediæval feudalism, an almost perfect aptitude for free political institutions. That the Irish believed in Manning's friendship for them was attested by the grief expressed all through Ireland and by the scattered members of the Irish race.

There can be no question in the mind of any one who honestly studies Manning's career, even if only in Purcell's pages, that Manning's chief desire from the time he entered the ecclesiastical state as an Anglican was to serve God himself and to induce all others to do the same. There was no hypocrisy about him. Modern England has produced no man who could more sincerely than Manning repeat Terence's trite and triturated sentiment, *nihil humanum me alienum puto*, but for all this seeming diffuseness of benevolent sentiment during his sixty years, God and God's work

through the offices of religion were really the one over-mastering thought. The three Englishmen of the last half of the nineteenth century who have won the approbation of the entire civilized world—not of mere fractions of it—were Newman, Gladstone and Manning. Two of these became Catholic in the prime of their intellectual faculties, the other, Gladstone, once came near the gate of the fold, but, when invited by Manning to accompany him, did not enter.¹ Each in his own way, according to his own genius, has conferred great benefits on his race and the world—benefits which will be better understood and appreciated when the next generation comes to study them and their times.

THOS. F. GALWEY.

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 617.

MR. PURCELL'S "LIFE OF CARDINAL MANNING."

IT may be difficult to write a biography without a bias. Macaulay, who was one of the grandest of essayists, could seldom veil his bias in a biography. Take that wonderfully eloquent piece of character-drawing, in which he portrays his special favorite, William III. There is not a word of depreciation, so much as an allusion to any defect, in a character which most persons would think equivocal. The object of the biographer was to represent the new dynasty as being ushered in by a typical sovereign; and so the chapter is a panegyric, an adulation, from almost the first word to the last. On the other hand, to take an example of writing biography, of which the animus is too evidently hostile—we may have, some of us, read Mr. Froude's editing of the private papers and correspondence of Carlyle, in which editing there was more desire to disparage than there was to exalt a great writer. We should not say that, in either case, there was the true spirit of biography. What we want in a life is a truthful representation of the broadest characteristics and traits. We do not want to be vexed with private matters, which cannot possibly be understood by outsiders, since the chief personage is not alive now to explain them; we do not want to put our interpretation on letters which no one in the world save the persons who were addressed could know how to "read between the lines"; we do not want to attribute unworthy motives, where we cannot know what was in the mind; and, above all, we do not want to read "a thing was so," when it may have been exactly the contrary.

In some parts, Mr. Purcell's "Life of Cardinal Manning" must afford every reader satisfaction. There are chapters which are admirably compiled; showing an industry, if not a critical faculty, which has resulted in a truthful analysis. Nor must the frankness of the author's style of writing be omitted from his claims to good repute. He lets all the world know his political opinions, and his disesteem—intellectually speaking—of those who have the misfortune to differ from him. This frankness, however, is perhaps a dangerous virtue, in the character of a man who is injudicious; leading him to publish matters which good taste would not make public; and to offer criticism in regard to private motives, which good feeling would make him keep to himself. We may take a few examples of what we may call breaches of good taste, and also indications of blunt feeling, which somewhat offend us in this biography.

It is hinted—it is more than hinted, it is argued—that Cardinal Manning was really "converted" in his heart, long before he proclaimed his conversion; and this reticence is imputed to him for disingenuousness. Now, we are bound to say, that reading only what Mr. Purcell has published, we should have formed the exactly opposite conclusion. In the private diaries and letters, purporting to show what Mr. Purcell calls the "inner man," we find the Cardinal (then Archdeacon) Manning expressing his suspicion that his doubts may prove to be a delusion. Such entries as "something keeps rising and saying, you will end in the Roman Church; and yet I do not feel at all as if my safety required any change, and I do feel that a change might be a positive delusion," prove—not merely indicate—that the archdeacon's conscience, though restless, was perfectly sincere. Nor, on the other hand, do we find any public utterance which was at variance with this conscientious misgiving. As he says himself, "I know of no one act or word tending to unsettlement consciously spoken or done by me. All that I have written has been studiously in support, *hopefully* and affectionately, of the Church of England." Indeed, we may go so far as to say that Mr. Purcell's intimation of disingenuousness is flatly contradicted by his quotations. "I cared for the Church of England," wrote the cardinal, "so long as I believed it was a part of the Church. When it revealed itself to be human in its origin, erroneous in its doctrines, and contrary to the word and will of God, it left me, not I it. All the bishoprics in England were nothing to me." But this conviction could not be ripened in a moment. With Newman it was a process of many years. With Manning it was scarcely less speedy. No one who has passed through the bitter struggle of cutting himself loose from his life's moorings, can fail to remember how delicate seemed the balance between his duties to others and to himself.

Kindred to this unkind imputation, and as it seems to us quite as unfair, is the quoting a confession in Manning's private dairy (January 30, 1846), "I do feel pleasure in honor, precedence, elevation, the society of great people, and all this is very shameful and mean," as though the confession were a proof that merely mundane aspiration was Manning's besetting sin or weakness. Yet, if St. Augustine had written such words in his "Confessions," no Christian would have cried shame on his estimate that such weakness was "very shameful and mean." Still less would any Christian have built up on such an estimate the utterly unwarrantable conclusion that the writer "never committed himself, if he could help it, to an unpopular movement, or took his stand on a failing cause." Such an inference would have been extravagantly unjust. As a matter of fact, Cardinal Manning was remarkable

for his independent adherence to causes, which were so unpopular as to offend the great majority of Englishmen, socially, politically, religiously. He proclaimed his attachment to Gladstone's scheme for Home Rule, when three-fourths of Englishmen were opposed to it. He advocated total abstinence with a full knowledge that in good society, as well as among the lower social strata, such a principle and practice were repugnant; indeed, it is supposed that at the last general election, the dislike of what was known as local option turned the scale against the Liberal government. He was known to be in favor of the temporal power, though his countrymen were rejoiced that it was overthrown; just as he was an ardent advocate for proclaiming infallibility in the very teeth of English national prejudice. Moreover, he was the advocate of the rights of the poor man, when scarcely any other ecclesiastic took his part; asserting fearlessly that the poor man had the "same rights as the rich man," and that he "need not ask for charity but for justice." It may be said of Manning that he cared neither for popularity nor unpopularity, for the accident of a failing or a successful cause; he only knew of the distinction "right and wrong"; but as to policy, expediency, he cared nothing.

Perhaps the most unfortunate, the most unpleasant, of the inferences in which our author has so freely indulged is in regard to Manning's friendship with Newman. Preaching at the London Oratory on the occasion of the death of Cardinal Newman, Cardinal Manning had spoken of his friendship with the late cardinal as "a friendship of sixty years and more." Mr. Purcell proceeds to ridicule this statement. He declares, in the first place, that the statement was inaccurate; and in the next place, that Manning's object in making it was one of weak vanity and make-belief. "At that supreme moment the not unnatural desire of Manning's heart was that his name should go forth before the world linked with that of Newman's as a life-long friend and fellow-worker; that he might, in a sense, be co-partner in Newman's glory." Was there ever so ungracious an assumption? In order to emphasize his judgment, he makes Cardinal Manning speak of "the closest friendship" with the late cardinal, "closest" being a discovery of the biographer. Now, as a matter of fact, such friendship had existed—not the closest friendship, but friendship—for sixty years and more. Nor was it ever rudely broken, though, like other friendships, it was cooled by the varying incidents of the terribly trying controversies of the period. To the last, the private letters of both cardinals were signed, and we presume sincerely, "yours affectionately." In the year 1857, which was twelve years after the conversion of Dr. Newman, there were published "Sermons preached on various occasions by the Rev. J. H. Newman,"

and we find on the title-page that the dedication was to Manning, as "a memorial of the friendship which there has been between us for nearly thirty years." What becomes, then, of Mr. Purcell's denial? That there may have been times when, for reasons known to themselves, these two great men held aloof from one another, is quite possible; indeed, it would seem probable; but, if so, it was their own business, no one's else; nor can we imagine what benefit can be derived to the public from the discussion of such varied relations, since it is totally impossible that the "outer world" should apprehend their true gist, or should judge of the incentives to such "*irae amantium*" as are inevitable in the course of sixty years.

We are surprised also to be informed that "About his marriage Cardinal Manning always observed a singular reticence." And then we are told that "he may have feared that the common knowledge of his early marriage, strange as it may seem, might produce, somehow or other, among his Catholic flock, especially priests, monks and nuns, an unpleasant impression derogatory to his high ecclesiastical dignity and position." How it could be possible that the marriage of an Anglican clergyman should scandalize either Catholics or Protestants, we should be puzzled in trying to conjecture. Cardinal Weld, we know, was married, and has now numerous descendants; and it would be as curious to think of those descendants as "observing a singular reticence" in regard to their honorable origin, as it is to think of Cardinal Manning as being shy about his marriage, or desiring to keep it secret from the world. No doubt the cardinal was reserved on such a subject; his natural tenderness and refinement would make him so; but he has left a copious diary—which has not been given to our biographer—in which he wrote down, day by day, his feelings and reflections during the illness of his deeply beloved wife.

A great mistake, that is in judgment, is the unveiling of what may be called the *secreta domus*, in regard to the Westminster Chapter. There is a want of due remembrance of the times, of the exceptional pressure of the period—a period when the newness of Catholic position had to contend with the oldness of Protestant prejudice. Scarcely relieved from the bonds of national cruelty, with the inevitable timidity, reserve and perhaps inaptitude which three centuries of ostracism had generated, the new hierarchy in England was ill at ease, nor could it at first be harmonious. Moreover the number of distinguished converts—who had the faith but no Catholic experience—were not always a source of strength to the "old" Catholics in the politic or the diplomatic sense. Little differences which, in an established order

of things, would not so much as have been noticed, became sources of scandal in the perfectly new organization, which had enough to do to fight all outsiders. For such reasons it is that Mr. Purcell would have done wisely to minimize all allusions to the period. Catholics can, of course, easily discriminate between the divine and the human side of "the Church," but Protestants have no instinct of discrimination on account of the human origin of their religion. It was well, indeed, in our biographer to trace the development of the hierarchy, but it was in poor judgment to dwell on details which the Protestant reviewers call "squabbles," and which were far below the dignity of the subject. This is the view taken by the Anglican *Athenæum*, in which we find the honest regret that, instead of writing a life which should have been regarded as a classic for all time, the biographer has seemed to puddle among ephemeral quarrels which should have been relegated to a generous oblivion.

"The magnificent indiscretions of Mr. Purcell," as the *Daily Chronicle* has written, "who after all did not know his hero intimately, and neither realized nor revered him," have been counter-balanced by a delightful little book by Dr. Gasquet, who did know the cardinal intimately, and had the right spirit to judge him. As to the superficial judgment of Mr. Purcell, which implies that the cardinal was ambitious, Dr. Gasquet says truly: "He would not have been the great servant of God and man that he was, if he had not been ambitious." As to the cardinal's deep sympathy with the struggling classes—not sufficiently dwelt upon by Mr. Purcell—Dr. Gasquet says that he first acquired that sympathy from his own diligence in (Anglican) parochial work, and that his later efforts in the days of the Dock Strike were only a ripened example of that sympathy with the laboring classes which had been always a powerful motor in his ministry. And, as to a certain coldness of manner which some persons attributed to pride, Dr. Gasquet records the incident of his being asked by one of his nieces: "Why do people call you cold?" His answer was a revelation of the whole man, which only his personal intimates could understand: "The truth is, my child, I feel so much that, if I once expressed it, I should lose my self-control."

Now, we can well understand that such a character as Cardinal Manning would find a pleasure in jotting down in his diary the thoughts he would not express before the world. In the same spirit—delighting, as he did, in epigrammatic hyperbole—he would write to an intimate friend with a sort of revelry in indiscretion, such as the intimate friend and he alone would understand. It is obvious that such jottings and such letters were not intended for and are not interpretable by outsiders. But still more must such

privacy be held sacred in regard to letters which were obviously confidential, and which it is certain that the writer would have rather thrown into the fire than have submitted to public misapprehension. It is just here that a questionable taste reaches a point which may almost be censured as unjust. And when we add that the biographer's criticism is in many places painfully one-sided we cannot help feeling that there is an animus which had no right to be made apparent in a "Life." As the London *Spectator*—a high-class Anglican journal—has expressed the impression on the reader: "He (the biographer) gives the evidence in such order and with such suggestion of its significance as to make irresistibly for the prosecution, and then says: If there is a reasonable doubt by all means acquit the prisoner; but if after considering the evidence you come to the conclusion that he is guilty, I call on you to give your verdict against him." We may have no right to impute such an animus to the biographer, yet it is difficult to avoid the suspicion. As to the selection of private papers to be published and the moral right of the biographer to make his choice, we can hardly speak of a point which is *sub judice* in the sense that it is controverted by the executors. It will be better, therefore, to pass over the question of moral right and confine our reflections to that of taste. As the London *Spectator* has well put it: "When a man entrusts to his executors his most private and confidential correspondence the trust is the most sacred one which friendship can confide. In discharging it two rules are generally regarded as paramount—respect for the wishes of the dead and regard for the feelings of the living." As to the first rule, we cannot believe that the late cardinal, who was one of the most judicious of men, could have desired such injudicious publications; and as to the second rule, every one who was intimate with the late cardinal knows how refined and even exquisite he was in his regard for the sensibilities of others. We should rather conclude that the biographer, in his determination to be over frank, over honest, had forgotten that even *summum jus* may be very often *summa injuria*; and because he has been disposed himself to draw inferences that were unfavorable to the portrait of his hero, has thought it wise to ask his readers to think with him rather than draw their own inferences for themselves.

If we contrast two different conceptions, the one the popular estimate of Cardinal Manning, the other Mr. Purcell's presentation, we find ourselves wondering what could be the use of writing a "Life" which might risk the lowering of the popular idea. Mr. Purcell, in a letter to the *Times*, argues that such an ingenuous character as all men knew the cardinal to have been was not likely to "select as biographer a gushing incense-burner or an

adept in the meaner art of producing, by a judicious system of suppression, an idealized portrait, a fancy picture to catch the cheap applause of the groundlings, but one whom he knew of old to be an independent and outspoken critic." Yet to be independent and outspoken is not necessarily to be judicious or refined. Cardinal Vaughan, in his vigorous critique in the *Nineteenth Century*, has well remarked: "If all private and intimate correspondence were to be conducted with a view to its presently being cast upon the four winds, it might be well for such a biography as this; but such a change in our customs would revolutionize the familiar intercourse of friendship, and would perhaps in the end dry us all up into pedants." And again, Cardinal Vaughan has remarked: "Want of proportion in the parts and omissions in the structure produce deformity, inability to understand and to rise to the level of the life that is limned, and misjudgments of aims and motives render a biography a libel." It is only a question, therefore, whether the libel is by suppression or exaggeration, by ill taste or sheer want of judgment.

Now, it cannot be doubted that if an artist paint a portrait of a great man and purposely exaggerate weak features, while purposely weakening strong features, he "libels" his subject in presentation. But we have already said that frankness, not hostility, may probably have been the motor of the compilation, though the result is somewhat painful to English Catholics. We all knew the cardinal as, primarily and before all things, an active social reformer of our generation; while as to his inner mind we have all admitted that self control was his dominant characteristic through life. We all knew him, in the language of the "resolutions" which were passed by laborers' unions in Great Britain so soon as it was known that he was dead, as "a friend who had endeared himself to the heart of every workingman by the profound interest he ever exhibited in his welfare, and by the noble earnestness with which he fought the cause of the oppressed," just as we all knew him, in other grooves, other phases, as having converted the Protestant mind to the calm assurance of Catholic loyalty, of Catholic trustworthiness or honesty, and as the social apostle who had made his countrymen believe in Catholics, though he might not have made them believe in the Catholic religion. We were not prepared, therefore, for a life of the great cardinal which should represent him as either feeble or egotistic, or as one who put his own personal reputation before what he conceived to be high duty. It was not the intention of the biographer—we are sure of this—to produce such an impression upon his readers; it was his misfortune, because he lacked judgment and the necessary gifts for his task.

"The publication of this *Life* is almost a crime," writes Cardinal Vaughan. "It throws into the street a multitude of letters defamatory of persons living and dead, to the scandal, the grief and indignation of countless friends and kinsfolk." Was it likely, we must ask, that he who gave as his last message to the world this kindly and diffident farewell: "I hope that no word of mine, written or spoken, will do harm to any one when I am dead," would have wished that his private or playful reflections should be carelessly "thrown into the streets?" They who knew him intimately used to enjoy the perfect freedom with which he would chat about almost everything; a habit, indeed, which has not been uncommon with great men, who seek relief from austere duties in being natural. What would become of us all, if our free and easy moments spent in the company of our intimates were to be made the public property of the half-educated or unappreciative, the spiteful, the injudicious, or the wicked? Justice Maule said that "the majesty of a judge was becoming in his wig and his gown, but would be ridiculous in his dressing gown and slippers." The same truism would apply to all great men, be they cardinals, statesmen or kings. Dr. Johnson was one of the very few great men who was fond of "posing" in an arm-chair in a tavern; yet even he sometimes hazarded observations which Boswell thought it prudent to suppress. It is sheer nonsense to affirm that in order to write a true biography you must put down every remark that your hero regretted, every pleasantry that he threw off in play, or every sarcasm he was not cautious to resist. Equally absurd is it to maintain that a man's private letters, written to those only who could perfectly understand them, must be regarded as the property of the nation, or can be interpreted by the foe or the stranger. It would be as ridiculous to take a man's public speeches as a revelation of his domestic amenities, as to suppose that his private diaries and private letters were intended for universal circulation.

True, there will be no danger to the educated reader who, both knowing the character of the cardinal and the peculiar pressure of the times in which he lived, can distinguish the man from his irritations, the holy priest from his natural infirmities. The danger will be only for outside Protestants, who knew neither the man nor his religion, and who have no honest desire to learn the truth. And this danger will lie in a certain suppression of beautiful traits—or at least in a comparatively faint allusion—which the author has suffered himself to approve. Of the peace-maker, the guide and the friend, we do not read much in this portraiture; we do not find letters in which he advised and consoled; though we have a good deal of correspondence which had much better have been left out, and which could have no essential bearing on the life.

We have some very warm scoldings of popular personages, with whose politics the author is at issue, as, for example, where Mr. Gladstone is spoken of as "attempting to wreck the Empire"; but we have no corresponding energy of praise for the admirable characteristics of the cardinal. We do not mean to say that there are not many passages in which the cardinal is very sincerely admired; but what we dislike is the arranging of evidence which seems to put him in an unfavorable light, and the criticism which is brought to bear on that evidence in a spirit, as the *Spectator* says, of "a prosecutor." Both negatively and positively the life is hardly fair, while as a whole-souled portrait of a great man it is defective—well, let us call it disappointing.

Mr. Gladstone has, however, expressed himself as much pleased with the life, and we know that he warmly esteemed the cardinal. This satisfaction is perfectly natural in a man of Mr. Gladstone's breadth of mind, for he would know how to brush aside, as beneath contempt, the "small" censures in which the public will delight. We have already had a free expression of jubilation in some of the ill-natured Protestant journals, with a song of joy over the cardinal's weak points. Here was the grave scandal to be avoided. A biographer, like any ordinary true friend, is as much bound in his book as in his conversation to avoid running the risk of giving scandal; and he is bound also to respect the feelings of living persons, of whom his hero may have expressed himself freely.

We are promised a new life by the executors. Mr. Purcell will be glad that any defects in his own estimate may be rectified by fresh lights and revelations. Indeed, it is to be regretted that, before going to press, the biographer did not submit his work to competent critics, whose knowledge and whose taste would have been indisputable. We have, some of us, experienced—that is, those of us who have ventured to publish books—that what seemed to us the right thing before going to press, seemed capable of much improvement a few weeks after; and we even marvelled at our own want of judgment in letting things pass which were in bad form. In so important a matter as a biography of Cardinal Manning, it would have been desirable to anticipate such repentance. Spite of Shakespeare's assurance in "Macbeth," "What's done, is done," we shall hope for a revision of the author's work, in which a good deal will be remorsefully cut out.

A. F. MARSHALL.

THE CHRISTIANS UNDER TURKISH RULE.

THE outbreak of Moslem fanaticism in Armenia which threatens to exterminate the Christian population of that province appears to go on still, in spite of the imposing display of European war ships at the Dardanelles and the indignant protests of the civilized world. In the mass of contradictory dispatches from Constantinople and Asia Minor with which the press of Europe and America is daily flooded, it is hard to tell whether the sufferings of the Armenians are increasing or lessening. What is certain is, that no steps have been taken to effectually protect the Christians of Armenia against the barbarity of their rulers, who have shown themselves already as reckless of Christian lives and rights as their Tartar ancestors, who marked their path of conquest with mountains of human skulls. How many have been the victims already it is impossible to ascertain, but they certainly have been numbered by thousands, and many more have been forced into Mahometanism as the price of their lives. The cynical replies of the Turkish Government and the reckless assertions of the news-gatherers of the European press appear equally indifferent to truth, and the one sure thing is, that an unarmed Christian population continues to be absolutely subject to the power of a horde of barbarians who recognize no law but their own will, and who are fanatically hostile to the Christian faith and its professors.

The state of affairs now existing in Armenia is unfortunately no strange or new episode in Turkey. It had its counterparts in the massacres of Bulgaria which preceded the last war with Russia; in that of Damascus in 1860; in the outbreak of the Druses of Lebanon of the same year; in the slaughter of the Christians of Aleppo and of Djedda a few years earlier; and in the horrors of the Greek War of Independence. In 1822 a Turkish pasha swept the flourishing island of Scio of its whole population in an outburst of fanatic hatred to the Greek name. The system he adopted towards this unarmed community was that of the slave dealers of Africa when gathering in their human chattels for market. A line of Turkish soldiers was drawn across the island, while a fleet blockaded its coasts, and men, women and children were swept as in a dragnet to the port, where those not murdered were carried into slavery and their property made the booty of their assailants. So complete was the extermination, that out of thirteen thousand Catholics, Greek and Italian, in Scio, only three hundred were left,

and even to-day their numbers are scarcely reckoned at five hundred souls. It was an attempt to repeat the example of Scio in the Morea by sweeping it of its whole population that brought about the naval engagement at Navarrino, and destroyed in an hour the Turko-Egyptian navy. The interference of France and Russia then secured the freedom of the Greeks in the southern provinces of the mainland and the promise of toleration for all Christians throughout the Sultan's dominions; but neither these promises, nor the help given to Abdul Mejid against the Russian invasion in 1854 by France and England, could protect the Christians of Turkey against the massacres of Aleppo, of Damascus and of Lebanon, even in times of domestic peace. These two are only examples on a large scale of a policy carried out in countless other cases by the authority of Turkish governors or half-independent Mahometan chiefs. It was common twenty years ago to find in the different provinces of Anatolia whole villages of Christian origin which had been forced to profess Mahometanism at the point of the sword within the last generation. Mahometan names were coupled with Christian surnames in a way which unmistakably revealed the recent proselytism enforced on their bearers, but these facts were never brought to public notice.

There is a striking resemblance between the details of former massacres of Christians and those reported recently in Armenia. When the Turkish government wishes to disguise its own share in these outbreaks of Moslem bigotry, and is forced to admit their occurrence by evidence that cannot be gainsaid, the blame for them is usually laid on some body of fanatics which the Porte declares itself unable to restrain, but carefully avoids punishing. In Bulgaria it was the Bashi Bazouks, in Syria the Druses, in Armenia it is the Kurds, elsewhere the Circassians. The Turkish governors protest their inability to restrain those populations from slaughtering Christians, though in other respects they are obedient vassals of the Sultan. The plea is occasionally varied by representing the Christians as the aggressors, especially when the Turkish regular troops take part in the massacres. The Bulgarians, the Maronites and the Armenians, three habitually unwarlike and disarmed races, have been described as bloodthirsty rebels after they had been made victims of Turkish savagery. The falsehood of this charge is notorious, but it serves the purpose of the Sultan's government just as well. The one thing feared really by the Turks is an invasion from some Christian power outside Turkey. Their own Christian subjects they scorn as enemies, while they hate them cordially at the same time. In the diplomatic warfare which is usually the only crusade which follows a massacre in some Turkish district, the Armenians or Maronites may figure as reckless combatants,

but soldiering is not the trade of populations to whom the use of arms has been forbidden for generations.

How little faith can be placed in Turkish laws or officials can readily be judged from the very nature of the state, which, by diplomatic usage, is reckoned among the "Powers" of Europe. Turkey is not a nation in the sense given to the word by the civilized world. It is to-day, as it has been from the days when Osman laid the foundations of the empire, six centuries ago, an armed population of Tartar race and habits, levying tribute at will on a multitude of Christian population whom it treats as its natural slaves, with no rights to life or property but such as the interests of their rulers induce them to grant. The Cheri, or Koranic code is the supreme law, and the Sultan the supreme ruler and judge of all his subjects, and, in Mahometan theory, of the whole human race. War against Christian or non-Mahometan populations is not only the right, but the duty of the "Chief of the Faithful," unless they acknowledge vassalage to the "True Believers." It is only the want of power to make such wars successful that in Mahometan ideas justifies the Sultan in allowing any Christian nation the right of existence. For the Christians subject to Turkish rule it is a fixed principle of law that they must be subject entirely to the will of the "True Believers." It has become customary of late years, since England and France saved the empire from the invasion of Nicholas, for the Turkish government to proclaim the equality of all classes before the law. Abdul Mejid in 1856 issued a proclamation to that effect, and it has been repeated several times since, but the real value of these proclamations may be gathered from the fact that at the same time the "Cheri" is proclaimed the supreme code. As this code declares positively that the evidence of Christians cannot be received against a Mahometan either in civil or criminal cases, it is easy to see what the so-called equality is in fact.

In 1877 the Turkish government under the administration of Midhat Pacha took a further step to show to the world its advancement in the ways of modern civilization. A constitution was established by proclamation with two chambers, to the lower one of which Christians were admitted. The deputies, however, were not elected by the people but appointed by the government, and in the hundred and thirteenth article of the "Constitution" itself it was further provided that "the Imperial government reserved to itself the power to suspend the ordinary law at will in any district," and also "to banish, at discretion, any subject whom the police might consider dangerous." A constitution of such a kind may seem an audacious farce, but it was the nearest approach to a civilized form of government that Mahometan Turkey could

tolerate. The Mahometans may enjoy a certain amount of protection from the Koranic code and divide the patronage of government between them, but while the Sultan's government retains its power, its Christian subjects can have no rights of freemen in their native land.

The treatment given to the Catholic Armenians by successive viziers between 1870 and 1876, in a time of full peace, is a good example of the spirit of the Mahometan government towards Christians. There are over a million of Catholics in the empire, and they have for centuries been recognized as such by the authorities, and allowed the same contemptuous tolerance as the other Christian bodies. Owing to the diversity of rites, they are divided into Latins, Armenians, Syrians, Chaldeans, Maronites and United Greeks, each having a Patriarch recognized by the Ottoman authorities as its official head. When the "old Catholic" movement was started in Germany and Switzerland in 1871, the Turkish minister, though a Mahometan and totally indifferent to every form of Christianity, was taken with the whim of copying the action of Bismarck in declaring that the decrees of the Vatican Council had changed the Constitution of the Church. Mahmood Pasha, the vizier, decided to apply the Bismarckian system to the Armenian Catholics by way of a social experiment, for he did not interfere with the religious affairs of the other nine-tenths of the Catholic population. Mgr. Hassoun, the Armenian Patriarch, long recognized by the Ottoman authorities, was summarily deposed and exiled, and a handful of schismatics were invited to elect a new Patriarch for the hundred thousand Armenian Catholics. The Catholic body naturally refused to accept this official, who was an excommunicated monk named Kupelian. The government paid no attention to the protests of the Catholic population, but at once declared Kupelian the legal head of the Armenians in union with the Holy See, and the Turkish police put him in possession of the church buildings, seminaries, and hospitals built by Catholic alms. The adherents of Kupelian were not more numerous than Dr. Döllinger's partisans in Germany or France. In Angora and Aleppo the priest named by him had only his clerk for a congregation, but nevertheless the Catholics saw their churches seized for his use by the Turkish police. This state of affairs was continued up to 1877, when the revolt of the European provinces gave other occupation to the government than harrassing a handful of its Catholic subjects as a political amusement. This incident gives a good idea of the supreme contempt for any rights of Christians which is the cardinal principle of Turkish rule.

To understand properly the relations between the Ottoman

Government and its Christian subjects, it is necessary to remember the organization of that government and its history. The Turks are not a population which has amalgamated with the original races of Turkey; they are simply an armed nation of barbarian invaders which for four centuries and more has maintained the condition of conquerors over conquered. The profession of Mahometanism is the first requisite of Turkish nationalization, if the word has any meaning in Turkey. Greek and Armenian and Syrian Christians are to-day, as they were five centuries ago, foreigners in the eyes of the true Turks and only permitted to exist and practice their religion by the gracious pleasure of the Sultan. The law of the empire is not made for them; they are incapable of its application, strictly speaking, by the fact of not being Moslems. When the Turkoman horde, organized by Ertogrul, began under Osman the career of conquest which gave birth to the Turkish Empire, its policy was to bring into subjection every people with whom it came in contact and to offer them the alternative of extermination or payment of a tribute fixed by the conquerors, as a bandit might levy ransom from his prisoners. If the conquered were willing to profess the doctrine of Mahomet they were enrolled in the list of the conquerors and reckoned as true Turks in every sense. A tribute of boys was moreover levied on the different Christian nations conquered by the arms of the Osmanli, and these formed the Janissaries, the picked troops of the Sultan's army. The Tartar blood of the original invaders has thus been mingled in the modern Turk with that of every Christian race that came under their power. Mahometanism, not race, is the political bond of the Turkish nation. In 1875, Edhem Pasha, the Grand Vizier, was himself a Greek who had been carried into slavery from the Morea in 1827 when a child and reared a Moslem by his master who subsequently adopted him. His brother was at the same time a Greek priest near Smyrna, but to the Mahometan Vizier the latter was only an infidel "giaour."

When the conquered Christians paid tribute instead of accepting Mahometanism the Turkish Government allowed each community to regulate its internal affairs by its own laws, provided the tribute taxes were promptly paid and that no Turk desired to interfere with their property or personal liberty. In most cases the religious head of each community, the Patriarch or Metropolitan, was recognized as its civil head likewise and was made responsible for the conduct of his co-religionists. In some cases national chiefs were left to rule, and where there were no Mahometan settlements the Christian communities remained practically self-governing nations. The Maronites of Mount Lebanon and the Miridites of Albania, both Catholic in faith, are examples of this latter class.

The Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, after the taking of that city, was recognized by the Sultan as civil head of all the Greeks in the empire. Various other Patriarchs, some Catholics, others Schismatic, were entrusted with supreme power over their fellow believers, subject of course to the authority of the Turkish governors whenever they chose to interfere in the affairs of the Christians. At present there are Latin, Greek, Armenian, Syrian, Chaldean and Maronite Catholic Patriarchs, Greek, Armenian, Nestorian and Jacobite, Schismatical Patriarchs; a Bulgarian exarch and various other dignitaries of different denominations recognized by the Turkish Government as civil and religious heads of various bodies of its subjects, but all outside the class of Turks. They are regarded much in the same light as England regards the King of Ashanti or the Tuli chiefs lately reduced to subjection to the empire, but allowed to manage their own subjects during the good pleasure of their masters.

So deeply is this feeling rooted in the Turkish Government, that it regards it as quite natural that the consuls of Christian nations should look after the interests of its own subjects as if they were absolute foreigners in the land. France for centuries was regarded as the natural protector of the Catholics throughout Turkey, and Russia claimed a similar position with regard to the schismatic Greeks. The Turkish authorities find nothing strange in this. In 1876, when the French ambassador addressed a remonstrance to the Turkish minister against the persecution to which the Catholic Armenians were being subjected, the latter replied that he wished France would take away the whole Armenian population and let the government rest from the trouble of ruling them. The utterance was typical of the feelings of the Turkish rulers towards their Christian subjects.

This habit of regarding all Christians as aliens is as old as the Ottoman Empire itself. It is now six hundred years since the Turkoman Shepherd Chief, who founded the dynasty of Osman, formed an army of his countrymen on the banks of the Euphrates and started to conquer a kingdom from the territory of the Greek Empire in Asia. Such enterprises have always been common among the wandering hordes of the Tartar steppes, who are as fond of war and plunder as were our own Indian tribes. An ambitious and able chief could always raise a following among those soldier shepherds and lead them and their families to the conquest of some settled but unwarlike neighboring country. The result of these movements is nearly always the same. The uncivilized horde conquers a civilized country, occupies its cities and fields, and then falls into habits of lazy self-indulgence which, in a generation or two, leaves it without the warlike habits on which alone

its superiority rested, and the barbarian kingdom is destroyed as quickly as it sprang up. The Osmanli dynasty had a different fate. By a combination of circumstances unknown before in history, a succession of eleven really able and vigorous sultans appeared at the head of the Turkish Empire founded by Osman. They continued to war and conquer for three full centuries without any relaxation either in their military spirit or their religious fanaticism. The institution of the Janissaries, by which the flower of the male children of their conquered subjects were forced into Mahometanism in their infancy and trained up as soldiers from their boyhood, was a powerful means of preserving and increasing the military strength of the original tribe, now become the imperial race of the Osmanli Turks. Other recruits were gathered from the swarms of their own race that were ever ready to leave the plains of Tartary to share the booty of their conquering countrymen. The conquered populations, when not Moslem, were treated as the natural slaves of the Turks, and only useful as furnishing them with the luxuries of civilization and the material resources needed for further conquests.

The wave of Mahometan conquest which, in the seventh and eighth centuries, had carried the dominions of the Arab caliphs from Spain to India, was renewed five hundred years later by the Turkoman followers of the dynasty of Osman. The Asiatic territory of the Greek Empire and that of the successors of the caliphs were absorbed in a couple of generations, and then the invaders passed on to Europe and made Adrianople their capital. The European nations were as powerless to resist their onslaught as the Asiatics had been. Stephen Dushan had founded a powerful kingdom of Servia, but it was subjected by the battle of Kossovo in the early part of the fifteenth century. The Hungarians and Poles, with allies from France and the West, were utterly defeated in the great battles of Nicopolis and Varna, and finally, in 1453, Constantinople, the greatest city then of the civilized world both in wealth and population and the representative of the Roman Empire of the Cæsars, was taken by storm, and became the seat of the Turkish sultans.

The Turks did not change their habits nor their fierce energy in Constantinople. They aspired to the complete conquest of Europe, and Rome was the next object of their desires. In that they were disappointed, but elsewhere for a full hundred years and more they kept on their career of successful aggression. Egypt was conquered by the first Selim, who there obtained from the descendant of the Arab caliphs the cession of that dignity to himself. The Turkish sultan thus became also caliph or spiritual head of the orthodox Mahometan world, and his successors have since re-

tained the double rank. In the reign of Soliman "the Magnificent," the contemporary of Charles V., the Turkish Empire exceeded both in extent and wealth the whole of Christian Europe. In military strength and naval power it was unquestionably the strongest power on earth. Charles V. saw Vienna besieged for a month by Turkish armies without being able to offer them battle, and though Vienna escaped, Hungary and Transylvania became provinces of Turkey. The fertile plains of South Russia acknowledged Turkish supremacy, though ruled by the Mahometan King of Crim Tartary, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoph were both Turkish lakes. The whole of North Africa, to the borders of Morocco with Egypt and Nubia, and nearly the whole of Arabia, were provinces of the Empire of Soliman.

The Osmanli Turks, thus become successors of the Roman lords of the civilized world, scarcely changed their character of Tartar marauders. They despised the civilization as well as the religion of their Christian enemies. The luxuries which they extorted from their subjects they enjoyed as an Indian tribe would the plunder of an American town, but they scorned to provide even those luxuries by their own labor. The higher lessons of civilization they utterly refused to learn. Art, literature, and science, continued as foreign to the Turkish rulers of Constantinople as they had been to their ancestors when feeding their flocks in the steppes of Turkestan. The systems of law and administration devised by the experience of fifty generations of the highest races of Europe, they treated with contempt; as unworthy of notice beside the crude rules of the Koranic code. Colleges and schools, except for teaching the doctrines of Mahomet were unknown to the subjects of Soliman. The principles of commerce, of combining men for the works of peace, of public improvements, were all scorned by them as unworthy of warriors and left to their Christian subjects to practice, as best they might under the rule of capricious barbarians. It is little wonder that, after the booty of the early conquest had been wasted, decay set in everywhere through the Turkish Empire. The fairest lands of Europe and Asia fell back to the state of a wilderness. Cyprus under its Christian kings had a population of two millions. After three centuries of Turkish rule it numbers scarcely a tenth of that today. The same has been the fate of every land cursed by Turkish rule. Constantinople when taken by Mahomet II., contained a larger and wealthier population than Paris and London combined, and a higher civilization than either. Its present condition gives the measure of the capacity of the Ottomans for any work beyond ruthless war.

The conquests of the Turks in Europe were checked in the six-

teenth century by the victory of Lepanto won by the Spaniards and Venetians. For a century later, however, they continued to be one of the great, if no longer the greatest, military powers of the world. In 1683 a Sultan undertook the conquest of Germany, and his armies would have taken Vienna but for the arrival of the Polish King Sobieski. The defeat then inflicted on the Ottoman army was the commencement of their downfall; step by step the conquered Christian lands were won back from Turkish dominion. The seventeenth century saw them driven from Hungary and Poland. By the close of the eighteenth they had lost the whole north coast of the Black Sea and their armies were powerless against the disciplined troops of Europe. Napoleon's campaigns in Egypt and Syria showed how far the Turks had fallen even as soldiers, in comparison with the nations of Christian Europe. Mahmoud, the reforming Sultan of our own century appreciated this fact and attempted to stop the ruin of the empire by introducing the improvements of modern civilization. He only succeeded partially in reorganizing the army and giving a less Tartar form to the exterior of the Turkish administration, but the old barbarian spirit remains unchanged still. At Silistria and at Plevna, the Turkish soldiers showed that they still retain the fighting qualities of their race. At Damascus, in Bulgaria, and now in Armenia, they have proved that they are still the same ruthless barbarians they were in the days of Mohammed II.

The action of the western civilized nations towards the decaying barbarism enthroned still at Constantinople, shows how deeply modern Europe has degenerated from the spirit of the Crusades. The atrocities of Turkish rule are universally admitted, but no serious attempt has been made to check them, though any civilized power could easily effect it. England, since the beginning of this century, has indeed made herself for commercial and political objects, the avowed champion of the Mahometan despotism of the Sultan. She aided him to conquer Egypt from the French and she interfered to restore his dominion in Syria, which had been occupied by the more civilized power of Mehemet Ali. During the Greek war of independence she protected Turkey with her fleet. The battle of Navarrino which ended that war was fought against the express instructions of the British Cabinet. A French and a Russian fleet had sailed to Greek waters on the news of the Turkish atrocities in the Morea and the English Admiral, Codrington, was sent with a strong squadron to prevent their interference with the Egyptian-Turkish forces in their work of massacre. A Turkish ship captain, who did not comprehend the conduct of his English allies, fired on one of their vessels in a fit of ignorant rage, and the English Admiral forgot his instructions in the heat of wrath

and returned the fire. The French and Russian fleets at once took part, and in an hour the whole Turkish fleet was at the bottom of Navarrino Bay and the freedom of Greece was assured in spite of England's friendship for its Moslem rulers. The spirit of English policy was shown again during the Crimean war, and later at the time of the butcheries in Syria in 1860. On that occasion Napoleon III. insisted on landing French troops and protecting the Syrian Christians from extermination. The English Minister did not hesitate to assert that the maintainance of Turkey, in the eyes of his government, was paramount to the existence of the Eastern Christians. A similar sentiment has been publicly expressed this present year by the actual Prime Minister of England, in his famous speech on Armenia.

Russia, while professing her sympathies with the condition of the Christians under Turkish rule, is as little disposed to interfere in their behalf honestly as England. The great object of her policy is not to restore freedom to the Eastern Christians, but to make them and the whole territory of Turkey subjects of her own despotism. For the methods of the Turks the Russian administration feels no repugnance. It has practiced them itself whenever it suited its interests, though the elaborate despotism of Peter is less liable to outbursts of mere angry passion than the fanatic brutality of the Turkish sultans. The massacres committed by the Cossacks in Poland last century under the express orders of Catherine II., were as savage as those of Bulgaria or Armenia, and the extermination of the Janissaries by Mahmood was the counterpart of the butchery of the Streltzi by Peter the Great. The conquests of Khiva and the Turkomans by Russia within the present generation, were as brutal as the old Turkish invasions of Europe when the Osmanli scimeter was supreme in war. At present it seems as if Russia, for her own ends, were willing to keep the Turks in possession of their Christian subjects, if they will consent to be themselves the vassals of the czar. The occupation of Turkey by Russia would only be for the subjects of the latter the exchange of a crumbling and ignorant despotism for a powerful and well organized one. It may be doubted whether the benefit would outweigh the loss of such a change, however vile the Turkish regime may be.

France, whatever be the faults of its policy, and that policy is often unscrupulous enough, is the only European power which, so far, has shown any real interest in the emancipation of the Christians of Turkey. It was her interference that secured the independence of Greece, and the establishment of a Christian government in the Lebanon in 1861 was the only successful measure taken to secure the lives of the Christians under Turkish rule

against outbursts of Moslem fanaticism. Since that time there has been no recurrence in Syria of the massacres and civil wars which used to be almost of yearly occurrence. An application of the same system in Armenia, and wherever Christian populations are exposed to Moslem lawlessness would, in all probability, give the same results. The Turkish government cannot abrogate the Koranic law, but it can leave the administration of its Christian populations in exclusively Christian hands. The selfish political interests of the European powers cannot be made to unite for the substitution of a Christian power at Constantinople for the Sultan, but there is nothing to prevent the extension of the system now in force in Syria to every part of the Turkish territory. It would be virtually the establishment of home rule throughout the empire, such as was granted by the conquering sultans in theory, but free from the dangers of irresponsible despotism which have made it worthless so far in practice. Mahometan rule, as it now exists in Turkey, is doomed, and the greatest danger to its Christian subjects is that it may be replaced by another despotism stronger but not less unscrupulous than that of the sultans, whose dynasty has now so nearly run its course of blood.

B. CLINCH.

THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED APOLOGY OF APOLLONIUS, THE MARTYR.

THE nineteenth century, the century of science, as it proudly calls itself, has also been pre-eminently the age of historical investigation and antiquarian research. The decipherers and translators of the mysterious picture writing of Egypt have revived the history of that wonderful land. Excavators on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates have brought to light, and Assyriologists have interpreted, thousands of tablets and inscriptions telling the story of kings and conquerors who ruled before Abraham was born. Schliemann has dug up the site of Homer's Troy. Kenyon has presented the student of Greek history with Aristotle's History of the Athenian Constitution. The Annals of Rome have been made fuller and clearer by the recovery of Augustus's story of his own reign (the *Monumentum Ancyranum*), of Diocletian's edict and hundreds of other valuable documents. From the underground galleries of the early Christian cemeteries of Rome, Giovanni Battista de Rossi has dug up the priceless annals of the early Roman Church. His boundless learning and almost inspired genius compelled the Catacombs to give up the secrets they had concealed for so many centuries. His researches in the Roman and other archives, as well as his subterranean investigations, have restored to the historian many venerable documents setting forth the pathetic tale of the sufferings and heroism of our Christian forefathers. Other important discoveries, also, have sent a thrill of joy into the hearts of the students of the early history of Christianity. From Constantinople came the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, from Venice many Syriac and Armenian documents. Other scholars recovered the Apology of Aristides and the Diatesseron of Tatian. On the present occasion we would draw the attention of our readers to another early Christian document, recently discovered. Though less extensive and less important than some of the writings just mentioned, it challenges our interest in a high degree. We speak of the Apology of the Roman philosopher and senator Apollonius. Until a few years ago so little was known of this ancient defence of the Christian faith, that though published more than twenty years ago, its true character was recognized only quite recently. All that was previously known of Apollonius and his Apology was contained in a few statements found in the first historian of the Christian Church, Eusebius of Cæsarea, and in a short reference to him by St. Jerome. St. Je-

rome, however, does little more than repeat and amplify the report of Eusebius. Apollonius, the Bishop of Cæsarea tells us, was a distinguished Roman, who lived under the Emperor Commodus. He was famed for his culture and learning, and especially for his thorough knowledge of philosophy. From St. Jerome we learn that he was a senator. Apollonius, who had become a Christian, lived at Rome for a number of years unmolested and in peace. The Emperor Commodus, brute and profligate though he was, proved himself far more just and considerate to the Christians than his father, the cultured but narrow-minded Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher. Marcia, the wife—the Roman historians call her *concubina*—of Commodus, was a Christian, and no doubt influenced the emperor to treat those of her faith with mercy and kindness. We need not wonder, therefore, that Apollonius, in spite of his eminence and fame, escaped persecution so long. For in those days, even when the emperor was gentle, the law was cruel. There was a decree of the senate it seems—the senate being, since Augustus, the partner in sovereignty of the Princeps—embodying apparently the views which we find set down in Trajan's famous letter to Pliny regarding the treatment of the Christians. They were not to be hunted down, but if brought before the judges they must recant or die. Until one of his own slaves turned informer, and brought him before the senate and Perenius, the prefect of the emperor's body-guard (182–185 A.D.), no one had thought fit to impeach Apollonius. In presence of his judges, Eusebius tells us Apollonius delivered a defence of his faith. This the bishop of Cæsarea had published in a collection of *Acta Martyrum*, or records of the trials of Christian martyrs, some time before writing his history. Unfortunately, this important collection has perished. Our loss is the more to be regretted, as the bishop appears to have been a man of clear, penetrating judgment, that distinguished readily the genuine from the false. His authority alone, therefore, is a guarantee of the authenticity of the Acts of Apollonius published by him. However, these Acts had been lost for centuries, and no one dreamed of their discovery. But in this case, as so often, the unexpected happened. In 1874 the Mekhitharists in Venice, a congregation of Oriental monks, who devote themselves to the study of Oriental literature and the promotion of Catholic interests in the East, published a volume of ancient Armenian documents bearing on the history of the Church. The Apology of Apollonius was one of these. But no one recognized its importance or saw its identity with the lost Apology spoken of by Eusebius. For well-nigh twenty years it lay buried amid the Armenian lore of the learned Mekhitharists. Finally, an Oxford scholar, Mr. F. C. Conybeare, recognized its importance, and pub-

lished a translation in his book entitled "Monuments of Early Christianity." Once introduced to the world of European scholars, its value was recognized. Prof. Harnack characterized it as "the noblest Apology for the Christian faith transmitted to us from antiquity." The Acts of Apollonius, he adds, bear the stamp of life and authenticity. As the reader will notice at once, these acts are the record of the holy martyr's trial, and present to us a living picture of the procedure of a Roman judge against a man charged with being a Christian. No doubt all Roman prefects and governors were not as considerate as Perenius, who tried Apollonius. Besides, we must not forget that the confessor of Christ was a man of unusual rank and prominence. St. Jerome's statement that he was a Roman senator is accepted by Hardy¹ and Hilgenfeld. It is confirmed by the fact of Apollonius being summoned before the senate. During the second century almost every emperor promised, at his accession, to put no senator to death on his sole authority. The Perenius who figures as the presiding judge at the beginning of the trial was the favorite of Commodus from his accession, 180-185. As commander of the emperor's body-guard, and probably as prefect of the City of Rome, he might preside in the senate as the emperor's representative. By his order, therefore, Apollonius is brought before the senate to be tried by his peers. Whether Perenius is also the magistrate who appears in the later part of our document is not so sure. Some critics are of opinion that this magistrate is the regular president of the senate.² At all events, both are equally courteous to the martyr and equally subservient to the senate's authority. It may not be uninteresting to recall that Perenius, though a clever courtier, came to a violent end. Like the wives of Henry VIII., the favorites of Commodus generally paid with their heads for the privilege of their master's favor. Perenius was beheaded by the emperor's order in 185 A.D.

We are now acquainted with the most important preliminary details required for the understanding of the story of the trial of Apollonius and the appreciation of his Apology. We now subjoin the text of the venerable document following the version of the German orientalist, Paul Rohrbach, as far as he gives it, in the April number of the *Deutsche Rundschau*. While agreeing substantially with Mr. Conybeare's version, Rohrbach's translation shows some interesting differences and throughout is clearer and less archaic. The passages not given by Rohrbach have been inserted from Mr. Conybeare's translation. They are paragraphs 4-11, 24-27, 43-45, 47.

¹ E. G. Hardy, *Christianity and the Roman Government*, p. 200-8.

² So Hilgenfeld, in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, for May 18, 1895, p. 663.

1. Terentius, the Prefect, commanded him to be brought before the Senate and said to him: "Apollonius, why do you resist the invincible laws and the order of the Emperor and why do you refuse to sacrifice to the Gods?" 2. Apollonius said: "Because I am a Christian; and fear God, who made heaven and earth and sacrifice not to lifeless idols." 3. The Prefect said: "But you ought to repent of such sentiments because of the edicts of the Emperors, and swear by the Fortune of the autocrat Commodus." 4. Apollonius replied: "Listen attentively to my answer; He who repents of good and just works, he, indeed, is godless and without hope; but he who repents of unlawful deeds and of evil thoughts and returns not to them, he is a lover of God and has regard to hope. 5. I am firmly resolved to keep the beautiful and glorious commandment of God, which he taught by my Lord Christ, who knows the thoughts of men, and beholds all that is done both openly and in secret. 6. It is best not to swear at all, but always to live in peace and truth. For the truth is a great oath and for this reason is it bad and evil to swear by Christ. But because of falsehood is there disbelief and because of disbelief there is swearing, I will swear truth freely by the true God, though we love the Emperor also and offer prayers for his Majesty." 7. The Prefect said: "Come, then, and sacrifice to Apollo and to the other gods and to the image of the Emperor." 8. Apollonius said: "As to changing my purpose and as to the oath, I have given answer; but as to sacrifices, I and all Christians offer a bloodless sacrifice to God, Lord of heaven and earth and of the sea, and of all living things for the soul-endowed rational images (*i.e.*, the men), who have been appointed by God's Providence to rule over the earth. 9. Therefore, according to God's precept, we pray to him who dwells in heaven, who is the only God, that they may justly rule upon this earth, for we know for certain that he (*i.e.*, Commodus) is established emperor through none other than through the one King, God, who holds all in his hand." 10. The Prefect said: "You were not summoned here to talk philosophy. I will give you one day's respite to reflect on your interest and to consider the question of your life." And he ordered him to be taken to prison.

11. And after three days he ordered him to be brought before him and said to him: "What resolution have you come to?" 12. Apollonius answered: "I am and shall be true to the worship of God, as I said before." 13. The Prefect said: "Because of the decree of the Senate I advise you to repent and to sacrifice to the gods, to whom the whole earth offers adoration and sacrifice; for it is far better for you to live among us than to die a wretched death. You are not unacquainted with the decree of the Senate, I think." 14. Apollonius said: "I know the decrees of Almighty

God, and I am and shall be true to his worship, and I do not adore idols fashioned by man's hands, made of gold, silver, and wood, that see not and hear not, because they are the work of men's hands and the true worship of God they know not. 15. But I have learned to adore the God of heavens and to bend the knee to Him alone, who breathed the breath of life into all men and continually gives life to all. 16. And I shall not debase myself nor cast myself into the abyss, for it is a great disgrace to prostrate one's self before things that are vile, and it is servile to adore what is worthless: men sin in adoring such things. Fools were they who invented them, and more senseless still those who adore and honor them.

17. The Egyptians in their folly adore onions. 18. The Athenians to this very day adore the head of an ox made of copper and call it 'the Fortune of Athens.' And they have likewise set up in the well-known place near the statue of Zeus and Herakles to pray to them. 19. And yet in what respect are they better than dried clay or a baked potsherd. Eyes have they and see not, ears have they and hear not, hands have they and seize not, feet have they and walk not, for the mere form gives not true being. And I think that Socrates also made sport of the Athenians, when he swore by the plane-tree, by the dog, and by dried wood. 20. By worshipping idols, men firstly sin against themselves. 21. In the next place they deny God, because they reject the truth. The Egyptians have called the onion and the leek gods, and the fruits that we feed upon, and which enter the stomach, and are thrown on the dunghill, these have they adored. Yea, they have adored fish also, and the dove, and the dog, and stone and the wolf, and they have all worshipped the fictions of their own fancy. 22. Thirdly, men sin when they worship men, angels and demons, calling them gods."

23. The Prefect answered: "You have talked much philosophy and given no pleasure. But do you not know that by the decree of the Senate there shall be no Christians at all." 24. Apollonius answered: "Yes, but the human decree of the Senate cannot override God's decree. For inasmuch as men frivolously hate and slay those who do them good, so in many ways men stand aloof from God. 25. But know that God has appointed death and after death judgment for all, for kings and poor men, for rulers and slaves and freemen, for philosophers and the ignorant. 26. But there is a distinction of death (from death). Therefore, the disciples of Christ daily die, crucifying their desires and mortifying them in accordance with the Divine Scriptures. For we have no part at all in immodest desires, nor do we allow impure sights, nor lewd glances, nor ears that listen to evil, lest our souls be wounded thereby.

27. "For while we live we live for God and suffer tortures for Him that we may not miserably suffer everlasting death. 28. Moreover, we do not grieve at having our goods taken from us, because we know that both in life and death we are the Lord's. Fever or any other sickness may kill a man. I may suppose that I died of such a disease."

29. The Prefect said: "Therefore you insist upon dying." 30. Apollonius answered: "I wish to live in Christ, but I do not fear death, because of the love of life. For there is nothing more worthy of our esteem than life everlasting, which, for the soul that has here led a noble life, is the mother of immortality."

31. The Prefect said: "I do not understand what you say." 32. Apollonius said: "What shall I do for you? What enlightens the heart is the Word of God, as light gives sight to the eyes." 33. A philosopher who was present said: "Apollonius you make a laughing stock of yourself, for you have gone far astray, though you fancy you speak deep truths." 34. Apollonius said: "I have learned to pray but not to sneer; however, your hypocrisy proves the blindness of your heart, for to fools only truth seems laughable." 35. The magistrate¹ said: "Explain to me clearly what you mean." 36. Apollonius answered: "The Word of God, of the Redeemer of souls and bodies, became Man in Judæa, fulfilled all righteousness and was gloriously filled with divine wisdom. He taught the true religion, that was becoming to the sons of men, to silence the principle of sin. 37. For He taught them to restrain their anger, to moderate their appetites, to check their lust, to dispel sorrow, to be compassionate, to cherish charity, to cast off vanity, to forego revenge, not to be vindictive, to condemn death, but not through injustice, but while bearing patiently with the unjust, to obey the laws of God, to honor rulers, to adore God, to believe in an immortal soul, which is in God;² to expect the judgment after death, to hope for a reward after the resurrection, which God will grant to the pious.

38. "All this He taught by word and deed with great constancy, and after being commended by all for the benefits He bestowed, He was put to death at last, as philosophers and just men had also been put to death before Him. For the just are hated by the unjust; 39, as also the divine Scripture says: 'Let us bind the just man, for he is an offence to us.'³ 40. But one of the Greek sages,⁴ also, has said that 'the just man will suffer, be spit upon

¹ So Rohrbach, but we are inclined, with Hilgenfeld, to recognize in this magistrate the usual president of the senate.

² Conybeare translates: "to entrust the Spirit to immortal God."

³ Isaiah, ch. iii., 10, in the *Septuagint*. The Douay version has no such passage either iii. 10, or iii. 13, to which Conybeare refers.

⁴ Plato in the *Republic*, ii., 361 ff.

and crucified.' 41. Just as the Athenians, led by the mob, pronounced and passed the unjust sentence of death on him (Socrates). So also the unjust at last pronounced sentence of death, because the unjust grew envious of Him, 42, as they had grown envious of the prophets, who lived before Him, and had foretold of Him that He would come and do good to all men and persuade all men by His virtue to adore God the Father, the Creator of all things; in Him (the Word) we believe and before Him we prostrate ourselves, for from Him we have learned precepts of piety before unknown to us, and henceforth we shall not go astray, but we lead a life of goodness and we hope in the future life."

43. The magistrate said: "I thought you had changed your mind over night." 44. Apollonius said: "And I expected that your thoughts would be changed over night, and the eyes of your spirit be opened by my answer, and that your heart would bear fruit, and that you would worship God, the Creator of all, and offer your prayers to him continually by means of compassion; for compassion shown by men to men is a bloodless sacrifice and holy unto God."

45. The magistrate said: "I would fain set you free, but I cannot do so on account of the decree of the senate. However, I will pass a mild sentence," and he ordered him to be beheaded with the sword. 46. Apollonius said: "I thank my God for your sentence."

47. And the executioners forthwith led him away and beheaded him, while he continued to glorify the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, to whom be glory forever. Amen.

The story of the martyrdom of our Christian philosopher has the appearance of a court record. There is no reason forbidding the assumption that in this case appearances are not deceptive. Christians interested would meet with little difficulty if, after the death of the martyr, they desired to examine and copy the record of his trial. Certainly, after the conversion of Constantine, the Roman government would place no obstacles in the way of men like Eusebius, who sought to preserve the memory of the noble martyrs who had given their lives for their faith. Besides, the art of shorthand writing was well known and practiced in Rome. Cicero's first oration against Catiline, an extempore speech, as is well known, was taken down by his secretary, M. Tullius Tiro. The Christians therefore might, in cases where it seemed desirable to them, have the court proceedings stenographed. Nor are the acts of St. Apollonius the only examples of a Christian trial that has come down to us. The acts of the Scillitan martyrs¹ are simi-

¹ They may be found in the original Latin in Robinson's *Texts and Studies—The*

larly the copy of court proceedings, and the same is true of others of the *Acta Sanctorum*. In the Acts of Apollonius there is nothing that might lead us even to suspect the authenticity of the recital. The name Perenius, it is true, has been corrupted into Terentius, but write the names in capitals and the change is at once explained. Apart from this the date, the chronological correctness of all the statements, the local and temporal coloring, and the other internal characteristics of the narrative, far from suggesting doubts, all conspire to support the genuineness of the document. Accordingly, not only Mr. Conybeare, but rigorous critics, whose learning deserves our confidence, and who are certainly not open to the charge of credulity, men like Harnack, Hilgenfeld and Rohrbach, have unreservedly admitted the authenticity of this newly recovered monument of early Christianity. We may, therefore, accept it with entire confidence.

What, then, can we gather from this interesting relic of Christian antiquity? Of course, we possess other apologies for our faith, fuller and older than that of Apollonius. The apologies of Aristides and of St. Justin, though we cannot fix their date to a year, were written some twenty-five to fifty years earlier. But the defence of Christianity, as set forth by these two writers, was composed in the closet, after careful reflection and for a special object. Our Apology is the extempore effort of a learned scholar when called to justify his religious belief before the judge who was to decide his fate. It is, so to say, a photograph taken from life. It is interesting not only, nor chiefly, on account of the arguments set forth, but as the self-portrait of a Christian scholar in the most trying of circumstances. And what does this portrait reveal to us? It shows us a man in the true sense of the word, self-possessed, clear-headed, fully conscious of the crisis that impends over him, his eyes calmly scanning the doom that stares him in the face. One way of escaping it there is, but duty, conviction, the fear of God, the love of Christ bar this way. From first to last there is not the faintest trace of wavering. He feels deeply the injustice of the law that requires him to do what God forbids. But no word of complaint escapes his lips, not a syllable betraying bitterness. He is the same quiet, dignified, manly gentleman throughout. He does not reproach the prefect; his replies to the judge are firm but charitable. He wishes him no evil; he hopes that his judge, too, may receive the heavenly light that is to him above life and its attractions. Apollonius reflects not only the dignity but the charity of his Master.

Why does he prize his faith above all things earthly? We must

Passion of St. Perpetua, p. 112 ff., or in Allard's *Histoire des Persecutions*, vol. i., p. 437 ff.

not make the mistake that has been made by some scholars that have written on our martyr's defence of Christianity.¹ A man pleading for his life cannot be expected to give even an exhaustive summary of his principles. What he says is said not to convey his own judgment or sentiments regarding his religious beliefs. It is said to carry conviction to the persons he addresses. And Apollonius, the scholar, Apollonius, the senator, knows the men to whom he addresses his words. He knows what is likely to have weight with them. We may go further, and say that he knows what appealed to himself in favor of Christianity when he was a pagan, only we must bear in mind that the active practical Christian looks at his religion from a different intellectual standpoint. He looks at it as a man who has experienced in the life of grace what no pagan eye can see and no pagan heart conceive. In Apollonius's discourse, therefore, it would be absurd to look for a complete abstract of current Christian doctrine, or a full setting forth of his own inmost convictions. The argument from silence is precarious at all times; especially so when we know that the speaker, from the nature of the case and because of the shortness of the time allowed him, can say only what will impress the hearer most favorably. What, therefore, does Apollonius regard as most likely to influence Perenius and his other hearers in his favor? "I am firmly resolved," he tells us, "to keep the beautiful and glorious commandment of God, which is taught by my Lord Christ." What was this beautiful and glorious commandment? "He taught his disciples to restrain their anger, to moderate their appetites, to check their lust, to dispel sorrow, to be compassionate, to cherish charity, to cast off vanity, to forego revenge, not to be vindictive, to condemn death, . . . to honor rulers, to adore God, to believe in an immortal soul, . . . to expect the judgment after death, to hope for a reward after the resurrection." What Apollonius emphasizes, therefore, is, that Christ taught the practice of Christian virtue, and especially of Christian charity, with a view to a reward in the life to come. But this teaching, he tells us, is not merely empty sound, merely fine phrases. "Henceforth we shall not go astray, but *we lead* a life of goodness and we hope in the future life." Why? Because we believe in Christ.

The magistrate was deeply impressed. "I would fain set you free," he said, "but I cannot do so." The noble martyr had struck the note to which every natural heart has a responsive chord. The senators of Commodus were not hard, fanatical believers in stoic virtue; the most of them were men with no lofty ideals. But even the rascal appreciates the nobility of virtue, and all men crave for

¹ What we shall say here is equally applicable to similar strictures made on the Apology of Aristides.

the life to come. Christ, the Word of God, made Man in Judæa, taught the one and promised the other. The power of Christ's word and example made his followers "lead lives of goodness." These sublime doctrines, supported by the authority of the Word, these noble deeds had spoken to the heart of Apollonius and many other right minded pagans; these same doctrines and deeds Apollonius thought might find an echo in the hearts of his pagan judges. The world is full of modern pagans. Mayhap that these, like their brethren under Commodus, will be more impressed by the practice of Christian virtue and the Christian's unswerving belief in a future life and a future reward, than by a thousand scientific apologies. What gave such overmastering power to the voice of Apollonius and the voice of the thousands who suffered for Christ, was their absolute unwavering certainty of immortality and Christ's crown. Apollonius's voice, ringing out with the full power of complete conviction these teachings of our Lord, which after all are the echoes of our own aspirations, failed not to communicate to his hearers an electric shock. Were the Christians of the nineteenth century to bear witness with like power and the like ring of absolute sincerity to these fundamental beliefs, were they to seal these beliefs by lives that, scorning the riches of the present, would proclaim "the hope of the future life," might not many a modern pagan, now deaf to Christ's "beautiful and glorious commandment," be roused to a sense of its beauty and its glory?

But Apollonius's argument is not only affirmative; it is negative also. It is decidedly aggressive. He is to forfeit his life for refusing to honor the gods of Cæsar. He defends himself by assailing them. His arguments are not new. They had been repeated again and again since the old Xenophanes had denounced the lying, cheating, lusting gods of the divine Homer, Academics, Peripatetics. Stoics had rehearsed the demonstration. Apollonius, it is true, does not dwell on the immorality of the heathen deities. To him who worships the only true God, the omnipotent Creator of heaven and earth, it is an absurdity, an outrage, to worship stones, bronze and wood, wrought into the likeness of the human form, as the arbiters of man's destiny. Like Aristides—in one passage he uses almost the same language—he ridicules the folly of the Egyptians, who offered divine honors to the onion and the leek. The Christian senator and scholar understood his audience. The president and members of the Roman senate, the successors of Cicero and the other augurs, who smiled when they looked at each other performing their augural functions, felt the force of Apollonius's attack. They dared not break a lance for the gods whom they wished their Christian colleague to worship; they were ashamed even to interrupt his denunciation. They list-

ened to the end, and then the prefect calmly tells him: "You have talked much philosophy and given us pleasure." No doubt it was not the aim of the Christian martyr to give his judges "pleasure"; no doubt these polite words proved to him, as clearly as the sternest rebuff could have done, the failure of his effort to make the truth a principle of action in the hearts of the senators. Still, Apollonius's words were not thrown away. For himself, it is true, he achieved nothing. For his religion and his brethren he accomplished much perhaps. He placed in the minds of all who heard him or who read his words a ferment that must leaven their thoughts, and sooner or later result in action. Men, even torpid, nay, unprincipled men, are impressed when they see their image reflected in the mirror of truth. When they behold their own distorted lineaments they wince. Man's conscience is a stern judge who cannot be bribed, though he may for a time be anæsthetized. Once he has tasted the sweetness of truth he will have an irresistible tendency to spew out falsehood. To spew the lie out of his mouth is half a victory for the truth. They first suffer, then admire, then, perchance, embrace it. Apollonius opened or reopened the eyes of the conscript fathers so as to see what a hideous caricature the Roman state religion was. They saw it, for though its official guardians, they said not a word. It was a case of Cicero's "*Cum tacent, probant.*" They not only condemned paganism, they admired the martyr's doctrine. Weakness, human respect, tradition led them to be false to the light—false so far as truth bade them boldly to stand up for its rights and the rights of conscience. Their minds were vanquished, but their wills were craven. But he who persecutes, through weakness, and in spite of himself, is not the bitter un pitying foe, that the ignorant fanatic always is. The former tastes wormwood, where the latter finds only honey; the former blushes when he tortures, the latter exults; the former looks for an excuse not to act, the latter has his arm ever raised to strike. Apollonius served his brethren well, when he forced the statesmen of Rome to avow that his word filled them with "pleasure." His attack was justified. Aggression had proved the best defence. Here again he conveys a lesson. Often the best defence is a powerful attack. Apply it to our age. The spirit of the modern pagan is negation. He assails everything; he builds up nothing or very little. But he exults in his work of destruction. Destruction, religions, moral, social, we are told, is liberation, is regeneration. Naturally, when the modern pagan attacks some part of the Christian citadel, its garrison defend it with might and main. Do we not instinctively protect any part of our body threatened by the ruffian by interposing our hand? And yet often the best way to save our eye is to smite our assailants. Perhaps,

the best method of fighting for Christianity and religion to-day consists in showing the shams and hollow pretences of its enemies. The modern pagan, we are aware, does not offer us many points of attack. He is an agnostic. He pretends to have no principles to defend. They are all negative. Still, his negations are to regenerate the world. He rigidly demands that your foundations shall be solid. Let him be required to show us how zero is to beget the infinite. Let him be required to show us his *ποῦ στῶ*. Point out the vanity of his promises, the inanity of his prophecies. Apollonius has already had imitators in the nineteenth century. M. Ferdinand Brunetière has recently exposed the baselessness of the pretences of pseudo-science as a moral and religious regenerator, the falsity of its claim to make mankind happy. Before publishing his essay, M. Brunetière had paid a visit to the Holy Father, and perhaps the French writer's incisive attack may be looked upon as an outcome of that visit. The brochure, though its author is not a theologian and does not pretend to write as such, produced a profound impression. How the enemies of the Church viewed it, appears clearly from the numerous and speedy attempts made to answer it. This assailants of the past were compelled to take the defensive. The fact in itself means a weakening of the foe. Mr. Balfour's book, again, though no Catholic would make it the philosophical basis of his religion, has also dealt some vigorous blows at the agnostics, and will be useful from that point of view. In general, the feeling seems to spread, that the time has come to put the modern paganism on the defensive. That the history of early Christianity certainly warrants these tactics, is again proven by its defence, as made by the holy "martyr Apollonius." Let the assault be bold and vigorous, free from bitterness, and let it be based on incontestable facts, and the result cannot be doubtful.

The loyalty of Apollonius to the emperor is another notable feature of the address. To God alone will he pay divine honors. The emperor, he, like all other Christians, respects as a man "appointed by God's Providence to rule over the earth." "We love the emperor and pray for his majesty." While manfully upholding freedom of conscience, he meets squarely the charge of disloyalty made against his brethren in the faith. Of the emperor, especially, he speaks in terms of loyal affection. Commodus, it is true, was a brute and a tyrant, yet "he is established in authority through none other than through the one king, God, who holds all in his hand." Therefore the Christian prays God that kings and emperors "may rule justly upon this earth." No doubt, the comparative fairness of Commodus to the faithful, and his merciful kindness to some of them touched the martyr's heart. No doubt, also, in these words spoke the Roman statesman and senator. But

apart from personal considerations, Apollonius briefly lays down the teaching of the Church on the respect, loyalty and obedience, due to the civil powers, as established by God, it is entitled to obedience, when its rule is just, but after all God is supreme, and the conscience is free. How clear, how pointed, how correct.

What distinctively Christian doctrines do we meet with in the new apology? Before answering the question, let us recall what has already been said. Apollonius's discourse is not a systematic theology, nor even a catechism. He rehearses only such Christian teaching, as, he thinks will help his cause. Still it is interesting to inquire what is his profession of faith. Let us gather its articles one by one, and arrange them so as to parallel the Apostle's Creed. Here is the creed of Apollonius: "1. I believe in God, the Father, Creator of heaven and earth; and, 2, the word of God (Jesus Christ); 3. Who became man in Judæa; and, 4, was put to death. 5. I believe in a judgment after death; 6. A resurrection; and, 7, a future life; 8. I believe in the Holy Spirit." Alongside of this creed let us place the creed of Aristides, as contained in his "Apology." We quote from Professor J. Rendel Harris.¹ "1. believe in one God, Almighty, maker of heaven and earth; 2. And in Jesus Christ, His Son; 3. Born of the Virgin Mary; 4. He was pierced by the Jews, He died and was buried; 5. The third day He rose again; 6. He ascended into Heaven; 7. He is about to come to judge." Compare with these creeds the version of the *Credo* handed down by Rufinus as that of the Roman Church. "I. I believe in God the Father Almighty; II. And in Christ Jesus, His only Son, our Lord; III. Who was born of the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary; IV. Was crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried; V. The third day He arose from the dead; VI. Ascended into Heaven; VII. Is seated at the right hand of the Father; VIII. And in the Holy Ghost; IX. The Holy Church; X. The forgiveness of sins; XI. The resurrection of the flesh."²

The resemblance between the creeds of Apollonius and Aristides is certainly marked. On the other hand, we observe characteristic differences. Our martyr emphasizes the resurrection and the future life, the thoughts probably uppermost in his mind as he faced his judges. Aristides places in relief our Lord's resurrection and ascension, the crowning proofs of his divinity. Both speaking before Roman magistrates pass over the part Pilate, the Roman governor, had in the Saviour's passion and death. If we now turn to the Roman version of the Christian symbol, the coincidences are certainly more striking than the omissions. It is indeed remarka-

¹ J. Rendel Harris, *The Apology of Aristides*, p. 25.

² Fouard, *St. Peter and The First Years of Christianity*, p. 233.

ble that in an address, whose primary aim was certainly not to epitomize Christian doctrine, eight of the eleven articles found in the *Credo* of Rufinus should appear. Apollonius rests the proof of Christ's divinity on the divinity of this teaching—a natural train of thought for a professed philosopher. This accounts for the absence of the articles reciting our Saviour's resurrection and ascension. His conception and birth appears in our martyr's address to be viewed more from the divine than the human side. Hence the failure to mention his birth from the Blessed Virgin. St. John, in his Gospel, omits our Lord's human genealogy, and the close connection between the views of Apollonius and the Fourth Gospel is manifest. Like the beloved disciple, he regards the Christ as the word of God—a conception that would commend itself to him as a philosopher. The absence of the articles of the Creed not found in the Apology, therefore, easily accounts for it; in fact the circumstances under which the document was composed make it natural as well as the contest.

Outside of the Creed, what is most suggestive in the Apology is the pointed reference to St. John's Gospel. There can be no doubt of this reference nor of the importance attached by Apollonius to St. John's conception of our Saviour as the divine Word. Bearing in mind that the martyr was a professed philosopher, we may well believe that the sublime opening of the Fourth Gospel had produced a profound impression him. Unluckily, we do not know the date of the Apologist's conversion, or we should have had a fixed point established at which St. John's Gospel was a document well-known and commonly cited in the imperial city. Another expression that arrests our attention is the passage: "I and all Christians offer a bloodless sacrifice to God." At first sight it suggests an allusion to the unbloody sacrifice of the altar. But when at the very close of the address we come to the statement that "compassion shown by men to men is a bloodless sacrifice and holy unto God," we feel how careful we must be in interpreting expressions that may be taken in a figurative sense.

What the newly-found Apology tells us of its author and his faith we have seen. What light does it throw on the attitude of the Roman government and of the men of Rome toward the teaching of Christ? The picture it reveals is one of strong lights and shadows. In the trial of the Christian Senator, Perenius and the Senate do not play the part of bloodthirsty, bullying, fanatical bigots. They treat him with great courtesy and a show of benevolent sympathy. They listen with pleasure to his philosophy. They would fain save his life. They do not find fault with his views. They almost appear to enjoy his denunciation of the pagan gods. They utter not a word in their defence. But the de-

cree of the Senate, the law, is against the Christian. Truth may be on his side, justice may plead for him. These civil, courteous men of the world care not for truth, disregard justice and the rights of conscience. Truth, right, justice, conscience, all must bow before the state. What the state commands must be obeyed. The most sacred convictions and rights of the individual are as nothing before the fiat of the government. This is the position of the body of men formerly called by Cicero *sanctis simum orbis terrarum consilium*, the most venerable assembly on earth. Could an authority which thus openly and formerly set at naught truth, right, the honor and conscience of man? Could such an authority maintain itself? Could it gain the victory in its struggle with Christianity, with the principle that vindicated to men their manhood and their honor, that set truth above self-interest, that substituted for universal tyranny universal love? Impossible. Had no overruling Providence protected the work of Christ humanity would have forbidden such a result. When the men who sat in the chairs of the Scipios and the Catos proclaimed that the Romans and the subjects of Rome must trample under foot truth and justice, all that was holiest to their forefathers, they pronounced the doom of Rome. The very stones must rise in indignation, sympathizing with the Christian, who stood for truth and justice. So it came Apollonius was beheaded. Hundreds of his brethren in the faith were massacred. The blood of the martyr was the seed of the Church.

What a lamentable picture do the judges and the senators afford when compared with the noble firmness of martyr! Apollonius was the true descendant of these Romans of old who stood for justice, though the heavens should fall. "*Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*" Cato remained true to his principles, though fortune went against him. Thræsea Paitus and Barea Soranus flung away their lives rather than truckle to the imperial tyrant. What did their degenerate successors do? They kissed the hand that smote them. They bartered away the honor and the fame of the Roman Senate. They gloried in the apotheosis of their own slavery. The inevitable result came. The sceptre fell from the hands of these unworthy sons of great Rome. The humble follower of Christ, in whom lived a spirit far more humane and far more godlike than the spirits of Cato and Thræsea, which we admire, became the successor of those noble heroes, the heir of their empire.

Justly, therefore, do we express our joy over the recovery of the noble Apology of Apollonius. Its earnest, manly, noble sentiments are a lesson to the Christian of every age. Its plea for Christ's faith, simple and brief, appeals to every right-thinking

man. Its picture of the virtues and the holiness that ennobled our Christian forefathers is a living exhortation to follow their example. From its pages radiate floods of light showing to us how rotten were Roman enemies of Christ's foreboding the coming triumph of His Church. Above all, it challenges our admiration for that dignified, manly Christlike champion of Christ—the noble Senator, Apollonius.

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MOST REV. PETER RICHARD KENRICK, D.D.

ON the fourth of March last, in the ninetieth year of his age, and the fifty-fifth of his episcopate and within two days of the sixty-fourth anniversary of his priesthood, died at St. Louis the above-named prelate, who will survive in the ecclesiastical history of America as in many respects the greatest of her bishops. In profound and varied learning, in marked individuality and fortitude of character and in enlightened and tender piety, and withal in practical judgment and financial ability and foresight—in each of these qualities he was the equal of any one of them; while in their unusual combination he stood alone.

Though he did not write as much as his distinguished brother, the Archbishop of Baltimore, he was not a less learned theologian, whilst in the sciences he was far better versed. What he did write shows great thoroughness and accuracy. His work on Anglican Ordinations was the most exhaustive and convincing of its day, and the late Bishop of Buffalo acknowledges his obligations to it in his admirable book on the same subject. His doctrinal sermons, like that preached at the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, were masterpieces of close reasoning and felicitous illustration. The argument in favor of the "Holy House of Loretto" in his book on that subject showed his power of grouping facts and probabilities until they produced in the aggregate, conviction of his position.

His "Month of Mary," at once scriptural, argumentative and devotional, was adopted in London by the distinguished Oratorian, Father Faber, who wrote a preface to it, as the best of the many works on the subject. In this work, written whilst he was still

Vicar-General of Philadelphia, the archbishop shows himself a thorough believer in the philosophy of piety defended subsequently in Cardinal Newman's celebrated letter to Doctor Pusey, which was so severely and unfairly criticized in its day. Whilst all must agree on articles of faith and the great motives which faith furnishes for popular piety, yet in the *expression* of that piety, we maybe influenced by national and individual temperament and environments. The "Glories of Mary," by St. Alphonsus, and the "Month of Mary," by Dr. Kenrick, are illustrations of this important truth. It were well that we had more such original works of popular devotion as the latter. Translations not unfrequently contain expressions which, though not exaggerated, as they gushed forth from the abundance of the hearts of those who first used them; yet to people of cooler temperament, though not of less faith and self-sacrifice, they seem extravagant. Alike in their natural characters, Cardinal Newman and Archbishop Kenrick shared the same views and sentiments on nearly all the great questions of the day, and, though they never met, they corresponded on important subjects affecting the Church. When the writer of this notice paid a visit, or rather made a pilgrimage to see Cardinal Newman in Birmingham eight years ago, he remembers with what affectionate interest he asked for Monsignor Kenrick, of St. Louis, with whom he so deeply sympathized. Though like the great cardinal, Archbishop Kenrick did not seek, but rather avoided popularity, yet, like him also, his silent influence on minds and hearts was widespread and profound. During our Civil War he kept aloof from politics and abstained for a time from reading the newspapers, because he believed that, in the peculiar circumstances of Missouri as a border State, the interests of religion would be best forwarded by prudent silence; yet an impression became general that the archbishop shared the views of the distinguished jurist, Charles O'Connor, of New York, as well as many other great authorities, in regard to the relations of the States to the General Government. This fact coming to the knowledge of Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, this functionary sought, through his friend, Archbishop Hughes, to have the prelate of St. Louis removed by the Roman authorities to another see. It is true he had done no overt act nor spoken treasonable words; but the simple fact that a man of such profound influence in that city and State should hold such views was deemed at that critical period, dangerous to the country. But Mr. Seward's little bell did not tingle in the Vatican, and beyond sending the Secretary's letter to Baltimore, from which place it was sent to St. Louis, nothing more was done by the Archbishop of New York. From this fact arose the coolness that existed between Archbishop Hughes and Secretary Seward in their latter years.

In the administration of the affairs of the Catholic Church in these States during his long episcopate, Archbishop Kenrick was a great and wise power. With a combination of conservatism, which at times seemed to retrograde, and a progressiveness that as frequently seemed startling, with a lofty purity of intention transparent to all men, the great prelate won the admiration of and influenced all parties, whilst belonging to none. It was he who first proposed that the priests of the Church here should vote in the election of their bishops, according to the genius of the country and the spirit and practice of the Church herself. He first suggested that whenever it was possible there should be an archbishop in each State, and proposed in the Second Plenary Council that Boston, Chicago and Milwaukee should be created metropolitan sees, though the two latter provinces were to be taken from his own.

As regards the relations of the Church in this country with the Holy See, his position may be thus summarized: He acknowledged, of course, the Supreme Headship in faith and morals of the Roman Pontiff, the centre of unity and the cause of stability. But he distinguished between power and the exercise of power. Whilst he necessarily as a Catholic admitted the power, he was much of a "home-ruler" in desiring that the exercise of that power be limited to faith and essential discipline where uniformity was desirable; but where local knowledge was essential to wise government, much should be left to individual bishops, who, to use a happy illustration of Cardinal Manning (who, in his latter days, greatly shared Archbishop Kenrick's views), "have their fingers on the pulse of the people." Where precisely to draw the line is, of course, the great practical difficulty. We may hope in the future that between the national independent character of the American episcopate as a centrifugal force, and the centralizing influence of Roman authority, the young Church of these States will be kept in the proper orbit of her course under the controlling influence of the Holy Spirit.

The recent death of Archbishop Kenrick brought up again the question of his submission to the decree of Papal Infallibility. Submission to a *doctrine* implies believing it, and without such faith submission were hypocrisy, of which no man ever dared to accuse the departed prelate. His act of faith in the dogma was a supreme tribute to the Church as "the pillar and ground of truth," for "simply and singly" on her authority he believed. In his profession of faith made publicly in St. John's Church, in St. Louis, he states that "up to the very period of the assembling of that council (of the Vatican) I had held as a theological opinion what that council had decreed to be an article of

Christain faith." His case, if properly studied, shows the wonderful union in the Church of liberty of thought with obedience to authority—"the rationabile obsequium" of the Apostle and the secret of unity and perpetuity in this kingdom of God on earth. Belief in a doctrine on the authority of a teacher which the intellect has already accepted as infallible, is a most reasonable and salutary act. Belief in the authority of a church which might err, and on that authority *alone*, would be a degrading act. But his own words tell more forcibly than can any paraphrase of them: "The motive of my submission is simply and singly the authority of the Catholic Church. That submission is a most reasonable obedience, because of the necessity of obeying and following the authority established by God; and having the guarantee of our Divine Savior's perpetual assistance is in itself evidence that cannot be gainsaid by any one who professes to recognize Jesus Christ as his Savior and his God. Simply and singly on that authority I yield obedience, full and unreserved submission to the definition, concerning the character of which there can be no doubt, as it has emanated from the Council and was subsequently accepted by the greater part, even of those who were in the minority on that occasion. In yielding this submission, I say to the Church in the words of Peter and Paul: 'To whom, O Holy Mother, shall we go but to Thee? Thou hast the words of eternal life and we have believed and have known that thou art the pillar and the ground of truth.'"

The outburst of feeling on occasion of the death and funeral of Archbishop Kenrick showed how profound and general were the admiration and love entertained for him by all classes and creeds in the great community of St. Louis and throughout the whole country. The presence of his Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, who has always expressed affection and admiration for the departed prelate, of so many archbishops, bishops and priests from every part of the country, the fact that though the day of the funeral was most inclement, yet the streets and road leading to the cemetery were lined with people for over four miles of the way, and that many still visit his grave as that of a saint, are evidence enough of the hold he has taken on the popular heart. In Dublin, the city of his birth and first days of his priesthood, the announcement of his death called forth the warmest expressions of admiration and affection. And now that this figure has passed through the portals of death into the house of his eternity, it only remains to raise his statue and place it in the niche to which it belongs in the temple of our national Church, next to that of his great brother of Baltimore and on a line with those of Carroll, England and Hughes, that the men of future ages may regard him as amongst the foremost fathers of the Christian Church in this new world.

P. J. R.

Scientific Chronicle.

THE BALL-NOZZLE—THE PLATE-NOZZLE;

WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW THEY WORK.

FOR some months past there has been on exhibition in the city of New York, a curious instrument called the "Ball-Nozzle," which has been, and still is, a source of astonishment to the natives and their suburban friends, and country cousins. Yet it is not a complicated piece of machinery, with gears and pulleys and cranks, but as simple a piece of mechanism as can well be imagined. It consists merely of a tube through which water is forced under greater or less pressure, but which, instead of ending in a straight bore as does an ordinary fire-hose nozzle, is flared out into a cone-shaped opening, very like a funnel, the angle of the cone being about 50 degrees. The nozzle being first pointed upward, a rather light ball of wood, or hollow metal, is laid loosely in the cone-shaped opening. The diameter of the ball is nearly as great as the diameter of the cone at its widest part.

When the water is turned on, the uninitiated stand by to see the ball shot forth from the mouth of the tube. Instead of this, however, it only starts out enough to allow a sheet of water to issue tangentially all around it, nor will it even fall out when the tube is inverted and held mouth downwards. Still, lest the ball should tumble out when the machine is not in use, and be lost, a guard, in the shape of a semi-circle of hoop iron is placed across the opening. On leaving the nozzle the water breaks into a sheet of fine spray which spreads out over an ever-increasing surface.

This is just what is wanted for the purpose of fighting fire at short ranges. The stream from an ordinary fire-nozzle covers but a small surface at a time, while all around that spot, everything may be blazing hot, so that the fireman is prevented from getting near enough to do effective work. A conical stream from the ball-nozzle can easily be made to cover a circle of one hundred feet radius, which means a surface of over 31,000 square feet. The fire is deadened over this whole extent at once, and no water is wasted, while at the same time, the spray stands up as a firm wall of defence against the demon of fire that the hero of the hose is combating. The fireman can thus advance nearer and nearer, and so be able to throttle his already half-choked enemy on his own ground. This is true in the case even of an outdoor attack on fire, but in a confined space, as in a room, the spray has the further advantage of completely filling the whole space, and of thus putting out the fire at one spot without allowing it to be kindled at a dozen others.

One, or at most two, of such nozzles permanently fixed in the ceiling, would be amply sufficient to protect the largest room of a very large workshop, or factory, or cellar. In any case the current of water could be controlled from any one of several different points, near or far, or could perhaps be arranged to work automatically.

A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the damage caused at fires, is due to water, too much of it having gone where it could do no good, and too little where it might have been useful. But the Ball-Nozzle gives only spray, and that will do but little harm comparatively to anything except the fire. These advantages conspire to render the Ball-Nozzle the most efficient weapon that has yet been found against large masses of fire, and we note with pleasure that it is being rapidly introduced into the principal cities of the country.

Still, when it is necessary to reach great distances, a solid stream of water is necessary, and then the ordinary straight nozzle must be used. In order to obviate the need of two sets of hose, and two nozzles, the main nozzle is made to end in two branches, slightly diverging from each other, the one being furnished with a straight bore, the other with a cone and ball. To change from a solid stream to a stream of spray, or *vice versa*, all that is required is to give less than a half-turn to a common three-way valve, and this requires but a fraction of a second of time. Many other uses for this contrivance will readily suggest themselves, as for example, for ornamental fountains, for lawn sprinklers, etc. One wag suggests that this may after all be the solution of the problem of producing rain artificially. He evidently has no use for water.

From a scientific point of view, however, what will, we think, interest our readers the most is the explanation of the seeming paradox. Before launching out on this path it may be well to remark that the ball and nozzle is by no means a new discovery. Many years ago, as far back in fact as we remember, and how much further we wot not, it went under the name of the *Pipe-Paradox*, and, in a slightly different form, under the name of *Plate-Paradox*. We have found them for sale at street corners, in the open market as it were, among specimens of apparatus for physics, in toy-shops, in fairs, and in other haunts of our youthful days. In all cases, the dealer duly endeavored to impress upon our mind that the whole thing was wrapped up in a thick covering of mystery, and tied with a Gordian knot, and that the secret would never be discovered, at least on this side of the Happy Hunting Ground. We have even made them ourself, and have experimented with them, over and over again, using indifferently either air or water, and we have explained them, to our own satisfaction at least, to class after class of embryo physicists.

We have already told how the Ball-Nozzle is constructed. It is in order just here to do the same, in a dozen words, for the Plate-Paradox, or as we would prefer to call it, the Plate-Nozzle. Take a pipe of convenient size through which a stream of water or air may be made to flow. Fit this pipe into the centre of a metal plate so as to come through just flush. This plate is technically termed the "disk."

Another plate of the same size is provided with a long pin, quite slender, fixed into the centre of the plate, at right angles to its flat surface. The purpose of this pin is to keep the "plate" from sliding off laterally. And now your machine is complete.

How now do these machines work? There is no difference whatever in principle between them, but as it is rather more easy to follow on the Plate-Nozzle we shall direct our attention to it first. Given a head of water capable of producing a pressure of say 200 pounds per square inch, an open pipe connected with that head of water, and the plate placed squarely in front of the flowing stream, the question arises: "Why is not the plate hurled forwards? Why at least does it not fall when the pipe is held pointing vertically downwards? The answer given is: "The pressure of the atmosphere keeps it on." How is that? Why, the flow of the water tends to create a vacuum behind the plate, and hence the pressure of the air inwards holds the plate in place. Admitting for the moment the tendency to a vacuum, which we shall justify further on, some people, otherwise well informed, perhaps even learned in their own way, find a difficulty in accepting this as a sufficient explanation. For, say they, the pressure of the atmosphere is barely 15 pounds per square inch, while the instrument is credited with having worked with a water pressure in the opposite direction of 200 pounds per square inch. It is clear that 15 pounds will not balance 200, and therefore either atmospheric pressure is not the cause, or else the laws of Nature [with a big N] have failed. Well, well, in spite of all this, we have always believed, and we still believe, that atmospheric pressure is the cause of the phenomenon, and at the same time, that the laws of Nature are getting along quite comfortably.

The fallacy of the objection consists in supposing that because the water is delivered under what is called 200 pounds to the square inch there really is that actual pressure in the flowing water. When the pipe is closed there is indeed that pressure against the valve and against the walls of the pipe at that point, and also between the layers of water just there; in other words, there is a *static* pressure of 200 pounds. But when the current is flowing such is by no means the case. For the sake of clearness let us take first the case of a vertical pipe, and afterwards that of one lying horizontally, and give in each case both the theoretical and the practical results.

For the first case let us take a pipe and stand it in an accurately vertical position. Let it be of perfectly even bore and ideally smooth, and consequently absolutely frictionless. Let it be 463 feet high, closed with a flat plate at the bottom, and filled with water. This will give us at the bottom a pressure of 200 pounds per square inch against the plate, the walls of the pipe, and between the lowest layers of water. Now, let us climb the pipe and test the pressure all the way up. We shall find that it will diminish with perfect regularity as we ascend, till at the very top it will have been reduced to zero. So far it has been a purely static question, and no one can have any doubt that so far all is correct.

If we now make an opening at any point in the side of the pipe water will flow out, and that with greater or less velocity, according to the greater or less depth of the point below the surface of the water. It will be of use here to know what these pressures and velocities are for some few points on the way down. They will be found in the following table :

Depth from Surface in Feet.	Pressure in Pounds per Square Inch.	Velocity of Efflux in Feet per Second.
50,	21.5	58.6
100,	43.2	80.0
150,	64.8	98.0
200,	86.4	113.1
300,	129.6	138.5
400,	172.8	160.0
Bottom 463,	200.0	172.1

The test-holes having been closed, and a supply having been arranged to keep the pipe always full, remove the plate from the bottom of the pipe. The water will, of course, flow, but it will exert no pressure whatever against the walls of the pipe, nor between successive layers in its own mass. If an opening be now made at any point in the walls of the pipe, no water will flow out, nor would the most delicately-elastic ball descending with the water suffer the slightest vertical compression. On the contrary, in this particular case of water flowing by its own weight through a pipe, as described, there is a tendency to create a vacuum within. The reason of this is because the water is falling, and the further it has fallen the greater is its velocity, as seen by the table just given, for it is provable that the velocity of fall at any given point is the same as its velocity of efflux would be for the same point, through a lateral opening. Hence each horizontal layer of water in the pipe is tending to travel faster than any layer above it, and therefore striving to get away from it, and consequently endeavoring to produce a vacuum between them. This is true of each layer with respect to the layer above it throughout the whole length of the pipe, and hence the tendency to a vacuum exists all along the line from end to end of the pipe. This is why, when an opening is made anywhere in the walls of such a pipe, instead of an outflow of water, we have a violent inrush of air which is carried bodily down free of express charges. On this principle the Bunsen air-pump, in which water is used, and the Sprengel air-pump, for which mercury is employed, depend for their operation.

Let us suppose, now, just by way of an episode, that the water were allowed to fall freely with no pipe around it. In that case, if there were no cohesion in the liquid, it would, on account of the ever-increasing velocity, simply separate into horizontal layers of the thickness of one molecule, while the distances between the layers would increase from point to point all the way down. But since there *is* cohesion, the layers are held together with a certain force, and therefore the column must grow thinner and thinner, until the separating strain overpowers cohesion, and then the water will break into independent drops. This

can be observed in the fall of any liquid, but better in the case of those in which the cohesion is more marked. We never tired of observing this pretty phenomenon in the days when we still preferred treacle, or molasses (oh, pardon, they call it syrup now), to butter. It was, indeed, "sweetness long-drawn out." End of the episode.

We now return to our water-pipe. If the bore of the pipe be constricted at any point, or the flow be obstructed in any way, the tendency to create a vacuum above that point will be lessened. With just the right amount of obstruction that tendency will vanish entirely, and there will be neither inward nor outward pressure against the walls of the pipe, and consequently neither positive nor negative pressure between layer and layer of the water. If the obstruction be made greater than this, then there will be a pressure outwards at all points above the obstruction. In practice there always is, and always must be, some friction, and therefore some obstruction to the flow, but this will hardly ever be sufficient to balance the tendency to a vacuum.

Now take the second case, in which the pipe is lying horizontally. Here things are in a somewhat different condition. In the vertical pipe each particle of water is pulled down by the force of gravity, and would fall just the same even if it were alone. In the horizontal pipe, on the contrary, it will not move forward by a pull of gravity, for gravity does not pull that way, but must be urged on by a *vis a tergo*, a pressure from behind, just as some people will go, through the influence of a motive pulling ahead, while others require a power of pushing. In our horizontal pipe, suppose this pressure to be produced by a large stand-pipe, kept full up to a height of 463 feet, into the base of which our horizontal pipe is fixed. If the pipe be plugged at its outer end, there will be in it everywhere a static pressure of 200 pounds to every square inch of its surface. If the plug be removed, and we suppose as before the pipe to be absolutely frictionless, then the water would enter the pipe at a velocity of 172.1 feet per second, and would run through it at that rate without any pressure at all between its advancing cross-sections. So much for the theoretical aspect of the question.

But in practice, friction, like Banquo's ghost, will not down. For the sake of simplicity let us suppose that the friction is uniform all along the pipe. Now since the water in the horizontal pipe is not pulled along by gravity, one part of the water does not tend to outstrip the other in the race, and therefore there is no tendency to the production of a vacuum. The obstruction, or resistance, due to friction will therefore manifest itself. As a result, we find that the pressure in the pipe varies from zero at the outlet to a maximum at the point where it enters the stand-pipe. The variation is perfectly regular, so that at $\frac{1}{4}$ the distance from the outlet to the inlet it is $\frac{1}{4}$ the maximum, at $\frac{1}{2}$ the distance it is $\frac{1}{2}$ the maximum, and so in direct proportion for all other distances. The reason for this regularity in the increase of the pressure is because each layer, across the pipe, is retarded by the friction of all that is ahead of it to the outlet of the pipe.

This whole doctrine may be summed up in a few words, thus: Motion is not pressure, nor does unimpeded motion beget any pressure; but when

a moving body is resisted in its motion, a pressure is developed between that body and whatever is offering the resistance. When the resistance is lessened the pressure is reduced, *i.e.*, remove the obstruction and you relieve the pressure. Besides the obstruction due to friction, there is another due to the resistance of the air at the point of exit, and whose effect, whatever it may be in practice, must be added to that of friction.

We now apply what has been said to the case of the plate-nozzle. When the plate is held fast against the end of the open pipe, the flow is totally impeded, and the whole static pressure of 200 pounds, due to the head of water in the stand-pipe, exists through the whole length of the horizontal pipe, and is exerted against that part of the plate which covers the bore of the same. If the plate be next held at a little distance straight in front of the hole, the issuing water will be less impeded, its own pressure in the pipe will be reduced, and its pressure against the plate will fall just to the same extent. And as long as the issuing water fills the whole space between the plate and the disk, the pressure will continue to fall according as the plate is removed further and further away. But this does not yet settle the difficulty, for, outward pressure, however small we may suppose it to be, will never hold the plate *in*. For this there must be an equal and contrary pressure from some other source. Whence comes this required inward pressure?

To make things definite, let us suppose the bore of our pipe to be $\frac{1}{2}$ inch, and the diameter of the plate to be 2 inches. The area of the plate will then be 16 times that of the bore of the pipe. Now the issuing water must, and will, spread out radially over the whole surface of the plate, and will fill the whole space between the plate and the disk. Its pressure therefore on each square inch of the plate will be only $\frac{1}{16}$ of what it would be if the area of the plate were just equal to that of the bore; and what it would be at the bore depends on how much resistance is offered to the discharge. Suppose now that the disk and plate be at such a distance apart that the resistance to the flow is 160 pounds per square inch. Then the average pressure per square inch between disk and plate would be 160 divided by 16, or only 10 pounds. There being no air pressure between disk and plate, the inward pressure of the atmosphere, 15 pounds, will be competent not merely to hold the plate in that position against the stream, but will force it into such a position that the inward and outward pressures may just balance each other, or, if the nozzle be pointed downwards, will hold up a pretty heavy plate against gravity.

The ordinary way of stating all this is to say that there is a tendency to produce a vacuum between the plate and the disk, and that hence the atmospheric pressure holds the plate to the nozzle. This is, no doubt, a part of the cause, for, if holes be bored through the disk, air will enter and the plate will fall off. But it is evident that it cannot be the whole cause, but must be supplemented by a reduction in the water pressure down at least to that of the atmosphere; and we think we have shown how that reduction is brought about.

The ball-nozzle is the same as the plate-nozzle in every respect, except that in the former the flaring angle is only 50 or 60 degrees, while in the latter it is 180 degrees. This necessitates a little change in the calculation for the reduction of pressure between the disk and

the plate. The diameter to be used in this calculation is not the diameter of the ball itself, but the diameter of the circle (on the ball) which is tangent to the walls of the cone. Given, therefore, a plate and a ball of the same diameter, the plate would hold up the greater weight. The spray would, however, be projected laterally and not at all forward. This would not be advantageous for the fire-brigade, but for some purposes it might prove the better form.

The question has been asked whether there is any pressure that could blow the ball or plate away from the nozzle. The *Scientific American* of July 13, 1895, seems to think there may be. The true answer is not far to seek. Whether the ball or plate will be blown away depends, for a given water pressure, on the relation between the area of the bore of the pipe and the area of the plate, or the *effective* area of the ball. Given any pressure you please, you can increase the area of the plate or ball so as to bring it down to working limits, and it will be all right.

Usually the ball rotates more or less rapidly, and more or less irregularly. There are several causes which may have a hand in this result. To which one of them, or to what combination of them the rotation in any particular case is due may not be easy of determination. These causes are, first, any little irregularity in the shape of the ball. The water would then act a little more strongly on one side of the ball than on the other, and give it a start on the turn, while the momentum thus acquired would get the ball past the dead-point, and so keep it going. Secondly, any irregularity in the cone itself would bring about the same result. Thirdly, any want of homogeneousness in the ball that would throw its centre of gravity out of its centre of figure, would act in the same way. Fourthly, if the jet be held in any position except an accurately vertical one, the ball would press a little more to one side of the cone than to the other. This would cause a difference of flow on opposite sides of the ball, and hence make it rotate. Fifthly, it is known that water issuing from a jet has a tendency to take on a spiral motion more or less pronounced, and this would, of course, impart to the ball a similar motion. This last seems to be the only cause assignable why the plate of the plate-nozzle should rotate, as it frequently does.

In conclusion, we would say that when the novelty of the thing has died away, and the dear public is satisfied that it knows all that can be known about the matter, we would like to suggest what we believe would be an improvement.

Thus, instead of a ball, take a cone, hollow, so as to be light, of just the same angle as the cone of the nozzle. Arrange it on a stem fixed in the axis of the nozzle, so that it can be slid in or out, and so adjust to a nicety the space between it and the other cone. When by trial a place is found that gives the best result for the purpose intended, fix it there, and the job is done. Being fixed, it would remain uninjured, while a ball would, in time, necessarily get battered up and so work less satisfactorily. That the ball-nozzle, or the improved pattern which we venture to christen the "Plate-Nozzle," may prove a bonanza for those who are in it, is our hearty wish. Our suggested improvement, however, is thrown in gratis.

T. J. A. FREEMAN, S.J.

Book Notices.

THE LIFE OF CARDINAL MANNING. By *Edwin Sheridan Purcell*.

This is an intensely interesting, in some respects painful, yet, on the whole, a profoundly edifying book. The great and noble soul whose life on earth is depicted in it, has been unjustly treated. Mere human frailties have been dwelt upon with painful iteration, and though the work contains much hearty and noble praise, nevertheless so much depreciation is hinted at and implied as to give rise to a suspicion in the minds of those who well knew the late Cardinal that the biographer must have been actuated by more or less hostility towards the object of his depreciation and laudation.

We who knew intimately Cardinal Manning for more than forty years, felt persuaded that his enthusiastic and uncritical admirers might be pained by an accurate and complete account of what the man really was as he lived and breathed; but we were also certain that such an account would be full of edification and tend to greatly elevate him in the estimation of all reasonable men who had before but a slight knowledge of what manner of man he was. We find both our anticipations partly realized. The work is a very photograph of the innermost nature of the late Cardinal, as regards all those points as to which the biographer provides us with documentary evidence, but it is a libel with respect to matters which are unmistakably insinuated, though the evidence by no means justifies such insinuations.

Cardinal Manning possessed a lofty and noble nature which by itself, shielded him effectually from most of the temptations which beset ordinary humanity. Great graces were bestowed on him and with these he nobly corresponded. But he had the defects of his qualities.

Possessed of indomitable energy, untiring industry and unquestionable enthusiasm (as is shown by the work of even his later years), it was small wonder he could not bear to trust any of the work he had to do to heads and hearts he knew to be much less able than his own. Possessed, also, of wonderfully wide and keen powers of mental vision (as evidenced by his prescience respecting the definition of Papal Infallibility) in what concerned the interests of the Church and the good of souls, ought we to be surprised if his zeal in these matters sometimes led him unconsciously to disregard, or put on one side, the feelings of a worthy and estimable opponent and occasionally to carry diplomacy (and he was a born diplomat), to the verge of intrigue? He was a man entirely given up and devoted to what he believed to be God's service, and zealously employed his great and singularly varied powers in promoting what he was convinced was the Divine will. Yet he was ever on the watch lest he should be misled by his own personal inclinations, and this very conscientiousness has in one notable instance been made the ground of a strange charge of insincerity with respect to what his biographer calls "the double voice." He seems to think that as soon as Dr. Manning found himself beset with insurmountable and fatal doubts about the Church of England, he ought to have imparted those doubts to persons who craved his counsel, if not even to have at once cut himself loose from the English Establishment. He fails altogether to note that Man-

ning doubted his doubts and in his humility (comparing himself with others who had felt none), suspected that his doubts were mere temptations. Could it possibly have been his duty to make known what he thus suspected might be the promptings of the evil one? Besides he was a firm believer in the "Church Catholic" (as Anglicans call it) and only a doubter as to whether the Anglican Church was a branch of it. What could he do, while thus uncertain, but wait and pray? He had declared (when the setting up of an Anglican "free church" had been proposed to him): "Englishmen three hundred years ago left the ship of Peter for a boat; I am not going to leave the boat for a tub."

In the business of depriving Archbishop Errington of his right of succession to the see of Westminster, Mr. Purcell's plain suggestion is that Cardinal Manning's actions were influenced by a desire to obtain this dignity himself. We are confident that there is, at least, no evidence of this. On the contrary he sought very earnestly to have Dr. Ullathorne appointed as the biography clearly states. But even had it been so, would it have been necessarily a fault in him? A man may know the qualities of his mind as well as those of his body. There is no pride or vainglory in knowing we have a strong will or a keen intellect, any more than in knowing we have blue eyes or a good leg. Manning might have been aware of what we believe to have been an undoubted fact, namely that no one else was nearly so well qualified for the post as he was himself. He had identified "ultramontaniam" with Divine truth, he knew that Dr. Errington was "anti-ultramontan," he knew that Cardinal Wiseman (to whom he was devoted) heartily desired to be rid of Dr. Errington; why then should he not have tried that the fittest man should succeed to so supremely important a post? Every one now rejoices that he did succeed, for he has raised the Catholic Church in England and the archbishopric of Westminster to a position they could not otherwise have obtained, purely through his own personal qualifications. Very curious was Manning's constant hostility to that great Society of Jesus, with its unceasing and restless zeal for God's service and its manifest desire to have power in its own hands, as being the body most fit to hold such power. Two who pursue the same end and business are proverbially said to "never agree," and as amongst the many English corporations every holder of a church-living constitutes by himself, in law "*a corporation sole*," so Cardinal Manning may be said to have been a little Society of Jesus in himself.

Mr. Purcell draws out excellently well the reasons which made the definition of infallibility not only desirable in itself but opportune, and testifies to the admirable clearness with which the Cardinal saw and enunciated these reasons. Events have now made plain to every eye how mistaken were those who dreaded the consequences of so concentrating the authority of the Church that no political obstacles (which might render the assembling of a general council impossible) should be able to hinder its rapid and most authoritative action.

The future archbishop, from his early manhood, had a profound sympathy with the poor and suffering. His ministrations as Rector of Lavington were unceasing and deeply appreciated by his simple, rustic parishioners. As a Catholic priest, prelate and cardinal, he was untiring in his zeal for the poor and for those who needed aid most sorely. His very first work, as Archbishop of Westminster, was to provide for the education of London's 20,000 helpless Catholic children. Next in importance in his eyes was the rescue of those given over to the demon of drink, perseveringly discouraging, by his own example, the use of alcohol in all its forms.

Catholics may regret the publication of his list of obstacles to the spread of Catholicism, but we believe it will do far more good than harm. In England there is, at the head of the laity, a noble example of all civic and manly virtues combined with a deep but unobtrusive piety in the Duke of Norfolk. A few might be named who follow him, *longo intervallo*, but the mass of the English Catholics of the higher and middle classes are sadly infected with worldliness. For that contemptible vice Manning had neither mercy nor pity. The mean struggle to enter, by serpentine contortions into a more and more fashionable social stratum—than which nothing can be more in opposition to the whole teaching of Our Blessed Lord—he bitterly scorned, denouncing those whose great effort was to obtain “a key of Grosvenor Square.” Not but what, in his journal, he lets us know that he *felt* pleasure in dignity and precedence, and *enjoyed* the society of the socially distinguished. This fact, however, but adds to his merit. It is no fault to be tempted; the first sense of the enticement of temptation is not (as Luther absurdly taught that it was) a sin, for grace “is made perfect in infirmity.” The world, the flesh, and the devil *are* alluring. If sin was never a pleasure, who would ever sin?

Manning felt the seductions of the world, but turned from them and spent his efforts and his few spare hours mainly amongst his clergy and his poor. There is not a fragment of evidence that he ever gave way to worldliness, and his demeanor with the Queen herself was as full of simplicity as dignity. He denounced where his clear spiritual vision told him he ought to rebuke, and he did rightly indeed if, as we believe, worldliness is the great curse of Catholicism in England and one main reason of its tardy progress.

The least pleasing part of Cardinal Manning's life is what relates to Cardinal Newman. We do not here refer to his conscientious and persistent opposition to the scheme of Oxford education—regrettable as that aberration of judgment in our opinion was. Neither do we refer to anything connected with the Vatican Council. We refer to Manning's evident wish that Newman should decline the Cardinalate, which wish was doubtless father to the thought and assertion that he had, in fact, declined it. The letters of the two cardinals, which Mr. Purcell publishes, are more curious and amusing than edifying. But if Manning was unjust to, and even jealous of, Newman, it must also be admitted that Newman was morbidly sensitive and somewhat too desirous of the praise of men. These two admirable and wonderful ecclesiastics may be compared to the precious stones which fate had set rolling together, both almost perfect yet each with a slight chip so that in revolving they scratched each other. No doubt Newman's was, on the whole, the higher nature; his was the finer intellect and, in some respects, the more winning personality. But he had not Manning's greatest characteristic—his persevering and energetically active love for the poor. Newman will, for all time, be more influential for men who read and ponder what they read. But in the sphere of active personal influence, Manning was inevitably an *Ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν*.

Mr. Purcell's book will no doubt do some harm, but we are very sure it will do much more good. Some inquirers may be turned back, some Protestants confirmed in their errors, not by facts but by insinuations. But the number of those who will be powerfully attracted to Catholicism by reading this life of one so full of zeal, charity and the love of God—whose great desire was “Thy will be done”—will be vastly greater. Not a few Protestants will have expected (in being thus taken completely behind the scenes) to find some sign of unmistakable faults

corresponding with their prejudiced anticipations. They will find instead the plain record, supported by irrefutable evidence, of a life free from all taint of common frailties and one abounding in charity for Protestants themselves. If some actions are to be deemed matters of regret in themselves, it is none the less plain that they were due to nothing but a mistaken view as to the best mode of serving God and promoting the welfare of human souls.

The book does indeed well repay perusal and is a wonderfully painstaking work. There can be no doubt, however, that its author has erred grievously in publishing letters referring to persons yet living and even letters of the kind whose writers are still alive. To have published many of Mgr. George Talbot's letters was a grave error, but to have published that of the Rev. Dr. Rigg was an infamy. There are also letters of a most private nature which we marvel greatly to find have been published, as is stated, with the consent of their owners—as for example, some of those belonging to Lady Herbert of Lea.

In conclusion we must profess our conviction that, with all its faults, Catholics have good cause to rejoice at the publication of Mr. Purcell's book and we are convinced that the more widely and thoughtfully it is perused, the more the greatness, the nobility and above all the holiness of the late Cardinal Manning will be understood and appreciated.

GESCHICHTE DER PAEPSTE IM ZEITALTER DER RENAISSANCE. Von Ludwig Pastor. Freiburg and St. Louis: Herder. 1895.

By far the most important announcement in Catholic literary and scientific circles is that of the publication of the third (German) volume of Dr. Pastor's great "History of the Popes." This is the most crucial, we had almost said cruel, portion of the distinguished historian's task; and the learned Catholic world has been awaiting Pastor's verdict, especially on Alexander VI., with painful anxiety. What was to be the very last word of impartial history upon the odious name of Borgia? Reputable historians had already relegated to the realm of exploded calumnies the incredible story of alleged murders, incests, poisoned banquets, etc., which had coupled the Borgian name with the Neros and Elagabaluses of antiquity; but, even after the elimination of the infamies begotten by prurient imaginations, there remained the grave, nay, for a Vicar of Christ appalling, accusation of immorality. Whilst no one has ever been so foolish as to claim utter sinlessness for a Supreme Pontiff, yet the respect which the sublime dignity of the Papacy wrings, even from its enemies, makes Catholic and Protestant alike view as horrible crimes in a Roman Pontiff what in secular monarchs are condoned as human frailties. It is, indeed, the homage due to the Papacy, and paid, consciously or unconsciously, when we demand that the Bishop of Rome, beyond all other bishops, should be *irreprehensibilis*.

It was not to be wondered at, therefore, that some Catholic writers should have made desperate attempts to reconstruct the reputation of Alexander VI.; no more wonderful, in fact, than that a man should strive to defend the character of his father. Such attempts had failed to carry persuasion in the past; there remained the faint hope that the indefatigable labors of Dr. Pastor among the archives of Europe might afford, not only Catholics, but all those who wish well of human nature, some relief. After mature deliberation, and evidently with a heavy heart, the great historian is compelled to render a verdict of guilty. We

can readily understand with what sorrow he penned the following sad words: "Although the possibility is not excluded, that in some out-of-the-way corner documents may be still forthcoming to throw light upon the history of the Borgia Pope, yet, substantially, the materials seem to have been exhausted. At any rate, the documents presented in this volume are sufficient to enable a definitive judgment to be reached on the general subject. On every point, indeed, the final word cannot yet be spoken; a rich field still remains for detailed investigation. However, the main fact stands firm; *Every attempt to rehabilitate Alexander VI. must henceforward appear a hopeless task.*" Truly a sad conclusion to the Catholic; but the truth must prevail, no matter how disagreeable. May the prayers of the faithful and the vigilance of those upon whom rests the responsibility of electing the Roman Pontiff, preserve the Church from any similar disaster.

Feeling that much of his narrative must be distressing to his readers, Dr. Pastor places *in capite libri*, and, as it were, a text or keynote, the immortal words more applicable to the unworthiness of Borgia than to the humility of Leo: "Petri dignitas in indigno herede non deficit." In order, too, to offset the blackness of the coloring, he devotes a couple of hundred pages to a survey of the general condition of morals and civilization in the latter part of the fifteenth century. We have no hesitation in predicting that this preliminary dissertation of the learned historian will be considered the most valuable portion of his labor. It will be news to many that there were, at that period, other agencies at work in the Church and society than Borgias and Cibus and Sforzas; that exemplary bishops, zealous priests, devout religious communities, charitable confraternities, learned teachers, eminent artists, were busily engaged in doing God's work, knowing little and caring less about the loose morals of certain personages of high estate in Italy and elsewhere. Particularly consoling to us has been the long list of canonized saints of the fifteenth century, whose bare names (and the author tells us that his list is incomplete) extends over two pages and a half. Surprising, too, is the long list of stately churches and magnificent asylums and hospitals erected by a generation whose religious decadence we are so accustomed to deplore. The thought arose within us whether posterity will, after all, consider us to have been so very far in advance of those we criticize.

We had not intended to give here an extended review of Dr. Pastor's volume. It would be impossible to do so without a long study of its myriad details. We shall return to the task in some future number, when the book shall have been made more accessible to our readers in an English translation.

ASSYRIAN AND BABYLONIAN RELIGIOUS TEXTS, copied from the original tablets preserved in the British Museum. By *Dr. James A. Craig*. 1895. Leipzig. Vol. i. Texts in cuneiform characters, with preface.

Prof. Dr. Craig, of the University of Michigan, has done honor to American learning, and at the same time has rendered a great service to Assyriology, by his recent publication of some Assyrian religious texts of the British Museum.

This work will be invaluable to all students of Semitic religion, and it is to be hoped that the many unpublished inscriptions of this class preserved in the different museums of Europe will be made more accessible to us by equally able hands.

As yet, only the first part, containing the preface and the text, has reached us, and in general shows very careful work in copying and autographing the original tablets. Several of the texts have already appeared in Knudtzon's "Assyrische Gebete au den Sonnengott," as also in "Zeitschrift für Assyriologie," and "Hebraica" with comments by Profs. Bruennow, Zimmern, Strong, *et al.* The fact, however, that Dr. Craig offers a new version of several of these texts alone justifies their republication, but as the second part containing the results of his study has not appeared, it is impossible to criticise his work here in this particular.

We wish, however, to call attention to the preface of this work, where after drawing a parallel between the Hebrew and Assyrian religions, Prof. Craig says, "The principal fault of Babylonian-Assyrian theology is its polytheism *from which the Hebrew mind eventually emancipated itself*" (p. 2).

What the author's intention was in writing these lines we cannot say, but it seems to us to indicate the tendency, object, and scope of the whole work. In these words we can read but one meaning, viz., that the Hebrew religion, its belief in one God, and its whole moral code, was but the result of gradual development from a barbarous and heathen worship; that the Biblical narrative of man's origin and supernatural guidance of the chosen tribes is but a fictitious story.

This rationalist theory as to the origin of the Jewish creed has already been proposed and defended by several famous theologians (?) of German universities, whose only object seems to be the destruction of all belief in the Sacred Scriptures and the supernatural, but their polemical treatises have little or no scientific foundation, historical or philological.

Prof. Craig's work, whatever his interpretation and readings of the different inscriptions may be, will not strengthen the theories of Budde, Baetagen, Niebuhr, and the Graf-Wellhausen school of critics, but, if carefully studied, will rather go to prove that the polytheism of the Assyrians and Babylonians was but the degeneration of a primeval monotheistic cult, taking its origin in the materialization of the belief in one God and the destruction of the mysterious, which to a great extent enveloped the monotheism of the first members of the human race.

If the historical and religious Assyrian texts, thus far published, be carefully studied, if the development of absolute polytheism from an indefinite monolatry be closely observed, if, in fine, all scientific material bearing on this subject be diligently examined, the conclusion must be reached that Stade ("Geschichte Israels") and Wellhausen ("Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels") have sought to outline and to prove a preconceived idea of religious progress among the Semites, without any other reason than some very arbitrary and, to a great extent, extremely doubtful text critical studies of the original (?) Hebrew text.

The conclusions of these so-called theologians Prof. Craig has inserted in his preface, and thus gives his work a tone and tendency which the text following scarcely justifies.

On this account it would appear to us that philologists should be somewhat more careful in their assertion of theological doctrines and opinions, and confine themselves rather to an objective study of the material offered. Philology and theology are by no means the same, though one may be an invaluable auxiliary to the other.

We cannot, however, refrain from repeating that the work of Prof. Craig is invaluable for all students of Semitic religion, as also to Assyriologists, though not much new material is offered from a philological point of view.

GEISLER.

ENGLISH LITERATURE. A Manual for Academies, High Schools and Colleges. By the Brothers of the Christian Schools. New York: P. O'Shea, 19 Barclay St.

In this volume of five hundred pages, a well-written, clear, accurate and interesting account is given of English literature from the time of the earliest Old-English or Anglo-Saxon poetry down to the present day. Mr. George Parsons Lathrop contributes an introduction to the volume, in which he shows the utility of such a study, and points out the prominent merits of the present guide to our literature. It is difficult to add anything in praise of the splendid work done by Brother Noah in this line. Mr. Lathrop has said it all, and said it well, as all who are familiar with his style will readily surmise. "It is a pleasure," writes Mr. Lathrop, "to find in such a work accuracy, method and chronological arrangement, combined with vividness and naturalness of style and presentation. Some of the best treatises or manuals on this subject (including those written from the Catholic point of view), although wrought with complete mastery of the theme and the most exact scholarship, do not succeed in bringing the minds, the conditions and the meaning of the past forcibly home to the reader in the present, so as to make him feel that all this past is a part of his inheritance for daily use, and belongs to his consciousness as much as anything else that he may happen to be thinking about in the passing hour. Brother Noah, however, makes the men and the thoughts of the remotest time as vivid and immediately interesting to us, as though they belonged to our own century and our own neighborhood." To have succeeded in doing what Mr. Lathrop indicates, is to have achieved a notable triumph. All those who have gone through the ordinary grind-mill of Manuals of English Literature will appreciate the difficulties encountered and overcome before such a brilliant victory might be thus heralded to the pedagogic world. These manuals are too often mere catalogues of names, or wishy-washy repetitions of traditions, estimates of authors and books current and accepted in days when faulty literary fashions ruled the camps of the critics, and literary tastes were far removed from the exacting standards of the present time. In some of the manuals, the poets and prose writers of the Victorian era receive scantiest mention, in order that long and deservedly obsolete poets may have minute biographical notice. Sufficient in times that could not boast many better names, their place should long since have been with the forgotten dead. To give such names an extended notice at the expense of the vast army of better writers of the present day, is surely to defy all the laws of literary and artistic perspective, and as a consequence, to give the student an idea that a writer must die before he can be called great. The ordinary "guide" becomes thus merely another Horatian *Laudator temporis acti*.

By adopting an easy essay style, Brother Noah has succeeded also in avoiding the well-nigh universal characteristic of literature manuals—dryness. He has been at pains to digest his matter into a personal narrative. He writes a *history* rather than a *chronicle*—a distinction rarely enough noted by the compiler of "Manuals." He has his own view, and he sets it forth perspicuously and in an entertaining way. Catholic interests receive, of course, a proper share of attention in his book.

We commend this volume to the attention of teachers. They will perhaps agree with us, that its most prominent excellence lies in its interesting presentation of a study which all school experience shows to be a very dry and uninteresting one. It does not, however, compass its end of being attractive by any lessening of the variety and scope of the topics and names to properly included in such a manual, but on the contrary is both full and suggestive. Teachers will be glad to observe

the full pedagogic apparatus accompanying each chapter. The suggested additional readings for the pupil will broaden his view and his knowledge at the same time, while the "Review" at the end of each chapter will stimulate thought and tend gradually to stir up the student to enthusiasm in individual work in the pleasant field of letters. H. T. H.

A TUSCAN MAGDALEN AND OTHER POEMS. By *Eleanor C. Donnelly*. Philadelphia: H. L. Kilner & Co.

Another ample volume of poems from the rich storehouse of Miss Donnelly's cultured mind and heart is an agreeable announcement to make to the reading public. She has essayed many themes and has sung many songs; and while the ear has applauded their melody and sweetness, it is also true—a rare thing to be able to say without reservation—that the heart has never failed to acknowledge their inner and best burden, has always felt the influence of her deeply religious soul, her unselfish and glowing ideals, her womanly tenderness and depth of feeling. Of how many of those who have sung or are now singing songs can this be truthfully said? We are conscious throughout all her melodies of what is, after all, the best in literature, the "personal note" of a finely-strung lyre. Her themes are instinct with an unquestioning loyalty to true Catholic faith and hope and love. The devout child of Holy Mother Church never permits herself to masquerade in the meretricious adornment of sensual phraseology or half-displayed suggestiveness. "Realism" has no meaning for her save its best and highest meaning; and this is the realism of the ideal life, the realism of virtue, the realism of a strong and deathless quest after truth. The vicious is not the real, but the unreal. Sin is a negation, rather than an entity. The real things are God and his providence, man and his destiny. How beautifully her poem on "Doing the Will of God" insists on this fundamental truth!

Once more—O stars in the azure sky,
O moon, arrayed in your silver sheen!
Majestic sun, enthroned on high,
Flooding with light all things terrene—
What are ye doing? Tell me, pray—
"Doing the Will of God!" chant they.

From the text of nature is preached to us the real things of life, our strivings to accomplish everywhere and always the holy will of God.

The subjects treated in this latest of Miss Donnelly's volumes of poetry have been suggestions caught in many fields of a wide and elegant reading. Many of the themes are legends from the lives of the saints, many of them lessons from the same source; but all are rendered captivating by an easy and natural flow of thought and a fine use of the adorning power of poetical expression. Our authoress has escaped with rare ability the temptation to mysticism in thought and expression which is so cornent in the verse of the times in which we live. It is quite easy to multiply splendid figures of thought and diction, to sew on "purple patches" of imagery, to rifle the heavens and to dredge the deep sea of feeling and emotion, if the poet does not care to bind himself down to a clear and continuous line of thought. Mysticism is not poetry. It displays, not a great mind or a deeply poetic soul, but rather a hazy thought and an ill-governed imagination. The magazines of to-day are filled with such "poetry." It is a real pleasure to meet,

as we do in this volume, with melodies as clear and as intelligible as those which made Mozart or Schubert the nightingales of all the ages. Frequently, too, the reader will come suddenly upon some sublime peak of thought, displaying vast horizons he had never surmised before; or will be led to the verge of some precipice of emotion, opening up to his consciousness depths he had never probed before. We felicitate the authoress on her poetic gift and its splendid fruits. Her poems enrich the Catholic literature which is to delight and inform the men and women as well of the future as of the present. H. T. H.

MONSEIGNEUR FREPPEL EVEQUE D'ANGERS. Sermons inédits. Œuvre posthume. 2 vols. Paris : A. Roger T. Chernoviz, 7 Rue des Grands Augustus. 1896.

Mgr. Freppel, Bishop of Angers and member of the Chamber of Deputies, was one of the most illustrious of contemporary French churchmen. He was an orator of the first order, an able politician, and in social circles fascinated even his political enemies. He died in 1891, his health having broken down under the numerous and weighty labors he was called upon to sustain.

The merit of Bishop Freppel as a writer is admitted by all. Every French priest's library contains some books of his "*Cours d'Eloquence Sacrée* (10 vols.), his sermons on Christian life, his conferences on the divinity of Jesus Christ, his oratorical and pastoral works (11 vols.), his polemical works, and his interesting study on the French Revolution written *à propos* of the centenary of 1789. Though his life was comparatively short and always busy, it would seem from a perusal of his numerous and valuable writings as if he had exhausted the entire field of religious literature. Our surprise is all the greater when we see, since December 22, 1891, nine volumes of posthumous works appear. Of those, two are devoted to Bossuet and sacred eloquence of the eighteenth century, two to his conferences at the Church of St. Genevieve, the remaining five volumes being occupied with miscellaneous writings, oratorical, pastoral and polemical. The two volumes which we present to the readers of the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY are made up of extracts from manuscripts written when the author was yet a young priest; but you must not suppose therefore that they are jejune in execution. The Abbé Freppel was at the age of twenty-five a professor of the *Ecole des Carmes* of Paris, an institution which has given to the Church of France many of her brightest ornaments, and at twenty-eight he was called to the chair of Sacred Eloquence at the Sorbonne—two titles which no one will dispute. The writer recalls two occasions on which he had the pleasure of hearing him, once in a pulpit of the capital and once in the tribune of the Palais Bourbon, and can affirm that he presented the ideal orator in the political as in the religious sphere. Unit- ing in the pulpit sublime conceptions with expressions which left no room for doubt as to his meaning, he captivated the intelligence, while his manner won all hearts. At the Chamber he now gave vent to the indignation of the tribune, and again jested with the "persiflage" of a well-educated man whose refined mind was ever charitable, so that, while bleeding, he inflicted no deep wound, and by his Gallic good-nature won even those who merited his severest castigations.

These two volumes contain an echo of the numerous sermons preached by the Abbé Freppel during his sojourn at Paris, at the Madeleine, at d'Boch and different churches, to congregations composed of the most distinguished members of the aristocracy of the second empire. What

thoughts must have entered the mind of the young Alsatian priest as he ascended the marble steps of pulpits yet resounding with the voices of the most distinguished orators! He was not unworthy of his predecessors, and we believe that the American clergy, in reading his magnificent discourses on the Incarnation, on the Eucharist, on the words of Christ on the Cross, his sermons for retreats or pastoral visitations contained in the present volumes, will derive pleasure as well as profit from the perusal. The Bishop of Angers aims at instruction rather than effect; but his mind impregnated with the light of faith was carried away by a natural eloquence.

Before concluding this brief notice let us say that to the two present volumes is added a general index, very carefully made, of all the oratorical works of Mgr. Freppel, which will be of the greatest utility to preachers.

G. PERIES.

MEANS AND END OF EDUCATION. By *J. L. Spalding*, Bishop of Peoria. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

The right reverend author of this charming little volume of two hundred pages has the fine literary tact—instinctive when best, rather than acquired—of investing any topic with alluring graces as well of thought as of expression, so that when we once begin our acquaintance under his guidance with the topic we desire as long a fellowship with it as possible. His subjects may have seemed dry to us before, thoroughly thrashed out, and quite resigned to rest at last in the silence of the dusty shelf. Nevertheless, the author demonstrates that the last *interesting* word has not been said concerning them. He is able to impress us with the conviction that his topics are quite as fresh and inviting as when the first word had been uttered—nay, more so, for that thought begets thought in the mind that is truly alive, and the field of investigation displays to the patient seeker ever-widening horizons. Two chapters are devoted to "Truth and Love," an elegant literary disquisition on the power of good books to inform the mind, stimulate the heart, open up new worlds to the intellect and the imagination. He shows to the reader the means of acquiring helpful knowledge, and the fruits of its conquest. His sentences have all the diamond-like brilliancy and crystallization of thought associated in our minds, especially with such books as the "Imitation" and Bacon's "Essays." His frequent informal use of the phraseology of the great Wordsworthian ode tells us not only is he himself a poet, but that his mind is saturated with the sonorous and vivid rhythms of the "Intimations." The essay is indeed helpful and stimulating, suggestive rather than full, many-sided rather than elaborate. We have dwelt on this essay thus much because its perusal will urge us to that of the others: "The Making of One's Self," "Woman and Education," "The Scope of Public School Education," "The Religious Element in Education," and "The Higher Education," the discourse delivered at the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, which, being enforced by the offer of three hundred thousand dollars by Miss Caldwell, led to the founding of the University at Washington.

MAYNOOTH COLLEGE: ITS CENTENARY HISTORY. By the *Most Reverend John Healy, D.D., M.R.I.A.*, Bishop of Macra and Coadjutor Bishop of Clonfort. Dublin: Browne & Nolan, limited. New York, Cincinnati and Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1895.

The able and interesting article which appeared in our pages from the

Very Rev. Dr. Hogan gave our readers a brief summary of the splendid work done during its existence of a century by "the great *Alma Mater* of the priesthood of Ireland." Enough was said within the limits of an article to arouse the desire for a more extended survey, and the work has been confided to the most competent of Irish ecclesiastical writers, the learned Bishop Healy. His large volume of 770 pages is truly a thing of beauty, and reflects great credit on the well-known firm of Browne & Nolan. The paper is of the finest quality, the letterpress clean and beautiful, and the profuse illustrations set forth the story most pleasingly to the eye. Altogether, the book is brought out in a manner worthy of the occasion and the subject.

These are, to be sure, minor beauties, but none the less very acceptable at a time which has witnessed so many well-written books marred by the slovenliness of typographical setting. Often have we murmured when so-called *editions de luxe* have come into our sanctum dressed as awkwardly as country cousins at a banquet: Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding garment? Such was not our greeting to the present volume, which might serve as a model for all similar publications.

Passing to Bishop Healy's share in the work, we expected a rare literary treat; nor were we disappointed. The theme is invested with all the charm which consummate skill can pour into a labor of love. The proper history of Maynooth is prefaced by three valuable chapters on ecclesiastical education in Ireland, in which the author's extensive erudition has condensed the studies of a lifetime. The story of the great college is told with remarkably good taste and in a style quite removed from the exaggerations and bombast which like occasions are apt to excite in mediocre panegyrists. As Maynooth has been the centre of Irish Catholic activity these past hundred years, Bishop Healy is led to touch upon nearly all the questions which have stirred the Irish heart, and he gilds whatever he touches. We can only repeat that Bishop Healy has set a model which the historians of similar institutions would do well to study and imitate.

FABIOLA, OR THE CHURCH IN THE CATACOMBS. By *Cardinal Wiseman*. Illustrated edition. New York: Benziger Brothers.

We notice this new edition of Cardinal Wiseman's classic romance, mainly to impress upon our readers the necessity of making the study of *Fabiola* an important item in the education of Catholic boys and girls. In fact, the charming little story is an entire education in itself, and has for two generations enlightened and fortified an army of young Pancratiuses and Agneses. Regarding the present edition, we can honestly say, that it is a vast improvement upon previous editions, the illustrations being very successful, except in the difficult and important matter of portraying the *dramatis personæ*, who surely were much more attractive in appearance than the book represents them.

GESCHICHTE DER CHRISTLICHEN KUNST. Von *Franz Xaver Kraus*. Herder: Freiburg and St. Louis, 1896.

This is the first of two bulky volumes in which Dr. Kraus, well known in Germany for valuable labors in the field of Christian antiquities, narrates the glorious story of Christian Art. It is a large octavo volume

of 621 pages, copiously illustrated in the style we have been taught to expect from the renowned firm of Herder, and, with bewildering erudition gathers together whatever is known of Christian painting and architecture in the Græco-Roman world and in Byzantine times. It is a work of infinite labor, and fitly crowns the career of one of the greatest, if not most widely known, students of this generation.

A MEMOIR OF MRS. AUGUSTUS CRAVEN (PAULINE DE KA FERRONNAYS) with extracts from her Diaries and Correspondence. By *Maria Catherine Bishop*. A new edition. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1896.

We know no better book to place in the hands of our educated Catholic women than this memoir of a lady who was the perfect model of Catholic womanhood in the nineteenth century. If America at the present day possessed a hundred women with this gifted, learned and saintly Frenchwomen's talents, energy, and powers of expression, their influence would be preponderating in a country like ours. We wish, particularly that our young women would make a close study of Mrs. Craven's charming and "masculine" letters, and form their own style thereupon.

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE SIMPLY EXPLAINED. By *Philip Bold*. Revised and in part edited by Father Eyre, S.J. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1896. Price, \$3.00. Received from Benziger Brothers.

A truly admirable exposition of Catholic truth; giving in simple but choice language a comprehensive survey of the moral and dogmatic teachings of Holy Church. We most warmly recommend the book to all those who are seeking to know the truth, or who wish to place a sound and readable treatise in the hands of earnest searchers after religious faith.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

CHAPTERS OF BIBLE STUDY, OR A POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES. By the *Rev. Herman J. Heuser*, Professor of Scripture in St. Charles' Seminary, Overbrook, Pa. New York: The Cathedral Library Association.

THE PRIMARY FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION. By *E. D. Cope, Ph.D.*, Member of the U. S. National Academy of Sciences; Professor of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy in the University of Pennsylvania. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1896. Price \$2.

BIBLISCHE STUDIEN: 1 Band, 2 Heft: Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts nach der Heiligen Schrift, der Profangeschichte und der Vorgeschichte. Von *Prof. Dr. P. Schanz*. Freiburg and St. Louis: Herder. Price, 43 cents net.

GESCHICHTE DER CHRISTLICHEN ESCHATOLOGIE INNERHALB DER VORNICAENISCHEN ZEIT. Von *Leonhard Atzberger*, Professor der Dogmatik in Muenchen. Freiburg and St. Louis: Herder. 1896. Price, net, \$3.10.

PLAIN FACTS FOR FAIR MINDS: An Appeal to Candor and Common Sense. By *George M. Searle*, Priest to the Congregation of St. Paul the Apostle. New York: The Catholic Book Exchange.

SERMONS ON THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. By *Very Rev. D. J. McDermott*, Rector of St. Mary's Church, Philadelphia, Pa. New York: Benziger Brothers.

STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By *Rev. James H. O'Donnell*, Watertown, Conn. West Chester, New York: New York Catholic Protectory Print. 1896.

THE COMEDY OF ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM. By *A. F. Marshal, B.A.*, Oxon. Revised edition. Benziger Brothers.

AETHIOPUM SERVUS; a study in Christian Altruism. By *M. D. Petre*. Received from Benziger Brothers.

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ITALY AND THE RUINS OF POLITICAL LIBERTY.

THE day on which we write will be memorable in the history of Italy—that is to say, of the Italy which was said to have been redeemed from tyranny and was united into one glorious kingdom by the forces of the Revolution. The Italian chambers meet to-day after a protracted vacation, for which they never asked, but by means of which they were kept duly silent by the prime minister, who falls from power on this day. His fall may be only a piece of trifling to save appearances for the present; but what he falls for is no trifle. The latest of the dictatorial speculations and operations of Francesco Crispi is the battle of Adua, fought in Abyssinia four days ago, on the 1st of March, 1896. It has entailed the loss of an entire army, some 15,000 to 20,000 men, with sixty cannons and ammunition, and consequently the fort of Adigrat and all the munitions of war. King Menelik has suddenly become a more prominent military power, with a better equipment of modern arms, than the whole of this Garibaldian United Italy. The feats of arms which had preceded this last were the loss of an entire column at Amba Alagi, of a fort at Makalle, and the precipitate evacuation of a vast territory, coolly invaded, as Rome had been, without asking permission of its owners. The minister's feats of dictatorial administration, executed without the authority of Parliament, and during the enforced vacation, had been in the line of expenses thrown upon a bankrupt exchequer by despatching 20,000 men in December, then 10,000 more afterwards, and attempting two days ago to reinforce the number of victims for the slaughter by ordering new brigades to be sent. No doubt he knew his majority. He had bought them all in; and he had bought their places for them last June, always with the

money of the impoverished nation. But it suits them to join now in the hue and cry, to save themselves till the storm blows over, and to recover him, when the short-lived spirit of mutiny shall have expired.

Viewed with a philosophical eye, the scene presents one redeeming feature. It is that the wholesale disaster abroad is not this time at the expense of the Church. It is United Italy, as a political power in Europe, that goes out of existence on this occasion, confessedly by an act of suicide. The revolvers, bayonets and swords, which ornament on this happy day the streets and piazzas at home, for once at least are not directed against nuns, priests and the Pope. Nor even are they directed against the Catholic citizens in the first instance. Now, as also on the glorious 20th of September last, when the "Liberation of Rome" from the "tyranny" of the Popes was laboriously celebrated on its twenty-fifth anniversary, the bayonets and the swords are bristling and the revolvers are ready to jump out of their cases against the children of the Revolution itself, who are investing the present régime pretty much like the Abyssinians, though not quite in Abyssinian style.

Those Scioans fought honestly for their hearths and their homes, with lances of their own make and with Remington rifles, which had once been the property of the Pope. Their spirited and Christian behavior throughout has not only vindicated their rights as a nation to own their own soil and to be left alone, but it seems to have answered also the prayer of His Holiness uttered with such deep and aggrieved feeling during the September feasts: *Ut inimicos Sanctæ Ecclesiæ humiliare digneris, Te rogamus audi nos.* In fact, this government, which appropriated the rifles of the zouaves from the Papal casernas, has seen its own military shot down with those same Papal arms. It had disposed of them evidently to good purpose. And the good people of the Trastevere are just now saying: *I fucili del Papa sparano ancora*—"The Pope's rifles are firing still!"

It is not in this style that the children of the Revolution are felt to be swarming around to-day; though it will come to the same result eventually, of avenging the Pope somehow. They swarm in the same way as their parent grew—a fungous growth spreading over the body which they are about to destroy, a putrefactive organism into which the carcass is breaking up, to be followed in steady succession by lower and lower types of socialistic and anarchistic microbes, until, having transmuted the body politic into their own vile substance and disposed of all the fibre, they will leave behind them only a residue of their own impalpable dust and escaping gases.

The army itself, which is really the sole implement of a government like this, consists of conscripts, who are practically convicts for a certain term of years, and who are made fit for the penitentiary by the time they leave the service, however innocent they may have been before. It consists of lads torn from their families, who had to be chosen by lot each time, for despatching into Africa, as if they were mutineers being decimated. Men and boys alike, the greatest part of them had never felt the slightest attraction to a life of arms. And, as the regiments go drilling and marching and countermarching, and mounting guard at the palace and returning to those quarters which were once monasteries and convents, they remind one of nothing so much as that of the chain-gangs in America breaking stones on the highways, all for the public good. The patriotism of the two denominations reaches about the same level. So martial are the poor conscripts, except when a splendid band is tripping along at their head, making them trip along too, that, according to the latest news about Adua—news that is absolutely certain—the troops that broke ranks and scattered and fled for their lives, when as yet scarcely touched by fire, were not the black soldiers of the foremost battalions, but the white troops fresh from Italy, who were to support the van. No wonder! For they should have been at their ploughs or their books or their counters, not running against the point of a Scioan's lance.

This machinery of arms, no matter who bears them, is the power by which certain free governments at present, notably the Italians and the French, impose the sacred bond of fear upon the nation. Every soldier is himself terrorized by the military law over him. The freemason lodges terrify the men who apply the law. And every man in the lodges is under the spell of holy fright imposed by all the rest. Here we have the practical working of the newest form of "free" constitution. This is the most advanced type of political liberty. Italy and France have gone this way. Spain and Hungary are going the same way. Others are following. And yet we are just at the close of our most glorious epoch, the age of ages for liberty and enlightenment, the magnificent nineteenth century, which inspires so many a triumphal ode on the "spirit of the age."

When the age pipes, why some dance; and, as the Greek comedian said, we have a right to be merry on a merry subject. The age is light and frisky; there is no doubt of it. And lightest and friskiest of all men are they who dance to it. A critical sense shall at least keep us sober, if we can just escape the grip of a higher criticism, which would make us positively melancholy. But "out upon thee, Melancholy," when we mean to speak of the spirit of the age.

I.

Rome and its recent ruins gave us some food for reflection in a former article of this REVIEW. We meant, of course, the ruins of recent structures in Rome—the pieces into which a new house goes when it will not stand. The science of architecture, which deals with statics, has nothing to learn from things that go up only to come down. Recent ruins have no past nor future. Their function is transitory—to offend the eye for a moment in the flitting present. Religion, indeed, has a footing in the contemplation of some recent ruins, if the anathema of the Pope had entered into the composition of the mortar. We shall leave it to the reflection of our readers to determine whether, in the collapse of some recent political liberties, called constitutions, the same element entered as accelerating the catastrophe.

The mention of religion here furnishes us with a striking contrast as set over against the ruins of political enterprises. Religion too seems to be in a state of ruin. Christianity, as forming part of the organization of modern nations, seems to be no more. The Christendom which consisted in the formation of nations by Christianity, and in an organic life animated by its principles and laws, would appear to be standing forth in the moral and social world of the day as a great antique pile, with its foundations still there, its old walls standing, its pillars still erect, its roof more or less extended over all, but the structure reft with fissures, with the sunlight penetrating only to reveal decay, and the moon tracing pensively its shadows in place of Christianity's past glories. The united Christendom which was, scarcely seems to be. It knows no longer the Pontiff's throne. Grass grows over the laws of the decalogue. And, as to the beatitudes of peace, and mercy, and charity, and joy, and thirsting for justice, or that long suffering for justice's sake, whereby mankind in its highest stage rose towards the vestibule of heaven, what a wreck we have come to in the history of the world! Historians make excursions to it, as an interesting pile. Philosophers go out to study it as possibly suggesting some ideas. Poets delight in it, for the moonlight is there. But what nation belongs to it any more, or sighs, "I have loved the glory of Thy house, O Lord!"

Verily, if a ruin it is, it is one under the shadow of which the reflective soul may well gather its thoughts, and luxuriate in the associations woven there by forty generations gone before. Raised above the narrow hollow of our fleeting time and dusty place, we may enter here into the accumulated life of centuries, and feel hearts still beating, and voices still ringing, and hopes throbbing still, memories which gather and flock around, where the surviving heir of the ages stands. He may well stand there and think

and pray, conscious happily that the same God is present to him, who disposed the destinies of all gone before; feeling the same stream of humanity coursing in his veins as in theirs; alive to the identical mystery of Providence which is now wrapping himself around, and counting his own thoughts and sentiments, too subtle for aught but music to express, to add them to the sum of all that humanity yielded before. All is being gathered into one divine bosom. All is being reserved for the revelation of the future. Not only the noise of multitudes without and the confusion of wars abroad, not only the dust and the smoke where men have pitched their tents, but his own silent footfall, his inquiring gaze into the ways of God with man, and his wondering surprise at the strange and devious ways of man with God, all is being set in place for the one great tableau, when mankind shall for the first and last time be set face to face with itself, and the nations that have perished shall see why they did so. If Christendom is a ruin, it is so only because the nations that need help come not where they may find it. And God, who made the nations for peace and health, and love and worship, will leave that structure there, for them to renew it, if they will choose to do so, to fill in the old walls, to reinforce those pillars, to recap those vaults, and bid Christendom stand forth again, as gorgeous as the basilica of St. Peter on the Vatican—if only they choose to do so.

Aside of it, and around it, extends the waste of modern things. Notably, there lie the broken-down piles of modern liberties. It was because of liberty that men broke forth from Christianity. And what has become of the liberty which they chose instead of Christ?

It is accepted as a first principle of the time, that political liberty consists in a certain form of constitution, called emphatically "free." Whether the constitution is capped by an hereditary head, styled a monarch, or by an elective head named a president, it is the one form specifically free. Yet, as this constitutional form with its political liberties does now appear either in the republic of France or in the monarchy of Italy, never could it have been made clearer that liberty does not consist in a constitution; for here we have constitutions without liberty. These paper instruments were themselves drawn up not for liberty, but for other purposes. They are the charters of certain associations, which styled them national constitutions, but which knew perfectly well that they were mere articles of conveyance, putting the nation into the pockets of a few. Having invented the instrument and copyrighted it by a process called a *plebiscite*, they work the machinery accordingly, and then legislate henceforth to supplement it. The legislation is prospective, retrospective, elastic, adjustable to every

possible purpose, except that of ousting the association out of power, or enabling their public crimes to be brought to justice. Like their *plebs*, which they feed at the door, their benches of justice too, both high and low, they feed with themselves. And, when even such a judiciary could not support laws of their own making if challenged in the courts, they pass over it and leave it out, inventing the new device of executing laws "by way of administration," as in the case of the present confiscation going on against the religious orders in France. The laws already prepared in the lodges are passed without the jarring war of words; for where the speaking is all on the side of a helpless minority, as is the case in Italy, there can clearly be no contention. In France there is generally more show of debate; but there is reason to doubt, whether the show is not as carefully prepared as the law which is meant to pass. The show of debate serves in part to disguise what the law-making power is doing. Then, if anything remains too plain for the intelligence of the bewildered multitude, the reptile press, which is the parliament of the crowd, makes a suitable decoction of that. In any case, the law thenceforth is law; and there is an end of it. It represents the will of that awful thing—whatever may be meant by it—that awful thing, called the State. Whatever it is, or is meant by it, it comes towering with a mighty mien, robbing, expatriating, shooting, shouting, and the people cowering go like a flock of sheep where this awful thing bids. This "State" generally appears in the scarf of an official, or in his moustache—a simple outsider does not see precisely where the awful thing reveals itself—also with a vague suspicion of bayonets somewhere, if you do not walk through the right door, or do not go into the right car, if you pretend that your house is your own, or that you are not dangerous to the "State." The "way of administration" will settle that for you in twenty-four hours. Meanwhile, it is the people that has made its laws, of course; and is obeying them freely. For we are under a free constitution; yea, a republic.

II.

In any meeting of the Italian chambers, during these last eight months, one might witness the very peculiar scene of a government measure being attacked by radicals, like Cavallotti and Imbriani, by moderates of the type of Di Rudini, by half-a-dozen other speakers, able, fiery, even ferocious. Not a word comes in reply from the members of an immense majority. There is no discussion, except in the sense of criticism and condemnation. The debate, such as it is, comes to a close when assailants desist. The vote is taken. And the measure, condemned by all the ora-

tory which has been heard in the house, passes with the usual overwhelming majority. In the special conventions of the dominant party, a similar scene might be witnessed. The prime minister held a very important meeting some little while ago. He spoke and spoke, and there was no end of his speaking, about himself and his policy. Then he asked for contributions from the enlightenment of the statesmen present to the general fund of wisdom. There was no reply. He expressed himself singularly comforted by this spectacle of their perfect unanimity; and, assuring them in turn of his own devotion, he said: "I am ready to go to hell with you." The sincerity of the sentiment is sufficiently guaranteed by the ordinary life and worship of the lodges. But the sympathetic extension of it does not stop short with the members. It embraces the whole country, now that the people are free.

The cabinet of a mighty modern state should scarcely be expected to conduct the municipal affairs of a town; no more, in fact, than it need manage a sacristy. But, like sacristies, so towns are administered, when occasion invites, by a free government of this kind. It can sweep away a municipal council and substitute a royal commissary for mayor, aldermen, councilmen and all the rest. It is simply the principle of dictatorship carried down to the last unit of the general body politic.

Thus the other day a royal commissary took charge of the city of Turin. The Catholic majority in the communal council had voted a reduction of appropriations for the national feast days of the Statute and birthdays of king and queen. Strictly speaking, there is no need of any appropriations whatever for legal holidays. It is enough if the banks and public schools and the public offices close for the day. The action of the Catholic majority was a step towards purifying city administration of general politics, which the liberals are always and everywhere intruding into every function of life. The vote stood 34 against 25. The reduction was passed. Immediately there was tumult and uproar from the minority of liberals. The mayor and his giunta felt constrained to resign, and the council had to proceed to a new election. Now, the liberals could hope for nothing from the majority, but everything from a royal commissary; and, as without the liberal votes, the requisite number could not be mustered for the election of a new mayor, the minority returned blank papers in three ballots, which gave respectively 37, 38 and 36 votes for the new Catholic candidate. There was a dead-lock; and the royal commissary appeared, taking the city in charge.

Here was a technical and perhaps grave emergency, created by the liberals. But neither gravity of circumstance nor technicality of law is at all necessary for the intervention of the dictatorial

power, in disfranchising a city for a time of its municipal government, in dismissing a mayor for "unpatriotic" conduct, in doing just what it likes. The syndic of Rome, Prince Torlonia, was turned out of his office on a former occasion. His offence was that of undertaking to present the compliments of the city of Rome to the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, on the occasion of his sacerdotal jubilee.

The case of Turin was particularly instructive. It opened the eyes of Catholics, not only to more extensive resources of liberalism than they had thought of, but to the utter inadequacy also of a certain policy, which they had been following pretty generally. As to Parliament, the good Catholics keep out of it altogether, and they cast no votes for candidates, observing in this the express instructions of the Holy Father. But they have been studiously exhorted to enter the municipal councils and put some check on the de-christianizing of schools, asylums, hospitals and other institutions. Now, they were met here with the serious difficulty that, if they took charge of the communal councils as a majority and meant to act as conscientious Catholics, they would run the risk at every turn of encountering the central government and of being turned out at any moment by a royal commissary. They considered, therefore, that by keeping studiously in a minority they could serve as a drag at least on the infidel majority, and, when occasions arose to compromise them, they had only to cast their conscientious votes and then abstain from active participation in political demonstrations or whatever else might be demanded of the council. The syndic and the majority might march as it liked to the tune of the central government, which, being thus satisfied with the city's "patriotism," would meddle no farther. It was a half-measure, rendered excusable by the nature of the liberties they enjoy under this free constitution. But the vigorous populations of northern Italy, whence these usurpers themselves came, could not long remain cowering down under the freemason whip; and the general revival of Catholic life, which had taken its start precisely in Piedmont and in Lombardy, has led to bolder measures. So they have taken charge of things with fine majorities. Venice has made its schools Christian again. Milan is radiating its ecclesiastical influence, and two days ago it looked as if a revolution was beginning there; and just at present it is uncertain whether the military is not about to mutiny. Turin had its majority in the council, and now that a new election has just taken place its majority is Catholic as before. But the instructive feature of the incident of last January was that even a majority can be checkmated, and the council dissolved, on a liberal issue most remote from a question of general politics.

In this crisis the glorious free people figured as usual—that free people of the plebiscites, which endorses the public robberies, which shouts itself hoarse around the new statues of revolutionary heroes and fills its pockets with pay for votes at the political elections. During the days of the contention a fair specimen of this sovereign people had gathered about the town-hall. It pressed against the doors with the customary declarations of its sublime disagreement with the Catholic counsellors. When the council was dissolved, the Assessor Dumontel tried in vain to make his way out and pass through the mob. Two liberal colleagues begged him to desist and make his escape by another door. The gentleman replied: “I have always come in by this door during the thirteen years that I have been a member of the council, and I mean to go out of it to-day.” And he did pass out; and so did all the Catholic members, holding their heads high, calm and serene, while the sovereign people of the free constitution hissed and yelled and threatened in the expression of its high displeasure. If the free people came near killing the councillor Radicati, that was, no doubt, because he was so helpless. He was dragging himself along on his crutches.

This is the constitutional *plebs* which, under the process of general corruption, is becoming stronger every day. Reinforced each year by the generations of cultured lads who are poured out of the government schools, it is at present the strength, as it is also the canker and will be the ruin, of the power which engenders it, and, first and foremost, of this glorious house of Savoy. It corresponds exactly to that noble Roman people of the decaying Roman empire, who lived on the largesses of pence thrown out to it, on the bits of bread doled out to it, and chiefly on the feast of blood shed in the amphitheater to amuse it. Again, it looks very much as if the staple article which constitutes this people of the plebiscite were the identical stuff which filled Italy with hordes of brigands in former ages. Many of these, who would have been brigands in other days, have possessed themselves now of so much power in the shape of money that they are sitting in the chambers as senators and deputies. Economists tell us that coal is only vegetable fibre which has stored up the rays of the sun and yields them up again as radiant heat. Just like economic coal these statesmen have stored up their money—better not inquire where—and are disengaging it now as constitutional power; but, unlike coal, they lay in new stores as they go. However, they are legislators now, and they have privileges; and they must not be called brigands. Said one of them to another, long before Rome was seized: “Had we done such things as we have done for any other cause than the redemption of Italy, we should be great blackguards.” His words

are on record, and they seem to mean just what they say, that the redeemers of Italy are blackguards, but they should not be called so. Their proper name now is honorable ministers, honorable senators, honorable deputies. But, to do them justice, we are not quite sure whether all of them would have been brigands in other times for the sake of foul lucre. Some thinkers are prone to believe that many among them would have been ecclesiastics in other ages for the sake of ecclesiastical revenues. And now that they are "honorables" instead of "reverend," and that brave young sparks wear epaulettes with grace instead of vestments with sacrilege, these reflective old heads are inclined to bless God and His Providence for deriving an unqualified good out of what seemed to be an unqualified evil.

Another excellent turn which, purblind as we are, we may still discern in the actual course of events is that, as there is no Protestantism nor hypocrisy in the Italian nation, so these apostates entertain no indifference in matters of religion. They know no application of the principle, "Live and let live," and consequently, before they have finished their present operations, they will have stimulated into life every latent ember of true religious sentiment in the drowsy carelessness of so many good people, who would otherwise let well-enough alone and let things go on to perdition. There is little need of hypocrisy in present circumstances. On the contrary, as in many social matters Italians give a shock to our varnished sensibilities, so in matters of religion they exhibit any amount of nature, pure and unvarnished. Good people show this in many ways of most simple and natural devotion. The others show it too just in the way that Christ our Lord described, when He said that if people will not love God and hate the devil they will put up with the devil and hate God. And thence arises that singular feature in these Catholic countries where, instead of taking things quietly and being what they like, they are all loving God or adoring the devil and, *vice versa*, fighting with the devil or fighting with God. They are demonstratively so. In short, they are natural. They are neither Protestants nor hypocrites. The things beyond this world are too real to their sense to be ignored with indifference; and, in the present breaking up of society, there is no inducement for the wolves to put on the fleece of the lamb. The lambs are lambs, and the wolves are wolves. And that we consider natural. It is a pity nature is not more widely spread over the world.

Here is an entertaining illustration just at hand of what we are endeavoring to express. Alongside of the glorious Church of the Gesù there runs a narrow street called the *Via del Gesù*. One could feel the fragrance of the Church and of Christ's sacred name envel-

oping the Altieri palace opposite with the name *Via del Gesù* affixed to it. Now, alas! the name is gone, and it is the *Via del Plebiscito*. The constitutional *plebs* that did not want the Church begrudged the name of Christ to the palace opposite. And now it runs its plebeian course from the new "Corso of Victor Emmanuel" through its narrow *Via del Plebiscito* up into the new "Street of the Nation." A pretty laborious ascent they have made of it from a certain creature once called Victor Emmanuel II. through a plebiscite up to a nation. There was a method in their madness, and there is an art in their memory of it. But in all alike they are eminently natural. They take care to run over the name of Christ.

III.

Having given some illustrations of the working of a free constitution in the chambers, in the municipalities, in the piazzas and the streets, we may add a few more to illustrate the personal liberty of thinking, speaking, and even of living, and also a peculiar formation now given to personal character.

When the political elections were the subject of agitation last year, a certain Dr. Poletti, who was attached to the militia, delivered some public addresses, in which he inculcated obedience to the Pope, who had forbidden Catholics to take part in the elections. He was brought before the military authorities for doing so, and was required to explain. He did so with admirable clearness. The first article of the Statute, he said, recognized the Catholic religion as that of the state; and the Pope, as head of the Church, has the right of governing the faithful in matters of morals and discipline. Wherefore, as he commanded abstention from the political elections, the doctor maintained that it belonged to us to obey and to recommend obedience. In the course of his argument there had been no occasion for speaking of the temporal power; but he had spoken of the necessity, under which the government lay, of coming to an agreement with the Holy See, and thereby removing the cause of nearly all the moral and physical evils which are afflicting poor Italy. He had not animadverted on the national institutions. On the contrary, in keeping with the spirit of his military oath, he hoped that an end would be put at last to a system of persons and things which only heaped ruin on the country from the epoch of its unification till the present day. "And, again, with regard to the abstention from the elections, there was another reason besides that of obedience, mentioned before, which was, that Catholics were bound, by abstaining at present, to get themselves ready for entering the political arena at the right moment; and, having kept their hands clean so far, they could repair all these material and moral evils which the dominant

liberalism has accumulated on their country." In answer to this satisfactory explanation, the ministry sent word that he should resign his post of officer. Poletti did so, adding what the ministry insisted he should not add—the reasons for his resignation. Poletti answered that such silence was repugnant to his conscience, and so he gave the reasons, which were simply his obedience to the Pope's command. Whereupon the ministry, by a decree bearing the king's signature, approved of the proposal already made by the court-martial of Brescia, and degraded Poletti to the rank of a private soldier. The decree stated the motives for passing the sentence. These were: "The public manifestation of opinions hostile to the constitutional monarchy and to the fundamental institutions of the state." Poletti then sent his epaulettes as an offering to the Holy Father, accompanied with a statement of the whole incident. A journal which published this statement was sequestered by the government. That is what constitutional liberty comes to, in freedom of thought, speech and press. And it shows too, that, if personal hypocrisy in religion and life is not indigenous in a population like this, it does not follow that political hypocrisy is not an essential part of the programme for those who work the machinery of state and for those who are ground down to be worked by it.

The most fundamental of all liberties is that of the human being in his private life, to think, to speak, to act, if he remains within the legitimate sphere of the laws imposed by God on human nature, and of the just laws added by social authority for the evident public good. But, if that is most fundamental, there is a form of it most intimate and absolutely sacred. It is his right to deal with God, and consecrate himself, if he chooses, to the special service of his Creator. How this constitutional form of political liberty has dealt with religious and the orders they belong to, we sketched on a former occasion. We need add now only some illustrations of the present theme.

Individual nuns, especially in the cloistered orders, brought with them a dowry for their maintenance in the convent, the dowry thenceforth forming part of the common fund. All was swept away, some twenty-three years ago; and, in lieu of their property, a pittance of ten cents a day was assigned to professed nuns, until they should die out. The pittance is paid four times a year, that is, nine dollars at the close of each quarter—not in advance. If the nun dies in the interval between one payment and another, she is not counted. So the expenses incurred by her sickness and burial fall upon the remainder of the community, most of whom are now old, many of them always sick, and every one exposed to manifold hardships entirely foreign to their secluded and

holy life. For they had been driven out of their cloisters, which were wanted for barracks, post-offices, police stations. Sometimes they were allowed to huddle themselves into a corner of their old monastery, until the race should have expired ; but generally they were provided for in any out-house or barn that could be made to wear the appearance of a habitation ; and, as to roof, windows and doors, they could pay thenceforth the running expenses of repair out of their few centimes a day. The poor victims have been entirely at the mercy of local officials, who, like their masters, simply want to get rid of them, and feel justly aggrieved that the holy souls do not die quick enough. At the commencement of the prosecution, kind rich friends, and also the simple peasantry, were of assistance to them ; though such an arrangement is not in the form of life projected by cloistered nuns, whose dowries are their fixed fund for support. Now the rich are few ; and such as remain are trying to balance themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. The simple peasantry are so poor that their houses are sold by the government over their heads, and they emigrate to South America, to North America, anywhere to get out of the claws of the harpies. And the poor nuns, always in debt for bread, and patching their habits as best they can, for there are no means to buy new cloth, are thrown more directly than ever on the divine providence of Him, to whom they gave themselves, and who feeds and clothes the sparrow. One Review has 390 such destitute convents regularly on its list of charitable beneficence, and makes special appeals for them twice a year, at Christmas and Easter, under the title of *L'Obolo per le Povere Monache*, "The Mite for the Poor Nuns."¹

The active orders of religious women, and the orders of men, whether active or contemplative, were treated in the same way. But men are supposed to be able to take care of themselves. One solitary instance of liberality was afforded by this liberal government of the freshest, newest type in our golden age. It exempted the "generalitital" houses from immediate confiscation, that is, the houses in which resided the General Superiors of institutions having branches in other parts of the world. But, as soon as the actual Superior General died, the property should go, like all the rest, to its owner, the nation. This feat of liberality was altogether characteristic, not as a mark of respect for personal freedom, but for the motives which rendered it commendable. The motives were very simple. These houses had an international character ; and the noble government feared the raising of a little finger on the part of some foreign government, and, therefore, practised

¹ *The Civiltà Cattolica*.

diplomatic deference in this generous style. But its own citizens, suggesting as they did no diplomatic relations, nor the raising of any little finger on the part of Austria or Germany, of England or of the United States, were entirely at its paternal mercy, and were stripped accordingly; and the desks, chairs and cupboards, the washstands, hat-racks, the dishes and plates, were sold at auction. Even in its liberality it made one reserve; for, no doubt, it conceived no fear that any mortal government would stir that finger on behalf of the Jesuits. The *Gesù*, the generalitital house of the Society of Jesus, was excepted from the right of immunity; and the general himself was excepted from the law of compensation, which waited on the other Superiors-General during their natural lifetime.

And the books, and the archives? You have only to go into the old Roman College, or into the different *Archivii di Stato*, to see what became of them in the city of Rome. You can see in Florence, Naples, Turin, Milan, yes, and in every insignificant communal town, what became of the treasures of books and manuscripts, and the most secret and sacred archives, gathered in the course of centuries, by the men who wrote them, who transcribed them, who transacted their own private business, and kept the records; never imagining, good simple souls! that the world was to slide backwards, and the civilization of Christendom was to vanish into the barbarism of this age.

About forty-five libraries of religious houses have been "pooled" into the Victor Emmanuel Library, which fills the Jesuit refectory, parlors, community rooms, and private rooms, besides the old corridors, of the Roman College. The archives, housed in the private rooms upstairs, are catalogued in large folios on a table in the reserved students' room downstairs, the ancient parlor of the community. One huge volume describes the *fondo gesuitico* of documents; others smaller, the *fondi* of single houses, or of several thrown together. The statues, inscriptions, and other memories of the Roman College, founded by Gregory XIII., all remain ostentatiously in their places. Inscriptions taken from the other suppressed houses are inserted in the walls, to preserve the history of the founders of libraries, with a special inscription inserted under each, "Taken from the Convent of Ara Coeli," etc. The nation is ostentatiously grateful to the bees who have built their hives so industriously during centuries, and have left it sole relict to eat the honey. Such archives as are not supposed to be historical—for it is wondrously little this modern enlightenment understands of what it has stolen—are so far scattered about in the Archives of State throughout the city. But now, the *Gesù*, since the Jesuits will not buy it back, is waiting for an occupation; and all these

archives are to go there. The Director-General is so grateful to the Jesuits in particular for their magnificent legacies, that he has already put back into the identical cupboards of the general's old private archives the identical volumes which the nation, in its first fervor of gratitude, had carried elsewhere—partly, however, because the Gesù was first to be a barracks. But, as what was good enough for a community did not suit the soldiers, the director of the stolen archives is to have his chance; and as a mark of gratitude, he said, he would use the same cupboards, which still happened to remain in those repositories, for the same folios to which the destinies of the nation had made it the happy heir. Nor is their cup of happiness as yet quite full. A simple lay brother in a certain religious institute dropped the remark, that at the top of the church there was a great number of boxes, apparently of books. The hounds are at once on the scent. They wait on the Superior, demanding the delivery of certain archives not yet handed over. He has none. They tell him where they can be found. He never heard of them. A search is made; and there they are. They belong to the state; and off they go.

About one hundred millions of dollars were realized by these people on the sale of the property of the religious. Thenceforward, no religious congregations existed any more. At once, with that spirit of zeal and charity which is the spirit of Christ, the busy religious began to act as citizens; they obtained means to buy again, to build again; but only as individual citizens, using the ordinary rights of any private person. After the wholesale devastation of 1873 and 1874, Rome seems to have become again as rich as ever in religious houses. Now Crispi engaged in the African war, and, instead of spending only the thirty millions of lire (six million dollars) appropriated for the purpose by the chambers, he spent one hundred and fifty millions. This looked inconvenient, so he said he would make the religious, or, as he calls them, the *Frati*, "pay for the war in Abyssinia." That is to say, he would confiscate all a second time. But the religious congregations no longer exist; the law does not recognize them. That makes no difference. They seem to conceive that a law can be made any day, retrospective, retroactive, reaching as far back as the days of Noe. For, in the last analysis, there would appear to be only one thing an Italian law cannot reach; that is, the pockets of the deputies.

One thing the minister did not include in his reckonings when he stated his policy. That was the prayers of the religious, who thought they had a friend in heaven powerful enough to save them from another confiscation. And just when one-half of the time had elapsed that was to determine their fate, Crispi was hissed

out of office in the chambers and reviled in effigy all over the country.

IV.

Quite a new formation of personal character is the inevitable result of such new circumstances. People have to struggle for existence, and, to survive, they must have conformed to the environment. Many have thought quite naturally that conformity with the environment meant the adoption of liberal principles. Or rather they have not thought at all. When people want bread they have not time to think; and when they have time, and have bread, few think anyhow. The press pretends to do the thinking, the spirit of the age does the piping, the folks go marching; and those who do not march must simply stay behind. It is the age of all ages for the *parvenus—per pervenire*, say the Italians, *pour arriver*, say the French, "to get there," we should say. To get there we must, though we walk over the shoulders of the crowd, as was done in the crush on Brooklyn Bridge, though we walk over our fathers and mothers, though we walk over our teachers and pastors, though we walk over religion, the Church and the Ten Commandments. "Move on!" cry the policemen to the passengers as they tumble out and block the way; "move on and keep to the right!" That is the progress of the age. If you do not move on and keep to the side of the powers that be; if you are "contemptibly inert," as Tertullian tells us the pagans of the primitive times considered the primitive Christians to be; if you will stick to old notions about obeying God rather than men, why you are contemptibly stationary, you are fit for a monastery, and you are just prime for a modern government to send you out and about your business. You will learn sense when you have seen others get there instead of you; and you will know how to eat honey when you see others have got into your hive. You will then go and do likewise, and eat other people's honey, and, however late and sorry, you will be inspired at length with the spirit of this age.

A cultured proletariat is being educated in the government lyceums, and it is already stalking about to educate this unsophisticated and benighted Italian people. It is looking and waiting for places, and it gets its bread meanwhile as best it may. Its moral structure, to the surprise and bewilderment of its fathers and grandfathers, is of a kind they never, even under a nightmare, caught a glimpse of before. But that is only because they have never been in America to see the yearly output of certain universities in our blest republic. Now they see it without going to America. It is a cultured aggregation to the *plebs* of their consti-

tution ; the affiliation of education to the patriotism of the piazzas. It is splendid material to jostle priests with or to turn out nuns with at home, or, if sent to Africa, to throw down its muskets and run away. It is really the very best culture of the age.

The general meekness of a Christian population, and particularly that of a paternal and affectionate clergy, is a grand foil for the spirit of young Italy, as of young France, and other youthful products. In these places the militant character of Christianity, which knows what is due to it from others, which expects that others know it too, or else will prick their sleeping consciousness into a becoming state of attention, the spirit of walking through the advanced world of the day with decorous humility, but also with one's head moderately high, has never been developed in these Christian parts, where all heretofore has been so home-like and patriarchal. Folks are taken aback and give way, where we should see reason for a slight push of the elbow to keep things straight: And, quite accustomed to such clerical meekness, which has reposed heretofore on uniform respect and affection, a set of beardless youths coming along a sidewalk not only do not make way for a venerable ecclesiastic to pass, but seem to expect that he will go out into the dirty street and let the coming man pass. So he does. If an American or English ecclesiastic, not used to devious ways but always moving straight on, seems to be running into them, it is quite marvelous how quickly the brave youths make way, as if the Africans were coming. It is a cultured poltroonery, which will fawn on the freemasons for a daily penny, and to get it will blaspheme Christianity, but, when caught sooner or later on a death-bed, will beg for absolution from the friar whom it had flouted while it danced to the spirit of the age.

Nor are those young women, who have been caught in the State machinery of schools, of a kind to excite special comment in the minds of those who are accustomed to this hybrid creature in other lands. But here the shock, which the sight of her gives to the general Catholic sentiment, serves as quite an awakening to our torpid judgments of what is becoming, beautiful and right in the gentler and more upright sex. Callous, indeed, people are becoming to the sights and exhibitions which women make of themselves, especially in centres like Rome and Florence, where their sisters from other lands bring their manners with them. Nevertheless, the judgments passed in conversation, the articles in daily Catholic papers, the reviews in periodicals, all breathe an atmosphere of thought, in which mental and moral diseases of the commonest occurrence amongst us have not yet become naturalized. When this devotee of a queen, who lives with that husband of hers in a palace of the popes, was busy with her devotions one

Holy Week, and as usual was ostentatiously so, the question arose, in a company of learned and experienced men, whether the person in question was sincere in her belief. One of them, a professor, called by the Pope from the north of Italy to lecture on Dante in the University of the Apollinare, delivered his opinion with some warmth and even indignation. We thought it extremely interesting and charming, not so much for the thing said, as for the more general frame of mind which his remark betrayed. "If," said he, "we are to doubt whether a woman is a Christian and approaches the Sacraments, we may as well begin to doubt about everything!"

In spite of all the imported liberalism, and the incrustation of vices which it so rapidly deposits where it has full play, there is one thing which we have failed to discern. Nay, there are many things; we have never seen a case of intoxication, for instance. But one thing there is which may afflict you in other parts of the world, though you happen to be in the most select company, and which one misses here in every company, no matter how simple. It is vulgarity. Both in city and country the people seem to be polite by nature. Their phrases and salutations in every-day life breathe an aroma of charity and reverence that is delicious. The Christian fragrance of grace, which has enveloped the generations for fifteen centuries, does not seem to be dissipated even when infidelity is already in the heart. It is, indeed, a natural endowment of a Catholic people. Twice only have instances of vulgarity met our eye—once in a railway train and once in a tramway at Florence. They were American tourists in the one case, and, apparently, English artists in the other. In both cases they were parties of women.

V.

The tourists who go travelling through Italy under charge of a Cook's agent form their precious judgments of what Italy is, without having spoken a word in Italian to any mortal being; and, when they go home, give off their stored-up wisdom to the general public without being able sometimes to compose a decent paragraph in their mother tongue. The English-speaking colonies, which live in the centres here, are substantially Protestant, and absorb the few Catholics, who covet the privilege of speaking their native language; and the run of their thought flows smoothly from its sources, anti-papal, bigoted, fastidious and pharisaical. The correspondents of the general press abroad either come from abroad and do not belie their origin; or, if they are Italians chosen by New York papers, they owe their selection to qualifications which recommend them from the newspaper's point of view, not

from the side of Catholicity or truth. The result is that Dickens or Mr. Stead could write a juster account of America or Chicago than the correspondents or politicians afford of Italy to the American reading public. The same is true of Mexico, France, Spain. An article of Castellar in the *Forum*, on the politics of Spain, would lead one to surmise that the eminent statesman had never thought it worth his while to credit a living American with any knowledge of Christian and European history.

To explain the political condition of Italy, it will be enough, we believe, to take note of two causes and of two circumstances. The two causes are: first, the secret sects, culminating in the dominant freemasonry; secondly, treachery, sometimes gross, at other times subtle, in some cases conscious, and perhaps in other cases unconscious. Of the two circumstances, one belongs to an order of policy higher than the Italian or any national diplomacy, and higher than all political diplomacy combined; it is the necessary attitude of the Sovereign Pontiff, face to face with the usurpation of his temporal power. The other circumstance is incidental to a nation unaccustomed to the working of a constitutional form of government, and saddled with one in spite of itself, and that such a one! In any case, a harness suits only when it fits, and when such a fraud as this is perpetrated at a people's expense, no wonder they show themselves inert under it, either stolidly or contemptuously so. The contempt expressed extends freely to all so-called constitutional governments, and rightly so if this were a fair specimen of them. Meanwhile, inertness, even in the most legitimate spheres of activity, is a circumstantial evil of the day. It is the evil of the dead weight.

As to the first cause—the sects—their original plan of action had been in harmony with their nature—underhand and intensely secret. When this reached a sufficient degree of maturity for public and political policy, their second plan of action was also in keeping with their nature—mendacious and contagious. Theirs was the political principle, "A Free Church in a Free State," to catch the Church in the toils of whatever they meant by the State, to subjugate the Church and get rid of its head. Theirs, too, was the diplomatic principle of "non-intervention," to prevent any Catholic power from interposing, and arresting them in the progress of their future robberies. Theirs, again, was the catch about the "Unification of Italy," which, once united, was to become one of the greatest powers of the world—a Roman empire renewed in the latter times—a British colonial empire, to begin at home, to extend into African colonization, and then to stop—who knows where? This last device was to catch the eyes and fancies of the light heads, and they succeeded admirably in every class of society,

ecclesiastical and lay ; people lost their heads over the unity of a redeemed Italy. It was the political *influenza* of thirty or forty years ago, and the contagion remains in the system as political liberalism to-day.

When their work was over, and the last burglary had been accomplished in the liberation of Rome, the veil of secrecy could be largely dispensed with. Their worship of Satan has become public and open. The banner of Lucifer heads their legal processions. Their processions are always legal, while that of a priest carrying the Blessed Sacrament to the dying, with an acolyte ringing a bell before him, is a procession unlawful and against the security of public order. Their blasphemous orations, and their dedications of marble statues to blasphemers, are invested with the pomp of state, while an episcopal pastoral or the singing of a Pater Noster outside of the precincts of a church would expose a bishop to prosecution. They call for hymns to Satan, and pay for them, as national anthems, out of the public treasury. To corrupt and be corrupted, which was always an incidental eddy in the current of human affairs, is now the current itself of public policy. In education, it does not mean any watery solution of secularism or laicisation—not mere theories of Rousseau, or the incipient materialism of Pestalozzianism. It is an acrid concentration of educational villany to soften the sinews of a nation's morality by macerating the moral fibre of the young, by applying corrosive elements to the plastic student, to the shrinking school-girl, to the unprotected orphan, and even to infants. For this reason, among twenty others, it was necessary to annihilate the insinuating grace of sisters and of all religious. For the same reason, all the young manhood of the country, including seminarians, was to be driven into the barracks like a drove of cattle, and be made valiant warriors against the Scioans and the world generally, after they should have graduated in vice. Of course, the patient in the hospital does not escape them any more than the patient public, which receives through the press, through placards and illustrations, and through all the arteries and veins of modern communication, a daily and hourly infusion of the virus which circulates. A crowning circumstance, which at the end of the chapter appeals to the infected fancies of the light heads, as the unity of Italy caught them at the beginning, is that the many varieties of public and private immorality, however enormous, are strictly connected with the possession of money, place and power. For the spirit of the age, having had fair play for once, not only in Italy and in France, but in other countries too, has endowed with its money and its power a brood of the most venomous reptiles that ever crawled over a social body.

What they meant by a free church is plain enough ; but they were anxious to show what they meant by the liberty of a free state. They went off into another continent and into the perfectly free state of another people, and thought to put it in their pockets as a token ever at hand of what they meant by national freedom. Moreover, they illustrated what they meant by non-intervention ; for in a country where there was no war, no opposing interests fighting with one another, and no creature on earth calling for their intervention, they went uncalled, and interposed their glorious *bandiera* of United Italy and their valiant lads of the barracks. And what Divine Providence meant in allowing all this redemption and unification of the new grand kingdom of Savoy, and in permitting the twenty-fifth anniversary to come round of the burglary committed on the 20th of September, 1870, has been made clear, step by step, in this little African side-play of the last six months. On the 20th of September last, when the Pope prayed that God would humble the enemies of Holy Church, King Menelik signed his call to the tribes and their chiefs, summoning them as the "friends of Mary." The first Sunday of October, the feast of the Holy Rosary, when the Church was praying to Mary for the same intention, appears to have been the day for the assembling of the tribes. The sanguinary deeds which had marked the track of the revolution during twenty-three years, till Rome was taken, received their offset from King Menelik in a series of sanguinary defeats, during two months and a half, till the rout and massacre of March the first. And when, two mornings later, the news arrived in Rome, the Holy Father, who was on his way in solemn pomp to celebrate in the Sistine Chapel the nineteenth anniversary of his coronation, received from his Cardinals the information that the glorious kingdom of Italy had sunk out of sight from among the respectable powers of the world.

While giving to the secret sects the very first place in the political drama of Italy's decline and fall, we cannot in justice assign them all the place and every part which has been enacted. The worship and profession of evil, which is their life, did not come into existence with them. There has been no age of the Church in which a succession of errors and heresies has not kept up the tradition of evil worshipped as good, and of good assaulted as evil—the tradition not merely of virtue being on the cross and vice being on a throne, but of virtue and truth being pronounced worthy of death, and vice and error proclaimed worthy of redemption. A long series of errors and heresies, from Manicheism down, have maintained that uniform principle of internal doctrine, while they have preserved, likewise, a uniform foreign policy of hatred for the Church and for all parts of Christian civilization founded on

the Church. Distinguished among themselves by the mark, whereby we may know whose disciples they are, that they heartily hate one another, they have also been distinguished by that other mark which Christ set upon their brow when, sending them forth, like Cain, from the face of the Lord and of His Church, He turned and said to her: "The world hates you, because it hated Me before you."

The second cause, then, which played into the hands of the first, was treachery under various shapes and forms—a painful subject, of which we note only the main species. It has played so fast and loose, and it has been so enterprising under a paternal government like that of the Popes, who do not rule with a rod of iron nor delight in shedding blood, that ecclesiastical rulers have not merely been uncertain at what turn they may light upon a traitor, but whether the man at their elbow was not himself a freemason.

The other day a marquis died, meeting his death at the hands of a lunatic in an asylum of which he was the beneficent founder. The brother of an eminent dignitary in the Church, he had possessed himself, under Pius IX., of important secrets regarding the movements of the Papal troops. He passed on the secrets promptly to the enemy, as fast as the post of confidence he occupied allowed him to gather them in, and—he was caught in the act. Reprieved from the sentence of death, he lived to become a great man and a senator in the new kingdom of Italy. He died like so many others of his kind, who expect that, when the shades of evening gather, the dew will begin to fall, and when the heyday of their life is over, the sweet absolution of the Church will descend upon their heads; and night will be no night to them, nor death have its merited sting. How it is, who knows? The rest is mystery, as the life of the false is mystery—dark, gloomy and hard.

It was treachery like this that made Rome a tributary of the sects, long before they effected an entrance. The streets of the city became unsafe to Italians and foreigners alike. The police, supposed to be Papal, were round about; and burglars or highwaymen, red-handed, were brought to the police for arrest. But the officers were not there for that purpose. They and other parts of the machinery were working for another object, to show the world at large the misgovernment of the Pope, and that Rome must be redeemed. How had the sectaries got into the police?

Well-known chiefs of the sects moved about the streets of Rome. Kegs of powder were stored in the heart of the city. A common cab was hired and one of the kegs was placed by the side of the cabman, for there was not room enough inside. They drive to the Papal barracks hard by the Vatican, and in five min-

utes the whole building is blown into the air. When everybody knew that strange things were brewing, the guardians of public security alone were ignorant. And that the mines were well laid that great and good man, Napoleon III., was a witness not to be despised, for he had his own specific preferences regarding persons and things in Rome, and he let the Pope know them. Pius IX. had to conform to the wishes of his great and good friend. A letter from the empress, just received and read by Pius IX., and carefully laid by in a secret place, finds its way back on the spot to the emperor, compromising the empress with him. Napoleon signalized the success of his policy by tumbling at Sedan, and forthwith Rome was occupied. The occupants have just signalized the success of their quarter-century of government by tumbling at Adua; and who will come next? It is all a mystery of Providence governed by the law of justice. If the punishments inflicted for a national sin have not brought people to their senses, neither are the evils as yet at their height. When God is very angry with human ingratitude He inflicts the greatest chastisement of all: He allows it to triumph in its iniquity.

Though the laity at large might feel no single incentive left to practice hypocrisy, there remained that other state, more elevated than the secular, and by its condition of sanctity never free from the approaches of the insidious foe. There were some ecclesiastics rich in intellectual gifts, clever at the pen; yes, intellectual enough to lead philosophical thought and pious enough to be made to pose after death for the honors of the altar. Yet, during life, men of this type were on terms of intimacy with the chief figures of the party hostile to the Church, and, either during life or after death, their works or their gifts alike went into the Hades of condemned and prohibited goods. They were men secularized at heart, though wearing the ecclesiastical garb. They had never added to the blessings of their state that distinct grace of studying deeply and knowing profoundly the things of divine science, the sacred deposit left as the appanage of their own vocation. Whole schools of residuary Jansenism and Gallicanism have occupied parts of Italy even to our day, and Tuscany was noted for the growth of both these errors and the parallel growth of freemasonry and other sects far back in the past century. In such an atmosphere neither Christian divinity nor Christian virtue nor ecclesiastical policy could survive. While they and their gifts, such as they were, formed the best part of the conquest which the masonic hordes made in the country, it was through such as these that the same hordes got their best purchase on the general thought of the nation. Delusions were spread, fallacies disguised, imaginations exalted, and truth sat by to mourn. For, if there is

one thing which has always distinguished the Pharisee whose interests forbid him to become an apostate, it is that matters of plain Christian doctrine, of plain Christian duty, of the commonest disinterestedness in the works of mercy and charity are things not in his line. If there be an unmixed interest of Christ, he is not in it.

This was the school of ecclesiastical liberals, who, in Italy and France, knew enough of ecclesiastical doctrine to guide the movements of the enemy without. And hence appears a remarkable feature in the war against religious congregations. That war has not proceeded on the lines of political policy only. It has shown the strategy and has advanced the reasons of a domestic foe. If one will consult the pages of a modern canonist, Bouix, for instance, to see the principles and methods of domestic enemies against the whole religious state and will compare therewith the policy, the line of reasoning, the fallacies of a Jules Ferry, a Paul Bert, a Bourgeois, or of the Victor Emmanuel government, ushering the religious orders outside of the pale of the Catholic Church as useless, as superfluous, as a *superfétation*, which, in the interests of Catholicity pure and undefiled, it is time to get rid of, he will not fail to see the identity between the two, the purest "spirit of the age" inside having supplied the masonic spirit of the age outside with munitions of war. Perhaps they did not always mean it, as the Italians did not quite mean it, when they robbed the Papal casernas of the Remington rifles and then found themselves shot down at Adua with the same rifles in the hands of the Abyssinians. Still less did liberals mean that, when masonry should have despatched the religious congregations, it should then wheel round and despatch themselves. Yet this is what has happened before.

We must hurry to a conclusion, and so we cannot tarry on those two circumstances, however interesting, which have given the enemies of the Church an accumulated advantage from the very excess of their iniquity.

One is the attitude of protest adopted and maintained by the Sovereign Pontiff in the face of such stupendous public immorality. His duty, his place, the interests of the Church universal, in America, France, Germany, India, China, Japan, in the islands of the southern seas, as well in Alaska by the north pole, rendered imperative on him the one ecclesiastical line of policy, which Pius IX. promptly adopted and which Leo XIII. has unswervingly followed. Good men and thinking men, who thought in their earlier wisdom that some allowance should be made for the spirit of the times, now believe and say in their later wisdom that "Pius IX. was a providential man" in yielding not an inch to the spirit of the age. *Cunctando restituit rem.* An instance will explain this. A reconstruction has to take place. Whether by a revolution or

through a republic or through half a score of republics or some other way reserved to the secrets of Divine Providence, there is going to be a distribution of spoils, that is, of the spoils which the robbers have thrown into the heap of their United Italy. But there will have to be a distribution of debts, which are a much more portentous pile than all the spoils together. Had the Holy Father indulged in a word, a look, a glance, which could have been interpreted as the remotest acceptance of the *statu quo*, he would now stand committed to the liabilities incident to the changes in the *statu quo*, and his own share brought back to him would come, not as intact and privileged, but as merely a part of a mortgaged fund, smothered in debts for all time to come. Now he can treat independently, as a proprietor atrociously injured and outraged during more than a quarter of a century past. And the advantage he possesses is becoming more and more evident as time goes on. The marauders have invented the term "intangible Rome" to give expression to their feelings. They stand in the doorway, they run to the windows, they climb to the housetop to tell all the passers-by that Rome is "intangible." Whereat the passers-by wonderingly reflect: These men are in a house not their own, and they are going to lose it for sure! So their own press reflected on the "intangibility" celebrated on the 20th of September last.

The last circumstance is the inertness of the Italian people, in neglecting such means of agitation as are quite within their competency, such as the Pope exhorts them to adopt, and as the Archbishop of Milan has lately propounded in a masterly letter. The points of Cardinal Ferrari's theme in this letter, on the public action of Catholics for the religious and civil restoration of Italy, were such as the following: Action is necessary; the persecution proceeds from masonry and allied sects; where there is a will there is a way; antecedent success shows how much good can be done; heretofore the confraternities sufficed, now there must also be committees and congresses; the clergy are citizens who have to bear the taxes and other burdens of citizenship, and "it is very strange to pretend that they have not the correlative rights of citizenship," and must never have anything to do with committees for the social good.

No doubt, a Catholic people suffer from two disadvantages, when they have to contend with the spirit of the age, organized as a brand-new constitution can organize it. The first disadvantage is, that they cannot lie, they cannot steal, they cannot perjure themselves, they cannot disobey the lawful powers, and they are encumbered in their every movement by the orphan, the poor, the innocent, the helpless, who, first and last, are always their por-

tion. The second disadvantage is, that the children of the age know all this, that their enemy cannot lie, while they themselves can; that they cannot steal, cannot evade a just law or make a bad one; cannot turn their backs on the destitute, whom they themselves throw about as they march along, like the treasures which Mithridates left scattered in Pontus, to dissipate the forces of Lucullus. Nevertheless, if the forces of good in the world are always thus helpless and simple, it only proves that, as God's little children here are theirs, so they are God's portion and his heritage; and "fear not," He says, "for I have overcome the world."

VI.

And what conclusions follow from this imperfect sketch of the times? As far as we can see, the thoughtful reader can gather two, corresponding respectively to the recent ruins, the *débris*, of modern liberty, and to the magnificent ancient ruins of Christendom.

The unsightly ruins of modern liberties are conspicuous for the dust that rises all about them, and for the noise that fills the air above them. As far as we can distinguish aught intelligible in the clamor, we imagine it is the word "liberty." And, as to the thing designated by the word, we are sure it is that heap which lies there. We are cozened to believe that liberty is man's perfection; that liberty is the glory of the century; that we have mounted to the law of liberty; and a free people makes the law. And whatever is, is right, when a free people makes it. This law of liberty, which used to mean that liberty, straitened and drilled and trimmed by the thousand laws of virtue, could become so virtuous as never to move out of the line of law, now means that, without any virtue, and without any training or supporting that way, whatever it does is right. And if two men equally vicious do it together, it is more right still. But if five hundred men in a legislature, pooling their vices all in one, distill them into a concentrated essence, called a bill first, and then a law, why that is the voice of God, of the state, of the people! *Vox populi, Vox Dei.*

Then, just while we are regarding the spectacle, some one touches us on the shoulder, and whispers: "Don't you know, the Church too has entered on the law of liberty? The law of the commandments and of the counsels have undergone a change, among a free people, in a free state; and the Beatitudes live elsewhere now. When the whole spirit of the age moved towards personal liberty and independence, so that whatever you did was sure to be right, the Church did well in going along too. The evangelical counsels, for instance, were antiquated; and the vows—Pshaw! You

understand me! A free church in a free state!" "Why, my friend, what do you mean? Has the Church done away with the vows and the counsels, and is making a detour on the commandments? I had not really heard of it." "Not—not quite—quite yet," he replies; "but, you know, it comes to that. Free men don't need any incentives to virtue. They are a law to themselves. And what I mean is this; the Church has approved of the absence of vows! You see!" "Oh! yes," we answer; "there have always been laymen."

So much for the *débris*. Now for the ancient ruin.

As the substitution of personal whims for the rules of virtue, the substitution of individual instincts for the rhythmical laws of wisdom, is the easiest of all frauds for any man to perpetrate, and the most expeditious factory of ruins, religious, political, social, and individual; so the construction of natural and divine law into a living edifice of men, communities, nations, into living stones, not put together by hand, nor circumscribed by time, is a work worthy of One only, the Spirit who first moulded the world, and moulded it to receive such a structure of Christianity. This edifice was the Catholic Church in Christian society. All the customs of life, founded on the law of God and reaching unto the beatitude of peace, all the conditions of private and public existence, the order of social justice, the avenues of national commerce, business in all its phases, along with the countless relations of the beautiful domestic circle, all were conceived in the heart of religion, a social world embosomed in religion, crowning the terrestrial world which God had made worthy of it, and leading to the divine, whither God directed it. This was Christendom. It was the spirit of order and subordination, of obedience and respect; of personal quiet and of peace in the family; of mercy towards the suffering and of resignation under suffering. It was just what we see about us in the midst of a Catholic people, though sadly ravaged by an anti-Catholic government—a spirit of cheerfulness, cordiality, of instinctive and genuine courtesy, which makes a people polite in manner and delicate in sentiment, without the training of art or the factitious veneering of schools. Its merriness can find room for expansion anywhere; for the world is fair, and souls are good, and God is best and is everywhere. Its recreations are extremely simple, and without other turmoil than the vivacity of lively intercourse. So is it in Italy. In Ireland, its sweetness is tinged with mournfulness, but it is melodious and pleasant withal. In Belgium or in Germany, it is calculating and systematic, and under the friction of contention will thrust back approaching liberalism or obtain the balance of power in a frowning empire. With it, war is for the sake of peace; and, whether

it levies troops or levies tariff, the income it expects is security for all and stability.

In countries not Catholic, this Christian structure, though largely dismantled, retains still the tracery of a great and noble architecture. The habits, thoughts, literature of such people evince a humanity of feeling, a consciousness of right and duty, which never belonged to the natural man before he was purified and sanctified in the Catholic Church of Christendom. And, when the nations retain these qualities, three centuries after having left the Catholic Church of Christendom; when under the moss, in the torn lines, in the crevices and open rifts, of education without God, of marriage without fidelity, of policy without honesty, of might instead of right, and successful cupidity posing as patriotic virtue, when, in spite of all this, there can still stand forth the framework of Christian character, the beneficence of institutions, and the justice of legal codes; it is quite clear that God is bearing witness to Himself in the person of fallen man, and is justifying the Christendom which He had made amid the nations by the magnificence of the ruins which the nations make of themselves.

THOS. HUGHES, S.J.

ROME, March 14, 1896.

ROME OR NATURALISM.

PART II.

THE Catholic Church is the continuation and extension of the Incarnation. The Eternal Word became Man, not merely that He might make a transitory stay on the earth, that He might do transient works, undergo transient sufferings, and then withdraw into the eternal silence of His Divine beatitude, but chiefly that He might draw in a special manner all the elect and in due proportion all the creation to Himself in God as final cause. In Him the supernatural revelation and religion of God were personified and completed. He came on earth to stay until the end of the world, to carry on the work begun in His conception, birth, life, death and resurrection, until its consummation in the kingdom of the heavens.

Having ascended into heaven, He could not carry on the work of redemption in His visible form and presence. It was therefore necessary to do this through some visible medium, through an apostolate. Accordingly, He commissioned the Apostles and communicated to them the authority which he had received from the Father. They were not clothed with this power singly and separately, but as one college, one moral person. They were made one by being united under one head and prince, St. Peter. The apostleship was committed to him in all its plenitude, and in an eminent, primary sense. It was given to the others in a secondary and dependent mode, not by subtraction or diminution of his supremacy, but by participation in his apostolic authority. When the Lord ascended into heaven, the Christian faith, law and sacraments were actually and exclusively in the hands of the Apostles, as witnesses, keepers, teachers and ministers of the truth and grace which were brought from heaven by the Incarnate Word. The Mosaic dispensation was abrogated. The new law was given to the Apostles. They were the teaching and ruling hierarchy in the One, Holy, Apostolic Church, destined to become Catholic, and entirely constituted in themselves and their disciples.

The principle of organic unity was the principality of St. Peter. The apostolic office was committed to him in all its fulness. It was committed to him, not as a mere individual, and for a time, but as the first of a line of successors in a permanent, perpetual, world-wide supremacy over the spiritual kingdom of Christ. He

was as it were multiplied in his associate Apostles. After the death of St. Peter, his successors in the Apostolic See of Rome inherited his primacy, and the other bishops, who succeeded to the ordinary powers of the other Apostles after their death, became his assessors and colleagues in the government of the Church, subordinate princes under the one Sovereign Pontiff. Patriarchates and other minor provinces were not autonomous or voluntary confederations of suffragan bishops. They were parts and provinces of one kingdom. Metropolitans were superior to other bishops, not by any divine right, but as representatives of the Roman Pontiff, and by virtue of an appointment emanating from St. Peter and the other Apostles.

The apostolic writings, and those of the fathers of the second and following centuries, are full of the idea of Catholic unity. The notion of branch-churches, of national churches, of independent, local hierarchies, is wholly foreign to them. A difference of doctrine from the doctrine of the universal church is for them a heresy. Division of communion from the Catholic communion is schism. Separated societies, however numerous, are sects of perdition. Nothing can be stronger than their language on the deadly nature of heresy and schism, and their assertion of the axiom that out of the Church there is no salvation.

This stringent doctrine of the necessity of Catholic faith and communion to salvation, and the deadly guilt of heresy and schism, was founded on the dogma of the supreme, infallible authority of the Church.

The Eternal Word became man, in order to make the final and perfect revelation of himself as the one object of faith to men, and of the supreme love which sanctifies and finally glorifies the true believers. Faith is the radical principle of justification; faith in the Person of Christ, the Son of God; which includes faith in the Blessed Trinity, in all the mysteries of the raised humanity of Christ, in all the truths revealed by Him; and it is the operative principle of obedience to His law. Objective religion is, therefore, primarily, a revealed doctrine and law of life, a way of salvation by grace. When Jesus Christ made the Church the medium of communicating the grace of the Incarnation to men, He necessarily communicated first of all His own divine authority to teach the faith.

Christianity is essentially a supernatural, divine revelation. As such, it does not demand and effect the assent of the mind by the intrinsic evidence or demonstration of the truth proposed, but by authority. The authority must necessarily be infallible, or otherwise it is not authority capable of commanding a firm, undoubting assent. The motive of credibility in a divine revelation is the in-

fallible divine veracity. If the revelation be made through a medium, the transmission must be secured from error, in order that the motive of credibility may come into contact with the mind and move it to assent. Our Blessed Lord, being divine, was the Eternal Word of God in His Person; He not only possessed the truth in its infinite plenitude, He *was* the truth. His human mind, and His human voice, were the medium of revealing this truth to His disciples. No Christian can doubt that it was an infallible medium. He was God revealed and speaking to men through all the ages until the consummation of the world; and since in his bodily form and presence He is no longer visible and audible on the earth, He must continue His presence and speech in a mode which is equivalent, through an infallible medium.

When the Lord had ascended into Heaven, there was no authority left on the earth to proclaim the Gospel, the New Law, the Faith and Religion of Christ, in its final and perfect form as He had revealed it, except that which He had committed to the Apostles. Their oral teaching was the only Rule of Faith. All Christians confess that they were infallible. Those who have abjured the authority of the Roman Church ascribe to the Apostles all the infallibility it has ever claimed for the Catholic Episcopate under the supreme headship of the Roman Pontiff, as distinct from the Apostolic College under the principedom of St. Peter. They ascribe to the Apostolate, in common with Catholics, even more than this. That is, authority to make the original promulgation of the Christian Faith and Law; and also inspiration, when they recorded their teaching in written documents, historical, doctrinal and prophetic. Therefore, the only controversy relates to the mode in which the infallible authority of the Apostles was made continuous and perpetual after their death. All admit that the divine revelation made perfect in Jesus Christ is proposed to the faith of all men in all ages by the infallible authority of the Apostles. The Catholic Church teaches that the Apostles confided this revelation to their successors, who are in their corporate capacity under their head, an indefectible and infallible organ of Jesus Christ, through the Holy Spirit, given to the Apostolic Church on the day of Pentecost.

Those who call themselves *par excellence*, the "Evangelical Christians," hold that the Apostolic office was confined to the original Apostles. They had no successors, but remained as the sole and immediate authority in the Christian Church, during all ages, by their writings, which they bequeathed as the rule to all true believers, until the end of the world. The Church is an invisible society, composed of these true believers, who re-

ceive their faith directly and individually from this Apostolic teaching and a personal, private illumination of the Holy Spirit. This Church is one by a spiritual communion of all its members in faith and grace. It is holy, because composed of members who are all in the state of sanctifying grace. It is catholic, because it embraces all the elect in all ages and all countries. It is apostolic, because it originated from the preaching of the Apostles and has preserved the doctrine which they taught. Those who are ostensibly true believers, by uniting in the profession of the faith, and in the exercise of the worship of the Christian religion, form visible churches; and the whole aggregate of professing Christians belonging to these particular churches may be called the Visible Universal Church. The theory is incoherent and inconsistent. Those who hold it sometimes use language pre-supposing that the Church is visible; at other times, that it is invisible: but however ambiguous their language, they are compelled to assert the unity of the true Church, whatever it is; to assert that there is one society of true believers, subsisting from the day of the Apostles until the end of the world, and that this society is holy, is catholic and apostolic.

They are, in consequence, obliged to hold that it is indefectible and infallible.

They must, of course, assert that there is an infallible rule of faith. True believers receive and profess the faith proposed by this rule with unerring certainty, being illuminated by the Holy Spirit. Their concurrent confession of this same faith must therefore be infallible. And in their assemblies, where they promulgate formularies and confessions, although they disclaim official infallibility, they assume a tone of authority which implies that the Holy Spirit speaks through their mouth. They declare categorically and dogmatically what are the doctrines of divine revelation, and they demand full assent to them, as a term of Christian fellowship and a condition of salvation. When they have had civil and coercive power, they have fined, exiled, imprisoned, tortured and executed dissenters, not only Catholics, but Protestants, in Germany, Scotland, England and New England.

There is, therefore, according to this theory, an environment of sensible phenomena around the invisible Church of the elect, which mimetically represents its ideal qualities. Its inward spiritual unity and catholicity must necessarily be manifested by a unanimous and universal profession of one creed, always, everywhere, and by all. This outward sign must denote, though it does not make visible, the presence of the mystical body of Christ, as the eucharistic accidents denote, though they do not make visible the presence of His real body. The same outward and visible sign must be, there-

fore, a note of the true Church, unmistakable and unique, belonging to it alone, and to no false pretender. So then, if the Apostles gave the divine revelation immediately to all the faithful in the New Testament which they bequeathed to them as their only rule of faith, the Christians of the first and second centuries must have known this, and this fundamental principle of faith must have left its ineffaceable mark upon that first age of Christianity.

There is, however, not the faintest trace of the kind to be found in history. The best Protestant historians and scholars, Harnack, Lightfoot, Fisher, admit, that at a very early period, somewhere between A.D. 100 and A.D. 300, an organized hierarchy, in which bishops held the first place, was in universal and undisputed possession of the place of the Apostles, as their successors by a right which they claimed to be of Apostolic and divine origin. Those who ascribe this hierarchical order to a purely human origin are driven to conjecture that it grew up gradually during the second and third centuries; but they cannot find a scintilla of evidence for such an extraordinary transformation of Christianity. The ideal church of Lutherans and Calvinists cannot and does not have a trace of the notes of unity, catholicity and apostolicity; and it is a contradiction in terms to suppose that such attributes, which by their nature must have existed in indefectible continuity from the beginning, can be evolved at this late day from the heterogeneous atoms of Protestantism.

It is evident that one must look for an Apostolic Succession in an unbroken line of bishops as the only chain which can bind the Church of the present in an organic unity with the Church of the past, and reunite all links which are now broken off and separate in the Church of the future.

The High Church divines of the Protestant Episcopal denomination have proven with abundant learning and logic that the theory of Christianity, which may be called the sacramental and sacerdotal, is the only one which has any foundation either in Scripture or tradition. As for the Calvinistic theory and the vague, variable evangelicalism which is its shadow, they are nowhere and deserve no attention. The only serious alternative in a wide view of the present state and future destinies of Christianity is between Catholicism and Rationalism, *i.e.*, Pure Naturalism.

The idea of Catholicism is in opposition to the idea of individualism and of an invisible Church composed of a multitude united only by invisible bonds. It is the idea of a visible Church, having an organic constitution and regimen, a Church which is universal *as a unit*, in opposition to the idea of a universal including a plurality of equal and similar units. The organic constitu-

tion and regimen of the Catholic Church is episcopal. It is a hierarchical order composed of bishops who are not isolated heads of particular, single churches, or colleagues in the government of particular groups of churches; but members of a *universal* episcopate; a consolidated hierarchy, in which each bishop has a judicial and legislative authority for the whole world, as well as for his particular diocese.

The root of the hierarchy is in the Apostolic Succession. And it is primarily their teaching office which the Apostles have transmitted to their successors.

Certain Anglicans, professing themselves Catholics, have appropriated one part of the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, viz., that which teaches the transmission of the sacerdotal character by ordination, to the neglect of that which is still more important, the transmission of the Catholic faith. Our Blessed Lord commissioned His Apostles primarily and chiefly to continue his own chief and primary work as Mediator between God and men. It was for this that He became incarnate, that is, to make the revelation of God to His rational creatures. His work of redemption was accomplished in order to remove an obstacle which impeded the fulfillment of God's gracious purpose of bringing the human race to a beatified union with Himself. The obstacle, that is sin, being removed by the atoning sacrifice of the cross, the chief purpose of the incarnation is carried out by bringing men through faith into union with God in Christ. The Church was the medium of effecting this union, and was, therefore, animated by a spirit and principle producing first of all unity in faith. The offering of sacrifice, and the administration of sacraments, presuppose the Church already constituted in unity of faith and order. The transmission of sacerdotal power in a hierarchy through Apostolic Succession is, therefore, subordinate to an authority to make known the supernatural revelation of God through Christ, on which the Church is founded. This authority was communicated by Jesus Christ to the apostolate, and together with it all the sacerdotal powers necessary to the founding and perpetual stability of the Catholic Church. It is the very idea of Apostolic Succession that this commission was not transient, but permanent in a Catholic episcopate inheriting authority and power from the apostolate.

During the Apostolic age, the one Catholic Church was plainly manifest as a society in strict and perfect unity of faith and communion with the Apostles, subject to their teaching and government. During the second and third centuries it is universally admitted that the Catholic Church was a society of Christians united in faith and communion under an episcopate whose centre and chief bishop was in Rome. The same society persisted in the

fourth century, celebrated two general councils at Nicæa and Constantinople, still persisted during the fifth and sixth centuries, celebrating four other general councils; and has persisted until the present moment, having celebrated during these last thirteen centuries fourteen other general councils. In the east there are several other collections of bishops, entirely separated from the communion of the Roman Church. Some of these sects acknowledge two general councils, others three, others seven. In the west there is the Episcopal Church of England, having several offshoots, for whose bishops Apostolic Succession is claimed. These may be said to acknowledge, in a general and informal way, six general councils.

How many of these collections of bishops can be included in the Catholic episcopate, and what is the extension of the Catholic communion? The Roman Church makes a positive and exclusive claim for her own bishops and her own communion. No one of the sects makes a similar claim officially, whatever their own individual champions may say on the subject. For a Greek or an Anglican, professing to stand on the broad foundation of the Catholicism of the early centuries, to deny that the Roman Church is a part of the Catholic Church would be futile. It is a favorite Anglican theory that the Catholic Church subsists in three great branches, Roman, Greek and Anglican. The division of the hierarchy into separate bodies is acknowledged and lamented as a great disaster and an abnormal state. Reunion is desired and hoped for as a restorative of the harmony in mutual intercommunion between the Roman Church with all the churches of the western patriarchate, and the great patriarchates of the east, which continued with some interruption for a thousand years. Since the eleventh century, two great disruptions have occurred, tearing away from the communion of the Roman Church Constantinople and Canterbury. Plainly, all those who regard Catholic unity as still subsisting between these divisions must place the principle and the bond of unity in the episcopate, prescinding from the Roman supremacy. The Apostolic Succession of bishops from an episcopal ancestry, going back to the founders of the Church, is the golden chain binding all in a mystic, sacramental fellowship and brotherhood in Christ. Wherever there is a duly consecrated bishop, there is a true priesthood, a true sacrifice, sacramental grace, the true Church in all essentials, in spite of accidental defects and imperfections.

So far as relates to that aggregate of societies which may be classed together under the generic term of the Protestant Episcopal Church, there are two pleas in bar of a hearing of the claim of its advocates that it is a branch of the Catholic Church

by reason of the Apostolic Succession of its episcopate. The first is, that the sort of general Catholicism professed by these advocates is only a theory of individuals and sections of the great body, but not the formal, official doctrine of any episcopal synods, general or particular.

The second plea in bar is that the consecration of the bishops in question is not acknowledged either by Rome or Constantinople.

It is much more satisfactory to test the theory of a purely episcopal constitution of the Catholic hierarchy by an examination of some church having bishops whose consecration is universally acknowledged, and having an official doctrine including all the ideal Catholicism of the highest Anglicans. Such a church is *really* what the Church of England is *ideally* on the poetical and eloquent pages of some of her apologists.

It is among the remnants of the ancient eastern patriarchates that we must look for such a church. The church of the great Russian Empire is by far the most important among the several ecclesiastical corporations existing in the east, separated from the communion of the Roman Church. The succession of its bishops is undoubted, its liturgy is Catholic, and it professes to retain unchanged the faith of the universal church during the first eight centuries. If the claim of the Russian bishops to make a part of the Catholic episcopate can be maintained, those of other groups of bishops may have some *prima facie* title to examination. Whereas, if this church can be proved to be a mere schism they are put out of court, as a matter of course.

The cause of the Russian Church depends on that of the Church of Constantinople, by which it was drawn into revolt against Roman supremacy.

If the Byzantine patriarchs were justified in their revolt, the so-called Greek or Orthodox Church has remained as it was until the middle of the eleventh century, a constituent part of the Catholic Church. In that case, the blame of the division between the east and the west would rest on the Roman Church, for having usurped supremacy over the eastern patriarchates. The Greek Church would then be, on the branch theory, the best and purest branch of the Catholic Church. The true way of reunion among all divisions of Christians would be for all to conform themselves in doctrine and discipline to the Greek Church. An ecumenical council, in which all bishops would have a right to sit, might determine all questions relating to dogma and ecclesiastical order, and the ideal Catholic Church, as some high Anglicans have conceived it, would become a reality.

The Byzantine patriarchate has done itself no honor since it fell

under Moslem domination. The patriarch preserves a nominal primacy over the other patriarchs and metropolitans who are in communion with him, but he has no real jurisdiction outside of the dominions of the sultan.

The Russian Church is by far the most respectable representative of the old eastern Christianity in the whole group of sects classed under the name of the Orthodox Church. The czar, who is the actual governing head of this church, by his descent from the Greek princess Zoe, is the heir of Constantine, the last emperor. He is the protector of the Christian sects in the east. If, as seems probable, he becomes the master of Constantinople, the Byzantine patriarchate will be subject to him, and he will be the *summus episcopus* over all bishops who acknowledge its primacy. If we suppose the Nestorian and Jacobite bishops to become absorbed into the Russian Church, and a union of the Church of England with the same to be accomplished, the czar would certainly confront the Pope as a most formidable rival, and his church, nearly or quite equal the Roman Church in extent and grandeur. This would not, however, fulfill the dream of the unification of Christendom according to the Anglican ideal. Two great and equal divisions of Christendom cannot make one Catholic Church, unless they are brought together by a bond of union. This can be effected only by one submitting to the other. Either the Russian Church with all its confederates must bow to the supremacy of the Pope, and to the authority of all the councils from the eighth to the twentieth, or the Roman Church must abandon its claim to supremacy, and all these councils be classed among particular synods.

We may inquire, now, what claim the Russian Church can make to stand upon the foundation of ancient and genuine Catholicism, and to invite all Christians to come and stand upon the same.

The foundation of Catholicism, exclusive of the papacy, can only be the Catholic episcopate. Neither Greeks nor Anglicans can contend that this episcopate is constituted purely and simply by succession in the line of ordination from the Apostles, without contradicting themselves. Arians had this Apostolic Succession, the remnants of the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies still retain it; yet all these are universally regarded as aliens to the Church. It is necessary, therefore, not only to have succession of orders from the Apostles in order that a bishop may belong to the Catholic episcopate, and his church to Catholic communion; they must also have the Apostolic faith.

Those who rebelled against legitimate discipline and government in the Church, like the Donatists, were regarded, from the beginning, as equally cut off from Catholic unity. It is necessary,

therefore, to be united with the Catholic episcopate by a bond of external regimen and order, as well as by a profession of the common faith.

The eastern patriarchates, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople, together with the exarchates and other great metropolitan churches, were in full communion with the Roman Church during several centuries. All bishops who abjured her communion and were excommunicated by the Roman Pontiff during this long period were likewise condemned as schismatics and heretics by the patriarchs of Constantinople, and the remnants of these ancient sects are to this day excluded from the communion of the so-called "Orthodox Eastern Church." The Byzantine claim demands, therefore, the recognition of the universal church in the east and west, before the division, as the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, and of its doctrine and order as the genuine and pure Catholicism. The patriarch Photius, who usurped the throne of St. Ignatius, was deposed and expelled in accordance with the sentence of Rome, and after his restitution, when the see was canonically vacant, with the consent of Rome, was again and finally expelled and exiled by the emperor and his own suffragans. The patriarch Ignatius is canonized by the Greek as well as by the Roman Church, and, although Photius was the principal author of the Byzantine schism, and the alienation of the episcopate of the eastern empire from Rome and the west continued after his downfall, it was not finally consummated until A.D. 1054, when Michael Cerularius sat on the patriarchal throne.

The real cause of the revolt of Photius and Michael was the Byzantine ambition to make the new Rome the rival of the old Rome. Doctrinal pretexts were an after-thought. The only dogmatic controversy of any real importance related to the Procession of the Holy Spirit and the addition of "Filioque" to the Creed.

This dogmatic question was thoroughly ventilated and discussed by Latin and Greek theologians at the Council of Florence, where Constantinople was fully represented and reconciled to Rome. There is doubtless a great deal of heresy among those prelates of the eastern churches who are the most violently anti-Roman. Still, there is no formal heresy promulgated by any official decree of the "Orthodox" Church. The Nestorians and Monophysites, even, although they retain formulas which are verbally heretical, may perhaps be regarded as holding implicitly the same Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation which was defined at Ephesus and Chalcedon.

Cardinal Vanutelli, who resided for many years in the east, says: "The religion which the dissenting Christians profess does

not substantially oppose or deny the Catholic faith. The difference in belief is, on the whole, only a difference in words."¹

It is the Byzantine claim that the "Orthodox" Church stands on the foundation of the first seven councils and has never changed its doctrines and discipline. Its cause of separation from Rome must, therefore, be that Rome has changed, by departing from the genuine, pure Catholicism of antiquity, usurping supremacy over the Catholic episcopate, and unjustly excommunicating a great number of eastern bishops and churches.

In what principle consists the right of the first seven councils to demand universal and exclusive homage as a supreme and final authority, dogmatic and legislative? Their supreme and final dogmatic authority can be derived from no other principle than the infallibility of the Catholic Church residing in the episcopate, whose judgment was pronounced in those councils. Their *exclusive* authority can be maintained only on the ground that there can be or actually have been only seven ecumenical councils. The notion that there can be only seven councils is too trivial and futile to be worthy of notice. The infallibility of the teaching Church is continuous and perpetual. If it could exercise its infallible office through a council in the fourth century, it could repeat the act at any subsequent period as often as it became necessary or opportune to do so. There is as much reason for recognizing the Eighth Council, chiefly composed of oriental prelates, as there is for the Seventh; and the same is true of the Council of Florence.

The Church of Russia, as the principal representative of eastern orthodoxy, a completely independent ecclesiastical corporation, allied with several other distinct bodies in the east, but completely separate from the Roman Pontiff and all bishops in his communion, can make no pretension to be, exclusively, the Catholic Church. It can only pretend to be a National Church, making a part of the universal church, isolated and separate from the communion of all western Christendom, not through its own fault, but through the fault of the Roman Church.

If this be a just pretension, the Muscovite patriarchate, which is in commission and administered by the Czar through his subordinate officers, stands on the same foundation of pure Catholicism with the patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch in the third, fourth and fifth centuries, during the period of the first six councils. Of course, this theory demands that the Roman Pontiff should be regarded as a mere patriarch, holding a primacy of honor only, and deriving all his prerogatives over and above his simple epis-

¹ Quoted by Rev. Joseph Yasbeck, *Eucharistic Congress*, p. 58.

copate, like the other patriarchs and metropolitans, from ecclesiastical, but not from divine, right.

This idea of Catholicism contains no principle of Catholic unity except the Apostolic Succession of bishops and the profession of a common faith. Organization in provinces and patriarchates is a confederation by voluntary agreement among episcopal churches, producing union but not unity. In fact, the idea of unity, in the sense of the visible, organic unity of one universal church, one as a kingdom, as a body, indivisible, containing its parts as a whole, distinct but inseparable from each other, and not a mere aggregation; such an idea is entirely wanting. And this lack is fatal to the pretensions of an unchanged tradition of genuine Catholicism from primitive antiquity. Primitive antiquity knew nothing of any such Catholicism, of any kind of church of abstract unity, which, as Catholic, is invisible, as visible in concrete reality is a singular, particular entity numerically multiplied into a multitude of churches. Primitive antiquity knew only of one church visible in its Catholicity and organic unity. It knew nothing of autonomous national or provincial churches, or of a divided church, subsisting in branches having no intercommunion with each other.

The pretension of the Russian Church to stand on the foundation of the ancient Catholicism and an unchanged orthodoxy is, therefore, false, and its claim to be a Catholic church untenable.

The first seven councils stood on the same foundation upon which rest the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, viz., the infallibility of the universal episcopate with and under its supreme head, the Roman Pontiff. The Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, in particular, bear unequivocal testimony to the papal supremacy. The eastern patriarchates and the bishops who ruled them were always subject to this supremacy, which was repeatedly acknowledged in the most formal manner even by the Byzantine emperors and patriarchs, until the time of Photius and afterwards. Those who revolted, like Nestorius of Constantinople, and Dioscorus of Alexandria, were deposed and excommunicated. The Seventh Council, which condemned and suppressed the iconoclastic heresy, did nothing but apply and carry out the action of the Holy See in contending against the imperial and ecclesiastical power which had sustained with violence and obstinacy that heresy during a long period.

The revolt against Rome in the ninth and eleventh centuries was the outcome of the persistent ambitious efforts of the Byzantine emperors and bishops from the fourth century on, to make New Rome the rival of Old Rome. The See of Constantinople, originally suffragan, was first elevated to the metropolitan rank, then to the patriarchal, then to a priority of honor over the other

patriarchal sees of the eastern empire, finally to a governing primacy. Photius, the worst among the wicked prelates who have disgraced Christianity, abjured the supremacy and even the communion of the Roman Church. No doubt he aspired to win for Constantinople the universal primacy, as certain emperors aspired to extend their sway over the territories of the old Roman Empire of the West. However, even their feeble hold upon the Italian exarchate relaxed, and by degrees their eastern empire decayed and dwindled, until at length it fell altogether before the Moslem invaders. Schism and heresy have blighted the once fair and flourishing Christianity of those regions. Even the perverted energy which broke forth into heresy and rebellion died out and was succeeded by a dull apathy, a comatose state between life and death, in which the separated portions of the Catholic Church have preserved all the orthodoxy which they brought away with them at their departure from the centre of unity.

Russia was converted by Greek missionaries before the formal division of the east from the west had been consummated. By reason of its close connection with Constantinople, the Russian Church was drawn by its influence into schism. It has since become completely independent and has hardened into a purely national church, subject to an absolute imperial domination.

I have no wish to echo and repeat all the evil spoken of the great Russian empire, especially by English writers. Neither do I desire to draw a dark picture of the Russian hierarchy, clergy, and the people in their religious aspect. It is impossible to deny, however, that intellectual life, science and spiritual vitality have been at a low ebb in this very numerous body, although I hope and am willing to believe that there is a great deal of genuine Christian piety and virtue among its members.

When we come to inquire how far the Russian Church possesses those principles which can insure stability and perpetuity to that amount of Catholicism which they have inherited, we cannot find that there is any secure foundation on which their Byzantine orthodoxy can rest.

The seven councils, isolated and alone, rest on a foundation of sand. The perpetual, inviolable authority and infallibility of the Catholic Church is denied, when it is asserted that it lost its power of speech in the eighth century. Every argument against the ecumenical character and infallible authority of the Fourth Council of Constantinople or the Council of Florence is equally valid against those other councils which are rejected by Anglicans, Jacobites and Nestorians. The persistence of eastern orthodoxy is due to oriental immobility in traditional habits, and to intellectual stagnation. There is very little theology, ecclesiastical history or sci-

ence to be found in that quarter. When the time of awakening comes the antiquated orthodoxy will have no more power over thinking and studious minds than the old Calvinism has in Switzerland or the old Lutheranism in Germany.

When one makes the further inquiry whether the Russian Church can become a nucleus for a great crystal of Catholic unity in Christendom, the case is still worse. Does any reasonable man fancy that the Pope is going to abjure all the councils of the last thousand years, and make an *amende honorable* to the successor of Photius? If he did, where would be Catholicism, where infallible authority, where a band strong enough to unite a sphere which had once burst asunder, broken into fragments and kept on rolling through space like a group of asteroids, the *débris* of a wrecked planet?

There is no disposition among Russians or other Greeks to make their church universal. All the aspirations for Catholic unity among them are longings for reunion with the Roman Church. A group of illustrious converts, such as Leo Allatius and Bessarion in the past, Tondini, Schouvaloff, the Gallitzins, Natalie Narischkin in the present century, like those who went from Oxford to Rome, have given testimony to the fact that their experience was like that of a Siberian exile returning to his country and his home.

These intelligent and devout Russians had everything which makes the ideal of Catholicism for the ritualists of England and the United States. Nevertheless, they were convinced that the Russian and the entire so-called Greek Church was not *the* Catholic Church, or even *a* Catholic Church. If they would be genuine Catholics and members of the one Catholic Church, they must leave the communion in which they were brought up and be received into the flock of the successor of St. Peter.

Anglicans have much less reason to confide in their so-called branch of the Church Universal than these Russians had to confide in their own. Leaving aside the question of the validity of their orders, Apostolic Succession in the episcopate, the priestly character, the sacrifice and sacraments, ceremonies, vestments, a doctrine approaching very closely to that of the Catholic Church, do not suffice to give these material constituents of Catholicism the vital form which makes its specific difference from Protestantism. Anglicans make a fatal blunder when they fancy that they are Catholics because they hold certain doctrines and practice certain rites appertaining to the Catholic system, which the majority of Protestants have rejected. They embrace these things on Protestant principles. Their Catholicism is a counterfeit. Any one who understands what was the Catholicism of St. Athanasius, of St. Cyprian, of St. Augustine, of all the early fathers and doctors, must

perceive its essential difference from that high churchism which emanated from Oxford, and has developed into ritualism. It was the doctrine of antiquity that the unity of the Church is indefectible and indivisible, her supreme and infallible jurisdiction and authority self-evident in her external, visible notes, and even in her exclusive possession of the name "Catholic." There was only one preamble to faith, viz., a reason to believe her testimony to Jesus Christ and to His doctrine and law. After that first preliminary was settled, there was but one proximate rule of faith, the teaching of the Church, every deviation from which was a heresy.

The note which distinguishes heresy from infidelity is some kind of belief in Christ and Christianity. It is distinguished from Catholic faith by the principle of selection, through the exercise of private judgment, of dogmas, as credible, in disregard of the authority of the Church. Heresiarchs may found sects, in which the dictates of their individual judgment on the contents of Scripture or tradition are consolidated into a collective judgment.

Those who are born and brought up in these sects may not exercise their individual judgment in matters of belief, but may receive passively what they are taught by their parents and instructors. But all the authority of this teaching, in so far as it is erroneous, goes back to the private opinions and judgments of the founders of the sect. Those who think and inquire for themselves cannot find any reasonable motive of obedience to this authority. They must search in all accessible sources of knowledge, in Scripture, tradition and rational theology, for the truth and the way of salvation. No matter how intelligent, sincere, and diligent they may be, they are at a great disadvantage as compared with Catholics who, in all things essential, have only to receive the instructions of an infallible teacher. If they earnestly desire to walk in the way of salvation, Catholics can have no hesitation as to what they must believe, and what they must do.

Now, those Anglicans who wished to be Catholics, and yet to remain in the Church of England, were in a worse predicament than ordinary Protestants who have no Catholic glimmerings. They were tossed, often for years, on a sea of doubt and perplexity, afraid to stay and afraid to go. Let any one peruse the history of converts, like the two cardinals, Manning and Newman, compare their mental state before and after conversion, and then say honestly whether they could have been Catholics both before and after this conversion. Let any one read Mr. Keble's and Dr. Pusey's reasons for remaining in the Church of England, and then judge if there is any likeness between such views and those of St. Irenæus and St. Augustine. Let one peruse the history of the Greek schism and of the Reformation, and then judge whether

parties between whom such warfare was waged were equally belonging to the same religion and the same church.

That idea of Catholicism which embraces Rome, Moscow, and Canterbury in the same category, fails altogether by the absence of the true conception of Catholic unity.

The language of Dr. Pusey in respect to Newman's conversion is a striking proof of this :

"As each, by God's grace, grows in holiness, *each church* will recognize more and more the presence of God's Holy Spirit in *the other* ; and what now hinders the union of the western church will fall off. It is perhaps the greatest event which has happened since the *communion of the churches* has been interrupted, that such a one, so formed in *our church*, and the work of God's spirit as *dwelling in her*, should be translated to theirs."¹

Here we have the Roman, the English, the Western, and by implication the Eastern and the Universal *Churches*, not one *de facto* or *de jure*, capable of union and communion which *de facto* have ceased to exist, but *de jure* ought to be restored, and are all that can be desired to constitute the genuine, normal, and perfect Catholicism which is the ideal Christianity.

In this loose and incoherent system, no better and less consistent than Congregationalism, the conception of any kind of universal church founded on apostolic institution and Apostolic Succession is absent. The pivot of the whole scheme is the doctrine of Apostolic Succession in the line of bishops, the transmission of the sacerdotal office in its fulness. With this sacerdotal doctrine is the sacramental doctrine, and whatever else pertains to what we may call high church orthodoxy. All these doctrinal and actual elements suffice to furnish the materials for constituting an organized, ecclesiastical society, a diocese, a province, a patriarchate, an ecumenical union of episcopal churches. But there must be some act of authority to give any of these a legal constitution.

If the Apostolic Succession is limited to the transmission of the ordinary episcopate of the Apostles equally to all bishops, it is only a particular diocese which can claim to be a church *jure divino et apostolico*.

Supposing the preliminary difficulty of assigning to each bishop the limits of his jurisdiction surmounted, and dioceses established in every country where there is a considerable multitude of Christians, each one of these churches will have a complete apostolic constitution—a bishop, priests, clergy, and faithful, the sacrifice, the baptismal creed, all the sacraments, except when a new bishop must receive his consecration from some other bishop. A more

¹ Liddon, *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii., p. 461.

extensive organization can only be effected by a voluntary confederation of bishops and churches, united under some ecclesiastical legislation, or, when the Christian religion has been adopted by the State, by the legislation of the sovereign power in the nation. An ecclesiastical society of this kind may be called a church, but it is a purely human institution, even though the right and power to establish such organized associations may be supposed to have been conferred on the hierarchy by apostolic and divine authority. These provinces, patriarchates, national and international confederations being established, and preserving mutual intercommunion all over the world, what is the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church of the creed? Let there be no heresies, schisms, divisions, but a perfect unanimity in teaching the same faith, in administering the same sacraments, in keeping the same essential order and discipline; this unanimity is the result of the agreement of all bishops and all the faithful. This universal collection and congregation of the faithful is one, by professing the same faith, by having a priesthood, a liturgy, and certain religious customs which have one ideal plan, and by mutual charity. It is holy in its common rule of morals, in the means of sanctification which it possesses, in the personal holiness of many of the clergy and laity, especially martyrs and saints. It is catholic by being multiplied in a vast number of bishoprics all through many of the principal regions of the world. It is apostolic, because of the origin of its faith, priesthood and constitutive laws from the Apostles.

This is the Catholicism of the High Church theory, the theory of all those who regard the Apostolic Succession of the universal episcopate as the sole and sufficient foundation of the Church, to the exclusion of the succession of the bishops of the Apostolic See to the universal supremacy of the Prince of the Apostles, St. Peter.

The Catholicism of this theory is unhistorical. It never existed and never could have existed. The theory is an after-thought, invented to justify rebellion against the supreme authority of the Church and to cloak schism with a plausible pretext.

Let us go back to the statement made at the beginning of this article. Jesus Christ came to be the Mediator between God and man. He began His mediation by His visible presence among men, His personal teaching and action, and He has continued it since His ascension by the extension and continuation of His Incarnation in the Church through the illuminating, vivifying, sanctifying presence of the Holy Spirit in His Mystical Body. While the Lord was present during His human life with the group of His disciples, the inchoate church was one under one supreme

head: holy, by union with the source of sanctity, infallible by faith in the Divine Master, potentially catholic, apostolic, as called and governed by the Supreme Apostle and High Priest, sent into the world and consecrated by the Father. After the ascension, and the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles, the Church was fully constituted in organic unity, under the supreme jurisdiction and authority of the Apostles, who received their mission from Jesus Christ, as He received His mission from the Father, a mission universal and perpetual, and, therefore, transmissible to successors. The apostolate was bound in unity by subordination under the Prince of the Apostles; the entire collection of the faithful was one, as the flock of St. Peter, to whom the Lord gave the charge, to feed, guide and govern all his sheep and all his lambs. The Apostles transmitted all their ordinary episcopal power and magistracy to the Catholic episcopate. St. Peter transmitted all his ordinary apostolic power and authority as chief pastor and head of the Church to his successors in the Apostolic See. This is an essential and a principal part of the Apostolic Succession. Chiefly through this supremacy the hierarchy, together with the whole collection of the faithful, dispersed through the world and gathered in particular episcopal churches, were made One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. So it has continued during all ages, and the Unity and Catholicity of the Church governed by the successor of St. Peter were never more splendidly manifest than they are at the present moment.

It is neither necessary nor opportune to repeat here the proofs of the Primacy of St. Peter and its transmission to his successors in the Roman See. They have been given in this REVIEW and elsewhere frequently and fully, and they are only strengthened by the attempted refutations of adversaries. In fact, the force of truth often extorts from them important admissions.

Grotius has said that "if there were no primacy in the Church, controversies would be interminable, as they now are in Protestantism."¹ But a primacy not including a supreme dogmatic magistracy would be useless for terminating disputes. It is a common view among rationalists that there is no logical alternative to Catholicism, except a denial of all supernatural religion. If we do not take pure, natural reason as our only criterion of truth, we must take, without any prejudice to the legitimate rights of reason, authority as a criterion. Authority in matters of dogmatic faith is insufficient if it be not infallible. When Christ gave the magistracy to the Teaching Church, *i.e.*, to the Catholic episcopate composed of the Apostles and their successors under the supremacy

¹ *Via ad Pacem*, ed Basil, t. iv., titul, 7, p. 658.

of His own vicar and vice-gerent, He endowed it with infallibility. This endowment was perpetual, and, therefore, the Church is indefectible. If it could be broken into fragments, it could never be restored to unity. A sword-blade broken into two parts cannot be restored by being stuck together with glue. A shattered planet cannot regain unity by a coalescing of its fragments. If the Catholic Church has become divided, there cannot be a new Catholicism created by an agreement among Roman, Greek and Anglican bishops, and if there could it would be only a human organization.

Catholic unity needs not to be restored; for it has never been lost. It exists perfect and unbroken. Multitudes of men have wandered away from the fold; but the flock is more numerous than ever. All the baptized belong to the flock of St. Peter until they lose the gift of faith, even though they have got lost in the devious paths of the surrounding desert. His voice still reaches the ears and hearts of millions who do not know whence it comes.

St. Peter, in the Council of Jerusalem, spoke to his associates in the sacred ministry of Christ, and said: "*Men, brethren, ye know how, from the days of old, God chose among us, that by MY MOUTH, the nations should hear the word of the Gospel and believe.*" (Acts xv.)

St. Leo the First, repeating the declaration of the Prince of the Apostles, as his successor, says as follows:

"When, as it is disclosed in the Lesson from the Gospel, the Lord had asked His disciples, Whom (while many held different opinions) they believed Him to be, and Blessed Peter had answered, saying: Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God; the Lord saith: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona, because flesh and blood have not revealed this to thee, but My Father, who is in heaven: and I say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and to thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon the earth, shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon the earth, shall be loosed also in heaven.

"This emplacement of the truth therefore remaineth, and Blessed Peter, persevering in the strength of a Rock which he received, has not abandoned the government of the Church committed to him.

"For, Peter daily declares in the universal church, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God, and every tongue which confesseth the Lord has imbibed the teaching of this voice. This faith subdueth the devil, and looseth the chains of his captives. This faith transplanteth those who have been uprooted from the earth in heaven and the gates of hell cannot prevail against it. For it is divinely endowed with such a great firmness that heretical pravity has never been able to corrupt it or pagan perfidy to overcome it. Wherefore, well beloved, let the festival of this day (the anniversary of Leo's inthronization) be celebrated by a reasonable observance in such wise, that in my humble person he may be revered and honored in whom both the care over all pastors and the guard over all the sheep committed to them perseveres, and whose dignity fails not in an unworthy heir.

"Wherefore, while we address our admonitions to your holy ears, believe that he in whose place we officiate is speaking, because we admonish you with his affection and speak to you nothing else than what he taught, beseeching you, that girding up

the loins of your mind you lead a chaste and sober life in the fear of God. Ye are my crown and my joy as saith the Apostle, if your faith, which from the beginning of the Gospel was proclaimed in the whole world, shall continue steadfast in love and holiness. For although every church throughout the entire terrestrial globe ought to flourish in all the virtues, it is especially incumbent on you among other peoples, to excel in the merits of piety, because your foundation is that very citadel of the Apostolic Rock, and while our Lord Jesus Christ has redeemed you together with all other peoples, the Blessed Apostle Peter has taught you above all others."¹

In like manner with the first Leo, the thirteenth Leo, with the voice and in the person of Peter, lovingly exhorts all his estranged children to re-enter the one fold, and to let him lead them into the green pastures and by the still waters of those meadows, where his flocks are feeding under the guard of his shepherd's crook. It will be a happy day when all the bishops of the east shall come, followed by their flocks, to pay due allegiance to the Vicar of Christ. May this day soon come. And may all the scattered sheep throughout the world, and all the children of Abraham, whether through Jacob, Ishmael or Esau, and all the offspring of Noah and Adam be gathered into the Church of God, and worship the Redeemer of the world, the expectation of nations.

We think we have fulfilled the promise to show that Rome is the only alternative to pure naturalism. Pure naturalism can explain nothing and promise nothing. It makes of the universe a chaos. There is no explanation of the origin and destiny of humanity, and no way of attaining this destiny except in supernatural religion. The supernatural is raised to its summit and personified in the incarnation of the Eternal Word. He has spoken the Word of God by His own mouth in the creation of the Church and the mission of His Vicar, through whose voice he has continued to speak. This voice calls all nominal Christians and all men into the one only way of temporal and eternal salvation, into the unity of the Catholic Church. The only hope of salvation for every individual man, and for mankind, is in obeying the voice of the Vicar of Christ.

AUGUSTINE F. HEWITT.

¹ Assumpt., Sermon, 2, in Anniv.

THE BAPTISM OF FRANCE.

IT has been said that when God erases, He is about to write again. In the fifth century of our era God made use of the barbarians to destroy the Roman Empire in the west, and on the resulting *tabula rasa* He traced the future annals of a new civilization, in which the instruments of His justice and of his loving wisdom, transformed by His Church, were to play a prominent part. These barbarians—these “conscripts of God,” as Chateaubriand happily styled them—were the blind accomplishers of an eternal design. The new religion, recently issued from the Catacombs, had need of new peoples. “The innocence of the Gospel needed the innocence of savages; a simple faith needed hearts which were as simple as that faith.” The need was satisfied; for twenty years after Odoacer the Herulan had reduced the Eternal City and had put an end to the Western Empire, there occurred in Gaul an event which initiated that marvellous series of events which mediæval writers gratefully described as the *Gesta Dei per Francos*—the wondrous deeds which God performed through the arms of the French, and which are discerned in even more modern times by such historians as grasp the truth that there can be no true philosophy of history for him who ignores the directing power of the Most High in the affairs of nations. This year will witness the celebration of the fourteenth centennial of the Baptism of France; for as such Christian historians have rightly designated the sacred function performed by St. Remy on the Christmas Day of A. D. 496, in the Baptistery of Rheims. It may be that God will tolerate an interference on the part of infidel—that is, Masonic—France to prevent an external and befitting manifestation of that gratitude to God which fills the great heart of the real and Catholic France as it reflects on the foundation of all the glories of *la grande nation*; but the emotions of that heart will be beyond the control of the agents of God’s arch-enemy, and they will be shared by all the children of that Church whom Catholic France has so well served.

I.

There are two theories concerning the origin of the Franks. One holds that they were a Germanic people, and that Tacitus mentions them when he speaks of the Isteuoni—a league of the Cherusci, Sicambri, Cauci, Catti and Brutteri. According to this idea, the Cherusci became weak after the days of Arminius, and

were for some time protected by the Catti; then recovering some of their olden strength, and acquiring a preponderance in the league, they assumed the names of Salic or River (*Ripuarii*) Franks, according as they dwelled near to the Saal or to the Rhine. However, some historians contend that the Franks were distinct from the Germans, and that originally they inhabited what are now Denmark and the duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg. During the reign of Gallienus the Franks crossed the Rhine and advanced even into Spain, and at Tarragona they embarked for Mauritania; then loading themselves with booty, they returned to their own land. In the middle of the fourth century they became nominal subjects of Rome, and defended the Rhenish frontier against the other barbarians. Many poets, and some historians, speak of a Frankish king, Pharamond, whose reign they ascribe to the neighborhood of the year A.D. 420; and authentic history tells of King Clodion, under whom the Salic Franks, about 440, advanced as far as the Somme. Meroveus, the founder of the Merovingian dynasty, was one of the victors at the battle of Chalons, in 451. Childeric, son of Meroveus, ascended the throne in 458; but his immoralities disgusted the nation, and he was forced to flee to Thuringia, whereupon the Franks chose as chief, probably not as king, the Roman Count of Soissons, general of the Roman forces in that part of Gaul. This nobleman, Egidius, was faithful to the Emperor Majorian, and therefore hostile to Ricimer, the Warwick of that day; consequently, he found himself deposed in favor of Gundioc, king of the Burgundians, and he saw the Visigoth, Theodoric II., with the connivance of Ricimer, occupy the Narbonnaise, his line of communication with Italy. Then Egidius invited the banished Childeric, whom the Franks now yearned for, to return to his throne. Childeric bade farewell to his host, the Thuringian monarch, but took with him the queen, Basina, who had become infatuated with the gallant Frank, and rushed to his embraces, declaring that if she knew of any man more robust than he, she would accord the preference to that man. Childeric expelled from Gaul the Alani, whom Theodoric II. had pushed as far as the Loire, and he consolidated his power over the Salic Franks. He died in 481, and the Franks lifted on their bucklers, in token of their submission to his rule, the young Clodoveus (Chlodowig or Clovis), the issue of the late king's adulterous union with Basina.

At this time five different peoples occupied Gaul. In the centre were the Romans; but we must remember that this term was then applied to such of the olden Gauls as had not imitated the Armoricans (Bretons) in proclaiming their independence, or had not recognized the sway of some barbarian monarch. Although the

western Empire had been dead for five years, the Roman authority was still represented by Syagrius, a son of the famous Egidius, who ruled over the cities of Beauvais, Soissons, Amiens, Troyes, Rheims and their dependent territories. The Armoricans were in the west, the Alemanni in the northeast, the Burgundians in the east and the Visigoths in the south. The Romans, Gallo-Romans and Armoricans were Catholics; the Burgundians and Visigoths were Arians, while the Franks and Alemanni were pagans. The power exercised by Count Syagrius was regarded as the sole legitimate authority in Gaul, having a duration of five centuries for its sanction, whereas the barbarian and Armorican governments relied only on the sword. Hence it was understood that if the Gauls were ever to resolve on a conquest of their national independence, they certainly would fight in the name of the Roman Empire. Therefore the destruction of that remnant of Roman domination, to which the Gauls still avowed an honorable fidelity, would naturally be the aim of any enterprising individual who would essay the formation of one state out of all the discordant elements which confronted his ambition. Clovis perceived this truth, and when the eastern emperor, bent on a restoration of the western empire, appointed the Frankish king general of the Roman armies in Gaul, the young monarch felt that the time for action had arrived. In virtue of his new title, he demanded obedience from Syagrius, and when the proud Roman refused to abdicate his rank, 5000 Franks advanced on Soissons. The count led his few soldiers to the open field, and having been defeated, he fled to Toulouse, the capital of Alaric II., king of the Visigoths. Soissons opened its gates to the conqueror, and in less than a year he was master of all the territories which the Romans had possessed between the Loire and the Rhine. Then, fearing that Syagrius would incite the neighboring princes to combine against the Franks, Clovis menaced Alaric with war unless the Roman general were delivered to him. The Visigoth dared not refuse, and the unfortunate was put to death. Clovis now sought for a bride, and his choice of Clotilda, a Burgundian princess and a Catholic, although she had been raised in an Arian court, gained for him the hearts of the Gallo-Romans. From the day of her marriage every Catholic eye in Gaul was turned toward Clotilda as to one who was to be the divine instrument for the conversion of the great Clovis to the true religion and a humane policy. In 496 the Alemanni, burning to emulate the Franks, advanced as far as Cologne and attacked Sigebert, king of the Ripuarii; whereupon Clovis, being a nephew of Sigebert, led his Salic Franks to the rescue. The hostile forces met at Tolbiac; the Alemanni were routed, and Clovis annexed to his dominions all the Alemannic conquests between the Mo-

selle and the Rhine, together with a large district on the right of the latter river. All of these Frankish conquests now received the name of *Francia Rhenana*—Rhenish France. The remaining Alemannic territories, Vindelicia alone excepted, were accorded to a duke of Alemania, who swore to be a vassal of the Frank monarch. Vindelicia was given to the Ostrogothic sovereign, Theodoric, who had acted as a mediator in effecting peace. This victory of Tolbiac was the occasion of the conversion of Clovis. In the beginning of the action the Franks, greatly outnumbered, were on the point of retreating, when their king thought of the God of Clotilda. He vowed that if he conquered the adorers of Odin he would become a Christian, and on the ensuing Christmas Day he was baptized by St. Remy in that baptistery at Rheims which still remains as a monument of one of the most important revolutions which the world has seen. The entire Frankish nation soon followed their monarch into the Fold of Christ, and from that date they became the most efficient constituent, after the Catholic Church the informing spirit, of the new civilization. Pope Anastasius II. granted to the Frankish kings the title of "Most Christian," and styled them the "Eldest Sons of the Church"—qualifications which were historically correct, since at that time the eastern emperor was a Eutychian heretic, and all the western Christian princes of any importance were Arians.¹

Here we must be guilty of a digression which is, nevertheless, quite apposite to our subject.

The antiquity of the title "Most Christian King," borne by the French kings, has been the subject of much discussion; many contending that the first monarch to bear the title as a special prerogative was Louis XI., to whom it was accorded by Pope Paul II. in 1459. This opinion was held by the great Benedictine writer Mabillon in his *Diplomatics* (y. 17c4); by the Jesuit historian Daniel, in his *History of France* (y. 1713), and by Henault in his *Chronology* (y. 1744). Daniel seems to have proved his side of the question quite conclusively; but in 1720 the Abbé de Camps showed that the famous title had been borne by all the

¹ About the year 377 the Goths asked the Emperor Valens, an Arian, for permission to settle in Roman territory, and the request was granted on condition that they embraced Arianism. One of their deputies, a bishop named Ulphilas—a man of talent, who had shown much orthodox zeal at the Council of Nice—yielded sufficiently to the imperial wiles to permit his nation to obey the sovereign's behest, although he himself continued to preach the Catholic doctrine, at least in its substantial integrity. Very soon the pest was communicated to all the allies of the Goths, such as the Gepidi, the Ostrogoths, the Vandals, the Alani, etc. Genseric led his Vandals into Arianism in 428. Gondobald did the same for his Burgundians in 430. The Anglo-Saxons in Britain were still idolators.—Tillemont, *Hist. Eccles.*, at y. 377; Ceiller, art "Ulphilas."

French monarchs since the days of Clovis. Griffet gave a new edition of Daniel's work in 1755, and, profiting by the researches of De Camps, assigned the origin of the title to the reign of Charles V. (1337-80). In 1760, the learned Bonamy demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Academy of Inscriptions that the title was accorded to King Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. After a careful consideration of all these arguments, it appears to us that the title of Most Christian King was not only recognized by the Popes as a special prerogative of the French kings, long before the days of Louis XI., but was transmitted by the first Christian king of the Franks as part of that inheritance of faith and devotion to the Church which was guarded by his successors, almost without exception, as their most precious possession. In the first place, Pope Paul II., who is represented as according, for the first time, the title of Most Christian King to Louis XI., acknowledged in a letter to Charles VII., the father of Louis XI. (*Epist.* 385), that the French sovereigns held the famous title by heredity, and because of their constant defence of the Holy See. And Louis XI., himself, in his *Institution* drawn up at Amboise in 1482 for the guidance of his successor, declares the same fact: "Considering that God our Creator has given to us such great graces; that He has been pleased to constitute us the king of the most notable nation an earth, this kingdom of France, many of whose sovereigns, our predecessors, have been so great, virtuous, and valiant that they have acquired the name of Most Christian Kings, etc." Secondly, St. Avitus, a contemporary of Clovis, tells us (see Ruinart's *Preface to St. Greg. Tur.*, No. 18) that there was no province in the West that did not owe its safety to the Franks; alluding, of course, to the combats of the first successors of Clovis against the Arians and the pagans. When Clovis was baptized he was the sole veritable Catholic king in Europe, and hence would properly be addressed as Most Christian. Therefore it is that we find Romanus, general of the Roman armies in Italy, addressing King Childebert as "your Christianity—*Christianitas vestra*," in the same sense as that of our phrase "your Majesty." Therefore also we find the same language in the letters of the emperor Mauritius, to Childebert, and in those of Pope St. Gregory I. to the kings Thierry and Theodebert, sons of Childebert II. Thirdly, even in the time of Charles V. of France, to whose reign rather than that of Louis XI. Griffet would ascribe the origin of the glorious title, we find Raoul de Presles (in his *Prologue to St. Augustine's City of God*) saying to Charles V.: "You are and ought to be the sole chief protector of the Church, just as your predecessors were; and this is held by the Holy See of Rome, which has been accustomed to address you *and your predecessors* as Most Christian Princes."

Fourthly, when the emperor Frederick III. wrote to Charles VII. about a projected Crusade, he admitted that the title belonged to the French monarchs as an inheritance, at least from the time of the first Holy Wars. Fifthly, Pius II., predecessor of Paul II., writes to Charles VII., that the monarch "has inherited the name of Most Christian from his ancestors" (see the *Glossary* of Ducange, at word *Christianitas*). And the same Pontiff says that this title has been an ornament of the French monarchs *per longissimam temporum seriem*; and that it has been accorded *consensu populorum, gentium, nationumque*. It is true, and also very strange, that in spite of these declarations of his immediate predecessor, Paul II. at first told Cousinot, the ambassador of Louis XI., that the Popes were not accustomed to term the French monarchs Most Christian Kings; but we must remember that the Pontiff was just then very angry with Louis on account of that prince's severity toward the traitor, Cardinal de la Balue. However, Paul II. did agree to style the monarch in the usual fashion; though he gave no Bull confirmatory of the long possessed title. Griffet seems to imply that this Bull was expedited, when he says that "we must regard this decision of Pope Paul II. as marking the remarkable epoch when the title of Most Christian was assured to our kings by a judicial act which undoubtedly gave to the already established usage a degree of authenticity which it had not yet possessed." If there had been any formal Bull issued in the premises by Paul II., Alexander VI. would scarcely have tried to deprive Charles VIII. of the title, in order to confer it upon Ferdinand of Spain; instead of it, he afterward gave the style of Catholic to the Spanish sovereign, only because the Sacred College protested against the innovation.¹

The consequences of the conversion of Clovis were immediate and supremely important. All the cities of Brittany submitted to the Frankish sceptre; all the Gallo-Romans regarded Clovis as their liberator from the yoke, either actual or threatened, of the Arian Visigoths and Burgundians; all the Roman legions which were still stationed between the Seine and the Loire entered the service of him whom the Vicar of Christ had blessed; and the Roman eagles and *Labarum* shed some of their ancient splendor over the warriors of the new Christian nation. Gallo-Romans and Franks were soon amalgamated by the force of their common Christianity; the first barbaric nation to embrace the faith of Christ had laid the foundations of France.

In his last will and testament St. Remy thus speaks of the family of Clovis: "I raised it to the supreme rank of royal

¹ See the *Memoires* of Commynes, b. viii., ch. 17.

majesty ; I baptized them all in the waters of salvation ; I gave to them the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and I consecrated their head as king with the Holy Chrism." But on that Christmas Day of 496 it was not only the family of Clovis, not only those 3000 of his warriors who were baptized with him, whom Christendom acclaimed as they issued from the Baptistery of Rheims ; then all France was assigned by the hand of God to a pre-eminent place in the destinies of the world. " Nearly two hundred years after Constantine," says Lacordaire, " there was, as yet, no Christian nation in the world.¹ The empire was formed of twenty different races, united indeed in administration, but separated by their traditions and customs ; and a new germ of division had been planted by Arianism, a most active and fruitful heresy. Then the empire was beset by barbarous populations whose greed was ever increasing, and who were either given to idolatry or subjugated by Arianism. But now behold the work of God ! Not far from the banks of the Rhine, a barbarian chieftain was engaged in battle with other barbarians. His followers were giving way ; and in his peril he bethought him of the God whom his wife adored, and whose power she had often lauded. He invokes that God ; and victory having declared for him, he prostrates himself at the feet of the God of Clotilda. That God was Christ ; that king, that queen, that bishop, that victory, were the French nation ; and the French nation was the first Catholic nation which God gave to His Church."²

If it had been given to St. Remy to see through the veil of the future, he would have known that a national birth was effected by the regenerating waters which he poured on the head of Clovis. " Forth from the Baptistery of Rheims issued France and all her destinies ; the age of Charlemagne, the freedom of the communes, the genius of scholasticism, the glories of the crusades, the days of St. Louis, the heroism of Joan of Arc, the valor of Henry IV., the splendor of Louis XIV., the eloquence of Bossuet, the great modern movement, and we ourselves. Yes, from that Baptistery

¹ This sentence is misleading, if one does not remember that the illustrious Dominican uses the word " nation " in its strict sense ; that is, applying it only to a politically-organized, united, and independent people. At the time of the baptism of Clovis, there were very many peoples who were entirely Catholic in Western Europe ; and in the East very far from all had succumbed to heresy. In Europe, the Italians were not the only ones who rejected Arianism ; the Gauls and the Britons (the latter then relegated to Cambria) were Catholics. And for half a century the Scots, whom we now know as " the Irish," had been Catholics, and they were then propagating the faith in Caledonia. The term " barbarian " was then applied pre-eminently to the various hordes of Teutonic origin ; and therefore it was said that the Franks were the first " barbaric " nation to receive the faith.

² *Discours sur la Vocation de la Nation Francaise*, delivered in Notre Dame, Paris, February 14, 1841.

we also came; we who are Catholics, despite the scandals of the Great Schism, despite the seductions of the Reformation, despite the diabolic reign of Voltaire, despite the bloody persecutions of the Revolution. Despite all these terrible trials, we are Catholics. Long and magnificent is that history which has been termed the *Gesta Dei per Francos*; for on its every page the grandeur of God and our national greatness stand forth in indissoluble unity."¹

II.

The spirit of the world affects to regard as insincere nearly every conversion to the Catholic faith, although it finds no difficulty in awarding the praise of sincerity to any perversion from that faith. It is quite natural, therefore, that heterodox and rationalistic historians should represent Clovis as being influenced by ambition when he threw himself at the feet of St. Remy; but one would suppose that a writer of the calibre of Augustin Thierry, even though he was not a professing Christian when he penned the observation, would not have fallen into this error.² Thierry wrote: "Among the French kings of the first race Clovis was the politician. With the view of founding an empire, he trampled on the worship of the gods of the north, and he associated himself with the orthodox bishops for the destruction of the two Arian kingdoms. But he was the tool rather than the director of this league. . . . He continued to be influenced by the customs and ideas of his people. . . . The torch and rapine did not spare the churches when he made his incursions toward the Saone and to the south of the Loire.³ . . . The ceremony (his baptism) was performed at Rheims, and the most splendid arts of the Romans were adopted with profusion to celebrate the triumph of the bishops."⁴ Gorini well remarks that if Clovis received baptism in order to found an empire, it was his policy that triumphed, and not the bishops or their faith, especially as, according to Thierry, the Christian Clovis was no more reverend towards the churches than the pagan Clovis had

¹ Henri Perreyve, *Panegyrique de Sainte Clotilde*.

² Gorini, in his admirable *Défense de l'Église* (1853) took occasion to refute a number of Thierry's assertions made in the *Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands* and in the *Lettres sur l'Histoire de France*. It is a pleasure to note that Thierry most handsomely admitted the justice of Gorini's animadversions, and in all posterior editions (while he lived) the criminated passages were either corrected or omitted. But the great historian had then become a devout and uncompromising Catholic. M. Henri Martin, the head of the Druidical school, imitated Thierry's example to some extent. Guizot granted the accuracy of Gorini's judgments, but he allowed the errors to appear in his later editions.

³ *Lettre vi. sur l'Histoire de France*.

⁴ *Conquête*, etc. In later editions, also published before his conversion, Thierry modified the last sentence so as to read: "to celebrate the triumph of the Catholic faith," thus presenting the prelates in a less odious fashion.

been. But how is it that the policy of Clovis had never shown itself during his fifteen years of reign on both banks of the Somme, in the midst of Christian populations, during his ten years of intimacy with St. Remy, and of acquaintance with other clergymen, and during the three years of entreaty on the part of Clotilda that he would abandon paganism? It was not until he found that the God of the Christians had heard his prayer at Tolbiac that he abandoned his false deities. And if conversion to Christianity was to strengthen his power, is it not strange that other barbarian princes of the day, equally ambitious, never made such a discovery? But, humanly speaking, Clovis did not need to embrace Christianity in order to attain the objects of his royal ambition. As a pagan he had subjugated Central Gaul, and all the other Gallo-Roman populations, still subject to other barbarians, were calling on him to deliver them. And what had he to hope, if fortune abandoned him, from the power of the orthodox clergy? They had been unable to save the orthodox Syagrius, put to death by him at Soissons; or the orthodox Childeric, murdered by the Burgundian Gondebald. Let us, therefore, say with Nicetus, bishop of Treves, addressing Chlodosinda, a granddaughter of the Frankish king: "Being a man of extreme prudence, Clovis did not embrace our faith until he found that it was the true one."¹ As for the remark of Thierry that Clovis and his Franks retained, after their conversion, an affection for their olden habits, it is certain that no people, newly converted, are at once metamorphosed. As Gorini expressed the idea, Clovis could scarcely become a St. Louis.

Among the heterodox there are some fortunate souls who are able to appreciate to some extent the intervention of God, the Creator and Sustainer, in the affairs of human life; but the arrogant rationalist, of the earth earthy, would fain perceive the workings of priestcraft in this intervention. Hence we are told that the marriage of Clovis to St. Clotilda was an affair of episcopal policy, that the bishops, who are said to have then held the destinies of Gaul in their hands, projected this union as a means for the conversion of the Franks, to whom they intended to subject the whole of Gaul, having realized that the Arian barbarians would be less easily converted than the idolatrous ones. But St. Gregory of Tours (b. 539), the father of French history, upon whom we must chiefly rely for all knowledge concerning the Franks of this period, assigns the charms and virtue of Clotilda as the cause of the demand of Clovis for her hand; the historian utters not one word which would indicate that the clergy had any part in the affair. "Clovis often sent ambassadors to the Burgundians; and these messengers hav-

¹ Sirmond, *Conc. Ant. Gall.*, vol. i., p. 324.

ing seen the young Clotilda, were impressed by her beauty and graciousness. Having learned that she was of royal blood,¹ they told Clovis about her. He immediately sent a special embassy to demand her hand, and Gondebald, not daring to refuse, delivered the maiden to the messengers. When Clovis received her, he was so enraptured that he made her his wife."²

As for the assertion that the Gallo-Roman bishops had devised the plan of subjecting all Gaul to the Franks, because of the greater probability of the future conversion of those idolators, it is certain that the orthodox clergy had no reason to despair of the conversion of the Arian Burgundians and Visigoths. They had already attained great success, and very little perspicacity was needed to foresee that soon their apostolic labors would be fully rewarded. In Burgundy the Catholic faith had been openly professed by King Chilperic, and Gondebald had proposed to profess it in secret. The daughter and grandchildren of the latter prince abjured their heresy, and Sigismund, the King of Geneva, made St. Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, his intimate friend and adviser. As to the Visigoths, in the previous century, before they had entered into any relations with the Arians of Constantinople, they had been Catholics; and even in Gaul it is very probable that Frederick, the brother of Theodoric II., was orthodox, for we find him informing Pope Hilarius of the intrusion of Hermes at Narbonne, and we hear the pontiff styling him "my son."³ Certainly these and many similar facts must have encouraged the Gallo-Roman clergy in the belief that the conversion of the Burgundians and the Visigoths was not improbable; and in the face of such a belief

¹ Through her father Clotilda descended from King Gondicarius, who perished while defending his subjects from the invading Huns of Attila, leaving his dominions to be divided by his sons, Gondemar, Godeghesil, Gondebald and Chilperic. The last-named prince was the father of Clotilda. On the death of Godeghesil, Gondebald made war on his other two brothers. Gondemar fell amid the flames of his last fortress; while Chilperic, taken on the field of battle, was conveyed to Geneva, then the capital of the Burgundians. He was there massacred, together with his wife and all his children, excepting Clotilda and one sister. Although a fervent Arian, Gondebald allowed full liberty to his nieces to practice the Catholic religion, in which they had been trained by their mother. Frequently Clotilda heard the voice of nature crying for vengeance on the murderer of her family; but she heeded the promptings of divine grace to forgive him. Many historians have painted Clotilda as a virulent fury; and in accordance with that idea they have represented her as taking revenge on Gondebald as soon as opportunity offered. For refutations of this calumny, see the disquisition of M. de l'Épinois on the value of the works of St. Gregory of Tours in the *Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne* for February, 1862; the *Examen du Célèbre Texte de St. Gregoire de Tours sur la Guerre contre Sigismond*, by Baral in the same *Annales* for December, 1862; and our article on the subject in the *Ave Maria*, vol. xxxv., No. 12.

² *Historia Ecclesiastica Francorum*, bk. ii., ch. 28. *Epitomata*, ch. 18.

³ *Epist. Hilarii ad Leontium*, in Sirmond, vol. i.

they would scarcely have devised the expedient of fettering themselves and their entire nation under the domination of those idolatrous Franks who, if we are to credit Guizot, were "more German, more barbarous," than the other barbarians. But, by the way, were the Franks more barbarous than the Burgundians and Visigoths? Guizot says: "There were notable differences between these peoples. The Franks were more foreign, more German, more barbarous than the Burgundians and the Goths. Before entering Gaul, the last had long held relations with the Romans, had lived in Italy and in the Eastern Empire, had become familiar with Roman manners, and very nearly the same may be said of the Burgundians. And what is more, these two peoples had been Christians for a long time, whereas the Franks came from Germany as yet pagans and enemies."¹ In the first place, we must observe that Clovis did not bring his Franks from Germany, but from Tournai, in the ancient Roman province of Belgium. When Clovis became King of the Franks, they had resided on the Roman side of the Rhine for more than a hundred and fifty years, having established themselves there in 337; and we may well say with Michelet that during this long residence in Celtic Belgium, they must have necessarily become, through intermarriage, Celtic to a great extent.² But the relations between the Franks and the Romans were of a date more ancient than that of the Frankish occupation of Belgium. From the year 288, when the Emperor Maximian hurled the Franks and other Germanic invaders across the Rhine, great numbers of the former entered the military service of Rome, and thus came in contact, at least, with Roman refinement. St. Sidonius, a contemporary of Clovis, gives pictures of luxurious display on the part of Frankish warriors which are incompatible with utter barbarism. According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the Emperor Constantine the Great considered the blood of the Franks so noble that he issued a decree permitting imperial princes to marry Frankish women.³ Before the time of Clovis, the Franks had given to Rome nine commanders-in-chief for her armies, five tribunes, a prefect of the city, a prime minister (Arbogastes), and an Empress (Eudoxia). Ammianus Marcellinus, writing in 370, tells us that for a long time past young Franks had frequented the schools of Rome, Ravenna, Milan, Narbonne and Autun; that so fine were the dwellings and so careful the cultivation on the right or Frankish side of the Rhine, that a stranger had to inquire as to which bank was the Roman.⁴ If the reader now reflects that

¹ *Histoire de la Civilization en France*, vol. i., lesson 8.

² *Histoire de France*, vol. i., p. 195.

³ Chateaubriand, *Analyse Raisonnée de l'Histoire de France*.

⁴ *Rerum Gestarum*, bk. xv.

the Visigothic chief, Ataulphus, said that the sole reason why he abandoned his design of founding a Gothic empire on the ruins of the Roman was, that "long experience had taught him the absolute impossibility of subjecting the unrestrained barbarism of the Goths to any kind of law,"¹ he will not agree with Guizot in the assertion that the Visigoths were more cultured than the Franks. There is no need of dilating on the barbarism of the Burgundians, since all historians agree that they were inferior to the Visigoths in every respect. Gorini assigns a very probable reason for the frequently accepted notion that the Visigoths were more cultured than the Franks. "As narrator of his life, the Frank monarch had only St. Gregory of Tours, the barbarian historian of barbarism; whereas, at the court of the Visigoths, there was, both as courtier and as suppliant, that personage whom M. Augustin Thierry terms 'the grandest poet of the fifth century,' St. Sidonius Apollinaris. This writer, a sensible man, and one of imagination, addicted to a highly-colored style, was led by many circumstances to describe the habits of Theodoric; his efforts to raise to the empire the father-in-law of Sidonius; the solemn receptions of his successor, Euric; the pleasures of his Gallo-Roman subjects, who lived in the retirement of their villas exchanging verses with each other, or carelessly promenading along the banks of the Garonne, or preparing magnificent presents for their sovereigns. The brilliant periods of the poet form a setting amid which the Visigoth kings lose their barbarism, and such a setting did not fall to the lot of Clovis. But the description of the prayers, labors, games and public audiences of Theodoric are no more interesting than would have been, if executed by an able pen, a picture of Clovis, surrounded by Clotilda, the lords of his court and the leaders of his army, the artists who had been brought from Italy, the Gallo-Romans of the East and South begging him to enrol them among his subjects, ambassadors imploring the freedom of the prisoners of Tolbiac, other ambassadors handing to him the insignia of the Consulate which they have brought from Constantinople, and St. Remy discoursing on the duties of a Christian ruler or recalling the pomp and splendor of the baptism at Rheims. There was no such painter for Clovis; only St. Gregory of Tours was to illustrate his career. Would Theodoric affect our imagination more strongly than Clovis, if no one had spoken of him but Jornandes or St. Isidore? . . . That superior refinement which Thierry discerns in the Visigoths must be ascribed less to any merit of the conquerors than to the Gallo-Roman nobles of the court and to the descriptions of Sidonius. As Thierry him-

¹ Orosius, *Historia*, bk. vii., ch. 43.

self says, 'the German appeared in the Visigoths as soon as they took the field,' and they took the field very frequently."¹

III.

"Hail! O Christ, who lovest the Franks!

"Preserve their kingdom; enlighten their leaders with Thy grace; protect their army; strengthen their faith!

"May Jesus Christ, the Sovereign Master of the masters of the earth, give to the Franks all the joys of peace!

"Hail! O Christ, who lovest the Franks!

"By means of its courage and its strength the Frankish race threw off the heavy yoke of the Romans; and having received the grace of baptism, covered with gold and precious stones the bodies of the holy martyrs which the pagans had burnt with fire, lacerated with the sword, and given as prey to wild beasts!"

These words, quaint at once and sublime, form the prelude to the new Salic Law, which Clovis, immediately after his baptism, assigned to his Franks as the basis of their future jurisprudence. Does the reader discern in them the spirit of a murderer—of a murderer of his own kindred? And yet we are told by certain historians that Clovis the Christian was a foul assassin of his own flesh and blood. In the year 1873 the educational superintendents ("Conseil de l'instruction publique") of the third French Republic authorized and "crowned" a text-book on the history of France, written by one Mad. de Saint-Ouen, in which we read: "Clovis I. would occupy a distinguished place in history, if he had not soiled his reign by his cruelties towards the chiefs of the various Frankish tribes, most of whom were related to him. Some of them he caused to be massacred, others he killed with his own hand." Then the good woman, undoubtedly sincere, since she follows, at a distance, in the footsteps of such pioneers as Guizot and Henry Martin, devotes twenty-five modest pages to the presumedly easy task of trying and condemning, for the instruction and edification of French youth, the entire series of Merovingian monarchs: "It is necessary to give only a rapid glance at these barbarous times." Can it be possible that the charge of murder is deserved by a prince whom Pope Anastasius lauded as a just man, and as the Eldest Son of the Church; by a prince whose most intimate counsellor was the grand St. Remy? But what evidence sustains the hideous accusation? Merely an alleged passage of St. Gregory of Tours, who wrote toward the end of the sixth century; that is nearly a century after the death of Clovis. And it is to be noted that St. Gregory, in this short passage, if indeed he was its author, used the word "*fertur*—it is said" no less than four times. Again, if this passage is authentic, how are we

¹ *Ubi supra*, Paris edit., 1864, vol. i., p. 319.

to account for the following language of the saint, uttered immediately after it? "Every day God caused the augmentation of the kingdom of Clovis, *because he walked before Him with a pure heart*, and did what was pleasing in His eyes."¹ And in the prologue to his fifth book, St. Gregory offers the example of Clovis to the sovereigns of the sixth century: "Remember the deeds of the first author of your victories; of him who put to death so many hostile kings, who crushed so many wicked peoples, who subjugated those who now are our countrymen (*patrias gentes*), and who left to you an authority over them which is stainless and uncontested." In the Council held at Orleans in 511, immediately after the alleged crimes of Clovis, the synodals placed at the head of their Acts a letter to Clovis in which they lauded his pious zeal and his *humanity*. Were these bishops hypocrites? Finally, we would draw attention to the characters and deeds of the petty princes who are supposed to have been the victims of the rage and greed of Clovis. In the Life of St. Maximin (Mesmin, abbot of Mici, near Orleans), written in the early part of the sixth century; in the Chronicle of Aimoin, written in the tenth century; in the Chronicle of Balderic, written in the eleventh; and above all, in the Life of St. Remy which Hincmar (b. 806) reproduced from a biography composed by a contemporary of Clovis, we find some pertinent particulars regarding these personages, all of which indicate that the Frank monarch was an inflexible punisher of revolt,² like Dagobert, if you will, or Charlemagne, or Louis XI., or Richelieu; but not an assassin. Much stress is laid upon the killing of Ragnacarius, a relative of Clovis. But Balderic, who tells us that he drew his narrative from the text of St. Gregory of Tours, plainly evinces that he did not read, in his copy of the alleged criminating "History," the passages which are adduced to show the wickedness of Clovis and the culpable subservience of the saint to royal power. Balderic says: "Clovis had assigned the custody of Cambrai to Ragnacarius, his cousin or his nephew When the king returned, this Ragnacarius, inflated by criminal pride, violated his pledges, and refused entrance into the city to his sovereign. The insolence and obscenities of Ragnacarius had already procured for him the hatred of the Franks, and now they resolved to bring about his death, and they informed the king of their intention." The rebel was delivered to his sovereign, and his execution was an act of justice. As to the murder of Sigebert by his son Chlodoric, and the killing of the latter by order of Clovis, there is nothing in

¹ "Deus augebat regnum ejus, eo quod ambularet recto corde coram eo, et faceret quæ placita erant in oculis ejus."

² And nevertheless, yielding to the intercession of St. Euspicius, he granted full pardon to the rebels of Verdun.

the adduced passage of St. Gregory which would indicate that the parricide was instigated by the Frank king, and certainly this sovereignty was justified in punishing so revolting a crime.

Augustin Thierry,¹ Ozanam² and Kries³ assign a German legendary source to the belief in the cruelty and injustice of the Christian Clovis; but one of the best of the critics of our day, A. Lecoy de la Marche, discerns its origin in the hatred which the Gallo-Roman race resumed during the reigns of the immediate successors of Clovis.⁴ We believe that the adduced testimony of St. Gregory of Tours is at least an interpolation, and probably a malicious forgery. The saint himself realized the danger of indiscreet or malevolent interpolation which menaced all MSS. in his day, and at the end of his work he affixed this warning: "Although this volume is written in uncultivated style, I conjure all the priests of the Lord who will hereafter rule this diocese of Tours, and I conjure them by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and the judgment day, if they do not wish to be then covered with confusion and to be condemned with the demon, that they never destroy this book, and that in copying it they never add or omit anything." Even Henri Martin, who greedily receives any argument which militates against the sincerity of the conversion of Clovis or against the sanctity of Clotilda, says of the Franco-Burgundian royal marriage: "Its important consequences struck the popular imagination so forcibly that they became the text for romantic recitals, which every succeeding generation enlarged and embellished." It is very probable that some copyist, whose critical faculties had been affected by these "highly-embellished recitals," introduced them in the margin of his copy of the Gregorian work, and that in time some other transcriber, innocently or culpably, conveyed the annotations into the text as the original production of the saint. Every careful investigator of the mediæval history is painfully familiar with interpolations in olden manuscripts, and it is only by the supposition that the Gregorian work was so maltreated that we are able to understand the praise lavished on Clovis by popes, councils and saints. That the supposition is well-founded has been satisfactorily proved by Le Cointe,⁵ Kries,⁶ Carlo Troya⁷ and Alphonso de Boissieu.⁸

¹ In his preface to his *Temps Mérovingiens*.

² *Les Germains*, vol. i., p. 133.

³ *De Gregorii Vita et Scriptis*, Breslau, 1839.

⁴ "Clovis; Ses Meurtres Politiques" in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, vol. i., p. 450.

⁵ *Annales Ecclesiastici Francorum*.

⁶ *Ubi sup.*

⁷ *Storia d'Italia*, vol. xi.

⁸ *Inscriptions Antiques de Lyon*, last number.

IV.

The marvelous action of Christianity in the work of civilization has been recognized by all conscientious historians and polemics; not only by those who were guided by Catholic principles, but even by those who were the victims of Protestant prejudice, or who allowed their intellects to be obscured by the vagaries of rationalism. The Protestant Guizot says: "Among the causes of our civilization the Christian Church presents itself to every mind. Society has never made such efforts to influence its surroundings and to assimilate to itself the external world as the Church put forth between the fifth and the tenth centuries. The Church attacked barbarism, as it were, on every side and, conquering it, she civilized it." Probably the reader has noted the frequent passionate invectives of Michelet against the Church; but the otherwise grand historian found himself compelled to admit: "By the side of the civil order another order is established, and it will take up and preserve the civil during the tempest of the barbarian invasion. Everywhere, alongside the Roman magistracy which is about to be eclipsed and to leave society in peril, religion has established another magistracy which will never prove deficient. Imperial universality is on the verge of ruin; but Catholic universality has appeared, and the world will be maintained and arranged by the Church." Balmes observes: "Amid this social dissolution, this monstrous upheaval of laws and customs, Christianity stands erect like a solitary column in a ruined city, like a glowing beacon in the midst of darkness. Christianity is the sole element which can render life to the germs of regeneration which are covered by ruins and gore." Laurentie says: "When civil wars had desolated the empire, and the provinces were at the mercy of the barbarians, only one authority in Gaul was popular, and that authority took care of the nation, a prey to various conquerors, one after another. This authority was that of the bishops, who were ever ready to throw themselves between the combatants." And the eloquent Montalembert remarks: "With invincible perseverance religion performed the arduous work of kneading and moulding the various elements of those Teutonic and northern races which had overrun Europe, in order to civilize and sanctify them through the patient and vivifying action of faith. Even Littré, the great materialist and philologist, who persevered in his atheism almost unto the hour of his death, avowed, in the midst of his hallucinations, that "in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries the Church was the grand agent of social salvation." And Gibbon himself declared: "The bishops made the kingdom of France." This admission received the equally celebrated commentary of Joseph de Maistre: "The bishops made France, as bees construct a hive."

As Cantù well observes, it is only by agriculture that men become really fixed in a country, "and become attached to it by sentiments which make sacred the name of fatherland," and Guizot never spoke more solidly than when he said that the Benedictines were *les défricheurs* of Europe. This influence of the Church was felt wherever there were barbarians to be tamed; but, above all others, and from the very day of their conversion, the Frank barbarians seem to have been the most amenable to the lessons of their spiritual mother, and to have been the most zealous and enthusiastic in their demonstrations of gratitude to God for their rescue from the darkness of paganism. Probably much of their amenability and much of the simplicity of their Catholic spirit was due to their speedy amalgamation with the Gallo-Romans; for centuries were to elapse (in the case of the Prussians more than seven) before all the other Teutons abandoned idolatry. But their own nature also seems to have been in their favor. We can discern a heart yearning to love God and to fight for His honor in the Clovis who cries out when he first hears of the Passion of Christ: "Oh! why was I not there with my Franks"? From the day when Clovis and his three thousand companions issued regenerated from the Baptistry of Rheims, giving an example which was to be soon followed by their entire nation, France seems to have been—if we may reverently so express our idea—the special pet of heaven. In its entirety, although not in all its particulars, her history warrants the supposition, and many a time and oft her foes have proclaimed the idea as truth. Probably there never lived a less enthusiastic man than that profound observer, the Austro-Spaniard, Charles V.; but he declared, after many years of experience of French propensity to recover from even merited misfortune: "No people ever did so much to bring about their own ruin as the French have done; but they always recover, for they are specially protected by God."

Gesta Dei per Francos! Certainly the French Catholic has reason for holy pride as he peruses the annals of his country, and discerns so many instances of God's use of the arms of France to effect His designs in the world, especially in the sole really important matter of the preservation of His church. And now that a culmination seems to have been nearly attained by the efforts of the enemies "of all that is called God," which have been exerted for a full century and more to effect the unchristianization of his country, the French Catholic may well meditate upon these *Gesta Dei*; for in them he will find a justification of his confidence that God has not deserted France, even in the matter of her temporal prosperity. Of course, while individuals attain the end of their creation only in the next world, nations must accomplish their

end here below, and therefore it may easily be that the end for which God established French nationality has already been reached. It may be that all Europe is soon to be made a *tabula rasa* by a Russian, Tartar or a still more Mongolian invasion from the distant east, and that once again the Catholic Church, the sole surviving institution of what was once the European *populus Christianus*, will pursue her God-given work of taming and converting a new set of barbarians, who will be the most prominent members of her flock during a coming decade of centuries. But the remembrance of what France has done, as an instrument of God, for Catholicism and civilization will endure in the world when the annals of many a now proud nation shall have become myths; for that remembrance will be guarded as a precious souvenir by that Church which will endure until the end of time. Perhaps it will be chiefly by a study of these *Gesta Dei per Francos*—both the original series, which were so named a thousand and more years ago, and the later ones, equally glorious—that the student of the thirtieth century of the Christian era will be able to learn something definite concerning that Arianism which is even now almost a myth to most people, although it was, in its day, more powerful than Protestantism has ever hoped to be. The student will learn how a mortal blow was given to Arianism by the victories of Clovis—against the Burgundians on the plains of Dijon and against the Visigoths on the plains of Vouillé. In the thirtieth century the investigator will learn how, when Arianism was in its death-throes, Mohammed appeared, and, as Lacordaire observes, “renewed the idea of Arius at the point of the scimeter”; how, after its subjugation of Spain, Islamism tried to subject France to the laws of the Koran, and the nation that was baptized at Rheims furnished Christendom with its champion in the person of Charles Martel, whose victory at Poitiers hurled the Mussulman hordes back into the Iberian peninsula, and deprived them of future possibility of subjugating the whole of Europe. Then our thirtieth century indagator into the past will continue his searches among the *Gesta* of that wonderful people of whose glories the traditions circulating in his day will be so redolent; and he will read how Frankish monarchs *restored* (not *gave*) to the head of God's Church that temporal sovereignty which the Founder of the Church had designed as its guarantee of independence amid the poor fluctuations of the politics of human intelligence. The Baronio of the thirtieth century will read how, when the Roman people, in 754, had proclaimed the secular sovereignty of their Pope-King, Stephen II., and the Lombard still quasi-barbarian monarchs, Astolphus and Desiderius, had appropriated much of what was rightly styled the Patrimony of the Church, the Franco-Gallic—in fact,

the French—sovereigns, Pepin and Charlemagne, restored, by force of French valor, the temporal power of the Pope, declaring that they reserved to themselves and their successors “No power within the same limits, unless that we may gain prayers for the repose of our souls, and that by you and your people we be styled PATRICIANS OF THE ROMANS.”¹ And when the searcher for historical truth shall have read such annals of the nineteenth century as may have come down to him, he will wonder why so many of the Italians of that time were so basely ungrateful to that pontifical monarchy which France had assured to them, and which had procured for them an almost uninterrupted primacy in letters, science and art during eleven centuries. Pursuing his studies, the thirtieth century publicist will find in the *Gesta* how, in the eleventh century, the great heart of France recognized the voice of God issuing from the sepulchre of the Saviour, and calling on the children of Clovis, Martel and Charlemagne to deliver the Holy Places from infidel persecution; how in that and all the following Crusades these descendants of heroes, and heroes themselves, shed far more of their blood in the holy cause than all other peoples combined, and how French monarchs ever afterward regarded that blood, and the tears and sympathy of those who could not fight, as the most precious jewels in their diadems. Then our investigator will read how, in the fifteenth century, God raised up that sweet maid of Orleans, who was canonized in the beginning of the twentieth century; how her valor, her purity and her faith triumphed over the arrogant nation which was soon to become heretical, and by that triumph preserved the Land of the Lilies from the imminent pestilence. Then the student will perceive, a little further on in the *Gesta*, how gallantly the French prevented their own land from succumbing to the dire conflagration which had seared the regions watered by the Thames and the Elbe. “Luther came into the world,” says Lacordaire, “and at his call Germany and England separated themselves from the Church. Had France accepted their fearful invitation, what would have been the result for Christianity? Her national enthusiasm saved France. Confederated in a holy league, Frenchmen placed their faith above everything else—even above their allegiance to their monarch—and they refused to recognize as legitimate heir to the crown any prince who would not swear fidelity to the God of

¹ In the olden time the title of “Roman Patrician” was given by the Pope-Kings to very few and only for very great services to the Holy See. Clovis had received the honor, and Pepin was anxious to bear a title which then signified “Defender of the Church,” and would therefore increase his consequence in the eyes of all Christian nations. He received it from Pope Stephen on the day that the Pontiff crowned him as King of the Franks.

Clovis, of Charlemagne and of St. Louis. For the defence of the Church we Frenchmen have fought combats of blood and of mind. Arianism crushed, Islamism vanquished, the temporal dominion of the Popes consolidated, Protestantism repelled, behold the four crowns of France which will not fade for all eternity."¹ These four crowns represent, indeed, the chief episodes among the *Gesta Dei per Francos*; but they are not the sole instances of God's use of the arm of France for the good of His mystic spouse, or of His loving protection of France. Much could be said about God's work in saving France from the philosophists and *sans culottes* of the last century, and much about France's defence of the Holy See almost to the present day.

Are there to be any more chronicles of *Gesta Dei per Francos*? An affirmative reply will be given by those who perceive pre-eminent vitality in the Catholicism of the great majority of Frenchmen: by those who contend that the French Church of our day has an inestimable advantage over that of the eighteenth century, inasmuch as now the warfare between good and evil in France is open, a contest between affirmation and negation, and not a question between religion and religiosity—because, in fine, the day of half-measures has passed, and now a Frenchman must be either a Christian or an atheist. Such students of their epoch find that the religious movement encouraged by Lacordaire, Montalembert, and Dupanloup, has been much advanced, of late, among the enlightened classes; and while they are invincibly opposed to the sect which now administers the affairs of the Republic, they see no reason why Catholics, as such, should regard the Republic itself with suspicion. "The Church follows all the natural movements of reason and of history, with the intelligent tenderness of a mother for her child; she is ever ready to satisfy the legitimate desires of her child. To the man of ancient times, crushed under the despotism of the Roman Empire, the Church offered refuge in one of her solitudes, where he could renounce the corrupting goods of earth. In the Middle Age, when man had acknowledged her maternal authority, the Church showed him that he could live according to the law of God, even in the world. At the time of the Renaissance, the Church associated herself with the literary and artistic movement of civilization; and she furnished the world with inspirations and subjects which helped to immortalize so many men and works of the sixteenth century. To-day, democracy, the equality of all men in civil and social rights and duties, is a general aspiration of civilized people; and it does not entail upon the Church any necessity of changing her doctrines, since

¹ *Ubi supra.*

she was the first to inculcate, under the superior law of charity—the love of God and of men—the principle of equality among men.”¹ Certainly, if we reflect upon the immense amount of good which Catholic France is now performing for Christendom, we shall be confident that there will be many more *Gesta dei per Francos* described for the edification of future generations, ere her nationality becomes what everything human must eventually become—a thing of the inexorable past. During the last two years, as we learn from the thoroughly reliable “Annals of the Propagation of the Faith,” France contributed three-fourths of the amount raised for Peter’s Pence in the entire world; and of the missionaries now laboring for the conversion of heathendom, and many of them awaiting a martyr’s crown, three-fourths are Frenchmen. We hope therefore, that Mgr. Freppel, one of the noblest Frenchmen who ever donned the mitre, was justified in pronouncing these encouraging words: “Lift up thy head, noble land! Have confidence in thy divine vocation! Thou hast not yet fulfilled thy divine mission; for shouldst thou disappear, thou wouldst leave a void which Divine Omnipotence alone could fill. If some days of forgetfulness have called down punishment upon thee, many centuries of devotion to Christ and His Church demand pardon for thee. Thou wilt resume thy glorious destiny; remaining in the world the soldier of Providence, the armed apostle of faith and of Christian civilization. Just as in the past, deliverance will be sought from thee by the weak and the oppressed of the universe. Thou wilt repeat those grand days of thy history, when all that was most venerable on earth was protected by the sword of Clovis, of Charlemagne, of Godefroy de Bouillon, of St. Louis, of Joan of Arc.”²

REUBEN PARSONS, D.D.

¹ Pellissier, *La France Chrétienne au XIXme Siècle*, Paris, 1895.

² “Discourse for the Benefit of Wounded Soldiers,” February, 1889.

THE CREED OF SCIENCE—OR AGNOSTIC EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION.

THE evolution theory has been so thoroughly thrashed out and winnowed in book and pamphlet and periodical, that what little grain of truth it may contain has been carefully separated from the straw and chaff. The subject is trite and hackneyed. Merely to see the name in the title of a magazine article may create in some minds that peculiar sense of loathing which is produced by stale and insipid food. It may do even worse; it may arouse a suspicion of unorthodox tendencies. For, it has been said with a touch of sarcasm: "Soon no one will be found to treat this theme except some eccentric Catholic, who is anxious to convince mankind that he can hold the most advanced and progressive views without being denounced to the Holy Office; that he can go to the very brink of heresy without tumbling over it. Like a thousand other exploded theories, evolution has had its day; it should be quietly consigned to the limbo of obsolete opinions."

All this may be true of evolution as a scientific theory. At all events, we have no mind to dispute the assertion. But evolution, as it has been generally taught by non-Catholic writers, is not simply a scientific theory; it is a creed, a religion. It is not simply an error in philosophy; it is a heresy in faith. And on this account only does it still deserve the attention of the Catholic journalist. A scientific theory, if it involves no religious question, is readily abandoned when it is proved to be untenable; but a heresy lives on, even after the fallacies upon which it rests have been exposed. The reason is because formal heresy is a disease of the will rather than of the intellect. It owes its strength not so much to the arguments which it advances as to the passions which it flatters.

Evolution has become the creed or religion of many, and hence it "dies so hard." It is, in reality, only one of two very ancient forms or phases of false religion—or, rather, irreligion—which have been disturbing the world in the past, and which will probably continue to disturb it in the future.

I.

"There is nothing new under the sun." At the very dawn of the Christian era there existed a school of philosophers, who styled

themselves *Gnostics* (from the Greek word *γνωσις*, knowledge), because they professed to be in direct communication with the world of mind, whereby they obtained a full and comprehensive knowledge of everything both in the sensible and the supersensible order, including the profoundest mysteries of the divine nature. They claimed to be the sole exponent's of scientific knowledge, and are supposed by commentators on the Sacred Writings to have been before the mind of the Apostle when he warned his disciples against the "oppositions of *knowledge* falsely so called," or, as the James version translates the text, the oppositions of *science* falsely so called."

In our times there has arisen another school of philosophers, who commonly go by the name of *Agnostics* (from the Greek word *ἀγνωσις*, want of knowledge, or ignorance), because they contend that the human intellect can have no knowledge of anything save the passing phenomena of sense, and that if it ventures beyond the bounds of matter, it "plunges into that vast Serbonian bog where whole armies of metaphysicians have floundered and sunk." Singularly enough, despite the contradiction implied in their very name, they, too, boast of holding the key to all scientific knowledge, and seem to orthodox believers to fall under the censure of another Apostle, who bids us "put to silence the *ignorance* of foolish men," or, according to another rendering of the passage, "the *agnosticism* of ignorant men."

With slight modifications, due to accidental causes, these two schools have represented the extremes of philosophic speculation—and of religious error—in every age. Between these two extremes, as the author of an admirable work entitled "Theistic Argument," clearly shows, the pendulum of philosophic thought has been perpetually oscillating, always attracted by the inherent force of truth, and yet, owing to the law of mental reaction or to some external impulse, often carried far beyond its centre of gravity. The point at issue, the *crucial question*, is ever the same. It divided Plato from the Greek sensist in ancient times, and the nominalist from the exaggerated realist in the Middle Ages, as it divides the idealist from the materialist in our days.

According to the idealist, the thinking mind is the self-subsisting centre of energy and life. It evolves the universe from itself by thought; it gives rise to society, government, art, religion and all the teeming activities of life; like the silk-worm, it surrounds itself with a mysterious web, which it spins from its own substance. According to the materialist, on the other hand, matter contains in itself "the promise and potency of all life." It evolves itself, by purely mechanical forces, from the nebulous state and the "fire-cloud," into the multitudinous appearances of the phenome-

nal universe; it works itself out, by a continuous process of ceaseless, indestructible activities, into all the masterpieces of human genius—into the “Hamlet” of Shakespeare, the “Paradise Lost” of Milton, the “Principia” of Newton.

The idealist not merely fancies himself to be in immediate contact with the eternal and absolute, but, in the words of the transcendental philosopher, he creates the Eternal and Absolute Being. The materialist does away altogether with the Eternal and Absolute Being; or if he admits it in some sort, he denies that it comes within the legitimate sphere of positive science, and sets it down as unknowable.

Not many years ago Emerson proclaimed to the admiring crowds that “drank in his honeyed words,” that in the future “the ideal would be recognized as the only real.” To-day Spencer bids us “forsake the shadowy region of intuition” and “follow the pathway of clearly ascertained fact” and experience. The idealist survives only in the ominous apparitions which come, like sprites and spooks from the spirit-land, to disturb the slumbers of the denizens of this lower world. Emerson no longer divides the empire of thought with Spencer; but the time, no doubt, will come when Spencer’s star will pale before some rising luminary, and idealism will be once more in the ascendant. What the poet wrote concerning words is likewise true, with a slight change, of rival systems of philosophy:

“Many shall rise, that now forgotten lie;
Others, in past credit, soon shall die,
If custom will, whose arbitrary sway
Thoughts and the forms of science must obey.”

The age of the *gnostic*, or idealist, is gone; the age of the *agnostic*, or materialist, is come. Positivism, determinism, and evolutionism are mere varieties of the same species. The agnostic marshals into the service of his system the brilliant discoveries of modern physical science; he transfers physical researches from the laboratory of the naturalist to the cabinet of the philosopher; he converts evolutionism into metaphysics. And while doing so, he claims to be “in alliance with the most intellectual tendencies of modern society.”

Evolutionism supplies the data, agnosticism interprets them. Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, Büchner commonly have played the part of evolutionist experimenters, who furnish the physical basis of the new system of metaphysics; while Spencer, Harrison, Matthew Arnold have usually appeared in the rôle of agnostic philosophers, who explain the experiments made conformably to the requirements of their school. They all represent the same form of

thought—materialism in its newest guise. Hence, too, they are often called by the common name of *agnostic evolutionists*; and Mr. Spencer's religion is known as the *religion of evolution*.

The doctrine of evolution is the *genesis* or *pangenesi*s, as the authors themselves call it, of the bible of agnosticism. In the authentic version the first chapter reads thus:

"1. Matter is the origin of all that exists, without the intrusion of any creative agency; all natural and mental forces are inherent in it. Nature, the all-engendering and all-devouring, is its own beginning and end, birth and death. (Büchner, 'Kraft und Stoff,' pp. 32 and 88.)

"2. At first there existed only a cosmic gas; then a fiery cloud; next a molten spheroid, in which not alone the more ignoble forms of life . . . but the human mind itself . . . all our philosophy, all our poetry and all our art . . . all are supposed to have been latent and potential. (Tyndall, 'Scientific Use of the Imagination.')

"3. Thereupon followed a long cooling process. The vapors were condensed; the crust of the earth, its seas, lakes and rivers, and life itself were formed. The difference between a living and a non-living body is a difference of degree, not of kind. (Fiske, 'Cosmic Philosophy,' p. 422). All natural bodies with which we are acquainted are equally living. (Haeckel, 'Natürl. Schöpfungsgesch,' by Dr. Ernst, 6 edit.)

"4. Light shines upon the water, and it is salted. Light shines upon the salted seal and it lives. (Oken, 'Elem. Physiol.'). Thus was produced the sea-mucus (or protoplasm), which is the life-stuff or physical basis of the earliest and simplest organisms. (Sect. 905, Ray Society's Edit. Oken's Physiol.)

"5. All the forms of vegetable and animal life, including man, have been successively and gradually developed from the earliest and simplest organisms (Spencer, 'Social Statistics,' p. 79) and, in particular, man himself is, without doubt, a lineal descendant of the anthropoid apes." (Haeckel, l. c.).

This completes the system of evolution, as now taught by the agnostic school; and we are assured by its adherents, that "no farther advance is probable or required," that it is "the only possible, thinkable system of ontology," and that those who do not accept it, are only such as "have not kept pace with the recent advances in natural history or have lagged behind in science." Whether any of its subordinate doctrines may be admitted, at least in a mitigated form—whether, in brief, the *Theistic Evolution*, advocated by some Catholic writers, can be reconciled with faith and reason—is beside our present purpose. We deal with *Agnostic Evolution* as a system and in its totality. Now, this system, as the reader will have observed, comprises these three fundamental dogmas:

1. Matter is its own beginning and end;
2. The lower forms of life were developed from inanimate matter by its own inherent, mechanical forces;
3. The higher forms of life, including man himself, were developed from the lower forms by the same inherent, mechanical forces.

Thus proposed, *evolutionism* may be viewed both as a *philo-*

sophical system, and as a *religious creed*. Its advocates propose it under this twofold aspect. "Like Kant, they construct not merely a theory of knowledge, but, in a certain way, of belief."¹ Viewed as a philosophical system, an eminent Christian naturalist characterizes it as "a puerile hypothesis." Viewed as a religious creed, he observes that it culminates logically in three negations—viz., of God, of the soul, and of virtue.² And the advocates of evolution corroborate the latter statement. Professor Clifford, for instance, holds that, if it is right to call any doctrine immoral, it is right so to call that doctrine which recognises "a destiny or a providence outside of us, overruling the efforts of man."³ Büchner tells us: "There exists a phrase repeated *ad nauseam*, of 'a mortal body and an immortal soul.' A closer examination causes us, with more truth, to reverse the sentence. . . . In a higher sense [the body] is immortal, since the smallest particle of which it is composed, cannot be destroyed. On the contrary, that which we call spirit, disappears with the dissolution of the individual material combination."⁴ And Mr. Taine assures us that virtue and vice are merely "products like sugar and vitriol."

As a *philosophical system*, evolution concerns us at present only because it supplies the basis of the *religious creed of science*. And here, no doubt, we shall be met with the objection: What is meant by calling a set of scientific doctrines a *creed*? Can there be any room for faith in a system, which professes to be thoroughly, purely scientific? Let us see.

The old theological concept of faith is expressed by St. Paul in these words: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." 1. In the first place, it is an "evidence," *i.e.*, a proof resting on the authority of another. 2. In the second place, it demands our assent to the truth "of things that appear not," *i.e.*, of such things as are not perviewous or evident to our reason. 3. In the third place, it supplies the "substance," *i.e.*, the basis, "of things hoped for," and therefore of our conduct and of the manner of realizing our hope. Now, it will not be a difficult matter to show that, in all these respects, the doctrine of evolution, as proclaimed by the modern apostles of science, sets up distinct claims to the name of a *creed*.

II.

In the first place, as far as resting on the authority of another is concerned, the *creed of science* makes demands on our faith more

¹ Sterling, *As Regards Protoplasm*, p. 77, foot.

² St. George Mivart, *Contemp. Rev.*, Sept., 1874.

³ *Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec., 1874, p. 730.

⁴ *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 13.

exacting than any revealed creed with which we are acquainted. Let us not be understood to condemn all faith that is born of reverence for a great name. So long as it is kept within bounds, it is perfectly conformable to reason. There is a disposition in human nature, to lean upon the authority of a fellow-man and, in the hope of avoiding a painful personal investigation, to accept his evidence as final. Hero-worship, Carlyle tells us, endures forever while man endures. The man who has distinguished himself in any department of knowledge, is like a messenger from the infinite unknown with tidings for us. "Direct from the inner fact of things, he lives and has to live in daily communion with it . . . ; his utterances are a sort of revelation Boswell venerates his Johnson, right truly, even in the eighteenth century. The unbelieving French believe in their Voltaire and crowd around him, in a very curious hero-worship, in that last act of his life when they stifle him with roses. He is the realized ideal of every one of them, the very thing they are all wanting to be, of all Frenchmen the most French The ladies pluck a hair or two from his fur to keep as a sacred relic He is properly their god—such a god as they are fit for."

Talk of demagogues in politics! There are as many in philosophy. Talk of Henry George, drawing after him the unthinking crowd! Heraclites, the pseudo-philosopher, did the same in cultured Greece; Ingersoll, the blaspheming infidel, does the same in our enlightened country. Let some daring spirit, with a little originality, arise; and forthwith thousands of satellites will follow in his train, especially if his doctrines cater to their baser instincts. They will be pantheists with Emerson, and fancy their souls to be "the Almighty in part and in infancy." They will be spiritists with Home, and hold *séances* to evoke the souls of the departed from their resting places. They will be buddhists with Colonel Alcott, believe in transmigration, and long for "Nirvana," as the final rest of their souls. They will be agnostics with Spencer, and deny the existence of spirits and souls altogether. Some have actually passed through all these stages within a few years; and, strange to say, they boast of thinking for themselves. There is no new opinion, however phantastical or preposterous, that will not count its proselytes by the scores. Its very extravagance has an irresistible charm for the fickle mind. "*Levia leves capiunt animos.*" It is the "fad" of the hour; and that is sufficient to recommend it. The fact is incontrovertible; it is patent to the least observant. But the question is: Is it reasonable? Is it worthy of men who pride themselves on their independence of thought?

Belief is a great factor in human life. But, according to Christian ideas at least, belief must be reasonable. "Rationabile

obsequium vestrum." When a prophet of old delivered his message, he confirmed it by signs and wonders, and said, like the Prophet of prophets: "Though you will not believe me, believe the works." How do the hierophants of the new dispensation accredit their mission? How do they qualify? So long as they announce merely the results of their observation of physical phenomena, they too appeal with right to their "works"—works of untiring industry and laborious research, which have written their names in blazing characters upon the golden scroll of fame. Far be it from us to depreciate what they have done for physical science. They come to us laden with the trophies of many well-proved facts. They delve deep into the bowels of the earth; they count and measure the rocky strata which compose the crust of the globe; they bring to light the giant forms of the mastodon, the deinotherion, the ammonite, the nummilites, which left their footprints in the obscure epochs of the past; they sound the ocean's depths, and find its loamy bottom, as well as the beds of our lakes and rivers, swarming with living beings so minute that 500,000,000 may exist in one drop of water; and they discover, under the microscope, that these same animalculæ possess an organic structure as wonderful as that of the elephant which swallows them by the millions in the running brook. "They have made it clear, that, in the animal and vegetable worlds, there exists, link on link, a complete chain of beings, from the microscopic mosses and algæ to the gigantic palm-tree, from the almost imperceptible minuteness of organization in the infusoria to the exuberant muscular organism of the mammoth; just as faith reveals, in the order of intelligences, another chain of beings, extending from man through all the bright hierarchies of heaven, up to the highest seraph that burns before the throne of God."¹

All hail to the patient explorers of nature's secrets! Long may they wear the laurels which they have won! We admit with gratitude the facts brought to light by their investigations, we accept with pleasure the verified results of their speculations, because we value every contribution to knowledge. So far they are within their rights. When, however, they leave the legitimate field of science to preach a new religion, we ask: Where are your credentials? What are the grounds upon which you rest your *creed*? But we ask in vain. Instead of producing their credentials they overpower us with polysyllabic Greek words, which only serve as a cloak to hide much learned ignorance. They forget Aristotle's precept about "thinking as the wise and speaking as common people do;" and they deliberately set at naught

¹ Heylen, *Progress and Dangers of the Age*, p. 25.

his advice, "define your terms and disputes will cease." Indeed, Pollock, Professor Clifford's biographer, tells us: "It is hardly worth the while to dispute about names when more serious things remain for discussion." And Huxley and Spencer consider that "in itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter. Matter may be regarded as a form of thought and thought may be regarded as a form of matter."¹ Assertions like these, as Mr. William Samuel Lilly remarks, are in themselves a revelation, not indeed of light, but of darkness. They give us a glimpse of chaos and of the void inane. Surely names are signs of—nay, the substitutes for—ideas. . . . Unless we use them as parrots do, which, to be sure, is the habit of many people, they stand to us in place of things.²

Like a certain well-known diplomatist, the modern scientific school seems to think that words were *invented*, not to express one's meaning but to conceal it and to "make the worse cause appear the better." Instead of intellect, scientists "speak of nervous centres; instead of life, of the play of cellular activities; instead of mental energy, of cerebral erethism. And their readers, piquing themselves on their distrust of everything outside the sphere of what they call facts, will *wonder with a foolish face of praise*." In their terminology *simple knowledge* is confounded at one time with *comprehensive knowledge*, at another time with *consciousness*, now with the *imagination*, and again with *sensitive perception* or *feeling*. We can have no *idea* of God they tell us, or *know* that He exists, because we cannot *comprehend* the Infinite; we can have no *notion* of Him, because we cannot *imagine* Him. Who ever said that we could *comprehend* God, *i.e.*, grasp or take in the fulness of the divine perfections? Who ever said that we could *imagine* Him, *i.e.*, represent Him under a material image, except only in the sense that even the painter's brush may depict an intellectual ideal or the poet's pen may body forth the forms of thought? Well may Mr. Lilly exclaim with Viola in *Twelfth Night*: "Words are grown so false that I am loth to prove reason with them." As the cuttlefish, when pursued, hides itself in a black liquor discharged from its ink-bag, so these scientists, when close pressed with arguments, retreat into the obscurity of a new-coined word. "*Stat magni nominis umbra*." Their tactics recall the saying of a witty priest, himself a scientific man who has enriched the world with more than one valuable discovery, and author of a spiritual work which a Protestant authority pronounced "the best book after the

¹ Elam, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 70.

² *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1886, p. 577.

Bible." Accustomed to accurate language and gifted with the happy faculty of presenting even the abstrusest subjects in an intelligible form, he had nothing but contempt for the scientific pedantry which seeks to pass off mere words as knowledge. Thus, if physicians called some familiar ailment by a learned name, he would compassionate the patient, saying: "Poor man! he is in a bad way; he has a *Greek* disease. If the disease doesn't kill him, the name will." The same thing may be said of much of our so-called science; its nomenclature alone is sufficient to "kill" it in the estimation of all real scholars. In metaphysics, in psychology, in ethics, in pedagogics, in every department of knowledge, the modern school of writers make it their chief study to mystify their readers by misapplying the terminology long familiar to the learned or by introducing a new and meaningless jargon of their own. Like certain presumptuous builders of old, they say to one another: "Let us make our name famous; let us make a tower, the top of which may reach to heaven." And the result is a Babel of tongues, so "that they understand not one another's speech." In fact, we may be permitted to doubt whether they understand themselves.

Is all this confusion deliberate and for a purpose, or is it only an index of their own minds? The question is not, perhaps, easy to answer. Certainly, for a philosopher who takes the dictates of common sense as the foundation of all correct reasoning, it is quite impossible to understand their mental structure. They are such anomalies in the universe that, in charity, one is inclined to believe that they must belong to one of those extinct species of transitionary beings which they are trying to discover, and to say with the poet: "*quod petis, hic est.*" Their contradictions are so numerous and so glaring that the fully developed human being seems to be scarcely capable of them. Take Mr. Huxley as a specimen among many. He defines man as a "conscious automaton." Man, he argues, must be an automaton because that is the logical corollary of the evolution theory. "The thoughts," he says, "to which I am now giving utterance and your thoughts regarding them are but the expression of molecular changes;" which amounts to saying, in ordinary human language, that man is only "an artful piece of mechanism, the cunningest of nature's clocks." Then, in the same breath, that automaton suddenly becomes "conscious," and elsewhere it is "endowed with free will . . . in as much as, in many respects, we are able to do as we like."¹ This is simply juggling with words.

Evolutionist philosophers are evidently able to go through the most extraordinary evolutions, far more rapid than any that are said

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1874, p. 577.

to have taken place in nature. No acrobat or tight-rope walker could go through so many in the same time. The unsophisticated, uninitiated man who witnesses their feats of mental gymnastics is simply bewildered, and unless he goes to such exhibitions with very steady nerves and sound metaphysical principles his head soon begins to swim. He feels as if he could not trust his own senses; he comes to doubt his own identity; and, perhaps, he is not quite sure that "two and two make four," as they used to do when he learned his tables.

Once the spectator has been brought to this state, the adroit performer

"Assumes the nod, affects the god,
And seems to shake the spheres."

He proclaims loudly that agnostic evolution is the "only possible, thinkable system of ontology"; with Darwin, he asserts that "it is *known* to afford the only possible solution of the mystery of the universe—a conclusion, the grounds of which will never be shaken"; with Tyndall, he insists that it is a doctrine not founded "on the basis of vague conjecture, but on *positive knowledge*"; or, maybe, with Büchner, he tells you very modestly (?) that *his* method of investigation has conducted him and his followers "to truth and enlightenment and delivered them from obstinate and pernicious prejudices," and that those who do not agree with him are "a howling pack, mental slaves and yelping curs."

III.

By this time the reader will have perceived that the apostles of the *creed of science* do not allow their authority to be questioned for a moment; and, perhaps, in the words written by Mr. Spencer about the father of the whole agnostic school, he will have said to himself: "No Pope ever claimed such infallibility." There can be no doubt that, so far as blind and unhesitating faith on the word of another is concerned, the *creed of science* is fully entitled to be called a creed. It is far more of a creed than of a science; it is daily becoming more unscientific.

What now of its tenets? Are they evident or pervious to human reason? Let the apostles of the creed speak for themselves. It is a fundamental dogma with them that "there are mysteries and locked doors everywhere," and that, "so far from explaining all things, each *explication* of science is encompassed by insoluble enigmas; so that, in all directions, we come upon an ever-enlarging sphere of impenetrable mystery."¹ We thank them for the

¹ *Religion*, Spencer and Harrison, Introduction.

admission, though we need not their researches to convince us that there are mysteries in nature. For they force themselves upon our notice. What is light? How clear to the eye, how impenetrable to the understanding! A natural mystery! What is heat? We know some of its effects, but its nature remains unexplored. Another mystery! What is electricity? We admire its marvellous workings, but about its essence the most distinguished member of the academy of science knows as little as the beginner. A mystery! But why instance the grave problems with which science has been so long grappling? Are there not mysteries all around us? mysteries in the grain which develops into the plant, into the blossom, into the ear, into the fruit? mysteries in the food which we change into our flesh and blood and bone by a transubstantiation as rapid as it is wonderful? mysteries in the tiniest insect which crawls upon the ground? mysteries in the wing of the gnat which buzzes in the evening air? mysteries in the atom of dust which floats in the sunbeam? Do you comprehend them? Do physicists or chemists comprehend them? Will they not have to exclaim, in the words of a distinguished naturalist, "All science is forced to take refuge in mystery and to terminate its speculations with an act of faith?" Yet, in all these cases, there is question of objects that fall under the senses. We know of their existence, though we cannot understand the nature of their operations.

Still more. Analytical geometry, dealing with the hyperbola and the asymptotes, proves to demonstration that two lines continually approach each other; and, at the same time, it proves that these lines will never meet within the realm of mathematics. Navigation proves theoretically that, if a vessel sailing north or south follows a certain spiral line, known as the loxodromic curve, it will continually advance towards the pole of the earth; and, on the other hand, it proves that, so long as the vessel does not leave that spiral line, it will never reach the pole. Even in the exact sciences such paradoxes abound, but they are always legitimate conclusions from admitted premises. Hence, though puzzled by the seeming contradiction which they imply, the intellect accepts them as true.

If now we leave the domain of purely natural science, if we cross the boundaries of time and space and enter into the presence of the infinite, we look for mysteries at every turn; for facts which, owing to our want of adequate perception, appear to us to be impossible; for truths which, though not against reason, are as far above it as heaven is above earth or the infinite above the finite. It is not the craving for light nor the higher aspirations of the soul that revolt against mysteries. It is the conceited mind,

which looks upon its own little self as the centre of all being and the fountain of all knowledge; or it is the narrow mind, which does not even suspect the existence of truths above the reach and ken of the human intellect. Nothing, therefore, can be more reasonable than the attitude of the Christian towards the revealed mysteries of religion. Remembering that "the searcher of majesty will be overwhelmed by glory," he does not pretend to gaze directly upon the sun of eternal wisdom, feeling only too happy to be allowed to view it "dimly as through a glass." Amid the darkness that encompasses mankind here below, he is content to be guided by the torch of faith "until the day dawn and the day-star shine in (his) heart." Provided he has a sufficient guarantee for the existence of a mystery, he bows down in humility of soul and says "*credo*—I believe."

But the mysteries of the *creed of science* are of a very different order from those of the Christian religion. To be convinced of this, we need but recall the cardinal doctrines of the *creed*, as formulated by its apostles:

1. Matter is its own beginning and end;
2. The lower forms of life were developed from matter by its own inherent, mechanical forces;
3. The higher forms of life, including man himself, were developed from the lower forms by the same inherent, mechanical forces.

Each of these doctrines, as their advocates admit, involves an impenetrable mystery; nevertheless, they furnish us with no grounds of belief, no *motives of credibility*, as theologians would say.

They cannot claim to propose these doctrines as facts which they or any one else have witnessed. They have not seen the beginning of matter, for, "according to their own theories," writes a Christian philosopher, "they were drifting about just then in atomic or molecular form, without thought or self-consciousness." Before dogmatizing, they would do well to reply to the challenge, so full of divine satire, addressed to "the innumerable company" of self-sufficient wisecracks: "Who is it that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if thou hast understanding. Who laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who stretched the line upon it? Upon what are its bases grounded, or who laid the corner-stone thereof?"

They have not seen life develop by "a mechanical process" from protoplasm, or seen a living organism baked from "life-stuff," as they have seen bricks baked from clay in a kiln. They have not seen a lower form of life evolved into a higher, nor one species

transformed into another; they have not even "gathered grapes from thorns or figs from thistles." O yes! We beg pardon; we were forgetting. Dr. Büchner, the elegant gentleman who applies such choice epithets to those that have the impudence to differ from him, states on his own authority that the *holothure*, an animal popularly called the sea-cucumber, *engenders snails*! Whence he argues: "If such an extraordinary process is possible that a holothuria should produce a snail, what naturalist can deny that conditions may once have subsisted (sic) in which . . . an ape, nay, any other animal, may have given birth to a man"? However, remarks Mr. Elam, "as this snail event is less likely to occur, zoologically speaking, than that a hen should hatch from one of her eggs a puppy dog, we may infer the value of Dr. Büchner's revelations generally.¹ Common sense people would not hesitate to class them with the legendary literature of his countryman, the Baron Von Münchhausen. Least of all have scientists seen the anthropoid ape evolve into a human being, or found the "missing link," for which they have been hitherto looking with as little prospect of success as the alchemist formerly looked for the *elixir* or *philosopher's stone*.

Do they prove their assertions by arguments either of deduction or induction? Rather, has not Mr. Spencer conclusively proved, in his "First Principles," that the idea of the self-existence or self-creation of matter involves a patent contradiction? Why, then, dogmatize, since the very first postulate of the whole system is manifestly inadmissible? With it the superstructure must fall, as the "baseless fabric of a vision"; and we must admit, as Spencer does in his sane moments, a first principle, which is not matter, from which the universe "proceeds by way of creation."

They do not prove that life can be produced by mechanical forces, from non-life. Like Huxley, they "frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory experimental proof that life can be developed, save from demonstrable antecedent life." They do not prove that the higher forms of life can be evolved from the lower. In fact, they do not make a single point. And if, in a truly scientific spirit, we "ask for some confirmatory evidence, we are told almost plaintively, that 'the strength of the doctrine of evolution consists not in experimental demonstration.' If we further inquire, in what its strength *does* consist, we fail to get any definite answer, except some vague statement as to 'its general harmony with scientific thought.'"² Agnostic evolution deals with phenomena, not as they exist, but as they might, could, would, or should have existed under certain undefined, impossible conditions, required by the "general harmony of scientific thought."

¹ *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 132, foot-note.

² *Idem*, p. 33.

The evolutionist, finding that the researches of science do not furnish a solid proof of his theory, adds, like Huxley, "If it were given me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time . . . I should *expect* to be a witness to the evolution of protoplasm from not-living matter." Like Spencer he sees, with the eye of the scientific imagination, a primitive "nebular haze," gradually concentrating into a molten mass, in which everything that now exists is latent and potential." "Such freaks hath strong imagination." Indeed, like Tyndall, under certain hypotheses, he does "*not doubt* (his) ability to produce the highest forms of organic matter."

Is there any need of further argument to show that the *creed of science* has absolutely no foundation to rest upon? To rank even as a scientific hypothesis, it must assign at least some plausible reasons based upon well-ascertained facts, hitherto not satisfactorily explained, of which it can give a rational explanation. The *creed of science* has no such reasons to assign. Furthermore, to prove such an hypothesis true, there is, according to Mr. Huxley himself, no other way but that of "observation upon existing forms of life." The *creed of science* has no such observation to produce. Mr. Elam is right, therefore, taking Huxley's proposition as his premise, in arguing thus: "The conclusions which necessarily flow from the study of organic evolution, may be summed up in one syllogism."

Without *verification* a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect;

But the theory of organic evolution is an unverified theoretic conception;

Therefore *organic evolution is a mere figment of the intellect.*¹ In other words, the *creed of science* is like the dreams of the fever patient—the "*ægri somnia vana*" of which the poet speaks—which are dispelled as soon as he awakes to self-consciousness.

But we have not yet sounded the *creed of science* to its depths. While professing to follow the only scientific method, its believers destroy the foundations of all true science. While claiming to be the apostles of reason, they absolutely stultify reason and discredit its primary conclusions. Matthew Arnold, for example, tells us that from the beauty of design and the harmonious working of a watch, we cannot infer that an intelligent being devised and made it; we only know, as a *fact of experience*, that men make watches, and *conclude* accordingly. *Conclude* what, pray? We do not conclude to the existence of a thing which we know as a fact of experience. At this rate, we cannot conclude anything. All sci-

¹ *Winds of Doctrine*, pp. 134 and 135.

ence becomes simply impossible; because we cannot abstract or generalize, cannot reason to any law or principle underlying anything. Reason is strangled, paralyzed; and we must end by being, not merely sceptics, but agnostics in the strictest sense of the word, that is, philosophical *know-nothings*. When men tell us that we can know nothing with certainty, except passing phenomena—that these phenomena may not have any underlying reality, that they are mere “phantasmagoria”—that matter itself is only the “phenomenal centre of energy,” or as Huxley holds, that matter may be spirit or spirit matter, cause effect or effect cause—that, for aught they know phenomenally, this may be that or that this, the first second or the second first—that they cannot believe that fire burns, that fire is extinguished by water, or life by the rope, for any *reason* or for any *necessity*, but simply for the habit of the thing; when men make these and similar statements in sober earnest, there can be no longer any question of reasoning with them, but only of restoring their reason in some institution for the cure of mental disease.

Prove to such men, as Lionel Beale did by microscopic observations, that their premises are fallacies, “without the slightest even apparent support”; it is all in vain. Each successive writer will make the same statements, with as much confidence as if they were founded in fact. He will add that “no really scientific mind now questions these *facts*”; and perhaps, like Spencer, he will deny that those who disagree with him, actually *think* or *believe*, even when they have a reflex consciousness of doing so. To any one who says, that he thinks the universe was created, or that he believes in a Creator, Mr. Spencer replies: “No! you do not think so; for such a doctrine is unthinkable. No! you do not believe; you only believe you believe.”¹ Show them, that they contradict all experience, which tells you that you are not a mere piece of mechanism, but capable of spontaneous free acts; and they will answer you that what you, the uninitiated and profane, take for conscious volition and the power of determining your own actions, is not an act of volition at all, but only the “symbol” of some pre-determination of molecular forces, that freedom is only a word to cover your ignorance. Assure them, that you can think, and that thought bears with it “the impress of nobility direct from God;” and they will answer, that your thought is only a secretion of your brain, and that it was “potential in the fires of the sun.” Tell them, that you can distinguish your own personality, and are conscious that there is *that* within you which is not Mr. Huxley or Mr. Spencer; and they will cut you short by saying, that what

¹ Elam, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 33.

you regard as your little *self*, is only a collection of phenomenal sensations. In short, they turn man's noblest faculties, destined to be channels of truth, into so many avenues of inevitable deception and falsehood, and make of man himself, not merely a mystery, but a compound of contradictions and absurdities. Original sin, as admitted by Christians, can account for many shortcomings; but it cannot account for this absolute degeneracy of nature.

IV.

Surely, every one must allow that, on the score of teaching doctrines not evident or perview to human reason, the *creed of science* has triumphantly established its right to the name of *creed*. It only remains to examine, how it satisfies the third and last condition of a religious creed; is it "the substance of things hoped for"? In other words, can it be the basis of a religion which furnishes grounds for rational expectation and motives of human conduct?

This question some years ago engaged the two most prominent leaders of the scientific school—Mr. Spencer and Mr. Frederick Harrison—in a warm and prolonged controversy, which was followed at the time with considerable interest by the English-speaking world, and which to all, except partisans of the cause, seemed to have ended fatally to both parties and to the views which they advocated. Each combatant—if we may be permitted to borrow Mr. Spencer's figurative language—after exchanging polite salutes and professing himself the other's humble servant, proceeded to the deadly encounter, and, amid flashes of wit coming from his polished blade, passed it through the ribs of his opponent's arguments, let out the vital principle, and reduced to an inanimate form whatever elements of religion agnosticism had been supposed to contain. Nothing is now left save the lifeless, but still unburied, corpses of the excommunicates. All, therefore, that we need in mercy do is to consign them to their unhallowed graves in the potter's field, "uncoffined, unhonored and unsung."

Both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison are agnostics, and pronounce the belief in a personal God as plainly unscientific. Both glory in having shattered all theological systems. But both insist upon the paramount necessity of religion and, consequently, of some object to reverence and worship. Both pursue the path of negation until they have done away with everything save *phenomenal nature* in its operation on mankind and the *Unknowable*. "Phenomenal nature and the Unknowable" behold here, writes Mr. Wilfrid Ward, their exhaustive division of all things. After destroying, as they suppose, all genuine religion, they have divided the clothes among themselves—that is, those ideas and cor-

responding emotions with which the objects of religious faith are invested by us, and which form their natural adornment, as well as the phrases which have been associated with religious feelings and belief. The saying of the psalmist, which was applied to other slayers of their God, may be applied to these also: "They have parted my garments among them, and on my vesture they have cast lots." Mr. Spencer dresses up the *Unknowable* with the ideas of infinity, eternity and energy. He talks to us of an eternal, infinite energy from which all things proceed, and asks us to worship it with the profoundest awe. Mr. Harrison dresses up *Humanity* with the sentiments of brotherly love, and proposes the worship of an ideal. "They have parted my garments among them." And having appropriated the clothes, both philosophers try to persuade themselves and the world that, after all, the clothes are the important part of religion and that, if they dress up something else in the same clothes, it will do just as well as the ancient faith. But the clothes won't fit.¹

Quite *à propos* of this subject we recall a caricature of King Louis XIV. of France. As memory vaguely pictures it to us now, it consisted of two comic prints adroitly combined into one. The first of these represented a broomstick arrayed in royal robes—high-heeled buskins, richly-embroidered satin vest, trailing mantle, and a queue of powdered hair surmounted by a crown of sparkling brilliants. Under it were the words, "Le Grand Monarque." The second represented a dwarfy human form—a head covered with a few straggling hairs, a shrivelled face, toothless gums and haggard features, whose outlines were, however, unmistakably those of the historic French monarch. Under it were the words, "Louis Quatorze." According to the conception of the artist the former is royalty minus the man in whom it is vested; the latter is the man minus his royalty—a decrepit specimen of humanity, seemingly as little qualified to wear the trappings of majesty as the broomstick which has donned them. The former is a fitting symbol of Mr. Spencer's religion; the latter of Mr. Harrison's. Both are simply what the robes make them; they lack the essentials of religion. The *creed of science*, whether it sets up the broomstick or the decrepit form of man, offers us no object worthy of worship or capable of founding rational expectation. It is not "the substance of things hoped for."

To make this evident to any thinking mind we need do little more than summarize the reasoning of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison; for each of them sees, as well as any one else, the weakness of his rival's position. We shall, therefore, endeavor to repro-

¹ Wilfrid Ward, *The Clothes of Religion*, passim.

duce briefly the substance of their arguments, and supplement them with others in full accord with their train of thought.

Who or what is that "Unknowable," asks Mr. Harrison, with trenchant logic, which Mr. Spencer holds up as an object of religious worship? Does not religion of necessity imply belief in a Power outside of us that controls our destinies and exercises an influence over our lives—a Power that founds our hope and challenges our admiration and our gratitude? Are these conditions verified in the "Great Unknowable"? Mr. Spencer talks piously (so piously!) of the *practical belief* that man is ever in the presence of some *energy* or *energies* of which he knows nothing and to which it would therefore be unwise to assign any limits, conditions or functions. Does he profess to believe in one uniform *energy*? If so, he professes to know something very important about his deity. He tells us that from this *energy* "all things proceed by way of creation." This sounds like a sudden reversion to the theological type of a conscious, personal God. Long ago we predicted to Mr. Spencer that he would find himself in strange company. Our prediction seems to be now verified. Mr. Spencer should go and worship with Christians. Or, does he wish to preserve the negative character of the "Unknowable"? In that case, what are those energies, those forces about which he discourses? Gravitation and vibration also imply forces; yet who ever dreamed of believing in gravitation or of worshipping vibration?

How mere a phrase must any religion be of which neither belief nor worship nor conduct can be spoken! Imagine a religion which can have no believers because *ex hypothesi* its adepts are forbidden to believe anything about it. Imagine a religion which excludes the idea of worship because its sole dogma is that there is a sort of something about which we know nothing, its first precept that it is a duty not to try to know anything about it. Lastly, imagine a religion that can have no relation to conduct; for obviously the "Unknowable" can give us no help to conduct and, *ex vi termini*, can have no bearing on conduct. What is religion for? Why do we want it? And what do we expect it to do for us? If it can give us no reason for hope, nothing for the mind to rest on, nothing to purify the heart, to exalt the sense of sympathy, to strengthen our resolves, to chasten us into resignation and to awaken a spirit of self-sacrifice—what is it good for? As to acknowledging our dependence upon the "Unknowable" or conforming our lives to it or trusting in it, the use of such words is absolutely meaningless. We can wonder at it as the child wonders at the "twinkling star," and that is all. Does Mr. Spencer commune with the "Unknowable" in the secret of his chamber? Does he find in it the ideal, the model to conform to or imitate?

One would like to see the new *Imitatio Ignoti* to replace the *Imitatio Christi*. It was said of old, "ignotum omne pro magnifico." The new version seems to be, "ignotum omne pro divino." The foundations of a creed can rest only on the known and the knowable. Better bury religion at once than let its ghost walk uneasy in our dreams. It cannot be found in this no-man's land and know-nothing creed. True religion must of necessity have something anthropomorphic, like the Christian, and present us with an object that shall respond to our human instincts, human feelings, human sympathies.

We have listened to Mr. Harrison. Let us also give his rival a hearing: Who or what, retorts Mr. Spencer, is that "Great Adorable Being, Humanity," which Mr. Harrison worships? Where is the incorporated form which we are to regard as the author of all the good that has come to our race, which founds our hope and challenges our admiration, our gratitude, our veneration and our awe? Faith, hope, love, gratitude, veneration and awe imply a conscious being—conscious of its ideas and its actions, its volitions and its feelings. Where is the seat of that consciousness? Is it diffused throughout mankind at large? That cannot be; for consciousness is an organized combination of mental states such as certainly do not exist throughout humanity. If that "Great Being" is unconscious, the emotions of faith, hope, veneration and gratitude are absolutely irrelevant. What and where, we ask again, is that "Great Adorable Being?" Is it the individual? Is it the aggregate of human beings, the community at large, the chosen few? What have any of them done for us individually with conscious love? Individuals have labored, the race has progressed, communities have organized themselves for the attainment of private ends with utter ignorance and unconsciousness, or at least with entire selfishness and disregard of social effects and the public welfare. We say nothing now of that ludicrous self-deification indulged in by the religion of "Humanity" and that wholesale canonization of saints upon its diptychs—nothing of the glaring inconsistency which places side by side in the same category Jewish patriarchs, Christian apostles and pagan philosophers, St. Bernard, Mahomet, Napoleon Bonaparte and other characters historically and ethically unsociable—nothing of those singular gatherings of the worshippers of "Humanity," wittily described by some one as consisting of three persons and no God—nothing of that strange ritual which incorporates Christian hymns into its meaningless service and ends with a prayer such as Dr. Congreve is said to have offered at one of his meetings: "Let us pray! We praise thee, Humanity, as for all thy servants, so especially for Auguste Comte (the founder of our faith); and we pray that in proof

of our gratitude we may become thy more willing and complete servants. . . . Thou queen of our devotion, the lady of our loving servitude, the one centre of all our being, the one bond of all ages, the one shelter of all the families of mankind, the one foundation of a truly catholic church. To thee be all honor and glory. Amen!"

If such a service looks like a comedy, and a travesty of religion, it is because it combines the maximum of imagination with the minimum of religious truth. What excites our sense of the ridiculous is not the want of inborn reverence in human nature, but the evident incongruity of the worship and the absence of any fitting object on which to lavish our affections. Yet surely veneration and gratitude are due somewhere, and if they are due at all, it must be to that ultimate cause from which humanity, individually and as a whole, in common with all other things, owe their origin, to that infinite energy from which all have proceeded by way of creation.

Such is the drift of Mr. Spencer's arguments. And here we may safely rest the issue of the whole cause. The two champions of the *creed of science* tell us that they have spoken the last words on agnosticism, and beyond all doubt, if there is any value in sound logic, they have triumphantly refuted each other and dealt the death-blow to the whole system. Of the two, Mr. Spencer, who is the recognized leader of the school, is unquestionably the abler reasoner; and he, so his antagonist tells us, is compelled, in virtue of his own premises, to join hands with Christians. If he does not hide himself again amidst the clouds and fogs of primeval nebulae, he must worship with us at the altar of a personal God—hitherto an unknown God to him, as He was to the learned judges of the Athenian areopagus until the great Apostle of Christianity came to announce Him to them. What is wanting to Mr. Spencer is not native intellect to discern the truth when it is fairly presented to him, but a little of that humility which converted Dionysius from a pagan philosopher into a believer of the Christian revelation. It is so hard for a "doctor in Israel" to become a simple disciple of the Crucified. The "whirlwinds of applause" said to greet Mr. Spencer when he addresses a crowd of adoring listeners, carry with them a blinding dust, much more likely to obscure his vision than any philosophical difficulty.

The issue between so-called science and religion is not substantially different from what it was when "Socrates, in Xenophon's hearing, confuted the little atheist Aristodemus." The groundwork of reasoning, the laws of the mind, have not changed. They cannot change as purely physical science changes. We may make new inventions and discover new secrets of nature; but all the dis-

coveries of physics, if they are to present anything more than a hap-hazard collection or museum of natural curiosities, must in the end be tested and systematized according to the laws of metaphysics. And, just in this respect, we find that our scientists and self-styled philosophers are lamentably at fault. What we censure in them is not too much science and philosophy, but a lack of all genuine science and philosophy, and of an accurate analysis of truth. Mr. Spencer furnishes us with many startling proofs of this lack of accurate analysis. Forced by his own reasoning to recognize an ultimate cause, distinct from the material universe, he suddenly takes fright at his conclusion, and, as usual, seeks shelter behind a polysyllabic Greek word. Though recognizing an ultimate cause, he refuses to accept the Christian idea of God, because that idea is "anthropomorphic." In other words, Christians—and, indeed, all but agnostics—conceive of God in the likeness of a *human person*; they speak of Him as seeing, hearing, loving; they give Him the attributes of knowledge, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc., and all these things connote a *human personality*.

Has Mr. Spencer ever heard of the figure of speech called *metaphor*? If he did not persistently confound reason with imagination—though he knows the difference full well—he would remember that the sensible image—the phantasm—may recall an idea and represent, in its own way, an intellectual truth. The smallest Christian child which has learned its catechism would tell him that God has no eyes, no ears, because He is a pure spirit; but that we use such expressions in speaking of Him in order to convey some notion, however inadequate, of that infinite Being who transcends all human language, as He transcends all human comprehension. Has he ever heard of *analogous* terms? The merest tyro in logic would tell him that knowledge, wisdom, goodness, justice, personality, etc., are not predicated of the infinite and eternal in precisely the same sense as of the finite and temporal; that in man's noblest faculties there is only a dim shadowing forth of that "Power of which," as Mr. Spencer says truly, "man and the world are products, and which is manifested through man and the world from instant to instant."¹

According to the clear and positive teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, the First Cause is *above* and *beyond* all genus and species, and between Him and finite beings there can be question only of *comparison* and *analogy*. Plato writes, in the same sense, that "the First Good is not being, but *above* and *beyond* being in dignity and power."² Mr. Spencer certainly requires no more, when he bids

¹ *Religion*, Spencer and Harrison, p. 68.

² *Republic*, 509, B.

us "submit ourselves, with all humility, to the established limits of our intelligence," in the conviction that the choice is not "between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality (*i.e.*, human personality) and something higher." Quite unwittingly, no doubt, he gives expression here to very sound Christian doctrine. It is only on the supposition that there is in God something higher than *human personality* that the Christian philosopher or theologian can reconcile the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation with the dictates of reason, that he can adore three divine Persons in the unity of the divine Essence and recognize his God in the Son of Man. How marvellously the deductions of right reason agree with Christian dogmas!

Science is dishonored when it rises in revolt against the teachings of well-proved revelation, and allows itself to be made "the stalking-horse of the miserable ghoul of atheism." Out upon such miscalled science! It is only another name for nescience and denial of truth. Its wild theorizing, its endless shifting and shirking and changing are leading the minds of men further and further from the truth. For truth does not change; like God, its spring and source, truth "remaineth forever;" truth "is ever ancient, ever new, the same yesterday, to-day and forever." "For those who believe," writes Mr. Gladstone, "that the old foundations are unshaken still, and that the fabric built upon them will look down for ages on the floating wreck of many a modern and boastful theory, it is difficult to see anything but infatuation in the destructive temperament which leads to the notion that to substitute a blind mechanism for the hand of God in the affairs of life, is to enlarge the scope of remedial agency; that to dismiss the highest of all inspirations is to elevate the strain of human thought and life; and that each of us is to rejoice that our several units are to be disintegrated at death into 'countless millions of organisms'; for such, it seems, is the latest 'revelation' delivered from the fragile tripod of the modern Delphi. Assuredly, on the minds of those who believe, or else on the minds of those who, after this fashion, disbelieve, there lies a deep judicial darkness—a darkness that may be felt. While disbelief, in the eyes of faith, is a sore calamity, this kind of disbelief, which renounces and repudiates with more than satisfaction what is brightest and best in the inheritance of man, is astounding and might be deemed incredible. Nay, some will say, rather than accept the flimsy and hollow consolations which it makes bold to offer, might we not go back to solar adoration, or with Goethe, to the hollows of Olympus?"¹

Out upon a *creed* which can furnish us no more reliable author-

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, November, 1885, p. 706.

ity than the *ipse dixit* of arrogant theorizers, which sets at defiance the first principles of reason, which destroys the very foundations of hope, and makes us doubt whether life is worth living. We want none of it. We want a creed based upon an authority that reason can commend—a creed which, though it may demand of us belief in many truths *above* our comprehension, yet contains nothing *against* sound reason—a creed which teaches us to look forward with hope to the day when the problem of life shall be fully solved—a creed, in fine, which cheers us with the thought that, when we shall have shaken off this mortal coil, the spiritual part of our being—the *divina particula auræ*, the breath of God—shall survive; that, like the phoenix, we shall rise again from our ashes, and that, amid the last wreck of matter, we shall light the torch of hope “at the funeral pyre of the universe.” R. J. M.

BALFOUR'S PHILOSOPHY.

PART III.

(SOME CAUSES OF BELIEF.)

IN our examination of the second part of Mr. Balfour's work—the part entitled *Some Reasons for Belief*—we concluded that although he was successful in showing that *Sensism* is both incoherent and baseless, he comprehended under the one term, "Rationalism," two very different things. He placed under it both (1) what he terms "Naturalism in embryo," or what is termed by us "Sensism" (which ignores the fundamental intuitions of the intellect), and also (2) rational philosophy (which builds upon the fundamental intuition of the intellect).

This confusion must infallibly lead to scepticism unless some help can be obtained to succor man's rational faculty when reduced to such sore straits as Mr. Balfour has felt himself compelled (owing to this confusion of thought) to reduce it.

In shortly restating the pith of the first two parts of his book, he says:¹

"In the first part of these notes I endeavored to show that Naturalism was practically insufficient."

We have already called attention² to the admirable and convincing way in which he has done this by means of a process of *reductio ad absurdum*.

But the insufficiency of *Naturalism* or *Sensism* might have been directly demonstrated in a very summary manner.

For "Naturalism" and "Sensism" are essentially mere imaginary enlargements and prolongations of *physical science*, and on that account can be plainly seen to be *necessarily* insufficient for our intellectual needs. Thinking men require to have some satisfying notions about morals, art, philosophy and religion, but *physical science* is, of course, unable to supply information about any such matters which are altogether beyond its sphere. It is, of course, perfectly true that physicists, *as such*, cannot justly be blamed for ignoring ethics, æsthetics, philosophy and religion, since such matters are in no way their business.

Physicists, *as such*, are right in trying to explain everything by

¹ P. 185.

² See *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January, 1896.

physical conceptions,¹ and the most the physicist (*qua* physicist) can say of any marvel whatever, is that he "cannot explain it."

He could never, as a physicist, be justified in affirming a miracle, for to do that he must step beyond physics into the regions of philosophy and theology.

Similarly he cannot deal with matters philosophical, and if a physicist (*qua* physicist) tries so to do, he must fall into what Mr. Balfour justly ridicules as "Naturalism" and we as "Sensism."

In so doing, the physicist is simply attempting the absurd and the impossible, and would end by depriving even his own physical science of any logical foundation if his views could prevail.

But if he continues to seek an ultimate foundation for his own science in a logical and unbiassed manner, he will thereby be led, or driven, into philosophy and to that which is the ultimate basis of philosophy and physics alike, namely, self-evident facts, self-evident first principles and a perception of the nature and force of logical inference.

But no rational man can be purely a physicist or purely a biologist; for some system of philosophy must be held (however unconsciously) by every person not mentally deficient, and every one has some perception of right and wrong and of causation. On this account we cannot hold physicists as free from blame for not apprehending truths with which, *as* physicists, they have nothing to do. For every man is bound to live *as* something more than *as* a physicist or *as* a biologist, namely, as a reasonable man in all the relations of social life. Mr. Balfour, not recognizing the profoundly rational, not "rationalistic," basis of natural theology, goes on to observe:²

"But if Naturalism by itself be practically insufficient . . . and if as I think . . . Idealism has not got us out of the difficulty, what remedy remains? One such remedy consists in simply setting up, side by side with the creed of natural science, another and supplementary set of beliefs which may minister to needs and aspirations which science cannot meet, and may speak amid silences which science is powerless to break. The natural world and the spiritual world, the world which is immediately subject to causation and the world which is immediately subject to God, are, in this view, each of them real, and each of them the objects of real knowledge. But the laws of the natural world are revealed to us by the discoveries of science, while the laws of the spiritual world are revealed to us through the authority of spiritual intuitions, inspired witnesses or divinely guided institutions. And the two regions of knowledge lie side by side, contiguous but not connected, like empires of different race and language, which own no common jurisdiction nor hold any intercourse with each other except along a disputed and wavering frontier where no superior power exists to settle their quarrels or determine their respective limits."

¹ Obviously the biologist, as such, is bound to consider the phenomena and laws of organic life, and will naturally try to explain all the phenomena of living beings of all kinds thereby.

² P. 186.

Well may Mr. Balfour term¹ such a system "a patchwork scheme of belief," and we cannot but marvel greatly that anyone of ability who has tried in many respects so admirably to lay serviceable foundations of belief, should declare that he "can hold out small hope of bettering it." Admitting his claim for it, that it is "more satisfactory as regards its content than Naturalism," it is indeed a sorry mode of quieting a mind troubled by religious doubts and difficulties. It is curious also that this system, thus brought forward as important, has never been advocated by any important writer, so far as we know.

Now what is really required, and what Mr. Balfour affirms (with us) is demanded "*rightly*," is a philosophy (or scheme of knowledge) which shall give "rational unity to an adequate creed." But such a philosophy Mr. Balfour pathetically declares² he neither has nor hopes soon to obtain.

Seeing clearly that there is no hope of obtaining any secure basis for morals and religion out of "Naturalism," or from "rationalism," in the first sense³ in which he uses the word, and seemingly unconscious of the support to be derived from "rationalism" in the second sense also comprehended by him under that term (*i.e.*, reason reposing on first principles), he proposes⁴ to "turn for assistance towards a new quarter," and attack "the problem by the aid of some more comprehensive, or at least more manageable, principle."

For this purpose he suggests that we should, for the moment, divest ourselves of all philosophic preconceptions, and consider beliefs with respect to their origin only—the causes which have actually given birth to them.

"Thus considered," he says, "they are, of course, mere products of natural conditions; psychological growths comparable to the flora and fauna of continents or oceans; objects of which we may say that they are useful or harmful, plentiful or rare, but not, except parenthetically and with a certain irrelevance, that they are true or untrue."

He then imagines an impartial spirit from another planet studying to discover the place different beliefs occupy in the natural history of the earth and its inhabitants, and arriving at the conclusion that even the simplest⁵ of them—those of sense-perception

¹ P. 187.

² P. 188.

³ See pp. 168, 170 and 185.

⁴ P. 188.

⁵ He tells us the observer would note "that the vast majority of these beliefs were the short-lived offspring of sense-perception"; "the sun is shining," "there is somebody in the room," "I feel tired," would be examples of this class. Here we have a glaring example of a misuse of the word "belief." Of what can a man be more certain than that he feels tired, and what testimony does a man with eyes require that the sun shines?

—are due to the action of external objects upon the believing organism, and more particularly on the nervous system, though multitudes of nervous changes do not result in the generation of any beliefs.

Neural changes would also be perceived by such an observant spirit to have a psychical side relating to beliefs, not concerning things present and perceived, but concerning things antecedent (memories) or future (anticipations).

"These two classes of beliefs," he continues,¹ "relating respectively to the present and the absent, cover the whole ground of what is commonly called experience, and something more. They include, therefore, at least in rudimentary form, all particulars which, on any theory, are required for scientific induction; and, according to empiricism in its older forms, they supply not this only, but also the whole of the raw material, without any exception, out of which reason must subsequently fashion whatever stock of additional beliefs it is needful for mankind to entertain."

He then goes on to point out that his impartial imaginary observer, intent on discovering how convictions are actually produced, finds that these simple beliefs require to be supplemented by something more than reason² in order to provide the apparatus of beliefs now current in the scientific, social, and spiritual life of mankind.

"These conditions," he tells us,³ "though necessary, are clearly not enough; the appropriate environment has also to be provided, and . . . it contains one group of causes so important in their collective operation, and yet in popular discourse so often misrepresented, that a detailed notice of it seems desirable."

In his second chapter, entitled *Authority and Reason*, he proceeds to develop, and points out of what this group of causes, which have so important a collective effect, consists. The name he applies to denote the group is "Authority."⁴

He goes on to remark,⁵ "that the theory of authority has been for three centuries the main battlefield whereon have met the opposing forces of new thoughts and old. But if so, it is only because at this point, at least, victory is commonly supposed long ago to have declared itself decisively in favor of the new. The very statement that

¹ P. 192.

² Mr. Balfour's words are: "Our Imaginary Observer . . . would soon find out that there were other influences besides *reasoning* required to supplement, etc." Evidently, however, he does not here refer to "ratiocination" only, but to rational mental activity of all kinds, *i.e.*, to reason. We shall find other instances in which he uses this borrowed term in an unduly wide sense—confounds "reason" with "reasoning."

³ P. 193.

⁴ At p. 219 Mr. Balfour defines what he means by authority as follows: "Authority, as I have been using the term, is in all cases contrasted with reason, and stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning."

⁵ P. 195.

the rival and opponent of authority is reason, seems to most persons equivalent to a declaration that the latter must be in the right, and the former in the wrong; while popular discussion and speculation have driven deep the general impression that authority serves no other purpose in the economy of nature than to supply a refuge for all that is most bigoted and absurd.

"The current theory by which these views are supported appears to be something of this kind: Every one has a 'right' to adopt any opinion he pleases. It is his 'duty' before exercising this 'right,' critically to sift the reasons by which such opinions may be supported, and so to adjust the degree of his convictions that they shall accurately correspond with the evidences adduced in their favor. Authority, therefore, has no place among the legitimate causes of belief. If it appears among them, it is as an intruder, to be jealously hooted down and mercilessly expelled. Reason, and reason only, can be safely permitted to mould the convictions of mankind. By its inward counsels alone should beings who boast that they are rational submit to be controlled. Sentiments like these are among the commonplaces of political and social philosophy.¹ Yet, looked at scientifically, they seem to me to be not merely erroneous, but absurd."

In this account Mr. Balfour is manifestly correct. He continues² as follows:

"Suppose for a moment a community of which each member should deliberately set himself to the task of throwing off so far as possible all prejudices due to education; where each should consider it his duty critically to examine the grounds whereon rest every positive enactment and every moral precept which he has been accustomed to obey; to dissect all the great loyalties which make social life possible, and all the minor conventions which help to make it easy; and to weigh out with scrupulous precision the exact degree of assent which in each particular case the results of the process might seem to justify. To say that such a community, if it acted upon the opinions thus arrived at, would stand but a poor chance in the struggle for existence is to say far too little. It would never even begin to be; and if by a miracle it was created, it would without doubt immediately resolve itself into its constituent elements."

Then he eloquently and forcibly depicts the disastrous and absurd consequences which would ensue were every one so to act³ in matters of every-day life.

"Consider by way of illustration the case of morality. If the right and the duty of private judgment be universal, it must be both the privilege and the business of every man to subject the maxims of current morality to a critical examination; and unless the examination is to be a farce every man should bring to it a mind as little warped as possible by habit and education or the unconscious bias of foregone conclusions. Picture, then, the condition of a society in which the successive generations would thus in turn devote their energies to an impartial criticism of the 'traditional'

¹ No one has been more persistent and forcible in stigmatizing what he called "the sin of faith," and in affirming the sacred duty of doubt, and our moral obligation to make an equation between credence and evidence, than the late Prof. Huxley. It is true he carefully abstained from applying this rule to morals, and only made use of it as a weapon against religion. Yet what could be more absurd than to declare that our reason is qualified to judge as to our duties to Almighty God whose being is not only unimaginable but inconceivable, but must yield a blind obedience to authority with respect to our duties to our fellow-men whose nature we are, nevertheless, well able to estimate by our knowledge of our own!

² P. 196.

³ *I.e.*, on Professor Huxley's canon as to credence.

view. What qualifications, natural or acquired, for such a task we are to attribute to this emancipated community I know not. But let us put them at the highest. Let us suppose that every man and woman, or rather every boy and girl (for ought reason to be ousted from her rights in persons under twenty-one years of age?), is endowed with the aptitude and training required to deal with problems like these. Arm them with the most recent methods of criticism and set them down to the task of estimating with open minds the claims which charity, temperance and poverty, murder, theft and adultery respectively have upon the approval or disapproval of mankind. What the result of such an experiment would be, what wild chaos of opinions . . . I know not. But it might well happen that even before our youthful critics got so far as a rearrangement of the Ten Commandments they might find themselves entangled in the preliminary question whether judgments conveying moral approbation and disapprobation were of a kind which reasonable beings should be asked at all; whether 'right' and 'wrong' were words representing anything more permanent and important than certain likes and dislikes which happen to be rather widely disseminated and more or less arbitrarily associated with social and legal functions."

The truth of this contention is manifest and unquestionable. Nevertheless, even here, Mr. Balfour's neglect of the unnoticed action of human reason is very noteworthy. His distrust of and apparent dislike to "reason" are extraordinary, and this in spite of his employment of his own exceptionally gifted individual reason in the task of discrediting reason as it exists in the race. And he does this, *mirabile dictu*, in the interest of religion! Yet what is more certain than the fact that if reason is not absolutely to be trusted as to its declarations concerning evident ultimate truths and first principles, all religion becomes thereby deprived of its *prolegomena*, the only foundation upon which it can possibly repose?

Mr. Balfour represents¹ his supposed "students" (of the above-cited passage) as tempted to reject ethical laws because "while there is no great difference as to what things are right or wrong, there is no semblance of agreement as to why they are right or why they are wrong." Thus he says, though all concur in holding murder to be wrong, one philosopher says it is so because inconsistent with human happiness; another because it is against conscience; a third because it is against God's law; and a fourth because it leads to the gallows.

"Now, whence," he asks,² "this curious mixture of agreement and disagreement? How account for the strange variety exhibited in the premises of these various systems and the not less strange uniformity exhibited in their conclusions?"

Surely the answer is most simple. The four selected philosophers agree as to the fact of murder being wrong and they only differ because each gives but a single fragment of the total reason *why* it is wrong. Murder is wrong because (1) it is anti-social, (2) is against conscience, (3) contravenes God's laws, and (4) leads to

¹ P. 198.

² P. 199.

the cutting short of a life which ought to have been prolonged to find happiness in doing good. All the reasons assigned are valid, and it would be easy to add others such as : (5) the putting an end to a life renders impossible the further performance of social duty by the murdered man ; (6) it causes distress to any one who loved him ; (7) it stops all acts of divine worship on the part of the victim, etc.

The position taken up as respects reason and authority by Mr. Balfour will become more and more clear to the reader as he peruses this second chapter.

He tells us that always and everywhere his imaginary observer would note the immense, inevitable and mainly beneficent part which authority pays in the production of belief.

The familiar sayings that "every man is the product of the society in which he lives," and that "it is vain to expect a man to rise much above the level of his age," are manifestations of that view to a certain extent, though they do not express Mr. Balfour's precise position.¹ This is because they rather pertain to the theory which regards reason as a sort of Ormuzd and authority as a sort of Ahriman in constant opposition to progress, which it identifies with all that is good. This confusion he declares to arise "out of the tacit assumption that reason means *right* reason."

But "reason" is and necessarily must be "right reason." To say that reason may not be right is like saying "a blue vase may be colorless ;" it is simply a contradiction in terms. Reason which is not "right" is not reason at all, but unreason. Probably here, as in other places, Mr. Balfour means by reason "*reasoning*." There are, of course, plenty of erroneous attempts at ratiocination, and many men are very unreasonable. But for the frequent mistakes made in reasoning it would be superfluous to warn mankind against fallacies.

But Mr. Balfour observes we might identify reason with right reason "and yet deny that all right belief was the fruit of reason." In a sense we might, indeed, say this of the truths of revelation (*e.g.*, the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and Transubstantiation), for they are necessarily inaccessible to reason. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Revelation itself reposes on its prolegomena, we might affirm that, thus considered, they are "the fruit of reason," as the produce of a pear tree grafted on a thorn may be said, in a sense, to be the fruit of the thorn, through which alone the grafted plant can nourish itself, blossom and bear fruit.

¹ He says (p. 202) : "Our ancestors . . . were not to be pitied because they reasoned little and believed much ; nor should we necessarily have any particular cause for self-congratulation if it were true that we reasoned more and, it may be, believed less."

After what Mr. Balfour mistakenly regards as a first source of error (the assumption that reason means right reason) he represents a tendency to magnify the importance and influence of self-conscious reason as a second source of error. We know we have set the rational machine in motion and are responsible to ourselves for its proper working, and this, he thinks, leads us naturally to concentrate our attention on it and unduly magnify its importance in the general scheme of things.

As an illustration he refers¹ to a primitive form of steam-engine which required a boy to work the valve of the cylinder by pulling a string, adding :

"I have little doubt that until the advent of that revolutionary youth who so tied the string to one of the moving parts of the engine that his personal supervision was no longer necessary, the boy in office greatly magnified his functions and regarded himself with pardonable pride as the most important, because the only rational, link in the chain of causes and effects. . . . So do we stand as reasoning beings in the presence of the complex processes, physiological and physical, out of which are manufactured the convictions necessary to the conduct of life. To the results obtained by their co-operation reason makes its slender contribution; but in order that it may do so effectively it is beneficently decreed that, pending the evolution of some better device, reason should appear to the reasoner the most admirable and important contrivance in the whole mechanism."

The lad, however, was perfectly right. He *was* the only rational link in the machine; but he would have been wrong indeed if he had esteemed himself above the men of science, the engineers and the artisans by whose intelligence the machine had been first conceived in principle, then accurately imagined and designed in detail, and finally formed and put together with skilled labor. Still more absurdly wrong would he have been if he had thought the power and strength he exercised in pulling the string was comparable with the energy of the physical forces or the strength of the masses of metal in aiding the play of which he performed his subordinate, yet then necessary, part. But the greatest mistake of all would have been if he had ranked his ill-instructed and undeveloped intelligence as anything less than all physical forces and any masses of matter whatever and wherever in one whole.

Of course the mechanism of the universe, including that of all living creatures and above all of man, has been so ordered by an all-wise Creator, that human beings have been unconsciously compelled by degrees to assert and arrange themselves in more and more developed and stable aggregations, without prejudice to their conscious reason and to the free-will necessary for their moral responsibility which exists amidst an overwhelming preponderance of acts due to habit, to the action of the environment and to other determining agencies.

¹ P. 203.

Mr. Balfour illustrates his position by appealing to physiology, and with much truth observes:¹

"Of all the complex causes which co-operate for the healthy nourishment of the body, no doubt the conscious choice of the most wholesome rather than the less wholesome forms of ordinary food is far from being the most unimportant. Yet, as it is within our immediate competence, we attend to it, moralize about it, and generally make much of it. But no man can, by taking thought directly, regulate his digestive secretions. We never, therefore, think of them at all until they go wrong, and then, unfortunately, to very little purpose. So it is with the body politic. A certain proportion (probably a small one) of the changes and adaptations required by altered surroundings can only be effected through the solvent action of criticism and discussion . . . matters we seem able to regulate by conscious effort. . . . We therefore unduly magnify the part they play. . . . We perceive that they supply business to the practical politician, lost material to the political theorist; and we forget amid the buzzing of debate the multitude of incomparably more important processes, by whose undeveloped co-operation alone the life and growth of the state is rendered possible."

The comparison, however, is not a good one. He justly considers that reason does intervene in political activity and in the rise or fall of states, but with regard to the processes of organic life (the vegetative functions of the organism) not only is reason unable to aid their action, but, as the late Sir Henry Holland interestingly pointed out, may do us serious mischief by frequently directing attention on the automatic actions of the bodily frame.

In the third section of his second chapter, Mr. Balfour directs our attention to what he regards as yet another (a third) source of delusion,² namely, the taking of non-rational, emotional tendencies (called by him "psychological climates") to be really products of reason.

Beliefs he regards as largely produced (as of course they are) by education, the pressure of domestic, social, scientific and ecclesiastical surroundings, but he tells us³ that:

"The power of authority is never more subtle and effective than when it produces a psychological 'atmosphere' or 'climate' favorable to the life of certain modes of belief; unfavorable, and even fatal, to the life of others."

They may vary enormously as to extent, duration, intensity and quality, but "their importance to the conduct of life, social and individual, cannot easily be overstated."

External circumstances, conditions of time and place limit the number of possible opinions on the one hand, and internal senti-

¹ P. 204.

² The two previous sources of delusion, according to Mr. Balfour, appear to be (1) "the assumption that reason means *right* reason," and (2) the exaggeration the part played by reason in manufacturing "the convictions necessary to the conduct of life" (p. 204), as above pointed out.

³ P. 206.

ments (which often cause opinions to be rejected without a hearing) also limit them on the other hand.

"Can this process," Mr. Balfour adds,¹ "be described as a rational one? That it is not the immediate result of *reasoning* is, I think, evident enough."

Here we have again the unfortunate confusion between "reason" and "ratiocination." If such limiting influences are not the immediate results of ratiocination, that does not prevent their being the immediate results of *reason* guided by its fundamental intuitions. We are compelled in this matter to differ altogether from Mr. Balfour, and to affirm that these "climates" are the immediate results of reason—not of course of reason exclusively, but of reason and emotion variously combined.

Minds are acted on by other minds, and every mind has its own passions, desires and sympathies, and is of course far from being all intellect. That "the wish is often father to the thought," is admitted by all, and we have elsewhere called special attention to the influence of emotion on religious belief.² Nevertheless every man's convictions—and therefore the convictions of every group of men and women—are intellectual states due to intellectual judgments and inferences, although, of course, they may be mistaken ones. Though the mind may be closed against the reception of some truth by bigotry or "inveterate" prejudice, the closure is due to a judgment of reason, often to a syllogism not explicitly recognized, such as, *e.g.*, "No good thing can come out of Nazareth. Something has come out of Nazareth. Therefore it cannot be a good thing." "The doctrines of Popery are doctrines of antichrist. The Immaculate Conception is a doctrine of Popery, therefore the Immaculate Conception is a doctrine of antichrist." Or, again, "all believers in religion, being men necessarily opposed to science, are men whose opinions need not even be considered. A. B. is a believer in religion, therefore, etc."

Mr. Balfour, indeed, admits³ that "psychological climates" may in many cases be the products of reasoning :

"As 'climates' are among the causes which produce beliefs, so are beliefs among the causes which produce 'climates.' . . . But are these results rational? Do they follow, I mean, on reason *quâ* reason, or are they, like a schoolboy's tears over a proposition of Euclid, consequences of reasoning, but not conclusions from it."

Our reply to this apt and amusing illustration is that they follow not as the tears, but directly from reason itself.

¹ P. 207. The italics are ours.

² See the article entitled "Sins of Belief and Sins of Unbelief," in the *Nineteenth Century* for 1884.

³ P. 208.

Mr. Balfour takes the opposite view, and to test its justice and validity he considers the case of rationalism in the naturalistic (or sensist) meaning of the term. This he regards¹ as "a non-rational effect of reason and a non-rational cause of belief," affirming that rationalism "is not a logical conclusion, but an intellectual temper."

With this assertion we cannot at all agree. We, of course, regard the "sensist" position as not only false, but absurd (as we have done our best to show in our preceding articles in this REVIEW), yet none the less we also regard it as an inevitable product of most mistaken premisses. Such premisses (explicitly recognized or not) are, *e.g.* :

1. "Men who have greatly promoted physical science are (as Hobbs explicitly declared them to be) the best authorities we can have as to philosophy and religion."

2. "Modern physical science has carried all before it, and in the opinion of the great majority has triumphed over the opponents of its speculative doctrines."

3. The statements of those who oppose such doctrines cannot be worth listening to.

4. Such obscurantists have opposed what has become generally received, and they must therefore be foolish or dishonest.

5. The opinions which have spread so widely and rapidly amongst those who know most of the world about them and are earnest in pursuit of new truths, must be the opinions which are to be supported, while whatever contradicts them should be scouted.

It would be an easy task to bring forward other such premisses. Mr. Balfour refers to witchcraft and mesmerism as instances of beliefs abandoned, or opposed, in deference to authority; but the belief in witchcraft could not have died out merely because a distaste for it had gradually arisen, but because the gradual advance in natural knowledge, and a more correct appreciation of the laws of evidence, made it less and less credible. Mesmerism was opposed because its asserted facts were deemed to be in contradiction with what seemed to offer an utterly overwhelming weight of contrary evidence. It has since been widely accepted, not because a taste for it has arisen, but because facts have been brought forward the truth of which has been deemed sufficiently demonstrated to outweigh antecedent opposition. That moods and tempers of different kinds ("psychological climates") exist is unquestionable, but they are results of reason, though its dictates be not explicitly drawn out as so many inferences distinctly adverted to by consciousness.

Mr. Balfour's treatment of the relations borne by reason and

¹ P. 212.

authority to belief, cannot fail to suggest to any one at all acquainted with English Catholic theology, some of the teachings of the late Cardinal Newman, especially in his "Grammar of Assent."

As every one knows, he attributed to mankind a special faculty which he called an "illative sense,"¹ to denote those conclusions concerning concrete matters at which men arrive with full confidence without the aid of any conscious process of ratiocination.

We ourselves believe the term to be a superfluous one, and consider the faculties enumerated by the scholastics amply sufficient to account for all our rational processes.

But however this may be, it is at least certain that Cardinal Newman regarded it as a distinctly *intellectual* power, and not as a merely "instinctive" process, and certainly not as anything resembling that "blind trust" to which modern writers so often misapply the name of "faith." He thus differed *toto cælo* from Mr. Balfour, according to whom "authority" enforces an obedience which is not intellectual, but instinctive—as we shall soon very clearly see. The impulse by which we follow authority is rational and rests on reasonable grounds, though these may never be distinctly drawn out before the conscious mind.

The first principles of reason are possessed by all men, and are continually acted on as they were by the farmer's wife and the rustic carter² of our former "illustrations."

If an Englishman is led by the authority of fashion to send his son to Eton, his act is not, on that account, a non-rational one. He says to himself: "A, B and C have all sent¹ their boys to Eton; it will be good for my son and for me that my boy should not take a lower position than their boys have. He will also make very valuable friends there, and if the teaching is not quite what I should choose, lots of young fellows get on there, and mine will have a good chance of getting on too."

Even in a matter seemingly so unintellectual as that of a married lady buying a bonnet in the latest fashion, the act is really a rational one, whether the reasons acted on are admirable ones or not. "Mrs. X. has such a bonnet; I will at least be equal to her. It will do my husband credit, besides it suits me, and shan't I make other women scowl at me!"

Mr. Balfour charges advocates of natural theology with being merely "naturalists" (sensists) of another sort.

But as we pointed out in our last article, they are by no means

¹ An unfortunate term, since the word "*sense*" is inapplicable to any *intellectual* power, and such Cardinal Newman represented this illative faculty to be.

² See AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1896, p. 313.

such, but build on the universal and necessary truths which constitute the first principles of all science of whatever kind.

In so far as Mr. Balfour does not build on such evident truths (such primary intellectual intuitions), but is content with "authority" as a basis, and, *mirabile dictu*,¹ with "custom" (!), he is himself an empiricist, and ranks but as a "naturalist," though one with lofty aspirations and refined and admirable tastes.

In his fourth section² of the second chapter of his third part, Mr. Balfour proceeds to examine what he regards as "the most important source of error," in estimating the influence of reason and authority, namely the jurisdiction over belief which "we can hardly do otherwise than recognize as belonging to reason by a natural and indefeasible title."

This is a direct consequence "of the view we find ourselves compelled to take of the essential character of reason and of our relations to it. Looked at from the outside, as one among the complex conditions which produce belief, reason appears relatively insignificant and ineffectual; not only appears so, but must be so, if human society is to be made possible. Looked at from the inside, it claims by an inalienable title to be supreme. Measured by its results it may be little; measured by its rights it is everything. There is no problem it may not investigate, no belief which it may not assail, no principle which it may not test. It cannot even by its own voluntary act, deprive itself of universal jurisdiction, as, according to a once fashionable theory, primitive man on entering the social state, contracted himself out of his natural rights and liberties.

This is well said. We cannot get behind our own reason, and what that declares to be evidently and necessarily true must be accepted by us as such, or we fall into the intellectual paralysis of absolute scepticism. A sound epistemology is at the basis of all science. But the clear recognition of this truth need not lead us to ignore the contagious influence of emotion.

We are convinced, however, that Mr. Balfour exaggerates this influence, and unduly minimizes the sway of reason while he exaggerates the action of non-rational influences. Because persons may not be able to give reasons for their convictions in no way proves that they are not convinced by very good ones. Abstract truths and first principles are often found very difficult of apprehension, but by the use of apt concrete examples, their supreme certitude can often be brought home to very poor intellects.

Of course, there may be exaggeration on either side of this contention, and if there have really been men so irrational as to uphold³ the right of every man to judge on every question, nothing could exceed their folly.

Mr. Balfour gives, as instances of arguments due to a prevailing "taste," the teaching of Hobbs' "*Leviathan*" and the doctrine of

¹ P. 164.

² P. 212.

³ P. 215.

'divine right' as taught by the Anglican clergy of the Stuart period, adding that as soon as the crisis which called them forth had passed away, "they were repugnant to the taste of a different age; 'Leviathan' and 'passive obedience' were handed over to the judgment of the historian."

But if certain theories find favor as responding to the needs of any particular period, they are not necessarily less the product of reason on that account. The doctrines of the "Leviathan" and of the passive obedience due to "kings by divine right," were logical deductions from the false and abominably Erastian principles of the Protestant Reformation, against which the doctrines of Puritanism were a relatively noble reaction. Mr. Balfour speaks of¹ "the ostentatious futility of the theories—'rights of man,' and so forth—by the aid of which the modern democratic movement was nursed through its infant maladies."

But there are very real and true "rights of man" which are the inevitable consequence of man's morally responsible nature, and constitute him "a person and not a thing."²

It is quite true, as Mr. Balfour says, "that in many cases conclusions are more permanent than premisses," and emotional tendencies are frequently the cause that "successive growths of apologetic and critical literature" often produce so little effect. But none the less those prejudices themselves are the results and outcome of rational deductions from unsatisfactory premisses.

In the fifth section of this second chapter Mr. Balfour considers what he deems an illegitimate process of giving as the alleged *reason* for a belief what is in fact an expression of the *authority* on which it is really based. He says:³

"To say that I believe a statement because I have been taught it, or because everybody in the village believes it, is to announce what everyday experience informs us is quite adequate *cause* of belief. It is not, however, *per se*, to give a reason for belief at all. But such statements can be turned at once into reasons by no process more elaborate than that of explicitly recognizing that my teachers, my family or my neighbors are truthful persons, happy in the possession of adequate means of information—propositions which in their turn, of course, require argumentative support. Such a procedure may, I need hardly say, be quite legitimate; and reasons of this kind are probably the principal ground on which in mature life we accept the great mass of our subordinate scientific and historical convictions. I believe, for instance, that the moon falls in towards the earth with the exact velocity required by the force of gravitation, for no other reason than that I believe in the competence and trustworthiness of the persons who have made the necessary calculations and observations. In this case the reason for my belief and the immediate cause of it are identical. The cause, indeed, is a cause only in virtue of its being first a reason. But in the former case this is not so. There early training, paternal authority or public opinion were causes of belief before they were reasons, and it is not impossible that to the very end they

¹ P. 218.

² As I have strongly urged in my book, *The Truth*.

³ P. 220.

contributed less to the resultant conviction in their capacity as reasons than they did in their capacity as non-rational causes."

Now, of course, as we have again and again affirmed, we possess emotion as well as intellect, and a benign Providence has ordained that the young child, at the mere dawn of reason, should be made acquiescent and docile through its feelings. In men also who have slightly developed minds the action of reason, of course, falls below what is usual. But the average youth soon begins to reason, and the intellect too often leads not only to questioning but to disobedience and revolt from paternal authority, as well as disregard of the more common opinion of those about him. But, as Mr. Balfour has admitted, reason may affirm the truth of paternal teaching, the probability of things commonly reputed true, and may give absolute certainty as to various matters, the evidence of which may consist of nothing but human testimony, as, *e.g.*, that there is a city known as New York in the United States or that a battle was fought which is known by the name "Waterloo." Not but, of course, Mr. Balfour is plainly right when he says¹ "that the argument from 'an authority' or 'authorities' is almost always useless as a *foundation* for a system of belief." More than this; it is and must always be not only useless but absurd. Every system of belief must repose (1) upon self-evident first principles, (2) upon our perception of the fact of our continuous existence, and (3) on the evident validity of logical reasoning. The error which would erect the opinion of mankind into a basis for philosophy was the error of De Lammenais.

The powerful action of reason against authority has been shown again and again in the revolt of a good man against his "psychological environment," and his success in producing stable moral reforms. Almost every canonized saint and every religious order is a witness of the supremacy of "reason" over Mr. Balfour's "authority."

Mr. Balfour accuses² theology of a tendency to extend the use of the argument from "an authority" or "authorities," so as to cover the fundamental portions of the system, and seeks to illustrate his accusation by the case of "Papal Infallibility, an example which may be regarded with the greater impartiality, as we are not, we suppose, likely to have among the readers of these notes many by whom it is accepted." This is an extraordinary assertion. We should think it probable that the number of educated English-speaking Catholics who have read carefully his "Foundations of Belief," would be relatively more numerous than those of any other denomination.

¹ P. 222.

² P. 223.

As to Papal Infallibility, Mr. Balfour supposes that no Catholic can hold it adequately unless he is antecedently convinced that (1) the New Testament narrative about the words "Thou art Peter," etc., are above all possible Biblical criticism; (2) that they actually instituted a Petrine primacy (3) to be transmitted by perpetual succession (4) in bishops of Rome, (5) that the primacy of jurisdiction carries with it the certainty of divine "assistance" (6) which insures inerrancy in *ex cathedra* definitions of facts and morals, and (7) that no announcement can be regarded as *ex cathedra* unless it relates to some matter already thoroughly sifted and considered by competent divines.¹

But no such elaborate mental process is needed, for every Catholic is convinced of the divine authority and inerrancy of *the Church*, and without that conviction he could not of course be a Catholic at all. All that his intellect can require may be summed up thus:

"Whatever the Church has decreed is true. Papal Infallibility has been decreed by the Church. Therefore, Papal Infallibility is true."

Mr. Balfour² very reasonably observes that instead of what has been written—or any merely fallible organization—forming a sole basis of support for Christianity, an infallible authority is rather needed to support the written word itself or an efficient organization. The supreme absurdity of the Bible and the Bible alone serving as a basis and guide of religion, is excellently expressed by our author in the following passage:³

"Indeed when we reflect upon the character of the religious books and of the religious organizations through which Christianity has been built up; when we consider the variety in date, in occasion, in authority, in context, in spiritual development which mark the first; the stormy history and the inevitable division which mark the second; when we further reflect on the astonishing number of the problems, linguistic, critical, metaphysical, and historical, which must be settled, at least in some preliminary fashion, before either the books or the organizations can be supposed entitled by right of rational proof to the position of impossible guides, we can hardly suppose that we were intended to find in these the *logical* foundations of our system of religious beliefs, however important be the part (and can it be exaggerated?) which they were destined to play in producing, fostering, and directing it."

In the sixth section of the second chapter, which concludes the third part of this work, Mr. Balfour summarizes his previous contention to the further depreciation of reason and the elevation of non-rational influences which, as we have seen, he dubs "authority."

¹ P. 224.

² P. 225.

³ P. 226; which may also be applied to the various sects and organizations which have separated from the one Church, and do not even venture to claim that infallibility which can alone render them efficient.

Wonderful to say, he even ventures to affirm:¹ "It is from authority that reason itself draws its most important premises." (!) As if those premises were not the self-evident truths and perceptions which (as we have again and again pointed out) underlie all our reasonings and constitute the ultimate ground of all truths apprehensible by the human intellect, which are not, like them, directly evident in and by themselves. He even ventures to say, in terminating the chapter :

"That if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it, not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of authority."

We, on the other hand, affirm that the lowest and least human character of men in society is their tendency to act like the "*Moutons de Panurge*," and to approximate in their actions to those of different tribes of gregarious animals.

It is true that we are all animals and that deep down in our sensitive nature are those more instinctive tendencies which lead the infant to seek and swallow its milky food and which later in life tend to the multiplication of the species.

It is true also that the feelings which underlie and favor the development of altruistic actions and so give a material support to ethics may be said to be instinctive,² as are those at the root of social agglomerations and therefore ultimately of politics.

But these dumb and blind tendencies lie hidden beneath the foundations of social life which is built up, sustained and developed by the action of reason, to which we entirely owe the acceptance and cultivation of that supreme and highest of all sociology which we call religion. It is such actions as those before referred to as those of saints and religious orders which constitute the greatest possible contrast which exists, or can exist, between the social activities of man and the gregarious habits and instincts of mere animals.

The fourth and last portion of Mr. Balfour's work consists of "suggestions towards a provisional philosophy."

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

¹ P. 223.

² As I have pointed out in the *Proceedings of the Zoological Society*, b. 1884, p. 462.

MADAME ROLAND.

THE new biography of Madame Roland¹ presents a most inviting subject for study, and in a way which cannot fail to gain attention. The book is charmingly written; the narrative is clear and strong; the story is well balanced; French life of the eighteenth century and events of the revolution are again distinctly before us. But more than this. The new light which is shed upon many aspects of the career of this remarkable woman and the resultant criticism of character and conduct are such as to put this book indisputably in advance of all previous biographies.

In the careful preparation of her work, Miss Tarbell resided several years in Paris, where she had access to a large mass of hitherto unpublished correspondence and other manuscripts of the Rolands, which had then recently been placed in the "Bibliothèque Nationale." She also made the acquaintance of the descendants of Madame Roland, who were of great assistance to her, and to one of them she dedicates her book. She visited Le Clos, the family home in Beaujolais, and in her chapter upon Madame Roland's country life there she gives an enchanting description of the place and its surroundings. These were the author's special opportunities, which, with her well-known ability, she has improved in producing a book which is at once bright, suggestive, scholarly and critical. From beginning to end it is a work rich in insight, in analysis of character and motive, in its opposition to the sentimentalism and idealizing which were Madame Roland's weakness; it is even fair criticism to say it is sometimes too cold and unsentimental, and seems to teach the banishing of all ideals in its eager zeal against those which are false and vain. Certainly the tone is quite different from the passionate admiration of Lamartine or the somewhat indiscriminate eulogy of the radical Miss Blind. It does not breathe the French spirit of praise intense like Sainte-Beuve, nor of hate intense like Taine. It does not exalt its subject as high in some ways as does the brief monograph of Austin Dobson, nor is there anything of the sensational extravagance of Carlyle's few words: "She shines in that black wreck of things like a white Grecian statue." But though a certain class of readers may be disappointed that they do not find exactly the hero or the martyr which Madame Roland has been so

¹ *Madame Roland; A Biographical Study.* By Ida M. Tarbell. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896.

commonly claimed to be, those who are fair-minded will close the book with an appreciation of the genuine critical spirit which has delineated both the strength and the weakness of this noted woman, and which attempts to put truth before fancies of even a century old!

MARIE JEANNE PHLIPON (*Manon* was her pet name) was born in Paris, March 18, 1754. Her parents were of the *bourgeoisie*. Her father was an engraver, an ordinary man, though respectable; her mother a high-minded woman. She had far more influence over their child than her father, who was often severe and arbitrary, and tried to govern her by force, which she resented; while she would readily yield to her mother's gentle guidance.

Marie was a precocious child. Her parents were pleased, and early provided her with various masters for her education. Her real training came, however, more from the books she read, which furnished food for the strong nature, both emotional and intellectual, which soon began to develop itself. The author who first most deeply impressed her was Plutarch, whose "Lives" stirred her imagination almost to delirium by their stories of noble deeds. "How many times," she says afterwards, "I wept that I had not been born a Spartan or a Roman!" With her mental acumen and her strong hunger for knowledge she was also in childhood and youth very pious. Her mother was a devoted Catholic and taught her the Bible and the Catechism, and religious and secular reading were carried along together. In preparing for her confirmation and first communion she manifested a keen moral sensitiveness, and after a while her parents yielded to her entreaty that she might go to the quiet of a convent for a time to escape from the distractions at home. So she spent a year with the Dames de la Congrégation de Notre Dame, where her growth in piety was most satisfactory, and where her spiritual devotion so developed that before she left she had resolved to enter a religious order as soon as she became of age. She enjoyed special opportunities for study at the convent, and while there she formed a fast friendship, which greatly influenced her, with a girl three years older, Sophie Cannet, from Amiens.

Before she had grown to womanhood—between fourteen and twenty-one—her inner life underwent a severe change. She began to go out into the world; she came home from certain visits "full of disdain and anxiety." She was shocked by the hollowness, the pretensions, the patronizing insincerity of those higher in life whom she saw; and though a visit to Versailles when she was twenty, where she saw the French court, did not yet develop any "contempt of monarchy" or any idea of "the sovereignty of the people," she did say if she were near the king she should hate his

grandeur, and was distressed by "the chasm between millions of men and one individual of their own kind." Still she didn't yet crave equality, and wrote, "truly, human nature is not very respectable when one considers it in a mass." The radical change just now was in her attitude towards religion. All her good resolves were thrown to the winds. She was a deeply thoughtful person, as well as intensely emotional. But at this period reason, or what she called such, got the supremacy. She began "to apply the test of reason to her faith," and ended by giving up Christianity and accepting a kind of Deism—a belief in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul. There does not seem to be sufficient evidence for Miss Blind's view that she became then—if ever—almost an agnostic. Under the influence of such writers as Diderot, D'Alembert, Raynal, and the encyclopædists generally, she revolted against a conception of authority which her imagination told her "would force her to believe a cruel absurdity," rebelling chiefly against her interpretation of the doctrines of infallibility and eternal punishment. She says, later, "I became skeptical by an effort; and I took for my creed beneficence in conduct and tolerance in opinion"; and while she prided herself upon her goodness and her practical morality, it was plain enough before the close of her life that if she had kept the guiding principle of the Catholic faith, she might have preserved a purer ethical standard, from the outward violation of which, as our author shows, the *guillotine just saved her!*

But though, in her self sufficiency, she did her best to throw off authority, did she wander on, a law unto herself, all the rest of her days? By no means. The death of her mother, in 1775, was a dreadful blow to her; and she recovered her happiness through the influence of a book, the "*Nouvelle Héloïse*," of Rousseau. She had read him somewhat already; but from this time he became her guide. "The feminine need of an authority," says Miss Tarbell, "was satisfied"—(rather, we may suggest, the *human* need of authority was met!)"—"she accepted him *en bloc*, and to defend and follow him became henceforth her concern." And this meant a reaction from the reign of *intellect* to that of *sentiment*. "Her vigorous, passionate young nature," says her biographer, "asserted itself; her mind burned with the possibilities of happiness; sentiment regained the power temporarily given to intellect, and from that time was the ruling force of her life." It is quite important to remember the influence of this man's teachings upon her, though we cannot delay to trace it fully. That was a sentimental generation; but for this very reason it is all the more sad that one of such undoubted mental powers should have taken for her chief master the very apostle of mawkish sentimentalism and even sen-

suality;¹—a man of so many noble ideas, but of so many base ones; theistic, but anti-Christian; in a way religious, but practically and abominably immoral. His views of education (in "*Emile*"—the best of his works, though, as says Mr. Lowell, "not without deplorable marks of his baseness") afterwards formed the model for the bringing up of her daughter; at the outbreak of the Revolution she said his teachings were "perfectly suited to civism," and in prison she boasted that she was fashioning her *Memoirs* upon his "Confessions," saying "these will be *my* Confessions, for I shall conceal nothing"; and so, in her slavish following of him she revealed experiences which violated good sense and delicacy; for, as Miss Tarbell writes, "she was incapable of exercising an independent judgment in a matter of taste, of opinion, of morals, where Rousseau was concerned, so completely had she adopted him." Alas! she had given up her faith, because she would not yield her *intellect*; and now, for a guide in *sentiment*, would not the authority of that old faith, with all its claimed mysticism, have been better than this?

The history of Mademoiselle Philipon's suitors and marriage is long and intricate, and we can only touch upon prominent points in the account. She was so susceptible that her biographer says she was one of those women who see in every man a possible lover. We know how marriages are arranged in France, particularly in the rank of life to which she belonged—by the parents. She had plenty of attention; but she would not accept any one of "the eligible, common-place suitors;" she was versed in Plutarch and the philosophers—she looked higher than her station, for which she cannot be blamed, any more than for telling her father she would marry only for love; and when he asked her, "What if you do not find your ideal?" "I shall die an old maid," she replied. At length one after another came who seemed philosophers or were so, who wrote books, or had artistic tastes, whose *sentiments* were in harmony with hers—all of them much older, strange to say, and with one of them, sixty years old—and she twenty-two!—she used to read verses of Rousseau and Voltaire—once both of them weeping and re-reading the same thing ten times! An odd pair of philosophers, indeed!—as Miss Tarbell calls them. M. Roland de la Platière, at the outset a rival of this very man, came to have the field to himself. It was in 1776 that he first met her; and he was about forty-two years of age, which made a disparity of years between them surely startling enough. He was an inspector-general of commerce, living in Amiens, and was related to Sophie Cannel, Mademoiselle Philipon's friend, by

¹ P. 32, and *vide* the valuable chapters upon Rousseau and his writings, in Edward J. Lowell's *Evening of the French Revolution*.

whom he was presented to her. He is described as "a man of more than ordinary value, who had rendered large services to his country ;" but morose and irritable, and "not an easy man to get along with ;" a man, moreover, who prided himself not only on his abilities but on his character, especially for scrupulous frankness. After various vicissitudes—a refusal to marry him, a Platonic arrangement to be friends, an engagement made, broken, and renewed—they were finally married February 4, 1780. In connection with the Roland courtship and marriage Miss Tarbell quotes fully from correspondence hitherto unpublished. This correspondence both brings out the sentimental side of Marie Philimon's nature, and is also in marked contrast with the tone of her "Memoirs," written at the close of her life, as to her feeling towards Roland. There she gives the impression that "her heart was not in the affair," but that she only yielded to his persistent entreaties, and, as Austin Dobson expresses it, "married a theory and not a husband." But these letters are full of even extravagant passion and devotion ; and it is rightly enough claimed that they show she was "desperately in love, happy in her betrothal, miserable in her liberation, and when the marriage was finally effected thoroughly satisfied." And the explanation which this book gives of the inconsistency is, not that she meant to falsify, but that when she wrote the "Memoirs," "she was under the influence of a new and absorbing passion," before which the ardent love of years ago "had become an indifferent affair of which she could talk philosophically and at which she could smile disinterestedly. The later passion was that for Buzot, which the world knew nothing of till nearly seventy-five years after her death—a passion which various writers since then have tried to excuse and smooth over, or even (as Sainte-Beuve) to justify, but which this most recent biographer does not hesitate to condemn. Nothing more need be said of this matter just here, as it must be referred to again ; but the plain argument from this newly published correspondence is—let not Madame Roland say or fancy she was not in love with Roland, for *she was* ! And, incidentally, abundant proof is brought out, in succeeding pages, of her continued affection and devotion certainly for the next seven or eight years. Not long after that, in 1789, the Revolution began to take their attention, and in 1791 Buzot appears upon the scene !

The Rolands spent the first year of their married life in Paris. He was occupied with literary labors—just then getting a book ready for the press—and his wife gave him all her time, alternating domestic cares with copying and proof-reading. She was well qualified to become a valuable helper in his work, and with a manifest interest in her new duties she soon made herself indis-

pensable. Before the year was over they went upon a charming visit to Roland's family in the Beaujolais, and the next year found them settled in Amiens. Here their only child, Eudora, was born, in October, 1781. Their life in Amiens was a quiet one. Roland was busy with long and heavy articles for the "*Encycopédie Méthodique*;" she was helping him during all the time she could spare from the care of the child, to whose bringing up she applied the principles she had learned of Rousseau—many of them quite sensible.

In the spring of 1784 a somewhat curious episode occurred, in Madame Roland's visiting Paris, where she spent a couple of months in soliciting for Roland *a title of nobility*, which he thought he had grounds for asking in the antiquity of his family, and in his thirty years of service to the country. She was unsuccessful, and she heard a good deal of hard criticism of her husband's pretensions. Other biographers have not made much of this event; but to Miss Tarbell it seems that these ardent republicans, perhaps all the more from the very inconsistency of their conduct, always made it an additional "sting" against royalty and aristocracy that the title was refused, Roland's services unrecognized, and their pride so rebuked. Baffled in her earnest attempts, she asked and secured for Roland a transfer to Lyons as inspector, with a larger salary and less work, and consequently more leisure for his studies. For reasons of economy, although his new duties kept him mostly there, they decided to live in Lyons only a couple of months of each year; and the rest of the time Madame Roland made her home with his mother and older brother, partly in Villefranche, and partly at Le Clos, their family estate in the country, about eleven miles away. In Lyons and in Villefranche they are both said to have made themselves unpopular—and she particularly by criticisms and even mocking satires upon leading people, and it is plain that they felt above their surroundings and were unhappy. But her country life at Le Clos, from all the description of it, must have been delightful; and in our survey it is worth while to dwell for a few moments upon these, her happiest, sweetest days. She was largely occupied with the education of her daughter, and there is a long and interesting letter (hitherto unpublished), telling how she applied the teachings of Rousseau. It is a pleasure to note the genuine interest she took in her neighbors, serving them and teaching them, and joining in their amusements. She set them a good example, too, in morals, and outwardly, at least, in religion; and Miss Tarbell thinks we may have "a genuine respect for the unselfishness of a woman who would get out of her bed at six o'clock in the morning for her neighbor's sake, to climb up the long steep hill to the church for early Mass." Her

imagination had pictured much from the country life she was now enjoying; and if we may trust her biographer, the reason why Le Clos realized many of her dreams, was "largely because she took hold of the practical life of the house and the farm with good will and intelligence." "She was no woman," says our author, "to allow work to master her; *she managed it*. Nor was she weak enough to fret under it, or to regard it as beneath her. She respected this most dignified and useful of woman's employments, and gave it intelligence and good will. This acceptance of and cheerfulness over common duties is one of the really strong things about Madame Roland." As for her husband, it seems quite clear that her love for him was as great as ever, and that she looked upon her affection as enduring. Her writing to him she says is "the dearest of her occupations," and there are specimens enough to give proof. The surmise is expressed that part of the secret of her tenderness may have been in the very fact of his being away from her so much, and that, according to her habit, *she idealized him*, whose actual presence afterwards, in "the friction of everyday life," broke the spell!

When the Revolution came the Rolands welcomed it. They were in hearty sympathy with its theoretical causes, for they were both strongly under the influence of the free-thinking of the time. They both had felt the oppression of the extreme taxation which prevailed; and Roland had suffered from it in its effect upon commercial interests. Madame Roland herself, from a child, had had, in a way, *a political education*. She had seen and felt "the rage or joy of the people, and had brooded over its meaning." *Révolution* had been always a familiar word in her ears, and she had seen practical workings of the idea on a limited scale. So when the States General met, in May, 1789, she hoped much for a reform of the old régime. The highest authorities show conclusively that at first there was no idea of the overthrow of monarchy in France at this time; that the people hoped only for reform; likewise that, in common with the rest of France, constitutional reform was all the Rolands then asked or thought of. But after the storming of the Bastille on the 14th of July, everything was changed. Says Miss Tarbell, "A new ideal arose, full winged, before Madame Roland. . . . Compromise, half-way measures, were at an end. Instead of reforms she demanded 'complete regeneration.' She saw in the sudden uprising of the people the 'sovereign' exercising 'the divine right of insurrection.'"

It was only the carrying out of what Rousseau had said it was right for "the sovereign people" to do in the circumstances. Civil war and riot had become justifiable, and she believed were now even necessary to accomplish the end that the people should

provide a fit government. *The ideal* was before her; and if there was ever an instance of the end taught to justify the means, she now gave it. For the first eighteen months of the Revolution they were at Le Clos or in Lyons; but she began and she continued the work of agitation. She carried on a violent correspondence with the leaders in Paris and elsewhere—Brissot, Champagneux, Bancal—and many of her papers were published in Paris, in Brissot's journal *Le Patriote Français*. She nourished the fire of her "restless energy" by her letters, by talks with her neighbors, and particularly by her reading; and Rousseau, as ever, was her inspired guide. And, all the while, her powerful influence was shaping the future policy of Roland in the part he was to take. She had lost faith in the sincerity of the king and the court, and she sneered at the action of the National Assembly, calling them "nothing but children, and their enthusiasm a straw fire," bidding them "put on trial two illustrious heads, . . . or they were all mad!" Truly, in her own madness she had entered upon "uncompromising war against the existing government," and how concentrated her idea was may be seen from her saying that the hope, the only hope, was not any more in the French people as a whole, but *in Paris!* The comments of Miss Tarbell at this point are terse and suggestive, and are worth citing, as a woman's broad criticism upon a woman. "She saw no danger in her doctrines. They moved to noble sentiments, to great aspirations. What greater good? That they incited to crimes, too, she did not admit. She was recklessly indifferent to what is; she only looked at what might be. Her eyes were turned to America, to Greece, to Rome, and not to the facts of the struggles of these countries; only to the fine actions of their heroes, the rounded phrases of their orators. . . . Nor was it a momentary enthusiasm. Her conviction never wavered. . . . She never admitted that anything but 'complete regeneration' could come of her teachings. It was the woman's nature, which, stirred to its depths by enthusiasm or passion, becomes narrow, stern, unbending—which can do but one thing, can see but one way, that inexplicable feminine conviction which is superior to experience and indifferent to logic."

In face of the aristocratic element, Roland was elected to the municipal government of Lyons, and was sent by that body, in 1791, as one of several deputies to urge the financial needs of Lyons before the National Assembly. So, in February of that year they came to Paris. The earnestness of Madame Roland, as serious as it was intense, at once manifested itself. For some months she followed the sessions of the Assembly, till she vowed she would never go again—angry at their folly and disgusted with

their compromises and delays, particularly in the Lyons matter. She had come up prejudiced, and closer knowledge only deepened her suspicions of their patriotism; while she believed in the sincerity of the aristocrats, but not in their principles, and their superiority of manner nettled her pride. She went to the patriotic clubs; but was not satisfied with them, and thought the Jacobins "too conservative." Of deepest interest were the gatherings of patriots in their apartments. The account shows us much of her character and influence at this period. The meetings were held four times a week. Brissot was there, the prominent leader, with whom now they first became personally acquainted; Pétion was there, soon after the mayor of Paris; the young Robespierre was there; and the melancholy, serious, sentimental Buzot. They discussed political questions and the general condition of affairs, while Madame Roland, with careful calculation, *took no part*, but sat at her table near by, sewing or, more often, writing letters, though listening with both ears and remembering all they said. She seems to have possessed the faculty of double attention, and once when one of the guests expressed surprise at her writing so rapidly in the midst of their discussion, she smilingly replied: "What would you say if I should repeat all your arguments?" Miss Tarbell, in some good remarks upon French conversation, suggests that she made too much of their talk, and that it was one of the Roland's greatest mistakes to regard this "game of words and sentiments" as if meant for "reflections and reason." However this may be, she did see that it was only fruitless "conversation"; she was disappointed that "few measures resulted"; she learned, she said, that there was "nothing so difficult as to unite different minds to work persistently for the same end"; and for all her own impatience she made this sage observation to one of her friends: "Our fine minds laugh at patience, as a negative virtue. I confess that in my eyes it is *the true sign of the force of the soul.*" With all her silence at these meetings, it is plain that she gained a wonderful hold upon these patriots. Her biographer carefully analyzes the sources of this influence, and attributes it in part to her qualities of mind and soul—she was the pure ideal of their principles, like a chaste Greek statue, "the type of the republic of which they dreamed"—and in part to her remarkable personal charm. Many writers have described her as beautiful, though this idea is contrary to all the traditions of her family, and none of the five portraits in this volume quite represent her thus; but all authorities agree that she was most attractive, charming, fascinating, and the secret was in the sonorousness, flexibility and mellowness of her voice, bringing out when she spoke all the vivacity, sympathy and intelligence of her face. She appreciated

her gift and knew how to use it. Lamartine quotes her speaking of it as "a gift most rare and most powerful over the senses," and we may forgive her self-complacent comment when told that Desmoulins wondered how with so little beauty and at her age she could have so many admirers—"He had never heard me talk."

When the king fled, on the 22d of June, the Rolands took heart; it was proof of his treachery; if the people would only *act now!* When he was brought back in twenty-four hours, and restored, they were in dismay. It was becoming evident to them that, as Miss Tarbell states it, "the Republic, which she and her friends dreamed of at this moment and did not hesitate to announce, *was not in the public mind*, and that when they insisted upon it, they were insisting upon *an individual opinion* of which the country at large had no conception, and for which it had no sympathy." Madame Roland left Paris in deep discouragement in September, and retired to Villefranche. She said she had had enough of Paris for now, and would go to the country. This was only a passing whim, however. Roland came soon. His office of inspectorship at Lyons had been abolished by the government; he had failed to get the nomination to the new Assembly for which they had hoped. Yet various reasons, and perhaps particularly that they might be at the centre of excitement, where they could "watch," and help start the "shock" of a new revolution, brought them again to the great city in December of that same year, 1791.

With the adoption of a new Constitution by the Assembly, and its acceptance by the king a few months before, and the people beginning to get quiet, how could Madame Roland continue "to prevent peace?" asks her biographer. And the answer given is, "*Her ideal was not satisfied*. It mattered little to her that the people were indifferent to this ideal; that they were satisfied with the constitution and asked for nothing but a chance to let it work. The satisfaction of this ideal had become a necessity, an imperative personal need. She could not give it up. It was too beautiful." These last became afterwards, we know, the exact words of the leader Buzot, as he looked back upon their tremendous mistake; "My error was too beautiful to be repented of." "Our dream was too beautiful to be abandoned."

From this time on, the weakness as much as the strength of Madame Roland's character is manifested, though she came to be known as the queen—the soul—of the Gironde, and is so often spoken of as the miracle of the Revolution. She was suspicious of all but those of her own precise views, verily diseased with suspicion, well called "the malady of those times." On the other

hand, she was supremely confident in herself. With impudent conceit, and that "self-admiration" which Taine (perhaps uncharitably) calls "her mental substratum," she writes, later, in her "Memoirs" that "the only rôle which ever suited her exactly in the world was that of Providence"; and so she profanely uttered what was near being a divine truth, for all along she was the instrument of Providence, though in ways she little knew or would little recognize!

The status and the relations of parties in the Assembly when she returned to Paris bring prominently before us the *Constitutionalists*, supporters of the king; the *Mountain*, coarse, ill-bred, ragged and dirty agitators; and the *Girondists*, the pure republicans, as they may be termed, even "blindly partisan," young and talented, as Miss Tarbell describes them, "brought up on Plutarch and Rousseau, and their heads filled with noble doctrines and drafts of perfect constitutions," but with little experience "of politics, of men, or of society"; and just at this time, in the freshness of their new influence and their eagerness for power—to carry out their republican ideas—wavered between the Constitutionalists and the Mountain, "fearing both, suspected by both." It was with this party that the Rolands joined themselves. Madame Roland would have brought its indecision to a quick end in favor of anarchy and insurrection. Without thus far openly committing themselves, they became soon after a power in the Assembly, under the leadership of Brissot, which the king felt he must reckon with. At last, probably to avoid suspicion, he consented to name a Girondist ministry, and in March (1792) Roland was appointed to the Department of the Interior.

It is easy to see in what a position of responsibility and power this event placed the aspiring Madame Roland, still bent upon her ideal. Though it is not necessary, with Taine, to call Roland only "an administrative puppet whose wife pulled the strings," it is true that she examined every question with him day after day, gave her opinion, and so far had the controlling influence that she was really the power concealed. It is much to her credit that all she did was "in private," and that in her salon she was as quiet as ever. They removed to a spacious palace, but continued to live in a simple way—exercised more and more upon matters of the State. Roland was dry and theoretical in the discharge of his duties, or often harsh and arbitrary. In April war with Prussia was declared, and the country was in greater commotion than ever; and particularly in Paris were there increased terror and suspicion. Madame Roland had a plan for the defence of the capital which she persuaded the Minister of War (Servan) to present to the Assem-

bly without the king's knowledge. They passed the measure, but he hesitated to sign it.¹ She thought him "disloyal," and wanted him forced to a decision. To this end she induced Roland to send him a long, threatening, even insulting official letter. She wrote the letter herself! Miss Tarbell gives it in full. The result was that in June both Servan and Roland were dismissed from the ministry. Then she bade him at once announce to the Assembly his discharge, and send in a copy of his—*her* letter,—a private letter, be it noted, meant originally only for the king's eye. Here was a *coup d'état* indeed! They thought "usefulness and glory" would come of it, and they were not wholly disappointed. The Assembly ordered the letter printed and sent throughout France! It did not cause the popular uprising which they hoped would ensue, and drive the king to reinstate the ministers; but it helped to keep up the excitement against royalty, and the whole Gironde party furthered the effort and did everything that eloquence and intrigue could to incite insurrection. Meanwhile the enemy from without was actually drawing near the capital, and in face of that danger the agony was growing terrible—"the irritated, harassed country," as our author pictures it, "opening its heart and pouring out its blood, young and old, weak and strong, even women and girls offering themselves." The Marseillais movement, for federalism, just then began to take shape. The cry was "Arm Paris; if that fails, seize the South." The Rolands and the Girondists knew it meant *insurrection*; but they did not stop, though a few of them, we are told, began to be nervous, lest they might not be able, on the king's overthrow, to control the fury of the people which they were arousing—especially as the insurrectionary element was now well organized, with Danton at its head, whom they feared. This dreadful "tension"—the most trying in the Revolution—was ended by the setting up of *The Commune* as the governing power of Paris on the 10th of August. Girondists and Jacobins now made up the Assembly; they voted the suspension of the king, to restore the Gironde ministers, Roland, Servan and Clavière, and to add others, chief of whom was the savage Danton. And Danton was at the head of the mob, which surged and swelled!

If the Girondists were now in power, representing *law*, they soon found that the Commune too was in power, and that they felt "called to act *above all law*." The insurrectionary element became "the new party of *Terror*," under the triumvirate of Robespierre, Danton, and Marat; Robespierre, "the abstract idea of the Revolution," Danton "its will," Marat "its avenging demon," as

¹ Perhaps partly because the same measure also urged the proscription of the priests.

Miss Blind calls them. They speedily entered upon deeds of zeal and savage fury, of which the climax was in setting up the guillotine. Alas! it was all only the carrying out of the principles for which Madame Roland had long labored. Her biographer's words are true, "It was her conviction which held Roland. It was her inspiration that fired the Gironde. Now that the force that she had evoked was organized, logically she must unite with it." But "disillusion" began to break up her ideal dreams; the patriot "radical," of a sudden, though too late, "became a conservative." She had thought of insurrection, says Miss Tarbell, as an ideal avenging spirit, but the realization, the "living incarnation," in the beastly Danton, she had not reckoned upon. Perhaps, as Danton was in the ministry, and with Roland, if she would have consented to work with him, she might have controlled him, and so controlled the Terrorists; but she loathed him; he inspired in her only "physical repugnance," and she utterly refused to have anything to do with him—which, of course, angered the brute all the more. Moreover, she was beginning to be deeply in love with Buzot—he seemed to her now to be the only hope of the Gironde, and undoubtedly she contrasted the two men, who were radically different, and had hopes and ambitions for her new lover. The horrible September massacres came on; Roland protested; but what cared the Commune for him, or for her? September 5th she wrote, "We are under the knife of Robespierre and Marat"; and a few days later, "Danton directs everything, Robespierre is his mannikin, Marat holds his torch and his knife." . . . "You know my enthusiasm for the Revolution. Well, I am ashamed of it. It is stained by these wretches. It is become hideous." So, as writes her biographer, "she had begun to experience one of the saddest disillusiones of life, the loss of faith in her own undertaking, to see that the thing she had worked to create was a monster, that it must be throttled, that it was too horrible to live."

What was called *The Republic* began with September 21, 1792, when the Convention replaced the Assembly. They wanted Roland and his colleagues to remain in the ministry, and Danton sneeringly asked, "Why not invite Madame Roland too? Everyone knows that he has not been alone in his office." He withdrew the resignation he had sent in; but at the same time arraigned the Commune and the Mountain, and said he staid as their enemy. From this point on the Rolands were plainly *turned against the Revolution*. The Gironde was in a final desperate struggle, which was to end only in ruin. Roland continued at his post for the next four months, fighting the Terrorists, "fearless, sincere, honest, disinterested," as our author affirms, but "so pitifully inadequate to

the situation, so ridiculously subjective in his methods, that irritation at his impotence is forgotten in the compassion it awakens." Madame Roland was active, too, but with noble spirit keeping her place at home, assisting him continually in all his official work. Buzot championed his cause in the Convention, partly from sympathy with Madame Roland, and partly because she had won him over to her own disillusion with the Revolution. His own words show what this book claims, that in the downfall of the Gironde he was the one who felt most deeply the failure of their beautiful dream. Most of those who pretended to be republicans at this time, he says, were so only in name. "It is useless to deny it," he writes, "the majority of the French people sighed after royalty and the constitution of 1791." . . . "The guillotine explains everything. It is the great weapon of the French government. This people is republican because of the guillotine." In addition to other perils, at the opening of 1793 the Rolands were in danger of mob violence, and for many days and nights they lived in constant fear of assassination. On January 22d, the day after the execution of the king, Roland resigned from the ministry. When they had moved to their palatial residence they had still kept their little apartment in the Rue de la Harpe, and thither they now retired. They were indifferent to the change of position and surroundings. Miss Tarbell's words pay them a fitting tribute. "Their convictions of their own right doing," she says, "made them superior to all influences which affect worldly and selfish natures. It is impossible for such people as the Rolands to 'come down,' in life. Material considerations are so external, so mere an incident, that they can go from palace to hut without giving the matter a second thought."

But meanwhile the personal relations of these two people to each other were becoming most painfully strained. One of the two was certainly very far from perfect or exemplary in the matter we are now to speak of, for all she talked so much of what she called her "duty." Alas! the passion for Buzot was doing its work. Madame Roland, with what her biographer rather strangely calls "a sentimental need of frankness," "useless and cruel," had confessed to her husband that she loved Buzot, but that "she would stay with him, and be faithful to her marriage vows;"! *i.e.*, that with a certain sense of "duty" she would try to do what was outwardly right, while she had deserted him in her heart! In her "Memoirs," when in prison, justifying herself, as always, she writes, "while remaining faithful to my duties, I was too artless to conceal my feelings. My husband, excessively sensitive on account of his affection and self-respect, could not endure the idea of the least change in his empire (!); he grew suspicious, his jealousy

irritated me. Happiness fled from us. He adored me; I sacrificed myself (!) for him, and we were unhappy." Was it strange? we are inclined to ask. So, though the three had politically worked in harmony "for many months," now at last in May, the Rolands, says Miss Tarbell, "felt they must get away from Buzot, and resolved to go to the country." There had been so many threats, too, that they feared Roland would soon be arrested if they staid longer. They had been waiting some days for their passports, and when, at last, these came, Madame Roland was detained by a sudden illness for another week. On the 31st of May Roland was arrested, but in some way escaped from the guards and found a place of concealment. He reached Amiens safely within a few days. Very early the next morning, June 1st, Madame Roland was herself taken, by order of the Commune. Though there was no ground of arrest given, she did not resist; it would have been useless; and she was led away to the Abbaye in the midst of a jeering crowd. All that was made known by the questioning of June 12th, was that "she was a *suspect*." On June 24th she was set free. But this was only the refinement of cruelty, the cat playing with the mouse. On the very door steps of her house she was re-arrested, and was now taken to another and worse prison, that of Sainte Pélagie, where she found herself in the vilest surroundings, with the worst and lowest criminals.

Madame Roland's prison life of five months is a most important portion of her career, for what it reveals of her conduct, character, and example. It was marked by a strangely calm and cheerful courage and endurance; and by a kindness and gentleness towards jailers and fellow-prisoners which won all hearts. She rose to the occasion with a proud indifference to results and a nature that proved itself victor over all outward circumstances. In a most telling chapter, Miss Tarbell inquires carefully into the reasons for this "phenomenal fortitude." Undoubtedly it was in part from her very nature, and in part from the environment of the present and the training of the past. Moreover it was partly concerned with the *struggle for liberty* in which she had been engaged, the determination to endure to the end, though the bright dream of life had failed; and it is partly explained, this strange courage, by *personal considerations* which entered into her very soul.

As regards liberty and the tragedy in which she had been engaged, and in which she could now imagine herself "an independent actor," this latest and clearest biographer says—and with much truth, as it seems to us—"She took a dramatic pose and she kept it to the end." This is not made a motive for severe criticism. On the other hand, we read: "If there was a shade of the theatrical in it . . . there is so much indifference to self, ha-

tred of despotism, contempt of injustice, courage before pain, that the lack of perfect naturalness is forgotten." As regards more personal considerations, we refer, of course, to her passion for Buzot, which now spoke out, in the five letters to him which were long lost to the world and first came to light in 1864. Miss Tarbell gives a more critical analysis of these letters than has yet been offered, though it must be said she is sometimes rather inconsistent in her observations, and not on the whole very strong, from any high point of view, upon the moral bearings of the matter. We cannot resist the impression that she sympathizes a little too deeply with the one whom she is both blaming and trying to free from blame.¹ In a previous chapter upon "Buzot and Madame Roland" it is brought out that once before with another near friend (Bancal) her heart became much engaged, and "she was saved from folly by circumstances"; and after the necessity of such an apology as that there seems little use in trying to smooth over in any way the moral relations to Buzot because of the theories at that time in reference to love and the state of nature (we well know whence those shocking theories sprang and what they meant!) or because she herself maintained an outward allegiance to her notion of "duty," while her heart was unfaithful. The facts prove that Madame Roland did not fully resist the base theory and the lax morals of the times! Let us quote her biographer's own words: "There is no escaping the conclusion that, had she lived, she would have ultimately left Roland for Buzot. . . . She was happy to be guillotined when she was, otherwise she must have inevitably suffered the most terrible and humiliating of all the disillusionings of a woman—the loss of faith in herself, in the infallibility of her sentiments, in her incapability to do wrong." And so her spirit in prison is partly accounted for in her feeling that her prison was giving her a higher kind of freedom. The whole tone of the letters shows this. "What does it matter to me," she writes, "if I am here or there? Is not my heart always with me? To confine me in a prison—is it not to deliver me entirely to it? My company—it is *my love*! My occupation—it is to think of it!" Again: "I dare not tell you, and you alone can understand, that I was not sorry to be arrested. . . . I owe it to my jailers that I can reconcile duty and love. Do not pity me. People admire my courage; but they do not understand my joys." Once more: "Circumstances have given me that which I could never have had without a kind of crime. How I love the chains which give me freedom to love you undividedly, to think of you ceaselessly! . . . I do not want to pene-

¹ See particularly pp. 239, 241-42, 274.

trate the designs of heaven. I will not allow myself to make guilty prayers; but I bless God for having substituted my present chains for those I wore before. And this change appears to me the beginning of favor. If He grants me more, may He leave me here until my deliverance from a world given over to injustice and unhappiness!" Is not all this enough to make right-minded people turn from the sickly sentimentalism of Sainte-Beuve, who declares that Madame Roland's love for Buzot "was the one touch of softness that her nature needed to make it *wholly feminine and French!*"

In the prison they let her have a few books, and a friend sent her flowers. She followed regular occupations day by day, drawing or studying in the morning and writing in the afternoon; and all this, though she was in the midst of distraction most trying, from the noise of the quarreling and cursing and obscene talk that was borne to her ears through the thin partitions of her cell. This careful arrangement of her time amidst such surroundings our author remarks is "perhaps a better index to her real force of character than her exalted periods and professions."

She chiefly busied herself with writing out "Historical Notes," as she called them, and a great mass of "Political and Personal Memoirs," producing in all some seven hundred pages of manuscript which she got to her friends and most of which has been preserved. Space forbids our treatment of all this work with the detail which it deserves. It is wonderful in whatever aspect it is viewed—the flow of thought, the deep emotion (biasing judgment, as might be expected), sometimes definite characterization, sometimes sparkling mirth, and, not least, the clear handwriting with scarcely an erasure and only marked with stains of tears. In the "Political Memoirs" Miss Tarbell considers it unquestionable that she poses, that she continually remembers she is speaking to posterity and must appear to the future as "the apostle of the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity." The "Personal Memoirs" have nothing of this over-dramatic conceit and this stiffness of manner, and we can well believe in the irresistible charm of their freshness and naturalness, only counting it most pitiful that she should have so taken the base, morbid Rousseau for her model as to what she should put in and what she should leave out. They are not wholly to be trusted in their representations of herself, yet their value is great, both personal and historical, for they not only furnish the chief record of the first twenty-five years of her life, but are "the most attractive material we have of the life of her class in the eighteenth century."

On November 1st, Madame Roland was taken to still another prison, the Conciergerie, where she was exposed to still worse in-

dignities than before. But only for a short time, for the Conciergerie meant a transfer to the death-cart and the guillotine. On two different days she was brought before the dread Revolutionary Tribunal. The questions were so cunningly worded that "in answering them honestly she condemned herself." November 7th, three witnesses appeared against her, one of them, overborne by fear or cowardice, a servant who had been thirteen years in her employ! The next day came the form of trial, on the charge of "a horrible conspiracy against the unity and indivisibility of the republic, the liberty and surety of the French people." She was allowed no defence, and was sentenced to death. The cart awaited her, and she went to the guillotine—"upright and calm," as one says who saw her, "her eyes shining, her color fresh and brilliant, a smile on her lips, trying to cheer her companion, a man overwhelmed by the terror of approaching death." The story of her calling for a pen and paper at the guillotine to write the thoughts which arose in her is only a story, which good authority makes us agree with Sainte-Beuve in calling "impossible, puerile, untrue to her nature and unsupported by contemporary evidence"; but it is true that, as they fastened her to the plank, her eyes falling upon a great statue of liberty near by, she uttered certain words, though authorities differ as to just what they were, whether, "*O Liberté, comme on t'a jouée!*" or, "*O Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom!*"

In the course of this paper we have already made so many comments upon the career of this noted woman and upon the work of her biographer that fuller estimates can hardly be expected. From a Christian standpoint one is more and more saddened, as he goes on with the record of Madame Roland's life, that she made shipwreck of her faith as she did. She had remarkable, superior natural gifts. With the guiding principle of the faith for reason and for sentiment, what errors and extravagances she might have been saved from! How much purer a reputation she might have left behind! Her pride and self-sufficiency were the source of her spiritual downfall. She came under the control of free-thinking authors, and thus she illustrates the care which all need to exercise over their own reading or that of others whom they can influence. Books were the elevation of Madame Roland; books were her ruin.

With her political ideas and the means she took to advance them we are not further concerned. In her ambition she followed a dream of liberty and equality, and she saw the dream come to naught. She bravely suffered; yet the record of that miserable passion for Buzot shows her death was not wholly for liberty, by any means!

She was one who idealized everything, as her biographer affirms, and the great ideal of her life was dispelled; but that does not prove the vanity of ideals nor the folly of cherishing them, as this book so strenuously keeps insisting or implying. We must have ideals. All who have accomplished anything worthy of God or of their fellow-men have had them and been guided by them. Everything depends upon what the ideal is and how wisely it is aspired after. It is those who have made God their Supreme Ideal who have given the world the noblest of examples. Their aspirations bring the courage of heroes, the patient endurance of saints.

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CATHOLIC MISSIONS IN AFRICA.

WITHIN recent years Africa has attracted in no small measure the attention of the civilized world. The immense continent which, if we except its coast-line, was fifty years ago a *terra incognita* to the rest of the world, has become in our time an object of jealous interest to the leading nations of Europe. Almost every part of it has been explored, whether in the interests of geographical science or of commerce. It has been shown to possess, especially in its interior, immense regions capable of great development and teeming populations. In consequence, those nations of Europe that have been smarting under the loss of colonial empire and viewing with jealous eye the vast strides made by England outside her sea-girt home, have turned towards Africa with all that earnestness of hunger usually displayed by late comers in gold-mining regions. France tries to recoup herself for the loss of North America and the Indies by huge efforts to Gallicize Algiers, Senegal, part of the Congo district and several other regions. Her national ambition in this respect has been, under God's providence, of great use to missionary work. Belgium and Holland have hoisted their flags over large tracts of the dark continent in the hope, probably, of restoring thereby something of the pristine splendor of the commerce of the Netherlands. Germany has made a new departure in colonizing on the east coast of Africa; and even poor Italy, under the impression, apparently, that it was

unworthy of a member of the Triple Alliance to be without colonial possessions, has made an unsuccessful attempt to establish her sovereignty in Abyssinia. But England has been in Africa, as elsewhere, the first in the van, and the genius of her statesmen and the swiftness of her fleets have left but the offal to others. She practically owns the eastern continent from the Isthmus of Suez to the Cape of Good Hope. All the south is hers, and she possesses in the west most of what is valuable.

In presence of this rush to Africa on the part of nations for the purpose of greed and gain, it ought to be of interest to consider what the Church has been doing for spreading the light and blessings of the Gospel in those regions, as well when they were utterly abandoned by commerce and civilization as since. It redounds to the credit of the Church in America that to her is due the initiative in modern missionary enterprise in Africa, whilst to a congregation composed chiefly of zealous Frenchmen, and known as that of the Holy Ghost and Immaculate Heart of Mary, is due the honor of proving the possibility of carrying out the most stupendous of missionary enterprises—the conversion of the black races of Africa. The connection of the Church in the United States with the earliest missions in Africa was brought about in this way. The Fathers of one of the early Provincial Councils of Baltimore having become cognizant of the vast efforts being made by Protestant sects to evangelize, according to their views, the republic of Liberia, which had been recently founded under American auspices, resolved to send hither an Apostolic missionary. They chose for this purpose a very remarkable man, Mgr. Barron. He belonged to an ancient and most respectable family of Waterford, Ireland, and was an accomplished scholar and most zealous ecclesiastic. At the time of his appointment to the mission in Africa he was Vicar-General of Philadelphia. His first anxiety, in taking up his new work, was to find missionaries. The young Church in the United States had none to spare. He, therefore, turned to France, the mother-land of missionaries. He consulted on the subject the celebrated M. Desgenettes, the saintly founder of the Arch-Confraternity of the Immaculate Heart of Mary at Notre Dame des Victories in Paris. Through him he made the acquaintance of another saintly founder, Ven. F. M. Libermann, who had recently founded a Congregation of Missionary Priests for the express purpose of the evangelization of the most abandoned souls. Hitherto the Ven. Libermann and his disciples had been engaged almost exclusively in the French colonies; but the new missionary field in Africa, quite accorded with their end. And so a band of seven missionaries were put at the disposal of Mgr. Barron in 1843. Theirs was the first serious effort

made since the days of the early Church to Christianize Africa. Such an enterprise could not, of course, count on anything like immediate success. In fact, it met with what the world would call irreparable disaster. Soon after landing on the inhospitable and unhealthy west coast of Africa all the missionaries but one perished. The envoy from America, in a fit of despair, gave up the undertaking and returned home, where he afterwards died the death of a true missionary amid the yellow fever patients of Savannah. The Ven. Libermann found himself thus confronted with the problem: What was to be done with Africa? Was it to be abandoned? Guided by the Holy See and following their own inspiration, he and his determined never to abandon what had hitherto been *par excellence* the region of abandoned souls. And the religious society he founded has been from that day to this faithful to the noble resolve to devote its best efforts to the evangelization of Africa. The annals of its labors are strewn with sacrifices of every kind; year after year it has had to mourn the death of several of its ablest and best members carried off by the deadly climate; but it has never once allowed itself to be discouraged. And, thank God, it can to-day rejoice in results that could not have been dreamed of fifty years ago. In addition to the large and numerous Christian communities that have been formed and fostered by herself, the Congregation of the Holy Ghost finds her pioneer efforts imitated by numerous other religious orders, so that to-day Africa is fairly well supplied with missionaries in every part.

We trust it will prove interesting to our readers to consider the ways and means adopted by African missionaries, the chief obstacles that beset their work, the successes they have so far achieved, and the hopes of ultimate success they can reasonably entertain. The writer had recently an opportunity of getting information on these several points from the very best sources, the heads of various missions. On Pentecost Sunday, this year, there was a notable gathering of African Missioners at the Mother House of the Society already mentioned, for the purpose of electing a superior-general, and transacting other important business. There were present five bishops from Africa, Mgr. De Courmont, Vicar Apostolic of Zanguebar, Mgr. Carrie, V.A., of French Congo, Mgr. Barthet, V.A., of Senegambia, Mgr. Augonard, V.A., of Oubanghi, and Mgr. Le Roy, V.A., of Gabon, the Pro-Vicar of Sierra Leone, Very Rev. James Browne, and several Prefects-Apostolic and Superiors of Missions were also present. Their views, as well as their modes of procedure, may be fairly considered as identical with those of other missionaries in Africa who find themselves in practically similar circumstances.

The first question that suggests itself in connection with the African Missions is, What means do the missionaries adopt for converting the natives? Do they preach to them in large assemblages, as St. Paul did at Athens and St. Patrick at Tara? Or do they content themselves with a stray conversion here and there? Or do they adopt some systematic, though slow, method of winning over the blacks unto Christ?

It would seem that the conversions of adults wholesale, or even in considerable numbers, is utterly impracticable. Polygamy, and all its attendant sensuality, bars the way. And, as plurality of wives is a mark of social prominence, the adult who would become Christian would have to sacrifice not only animal pleasures but social caste. Hence conversions of adults are rare and little to be relied on. However, in some missions, as in that of Senegambia, young people between the ages of ten and twenty are frequently converted, and become excellent Christians. In other places, too, especially when Fetichism is the only superstition prevalent, young men are easily persuaded to give up their idols and embrace the faith. Many missionaries prefer these converts to all others and find them more reliable than those who have been brought up Christians from childhood. Still, the general experience favors the system of taking up children, teaching them the elements of learning, and especially trades and agriculture, and forming out of them Christian families. This method demands much patience, but it is held to be the only one which will bear substantial fruit. And, thus, the majority of missionaries are engaged in the routine work of training young children. It is evident that for such a work the co-operation of nuns is indispensable for the female portion of the population. A self-sacrificing order of French nuns known as the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny has rendered invaluable services in this respect in the missions conducted by The Fathers of the Holy Ghost. There is a community of Black Sisters also which renders great aid for the material service of the missions.

The children brought up by the missionaries are of two classes—those redeemed from slavery and those born free. It is found that the latter form far better material than the former for Christian development. The children are trained with a view exclusively to future usefulness. Their booklearning is confined, as a rule, to the Catechism, and reading and writing—all in their native tongue. The greater part of their time is spent in learning useful trades, and especially agriculture.

Much difficulty is experienced in training the boys to work, as it is considered in Africa unmanly and suited only to women to do work. But systematic training overcomes this as well as other

obstacles. And, thus, when these boys and girls have grown up to manhood and womanhood they are far better able than their pagan neighbors to support themselves. The missionaries have introduced foreign grains and fruit trees into the country, so that in the course of time Christianity will be synonymous with higher civilization and greater prosperity.

When the boys have grown up to manhood they choose partners for life from among the wards of the nuns, and set out, with the missionary at their head, to found a new Christian settlement, or else to introduce the goodly salt of Christianity into communities already existing. But wherever they settle down the missionary goes with them. His presence is needed not only for spiritual, but also for temporal matters. It is to him that the young community looks up for guidance and encouragement in all its undertakings. The establishment of such a community, say of fifty families, is evidently the result of much watching and waiting and toil on the part of the missionaries; but it carries with it the reward of much promise. Nor are the promises founded on these young communities unfulfilled. The members of them observe well the usual Christian practices, and most of them live up to the requirements of holy faith. Thus, in the mission of Senegambia, founded less than fifty years ago, there are already 15,000 Christians. There is an annual average of 1200 baptisms and 600 confirmations. Some 50 priests, together with a corresponding number of lay brothers and nuns, are employed in this mission. They are distributed among 20 stations or residences, some of which are separate a fortnight's journey from each other.

The results obtained may seem small to the eyes of those who are accustomed to the large numbers of Christian populations, or who have read in history of the wholesale conversion of nations. But the obstacles in the way of missionary work in Africa are greater than have ever been experienced elsewhere. The climate, in the first place, is a deadly obstacle. The name given to Sierra Leone, "the white man's grave," may be applied to two-thirds of the spheres of missionary labors. Fever antidotes, such as quinine, form part of the daily bread of nearly every missionary. The average term of endurance of the climate is about half a dozen years.

Another great obstacle to Christian progress in Africa is the ingrained sensuality and barbarism of the people as a whole. Steeped in immorality for thousands of years, enervated by a tropical climate, the inhabitants of the dark continent are but poor subjects for the self-denial inculcated by the Gospel. It will take generations of Christian training and influence to counteract the sensuality and barbarism of the past; but those who are thoroughly

conversant with the situation are unanimously of opinion that the happy consummation of a Christianized Africa is perfectly possible in the course of time. All that is needed is an increase of missionary resources. Every head of missions whom the writer consulted asserted that he could find fruitful employment to-morrow for one hundred more missionaries. "The harvest indeed is great, but the laborers are few."

In connection with the supply of missionaries for Africa, arises the question whether there is any hope of training a native clergy. Great efforts have been made in this respect by the early missionaries and are continued by their successors. In several of the missions there are both Junior and Senior seminaries for the training of black Levites. But the success so far obtained is only very partial. None of even the oldest established missions possesses more than four or five native priests. The percentage of defections before ordination is very large, and the danger of falling away even after receiving Holy Orders is considerable. Experience has taught the vicars-apostolic to be very cautious about promoting blacks to the priesthood; and the Holy See has given express instructions that black priests shall, even though seculars, live in community. But notwithstanding all difficulties, several excellent native missionaries have been raised on African soil; and the heads of missions are unanimous in holding that it will be possible after a lapse of time to provide the country with a native clergy.

For the present, the conversion of Africa must depend on the zeal of those who have imbibed the faith for ages. To help to forward it is the privilege and duty of every Catholic throughout the world. The Church has a prime obligation to teach the Gospel to every nation. The countless millions of Africans who have never heard of Christ appeal to the Church at the present time. The success of her efforts to Christianize them will be in proportion to the co-operation of all Catholics. Missionaries have to be trained, have to be forwarded to their missions, and have to be supported there. Whence will come the resources necessary for all this missionary equipment, if not from the faithful at large? One country, ancient, Catholic France, has hitherto sustained most of the missionary work in Africa. Through the association known as "The Propagation of the Faith," established some fifty years ago in Lyons, and mainly supported by her own people, she has contributed the material resources for the good work; and she has freely given of her noblest and best sons to preach the Gospel to the blacks. But in recent times the demands made on her at home, in consequence of the aggressive hostility of an infidel government, have largely crippled her missionary resources. The time is certainly come when other countries, notably the Church in the United

States, ought to give a helping hand to the evangelization of Africa. It is true that we have many demands at home, and that we have a large dark population at our own doors. But there can be no fear of lack of resources for our home work, which will always appeal to the generous zeal of American Catholics. There is far more danger of our losing sight of the distant vineyard towards which we have obligations in common with the Catholic world. One of the essential attributes of the Church is zeal for the salvation of souls, especially of such as have never received the light of God's spirit; and one of the healthiest marks of every branch of the Church is participation in her missionary spirit. What wonders could be effected in the way of missionary development in pagan lands by very slight sacrifices on the part of even half of our ten million Catholics in the United States! More than fifty years ago Africa appealed not in vain to the infant Church of the United States. To-day she appeals to our increased numbers and resources. The brightest page in the history of the Universal Church is the record of her Apostolic labors in pagan lands, and the brightest page in the history of every branch of the Church is that which records its co-operation in bringing the light of God's truth to those who have sat for ages in darkness and the shadow of death.

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THE POWER OF ENGLISH NONCONFORMITY.

IT was remarked recently by the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, an eminent Nonconformist authority, that "as Anglicans number only twenty millions and Nonconformists number sixty millions (throughout the world), conversion to any one church in particular must be regarded as mathematically impossible." There was probably more humor than accuracy in the use of the word mathematical. By "any one church in particular" Mr. Hughes meant any church save the Catholic, and certainly we are baffled when we imagine the possibility of the conversion of all sects to one sect. Whichever way we take Mr. Hughes's meaning, whether we think of all Anglicans as being converted to "any one" of the more than two hundred English sects, or of all the multitudinous English sects being converted to the religion called Anglicanism, or of the twenty millions of Anglicans being proportionately divided among the more than two hundred English sects, we can appreciate the numerical difficulty, and we have only to regret that the sheer absurdity of the consideration obscures for the moment its deep gravity.

But now as to the power of English Nonconformity; and before we touch upon sectarian statistics, is it not true that the multiplicity of the divisions gives it a huge power for evil throughout the world? We know that the conversion of the heathen is retarded by the conflicts of the missionaries, that more than two hundred sects, *plus* the huge Eastern schism and *plus* the infinitely varying Church of England, appear to the heathen to present almost every credential save that of a supernatural commission; and thus the power of schism becomes so great throughout the world that it is difficult for truth to fight against it. And perhaps England is the greatest offender. In one sense, indeed, "Orthodox" Russia is more scandalous than Protestant England, for all the world knows that the Czar's Church possesses a true priesthood, and that Orthodoxy is very close to Catholicity, so that the scandal of schism, where there is so much of Catholic truth, is less excusable than in Protestant England. But the English religion has a power for evil which is not possessed by the Russian schism. English ships carry schism and heresy into the ports of many other countries, whereas Russia keeps her schism and heresy for home use, and never thinks of evangelizing the heathen. Thus "the English religion" is almost everywhere, and that religion is

synonymous with variety and discord and with the destruction of ecclesiastical authority.

And it must be remembered, when considering the power of Nonconformity, that a good half of that power is derived from the example of the infinitely divided Anglican Church. Nonconformists reasonably point to the divisions among Anglicans as justifying their own separations. They argue—and their logic is irresistible —“if a church which affects to have Apostolic Succession, to be so richly endowed with Divine Authority as to be able to teach the Catholic Church and the Greek Church, and to be the true heir, the sole heir, of all primitive truth, is yet more divided in its doctrinal teaching than is any one of the sects of Nonconformists, how can she blame us for believing what we like without the affectation of church authority?” Thus Anglicanism lends power to Nonconformity by demonstrating the fallacy of its own pretensions. At the very time that it scolds the dissenting sects for their separation from the national mother-sect, it pronounces their absolution for both schism and heresy by proving that both offences are Anglican.

We cannot speak of English Nonconformity apart from its acknowledged parent stem, for every one of the English sects is the offspring of that Anglicanism which has taught them to make light of church authority. And in the present day we are struck by the strange anomaly that not a few of the English bishops favor Dissent, and even fraternize, doctrinally, with Dissenters. The Bishop of Worcester has administered holy communion to Scotch Presbyterians and English Baptists, and has affirmed in public speeches, and has rejoiced in the affirmation, “I fully recognize the Nonconformist bodies as churches.” So, too, the late Archbishop of Canterbury fraternized with the late Mr. Spurgeon, and hailed him as an ally in Christian teaching. And, on the other hand, to show how “comprehensive” of every doctrinal extreme is the Church of England, Dean Farrar says that “seven thousand of the Anglican clergy are avowed supporters of the Romeward movement”—that is, of Ritualistic excesses—while the Dean of Norwich expresses his hope that the Low Church clergy in the same Church will “out-pray the Ritualists, out-work them, out-live them,” to the confusion of the wicked “seven thousand.” So that Nonconformists may certainly claim the Church of England as their strongest champion for the principle of self-pleasing, and may plead its “hundred sects battling within one church” as “the Authoritative approval of No Authority.”

May we not say, then, that the power of English Nonconformity lies mainly in its alliance with Anglicanism; an alliance, not of professed doctrinal harmony, but of warfare against the principle

of authority. We do not say that the power of Nonconformity is mainly in the direction of evil; on the contrary, we should affirm that its power for good has been greater than the power of the Church of England. It would be no exaggeration to say that the national English piety, through the whole of the time of the four Georges, was mainly kept alive by Nonconformists; John Wesley, who left the National Church, being certainly the truest apostle of religious enthusiasm whom Protestantism had ever engendered. To him was due that rebound from Georgian insensibility which prepared the way for the birth of Oxford Puseyism; the modern Ritualists owing their after successes to the earnest spirit which Wesley introduced. English Dissenters have no reason to be ashamed of their influence in leavening the tone of national Protestantism. It is to them, largely, that the National Church is indebted for having preserved its belief in our Lord's Divinity. While the learned Dons of the establishment, as well as rectors and curates, were preaching heavy sermons to prove that "there is a God," or were rivaling each other in scholarly discourses on the authenticity or genuineness of the Scriptures, the Dissenters, in their simplicity, were preaching "Christ Crucified," and left all ponderous disputations to the Anglicans. They might be looked down upon for their half-educatedness (no such charge could now be brought against them), but they were innocent of spreading dry scepticism by laboring over the evidences of Christianity. Nonconformity had its power among the poor, and a gentle and real power it was. Persecuted, despised, almost ostracised for centuries, their quiet, earnest piety has been edifying; and, spite of vagaries which were inevitable in their position, they have seldom been scandalous or indecorous. More than this, they were fully justified in their desertion of a sham church, which had positively nothing in the world that could recommend it, save the fact that it was endowed and established. Men who are old enough to remember the dead-and-alive Anglican religion, so late even as forty-five years ago, the dull and dreary services in the churches, the uninteresting written sermons of the clergy, the neglect of the sick poor and of the dying, cannot wonder that so many Protestants who were in earnest turned their backs on the parliamentary religion. Add to such incitements the adamant social barriers which were thrown up between the wealthy and the poor classes—the latter being only permitted to attend the church services on the condition that they were kept severely to the back seats—and we can only marvel, not that so many became Dissenters, but that so many submitted calmly to such indignities. The present Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, Dr. Gregory, has published his recollections of forty years ago, of Anglican public worship and clerical

dulness, drawing a picture which, for arid, heartless Paganism could scarcely be surpassed by the imagination.

There are two truths on which we should emphatically insist when discussing the present power of Nonconformity, (1) that all dissent was engendered, through three centuries, by the utter unworthiness of Church of Englandism, (2) that the Church of England has persecuted its own offspring as relentlessly as it has persecuted Catholics. There is perhaps nothing more contemptible in English history than the persecution of Dissenters by Anglicans. In the time of Queen Elizabeth every English Dissenter who refused to attend the Church of England divine service was fined one hundred dollars for each offence; and was, moreover, compelled to find sureties for one thousand dollars until such time as he should conform to the Establishment. The refusal to comply with these conditions was followed, first, by imprisonment, then banishment, and if the offender returned to his own country he was hanged by the order of the High Commission. And this state of things was continued by King James I., while the pretended Act of Toleration, A.D. 1689, only permitted Dissenters to enjoy their civil rights on the condition that they took an obnoxious oath; an act which had full play for ninety years, and of which the spirit, if not the letter, was approved by Englishmen down to the early part of this century. Moreover, in the present century the British Parliament has been guilty of repeated acts of gross cruelty towards Dissenters. The House of Lords has been far worse than the House of Commons. Not content with maintaining the Test Act, with refusing education grants to Dissenters, and with insisting on retaining the odious Church Rate, the Upper House of English gentlemen refused to allow Dissenters the consolation of their own ministers at their friends' graves, forbade more than twenty Dissenters to worship together without a license from the Anglican bishop of the diocese, and several times rejected bills for the abolition of those tests which deprived Dissenters of all prizes at the university. Now with such a chain of cruel wrongs against Dissenters it might have been thought that Anglican churchmen would hold their peace in regard to "the bigotry of Catholic governments against Protestants." Quite the reverse. No institution in the world has ever persecuted religious dissidents with more ferocity than has the English National Church, while no institution has ever prated more about its religious and civil liberty, as though it held a monopoly of such privileges.

If we enquire, is the present status of Nonconformity—religious, political, and social—higher or lower in England than it used to be? the answer is, it is in most respects improved. There are still strange and curious sects, whose very names are mirth-provoking;

but educated Dissenters do not heed them any more than they heed the vagaries of eccentric politicians who spout their wild theories in the public parks. Nor is there much difference between the sects as to opinion, or worship, or practice. Indeed, one does not see why Dissenters should be disunited, why they should need so many names, so many sects. Perhaps it is the variety of such distinctions which fascinates the lovers of independence. It is the assertion of the *right* to please one's self. The Registrar General counts 248 sects in England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, without reckoning Jews or Greek schismatics, or the quite innumerable divisions in the National Church. No doubt each of the sects has its speciality, which may be known to the more critical of its adherents, but the great majority appear to be very much alike. Putting aside such sects as a Theistic Church, the Humanitarians, or the Eclectics, who have evidently a leading idea in their novelties, one does not see why there should not be some sort of *impar congressus* between a Reformed Episcopal Church, a Free Church, a Free Episcopal Church, and a Free Church of England; as also between the five divisions of the Methodist Church, the three divisions of the Baptist Church, and the three of the Congregational Church; or why the Unsectarians, the Recolative Religionists, the Independent Religious Reformationists, the Church of the People, and the Episcopalian Dissenters should not find sufficient in common for a combination. We must be afraid that to some minds the love of disintegration—it matters little by what name we describe it—is stronger than the love of religious harmony. The passion for novelty in Nonconformity increases with its unbridled indulgence. It may seem strange; yet, with all this embarrassment of sectarian wealth, there are always men who cannot find the exact thing, and who fly to the easiest remedy at hand, which is to invent one more creed, and proceed to immortalize it by giving to it the name of its inventor.

The most respectable—if the word be not discourteous—of English Nonconformist associations is what is commonly called the Wesleyan. There are said to be about fifteen million Wesleyans in the world; while as to England, there are nearly half a million Wesleyan Methodists; the Primitive Methodists numbering close upon two hundred thousand, and the remaining three divisions of the Methodist community possibly a hundred and twenty thousand; so that the total number is about three-quarters of a million. It is curious, however, that in England Wesleyanism does not spread or develop; the sect seems to be hereditary in belief, but seldom to be recruited by converts. "Respectable," however, is an appropriate word for a body which has preserved a

certain dignity, which has neither taken up with new fantastic ideas, nor minimized its evangelical traditions.

Calvinism, which was said by an energetic writer to have been "long since kicked out of creation," has still its foothold in Great Britain, though it has been softened as to the harshness of its tenets. Calvinistic Baptists, Calvinistic Independents, and Welsh Calvinists have all rubbed off, more or less, the sharp angles of their dogmatism; they have become amalgamated in some degree with other bodies; and their old doctrine of reprobation, repulsive and anti-Christian, if not absolutely discarded, is, at least, not now formulated, and is seldom preached by the more cultured of their pastors.

So that religiously, and perhaps still more, socially, Nonconformity has made real advances. The late Mr. Spurgeon was its benefactor. He found Nonconformity under a cloud, and he helped to raise it to social credit and respectability. It may be said that he did more to reconcile Anglicans to dissent than any other preacher since John Wesley. He was more of a Nonconformist than a sectarian; insisting less upon special Baptist tenets than on the superiority of a "ministry" over a "priesthood." But his great merit was that he made English Dissent "respectable." It may be true that few Anglicans care to enquire whether a Dissenter is a Baptist or a Wesleyan, or even a Quaker or a Plymouth Brother; but socially, and also intelligently, a Dissenter is no longer despised, though he may be regarded as a curious product of self-opinionism. The old expression, "he is only a Dissenter," is never heard in any class of society. Most people have read the story of Dr. Johnson—whether Boswell records it we are not sure—that he threw a weed over his garden wall into the garden of his neighbor, because his neighbor was "only a Dissenter." It is unlikely that Dr. Johnson would have been guilty of such coarseness on the ground of his disesteem for Dissenters; it is more likely, if the story be true, that he was ridiculing the popular Anglican prejudice against a class which had been driven into Nonconformity. We all know that Anglican prejudice, whether busied against "Popery," or against its own multitudinous offspring, the Dissenters, is very hard to be converted to even amenity. But the fact being now admitted, that the new Anglicanism is a wider departure from the old Anglicanism than was Nonconformism in the last century from Georgian Anglicanism, Anglicans feel that they have so "dissented" from their own church that they cannot consistently reproach their brother Dissenters. All Anglicanism is, and always has been, dissent; the Dissenters, so-called, only differing from Anglicans in a more candid profession of private judgment.

Politically, members of parliament have now to reckon with Nonconformists in preparing a "party cry" for an election. Mr. Disraeli made one of his political characters to say in "Coningsby," "I am all for a religious cry; it means nothing, and if successful does not interfere with business when we are in." But that was fifty years ago, and in these days a religious cry does mean something, as about ten millions of Dissenters would soon make known. On such a question as disestablishment, and perhaps still more on that of popular education, the Nonconformists have a strong voice in parliament. As Dr. Brown observed some time ago in the City Temple, "Nonconformists are no longer sent to prison by churchmen; they are sent to parliament to make laws for churchmen. Churchmen have to submit to this, and, so long as they take the money of the state, they must."

But now let us go a little more deeply into the so-called theology of Nonconformists. A somewhat wide acquaintance with their literature may enable us to do this without presumption. And such literature, upon the whole, is very painful. It is indeed more than painful, it is disheartening. While recognizing, as we should wish to do in this brief paper, the *bona fides* of the great body of Dissenters, we have yet to deplore their slowness in realizing the distinction between the Bible and its individual interpretation.

After reading scores of dissenting writings, published by their best men, we seem to be in a perfect wilderness of nothingness, or in a sort of maze of contradictory principles, in which we cannot find the beginning or the end. As to what the Dissenters do *not* believe, we get a tolerably clear understanding; but as to the doctrines which they really do accept, or as to the authority on which they accept them, we are left in a state of confusion. "We do *not* believe," says one of their writers, in a brief summary of Congregational Principles, "that by the waters of baptism, or the touch of priestly hands, any one can be made a child of God, a member of Christ, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven. It seems to us essentially superstitious to think so. But the very earnestness of our protest against the delusion of baptismal regeneration makes us lay deeper stress upon the spiritual truth of which that doctrine is the distortion, almost the caricature." So much for the Christian Sacrament of Baptism. But now as to the duty of Christian Unity. In a tract widely disseminated we find this curious rejoicing in sectarianism: "Diversities in creed, in worship, in enterprise that spring from loyalty to Christ and love to men are our glory." How are we to reason with men who call diversities in creed a proof of loyalty to the Divine Teacher of truth? Indeed these diversities—often flat contradictions—appear to be regarded, not only as permissible, but as revealed and com-

manded by Almighty God. What other interpretation can we put upon such words as "federation, not absorption, must be the watchword of the future; each church faithfully maintaining the special forms of truth *committed to its trust*." Here we have the assumption that (1) these "special forms" of doctrines *are* all truths; and (2) that Almighty God has committed to each sect the guardianship of its contradiction of others' beliefs, and of its own latest inventions in the way of heresies. It is so difficult to make any sense out of the position, and still more difficult to make any religion. It would seem to be both more simple and more honest to say plainly, "There is no such thing as positive truth. Let every man believe that which is right in his own eyes, and believe that it is right because he thinks so."

To turn now for a moment to the dissenting estimate of Ritualism. We shall at best find here a certain amount of common sense, though we shall not find the inferences which Catholic instinct, Catholic knowledge, would assume to be absolutely unavoidable. In a formal and well-written "Address delivered from the Chair of the Congregational Union of England and Wales," we read these very sensible observations: "The position taken up by Anglo-Catholics to-day is almost an entire reversal of that held by the Elizabethan divines of three centuries ago. . . . Our visitors from America will find 'the Church' no longer professing to be a bulwark of Protestantism; for a large section of its clergy scout the very name of Protestant; they will find a teaching ministry turned into a sacrificing priesthood, a communion table into an altar, the confessional creeping stealthily into use again," etc. And one more passage may well be quoted, as being perfectly true as to matters of fact, and as teaching a lesson which is ignored: "It is difficult to repress a smile when we remember that this (Anglican) Church, which refuses to recognise our churches, is itself not recognized by the Eastern Church—either Greek or Russian; that it has been formally excommunicated by the Western Church; and that therefore the whole of its clergy—archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, rectors, vicars, down to the humblest curate—all lie to this day under the ban of excommunication, and every man of them is a schismatic in the eyes of the only Church from which he can have derived that mystical sacramental grace which he claims to have."

If we next take the subject of ordinations, we find that Nonconformists, while at variance with the Ritualists, and at variance with the Catholic Church and with the Russian schism, have a theory which may be formulated as follows: "If a man thinks as I think, and preaches what I choose to consider 'Gospel,' I ordain him by my own personal approval." It is quite possible to express the

same theory in language which sounds less egotistical. For example, we find it formulated in this way by one of the most eminent of Congregationalists: "Our ordinations are the delegation of certain powers of the common priesthood of all believers to a brother deemed to be divinely gifted for their service." Here we have "delegations" from persons who possess no authority to delegate; we have "powers" said to be conferred by men and women who neither possess nor could define the assumed powers; we have a "common priesthood of all believers" imparted by persons who do not believe in a priesthood at all, and who are believers in contradictory doctrines; and we have the judgment as to persons being "divinely gifted" delivered by those who are not themselves divinely gifted, but who elect preachers who will conform to their "views" and strengthen them in their preconceived creeds. After such a conception of ordinations, we expect to find the same spirit of eclecticism pervading all other grooves of theology.

Thus, when we inquire as to the sin of schism, we are answered (in the "Tracts on Church Principles"): "It appears plain, not only that there can be separation without schism, but that a certain separateness is even essential to what may be truly called Catholic Unity, the unity, namely, of all churches, as well as of all Christians, in Christ. For freedom is indispensable to the highest kind of union." These statements, reduced to plain terms, mean that you may indulge in any amount of schism you like, and also in any amount of heresy, provided only you call yourself "spiritually" united with those whom you consider to be in error. And at this point we may notice the habitual confusion, on the part of Dissenting controversialists, between differences of opinion in regard to discipline, and differences of belief in regard to truths. We may also notice the habitual misstatement as to the most elementary teaching of the Catholic Church. As an example of this last kind, we read: "A consistent and loyal Roman Catholic is bound to believe that no members of the Church of England or of any Protestant Church can be saved, except by joining the Church of Rome." No Catholic who ever lived believed anything so false or so uncharitable; and the real doctrine has been explained by theologians in a hundred books, pamphlets and tracts. It is this disingenuousness of statement as to Catholic belief which it is so hard to successfully combat. In the same spirit we have the oft-repeated fiction, "The Catholic would take my Bible from me, and give me only a few mutilated pieces of it," which is thought to be an honest way of putting the truism that the mother and mistress of all truth withholds portions of the Old Testament from young persons; while, as to Paul's Epistles, she warns the faithful not

to "wrest things hard to be understood to their own destruction," after the manner of the vast majority of Protestants.

It may be thought that we have not thus far seen much of "The Power of English Nonconformity." Let us try to describe what this power is in the sense of its present effects on the English mind.

An Englishman finds himself living in an island where, theoretically, every man is a pontiff. With the exception of the small Catholic population—perhaps about two and a half millions—every man, say thirty-five millions, professes a vast range of infallibility in regard to all Christian truths, such as never was claimed by any Pope; being ready at a moment's notice to teach his own church and every other church what is necessary to be believed unto salvation, in regard to sacraments, public worship, church authority and all doctrinal and all moral theology. It is manifest that such an estimate of one's own powers must be accompanied by a correspondingly low estimate of the very "truths" which one is capable of judging. Why do Nonconformists, and why do Low Churchmen, speak lightly of the Mysteries of the Faith; sweeping away, as it were, by half a dozen at a time the most profound and supernatural verities? The answer is that since *they* are the sole judges of such truths, it is obvious that such truths cannot be divine. If any Protestant can settle off-hand the true doctrine of Baptism, or of the Real Presence, it is manifest that the doctrine of Baptism or of the Real Presence must be intellectually level with private intelligence, and that as to its supernatural character, well, how should it have any, since to define the supernatural is beyond the natural intellect, and can be done only by the Holy Spirit of God? Hence, we find that in Protestantism the supernatural element is eliminated from worship as from faith; Protestantism being little more than Natural Religion *plus* the sentiment of faith in redemption. This is, of course, only a rough way of putting it; just as Cardinal Newman summed up popular Protestantism as "paganism *minus* its gods." Intellectually, Protestantism has brought down Christianity to a level with private opinion; and spiritually it has deified private opinion, by making it sole judge of divine mysteries.

As an inevitable consequence, all kinds of Nonconformism—and Nonconformism is only superlative Church-of-Englandism—tend to exalt the individual at the price of truth, while affecting, before all things, to be "spiritual." This word "spiritual" is made to shelter the vagaries of almost any amount of personal vanity, and it is an example of the Protestant habit—specially rampant among Dissenters—of using a word which in itself is very good in a sense which is really very false. Thus, when a

Dissenter denies some Catholic verity he will say that he interprets it "spiritually." (We saw this just now in regard to baptism.) Schism and heresy, so far from being blamed, are spoken of as "spiritual union." The rejection of the adorable sacrifice of the Mass is the "spiritual" apprehension of Christ's sacrifice, and the same is said of the Protestant Communion. The refusal to confess sins in the sacrament of penance implies a "spiritual" confession made to God. And the substitution of Dissenting laymen for Catholic priests shows how spiritual is the pure ministry of the Gospel. No word has been more tortured by all kinds of Nonconformists than this (to them) misunderstood word spiritual. Every kind and degree of disobedience has found shelter under its far-spreading wing; every tortuous explaining away of Scripture, every bold denial of Catholic authority, every invention of some new conceit in heresy, has pleaded its spirituality in its defence, so that there is scarcely a form of error which has not been dubbed spiritual by its sectarian votary for the time being. Like the word "scriptural," what it really means is egotism—"scriptural" being used by Protestants, not to convey scriptural truth, but to convey "*my* interpretation of the Scriptures." These two words have been made the apology by all Dissenters for almost everything which is *not* spiritual, *not* scriptural. Yet the subterfuge is too transparent to deceive any one. Nearly two hundred and fifty sects in England, and at least three big churches within the Establishment, cry aloud that, whatever else Protestantism may be, it is certainly neither spiritual nor scriptural.

The wild luxuriance of English Nonconformity has at least this undeniable merit: That it shows how the "principle of Protestantism," if logically and consistently carried out, must make every man his own Supreme Pontiff. A study of the literature of Nonconformism makes it evident that its chief leaders have no objection to "Popery," provided every man may be his own Pope. Personal infallibility is a Protestant dogma; but always on the condition that the Head of the Teaching Church is excluded from all right to its possession. The power to judge pontiffs, to judge councils, to judge saints is lodged in every Protestant breast; but the Head of the Christian Church is the one melancholy exception to the enjoyment of universal infallibility. To put the position differently: Protestantism, which is a synonym of mutability, and which repudiates the teaching-power of the living Church, confers on every man the power to make his own creed; but the Catholic Church, which has never once contracted its own teaching through a period of nearly nineteen hundred years, is debarred from the privilege of knowing what is truth, and may be taught it by hosts of conflicting sectaries. This may seem an ex-

aggerated estimate; but to test the value of a principle we must see where it would lead us, and though no sincere Protestant, whether Nonconformist or Anglican, would admit that he carried his principles so far, and have the witness of an infinitely divided Protestantism to the general truth of the statement.

Suppose, however, we take the converse of the position. Instead of holding that every man is born a supreme pontiff, we are perfectly aware that there are not a few Protestants—not only Nonconformists but Anglicans—who hold that it does not much matter what you believe; but what *does* matter is that you live peaceably with all men, whether you think them to be heretics or orthodox. Peace, peace is their watchword, their aspiration, and they much prefer a harmony of discords to a harmony of obedience to authority. It is true that Nonconformism has mainly fathered this illusion in its despair of ever arriving at unanimity; but Anglicanism also cherishes the illusion. And we have recently had a remarkable illustration of its mastery over a very strong mind.

Mr. Gladstone, in his letter to the Sovereign Pontiff on "The Validity of Anglican Orders," considers that "an enquiry resulting in the proscription of Anglican Orders would be no less important than deplorable." And he adds that in his opinion "wisdom and charity" would arrest a promulgation of a hostile decision, which would be "an occasion and a means of embittering religious controversy." This may be the view of an astute politician, who is also an amiable Anglican, but it is not a Catholic estimate. It is indeed a very painful example of the cry of "peace, peace, where there is no peace;" or the aiming at smoothing over terrible differences, in place of bringing the differences to an end. We have just been tracing the consequences of this resolute rejection of the divine and infallible teaching of the Holy See; and we have seen that one of the worst features of that rejection has been its "embittering" of irrepressible controversies. Mr. Gladstone thinks it a pity to disturb the doubt about Anglican Orders, because people who doubt may still hope; and it is better, he thinks, to live on in hopeful doubt than to be told plainly that such orders are worthless. This is hardly a love of truth, it is a love of policy. It is carrying the spirit of the House of Commons into the sacred domain of divine rule. If Mr. Gladstone understood the Catholic faith, he would know that the Holy See has been implanted in the world expressly to teach truth to the nations; and that though policy and diplomacy must largely guide its action in all matters which are *not* of divine faith, they can have no place in regard to God's truth. The question of the validity of Anglican orders is primarily a question as to facts, not as to faith or to morals; but

the facts involve such terrible issues as the possession or the want of true sacraments—the receiving or the not receiving holy communion; the receiving or the not receiving absolution; the presence or the absence of the adorable Sacrifice, which is the one only “divine worship” worthy of God. Mr. Gladstone thinks it “wisdom and charity” to obscure such pre-eminent issues, and recommends the going to sleep for another century or two, before trying to put an end to all doubt. Is not this an example of the power of Nonconformism (whether outside or inside the establishment) to so completely shake the foundations of real earnestness that men prefer doubt to divine rule?

The power of the colossal weakness called Nonconformism is in the direction of the dissipation of the intellect in all that concerns divine faith. It is a dissipation which enfeebles the perception of the differences between human opinion and inerrancy; the differences between the natural and the supernatural; the difference between the certainties of the faith and the necessary uncertainties of “I think.” It is a dissipation which began in rebellion, and has resulted in a chaos of doubt. And one of its worst evils is that it puts a false “wisdom” and a false “charity”—no doubt sincerely conceived of by Mr. Gladstone—into the place of the wisdom which would adore divine certainty, and the charity which would seek to save all Christian souls. What wisdom can there be in *not* knowing the truths of God: what charity in *not* ending strifes? The humorous Frenchman who said that “language was given us with which to conceal our thoughts” might have added that, in some cases, it conceals from ourselves the real meaning of the words we employ. Wisdom is not perplexity, charity is not discord; and perhaps the exact opposite would be true, that wisdom cannot rest without knowledge, nor charity without true bonds of unity. The fictions, in the way of language, of which we have given examples—the word “spiritual” being made to veil private sentiment, and the word “scriptural” being made to veil private opinions—show how easy it is to “dissipate” the intellect by confusing the human with the divine. Nonconformism is only the ultimate dissipation of the intellect which puts self before authority. Queen Elizabeth put self before everything; she put her crown before the national salvation. Nonconformism does not do this; it is not so wicked. On the contrary, it desires everybody’s salvation. It only manumits private judgment in the place of living authority, because it does not believe in living authority.

A. F. MARSHALL.

THE APOSTOLATE OF FATHER BARAGA AMONG THE CHIPPEWAS AND WHITES OF LAKE SUPERIOR.¹

AMONG the élite of most of the surviving North American Indian nations certain peculiarities with some, and physical traits with others, may still be traced, indicating and connected with their race origin.

Take, for example, the full-blood Abnakis, the Algonkins, and the Micmac tribes in the Dominion of Canada, and they will be found to have retained the cleanly habits and the even temperament peculiar to the peoples of these nations when they were converted to Christianity during the early decades of the seventeenth century by the Jesuit missionaries.

The warriors of the Five Nations, "the Indians of the Indians," as some writers at the present day have, in our opinion, appropriately designated the people of the tribes of the nations of "the Long House," the Iroquoian League of the "Country of the Lakes" of New York, differed materially in facial contour and in physical formation.

The hard-set face, the keen vision, and the athletic form of the warriors of the Mohawk and of the Oneida nations, who, until the eclipse of French supremacy in New France, had been leaders of the raids which devastated the French settlements on the St. Lawrence, and who may well be termed the Roman conquerors of so many contemporary Indian nations, indicated the manner of men they were; whose cult, by inheritance, was of that nature which included no mercy for an enemy, and who ruthlessly struck their tomahawks upon the heads of the helpless women and children of their foes.

The facial contour of the full-blood survivors of these two nations at the present day is about all that is left to indicate their race origin. The Onondagas, who were of a more gentle nature, agriculturists, and the resident custodians for three centuries of the archives, and guardians of the council fire of the league, have so degenerated that little remains of the former dignified appearance of the constituency of the "tribes of the hills," as they were called during the seventeenth century, when the Catholic faith had become permanently, to all appearance at least, established in the

¹ See "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW* for January, 1896; and the "Chippewas of Lake Superior," in the *REVIEW* for April, 1896.

capital of the league in the Onondaga valley, and when Garontie, its head sachem, one of the most distinguished converts to Christianity, was baptized with great éclat by Bishop Laval, in the castle of St. Louis at Quebec.¹

Those who are familiar with the present condition of the Onondagas, as well as with their past history, say that the people of this nation have never ceased to mourn the fallen condition of their once powerful confederacy.

The Cayugas, who were also of agreeable mien, and who might be termed the "truck gardeners" of the people of the "Country of the Lakes," have become so nearly extinct that few of pure blood can be found to trace a resemblance of original stock.

Our proposition, however, of hereditary distinction apparent in the peoples of the North American Indian families, finds its best illustration, in so far as the Iroquoian nations are concerned, in the Senecas; most numerous of all, having the largest number of warriors, custodians of the "first fire," or "western door" of the "long house," who have inherited the physical peculiarities of their ancestors of three centuries ago. Of the several thousands of this people inhabiting the Seneca reservation in western New York, the great majority of the men are six feet high, of lithe and wiry frame, with blue eyes, elongated facial formation, and agreeable aspect.

Of the "savages of the savages," if we may be permitted to so designate the tribes whom Tecumseh marshalled under the British flag in the war of 1812, they probably represented the most barbaric and the lowest grades of the American Indians at that period.

They were, as a rule, a drunken and a murderous collection of brutal thieves, whose physiognomies but too plainly indicated their debased and cruel instincts. But their autonomy is difficult at the present day to define; their descendents are wards of the Dominion of Canada.

We have, in a former article, described the Ottawas, whose Adonean physique neither national misfortune nor eras of debauchery has materially changed.²

Let us write a few lines about the ensemble of the Chippewas of Lake Superior, as the people of this nation appeared during the decade of Father Baraga's apostolate among them at La Pointe.

Assemble in daylight, in an open field, and in a line, one hundred or more American Indians of the Northwest, of pure blood and of ten different nationalities, and he who is familiar with the

¹ See "The Romance of the Country of the Lakes of New York," in *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xviii., No. 69, January, 1893.

² See "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xxi., No. 81, January, 1896, pp. 106-129.

physiognomies of the races of this people will readily point out to you the Chippewa Indians of Lake Superior among those assembled.

The lower jaw-bone of the average Russian is not more distinctive of his race, than is the high cheek-bone of the average Chippewa. While the broad chin of the former, as well as his upper lip are, as a rule, covered with russet hair, there is no sign of a beard, neither the suspicion of a mustache, on the bright copper-hued and hollow-cheek face of the latter.

But there is no bright gleam in his eyes ; while his well-formed and stalwart frame, but scantily covered, seems wasted from want of nourishing food, and tanned from exposure too frequently endured from the want of protection against the winter blast, by the warm blanket, which is the inseparable part of an Indian's costume while living in his normal state.

There is a cast of hopelessness on a full-blood Chippewa's face which is more decidedly developed on the face of his squaw.

Who ever saw a smiling or a merry-faced Chippewa squaw ?

Even the daughter of the great Chippewa chief, Wa-ba-jeek, wife of John Johnston of the "Sault," when seen by Colonel McKenney in 1826, a high-caste Chippewa of pure blood, as she was, wore that look of sadness usually seen on the faces of the women of her race ; while the tinge of melancholy lingering on the fair faces of Mrs. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft and her beautiful sisters, children of Wa-ba-jeek's daughter and of her Irish husband, added, perhaps, to the charms of these exquisitely mannered ladies.

At what precise epoch this peculiar sadness became a feature in the physiognomy of the people of the once great Chippewa nation, or from what cause, is uncertain. The expression of an American Indian's face is usually grave ; but there is no such melancholic peculiarity to be noted among the Roman Catholic people of the Abnakis, the Algonkins or the Micmacs ; nor does it prevail among the Christian and Pagan Iroquoians either in New York State or in Canada.

From Marquette the coast line of Lake Superior curves northwest by south, around a semicircular shore, which extends almost due south, forming a bay, the east line of whose coast terminates at a hooked-nosed point in the lake ; this is Keweenaw. Lake Superior navigators usually rejoice when they have rounded this rather dangerous point. The bay referred to extends some distance inland, and its waters wash the shores of one of the few agreeable and sheltered localities on the Lake Superior coast.

The Jesuit explorers of the seventeenth century named this calm haven, *L'Anse*, "the little bay" ; and this name remains to the present day.

It is a central point in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. It is in the heart of one of the richest mining regions in the world, which has been developed during the nineteenth century. It is midway between the copper mines of the Ontonagan and Keweenaw ranges and the prolific iron mines of the Marquette district.

Before the development of so much mineral wealth, Father Baraga decided to transfer the centre of his apostolic work from La Pointe to L'Anse. He had evangelized the Chippewas, the half-breeds, and the whites on the shores and islands of the headwaters of Lake Superior.

It is doubtful if Father Baraga had any definite idea of the enormous mineral wealth hidden under the arid and uninviting surface of the soil, upon which, at the time, there lived, and starved, and suffered from cold, so many of the people of the Chippewa nation.

But, that he was moved by Divine Providence to make this change, we firmly believe; he was a very holy man, and nearer than most men were to the source of Infinite Power. A great change was impending over the Upper Peninsula; her wealth of copper and of iron, practically demonstrated, drew capitalists as well as adventurers in considerable numbers, to the localities where the richest mines were expected to be discovered. When organized capital became active in the work of developing mining property, skilled miners were brought from Pennsylvania, Illinois, and other States, as well as from Cornwall and from Sweden. The time came when a considerable percentage of these hardy men were found to be Roman Catholics.

Before towns were built, churches erected, and provided with resident pastors, the Catholics of mining centres would have been without pastoral aid in sickness or in extremity, were it not for the accessibility of the venerable apostle of the mission church at L'Anse.

But the impending departure of Father Baraga from La Pointe caused much sorrow among the Indians of that mission.

For nearly a decade he had been their consolation in their abject misery; he had taught them the sublime lesson of Jesus Christ, and the sorrows of the Mother of the Redeemer, the chosen one of her sex, who gave to the world a Saviour, whose suffering and whose death upon the cross were to consummate the Divine mission of man's redemption.

He had come among them as poor as themselves,¹ and they were, beyond a question, the most abject of the American Indian nations of the northwest. He not only had subsisted on their

¹ It will be remembered that Father Baraga had only three dollars when he arrived at La Pointe in 1835.

scanty food, but he had shivered and been nearly frozen during the rigors of the long Lake Superior winters.

When a runner or a messenger had come to his cabin during the frigid seasons, while the temperature was below zero, to beg his attendance at some distant cabin, where some poor Indian whom he had baptized was about to succumb to starvation or to cold, he had put on his snow-shoes, and regardless of time, or distance, or weather, he set out to bring the supreme consolation of religion to the soul of the dying Christian.

He had taught the women of this unfortunate race, upon whom the burden of the common misery rested most painfully, to offer their affliction to the Mother of Sorrows, as a powerful intermediary before the throne of Her Omnipotent Son. And, fully appreciating her virtues and her merits, when the Chippewa mother sent for him, when her child was menaced with death, and kneeling before him exclaimed in the expressive language of her people: "'Black gown,' speak to the mother of the 'Great Spirit,' that my child may be restored to health"; if it seemed good that the child, whom he had baptized, should be saved, this apostolic friend of probably the most miserable people on earth raised his eyes toward heaven and prayed.¹ There are some survivors of the Chippewas of La Pointe, domiciled at L'Anse, saved from expatriation by the forethought of Father Baraga, who tell us, that when the missionary, overcome by the sorrows of the Chippewa mother, appealed "to the mother of the Great Spirit," the expression of his face became transformed, as we might say, from the earthly to the heavenly, for its description would be impossible. But the child of the Chippewa squaw was saved!

The crucial experience of Father Baraga's apostolate during the first decade of his residence at the head waters of Lake Superior at La Pointe may never be known.

He was very reticent in all that related to his personal privations. Undoubtedly the Chippewas on this island were among the poorest of the people of this nation at the time; and perhaps on this account, the majority of them were converted to Christianity with less hard labor than they would have been, had they been living in a more comfortable condition. In the circuit of the adjacent islands including points on the main shores of Michigan and Wisconsin, comprising the field of Father Baraga's missionary work while at La Pointe, there were eighty distinct bands of Chippewas, having as many chiefs. When these chiefs came to the

¹ Related to us by the late Louis P. Trempe, one of the French merchants of the Sault.

council,¹ which we have referred to in a previous article, in the year 1826 at Fond du Lac, they, in the respective speeches of their tribal orators, had for their principal theme their great poverty, which was enlarged upon by each speaker.

According to Colonel McKinney, these chiefs comprised the greatest number of titled beggars among the American Indians he had ever seen gathered on any one occasion. It may be taken as a fact that at the time of Father Baraga's advent, the social condition of the people of these eighty bands had not improved. Poor and shiftless as they were, they had not given up their old-time vices, comprising debauchery and polygamy, while they still retained much of their race pride.

They were, moreover, generally full-blooded; few half-breeds were to be met with in the Chippewa villages. Whenever the missionary intended visiting for the first time a Chippewa village at any considerable distance from La Pointe, he usually sent one of his most intelligent converts a month at least before he expected to reach the scene of his intended mission,² whose duty it was to provide a cabin or a lodge, in which the missionary might live, and to construct near by a temporary chapel.

When he arrived at the village, if there had been no opposition on the part of its Pagan inhabitants, he sent for the chief of the band and informed the latter that he had an important communication to make to his tribe, asking that he assemble his people in council on a day named to hear the speech he would make them.

This was in accordance with Indian custom. All important business was transacted in such councils and they were usually attended by all the Indians present in the village at the time. Father Baraga addressed the assemblage and announced in fervent language the object of his coming to their village, requesting those present to consider his words and to assemble on the following day, that their chief might make known their willingness to listen to the instruction he had come to impart, or their refusal to be instructed in the religion of the "Great Spirit," whose minister he was.

This was in accordance with Indian etiquette. In fact he was not unknown to the Chippewas; his work at La Pointe, the saintly life he had led, and the power he was believed to possess to heal the sick, had become generally known, and it very rarely happened that his way to success had not been opened for him through the efforts of the faithful messenger whom he had sent to announce his coming, and that at the second council which assembled he

¹ "The Chippewas of Lake Superior," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, vol. xxi., April, 1896, pp. 366-7.

² Manuscript, Rev. W. Elliot, O.S.P.

was, if not welcomed, accorded permission to preach and to instruct. Father Baraga in his intercourse with the Chippewas was careful to follow their customs so far as these related to official intercourse with strangers coming to their tribes, and, by following the method we have attempted to outline, he gained his object without infringing upon their customs or wounding their pride.

When these formalities had been completed, and they sometimes required a week's time, the missionary gave notice that he would be pleased to have the men, women and children assemble on the ensuing Sunday, and witness the blessing and dedication of the little chapel and the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice. The sight of a "black gown" in his priestly robes, the solemn ceremony of the dedication of the mission chapel to some saint, the offering of the mass, the responses being made by his convert messenger, the singing of hymns by the latter in the Chippewa language, from the Chippewa prayer book of Father Baraga, all tended to prepare the minds of those present for the sermon which closed the exercises of the opening of the mission in that village. Again, in the afternoon vespers was chanted and another sermon preached. Invitation was given to all to attend the mass at six o'clock each morning, and to such as desired to be instructed, whether men or women, to remain after mass in the morning, when a class would be formed for daily instruction.

One by one these were drawn by the prayers of the missionary to seek the light of faith; and gradually the majority of the people, after being fully instructed, were baptized. Those only who were living in polygamy held back, but these were in time compelled by general opinion to abandon their evil ways. The evangelization of such Chippewa communities required generally about two months, according to the number of their people; but Father Baraga remained until his work was successfully ended. In the meantime some of the more intelligent among the men and women had been taught to read the Chippewa prayers; certain of these were appointed to read from the prayer book devotional exercises in the chapel on Sundays and to sing the hymns they had learned.

With the promise of a visit to the village at no distant day, Father Baraga returned to La Pointe, leaving a Christian community where he had found general unbelief.

Father Baraga's miraculous intervention on many occasions in behalf of the unfortunate constituents of his mission had become so widely known that he was credited by the Indians and half-breeds with sanctity, and venerated by this people as a saint; and as such he was almost worshipped by the copper-colored Christians, as well as by the greater majority of white people resident,

during the latter years of the missionary's life, in the Lake Superior region.

While contemplating his removal from La Pointe to L'Anse, Father Baraga brought to the former mission his fellow-countryman, the Franciscan, Father Skolla.¹

This holy priest became his successor at La Pointe. For fifty years the Indian missions there and in the vicinity have been almost continuously served by the venerable disciples of St. Francis, to the great spiritual advantage of the Chippewas, not only at La Pointe, but also on the islands and littoral of the headwaters of Lake Superior.

When Father Baraga came to L'Anse in 1843, he found the majority of the Indians dwelling upon the shores of the bay almost solidly Pagan.

It will be remembered that when Colonel McKenney, in 1826, accompanied General Cass to Fond du Lac, he mentioned in one of his letters that a Methodist mission was conducted at that time at L'Anse, under the auspices of Mr. Dingle, an agent of the American Fur Company.

After the exit of its patron, this mission had languished; it had but a feeble existence and a small following when Father Baraga planted the cross on the shores of the bay opposite its location.

Some of the Methodist Indians who knew of the missionary became much excited upon his coming and made threats of violence; but the venerable apostle had experienced similar opposition while fighting Paganism among the Ottawas in the Grand River reservation ten years previously, and he paid but slight attention to the menaces of those who opposed his coming.

Father Baraga built a church,² a mission house and a school, and commenced the work of evangelizing the Chippewas in the vicinity of his mission. Several Indian families from the vicinity of La Pointe, from Lac Vieux, Desert, Lac du Flambeau, etc., followed their venerated pastor and made their homes in the vicinity, on the shores of L'Anse. He had soon gathered around him a numerous following of Christian Chippewas. His missionary work proceeded with such success that debauchery was extirpated, sobriety succeeded, and then conversions and baptisms followed.

Father Baraga's experience in the Ottawa missions had taught him that the Indian's occupancy of the soil, under the American Government, was uncertain. He had seen the Ottawa tribes whom he had converted to Christianity deprived of their extensive lands by the *convenience* of Indian treaties, and his Christian com-

¹ Manuscript, Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

² The original mission church at L'Anse was dedicated to the Most Holy Name of Jesus.

munities expatriated to unknown territory west of the Mississippi. He could not contemplate such a result to his Chippewa constituents without grave solicitude. To prevent such a sad fate for those under his spiritual care, he bought in his own name, from the United States Government, a large tract of unoccupied land contiguous to his mission. This he divided into acre lots, upon which he had built small but comfortable dwellings, which he distributed among the heads of the Christian families surrounding his mission. No subsequent treaty could affect these Indians domiciled upon Father Baraga's own land; voluntary exile alone might cause their removal to the far-distant regions of the west. This is a paternal episode in the missionary career of Father Baraga; it speaks eloquently of the charitable instincts of his heart, while in the history of all missionary work during the nineteenth century, it will be difficult to find a parallel.

We do not assert as a fact, but from what we have learned, we are inclined to believe, that while Father Baraga was in Europe in 1837, he converted his patrimonial annual income of 750 Austrian florins into a cash capital, to enable him to carry on his missionary work and to provide funds for the publication of his works in the Chippewa language.

On a basis of 5 per cent., this conversion would have produced a cash capital of 15,000 Austrian florins, equivalent to about \$7500.

This sum, with the donations he had received while in Europe, provided funds for missionary work and enabled him to have printed his first editions of religious books in the Chippewa language, which were printed in Paris.

Although liberal allocations had been, in the meantime, made by the Propaganda of Lyons, and by the Leopoldine Society of Vienna, which latter had been organized through the efforts of the Very Rev. Dr. Résé, to provide funds especially intended for the promotion of missionary work among the Indians of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior, these allocations had to be paid to the ordinary of Detroit, and not direct to Father Baraga; it is doubtful if the venerable missionary up to the time of his inauguration of the mission at L'Anse, had received financial aid from either of these charitable organizations; and we are inclined to believe, he was deprived of such assistance in his beneficent work for several years later by adverse causes.

In writing an outline of such a history as is that of Father Baraga, the scenes of which are laid principally in our own State of Michigan, and the events of which have occurred during our own lifetime, it is exceedingly agreeable to be able to introduce some contemporary witness whose reliable testimony might confirm what we may write.

This is all the more satisfactory to us, for our subject is one which might tempt any writer to exaggerate the known facts of such a history.

But so many pass out of existence during a consecutive term of half a century, that but few contemporaries remain whose intelligence and whose memories would render them qualified to testify in regard to events in Father Baraga's career during the "forties" and "fifties," while documentary or printed detail is almost entirely unavailable. It is, unfortunately, our own experience that most of our commercial and professional correspondents who knew the venerable missionary, and who were witnesses of his works during the decades under consideration, and whose intelligence and veracity might throw additional light upon uncertain events, have passed from this life. And, as we have already stated, the man of all others who was best qualified to testify as to his ecclesiastical chief, the Very Rev. Edward Jacker, has long since been called to his eternal reward, leaving but a brief outline of the history needed, which would require volumes to elaborate, were the materials available.

But among our commercial correspondents in the Lake Superior region during the "fifties" a few still survive; one of the number is the Hon. Peter White, President of the First National Bank of Marquette, who for more than half a century has been identified with financial and mining operations in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, and who at times acted as the fiduciary of Frederick Baraga.

In response to our appeal for light upon the career of the missionary, Mr. White wrote to us under date of October 23, 1895. It might be proper before giving his letter to state that he is a prominent member of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Marquette and senior warden of that church.

"I first knew Bishop Baraga," he writes, "at the time Father Baraga, at L'Anse in 1850. His residence was a few miles distant from the location of the present town of Baraga.

"There was a population at the Roman Catholic mission of about 800 Chippewas, 100 or more half-breeds, and from 20 to 30 Frenchmen who had intermarried with Chippewa women.

"Father Baraga was the devoted friend of these people; they all loved him and almost worshipped him.

"He purchased from the government for the families of his mission a tract of land which he divided into large lots, on which he built houses for each family; he partly furnished these dwellings, and gave the heads of each a cooking stove, furniture, clothing and a supply of provisions to commence housekeeping in a civilized manner.

"He taught them to read, write, and to sing, and how to lead Christian lives. He instructed them as to the cultivation of the soil, providing them with seed and other requisites.

"He translated portions of the Bible into their language, prayers, and hymns,

compiled a grammar, speller, and reader for them, and had these separate works in the Chippewa language printed at his own expense.

"He provided and paid a teacher to instruct the Indians and their children.

"They gathered around him like a band of children, and listened to the words of wisdom he had always ready for them. Should any of them become sick, he provided a physician and medicine.

"He probably had lived among these Chippewas during twenty years, ministering to their spiritual and temporal welfare before he was created Bishop of Sault de Ste. Marie.

"Occasionally some 'sick call' would come to him from Houghton, Eagle River, Eagle Harbor, the Cliff Mine, the Old Albion Mine, or some other mining location on Keweenaw Point.

"I have known him to respond to these 'sick calls' in the dead of winter, alone and on snowshoes; very laborious journeys they were, full of peril and unlimited hardship and undertaken to administer the last rites to a dying Christian.

"There was no other priest for years in all that region.

"The houses Father Baraga caused to be built for the people of his mission were not large, but they were adequate to their condition and wants; most of them had been accustomed to live in wigwams.

"The houses were mostly one story or one and a half stories high, with good windows and doors, but enclosed with plain boards; each had a brick or stone chimney, and probably cost from \$500 to \$700, while the furniture cost not to exceed \$200 for each.

"I cannot give you the size of the lots, but they were from 200 to 300 feet square, and the grantees or their descendants still occupy them. The place is still called the "Roman Catholic Mission," but its population has dwindled down to about a third of its former number.

"On the opposite shore of the bay, where at a corresponding period there was a Methodist Mission, comprising many souls, not more than 150 remain. I have one of Bishop Baraga's grammars. The title reads:

" A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
GRAMMAR

OF THE OCHIPWE LANGUAGE.

Spoken by the Chippewa Indians, also by the Algonquin, Ottawa, and Pottawotomie Indians, with but little difference, etc.

By Frederick Baraga,

Missionary at L'Anse, Lake Superior.

Detroit.

Jabez Fox, Printer,

1850."

Mr. White concludes as follows:

"It is a great pleasure to me to be, even in a small way, of any assistance to you in such a noble task as you have undertaken, and I regret not being able to give you something better."

We regard such contemporary testimony as that of Mr. White as of great value.

While the venerable missionary thus labored for the moral and spiritual regeneration of the Chippewas, whom he sought to concentrate at L'Anse, and while he devoted his personal fortune to provide them homes at this mission, as the testimony of our correspondent, the Hon. Peter White proves, in order to lead this

people to a condition of civilized life, and to place them beyond the possibility of government removal, it was not the fate of the people of this unfortunate and miserable remnant of a once powerful nation to profit by such generous efforts to the general extent Father Baraga intended and desired. The fatalist tendencies of the average Chippewa, the miserable state in which he lived, the great love of kindred, added to the strong attachment maintained among all American Indians toward the soil wherein repose the remains of their departed ones, were peculiarities of race nature leading to callousness and disinclination to leave their homes, however wretched these may have been, or to separate from kindred who continued to lead Pagan lives.

This, in our opinion at least, may explain why a greater number of Christian converts did not come and take up their homes at the mission of L'Anse.

Few men of his time estimated more highly the work of saving a human soul than Father Baraga; this is evident from his letters to his sister, but confirmed more positively by his self-sacrificing efforts to win from a state of darkness the souls of the wretched people among whom the second decade of his sacerdotal life was exhaustively spent.

His mission at L'Anse had become a success as far as it was possible under the circumstances which we have attempted to explain. He was enjoying what to him was a life of comparative ease, if rising at three o'clock in the summer, and at four o'clock in the winter mornings each day, meditating an hour, and offering an early mass in his Church, so that the adult people could go to their work, supervising his school, and giving daily instruction, could be considered an easy life.¹ But such it was to Father Baraga; for each day had its enjoyment in his philological studies, which after his sacerdotal and missionary work had been performed, became his recreation and his great solace.

He was thus situated when, as we have stated, the irruption of a white population rapidly followed the discovery of great mineral wealth in the Lake Superior peninsula. This irruption came so rapidly that Father Baraga was confronted with a situation which soon overwhelmed him with priestly duties he had probably never contemplated, and which were destined to tax the physical powers he was endowed with, frail indeed as these were, to the uttermost extent. The mining towns were at first located in the Ontonagon the Keweenaw and the Marquette ranges of the Peninsula; and, as we have stated, their constituency comprised different races of hardy men, with different creeds, having a considerable percentage professing the Roman Catholic faith. It was during the initial

¹ It was the rule of life of Father Baraga to fast each day until noon.

years of the development of copper and of iron mining in the localities mentioned, that some of the hardest work accomplished during his career as a missionary was performed by Father Baraga. The fact that a saintly priest was located at L'Anse soon became well known to the Catholics in the respective mining communities; this knowledge was consoling to many, who were assured that a message would surely bring this priest promptly to the bedside of the sick among them, or to minister in his dying hours to the victims of accidents, which were not at the time of unfrequent occurrence..

This hopeful consolation was well founded. During the comparatively brief season of Lake Superior navigation, but in fair weather only, the shortest approach to most of the mining localities could be made by means of Father Baraga's small boat from so central a location as was L'Anse.

But during more than half the year a trip by such a little craft was impracticable.

No disciplined soldier could have been more prompt to obey the command of his superior than was Father Baraga to respond to "sick calls," come from whatever direction they might. If the journey could be made by his boat, so much time, always precious to him, could be saved; under any circumstances, he felt bound to bring the consolations of his sacred ministry to the bedside of those in danger of death, by the shortest method available.

Brave soldier of the Cross that he was, he did not hesitate to sling his knapsack on his back, and sometimes with an attendant, but often alone, on urgent occasions, this scion of a noble house, who had been reared in a castle in the fair climate of far-distant Carniola, set out upon journeys which were, as Mr. White describes them to have been, "full of hardship and often attended with peril."

During the frigid season the march had to be made on snowshoes; it was generally continuous, for there were no wayside inns, not even inhabited cabins, where food and shelter could be obtained. Fortunate did Father Baraga esteem the chance, if on some such journey a deserted cabin or an abandoned wigwam was met with in the solitude of the forest, which might afford shelter for the night or a temporary refuge during the worst raging of a Lake Superior storm; while usually during midwinter the temperature ranged below zero.¹

For years this kind of missionary life continued; it was only when churches had been built in the mining centres and resident pastors provided for them, that Father Baraga was relieved of

¹ On some of these journeys Father Baraga passed the night, wrapped in his blanket, in a snowdrift.

much of the hardest of such work. Had this venerable missionary been gifted with a robust frame, his great endurance would still be marvellous.

But his frail proportions, his delicately molded feet, his slender arms, his small, soft hands, his face more like that of a young girl than of a man, made up an ensemble apparently unfitted for the endurance of any kind of hardship. Such, however, are the cold historical facts of the status of Father Baraga and the method of his work during the decade under consideration.

We have not the faculty to draw a pen picture as real as we could wish. Our readers will remember the scene presented when, with the half-breed "Winzon," as his light boat was tossed upon the crest of the waves of a Lake Superior sea and was driven toward the rough coast, he rested on the bottom of his boat, reading his breviary, apparently all unmindful of the peril which crazed his attendant.¹

And again, when travelling with another attendant upon the ice, the great mass separated from its anchorage and was being driven rapidly out to sea, while he, unmoved by the danger, which caused his dark-hued attendant's face to turn white with fear, continued his daily meditation and prayer!

No wonder, then, that when, after two decades of toil such as had been his, we saw Frederick Baraga in his episcopal robes in Detroit in 1855, we were overcome with the evidence his personality but too plainly indicated, of the exhaustive missionary work he had performed on the Lake Superior Peninsula and on the shores of its adjacent waters.

Although at the time mentioned his slight form was unbent, the kindly gleam, which in former years had greeted his friends from his soft blue eyes, indicating the benevolence of his heart, was no longer bright, because those eyes had been partly seared by the snow-blasts and the sleet of Lake Superior storms, as hurtful to human vision as is the burning sand of an African simoon; while his face from constant exposure, as we have stated, had become tanned to the color of that of a half-breed.

In no country, probably, during the present century has the chase had a reality such as may be claimed for those localities included in the North American regions west of Lake Saint Clair. We may follow the hunter, whether he be an Indian or a white man, but in either case an ardent sportsman, as he courses through the forest in pursuit of the noblest of its wild animals, which is finally laid low by the bullet of his pursuer. This is the triumph of the latter. But if he be asked: Is the carcass of the wild beast

¹ "The Chippewas of Lake Superior." AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. xxi., pp. 371-373, April, 1896.

he has slain the reward of so much toil? If he be a true hunter, he will answer, No! The carcass represents the *game*.

The ideal prize, won after hours and days, perhaps, of excitement and fatigue.

We believe Father Baraga to have been one of the most intrepid and enduring hunters during the two decades of his sacerdotal life spent in the Lake Superior region, during the first half of the present century, if we may be permitted to make the parallel.

But his was not the *game* of the average hunter. No hunter who for days, perhaps, might chase and finally bring down the wild buck, could claim such a reward as Father Baraga was accustomed to win after an active effort, such as few, whether they were white or red men, could have endured.

His ideal *game*, if we may be permitted to use such a similitude, was the Immortal Soul—priceless in his eyes, and to be won or saved at any cost of personal endurance or self-sacrifice.

In the early history of copper mining in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, and during the "fifties," one of the principal lake ports during this period was Ontonagon. From this port was reached one of the richest mines. It was at the mouth of Ontonagon River; from its docks were transferred to the steamers the solid masses of pure copper and the ore taken from the mines in what was called the Ontonagon Range.

Here were also unladen the provisions, machinery, mining requisites, and other freight for mines. One of the richest in pure metal worked in this range was the "Minnesota."

We went down into the depths of this mine when visiting this region during the "fifties," and we saw in one of its chambers a solid wall, 20 or more feet square, of bright, pure copper, which had to be cut out by the hammer and chisel of the miner. The town of Ontonagon during Father Baraga's apostolate at L'Anse contained many Catholics; he was frequently called there to attend sick or disabled miners.

To reach there by his boat, he had to coast around Keweenaw Point and along the shore—a trip which was rarely made without more or less danger. But when such a journey by boat was impracticable, he had to traverse the great forest described in our previous article,¹ where neither human habitation nor living being could be seen.

From its position, Ontonagon became one of the most important outposts of Father Baraga's missionary work among white Christians during the earlier years of copper mining in the Lake Superior Peninsula.

¹ "The Chippewas of Lake Superior," AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1896, p. 359.

Here it became necessary to organize a congregation and to build a church sufficiently large, in which the people might assemble on Sundays and festivals, when the saintly missionary came to minister to their spiritual needs.

But the majority of the Ontonagon Catholics were of Irish birth or lineage; these contributed so liberally that in a brief time a half-square was purchased in Father Baraga's name, on which a spacious church was erected, which, in compliment to the zeal and liberality of its founders, was solemnly dedicated to St. Patrick.

If we are not mistaken, this was the first Christian Church intended for the use of white people dedicated in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. A century and a half previously, Ste. Anne's, the mother church of the northwest, had been dedicated by Father Delhalle at the post of Detroit.

Ste. Anne's, at Detroit, and St. Patrick's, at Ontonagon, are monumental landmarks, coincident with the foundation of civilization in the Lower and Upper Peninsulas of the State of Michigan.

At stated times Father Baraga announced his coming to the Catholics of Ontonagon; he usually remained in the town several weeks, during which he conducted missions for the English-speaking Catholics, the French and the German. To these he preached, and he also heard confessions in their respective languages, while for each special services were held and the Holy Sacrament administered.

In the meantime the great wealth of copper found in the Minnesota and in adjacent mines drew large numbers to the vicinity of the former; the town of Minnesota was organized; there were many Catholics in its constituency, which was not unlike that of Ontonagon. The same work of parochial organization was successful, while the preponderating element of Catholic population being of Irish birth and lineage, the spacious church subsequently built was, like that of Ontonagon, dedicated to the patron saint of Ireland.

To this central location Father Baraga came regularly and remained for weeks, giving retreats for the respective nationalities.

Probably the richest copper mines in the world remained to be developed between the Ontonagon Range and Point Keweenaw, on the Keweenaw Peninsula. These newly-developed mines had their respective centres at Copper Harbor, Eagle Harbor, Eagle River, and around the shores of Portage Lake.

These centres of mining wealth were rapidly filled by a population partaking very much of the elements combined at Ontonagon and Minnesota. They were in due time visited by Father Baraga, and where the number of Catholics in each permitted, congrega-

tions were organized, while temporary and permanent places for worship were liberally provided by the mining companies and gratuitously placed at the disposal of Father Baraga.¹

These, in their turn, were regularly visited by him, and the usual mission work already described ensued.

The copper mines had been fairly well developed before eastern capitalists became assured of the rich deposits of iron ore in the Marquette Range; they invested largely in opening the most prolific iron mines probably in the world.

This made Marquette a centre for iron mining in its vicinity, and the focus of a population somewhat different from that of the Ontonagon and Keweenaw Ranges; it was largely composed of Cornishmen and Swedes.

But Marquette was visited by Father Baraga, and the nucleus of its present Catholic population was organized.

This completed his missionary circuit in the Upper Peninsula among its white residents. What deserves mention in connection with the sacerdotal work of Father Baraga during this preliminary period in the history of this work among the white population which had come to the Lake Superior region, was the fact that this population was to a great extent composed of men. Comparatively speaking, there were very few women. Husbands could not provide suitable homes for their wives and children in the mining towns, and these were left where they could live more comfortably at less expense, and where they would not have to experience the rigors of a Lake Superior winter. Neither should the fact be overlooked that there was much self-denial and submission to the will of Divine Providence on the part of Father Baraga in this kind of missionary work among white people.

Since his advent into the missionary field among the red men of the Upper Lakes, he had lived with them, and he had at times partially starved on their uninviting, unsavory, and scanty food. As we have stated, when one of these unfortunates, the most miserable wretches probably living among the human race, was apparently about to yield to the inevitable, the "black gown" was sent for, to impart to the dying Indian the inestimable gift of immortal life. He did not hesitate when the messenger came to his cabin, whether it was day time or night time, whether the temperature was mild or many degrees below zero; the call upon which, perhaps, depended the future fate of an immortal soul was promptly responded to, and at times at the risk of his life, which we have

¹ The chief factor in these corporations was the managing official, usually termed "the clerk of the mine." He was the fiduciary of the capitalists interested in the enterprise. Generally speaking, he was shrewd enough to appreciate the influence which Father Baraga might exercise over his employees.

described, such as few mortals would, knowingly, have had the courage to face.

Father Baraga deeply sympathized with the unfortunate Chippewas; he knew their race instincts but too well, and while much of his time was devoted to their spiritual needs, as well as to the conversion of the more obdurate Pagans among them, his leisure hours were occupied with the study of their language, which, as we have explained, was his greatest recreation.

Nearly twenty years of his mature life had been spent among the Ottawas and Chippewas of the lakes. After he had evangelized the tribes of the former nationality, after he had succeeded in reforming their social condition, and partially restoring this fine race to the status of economic independence which had made them prominent among the nations of the red men of the West prior to the collapse of the grand scheme of their distinguished leader, Pontiac, to establish Indian control over all the territory west of the Ohio—the failure of which sent them demoralized and miserable to their former homes on the shores and islands of Michigan waters—Father Baraga was fated to see, as we have shown, the results of his most successful work among the Ottawas interfered with, and to a great extent nullified, by the expatriation of these tribes—Christian as most of their constituency were, but Christian and Pagan alike—to the distant regions west of the Mississippi. This result was a fatality common to most of the American Indian races who had been domiciled in the States whose territory had been encroached upon by white civilization. It may be said to have been inevitable; intelligent as Father Baraga was, while he may have deplored a result which he probably foresaw would be detrimental to the spiritual welfare of his Ottawa neophytes, he bowed to the will of God, satisfied with the part he had performed in the reformation of, perhaps, the finest of the Indian races of the West.

The advent of the whites, and in such numbers, into Chippewa territory, even while Father Baraga was absorbed in missionary work among the people of this nation, but not before he had secured a home for his spiritual followers at L'Anse, must have been an intimation to the venerable missionary that the same inevitable fate awaited the Chippewas of Lake Superior which had overtaken the Ottawas.

If Father Jacker had been spared, he might, perhaps, have shed some light upon the effect of this result upon the mind of Father Baraga; for he, above all others, had shared the confidence of his venerable chief. Interested as the great missionary was in the spiritual and temporal welfare of the Chippewas, such light might enable us to appreciate more fully his angelic nature in accepting

a situation which apparently either gave menace of a calamity or possibly a hope for the improvement of the temporal condition of the people of the Chippewa tribes.

As a result of his missionary experience, Indian life, with all its associations, including its phases of misery, had become, it may be said, a second nature; he had become accustomed to deal with a simple-minded and honest-hearted race of men and women, who, when they had been won from Paganism and baptized, became as docile as little children.

Such for nearly twenty years had been his daily experience; as he wrote to his sister, he was at home among the Indians, but among the whites, "he was like a fish thrown upon land."

With this changed status he was from necessity, and from the charity of his heart, not unwillingly called upon to exercise the functions of his sacred ministry, not among the guileless children of the forest, but among the white races represented by the adventurous advance guard, who had come to the Upper Peninsula in the pursuit of fortune with some, and of employment with most, ulcerated with God only knows how many of the prevailing vices of the times.

But he entered upon this work among the whites with a hearty zeal. His great sanctity inspired the men he addressed with reverence, and they listened to his gentle and apostolic admonitions with the consciousness that his sincerity was such as a holy priest only could possess.

While all this new work came to Father Baraga up in the Lake Superior region, his mind frequently reverted to such of the Indians as had been permitted to remain upon the islands and littoral of Lakes Huron and Michigan.

He found time to look after the spiritual welfare of his neophytes at the Sault and below, at Mackinac, St. Ignace, Cross Village, Cheboygan and Little Traverse, while he thus referred to his converts on Beaver Island: "The Indians of Beaver Island are very faithful and steady. Although they seldom see their missionary, they faithfully persevere in their religion, and meet every Sunday in their humble church to sing and pray until the missionary comes again to hear their confessions and announce to them the word of God, which they receive with thankfulness and spiritual joy."

When he did not go to his other Indian neophytes they came to him, and so it came about that he continued to control the spiritual welfare of all his Indian converts left within his reach.

But the white population kept pace with the development of the mineral wealth of the Lake Superior Peninsula. Increased numbers greeted Father Baraga at each succeeding visit he made

to the mining centres we have named; his work was extended, while the time required for his missionary exercises at each place became greater. He endeavored to obtain assistant priests from his own ordinary, but none were available, and he appealed for aid to Cincinnati.

It does not appear that he was successful. If any priests were sent to him by Archbishop Purcell, they did not remain long enough to become useful.

Few available priests could meet the requirements of Father Baraga. Few were qualified to hear confessions in the English, French and German languages, and to preach in these respective languages; besides, it was not a country where, especially during the winter season, an unacclimated European priest would care to live, and deny himself the use of wine at table and liquor as a stimulant against the rigors of the climate.

But upon this point Father Baraga was inexorable. He exacted from any priest associated with himself in missionary work the most rigid, practical adherence to the principle of total abstinence, which he had, as a rule of life, adhered to ever since that fearful night while in his missionary cabin at Grand Rapids, and menaced with death by the howling, drunken savages, and on his knees in prayer, he had made the vow to abstain from the use of intoxicants during his life.¹ It is certain, however, that Father Baraga ultimately succeeded in obtaining priestly assistance from his native province, where his renown as a missionary had inspired vocations in the hearts of some distinguished young priests, who communicated to him their wishes to associate themselves in his missionary work. Some of these young heroes came to him at L'Anse and were instructed in the Chippewa and the English languages; in the French and German they were already proficient. Two also came from the southern frontier of France, and were prepared, one especially for Indian missionary work, and the other for general work at Marquette. Under the approbation of the Archbishop of Cincinnati these accessions were made to the clerical force of the diocese of Detroit in the Upper Peninsula. One of the most prevalent evils which Father Baraga had to combat in the mining towns, such as Ontonagon, was intemperance; this evil among a *quasi* celibate population, unaccustomed to such a climate, was quite difficult to overcome.² The memory of Father

¹ "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. xxi., January, 1896, p. 123.

² All unconscious of the fact, a great factor operating against the missionary work of Father Baraga in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was Samuel Nathan Pike, of Cincinnati.

This amiable, this generous-hearted, this liberal patron of the fine arts, as he was,

Matthew however, was still warm in the hearts of many who had taken the pledge, and who still retained the medal received from the hand of this apostle in their native land, and who had remained faithful to their vows of total abstinence from intoxicating drink; these the missionary encouraged to organize in their respective localities into temperance leagues, to whose members he granted such spiritual reward as it was in his power to bestow.

He fostered these societies in every way; he delivered lectures on interesting subjects to them at stated times, and all through his missionary career among the whites of the Lake Superior region he found these organizations one of the most effective aids in saving the men whose souls were menaced by this prevalent vice from the fatal consequences of its indulgence. He had won the Ottawas and most of the Chippewas from their propensity to

also, the promotor of beneficent work in the city in which he lived, had derived his great wealth from the profits of one of the largest distilleries of whiskey during his time in the United States, before "Bourbon's" reign had succeeded.

It has been accepted as a fact, that to the peculiar qualities of the water of the Liffey, in the brewing of "Guinness' Dublin Stout," was due the popularity of this beverage in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, by the sale of which, the colossal fortune of this Irish brewer was accumulated. It is to the credit of Mr. Guinness that he spent a large share of his fortune in restoring the cathedral of Dublin to its original architectural splendor; while by other public-spirited liberality he prepared the way for his son, who was accorded a title and a seat in the peerage of Great Britain and Ireland. Whether it was due to the peculiar quality of the yellow water of the Ohio, that "Pike's Magnolia," became so popular, or to some secret method in its distillation, is a question we are not competent to answer; the fact is, however, that this brand of whiskey during the "fifties," was very popular, and especially in the Lake Superior region, where it was almost universally drunk as a stimulant. While the average price of a barrel of "Pike's Magnolia" was \$50 to the dealer, or about \$1 per gallon, on the basis of 64 "nippers" to such measure, at 10 cents each, the profit on each barrel was about \$200 to the retailer.

At that time, the Bavarian "lager," which Liebig named *liquid bread*, had not been imitated in this country; ale, so-called, of deleterious composition, was the milder beverage in use at the time in the Upper Peninsula.

During the period under consideration, some who enjoyed their vacation in a trip to the Upper Lakes will probably remember an agreeable, well-dressed, and well-mannered gentleman, who made his home during July, at the Chippewa House, at the Sault. An acceptable partner at the card table, always ready to join in an excursion to the interesting localities of the vicinity, and one of the few gentlemen at the hotel willing to join the ladies in their evening promenade on the long veranda of the "Chippewa," this gentleman from Cincinnati was in high favor; for his deportment in company was perfect, his cigars were of the finest Havana, while at the dinner table the best bottle of champagne mine host Smith could produce from his store was placed beside his plate, and sent with "his compliments," by the waiter, to those he deemed worthy. This gentleman, for as such in most respects he was entitled to be called, was the Lake Superior agent of Mr. Pike. His salary was double that of a State judge at the time; he was allowed \$5 per day for wine, and his travelling and hotel expenses were liberally provided for. He visited every locality in Lake Superior, and during the months of August and September each succeeding steamer brought hundreds of barrels to every port, on whose yellow ends could be seen in prominent letters "Pike's Magnolia." Mr. Pike's selection of his representatives was an evidence of his business shrewdness.

brutalize themselves and to make their families miserable by the too free use of the white man's "fire water"; but among the simple-minded red men this was comparatively easy work, while the reform effected was generally permanent. The Chippewas, however, at times yielded to temptation. While at L'Anse, Father Baraga sent one of his Indians to Portage Lake to purchase candles for Christmas solemnities; he got drunk and froze to death coming back.¹ Father Baraga wrote Mr. Douglass, proprietor of the store where the Indians had procured the whiskey: "You are guilty of that Indian's death!" We knew Mr. Douglass, who was a brother of Judge Douglass, of Detroit; he was an estimable gentleman, and probably had no knowledge of the affair, but he was so moved by Father Baraga's letter that he discontinued the sale of liquor. As we have explained, the whites of the mining centres were *quasi* celibates.

Instead of the family circle in the cottage, these men were domiciled in boarding-houses and hotels in their respective localities. The cost of a license was nominal, while in nearly all the places where these men had their homes, a barrel of "Pike's Magnolia" was usually "on tap." The crusade of Father Baraga against the use of intoxicants during the period under consideration was a difficult task. We consider the apostolate of temperance of Father Baraga among the Catholics thus domiciled in the mining centres of the Lake Superior region as among his most providential works, and his most successful efforts in behalf of the spiritual and temporal welfare of the new community to whom he had extended his paternal and sacerdotal ministrations.

Thus was the foundation laid of what now constitutes the diocese of Marquette, of the Upper Peninsula of the State of Michigan. In our outline of the missionary work of Father Baraga in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for January, 1896,² speaking of his labors in the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, we said: "Wheresoever the footprints of Father Richard and of his missionaries, and of Father Baraga and his assistants, had marked the advent of these saintly men on the mainland of the coast of Lake Michigan, the most wonderful transformations have taken place. Take, for example, Chicago, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Green Bay, Manistee, Muskegon, and many other cities on both shores of Lake Michigan." So, in like manner, the soil of the Lake Superior Peninsula traversed, during the "forties" and "fifties," by the saintly Baraga was destined to become the scene of changes in religion and in commercial enterprise unequaled, perhaps, in American history.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

¹ Manuscript, Rev. W. Elliott, C.S.P.

² Page 129.

MR. MALLOCK AS A DEFENDER OF NATURAL RELIGION.

Studies of Contemporary Superstition. By W. H. Mallock. London : Ward & Downey, Ltd. 1895.

Natural Religion. From the "Apologie des Christenthums" of Franz Hettinger, D.D., etc. Edited, with an introduction on Certainty, by Henry Sebastian Bowden, of the Oratory. (2d edition, 1892.) London : Burns & Oates, Ltd. 1890.

IN the earlier part of 1890 there appeared the first edition of Dr. Hettinger's "Natural Religion," edited by Fr. Bowden of the Oratory.¹ According to the opinion of the Catholic press, Fr. Bowden's work was "a judicious summary of the original," whose excellences "did not lie so much in strict science as in common sense." "In it," observed the "Dublin Review," "there are few arguments in which a clever reviewer could not pick holes; but, taking them altogether, they are valid and effective." The book has evidently proved a popular one, and is now running through its second edition.

Mr. Mallock, who, on the first appearance of the work, criticized it severely in the "Fortnightly Review,"² has this year published a volume of reprint essays called "Studies of Contemporary Superstition."³ The fifth of these studies is entitled "A Catholic Theologian on Natural Religion," and seems to represent his essay of 1890 in a somewhat modified form. Most of the views it contains are professedly not his own. They are a summary of the conclusions of modern agnosticism, which, he considers, Dr. Hettinger has failed to meet. With the correctness of Mr. Mallock's criticism, we have at present little concern. But having in view a totally different object, the nature of which will appear in the sequel, we must offer the reader a few specimens of the treatment Dr. Hettinger's book receives at the hands of his critic.

For the first twenty-two pages of his essay Mr. Mallock assumes the rôle of devil's advocate and counsel for modern science against natural religion.

¹ "Natural Religion," from the *Apologie des Christenthums* of Franz Hettinger, D.D., etc., edited, with an introduction on Certainty, by H. Seb. Bowden, of the Oratory. London : Burns & Oates, Ltd. 1890.

² "Reason Alone," *Fort. Rev.*, Nov. 1890.

³ *Studies of Contemporary Superstition*, by W. H. Mallock. London : Ward & Downey, Ltd. 1895.

"Let us," he says, "suppose ourselves to be doubters, who desire the comfort of faith, and ask ourselves how far, in the existing conditions of thought, such reasoning is calculated to be any help to us. To me it seems that this book, in a most deplorable and startling way, illustrates, little as he thinks it does, the following utterance of its editor: 'A defence of religion,' says Father Sebastian, 'based on arguments unsound or inconclusive, or ignoring the sceptical objections of the day, may only suggest new doubt and do more harm than good.' He adds that the present work he believes 'to be safe from this peril.' To any independent reader it will, I believe, seem to be full of it. It has every one of the faults that have just been mentioned. Most of it is inconclusive, much of it is unsound and the principal objections that require combating are ignored throughout the whole of it" (p. 184).

After charging Dr. Hettinger with seeming "utterly unaware of the extraordinary change which modern science has accomplished in the position of the human mind" (p. 184), he goes on to speak of the three arguments for the existence of God, drawn from the inertia of matter, the perfection of design and the benevolence of design. Mr. Mallock tells us how modern science disposes of them:

"To all such arguments," he says, "what science does is as follows: It does not destroy them as logical structures; but it blows away the bases on which they rest, like so many pieces of thistledown" (p. 187).

Then, after passing over the first argument and epitomizing the other two, he comes to Dr. Hettinger's assertion that, "if the world is not the work of God, but self-created; as the less cannot produce the greater, it must have been the work of man" and apparently missing the point which underlies this somewhat clumsily-expressed argument, Mr. Mallock explodes into the following remark:

"The deepest feeling which these lamentable puerilities call forth in us is astonishment that any serious man should in these days have recourse to them. But," he continues, "it will still be well to notice a few details of their ineptitude, for they give us the key to the fundamental unsoundness of the writer's entire position" (p. 189).

He proceeds to do this, observing in one place that:

"Dr. Hettinger seems to know nothing of that stupendous and overwhelming revelation which science has forced on man, of nature's unfathomable magnitude. . . . Had Dr. Hettinger realized this, he would have seen all his arguments which take man as the centre of things and assume for him some destiny that is obviously eminent and significant—he would have seen all these arguments perishing on each side of him, like helpless sailors washed overboard in a storm" (p. 190).

A little later touching on the "evolution" of free will:

"Here again we see that he has not the smallest idea what the scientific theory of the universe is. According to that theory nothing would have happened of the kind he mentions. What is free would not have been evolved out of what is not free;

because, according to that theory no such thing as freedom is in existence. What we call freedom is a mere subjective delusion ; and Dr. Hettinger, in assuming it to be a reality, attempts to answer science on its own grounds, by starting with the principal proposition which science declares itself to have disproved " (p. 191).

" Indeed," concludes Mr. Mallock, " This Catholic defence of natural religion, regarded as an answer to the arguments of scientific agnosticism, is no answer at all. . . . Whatever difficulties such arguments [as those of Dr. Hettinger] may meet, there are other difficulties which not only are not met, but which it seems the writer has not even conceived of. These difficulties consist, one and all of them, of certain broad generalizations, the truth of which modern science is daily branding deeper into the consciousness of civilization. They may be summed up as follows :

" The material universe is infinite and eternal, all its changes being the result of all-pervading and eternally unchanging laws.

" Life and consciousness, whatever may be their nature, are inseparable from this material universe ; they follow its laws and are the result of its laws. They are another aspect of the same machine.

" Such life and consciousness as we see exhibited in man is a fleeting and infinitesimal phenomenon in the eternity and the infinity of this All.

" No purpose that to human reason seems rational can be discovered of human reason in man's circumstances and history—certainly not any benevolent purpose ; and as to the universe as a whole, no meaning or purpose in it is even conjecturable " (p. 196).

The conclusion, then, of the whole matter is as follows : If by natural religion is meant a belief in God, based on the application of man's logical faculties to the facts of his own intellect and of the sensible universe, there is no such thing as natural religion at all (p. 196).

So far for the critical tone of Mr. Mallock's essay. With the truth or validity of the criticism itself we have no concern. It would require a volume to deal adequately with the subject—besides which, we have not the least inclination to undertake the defence either of Dr. Hettinger's original work nor of Father Bowden's synopsis of it. The occasion merely calls for the remark that Mr. Mallock has, in this case, and we think contrary to his wont, exhibited a fit of peevishness and unfairness which is not calculated to enhance his reputation. In the first place, he treats the book itself as if it were *ex professo* an answer to scientific agnosticism ; whereas, in fact, not even the name of agnosticism occurs throughout its pages. Dr. Hettinger certainly does not attempt to cope with a school of thought whose first principles make everything unthinkable ; but confines his attention to materialism, pantheism, rationalism, and the theory of evolution. Secondly, if Dr. Hettinger does not enter into the full treatment of primary principles, this is only in accordance with the professed purpose of the book, which is (to quote his own words) " to make the matter, as far as possible, intelligible and interesting to the general reader " (Preface, xxxvii.)—and that *not* the agnostic reader, but the Catholic laity before whom the lectures were originally delivered. Mr. Mallock has certainly suggested a false impression of the drift of the book, and treated it precisely as if it were what it explicitly professes *not to be*.

We come at length to the particular point at issue in this essay.

After twenty-two pages of destructive criticism, Mr. Mallock feels it incumbent on him to explain his purpose in making so vigorous an attack on the claims of natural religion.

"It is not," he says, "to show that there is no such thing as natural religion, but that if there is such a thing, it founds itself, and must defend itself, on quite other grounds than those put forward by writers like Dr. Hettinger. What, as it appears to me, these grounds are, I will try to explain briefly.

"In the first place, it must be recognized with absolute clearness, that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of the intellect, give us any proof of the existence of a personal Creator.

"In the second place it must be recognized that if we mean by Creator a Creator infinitely benevolent to man, and add as a corollary to this man's moral responsibility to this Creator, then such a Creator and such a responsibility are not only not discovered by observation and by the intellect, but the very idea of them, the more we contemplate it, becomes more and more preposterous. The proposition that God is infinitely good, and that man's will is free, must be recognized as unthinkable as the proposition that two straight lines can enclose a space.

"But the matter does not end here. There is a third truth to be recognized, which is this—that not only are a good God and a free human will unthinkable, but that everything else, if we try to think it out, ends in being unthinkable also. Time, space and eternity, we know that they exist, and yet the more we contemplate their existence, the more and more do we see that some impossibility is involved in it. We know that the universe exists, but we can neither conceive of it as being infinite, nor as having any confine. Our conception is incomplete, and in trying to make it complete we tear it to pieces. And with all conceptions it may be shown that the case is really the same. In all there is sleeping a germ of the inconceivable. The mind has only to realize all that is really implied in them, and, like Faust's poodle, each of them swells and swells to a monster, till the logical girdle of thought is no more able to contain it than a woman's sash is able to go round the equator. Out of the reason there are ever ready to spring wild horses, which, if we allow them, will tear reason to pieces. In other words, all thought is founded on assumptions which involve the negation of the laws of thought" (pp. 197-8).

These, then, are the concessions which must be made to agnosticism before we can advance one step towards founding a natural religion. Mr. Mallock is not blind to the position in which these concessions place us at the outset. He continues:

"Now if this fact is once realized, the mere idea of God's existence and goodness, and of man's freedom and responsibility, will not present to us any insuperable difficulties, on the grounds of their logical impossibility. It must be remembered, however, that the argument that has just been urged does not go to show that every impossibility is true, but merely that every impossibility is not necessarily untrue. It merely gives us, as it were, a kind of permissive bill to construct a natural religion if we can. It assures us that reason shall not interfere with us; but it does not promise that at starting reason shall do anything to assist us. That is to say, it leaves us to take the first step independently of reason. We have to start not with something proved, but with something assumed" (p. 198-9).

This being the only remaining position in which a natural religion is capable of being established, we are naturally anxious to see how the process of its establishment is to be carried out. Mr.

Mallock satisfies our curiosity in the last page of his essay, which shall form the conclusion of this somewhat lengthy series of quotations :

"Now what," asks Mr. Mallock, "is that something? Is it God and man's freedom? Is the first step we speak of the direct assumption that these are realities? Before answering we must consider the following point—that though natural religion must, as we say, be based on an assumption, and though we have no proof which will show it to be true, still we must have some motive for wishing to believe it to be true. Now what motive can man have for wishing to believe in the two propositions in question—that God exists, and that man is free, and responsible to God? They are propositions which are not only scientifically superfluous, and which also multiply and deepen the difficulties of the intellect, but they involve many consequences which are practically terrifying and disagreeable. The only motive then that can make us wish to assent to them does not lie in themselves. These primary doctrines of natural religion are not its primary assumptions; or to speak more correctly, they are not assumptions at all. They are logical deductions from some assumptions already made; and the assumption is the assumption of the value, the dignity and the significance of man's life. In other words, putting the question of a revelation aside, a belief in God can only logically be defended by assuming first a certain belief in life—a certain spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind, and a certain meaning in certain spiritual fears and hopes, and a certain authority, beyond that of tribal instinct, in the voice of conscience. Now as far as proof is concerned, all this is mere assumption. What faculty is there in man which is to urge him to assume it? It is difficult to suggest for it any better name than faith; and its formula put briefly comes to be as follows: 'I *do* believe in the spiritual value and the eternal meaning of life, because my nature is such that I abhor the belief that is the alternative.' This step once taken, natural reason steps in and works in the ordinary way; proving, just as it might prove any other theorem, that, given to life the sort of value in question, the existence of God and of man's freedom are its necessary logical consequences, and that it cannot be explained, or even expressed, without having recourse to them" (p. 199-200):

So far for Mr. Mallock's contention. Taking it in its general bearing, as an argument for the truths of natural religion, we have personally no word to say against it. It is in fact far from being a novel suggestion. It has been familiar to Catholic philosophers for several centuries, and will be found stated in nearly every scholastic text-book under some such name as the "*Argumentum Eudæmonologicum*." Its value was thrashed out long before we were born. But a far different matter at present exercises our mind. Putting aside altogether the question whether Catholic arguments in general are equal to meeting the difficulties of modern times, we are interested to know whether this particular one is more apt than its fellows. Mr. Mallock seems to think not only that it is, but that it is the only one that remains fit for use; trusting to it, he has been most drastic in condemning all beside it; and the question is, whether according to the modern world of thought he has gone far enough. Modern science will heartily agree that the arguments of Dr. Hettinger are not worth a straw; but modern science, it seems to me, must, in consistency with itself, consign Mr. Mallock's cherished argument to the same cate-

gory, and apply exactly the same destructive criticism to Mr. Mallock's reconstruction, which Mr. Mallock has applied to Dr. Hettinger's construction. It seems to us that Mr. Mallock, in the all-absorbing eagerness with which he has worried Dr. Hettinger, has remained in ignorance of the imminent danger threatening him in the rear. The following pages ought to show how real the danger is to which Mr. Mallock has so blindly exposed himself.

Let us then for a moment assume towards Mr. Mallock's argument the attitude which Mr. Mallock has assumed towards Dr. Hettinger's arguments: "Let me suppose myself to be a doubter, who desires the comfort of faith, and ask myself how far, in the existing condition of thought, such reasoning is calculated to be of any help to me" (p. 184). At the outset we find ourselves "left to take the first step independently of reason, and have to start not with something proved, but with something assumed" (p. 198-9).

This may mean one of two things. If "reason" means "reasoning" and nothing more; and if by an "assumption" is meant some self-evident primary truth, which for that very reason neither requires nor admits of proof, the introduction to natural religion so far presents no difficulty; for the obvious reason, that all human knowledge *must* begin in this way from what is ultimate and self-evident, and because demonstration itself is impossible without some ultimate self-evident premiss from which originally to start. But this can hardly be the meaning of the proposition. For Mr. Mallock has just told us that "all thought is founded on assumptions which involve the negation of the laws of thought" (p. 198). Now, surely one of the laws of thought is that self-evident propositions are certainly true. And it is absurd to suppose that a self-evident proposition should involve the negation of the laws of thought. Either then the assumption we are called on to make is self-evident, or it is not. If it is self-evident, it cannot be assumed independently of reason, for reason tells us that it must be assumed because of its self-evidency. If it is not self-evident, then reason tells us that we can only assume it as a mere working hypothesis; and we shall only be acting independently of reason if we assume it as though it were certainly true when it is only probably so. Nor are we yet out of the difficulty. If, as we are told, "everything we try to think out ends in being unthinkable," and even in case of existing things, "the more we contemplate their existence, the more and more we see some impossibility is involved in it" (p. 198), there is but little hope that an assumption of whose objective truth we have as yet no guarantee will fare better in the process. Whichever way, therefore, we take the word "reason," whether as signifying "reasoning," or as a synonym for "in-

tellest," the difficulty will remain. In the former sense, "reasoning" itself must be "based on an assumption which involves the negation of the laws of reasoning." In the latter sense, if we take reason to mean "rationality," or the intellectual faculty in general, we are involved in a contradiction in terms. For if we must take the first step independent of reason, it may be an unreasonable step and therefore ought not to be taken. "Reasoning," moreover, is a process which may be dispensed with in the case of self-evident truths. But "reason" is the law of our nature. No man can be commended for taking a step which he cannot recognize as in accordance with his rational nature. Whatever the assumption therefore is, it must be seen as a reasonable one. But this is as much as to say that it is either self evident or can be proved, and in neither case can the step be taken independently of reason.

Mr. Mallock next tells us that "Tho' we have no proof that natural religion is true, still we must have some motive for believing that it is true" (p. 199). Now, "motive" is some force which moves or urges us in a certain direction. And granted that we can accept the assumption in question, that assumption may turn out to be the very motive which we require to urge us on to a belief in natural religion. But what is to move us to accept the assumption itself? We want a further motive to urge us on to that. If the assumption itself attracts us, that can only be because its truth is apparent, or because it is highly desirable as something convenient or useful or good. In either case a difficulty arises. Either we are forced to assent to it, or we are not. But modern science has condemned the doctrine of free will as "a mere subjective delusion" (p. 191). Therefore we are forced to accept this assumption as soon as it is proposed; in which case all plans for the establishment of natural religion are both futile and unnecessary, and Mr. Mallock's scheme is so much waste paper. Yet we are face to face with the phenomenon of thousands of our fellow-beings conversant with this assumption and yet persistently refusing to accept it, and giving reasons for their refusal.

But if the assumption itself does not force us to accept it, what is there ulterior to the assumption which can urge us towards it? Mr. Mallock makes an attempt to answer this question, and I will therefore postpone its consideration for a while.

Supposing these preliminary difficulties solved in some way, we come face to face with the assumption itself:

"A certain belief in the value, dignity and significance of man's life—a certain spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind and a certain meaning in certain spiritual fears and hopes, and a certain authority, beyond that of a tribal instinct, in the voice of conscience" (p. 199).

Now, how this assumption can possibly be made independent of reason, even if "reason" be taken in the sense of "reasoning," we utterly fail to see. It is certainly not a self-evident proposition. The fact that we *live* is self-evident; so is the fact that life is made up of pleasures and pains, and that we naturally shrink from the one and embrace the other. But from this to a knowledge of the *value* of life there is a considerable process of reasoning required. To accept the assumption without this process, or to accept it without recognizing its truth—at least without seeing that it is reasonable to accept it—can be no more Mr. Mallock's wish than my own. Let me then examine the proposition in all its parts and see what, "in the existing conditions of thought," can be made out about it—not forgetting that whatever we make out will be the result of reasoning—and therefore not "independent of reason."

We are asked then to believe in "a certain spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind" (p. 199). But in the face of modern science how can I do this? Modern psychology denies altogether the existence of spirit and of the spiritual and reduces man's so-called spiritual life to the highly complex structure of material molecules. "Here we see that [Mr. Mallock] has not the smallest idea of what the scientific theory [of man's mental constitution] is. . . . According to that theory no such theory as [spirituality] is in existence. What we call [spirituality] is a mere subjective delusion, and [Mr. Mallock] in assuming it to be a reality attempts to answer science on its own grounds by starting with the principal proposition which science declares itself to have disproved" (p. 191).

Omitting then the word "spiritual," we are asked to recognize the "importance and dignity of certain acts and moods of mind" (p. 199). Importance of what kind, since spiritual importance is not to be admitted? It can only be importance in relation to this life, and we have the verdict of the whole hedonistic school that nothing is of importance except in so far as it contributes to our present or future material pleasure and well-being—and of the altruistic school that nothing is of importance except so far as it contributes to the well-being of the greatest number. Granting for argument's sake the value and importance of such moods and acts on this ground, it is difficult to see how such a concession could lead us very far towards the establishment of natural religion.

But what about the dignity? Dignity means either some kind of worth, and so coincides with "importance," or means "worthy of respect and reverence." Now Mr. Mallock has spent much of his literary energy in showing that modern thought, to be consistent with itself, must deny altogether the existence of any such

dignity in these acts or moods of mind ; and therefore, so long as we remain in "the existing condition of thought," we must "feel astonishment that any serious man should have recourse to such lamentable puerilities," and only go on "to notice a few details of their inaptitude, because they give us the key to the fundamental unsoundness of the writer's entire position " (p. 189).

We are not only asked, in the teeth of modern science, to believe in "the spiritual importance and dignity of certain acts and moods of mind," but also required to accept "a certain meaning in certain spiritual fears and hopes " (p. 199). Pray why, unless there is a future life before us, and a retributive judgment to be passed on the acts of our present life, what meaning can these spiritual hopes and fears have for us ? And if belief in the spiritual is repudiated by modern science, and if these hopes and fears are the outcome of superstition, nightmare, shadows, echoes, and such like natural phenomena ill understood, as not a few modern scientists have maintained ; then, far from recognizing "a certain meaning in these hopes and fears," we shall see nothing in them but the morbid product of a diseased imagination.

But Mr. Mallock does not rest here. We are also called upon to recognize "a certain authority beyond that of a tribal instinct, in the voice of conscience " (p. 199). How in the "present condition of thought " we can do this, we again fail entirely to see. Here is a proposition "not only scientifically, superfluous, and which also multiplies and deepens the difficulties of the intellect, but it involves many consequences which are practically terrifying and disagreeable " (p. 199). Consequently, "The only motive which can make us assent to it does not lie in itself " (*Ib.*). For if the conscience possesses such authority, we must, before recognizing it, know something of the nature and source of that authority ;¹ which we can only do by accepting the doctrine of a supreme legislator whose existence this very assumption is supposed to be the only means of proving, which is a shameless begging of the question. Moreover, in accepting this assumption, we must abandon modern science. For not only is the whole camp of pantheism, materialism, hedonism, utilitarianism and humanitarianism against us, but scientific agnosticism is "daily branding into the consciousness of civilized man," the truth, that "life and consciousness (and therefore conscience) follow and are the results of the laws of the material universe, and merely another aspect of the same machine " (p. 195); and finally, the whole contention of modern evolution is to show that conscience

¹ In his *New Republic*, Mr. Mallock embodies the pertinent question, "How can you decide between right and wrong, if you do not know *for whom* anything is right and for whom anything is wrong ? "

is precisely that product of tribal instinct which we are asked to assume that it is not.

Hence not only, "as far as proof is concerned" are all these postulates about the value of life "mere assumption," but they are assumptions for which modern science clamorously demands proofs before "a doubter who desires the comfort of faith," can, "in the present condition of thought," find in this course of procedure "anything to help him" (pp. 183-4).

The question then remains: Can any argument be brought forward by Mr. Mallock to give any coloring to his doctrine that life has any value at all? Some years ago he wrote a whole book to prove that, without a belief in the supernatural, life was not worth living. Must we suppose that he has changed his mind? Does he now believe that the value of life can be recognized independently of supernatural belief? His present contention seems to involve this. He appears to hold that the value of life can be recognized first, and that afterwards the supernatural must be accepted in order to explain its value. To use his own words:

"Given to life the sort of value in question, the existence of God and of man's freedom are its necessary logical consequences, and it cannot be explained or even expressed without having recourse to them" (p. 200).

Nevertheless, before this can come about, the aforesaid value must be given; *i.e.*, it must be recognized *as a fact* that life has the value claimed for it. How, then, is it to be recognized, if not by looking at the facts of life, and deducing, as a conclusion from them, the "assumption" required—which, however, if deduced from facts, can hardly be called "assumed."

Yet, looked at in itself, the value of life is by no means capable of demonstration. It is not to be denied that the whole of the pessimist school look upon life, at least intellectually, as a failure and an evil, and place its value below zero; and, on the supposition that there is no future life, all must hold with the materialistic school, that life's value is the sum of its temporal pleasures minus the sum of its temporal pains. But looked at from a temporal point of view, the value of life is almost nothing—at least to the majority of the human race. Without assuming an eternal destiny for man, we cannot believe in the value of his temporal life. But to assume it is to beg the whole question. An appeal to the facts of consciousness, the aspirations, the deep-seated moral sense, the feelings of the infinite, would tempt us to reply as Mr. Mallock replied to Dr. Hettinger on the question of free-will, "that according to the scientific theory [such aspirations, etc.] are mere subjective delusions" (p. 191). As for the "spiritual value of life" Mr. Mallock seems "utterly unaware of the change which

modern science has accomplished in the psychological doctrine of the human mind" (p. 184). As for the "eternal meaning of life," we should reply that the eternal meaning of the *material universe* may, indeed, be a fact, since "the material universe is infinite and eternal, all its changes being the result of all-pervading and eternally unchanging laws" (p. 195). But to speak of the eternal meaning of *life* is too absurd, since "such life and consciousness as we see exhibited in man is a fleeting and infinitesimal phenomenon in the eternity and the infinity of this all" (p. 196).

If Mr. Mallock points to the universality of this belief—the value of life—we reply that "since the introduction of the theory of evolution," this universality, such as it is, is accounted for on easier grounds—and hence "the force of this argument has disappeared" (F. R., November, 1890, p. 166).

Again, we should point to the "millions born into the world, not only surrounded by circumstances that are inexorably brutalizing, but with brutal passions ingrained into their whole system and forced upon them by the formation of their skulls" (p. 193), whose existence in Mr. Mallock's mind forms so insuperable an obstacle to belief in the goodness of God, and ask how much "spiritual importance and dignity in certain acts and moods of mind," how much "authority in the voice of conscience," and how much "spiritual value and eternal meaning" these millions could be expected to recognize in life? And adding to these an equal or greater number of millions, whose whole life is one checkered career of misery, failure, want and misfortune, we should ask, what would be the estimate formed by *these* of the value of the present life; unless they first assumed, *not* that value itself, but the existence of God and a future life, from which alone such value can be derived? Finally, we should ask, what force there could be in a theory based on the subjective peculiarities and fanciful aspiration of a "cultured few," whose pleasures in life happen to have predominated over their pains, resulting from the exercise of a vague faculty called "faith," and incited by "a wish to believe," and this after all other arguments for "man's pre-eminent and significant destiny have perished on all sides like helpless sailors washed overboard in a storm" (p. 190). "To all such arguments" we should conclude, "what science does is as follows: It does not destroy them as logical structures; but it blows away the bases on which they rest like so many pieces of thistledown" (p. 187).

This, then, is our conclusion as to the reasonableness of assuming the value of life as a basis for natural religion. All the value which life possesses depends on the truth of natural religion; "without this, it cannot be explained, nor even expressed" (p. 200). If then, "it must be recognized with absolute clearness,

that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of the intellect, give us any proof of the existence of a personal Creator" (p. 197); *a pari* it must be recognized, after what we have just said, that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of intellect give us any proof of the "spiritual value and eternal meaning of life" (p. 200).

In short, that if an assumption "independent of reason" has to be made at all, we might as well, and can as easily, assume the truth of natural religion, and from it deduce the value of life, as assume the value of life, and from it deduce the truth of natural religion—with this difference, that the truth of natural religion does not presuppose the value of life, whereas the value of life does presuppose the truth of natural religion; and therefore the former alternative would avoid the *petitio principii* involved in the order of procedure which Mr. Mallock maintains.

There is still, however, one loop-hole by which Mr. Mallock may try to escape, *i.e.*, by providing a special faculty, by which we are enabled to make the latter assumption, and by which we are unable to make the former.

Consequently, after expounding the great assumption of the value of life, he asks, "What faculty is there in man which is to urge him to assume it?" (p. 200). And gives his answer as follows:

"It is difficult to suggest any better name for it than faith; and its formula put briefly comes to be as follows: 'I do believe in the spiritual value and the eternal meaning of life, because my nature is such that I abhor the belief that is the alternative'" (p. 200).

Now if "Faith" is the best name that can be found for this "faculty," it must correspond, in some approximate way at least, to the definition of faith. Faith ought properly to be distinguished from knowledge as "a belief on the testimony of another," whether that other be a different person or a different faculty in the same person. It is difficult to mean anything else by the term, without hopeless distortion of words; from which charge the peculiar modern usage can hardly claim to be free. Either "faith" means this, or it is a blind instinct. Mr. Mallock can hardly maintain that it is a blind instinct, since not only does he exert himself to propagate his views on the subject, with the evident hope of convincing somebody, but, after formulating the act of faith which his proselytes are asked to make, he adds a reason or motive why that act of faith is made. Whether this reason be coercive or persuasive makes no difference. If blindly coercive, the reason is superfluous, and the assent is given independently of reason; but in this case it is no longer "faith," and our belief

cannot be said to be the result of a motive or the consequence of a "wish to believe." If it is *intelligently* coercive, that can only be because its truth and its consequences are both self-evident, and therefore it is not by "faith," but by "knowledge"—not "independently of reason," but *because* of reason that we assent. If it is only persuasive, then we can assent or not assent, and man's free-will is established—a conclusion dead against the scientific theory, which calls free-will "a subjective delusion."

If, then, the formula of faith means anything, it means this: My nature abhors the belief that life has no spiritual value or eternal meaning, etc. I believe my nature to be a true and trustworthy thing; on the testimony of my nature I therefore accept the belief that life has a spiritual and eternal value, because I can trust my nature in this its most fundamental utterance. Here are the witness or authority, the testimony, and the acceptance of it from that authority; in short, all that is involved in an exercise of faith, and this explanation is the only reasonable account which can be given of the case.

But let us look at the consequences of this position. The belief in the value of life is no longer the first step towards the construction of a natural religion, but the second; or if it is called the first step, it is neither an assumption nor taken independently of reason. On the contrary, it is a conclusion deduced from a previous premiss, and therefore taken in dependence on and aided by reason even taking reason in the sense of "reasoning."

Now whether my assent to the value of life is free or not free, and whether we assent to it as certain or probable, it still remains true that our intimate abhorrence of the contrary is alone the motive which impels me to this assent and the justification of the reasonableness of that assent. Moreover, the force of the motive is such that, despite the verdict of the modern science—despite all the decisions of the pantheistic, pessimistic, hedonistic, utilitarian, materialist, evolutionist and agnostic schools of thought—and despite the difficulties against this position which have been raised from facts and from principles in the foregoing pages—despite all these obstacles in our way, we are expected, under the influence of this verdict of our nature, to give an assent, which, in establishing the truths of natural religion, will cause modern thought to hide its diminished head and confess itself ignominiously mistaken in nine-tenths of its most prominent and telling conclusions. No wonder, then, if the doubter looks closer into this proposition and tests its genuineness before accepting either it or its consequences.

"My nature abhors the belief which is the alternative." However lively our "faith," and however incapable our reason, we can hardly believe this as a fact unless we see it to be at least probably

true. Our faith hardly extends to its acceptance on Mr. Mallock's *ipse dixit*. Does our nature really abhor the belief that life has no spiritual value and no eternal meaning? We do not care to dispute this point, simply because, even if true, it proves very little. Suppose we *do* find ourselves clinging to spiritual values and eternal meanings, how can we be assured that we *ought* to do so? There are many clings found in a man which are at least doubtfully right and desirable. According to common experience, the nature of the libertine abhors restraint; the nature of the lazy man abhors the necessity of labor; the nature of the selfish man abhors the altruistic principle; the nature of the rationalist abhors assumptions. Now, if these repugnances are condemned as "individual peculiarities" and "distortions of the human character," why should the abhorrence which we feel for the spiritual worthlessness and eternal insignificance of life be anything else? Why should not such an abhorrence be the product of a "subjective delusion," something on a par with the abhorrence which the licentious man feels towards social and religious restrictions? or the empty-headed and self-sufficient coxcomb feels with regard to being convicted of his ignorance?

Let us suppose this question solved satisfactorily. Let us imagine a test provided by which we can discern between the true and the fictitious dictates of "my nature," and that the aforesaid dictate is truly what Mr. Mallock claims it to be. Even on this supposition a considerable difficulty still remains before we can make use of anything which follows from its recognition.

This difficulty is expressed in the following question: Is it a certain truth that whatever nature (taken in its true and adequate sense) abhors is false? In other words, given that man is constituted according to a definite mode of being, tendency and mode of action which we call his "nature," and given that this nature is understood by man himself, is the dictate of that nature, as revealed in the consciousness of the individual, to be recognized as a criterion of truth? So that if our nature, truly understood, declares that a materialistic view of life is repugnant to our very essential character, can we recognize as certainly true that the "spiritual and eternal significance" view of life is the correct one?

On this question and its answer turns the whole fate of Mr. Mallock's proposal. Unfortunately, whatever answer he may give will only go to determine which horn of a dilemma he prefers to be impaled upon.

If he answers that the abhorrence of nature to a given proposition merely provides an inducement toward making the assumption of the value of life, if a man is willing to do so, then he has not only incidentally acknowledged the existence of free-will (a

doctrine repudiated by modern thought), but he has acknowledged that there is no vouch for the objective reality of the value of life, and therefore, that all attempts to explain that value by the introduction of natural religion is merely to assume several hypotheses in order to prove one hypothesis; and *not* modern science, but the inexorable logic of facts "blows away the bases on which his scheme rests like so many pieces of thistledown" (p. 187): his whole theory vanishes away like the Cheshire cat in wonderland, leaving nothing but a smile behind.

On the other hand, if Mr. Mallock asserts that the abhorrence of nature (properly understood, as already supposed—the case before us) is a satisfactory and conclusive evidence of the truth of the contrary belief—then he is reduced to the following ignominious position: He must admit that the belief in "the spiritual value and eternal meaning of life" is an ascertained truth, built on, or deduced immediately from, a self-evident or demonstrated proposition—viz., that "the clear dictates of nature are the criteria of truth, or that "the essential tendency of a given nature is a true one, and represents the objective truth in the order of things," or in other words, that "if nature dictates an eternal destiny for man, that eternal destiny is a fact, and is known as such."

But as a result of this admission, it is apparent that the scheme suggested for the instauration of natural religion is no longer, as Mr. Mallock alleged, a "logical process based on an assumption made of faith," but a logical process based on a certain truth perceived by intellect.

As a consequence, he will be obliged to retract the following concessions and statements in his essay:

1. "If by natural religion is meant a belief in God based on the application of man's logical faculties to the facts of his own intellect and of the sensible universe, there is no such thing as natural religion at all" (p. 196).

2. "It must be recognized with absolute clearness, that neither the testimony of sense, nor the testimony of history, nor the laws of the intellect, give us any proof of the existence of a personal Creator" (p. 197).

3. "It leaves us to take the first step independently of reason" (p. 198).
and

"Natural religion must, as we say, be based on an assumption" (p. 199).

If, however, he prefers the other alternative, and refuses to make these corrections, he must patiently submit to the retorsion of his scathing condemnation of Dr. Hettinger's book in the following terms:

"A defense of religion based on arguments unsound or inconclusive, or ignorant of the sceptical objections of the day, may only suggest new doubt and do more harm than good. Mr. Mallock's endeavor is not free from this peril. To the independent reader it will, I believe, seem to be full of it. It has every one of the faults that have

just been mentioned. Most of it is inconclusive, much of it unsound, and the principal objections that require combating are ignored throughout the whole of it" (p. 184.

In short, the whole essay might be described as "a literary endeavor in which the author begins by misunderstanding the drift of his opponent's argument, and ends by misunderstanding the drift of his own."

If, then, Mr. Mallock's position can be held as reasonable at all, his arguments must be put forward on a totally different understanding from that on which Mr. Mallock has advanced it. That understanding must be that it is based on a certain truth, known as such at the outset, and not on an "assumption of faith," which hereafter may or may not be discovered to be true.

All that remains to us is to indicate how in this case the argument must run, and in doing so, we beg to make Mr. Mallock welcome to the suggestion.

1. With this, as with every other argument that has any meaning, we must begin at the very first and fundamental truths of consciousness, viz., that we exist, that we possess a natural faculty for knowing truth, that we know the validity of our direct intellectual processes and that the principle of contradiction and other principles of an equally metaphysical character are true. These truths we hold, not as assumptions, but as self-evident fundamental truths which no one can explicitly deny without implicitly asserting them—in short, we must begin by acknowledging that certitude is prior to doubt. If there be in existence such a curiosity as a universal sceptic, of course he will disagree with us at the outset, and in doing so will implicitly show that he agrees with us. However, if he is obstinate, we must beg him to withdraw, and continue our argument with those who admit the foregoing truths as self-evident. The methodical and philosophical doubters, and perhaps the majority of modern agnostics, may also follow the example of the sceptic.

2. It is essential to our argument that human nature should be recognized as a permanent type of being. No matter how much that type may contain that is common with the brutes, it must be held as a certain truth that human nature is essentially superior to brute nature, and this by virtue of an essential mode of being, tendency and mode of action proper to man and not possible to the brutes. Whoever, therefore, is then among the "doubters desirous of the comfort of faith," who clings to the evolutionary notion that man is merely a developed specimen of animal life in which nature has

"Let the ape and tiger die,"

by a process of natural selection, or who maintains with the

materialists that man is but "a more complex composition of molecules," must at this point give up all hope of attaining faith and go away sorrowful. For unless man is the embodiment of an essential type superior in kind to the brute, it is ludicrous to attribute any "spiritual value or eternal meaning" to his life.

3. If there is to be recognized any value in Mr. Mallock's argument, we must admit as certainly true the axiom that "*Natura nil facit frustra*," "Nature does nothing in vain." This means that wherever we find a general tendency belonging to the essential nature of any type of being, we recognize that that type of being is designed (no matter by whom) to attain the goal of its tendency, and will in the main (allowing for accidents) do so. From this we can ascertain two truths: (1) from the presence of a natural tendency we can infer the certain existence of the object to which it tends; *e.g.*, If matter tends to fall to a certain centre, we know the real existence of the centre to which it will fall; and (2) from the presence of this tendency we can infer that that goal will or can be reached by the type which tends to it; *e.g.*, If matter tends to a certain centre, this matter can and will (except for accidents) attain that centre.

Now, we really doubt whether Mr. Mallock himself would admit this proposition. Yet it needs but a few remarks to show that it is precisely this proposition which underlies his assent to the "value of life," because "nature abhors the contrary belief." In a repugnance to one thing is involved a tendency to its contrary. Nature only abhors the materialistic view of life, because it naturally desires the spiritualistic view. But unless the tendencies of nature are believed to have their corresponding goal in the order of reality, we cannot be led to accept the value of life merely because nature tends to accept it and abhor the contrary. Consequently, Mr. Mallock's formula, whether he likes it or not, must be written in the form of the following syllogism:

1. Nature does nothing in vain. But nature has implanted in man a spiritual view of life, therefore the spiritual view of life is not vain.

2. But unless this spiritual view of life is true, it is worse than vain, it is delusive. Therefore, the spiritual view of life is the true one.

3. But it can only be the true one if there is objectively a real spiritual destiny before man to which he can and (except for accidents) will attain. Therefore, the spiritual destiny is real and attainable.

4. But this spiritual destiny involves the mortality of the soul, the freedom of will and a state of final beatitude in the knowledge and enjoyment of infinite goodness and truth, which is only possi-

ble in a personal God. Therefore, these essential doctrines of natural religion are demonstrated as true.

It is no part of my work to deal with this argument in its later developments. Our argument has simply been to investigate its foundations. If what we have stated above be correct, the following important conclusion ought to be drawn from it; viz., if it be true "that the fundamental difference between the philosophy of Catholicism and the philosophy of the modern world is, that according to Catholic doctrine certainty is prior to doubt and that according to modern agnosticism doubt is prior to certainty" (p. 176), nothing can be gained by attempting to build up a natural religion on what is left after striking our colors to agnostic first principles, as Mr. Mallock has tried to do by laying its foundations on an assumption made by a dubious faculty called "faith." Such an endeavor can only serve to give an appearance of weakness to the cause of religion, which in truth does not belong to it, and end in the failure of the endeavor itself. The real work to be done is in the battle field of the first principles. Till some common ground is established between the two camps, the argument of Catholicism against agnosticism will appear as futile and invalid to agnostics as the arguments of agnosticism against Catholicism appear to Catholics. But this does not mean that the ground principles on which either side is based are to be abandoned merely in the hope of producing an argument which may be more in accord with the opposite line of thought. Such attempts, as a rule, meet with but poor success; and of all such attempts we could hardly imagine one more futile, or one attended with a more dismal failure, than that in which Mr. Mallock, after doing his utmost to cast ignominy on Dr. Hettinger's defence of natural religion, attempts to reconstruct on the débris which he criticises as strorn an argument which shall be free from the faults he has just condemned. By the preliminary concession he makes to agnosticism, he undermines his whole position; and not only does his argument as it stands bristle with the most glaring contradictions, but, after boasting that it is the one remaining ground on which religion can found and defend itself, he shows conclusively (so far as the statement of his argument is correct) how that one remaining ground is the most unstable ground of all. We have, we hope, succeeded in rescuing his argument from its disgrace and shown that when rightly stated it is a valid one—always supposing its first principles are conceded. But we are convinced that, with agnosticism, nothing can be profitably done until it is clearly recognized on both sides, not that assumption is the basis of thought, but that certitude is the foundation of all our knowledge and that certitude is a real possession of the mind. E. R. HULL, S. J.

GEORGE WASHINGTON IN HIS RELATIONS WITH
CATHOLICS.

I N another article we delineated the religious character of Washington and his broad and liberal views, as exhibited in the leading part he took in framing the Constitution with its noble enactments in favor of religious liberty. Non-sectarian himself, he venerated the true Christian character wherever he found it. That he should have found it in such grand proportions in such men as Archbishop Carroll, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Daniel Carroll, James Fitzsimmons and numerous Catholic patriots and Christians whom I shall have occasion to mention, was a circumstance to win his respect and admiration for the Catholic religion and for the Catholic body in the colonies struggling for independence and in the United States after they had achieved it. So many Catholic patriots and so many noble acts of Catholics in support of the cause of liberty, such splendid services rendered to our country under Washington as commander-in-chief and as first president, brought him in contact with Catholics and gave him occasions to know them as Christians and as citizens. Though reared in the Episcopal Church, he was no sectarian; he arose above all the prejudices of his earliest education. While Catholics were the smallest religious body in the land and the objects of popular prejudice and unjust constitutions and laws, he respected and favored them; availed himself of many opportunities of testifying to their loyalty and patriotism, their Christian virtues, intelligence and love of freedom; defended them from oppression; assisted in winning for them equality under the Constitution. His relations with Catholics were interesting. We claim no exceptional favoritism for the Catholic body in the colonies or States, but that his relations with Catholics were friendly and intimate in many particular instances; always just and sympathetic, characterized by many decided marks of approval and admiration and by a particular leaning towards them. They were also characterized by many instances of public and official intercourse, of public praise and of warm personal and intimate friendships.

The ancestry of Washington were an ancient English family, belonging to the higher and aristocratic class, and many knights and esquires figure among them. They were of course Catholics; many of the family are registered as having been rectors of old Catholic Churches in England. No doubt they were represented by gallant knights in the Crusades, and the Manor of Wassington

or Wessington in England was held by his ancestors in fief from a Catholic bishop, the Lord Bishop of Durham, and they took part, with acknowledged valor, in the neighboring and border Scottish wars. Washington Irving quotes from an old inedited poem on the siege of Carlavaroock some verses commemorative of the feudal services rendered by the Washingtons to the Lord Bishop of Durham in the Scottish border wars :

" Their valor bowed before the rood and book,
And kneeling knighthood served a prelate lord,
Yet little deigned he on such a train to look,
Or glance of ruth or pity to afford.

" Their time has heard the peal rung out at night,
Has seen from every tower the cressets stream,
When the red bale fire on yon western height
Had roused the warder from his fitful dream.

" Has seen old Durham's lion banner float
O'er the proud bulwark, that with giant pride
And feet deep plunged amidst the circling moat,
The efforts of the roving Scot defied."

The Washingtons rendered to the Bishop of Durham for the Palatine or Manor of Washington, which they held of him in fief, "four pounds, and doing service, therefore, in the great chase of the Lord Bishop with two grey hounds, and also paying one mark to the palatine aid, when such tax should be raised." It was thus they served their feudal lord in the chase and in the wars, facts affording food for reflection on such a form of the union of Church and State.

At the so-called Reformation of the sixteenth century, the Washingtons, with most of the English people, became members of the Church of Henry VIII., or Anglican Church, and I have seen instances recorded in old documents where some of the family received from the crown and held estates and abbeys that were wrested from the Catholic Church by the king. During the protectorate the ancient families, that had adhered to the house of Stuart, drew upon them the vengeance of Cromwell, and many emigrated from England, and of these were John and Andrew Washington, who came to Virginia in 1657, John being the great-grandfather of our Washington. Another brother, James Washington, went to Holland the same year that John and Andrew came to Virginia, and settled at Rotterdam, where he became a Catholic; his descendants, who still bear the name of Washington, are Catholics now. Washington was reared in the Anglican or Episcopal Church, Virginia having been a favorite resort of the English cavaliers fleeing from the bigotry of the Covenanters and Roundheads. His first contact with the Catholics was during the French and Indian War,

when his adversaries were French Catholics. At Fort Du Quesne, now Pittsburg, then a French post, there was an ancient Catholic Shrine, which has been beautifully described by Father Lambing and is still commemorated in our history. It ought to be the scene of Catholic pilgrimages. No doubt in this war he saw the French chaplain administering the sacraments of the Catholic Church to dying soldiers on the field or in the hospital. Washington had never been abroad and had never seen Catholicity in Europe. Lossing says he was a communicant in the Episcopal Church and had pews in the churches at Pohick, near Mount Vernon, and at Alexandria. We have ourselves seen his pew in the church at Alexandria, where it is shown to visitors. It is a double square pew, with seats on both lengths or sides facing each other, and has thus reverently been preserved in its original shape, size and condition just as Washington sat in it, while all the other pews in the church have been altered or modernized by division of each pew into two. We doubt about his having been a communicant in the Episcopal Church in the latter part of his life, from the following anecdote related of him while he was residing in Philadelphia as president. At this time he went regularly to the Episcopal Church of that city with Martha Washington. She received communion on the regular days of communion, which however was always administered at the end of the regular services, and by a singular custom in that church, the non-communicant gentlemen of the congregation usually arose at that moment, at the end of the regular service, and retired from the edifice, leaving their wives inside to receive the communion. No doubt they lingered in the church yard to discuss the politics of the day. Washington followed this practice with the other male members of the congregation. The minister became displeased at the strange custom, as well he might, and on one day, while Washington was present with Martha Washington in their pew, the minister denounced the practice in unmeasured terms. He should have stopped here, but he went further and said (what he might better have omitted, for it was a personal allusion to the president), that it was "a practice which the countenance of the most eminent citizen could not make proper." Washington never afterwards entered that church. No doubt he attended service afterwards, while living at Mount Vernon, at Pohick and Alexandria, but we have no certain information of his being thereafter a communicant, and he had no minister with him at his death bed, unless there be truth in a dim and unauthenticated tradition, which we shall presently mention, that he was attended at that extreme moment by a Catholic priest. Lossing, in a letter addressed to Mr. Martin I. J. Griffin, of Philadelphia, in 1884, described Washington's religious sentiments, and

answered "no" to the question, "Was Washington a Catholic?" as follows: "Washington had a Catholic spirit, which embraced in its goodness *all his fellow-men*; but he was not a member of the Roman Catholic Church."

Washington's respect and friendship for Catholics grew out of his Catholic spirit, out of his natural sense of justice, out of his utter superiority to all prejudice, out of the loyalty to the struggling colonies which the Catholics of the Revolution manifested throughout the contest, out of the services rendered to the cause of independence by prominent Catholics whom he knew, out of the good fighting done under his own command by the Catholic soldiers, chiefly from Maryland and partly from Pennsylvania, out of the transcendent aid so generously given to our cause by two Catholic nations, France and Spain, out of his personal intercourse and friendship with the Catholic officers who commanded in the French armies and navies sent to our relief, some of whom were accomplished, learned and pious chaplains, out of the pleasure and edification he experienced from attending not unfrequently the impressive and devout services of the Catholic Church, and out of his clear insight into her doctrines, history, practices and discipline, the force of which he readily understood, in requiring all Catholic citizens, while fervently acknowledging their spiritual allegiance to the Pope, to feel, profess and practice a true and unswerving loyalty and patriotism to the country and nation of which they might be citizens. Such an example as this should, in our day and forever, banish all bigotry from the minds and education of Americans. Why should we hear even now the utterances of bigotry impugning the loyalty of Catholics when Washington trampled such sentiments and utterances under his feet?

Washington was reared in the same educational influences and prejudices against Catholics as were others of his time and country. Education, tradition, social discriminations were there to affect his character, if possible, with prejudice against Catholics as others were prejudiced. The bigotry which had refused to the Catholic Lord Baltimore a shelter from the elements on the shores of Virginia a century and a half before still existed. There were few if any Catholics living in his State. I have already mentioned in my paper on Washington in the April number of this REVIEW that under our national and State constitutions there was nothing to prevent the States themselves from persecuting conscience and religion and legislating against Catholics before 1776, and that many of the States were then doing it. Washington's own State had been one of these, and although Catholic Maryland had founded her government on the basis of religious liberty, in actual practice in 1634 and by statute in 1649, many of the

States prior to and at the Revolution persecuted Catholics for conscience' sake.

I promised just now to give some account of these proscriptive State Constitutions or laws. In New Hampshire, though its old proscriptive code passed away in 1776, Catholics were excluded from office and the Protestant religion was virtually established by the Constitution of 1792. In Massachusetts, 1779-80, Congregationalism was effectually erected into the State religion, and taxes on all were levied for its support. In New York, 1777, under the leadership of John Jay, Catholics were called upon to abjure their religious allegiance to the head of their Church or forfeit the privilege of naturalization and the rights of citizenship, and they forfeited them. An oath of office was presented to them, which no Catholic could take, and no Catholic could become naturalized. In New Jersey, 1776, Catholics were excluded from office. In Pennsylvania, 1776, no religious test was required except a belief in God, a place of future rewards and punishments and in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. The provisions of the Constitution of Delaware, 1776, were substantially like those of Pennsylvania. While the old laws in Maryland, enacted during the Protestant ascendancy, had become obsolete or repealed, the Constitution of 1776 forbade any minister from receiving lands except for a church or cemetery, and all citizens were requested to subscribe a declaration of belief in the Christian religion. The Constitution of North Carolina, 1776, while containing a formal or general declaration of religious liberty, enacted that "no person who shall deny the truth of the Protestant religion shall be capable of holding office or place of trust or profit in the civil government within this State." In South Carolina, 1778, the Protestant religion was established by the Constitution, and Catholics were excluded from office. Rhode Island had a law against Catholics, but had repealed it now. Connecticut had a law establishing Congregationalism, and hence needed no express provision in her Constitution. Virginia, Washington's own State, both in 1776 and again in 1786, proclaimed religious liberty and freedom of worship to be the "natural rights of mankind." Who is there that does not see in these noble declarations of Virginia the reflex of the liberal and just sentiments of Washington? Then and thenceforth one by one the old thirteen States removed all religious intolerance from their Constitutions and statutes, New Hampshire being the last to retain a vestige of it. The new States coming into the Union since then have Constitutional provisions in favor of religious liberty. So that now we may say that the nation and all the States of the Union rest their honor, their happiness and their glory in the guarantee of perfect religious

equality, liberty and freedom of religious worship. This excellent result is due, more than to any other one man, to the well-known sentiments and commanding influence of the commander-in-chief, the President of the Constitutional Convention, the first President of the United States, the Father of his Country.

The Catholic body at the Revolution was small mostly, and, with few exceptions, destitute of wealth and social influence, the subject of traditional and educational prejudices, proscribed by the laws, and, though mostly congregated in one State, unable to control a single State. In New York the Sons of Liberty ran up a flag bearing the legend, "No Popery." In the Mohawk valley, already consecrated by the martyr-blood of Father Jogues and his companions, a colony of Scotch Catholics had been driven over the border into Canada. Theirs was not the fashionable religion or church of the day, and, though statutes against them were repealed, popular prejudices survived to annoy Catholics then, and even in our own day finding expression in the burning of churches and convents, in anti-popery riots and the lynching of a holy priest. These unfavorable circumstances and surroundings, continuing more or less towards the close of the eighteenth century, enhanced the grandeur of Washington's liberality displayed a century ago. The Revolution also brought out the true character of Catholics, and whenever Washington saw them or met them, his justice and magnanimity saw overwhelming proofs of their loyalty and patriotism. He saw the Catholics of Maryland and Pennsylvania joining heartily and unitedly in the Revolution. Archbishop Carroll, in defending Catholics against unjust aspersions, said they were more unanimous on the side of independence than any other religious body in the land, and had shed their blood more liberally in proportion than their fellow-citizens of any other creed. Washington, too, saw the Declaration of Independence signed by Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the Constitution signed by Thomas Fitzsimmons and Daniel Carroll, who were among its founders; he saw John Carroll go to Canada with Dr. Franklin, Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll of Carrollton to endeavor to remove from Canadian minds the resentment caused by the declarations of the American Congress against the Quebec Act, which gave Canadians religious liberty, and by its aspersions uttered against the Catholic religion. He saw the famous Maryland Line fight by his side until they became his favorite soldiers; he saw by his side his devoted aides-de-camp, General Stephen Moylan of Philadelphia and Colonel John Fitzgerald of Virginia, during the whole war; and besides these he beheld distinguished in the service of the patriot army or rendering aid to the cause such Catholic officers as Doyle, McGuire, Charlevoix, Gosselin,

Guillot, La Balme, Loiseau and the Catholic Indian chief, Orono, who bore a Continental commission, leading his Catholic tribes to the field of battle. He saw Commodore Barry carry the Stars and Stripes in triumph over the seas, until he became the recognized founder of the American navy, and survived to receive a naval commission from the first president himself. It was a Catholic priest to whose exertions and services we owe the raising of the American flag over the cities of the great west, thus gaining the great northwest, now teeming with powerful States, to the cause of independence—this was Father Peter Gibault, the patriot-priest of Vincennes, who blessed the Catholic company of Kaskaskia as they filed into the Continental army of the northwest. The Catholic officer, Francis Vigo, and the Catholic priest, Peter Gibault, by the aid they rendered to the American general, Clark, saved an empire of States to the Union. In 1790 Washington's own State of Virginia acknowledged Father Gibault's services by a public resolution of its legislature. Catholic Indians, as well as Catholic white men, were led into the patriot cause by Father Gibault, and it is admitted in our histories that he saved the north-western States to the American Union. The first chaplain's commission issued by the Continental Congress was given to a Catholic priest, the Franciscan Father Lotbinière.

The two Catholic regiments from Canada and St. Regis, officered by such men as Louis, Guillot, Loiseau and Menard, won the title of "Congress's Own," and did not retire to their homes until Cornwallis surrendered his sword to Washington at Yorktown. Their descendants are now living upon lands in northern N w York, given them by Congress for their military services. Do you suppose that Washington's heart did not feel the thrill when the brave and gallant Captain La Balme, the hero of Detroit, fell in 1780 before that city, when struggling, at the head of Catholic soldiers, to wrest it from the English? Did he not witness the patriotic efforts rendered throughout the struggle for independence by the Right Rev. John Carroll? Did he not read the triumphant reply of Charles Carroll of Carrollton in defence of Catholics and advocating religious liberty to Daniel Dulany, the tory champion of England? Did he not know that, even before the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed, the Catholic nations of Europe befriended us, while a Protestant nation was struggling to enslave us. Not only France, but also Spain and Italy, gave either substantial aid or ardent sympathy. And even in Protestant Germany, whence England was enlisting Hessians for our subjugation, it was the Catholic princes of the empire that opposed and stopped the wicked enrollment. Before Catholic France sent her armies and fleets to fight for American liberties many Catholic officers of military and

scientific accomplishments, such as Lafayette, Duponceau, Conway, Dugan, Arundel, Pulaski, Arnaud, De Fleury, Du Portail, Du Condray and many others, embracing, as you perceive from the names, officers of the French-Irish brigade, came to aid in the American struggle, and Washington found them of great service in instructing, training, drilling and organizing the Continental troops and in planning brilliant military operations. What shall we say of our only avowed ally in the Revolution, Catholic France, whose fleets and armies rendered such services that historians deem the achievement of American independence an impossibility without them. Catholic Spain drew the Continental nations of Europe into an armed neutrality, thus defeating the machinations of England, and finally she drew the sword in our behalf at the South.

From these varied and numerous associations with Catholics Washington formed many intimate, personal and private friendships, which lasted during his life. His friendship with Lafayette, D'Estang, Luzerne, De Grasse and other French and Catholic officers was the complement of those he formed with the Catholic patriotic Carrolls, with General Moylan, Colonel Thomas Fitzsimons, Colonel Fitzgerald, Commodore Barry and many others. Thomas Fitzsimons rendered important aid to the financial success of the new government under Washington's administration. It is unquestionably true that the ardent support which Catholics, at home and abroad, rendered to the cause of American independence won the heart of Washington, made him their friend, led to many private friendships, called forth encomiums from him and established between him and Catholics special and interesting relations honorable at once to Washington and his Catholic fellow-citizens.

The personal and devoted friendship between Washington and Lafayette was at once beautiful, manly and tender; it was characteristic of them both. Lafayette loved liberty, but opposed licentiousness, and when in the French Revolution liberty was sunk in licentiousness, it was also Lafayette's downfall; he would have given France what Washington gave America, as he himself said, "a new Constitutional government." These two illustrious men would make the subject of a lecture. As evidences of their friendship, I will only cite three out of countless instances. In 1784, Mr. Irving informs us that Lafayette gladdened the heart of Washington by a two weeks' visit to Mount Vernon, where he was "a loved and honored guest." In 1790, Lafayette sent to Washington the key of the Bastille, which Washington hung in the main hall at Mount Vernon, where, in my youth, I saw it hanging just as Washington placed it, no other hand, from reverence, having

ever touched or moved it since Washington placed it there. Lafayette's letter sending the key of the Bastile to Washington concludes thus: "I make you homage, also, of the principal key of the fortress of despotism. It is a tribute which I owe you, as son to my adopted father, as aide-de-camp to my general, as missionary of liberty to its patriareh." Washington and Lafayette sickened at the regicide of the gentle king, who had assisted both in achieving our independence. When Lafayette fell before the French Revolution, "Washington," as Mr. Irving writes, "looked with a sadder eye on this catastrophe of Lafayette's high-hearted and gallant aspirations, and mourned over the adverse fortunes of his friend." This noble friendship was the type of many others, not quite so intimate, but equally sincere, between Washington and many Catholic officers and soldiers of the Revolution.

Washington's friendship for the three Carrolls is clearly shown by the history of the times. Mr. Brent, in his biography of Archbishop Carroll, shows how intimately that prelate was acquainted with and admired the life and character of Washington, while Mr. Irving relates how Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, was a favorite visitor at Mount Vernon; and how, when he aspired to the hand of Nelly Custis, the granddaughter of Martha Washington, and adopted daughter of the General, his suit was seconded by Martha Washington, and no doubt with the General's concurrence, in preference to that of Colonel Lawrence Lewis; while the young lady herself was won by the gallant Lewis. In the Constitutional Convention, Daniel Carroll and Thomas Fitzsimons had constant and sympathetic intercourse with Washington, who was President of that august body, and it is well known that Washington, Carroll and Fitzsimons united in sustaining all propositions in the Convention favoring Religious Liberty. General Stephen Moylan, of Philadelphia, commenced his service under Washington in Boston, 1775, and ended it only on the surrender of Cornwallis. Washington must have loved Moylan, whose very face and manner so attracted the Chief that he took him from the commissariat at Boston to his own staff as aide-de-camp; and it was at Washington's request that Congress made him quartermaster-general in 1776. Raising a regiment of cavalry, in 1778-9, Moylan returned to Washington's side, and served with them in the trying campaign of Valley Forge in 1779. He won by his gallantry and services the rank of brigadier-general. We shall see again these two noble friends associated intimately in Philadelphia, the one as President of the United States, and the other as the President of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick.

Washington had no more devoted friend or one whom he esteemed more highly than Colonel John Fitzgerald, of Alexandria,

It was Colonel John Fitzgerald, who in 1774 first introduced Moylan to George Washington at Mount Vernon, where they were both welcome guests, even before the war. Again we find Fitzgerald a guest at Mount Vernon with Dr. Diggs, a Catholic gentleman of Maryland, and again with Daniel Carroll, and on the latter occasion Fitzgerald offered his services to the newly-appointed commander-in-chief, and they were accepted on the spot. Appointed an aide-de-camp to Washington, Fitzgerald served him gallantly to the end. He was the intermediary and medium of communication and information between the general in the field and Martha Washington at Mount Vernon, and was thus the confidential friend and aide of Washington.

At Trenton, when Washington rode his horse before his troops in the face of the enemy, determined to win or die, the most exposed soldier in the field, and while calling on his troops to turn the adverse tide of war to victory, and seemed to all doomed to a certain and immediate death, then Fitzgerald covered his eyes that he might not see his commander fall. But in an instant the American army rushed to the rescue of the exposed chief, who led them on to the charge. Fitzgerald was in the foremost of the fight, and when the day was won and he saw Washington alive and victorious, he rode frantically to the General's side and exclaimed, "Thank God, your Excellency is safe!" Fitzgerald, afterwards describing the scene, said, "I wept, for joy, like a child!" It was he that carried the first news of the victories of Trenton and of Princeton to Martha Washington at Mount Vernon. When a cabal was formed to displace Washington and to put General Gates in command, it was Fitzgerald that penetrated the secrets of the conspirators, faced them with their perfidy, and communicated the information to the calm and unruffled chieftain. It is recorded that "the part that Fitzgerald took in this affair endeared him more than ever to the great commander." After the war, Washington and Fitzgerald were fast friends and neighbors in Virginia, exchanging visits and hospitality with each other. In 1788, Washington was a guest at Fitzgerald's dinner table on St. Patrick's Day, and Washington recorded the event in his diary. We have other accounts of Colonel Fitzgerald's visiting and dining at Mount Vernon; the last occasion being only six months before the General's death. I will also mention here that Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Philadelphia, and Washington were personal friends. At a grand banquet given to General and Mrs. Washington at Philadelphia, on March 4, 1798, on his going out of the presidency, Thomas Fitzsimmons was one of the two presiding officers of the occasion.

Washington had the highest regard for Commodore Barry. It

was Barry that carried the flag of the youngest of nations in triumph over the sea, and saw the flag of the oldest strike before his gallantry. Many are his naval victories, and Washington knew and praised them. On one occasion, when hailed by a British squadron, and asked who he was, his ship's name, etc., he characteristically answered, "The United States' Ship Alliance, saucy Jack Barry, half Irishman, half Yankee—who are you?" In 1778 Washington wrote him a letter complimenting him on his gallantry and address in a recent victory he had achieved, on the glory he had won, and wishing him a suitable recompense for his bravery. The first president afterwards commissioned the gallant captain in the United States navy.

In McSherry's "History of Maryland" are given the officers of the various regiments and companies of the old Maryland Line who fought under Washington and were his favorite soldiers, and it is with pride we can recount such numbers of Catholic names: the Neales, the Boarmans, the Stones, the Fords, the Thomases, the Semmes, the Clarkes, the Boones, the Simms, the Brents, the Mattinglys, the Brookes, the Kiltys, the Thompsons, the Campbells, the Miles, the Contees, the Dyers, the Lowes, the Morgans, and countless other Catholic names. Amongst these names is found that of my own grandfather, William Clarke, an officer under Washington in the Revolution, who was himself a lineal descendant of Robert Clarke, who, in the Maryland Assembly of 1649, voted for the first and then the only true bill of rights in America, the Maryland Act of Religious Liberty. Washington knew and praised all these for their patriotism and valor. While the regiments known as "Congress's Own" were composed chiefly of Catholics, so too Washington's favorite Continental regiments, the old Maryland Line, were greatly composed of Catholics; and these latter were the descendants of the English Catholic colonists, who, in 1634 and 1649, made Maryland "the Land of the Sanctuary," the home of religious liberty.

There was another Catholic patriot of the Revolution, a civilian, a friend of Washington, who rendered invaluable aid to the commander-in-chief and his patriot army in critical periods of the war, and who has scarcely been mentioned, and that only quite lately. This was Patrick Colvin, of New Jersey, the ferryman near Trenton, who, in 1776, ferried Washington and his army across the Delaware, and thus enabled them to circumvent the enemy's movements, and win the glorious victories of Trenton and Princeton. The great national painting in the rotunda of the capitol at Washington represents Washington and his army crossing the Delaware—who has ever known or seen, in that anxious group of patriots there, that a Catholic ferried them across the

historic river? Again in the summer of that year, when Washington, abandoning his first plan of confronting the British at New York, suddenly turned southward from New Jersey to join and relieve Lafayette in Virginia, it was Patrick Colvin who ferried the chief and his army across the Delaware at night. Still, again, in 1789, when Washington was on his way to New York to take the oath as first president of the United States, his journey was one grand ovation from a grateful nation. Now he crossed the Delaware in glory to win the victories and triumphs of peace—who can imagine the joy with which the old ferryman, Patrick Colvin, took personal charge of the presidential party, and ferried them across in his own boat. It is also quite probable, on circumstantial evidence, that Patrick Colvin carried across the Delaware the famous Jesuit missionary of the Revolution, Father Farmer, in his missions of grace and mercy, coming from Maryland or Pennsylvania to the few scattered Catholics in New Jersey and New York during the Revolution. No trace of Patrick Colvin's descendants can be found.

I could give many other instances of Washington's personal and friendly relations with Catholics, but I must proceed to notice now his more public relations with them, and with the Catholic body generally.

I have already alluded to one of Washington's official acts in favor of Catholics, and I promised further details; they are interesting. You know the history of Guy Fawke's conspiracy, in which a few misguided Catholics in England, driven to despair by the persecutions they suffered under the penal laws against their religion, undertook to blow up with gunpowder King James I. and the English Parliament. The celebration of the deliverance of the country from this catastrophe was observed as a legal holy-day in England until comparatively recent years. The Puritans of New England brought with them many such English customs and observances; but how could they hold holy-days in execration of Guy Fawkes for canvassing the life of King James I., when they themselves had actually been guilty of cutting off the head of his son, King Charles I.? What were they to do? Now, as they hated something worse than a king, and that was the Pope, the Pope was made to take the place of Guy Fawkes. So they turned Guy Fawkes' day into Pope day, and celebrated it on the same day, the fifth of November. The day was ushered in amid reports of firearms and fire-crackers, and loud huzzas, and by a motley procession singing the same verses that ushered in the Guy Fawkes' day of old in England:

"Let's always remember
The fifth of November,"

The celebration was conducted by a disorderly procession carrying in an open wagon an effigy of the Pope, accompanied usually by an effigy of the devil, or sometimes even of some additional well-known but obnoxious public personage of the day. Thus on November 5, 1774, in one of our cities, the procession was distinguished by the presence of the effigies of the Pope, the devil, of Lord North and Governor Hutchinson, and on another occasion, it was the Pope, the devil and the Pretender. In classic Boston this unseemly custom was sacredly observed, and the procession, after parading through the streets, traversed the Common, and their distinguished guests were ignominiously burned on the Common or on Copp's Hill. These processions were made up of the rabble, boys, drunken men, and the dregs of the slums of cities, and as they proceeded through the principal streets, persons were stopped and houses visited, and demands made on the quiet denizens for money, and all had to comply with the impudent demand to save their windows from being broken. The procession was led by one of the most reckless of the gang, who carried a bell, which he incessantly rang, while he shouted:

"Don't you hear my little bell
Go chink, chink, chink?
Please give me a little money,
To buy my pope some drink."

In New London the celebration seems to have blended the features of the English Guy Fawkes' day and the colonial Pope day, if we may judge from the crude verses chanted there:

"Guy Fawkes and the fifth of November,
The Pope and the Gunpowder Plot
Shall never be forgot."

Before the colonies had reached the time when religious liberty was to be proclaimed by them, ancient bigotry and prejudice caused great exception to be taken to the celebrated Quebec Act, by which England granted Canadians freedom of religion in order to keep them loyal to her. This gave new vigor and zest to Pope day celebrations in the revolting colonies. We could entertain you with accounts of this grotesque celebration in various colonies of the old thirteen. But we must come at once to Pope day at Boston, November 5, 1775. Washington with his patriot army, in which were many Catholics from Maryland and Pennsylvania, had occupied Boston for the defence of the town. It came to the commander's ears on that day that preparations were making in his army to celebrate Pope day with the usual processions and the usual effigies of the Pope and the devil. Washington was indig-

nant at such an insult to the Catholic soldiers of the patriot army, and he resolved to prevent it. On the very day the preparations had been made, but before the procession could be formed, Washington issued from his headquarters and had posted through the camp the following military order :

“ NOVEMBER 5th.

“ As the commander-in-chief has been apprised of a design formed for observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there should be officers and soldiers in this army so void of common sense as not to see the impropriety of such a step at this juncture, at a time when we are soliciting and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of the people of Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same cause—the defence of the liberty of America. At this juncture and under such circumstances to be insulting their religion is so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused ; indeed, instead of offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks to these our brethren, as to them we are indebted for every late happy success over the common enemy in Canada.”

It is needless to say that Pope day was not celebrated in Boston on that day, nor ever afterwards. Washington had sounded its death-knell. This absurd celebration of Pope day, which before the revolution had become the cause of riot and disorder, so much so as to have been forbidden and punished by local magistrates, as was done in New London in 1768, was revived but feebly after the war, and soon ceased altogether. In our neighboring city of New London the last vestige of it was when Arnold, the traitor, was substituted for the Pope, and the sixth of September for the fifth of November. The ditty now sung in the procession was also changed to suit the purpose, and ran as follows :

“ Don't you remember the sixth of September,
When Arnold burnt the town ?
He took the buildings one by one,
And burnt them to the ground.
And here you see the crooked sticks
For him to stand upon,
And when we take him down from them
We'll burn him to the ground,
We'll burn him to the ground.

“ Hark ! my little bell goes chink, chink, chink,
Give me some money to buy me some drink,
We'll take him down and cut off his head,
And then we'll say the traitor is dead.
And burn him to the ground,
And burn him to the ground.”

The prejudices of those early days have not entirely passed away, for we remember as a boy, in the presidential campaign between Henry Clay and Theodore Freelinghuysen for president and

vice-president, in 1844, the same year that the Know Nothings burned the Catholic Churches in Philadelphia, it was supposed that Mr. Freelinghuysen represented the anti-Catholic sentiments of the day, and the Know Nothings gave his ticket their support. One of the ribald ditties of the campaign was :

“Hurrah for Clay and Freelinghuysen !
Down with the Pope and Kyrie Eleison !”

In the Empire State we now hear the echo of the songs in opposition of the Evangelical Alliance and its allies to a Freedom of Worship bill.

Washington, on his way to Wall Street, where Congress sat, to be inaugurated as first President, on March 3, 1789, stopped at St. Paul's Episcopal Church, in Broadway, and joined in religious services held for that occasion. The Catholics of the United States delivered an address to General Washington, congratulating him and expressing their delight at his being chosen as the President of the nation he had saved.

The address of the Catholics of the United States to General Washington, on the occasion of his election as President of the United States, and the first President's answer to their address, have never been presented in the pages of this REVIEW, and we here present them to our readers :

*Address of the Catholics of the United States to General
Washington.*

“*Sir* : We have been long impatient to testify our joy and unbounded confidence in your being called, by an unanimous vote, to the first station of a country in which that unanimity could not have been attained without the previous merit of unexampled services, of eminent wisdom and unblemished virtue. Our congratulations have not reached you sooner because our scattered situation prevented our communication and the collecting of those sentiments which warmed every breast. But the delay has furnished us with the opportunity not merely of presaging the happiness to be expected under your administration, but of bearing testimony to that which we experience already. It is your peculiar talent, in war and in peace, to afford security to those who commit their protection into your hands. In war you shield them from the ravages of armed hostility; in peace you establish public tranquillity by the justice and moderation, no less than by the rigor, of your government. By example, as well as by vigilance, you extend the influence of laws on the manners of our fellow-citizens. You encourage respect for religion, and inculcate by words and actions that principle on which the welfare of nations so much depends, that a superintending Providence governs the events of the world and watches over the conduct of men. Your exalted maxims and unwearied attention to the moral and physical improvement of our country have produced already the happiest effects. Under your administration America is animated with zeal for the attainment and encouragement of useful literature. She improves her agriculture, extends her commerce, and acquires with foreign nations a dignity unknown to her before. From these happy events, from which none can feel a warmer interest than ourselves, we derive additional pleasure by recollecting that you, sir, have been the principal instrument to effect so

rapid a change in our political situation. This prospect of national prosperity is peculiarly pleasing to us on another account; because, whilst our country preserves her freedom and independence, we shall have a well-founded title to claim from her justice, the equal rights of citizenship, as the price of our blood spilt under your eyes, of our common exertions for her defence, under your auspicious conduct—rights rendered more dear to us by the remembrance of former hardships. When we pray for the preservation of them, where they have been granted—and expect the full extension of them from the justice of those States which still restrict them—when we solicit the protection of Heaven over our common country, we neither omit nor can omit recommending your preservation to the singular care of Divine Providence; because we conceive that no human means are so available to promote the welfare of the United States as the prolongation of your life and health, in which are included the energy of your example, the wisdom of your counsels, and the persuasive eloquence of your virtues.”

This admirable and patriotic address was signed, on behalf of the Catholic clergy of the United States, by the Right Rev. John Carroll, the newly-chosen bishop-elect, and, in behalf of the Catholic laity, by Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, and Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, Dominick Lynch, of New York, and Thomas Fitzsimons, of Pennsylvania. In reply to it, the Catholics of America received the following :

Address of General Washington.

“TO THE ROMAN CATHOLICS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

“*Gentlemen :* While I now receive with much satisfaction your congratulations on my being called, by an unanimous vote, to the first station in my country, I cannot but duly notice your politeness in offering an apology for the unavoidable delay. As that delay has given you an opportunity of realizing, instead of anticipating, the benefits of the general Government, you will do me the justice to believe that your testimony of the increase of the public prosperity enhances the pleasure which I should otherwise have experienced from your affectionate address.

“I feel that my conduct, in war and in peace, has met with more general approbation than could reasonably have been expected, and I find myself disposed to consider that fortunate circumstance, in a great degree, resulting from the able support and extraordinary candor of my fellow-citizens of all denominations.

“The prospect of national prosperity now before us is truly animating, and ought to excite the exertions of all good men to establish and secure the happiness of their country in the permanent duration of its freedom and independence. America, under the smiles of a Divine Providence, the protection of a good government, and the cultivation of manners, morals and piety, cannot fail of attaining an uncommon degree of eminence in literature, commerce, agriculture, improvements at home and respectability abroad.

“As mankind become more liberal, they will be more apt to allow that all those who conduct themselves as worthy members of the community are equally entitled to the protection of civil government. I hope ever to see America among the foremost nations in examples of justice and liberality. And I presume that your fellow-citizens will not forget the patriotic part which you took in the accomplishment of their Revolution and the establishment of your Government, or the important assistance which they received from a nation in which the Roman Catholic faith is professed.

“I thank you, gentlemen, for your kind concern for me. While my life and my health shall continue, in whatever situation I may be, it shall be my constant endeavor to justify the favorable sentiments which you are pleased to express of my conduct.

And may the members of your society in America, animated alone by the pure spirit of Christianity, and still conducting themselves as the faithful subjects of our free Government, enjoy every temporal and spiritual felicity.

‘ GEO. WASHINGTON.

“March 12, 1790.”

During his residence in Philadelphia as President he not unfrequently attended religious services at the old Catholic Chapel of the Jesuits, and, according to tradition, visited sociably the Jesuit Fathers in charge of it. On one occasion he carried John Adams with him to Vespers. I will not discuss the question involved in the tradition among the Jesuits of St. Joseph's Church, Philadelphia, that Washington attended a *Te Deum* celebrated there on December 3, 1781, to commemorate the victory of the American and French armies over Cornwallis at Yorktown, a tradition which has found its way into the Woodstock Papers and is countenanced by other authorities, though strenuously denied by others. The published controversy on this subject can be consulted by such persons as may desire to investigate it further. The members of the Continental Congress attended two *Te Deums* in Philadelphia, one was on July 4, 1779, in celebration of the anniversary of our Independence, and the other on November 4, 1781, in thanksgiving for the American victory at Yorktown; and two Requiem Masses, one on September 17, 1777, for General Du Coudray, a French officer, who lost his life in crossing the Delaware, and the other on May 4, 1780, for Don Juan de Mirales, the Spanish agent to the colonies. Washington also is known to have attended a Catholic burial service on April 29, 1780, over the remains of Don Juan de Mirales, at Morristown, New Jersey, where he died in Washington's army. Such was the impression these events and the alliance with Catholic France had made and such the use the British endeavored to make of them, that the Tories, disseminated the strange charge that Congress had become “Papist,” and that “the success of the American Revolutionary cause would mean the triumph of Popery.” Arnold, the traitor, even gives the alliance of the colonies with Catholic France as the cause and justification of his treason. From the early days when an American Congress went out of its way to denounce the Quebec Act and the religion of the Canadians, there was certainly a great change when we see that same body attending funeral services and *Te Deums* in a “popish chapel.” In 1785, we see Boston preparing to burn the Pope's effigy on Guy Fawkes' Day; “what a change,” Dr. Shea well exclaimed, “to see the selectmen of Boston or the magistrates of Newport following a crucifix through the streets!”

Another pleasing relation which Washington held with Cath-

olics was his acceptance of membership in the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, which was composed mostly of Catholics. This occurred on December 18, 1781, when Washington was unanimously *adopted* as a Friendly Son of St. Patrick; it was the only instance of *adoption* in the annals of the society, and we have the full official list, where the name of Washington is printed as an *adopted member*. On January 1, 1782, the society gave a special and brilliant dinner at the City Tavern, Philadelphia, in honor of Washington, and he attended, together with his staff and the most distinguished generals of the allied army of America and France, foreign ambassadors, civil officials, and all the distinguished men in Philadelphia. On March 18th following, when St. Patrick's Day was celebrated, Washington attended the regular meeting of the society. When a committee of the society presented him with the medal of the Society, on his election as an adopted member, Washington wrote to them: "I accept with singular pleasure the ensign of so worthy a fraternity as that of the Sons of St. Patrick in this city—a society distinguished for the firm adherence of its members to the glorious cause in which we are embarked." General Washington dined with his old friend, Colonel Fitzgerald, at Alexandria, in 1788, on St. Patrick's Day, and in 1798 Colonel Fitzgerald dined at the Spring Garden, Alexandria, on July 12th, with General Washington.

The next incident I will mention is the interchange of visits between Georgetown College and the Sage of Mount Vernon. On July 10, 1798, the President of Georgetown College, Rev. Richard V. Dubourg, afterwards bishop of New Orleans, and a professor and two of the students, Garrett Barry and John Law, with whose parents Washington was acquainted, paid a visit to the retired chief at Mount Vernon, and were his guests for a day and a night. Washington recorded the event in his diary. Among the students of Georgetown College were two Washingtons, Augustin and Bushrod, sons of Judge Bushrod Washington, grandsons of John Augustin Washington, brother of the general's father and grand-nephews of the general. The visit of the president of the college was returned by General Washington by appointment, and preparations were made at the college to receive him, but the time of his coming was not known. The original college building, which is still standing, was surrounded by a paling fence, which had been newly whitewashed. The general came unannounced and unattended in true republican style, riding his favorite horse, which, on dismounting, he tied to the white fence. He was received by Professor Rev. William Matthews, whom we knew well, for he was afterwards for over fifty years pastor of St. Patrick's Church, in Washington, where we worshipped.

I often visited and dined with this venerable priest and friend of my youth, who had known Washington, and often heard him relate such historical events, including the visit of Washington to Georgetown College. Washington is described as "alighting with grace and ease; he entered the humble enclosure with a benevolent serenity of countenance, and the placid look of confidence, for a cordial reception." Robert Walsh, of Philadelphia, a student, delivered a poetical address to the chief. We remember reading it; it was a fine literary production, full of ardent patriotism; we are sure the equanimity of Washington was not disturbed by the youthful poet's composing an epitaph for the general. From that day visits of presidents of the United States to Georgetown College have become traditional; for every president, since Washington visited the college, and many, if not all of them, have conferred the academic honors on the students. Near the same spot where Washington stood I have myself received the college honors from the hands of his successors.

We can now recall, with edification, that venerable priest, Father Matthews, the same that welcomed Washington to Georgetown College, reading every Sunday, at High Mass, that beautiful prayer which Archbishop Carroll composed a hundred years ago, invoking Heaven's blessings on the President, the Congress, and civil officers of the national and State governments, and on our country—a prayer then in general use on Sundays in this country, and which is still recited in the Baltimore Cathedral, whose corner-stone was laid by Archbishop Carroll, and in some other churches—a prayer which Cardinal Gibbons, in his recent article in the "North American Review" on Patriotism and Politics, pronounced "a masterpiece of liturgical literature." We should rejoice to see this noble prayer again recited in our churches. It is a model of Christian charity, devotion and patriotism.

Not only did Washington occasionally attend divine service at the Catholic chapel in Philadelphia, he was also a liberal contributor to the erection of the church of St. Augustine, in Philadelphia, whose corner-stone was laid by the Augustian Father, Matthew Carr. So industriously have all sources of information concerning Washington's relations with Catholics been searched, that we know that the first president and his family, at Philadelphia, were indebted to a Catholic for the music of the presidential mansion, for the president bought his piano from worthy Mr. Taws, a Catholic dealer in musical instruments. We think we have seen this attenuated and old-fashioned piano in one of the national museums in Washington. It presents a sorry appearance beside the modern Chickering or Steinway.

There are certain vague traditions, not yet traced to sources of

historical reliability, that Washington had always hanging in his bed-room, while president at Philadelphia, a full-length picture of the Blessed Virgin, the Immaculate Conception; and that when Rev. Dr. Maréchal, afterwards Archbishop of Baltimore, visited the general, and expressed a pleasant surprise at seeing the picture, the general answered: "How can I know the Son without honoring the Mother?" Another tradition, which we barely mention in passing, relates, that an old servant of the general, named Juba, used to relate and imitate the signs, how Washington at his meals made on himself the sign of the cross. There is still another tradition, that Washington sent over to Maryland in his last illness for a Catholic priest, and that the Jesuit Father, Francis Neale, a relative and connection of our own family, spent four hours with the expiring chief. It has been reported, too, that he had abjured Masonry. For these reasons, the question, "Was Washington a Catholic?" has been gravely discussed in some Catholic journals.

I have read and considered all that has been collected on this curious subject. I cannot find any sufficient, or even slight, evidence tending to prove that Washington ever became a Catholic. Washington was certainly catholic, as Mr. Lossing expressed it, though he never became a Catholic. One of the arguments used to prove that Washington received the light of the Catholic Faith was because he deserved this grace of his great natural virtues and good deeds. This question is not for man to determine. It rests only with God. It is not for us to know, though we may indulge in affectionate and grateful hopes, what graces and lights from Heaven beamed into his soul when he was about to go to his great reward.

The religious sentiments which he so often and so fervently expressed, and which I quoted in an article in the April number of this REVIEW, and the following passage from Washington's Farewell Address, go far to support this grateful view. I now quote from the Farewell Address:

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation *desert* the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure—reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

"'Tis substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundations of the fabric?"

From his religious character, and from his exemplary virtues, his numerous writings in advocacy of religion, morality and virtue, his aspirations after virtue and truth, may we not indulge the hope that, though Washington at his death did not belong to the body of the Catholic, he may have belonged to the soul of the Church, and that had he lived longer, and but for his untimely death, he would have joined the Church. I have heard Catholic divines express this view, and such seems to have been the view of Archbishop Carroll, who knew him well and long. This is inferrible from the eulogies he pronounced on Washington's exalted virtues in that noble funeral oration he pronounced on the death of Washington, and still more from the circular which he issued immediately thereafter, on December 29, 1799, directing the Catholic pastors of the whole United States, for such was his diocese, to hold services in their respective churches on February 22, 1800, in commemoration of Washington, and to pronounce eulogies on his life and virtues. In this circular he seems clearly to throw out the view, as St. Ambrose did in his funeral oration on the good and noble young Roman Emperor, Valentinian, that had he lived he would have joined the Catholic Church. Archbishop Carroll compares Washington to that just and virtuous ruler, "who," he says, as St. Ambrose said of Valentinian, "was deprived of life before his initiation into our Church."

Leaving this question in the hands of his Eternal Judge and our own, we, as true Americans, clinging to our country and its Constitution forever, accept from our fathers, with gratitude and love the inheritance of the services, the achievements and the virtues of our greatest, best and dearest Washington!

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Book Notices.

STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY. By *Rev. Reuben Parsons, D.D.* Vol. III. combines XV. and XVI. Royal 8vo., pp. 603. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co.

When, a few years ago, the first volume of Dr. Parson's work came from the press, it was warmly welcomed by all honest readers of history, because it gave to them what was badly needed, a work in the English language treating exhaustively and nearly exclusively of controverted points. Until that time no such work existed. The English reading student had an abundance of church history manuals, of various shapes and sizes, and of different degrees of merit, but no manual of general church history can satisfy the earnest student on the great controverted questions. A manual that attempted to do so would soon grow too big for its purpose. Satisfactory treatment of such subjects must be looked for by the general reader in a work like this, and, therefore, its first appearance was an important event for historical students. Nor were they slow to appreciate it, for already a second edition of the first volume has been issued.

Those who read the book when it first came from the press acknowledged that Dr. Parsons had done the first part of his work well. In the selection of subjects, in the statement of questions, in the selection and quotation of authorities, and, most of all, in summing up, he showed himself to be a scholar, a historian, and a philosopher. This did not surprise those who knew the reverend author, because he had already established his reputation by historical contributions to Catholic magazines, and by his book entitled "*Some Errors and Lies of History.*" In his new work, however, the field was so much broadened that the qualifications of the historian were displayed to much better advantage.

The first volume was very interesting, for it contained the history of all the great controverted questions of the first eight centuries. The second volume followed promptly, bringing the work down to the close of the fourteenth century. It was evident at once that the author was working fully up to the high standard which he had set for himself in the beginning, and that he was in every way admirably fitted for such a work.

If any lingering doubt remained in the minds of anyone as to the ultimate success of the work as a whole, it must be entirely dispelled by the appearance of the third volume.

Although in every age of the church questions have arisen which have furnished ground for controversy, the period embraced in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries may not inaptly be called the controversial age. A larger book is required to clear away the clouds of ignorance, error, falsehood, and misrepresentation that darken the events of these two centuries, than was required to clear the sky of the first eight centuries or of the six succeeding ones. He who tries at any time to separate truth from falsehood in connection with a fact of history hundreds of years after it has transpired, must bring to the work many qualifications, without which he will only add to the general confusion; but he who undertakes to separate truth from falsehood in regard to the great controverted points of church history during the

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, must possess the qualifications of the good historian in a supereminent degree. A glance at the names of leading persons and events in the third volume of Dr. Parson's history will convince any one of the truth of this assertion.

The fifteenth century had not completed its first decade when the Bohemian heresiarch, John Huss, appeared upon the scene. In 1409 he was rector of the University of Prague, and had become distinguished for eloquence, subtlety, and love of novelty, when the works of Wycliffe attracted his attention. He soon became tainted with the false teachings of the English innovator, and when Pope Alexander V. forbade the preachers of Bohemia to mention these doctrines, Huss refused to obey, and openly defended them. He was excommunicated in 1411. In 1415 the Council of Constance, after carefully examining his writings, summed up his false teachings in thirty articles, and said of them, "Many were erroneous, some scandalous, some offensive to pious ears, some rash and seditious, others notoriously heretical, and already condemned by the holy fathers and General Councils." As to the person of Huss, the Council declared him a heretic, degraded him from his priestly dignity, delivered him to the secular judgment, and by that power he was burned at the stake.

He was not a Protestant in the modern sense, because to the end he believed in transubstantiation, the necessity of confession, the seven sacraments, the existence of purgatory and the duty of prayers for the dead, and the veneration of the saints. Surely there is no room for such a man in the ranks of modern Protestantism, nor can it increase its antiquity by placing his name on its calendar of saints.

What a transition from John Huss to Joan of Arc! In the very year in which he was excommunicated she was born in the little village of Domremy, on the confines of Champagne, Burgundy, and Lorraine. She was only a peasant child who, until her womanhood, could not handle a sword or mount a horse, and yet were it not for her, England's sovereign would probably be wearing to-day the crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Ireland and France. At the age of thirteen she began to have visions of angels and saints who delivered to her messages from God. When she was eighteen years old she went to Charles VII. and told him that she had been appointed by Divine Providence to deliver him and his kingdom from the English. She knew the king when she first met him, although he was disguised in the midst of his courtiers. She dressed as a soldier, and, armed with a sword which was found buried in some old ruins, as she had foretold, she raised the siege of Orleans, riding at the head of the French forces, and bearing aloft her white banner covered with lilies. After leading the French troops victoriously through several other battles, she fell into the hands of the English, who after falsely accusing her, and inducing her by trickery to sign confessions which she had never made, burned her to death. On May 30, 1431, the Maid of Orleans died with these words upon her lips: "Jesus! Jesus! Jesus!" At the commencement of this century more than four hundred works had treated of her career. Some of these have aimed at her canonization, others have claimed for her the pedestal of a national heroine, while a few have held her up to ridicule. "But France awaits with confidence the moment when her sons will use, with propriety, the words which the ascendancy of truth compelled Shakespeare to put on the lips of Charles VII.: 'Joan la Pucelle shall be France's saint.'"

On the first day of the year 1431, which was to witness the close of the eventful life of the great heroine of history, Joan of Arc, a man-child opened his eyes for the first time at Xativa, in the diocese of Valencia, in Spain, who was to play an important part on the stage of the world. Roderick Llancol was the nephew of Alfonso Borgia, who in 1455, was elevated to the Papacy under the name of Calixtus III. From that time the Llancol family assumed the names and arms of the Borgias, by which they are known in history.

Young Roderick was noted for his talent. He studied for the bar, he entered the army, and finally was called by his uncle to Rome, where he was made successively commendatory archbishop of Valencia, cardinal-deacon and vice-chancellor of the Roman Church. At that time his conduct was exemplary and his ability unquestioned. In 1492, after five days of deliberation, twenty-three cardinals in conclave selected Roderick Borgia to succeed Innocent VIII., deceased, under the title of Alexander VI.

"It is an almost general opinion that Pope Alexander VI. had neither the virtues which befit the Supreme Pontificate of Christendom, nor those of any ordinary man. His name is seldom mentioned without thoughts of simony, treachery, lust, avarice and sacrilege. Other memories, long condemned and even accursed, have been rehabilitated; but that of Alexander VI. remains, as yet, foul and detestable to a large number of Christians. Are we, therefore, to take for granted all that has been alleged against this Pontiff? Even Roscoe, the Protestant historian of Leo X., contends that, whatever have been his crimes, there can be no doubt but that they have been highly overcharged. . . . The vices of Alexander were accompanied, although not compensated, by many great qualities which, in the consideration of his character, ought not to be passed over in silence."

The student of history must remember, that most of the information which blackens the character of Alexander VI. is attributed to Burkhard, master of ceremonies at the Papal Court, who was not in a position to get the information which is attributed to him. Moreover, it is not at all certain that we possess the authentic work of Burkhard. The charge that his election was simoniacal rests on weak grounds, while the assertion that he tried to poison several cardinals, and was himself poisoned, has no foundation in fact. Even Voltaire is very firm in attributing Alexander's death to natural causes. The fact is that the Pope was attacked on August 10, 1503, with the tertian fever prevalent in Rome at that time, and he died on the night of August 18th. On the broad general principle of justice that a man should be considered innocent until his guilt is proved, Alexander VI. was not guilty of the horrible crimes that were laid at his door while he occupied the Papal throne.

One of the most striking figures of the reign of Alexander VI. was the Dominican monk Savonarola. Born at Ferrara in 1452, and strangled to death by the civil authorities at Florence on May 23, 1498, his life was most eventful. He was ordained priest in 1482, and his first sermon was so badly preached that when it was finished only twenty persons remained in the church. He then devoted himself to Biblical studies for several years until in 1489 he was appointed professor of Scripture to the young religious of the Convent of St. Mark in Florence. He soon appeared in the pulpit again, and began to denounce, by divine command he claimed, the vices of voluptuous

Florence. He did not confine his efforts to the reformation of the State, but from the very beginning proclaimed the necessity of purifying the sanctuary. He was particularly severe on Alexander VI., and his auditors soon divided themselves into two factions. His followers were called "friarites" or "weepers," while those who were opposed to his vehement denunciations of church and State because they feared that evil would follow from them, were called *tepidi* or "lukewarm." At this time the "worst accusation against Savonarola was that of being more of a tribune and demagogue than of an ecclesiastic and a friar. The charge of heresy made against him was unfounded. As for his political notions, he was a thorough republican, and carried his principles to their utmost logical conclusion. He was a firm advocate of universal suffrage." For a time he was lord and governor of Florence, but he soon came in conflict with his ecclesiastical superiors, the people began to mistrust him, and his influence waned.

The Pope forbade him to preach, but, after a short submission, he rebelled against this prohibition and ascended the pulpit. When a sentence of excommunication was pronounced against him, he denied that the Pope could exercise such a power.

The end came in a very peculiar manner. One day a Franciscan friar, named Francis of Puglia, while preaching in the Church of Santa Croce, declared that Savonarola was an imposter, and challenged him to the "ordeal by fire." A follower of Savonarola, named Dominic, took up the challenge, and the civil magistrates appointed a lay-brother to meet him in the place of the Franciscan challenger. Certain propositions were made by Dominic, and their truth or falsity was to be decided by this curious method. The propositions were: "The Church needs reformation; she will be chastised; she will be renovated; Florence will be punished, but she will afterwards prosper; the infidels will be converted; all these things will soon happen; the excommunication of Savonarola is null."

The preparations were quickly made; the platform was erected; the necessary attendants and officers were appointed; and on April 7, 1498, the participants, with their friends, appeared in the Square of the Magistrates, now known as the Square of the Grand Duke. An immense multitude was present, and even the housetops were crowded. When the time arrived for the Dominican to step upon the platform, where the flames would soon leap about him, Savonarola handed to him a pyx containing the Holy Eucharist. The crowd saw the action, and objected because they believed that the flames would respect the Blessed Sacrament; but Savonarola persisted, and finally the ordeal was abandoned.

There is not much more to tell. Savonarola was seized by the civil authorities, tried and convicted of schism, heresy, persecution of the Church and seduction of the people. On May 23, 1498, he and two companions were strangled to death and their bodies were burned. It is a sad page of history.

Christophe, in his "History of the Papacy in the Fifteenth Century," says: "Some make a fanatic, a sectarian, an imposter, of Savonarola. The fact is, there is something of all these in the Dominican. If we open the door of his cell in St. Mark's, and there contemplate him at the foot of the crucifix, attenuated by fasting and flooded in an ecstasy of prayer; if we follow him to Santa Maria del Fiore and hear him reproaching voluptuous Florence with her vices, Savonarola is a saint, an apostle. But if we turn to the other side, and behold the tribune who

mixes politics with religion, the declaimer who inveighs against the existing powers, the seer who opposes a divine mission to the authority of the head of the Church, Savonarola is very like a fanatic, a sectarian, an imposter."

Luther and other Protestants have claimed Savonarola as the precursor of the "Reformation," but his works were declared orthodox by the proper authorities after some alterations in some of his sermons, and it is a remarkable fact that not one of his followers became a disciple of Luther or a betrayer of his country's liberty.

Cantu, in his work entitled "*Heretics of Italy*," speaks thus of the Dominican friar: "The fame of Savonarola remained suspended between heaven and hell, but his end was deplored by all, and perhaps first by those who caused it. In the churches of Santa Maria Novella and San Marco he is depicted as a saint, and Raphael placed him in the *Loggie* of the Vatican, among the Doctors of the Church. . . . It is said that Clement VIII. swore, in 1598, that if he succeeded in acquiring possession of Ferrara, he would canonize Savonarola. . . . Saints Philip Neri and Catharine de Ricci venerated him as blessed, and Benedict XIV. deemed him worthy of canonization."

It is a sad page of history.

We have glanced at a few of the interesting chapters of this book that the reader may have some understanding of its importance. What remains is not less interesting and important. Here is the history of "The Commencement of Protestantism," "Martin Luther," "Erasmus," "Leo X.," "The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day," "The Divorce of Henry VIII.," "Anglican Orders," "The Council of Trent," "Giordano Bruno," and many other well-known but not rightly-understood subjects. Indeed, this is a valuable book.

J. P. T.

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY; THE TRUTH OF THOUGHT OR MATERIAL LOGIC. A Short Treatise on the Initial Philosophy the Groundwork Necessary for the Consistent Pursuit of Knowledge. By *William Poland, S. J.* Pp. 208. New York, Boston and Chicago: Silver, Burdett & Co. 1896.

Father Poland, professor of philosophy in St. Louis University, has already given students of philosophy two sections of what he evidently contemplates constructing—a complete system of fundamental science. These two parts are especially designed as class-books, and in this relation, as well as in a wider sphere, have done good service in the cause of truth. We doubt whether there exist any better manuals of logic and ethics for the use of classes in colleges and convents than those by Father Poland. The Stonyhurst series are excellent in their order, but they appeal to the general reader and to the student who has already completed a course of philosophy. They are highly serviceable as collateral reading for students of philosophy, but are not intended nor adapted for text-books. One takes up, therefore, the present section of the author's rational philosophy anticipating the pleasure and the profit that came to the reader of the two preceding parts. Nor are we disappointed. Excellent as was the beginning of the work, the sequel is still better. This is doubtless largely due to the special subject-matter here discussed. Apart from ethics, which has a practical interest all its own, material logic has a winsomeness invincible for the speculative mind. We here leave aside the form, the shell of thought, and probe into its inmost heart and kernel, and that not on its subjective side as psychic movement, but as to its objective content. The question is as

to the meaning of thought as constituting knowledge. "Is there, indeed, such a thing as knowledge? Can we really rely upon thought as being at any time knowledge in the strict sense—that is, as having an objective value, as being representative of something which is or was or may be independently of the thought which we possess? Can we possess knowledge in such a way as to rest secure that the content of the thought has an object, a corresponding something which is not the thought itself? In other words, can we have certitude? If so, what is the basis of this certitude? What is the last reason we can give that the thought is indeed a knowledge-thought, that its content answers, as representative, in the way of thought to something which is not the thought? What, in other words, is the criterion of knowledge of logical truth?" (p. 14).

Questions such as these were not put at all by the scholastic philosophers, or if put it was but now and again, obiter, here and there. "They did not think it any more necessary to write special treatises on the fact of knowledge and the reality of the object of thought than upon the fact of hunger appeased by a real object called food" (p. 16). Nevertheless, though material logic as a criticism of thought is largely the outcome of modern scepticism, the result has been, on the whole, to the advantage of sound philosophy, necessitating as it has a more thorough search into the process and range of knowledge, and so making us better acquainted with the nature, value, limitations of our cognitive acts and the methods of building systems of scientific truth.

But aside from the attractiveness of this search for "the ultimate reasons of knowing" and the importance of the result from the point of view, both of mental discipline and of positive information, the author's mode of presenting his subject gives a peculiar charm to his work. The matter comprised within its covers is little else than what the student is wont to find in Latin manuals of Catholic philosophy; but the way in which it is all set before the mind is uniquely bright and fresh. The author has the rare gift of presenting old truths in new light, of fitting out the abstract with image and illustration that cause it to live in the consciousness, in a word, of making logic almost easy—easy not by mutilating its content, but by giving it the readiest ingress to the intellect. In this respect, while the work appeals to the lay academic student and the average seeker for liberal mental culture, it will prove of good service in filling in the tissue of knowledge gleaned by the clerical student in our seminaries from the Latin text-book and lecture. F. P. S.

CATHOLIC SUMMER AND WINTER SCHOOL LIBRARY: SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. By *Rev. J. A. Zahm, Ph.D., C.S.C.*
 PREHISTORIC AMERICANS. By the *Marquis de Nadaillac*.
 SUMMER SCHOOL ESSAYS. Vol. I.-II. Chicago: D. C. McBride & Co. 1896.
 Pr. 50c. each.

The managers of the Columbian Catholic Summer School have undertaken the laudable project of publishing in a series of handy volumes the lectures delivered at its opening session last year at Madison, Wisconsin. Both they and the publishers deserve the congratulations of all lovers of good books—books excellent as to matter and to form. The series of booklets thus far issued opens with the lectures delivered by Dr. Zahm before the Summer Schools at Madison and Plattsburg and the Winter School at New Orleans. These lectures are here presented as originally delivered, together with a well-written preface containing a reply to those who had animadverted, somewhat severely it seems, on the views regarding evolution defended by the lecturer before the Summer Schools.

The second volume contains the papers prepared by the Marquis de Nadaillac and translated and read at Madison. The writer is one of the most prominent European anthropologists, and probably no other living scholar is better entitled to tell what is known of the story of "The Mound Builders" and "The Cliff Dwellers" of the archaic age in our country, his great work on "Prehistoric America" having won for him an international reputation among anthropologists.

The third volume opens with a paper on "Buddhism and Christianity," by Mgr. D'Harlez, than whom there are few if any who speak with graver authority on the religion of Gautama. The same manual contains an essay by Dr. T. P. Hart on "Christian Science and Faith Cure." "The Growth of Reading Circles" is described by Rev. T. McMillan, C.S.P., and "Reading Circle Work" is discussed by Rev. R. Fuhr, O.S.F. Miss Katharine Conway's paper on "Catholic Literary Societies," though brief, is worthy of its theme. The volume fittingly closes with an essay on "Historical Criticism," by the illustrious Bollandist, Rev. P. C. DeSmidt, S.J.

The fourth volume contains a paper by Rev. P. F. Nugent on the "Spanish Inquisition;" on "Savonarola," by Mr. Condé B. Pallen, Ph.D.; on "Joan of Arc," by Mr. J. W. Wilstach; on "Magna Charta," by Prof. J. G. Ewing, and on the "Missionary Explorers of the Northwest," by Judge W. L. Kelly.

A fifth volume, announced as in preparation, will embrace seven other essays on timely topics, by writers of established authority.

The foregoing outline of the contents of the present Summer and Winter School Library will give some idea of the work done at the institutions in which the essays were given as lectures. Bearing in mind the fact that the library sums up the work of but one session, and that the very first, one cannot fail to recognize that these institutions are deserving of highest praise and encouragement. Whilst, however, it is of some profit that the best thought of European scholars should be placed within the reach of our people, papers produced abroad and translated and read here by substitutes for the writers, only very imperfectly realize the intellectual aim of a summer school.

One of the most pronounced palpable advantages of such institutions is, that they bring inquiring minds into personal contact with lecturers who present *vivâ voce* the results of their matured thought and labor and who being full of their subjects are in a condition to give of their abundance and to solve the questions of their hearers.

We trust that the managers of the Summer School will continue the work so happily begun and publish the lectures of each future session of their institution. The project goes far to create the kind of literature needed and demanded by Catholics in this country.

Probably the work would serve its end still more efficiently if the bibliographical feature were more pronounced.

Without encumbering and disfiguring the pages with foot-notes, each essay would add to its power for good if its author appended a brief list of works in which it would be profitable for readers to seek for further information.

The dress that has been selected for these manuals is of the prettiest and most becoming. They are the daintiest of booklets. Convenient in size, neat in binding, excellent in paper, with large, clear letter-press, they are ideal books, especially for summer—books such as a lover of the beautiful in this line delights to take up and fondle—books to read now and again at spare moments, to put into one's pocket for his trolley ride into town of mornings, or into his grip for his summer holiday, or

to carry about with him on his stroll into the country. Let us have more of them.

SYNOPSIS THEOLOGICÆ DOGMATICÆ FUNDAMENTALIS AD MENTEM S. THOMÆ AQ., hodiernis moribus accomodata. Pp. viii., 688. Tornaçi (Belg.) Desclee, Neoboraci: Benziger Bros.

Amongst the number of serviceable books of divinity studies recently published the present work by Father Tanquary, professor in St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, deserves a prominent place. The first two volumes of his work have been noticed in a former number of this REVIEW. The present, the third, though in logical order the first, brings the work to completion. Its subject-matter, fundamental theology, is, if there be degrees of importance in a science all of whose parts seem to be superlatively important, the most vital portion of the science of dogmatic truth, the very web of the entire system of theology, comprising, as it does, the questions regarding the true religion, the constitution of the Church and the sources of theological argument. Eminently important at all times in the scientific structure of theology, these subjects have in our day taken on an independent pre-eminence of their own, constituting as they do the matter of the special science of apologetics. They call, therefore, strongly for thorough, all-around treatment. The old truths of faith, and their theological inferences, must be adjusted again and again to the varying phases of the new learning and to the hydra-headed forms of error. This is particularly true of the opening questions of the work before us—those namely that concern the supernatural religion, the divinity of Christianity and the divine origin of the Church. Never, probably, before has the subject of Christian evidence been so thoroughly investigated as it is to-day. The wonders of physical science, though making nothing against the fact and the discernibility of true miracles, present new facts and demand new focusing of the light from the old principles. The higher criticism, far from weakening, rather strengthens the traditional arguments for the genuinity and integrity of the inspired record. But it calls for a broader and a deeper knowledge of the sacred text, of the circumstances under which it was written and the development of its history on the part of the Catholic theologian.

The study, too, of the nature and divine origin of Christianity necessitates some closer acquaintance with so-called cognate religions, especially of those mystic cults of the far-east which have of late obtained some strange power over the minds of those who have forsworn their allegiance to Christianity. A work, therefore, on Christian evidences must have at least two well-marked features to be of service to the Catholic student. First, it must present distinctly and thoroughly the arguments from reason and revelation for the divine origin of Christianity and of that organism in which it is fully preserved—the Catholic Church. Secondly, it must present these arguments in their bearing on the present status of scientific and historical research. These two characteristics are well pronounced in Father Tanquary's theology. His aim in this, as in the preceding volumes, has been to so form the mind of the young cleric that it may grasp the systematized aggregate of dogmatic truths in its relation to the mental environment of the times. This aim can, of course, be but imperfectly realized by a text-book, even when supplemented by the lectures of the professor. The student can only by his own reading and thought, and after experience, grasp the true inwardness, and we might say the outwardness of theology.

To this end he must be acquainted, not alone with the writings of the older theology, though a *thorough* knowledge of St. Thomas would leave little necessarily to be added, but with the best productions of the modern mind in that and related sciences. And it is in this line that Father Tanquary's present volume is particularly useful. He presents the truths and arguments of theology clearly and succinctly, but around it all he has gathered a wealth of literary citation and references, by the aid of which the student sees the truths under various lights and with the eyes and from the points of view of many a friend and foe.

With such a timely, well-ordered, handsomely printed text-book within easy reach, it were a shame, and something like an injustice, that any dry-as-dust, ill-printed, badly-congested compilation as had once to do service for lack of something better should still survive in any of our institutions of theology to clog and stunt the mind of young men eager to assimilate and utilize the saving truths of the Church's theology.

EVOLUTION AND DOGMA. By *Rev. J. A. Zahm, Ph.D., C.S.C.* Chicago: McBride & Co. 1896. Pp. xxx., 461.

A little, and Dr. Zahm would persuade us to become evolutionists. He pleads strongly, even eloquently at times, for the theory of transformism. It was doubtless the strength and eloquence of this pleading that drew upon it some criticism when it was made from the lecture platform last summer at Madison and Plattsburgh. His critics would probably have preferred that he had presented his views through the present bookish medium, rather than from the lecture hall of the Summer Schools. Not that they regarded it as inexpedient "to discuss Evolution before the audiences that gather at such institutions." It is, of course, as Dr. Zahm remarks, quoting Bishop Messmer, the president of the Columbian Summer School, "simply silly to maintain that such questions [as that of Evolution] are the exclusive prerogative of the secret circles of specialists and savants, since they are, day after day, brought before the general public by all manner of press products—newspapers, monthlies, books, and brochures—and are reasoned about by the masses." The *piece de resistance*, however, seized on by those who censured Dr. Zahm's lectures, seems to have been, not the discussion of Evolution, but his making the young institutions at Madison and Plattsburgh the media of certain "advanced" views, as he there advocated.

The subject of evolution has been sifted and re-sifted on every side by the most eminent Catholic savants, philosophers, and theologians of the present and past generations; and while all recognize the plausibility of a number of analogies whereon the theory of transformism is based, all, with rare exceptions, refuse to assume its advocacy, even when the theory is restricted to the sublunar orders of animated nature. But when the doctrine is extended to the genesis of Adam's body, the number of Catholic thinkers who can see their way to adopting such a view is exceedingly small. In view of this attitude of Catholic science, it seemed, to those who differ from Dr. Zahn's opinion, hardly opportune that the infant summer schools should put forth a plea for evolution of so latitudinarian a character.

Be all this as it may, none will find fault with the author of this volume in using the liberty not denied him by Catholic dogmatic definition of expressing his opinion regarding this popular subject. On the contrary, they will accord the work the high measure of praise it deserves, for there are apparent in its every page proofs of wide reading, patient research, careful sifting of arguments, and, especially, marked

candor and fairness to his opponents. One rarely finds the objections against evolution so fully and forcibly expressed as they are in this book. Indeed, the counter-difficulties seem stronger than the positive argument.

Those of our readers who are familiar with the large Catholic literature on this subject in the various European languages, will find nothing new in Dr. Zahm's book, but they will find brought here compactly together a mass of information clearly and attractively set forth, which they could glean elsewhere only by much and long labor. Those, on the other hand, who have not access to such foreign literature, will meet with no other work in English by a Catholic scholar, covering the same ground, and covering it so ably and fully; none that safeguards so completely the limits of reason and faith, the dignity of man, and the attributes of God.

May it be fair, in conclusion, to remark that Aristotle does not figure, as the author tells us, in the works of St. Thomas as the "magister, the master." This title was reserved for the Lombard. The Stagyrte was reverentially styled "philosophus, the philosopher." A mere bagatelle, a *lapsus pennæ*, which, however, should have been erased by one so familiar as is Dr. Zahm with the writings of the angelic doctor. F. P. S.

DISPUTATIONES THEOLOGICÆ SEU COMMENTARIA IN SUMMAM THEOL. D. THOMÆ, V. I., De Deo Uno Trino, 1895. V. II., De Creatione, 1893. Quebec: Demers Frates.

There are those who have small regard for the manner in which that grandest of sciences, dogmatic theology, is taught in some of the highest European institutions of divinity. They claim that too little appreciable advantage comes from a learned professor's soaring in the empyrean of speculative theology before a class of young men whose native powers and acquired strength are unable to lift them in so high a flight. They plead for the bringing of sacred knowledge into closer touch with the questions that agitate the human mind of to-day—a fuller, deeper, sifting of the problems raised by physical science, philosophy, and history—and the leaving of the recondite and soaringly speculative subjects to the taste and leisure of individuals. This, it may be, is taking too utilitarian a view of an eminently contemplative branch of knowledge, and gives insufficient credit to the influence of such knowledge in deepening not only the intellectual but the whole spiritual side of the student. Whatever may be said for or against the opinion that advocates the so-called "practical" view of theology, much is gained for the claimants of its deeper speculative side, when the professors of that side can be shown to have sent forth from their classes minds sufficiently familiar with theology in itself and its bearings to produce a work like the one before us. Dr. Paquet declares it his glory to have sat at the feet of Cardinal Satolli in the days when His Eminence expounded St. Thomas in the Urban College at Rome—*quemque ex cathedra Urbani Collegii de Propaganda fide mira eloquentia docentem ac disputantem nos per tres annos audissemus perpetuo gloriabimur [et qui] potentia ingenii, eruditionis laude, maxime autem notitia plenire ferventique amore doctrinarum adeo excelluit ut per eum gloriosiores scientiæ scholasticæ dies reflorescere quodammodo videantur*" (p. 7).

It is no small testimony to the worth of the master to have formed so apt a pupil, and to have indirectly caused the present work. *Causa causæ est causa causati.*

Dr. Paquet soars a middle flight. Taking the "Summa" of St. Thomas for his basis, he rather seeks to present the genuine thought of the angelic

doctor than to expand it by much profound speculation of his own. Whilst having an eye to the theories of modern science, especially in the volume on Creation, his aim has been rather to inform the minds of his pupils with the theological habit, and so to endow them with power to meet the adversary than to engross them over much with opposing tactics. Though he calls his work "*Commentaria*," it is not a comment on the text of the *Summa* "*à la Cajetano*," He has taken the thought and largely the phrasing of St. Thomas, and cast it in the accepted modern mould—retaining the "questions" and "articles" under the "disputations," but arranging the "articles" after the familiar plan of contemporary Catholic theology.

The work is, therefore, a modification of the "*Summa*" accommodated to the needs of the modern student.

The present volumes furnish about one-third of the prospective work. Four more are promised to complete the entire course of theology.

CONSCIENCE AND LAW, OR PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN CONDUCT. By *William Humphrey, S. J.* London: Thomas Baker. New York: Benziger Bros. 1896. Pp. xiii., 226. Price, \$1.60.

Those of our readers who are fairly well acquainted with the moral philosophy and theology taught in our Catholic seminaries and universities will find this work covering familiar ground and on quite familiar lines. The first chapter, on human responsibility, deals with the nature and principles of human acts; the second, with moral conscience; the third, with the nature and kinds of law; the fourth, with dispensations and privileges; the fifth, with the notions of justice and right; the sixth, and last, with the subject of restitution.

The first five of these chapters are reprinted in revised form from the *Month*, the sixth has been added to give a certain completeness to the matter.

The details of these subjects are wrought out with great terseness and precision, the phrasing of definition and distinction being almost as rigid as one finds it in scholastic Latin. We do not know of any other book of its species by a Catholic writer in English. It will, therefore, be found particularly well adapted for the use of students of law who are not sufficiently at home in scholastic Latinity to be able to avail themselves of the treasures of legal knowledge systematized in the writings of the theologians and canonists of the Church. At the same time students of theology themselves may derive advantage from the presentation in a neat-fitting English dress of ideas with which they have become acquainted only in the antique garb of Latin.

The book, whose subject matter is not overpoweringly attractive, has been made to win for itself at least a reading—perhaps even a studying; nothing else will profit here—by its material make-up. Paper, letterpress and arrangement of matter are what they should be in works of this kind.

LIFE OF REVEREND MOTHER MARY OF ST. EUPHRASIA PELLETIER. First Superior-General of the Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd of Angers. By *A. M. Clarke*. 12mo. Pp. 410. London: Burns & Oates, New York: Benziger Brothers.

Rose Pelletier was born on July 31, 1796, on the island of Noirmoutiers. In 1834 she became the first Superior-General of the Order of Our Lady of Charity, which had been instituted some time before by the venerable servant of God, John Eudes, who was one of the most

distinguished priests among the French clergy during the first and middle parts of the seventeenth century. She governed the order successfully until her death, on the 24th of April, 1868. As Cardinal Vaughan very well says, in a preface to this work: "God is often pleased to bestow upon the first superiors of religious orders that are destined to fill the Church with the perfume of their virtues, and to enrich it by the conversion of innumerable souls, signal and extraordinary graces. It is as though the efficacy and healing of the leaves were to be found in greater abundance in the root of the tree which He has planted. So it would seem to be in the present instance. The Order of the Good Shepherd, instituted for reclaiming sinners, was founded by the venerable John Eudes, whose beatification is in hand, and its first superior-general was a woman who died in our own time in the odor of sanctity, and whose process was actually commenced in 1887, within twenty-one years after her death."

The life of such a servant of God cannot be written too soon. It is the history of the Order of the Good Shepherd which she governed so well for so many years. It will encourage her children of the Good Shepherd to fidelity and perseverance. It will furnish all religious with a good model, and it will edify all good Christians.

If those who have charge of the education and direction of young women would put into their hands such books as this we should not be shocked so frequently at the sight of women devoting their lives to pursuits for which they are not fitted, while they neglect those works for which heaven has destined them.

In the work before us the biographer, Miss A. M. Clarke, has done her work well, and the publishers have done their duty by furnishing good type and paper.

RETREATS GIVEN BY FATHER DIGNAM OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS, with Letters and Notes of Spiritual Direction, and of Conferences and Sermons, with a Preface. By *Father Gretton, S.J.* 12 mo., pp. 409. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Benziger Brothers.

From a memoir of Augustus Dignam, published in the beginning of this year, we learn the following facts of his life:

He was born in 1833, and was educated as a day scholar in the City of London School. In 1857 he entered the Jesuit novitiate, at Beaumont, and was ordained priest in 1867. He was afflicted with constant ill-health, but this did not prevent him from entering upon the active work of the ministry. He was continually occupied with the exercises of St. Ignatius, and became unusually successful in conducting retreats, and in moving sinners to penance. The later years of his life were devoted especially to the "Apostleship of Prayer," and the "Messenger of the Sacred Heart." He was the Central Director until a short time before his death, when sickness forced him to resign the work to others.

His devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus was extraordinary. On a certain occasion he said to a friend: "The idea of the Sacred Heart pleading for us is a *great revelation*, and it has to be made known." The friend answered that it had been made known, and very widely already. "Only to a handful," he said, "in comparison to all who might know it, and ought to know it, if one could only get them to listen." This thought was always uppermost in his mind, and in the Retreats and Conferences contained in this book, his constant effort was to draw hearts to the knowledge of this Revelation. It is this which gives to them a special attraction and value.

The Retreats have not been printed from original manuscript, but from notes taken down by different persons at different times as the words fell from Father Dignam's lips or immediately afterwards. It should be added that these meditations will be almost useless unless to those who are well acquainted with the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius, and it will be necessary for readers of them to have a copy of the exercises, as well as of the Holy Gospels in their hands. The primary object of the book is to provide matter for the use chiefly of religious who wish to make private Retreats.

JESUS; HIS LIFE IN THE VERY WORDS OF THE FOUR GOSPELS. A Diatessaron. By *Henry Beauclerk, Priest of the Society of Jesus.* 12mo., pp. 234. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Benziger Brothers.

"Diatessaron, or through the Four, was the title given by the Syrian writer, Tatian, in the second century, to his 'Life of Jesus Christ,' compiled from the four Gospels. The present work embodies the same idea. It professes to set forth the life of our Lord in one connected uniform narrative, from which no event, discourse or detail occurring in any of the four Gospels has been omitted, nevertheless the whole narrative being made up entirely of the words of the inspired writers."

At first sight such a work might seem impossible, but a reference to the four indexes at the end of the volume shows that either in the text or in the margin every single verse of the four Gospels has been accounted for.

The question of the chronology of the event of the Gospels is a difficult one, but the author has not shunned it for that, as so many others have done. On the contrary, he says: "Although the chronology of events as herein set down may be in many cases at fault, I have at least spared no pains, by a diligent study of the best authorities, Catholic as well as Protestant, to guide myself to that order which seemed most satisfactory. It must be borne in mind, however, that with the Scriptural materials at our command absolute certainty on some points is out of the question."

The author has carried out the design of the work very carefully. By using abbreviations of the names of the Evangelists he assigns every word to its proper writer. This book has been an unusually difficult undertaking for publisher as well as for author, because of the references, not only in the margin but in the text, and because of footnotes. It has been done so very well that the publishers are worthy of special commendation.

PLAIN FACTS FOR FAIR MINDS: An Appeal to Candor and Common Sense. By *George M. Searle, Priest of the Congregation of St. Paul the Apostle.* 12mo., pp. 360. New York: Catholic Book Exchange, 120 W. 60th Street.

This book has been written, not with a view of controversy, but of simply stating the Catholic doctrine. There seems at the present time to be a better disposition than formerly on the part of those outside to listen to our own statement about our faith, rather than to those coming from second-hand sources. In these pages the truth of the Christian religion is practically assumed. It is addressed principally to what are commonly called Bible Christians, who form the majority of our Protestant population. It may be added, in further explanation of the work, that though, as has been said, it is not intended as an attack on distinctively Protestant doctrines, it has seemed best at the outset to compare the Catholic idea of Christianity with the usual Protestant theory basing religion on the Bible alone. The creed of the Catholic Church is then

set forth point by point ; the order here followed is that of the profession of faith made by converts. In conclusion, other charges against the Church not suggested by the profession, but often made by those who do not know us, are discussed and shown to rest on prejudice or misunderstanding.

Father Searle is a convert to the Catholic faith ; he is an astronomer whose reputation is not confined to this country, and he is professor of mathematics and astronomy in the Catholic University of America. It is not surprising that so good a subject, skilfully handled by so able an author, should appear in so good a book. Already, many thousand copies have been sold, and the demand has not yet been satisfied. No better book can be found for fair-minded Protestants, or for any Protestant who can be induced to listen to the Church pleading her own cause. It is brief, compact, clear, and it is cheap.

THE COMEDY OF ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM, IN THREE ACTS. By *A. F. Marshal, B.A.*, Oxon. New revised edition, 12mo., pp. 238. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This satire is so well known that only a passing notice is necessary to recall its excellent qualities. The book has been widely read, quoted, and commended. Now this new, revised edition is placed before the public, and it is high commendation to say of it, that it has lost nothing by revision. Catholics believe that all men should be children of the Catholic Church. If the truth be properly placed before them, by the grace of God, all men will become members of the Catholic Church. There are various ways of placing the truth before men ; all cannot be treated alike. A method which may attract one, may repel another. The way followed by Mr. Marshall in this book, is very amusing, and should be in many instances effective, but not in all. It is not always best to tell a man that he is in error ; sometimes it is better to let him find that out by showing to him the truth. But for that very large number of persons who can be moved by this method Mr. Marshall's book is excellent. It should be read especially by church-unionists.

SERMONS ON THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. By *Very Rev. D. I. McDermott*, Rector of St. Mary's Church, Philadelphia, Pa. 12 mo., pp. 183. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This book contains eight sermons on the Blessed Virgin, with the following titles ; "The Shadow of the Cross, or the Sorrows of Mary ;" "The Testimony of Mary, Queen of Prophets ;" "The Spiritual Motherhood of Mary, Our Lady of Mercy ;" "The Immaculate Conception"—three sermons ; "The Solemnity of the Most Holy Rosary ;" "The Holy Name of Mary."

They were prepared by the author for special occasions, beginning in 1868 and ending in 1891, and they were published first in 1892. Father McDermott has the reputation of being one of the best preachers in the archdiocese of Philadelphia, and although the ability to speak the word does not always go hand in hand with the ability to write it, he is an exception. He not only speaks well, but he writes well. These sermons bear the mark of the student, the theologian, the priest. They have merited the highest words of praise from able critics, and they are worthy of the attention of all who are interested in such publications.

ÆTHIOPUM SERVUS ; a study in Christian Altruism. By *M. D. Petre*. 12 mo., pp. 226. London : Osgood, McDowell & Co. Received from Benziger Brothers.

The text of this work is, "Blessed are they who mourn." The author

shows that suffering is a man's lot in this world, and that the true philanthropist is not he who teaches others that they can obtain true happiness in this life, but he who tells them that crosses are unavoidable, and shows them how to carry them. This truth is illustrated by the life of St. Peter Claver who called himself "the slave of slaves," and who wore himself out in the service of the negro slaves who were brought to Carthage in South America in the early part of the seventeenth century.

As a biographical work the book is meagre in detail. It deals more with slaves and slavery than with the life of the saint. From a literary point of view it is very well done, and in this respect it is an exception to most books of its kind,

The book is a credit to the publishers as well as to the author, for in paper, type and binding good taste is displayed. This is also exceptional.

GRAY'S SCHOOL AND FIELD BOOK OF BOTANY. American Book Co. Revised Edition.

It is late in the day to recommend any of Asa Gray's series of botanical works. They have been so long and extensively employed by school and college that they have proved beyond question their excellence and usefulness as media of instruction. The present edition contains the well-known "Elements," together with the "Field, Forest, and Garden Botany," which introduces the student to our common wild and cultivated plants. The latter portion has been revised by being brought down to date. Though intended, primarily, as a school-book, its simplicity of method and exposition adapt it as an excellent help to self-instruction, and as an introduction to the larger "Botanical Text-Book" in two volumes, and the more exhaustive "Manual," by the same author.

A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES. By *Henry Charles Lea, LL.D.* Volumes I. and II. Philadelphia: Lea Brothers & Co. 1896.

These two octavo volumes of over one thousand pages complete Part I. on Confession and Absolution. They give evidence of great research, extensive reading, and the use of an excellent library by the author. Almost every page bristles with quotations from and references to the Fathers, the schoolmen and theologians of every age down to the present day. There is certainly an abundance of erudition displayed. Nevertheless, the author's want of logical power, or rather his fixed mental attitude of predetermined hostility to an institution which he abominates, so perverts his vision and warps his exigesis that with all his learning he succeeds in giving us an exposition of his own views and theories rather than a history of the subject treated. We shall return to this work later.

HUNOLT'S SERMONS. Volumes XI. and XII. The Christian's Model, or Sermons on the Life and Death of Christ, the Example and Virtues of Mary, and of other chosen Saints of God. By *Rev. Francis Hunolt, S.J.*, translated from the German by Rev. J. Allen, D.D. 8vo. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This work has been reviewed in the *QUARTERLY* as the volumes came from the press. Every two volumes contain a series of seventy-four sermons, adapted to the Sundays and Holy-days of the year. The last volume contains, in addition to the index of sermons and subjects in Volumes XI. and XII., an index of sermons and subjects for the twelve volumes. All who have examined the work, or who have read the words

of praise spoken of it by reviewers and churchmen of prominence, know that in this extensive work the preacher has an almost exhaustless storehouse of good things for the pulpit. A full description of the work and tables of contents may be had from the publishers.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE AT THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By *Joannes Janssen*. Translated from the German by M. A. Mitchell and A. M. Christie. In two volumes. Vols. I. and II. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 17 South Broadway. Price for both volumes, \$6.25.

Expectate venis! At long length, the great work of the immortal Janssen appears in an English garb. Or, to speak more truly, we seem to be within measurable distance of seeing him in our native dress; for only his preliminary volume is before us; and time only can decide whether the English-speaking races are willing to encourage the further publication of one of the greatest monuments of Catholic erudition since the days of Baronius. We confine ourselves to a simple announcement of the work in the present number, reserving a fuller appreciation of it till October. Meanwhile we exhort every reader of the REVIEW to purchase his copy without delay.

INSTITUTIONES THEOLOGICÆ DOGMATICÆ. TRACT. DE GRATIA DIVINA. Auctore *Petro Einig, D.D., Ph.D.* Pp. viii., 210. Treviris ex off. ad S. Paulinum. 1896. Price, 2,80 marks.

This is the first volume of a course in dogmatic theology by Dr. Einig, professor in the ecclesiastical seminary of Treves. Like the tract on the B. Eucharist, published by the author about eight years ago, the present treatise on Grace is excellently adapted as a text for classes of theology. Brevity, without sacrifice of comprehensiveness of material, clearness of expression, solidity of demonstration, admirable order in the arrangement of parts—these perfections of the work will greatly assist the pupil in mastering a subject so beset with difficulties as that of Grace.

A CHRISTIAN APOLOGY. By *Paul Schanz, D.D., Ph.D.*, Professor of Theology in the University of Tübingen. Translated by Rev. Michael F. Glancey and Rev. Victor J. Schobel, D.D., in three volumes. 8vo. Second revised edition. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co.

This work was reviewed at length in Volumes XVI. and XVIII. of the QUARTERLY, and it is sufficient to say here that all that was said in praise of the work then, is endorsed now. Since its first appearance the book has been considered the most learned and best work of the kind in the English language, and it holds that place yet. It is the very best book to answer modern objections against religion.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE DIALOGUE OF THE SERAPHIC VIRGIN CATHARINE OF SIENA. Dictated by her, while in a state of ecstasy, to her secretaries, and completed in the year of our Lord 1370. Translated from the original Italian, with an introduction on the study of Mysticism, by *Algar Thorold*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price \$3.00 net.

THE GREAT COMMENTARY OF CORNELIUS A LAPIDE. First Epistle to the Corinthians. Translated and edited by W. F. Cobb, D.D. London: John Hodges. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price net \$3.00.

VOLTAIRE ET LE VOLTAIRIANISME. Par *Nourisson*, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: P. Lethielleux, Libraire-Editeur. Price, fr. 7.50.

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THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND THE EDUCATION PROBLEM.

NO fact was more striking in recent years than the overwhelming victory of the Tory party at the last general election in Great Britain. Reinforced by the Liberal-Unionist vote, Lord Salisbury's government has been numerically the strongest we have seen in England in our day. By itself the Tory branch of it was able to outvote any possible combination of antagonists. Even should the Liberal-Unionists mutiny and coalesce with Liberals and Irish Nationalists, the rock of Toryism was impregnable. Yet this invulnerable parliamentary combination has found that big battalions are not able to command success. As Bonaparte found he could not sit upon bayonets, so Lord Salisbury has discovered that he cannot resolve spiritual and intellectual problems by the automatic voting machine method. His failure is the most remarkable event of the kind ever recorded.

To understand the causes of this failure it is necessary to survey the general policy of the English government, as a continuous piece of political machinery, for the period since the merging of the English and Irish legislatures. Unification was the ostensible object of the fusion. Abolition of racial and political distinctions, identification of commercial and industrial interests, effacement of sectarian differences, were the glittering mirages held up by the act of union before the eyes of the world as the laudable ends in view. But time has proved the hollowness of the pretences. In no single department of administration were the systems of England and Ireland assimilated. Every step in reform gained by the English people, and always with the help of Irish

votes, yielded its fruits in Ireland only in the most inadequate and niggardly way. The local government acts for England and Scotland, by which every locality in those countries got its own resources completely under its own control, for its own benefit, were carried largely by Irish help; yet when the time came for the repayment of the debt by the people benefited, Ireland was left in the lurch. She is to this hour ruled by the English bureau in Dublin Castle, and cannot control a penny of her own taxation. It was in this spirit of sinister differentiation that the Salisbury government approached the great item in their Parliamentary programme, the education problem, and it was in accordance with the principle of suitability in retribution that the first repulse of the ministry took place over the Irish branch of that momentous problem.

This policy of differentiation was steadily pursued in all great questions of reform, even in the education acts. When a compulsory law was passed for Great Britain, Ireland was omitted from its operation. But the reason for that omission did not lie in any deference to the wish of the majority in Ireland. It was simply because the difficulty of enforcing a compulsory law appeared then to be insuperable. Since that time the conditions appeared to have undergone a change for the better. The new bill introduced by the government this year provided for the application of the compulsory principle, but differed from their English measure in a most vital point. It omitted to provide a "conscience clause," whereby the religious convictions of parents would be respected in the public schools. Other flaws there were, but this was a flagrant one. As a result, the bill is lost. The Irish bishops lost no time in meeting and discussing it, and they felt it their duty to forward their decided *non possumus* to the government. How it came to pass that any English minister, with ordinary experience on the subject, could make the mistake of hoping to succeed in such a measure with a hierarchy, a clergy and a people so resolute in matters of religion and education as the Irish, is not a little puzzling.

Here was the first failure of the big battalions. The official mind most unaccountably falls very often under the influence of some strange glamor in the study of this question. It appears to be afflicted with an organic incapacity to get below the surface of statistics or depart from cut-and-dried methods of investigation. Even our own painstaking and acute commissioner of education, Mr. Harris, seems to have missed the great lessons of the Irish educational struggle, and to have been deceived by the smooth surface of official reports. In his report on the National System in Ireland for 1890-91, he takes the explanation of the founder of

the system, Lord Stanley—the “scorpion Stanley” of O’Connell—as perfectly unimpeachable and reassuring. At the time of the organization of the Irish system, he reports: “It was necessary to allay the jealousies which had existed by previous attempts to force Protestant schools upon a population overwhelmingly Catholic. To this end a formal declaration was made on the part of the government that its purpose was to superintend a system of education from which should be banished even the suspicion of proselytism, and which, admitting children of all religious persuasions, should not interfere with the peculiar tenets of any.” How beautifully language can be made to conceal men’s thoughts! Archbishop Whateley was, while Lord Stanley was engaged in penning these soothing and statesmanlike explanations, exercising his profoundly logical mind in the devising of a code of lessons calculated, as he confided to his secret memoranda, to uproot the ancient faith of the Irish, and destroy the last vestiges of the Roman Catholic religion in their minds. If Mr. Harris had read that eminent prelate’s life and letters, as given by his daughter, he would hardly have penned the sentences which follow: “The sincerity of the government with respect to this purpose was evidenced in the construction of the board, which comprised eminent representatives of both Catholic and Protestant churches, and in placing under their control all matters affecting the subject of religious instruction. They were directed to separate literary and moral from religious instruction, and to remit the latter to the clergy.”

Extremely innocent, highly commendable, this purpose seemed to many an inquirer beside our unsuspecting commissioner. But the facts give a different story. Mixed education was the euphuism for an education in which the facts of Catholic history were to be doctored and the history of Ireland entirely blotted out. This was the thin end of the wedge. The establishment of the “Godless colleges,” a little while subsequently, was intended to drive it home.

The inner history of the Irish National Board has not yet been written; we only get a glimpse of it through these letters of Archbishop Whateley’s. When the subject is sufficiently ancient, no doubt some further light will be thrown on it by the State papers in the Birmingham Tower of Dublin Castle. But from the outer history accessible to us by the light of Archbishop Whateley’s naïve admission, we can form our own conclusions. Some portions of that history, as we find it unfolded by the late Sir Patrick Keenan before the Royal Commission of 1887, are extremely suggestive. Sir Patrick Keenan, it ought to be said in advance, while a model official, was also a most discreet one. As Resident Com-

missioner of National Education in Ireland, he knew the whole arcana of the office, so far as the doings of the National Board, *quâ* board, were concerned. To every question asked him on this subject by the late Cardinal Manning and other members of the commission, he gave exactly the replies that showed how strictly the Irish National Board conformed to its instructions and its *rôle*, and how strictly the executive portion of the education machinery conformed to the decisions of the board. Yet from these admirably-framed answers we may glean some useful knowledge. The composition of the National Board itself, for instance, and the many modifications it gradually underwent, are suggestive. When the board was originally constituted—that is, in the year 1831—it consisted of seven members. These were the Duke of Leinster, Archbishop Whateley, and Rev. Dr. Sadlier, Protestants; Archbishop Murray and Mr. Blake, Roman Catholics; Mr. Carlisle, Presbyterian, and Mr. Holmes, Unitarian. At the time this proportion was arranged the population of the country was, properly speaking, about seven and a half millions, of whom four-fifths were Roman Catholics. The head of the board, under its charter, was the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland for the time being. By law this functionary could not be a Roman Catholic; and the same law gave him the power of nominating and removing the Roman Catholic members of the board, as well as the rest; hence it will be seen that the Protestant minority in Ireland had no grievance on the score of inadequate representation on the Irish National Board. By degrees these proportions were gradually altered, but not to the extent that the conditions demanded, until the Irish press took courage to challenge the composition of the board and denounce its insidious policy. At length it was conceded that the ends of policy and equity would be best met by the formation of a board of twenty members, half Roman Catholics and half non-Catholics. We can only deplore the oversight which prevented the production of the various text-books issued by the Irish National Board during its half-century of existence, before this Royal Commission, as a grievous loss to the cause of truth.

But whatever the National Board of the past in its great wisdom intended, it is now generally conceded, that the whole grand design of the “system” has been a magnificent failure. The country, no doubt, is dotted all over with “national” schools, but the administration of these has become virtually denominational. The “combined literary and separate religious instruction” feature of the original design has all but entirely disappeared, not through any want of will or perseverance in the attempt to carry it out, but from the sheer force of local circumstances.

Sir Patrick Keenan gave some singularly interesting statistics

on this point in the course of his examination. At the period when he spoke, there were 3168 schools attended exclusively by Catholics, with Catholic teachers, in Ireland; and there were 809 non-Catholic schools, attended solely by non-Catholics. The "mixed" schools taught by Catholics, with a minority of Protestant pupils, numbered 2714. The minority amounted only to 5.6 per cent. of the whole attendance. Under Protestant teachers the mixed schools numbered 1228, and the Catholic minority amounted to 13.5 per cent. Besides these there were 77 schools where the teachers were of both denominations, and 52.9 per cent. of the pupils in these were Catholics. Thus it will be seen that the relative proportions of the respective religious denominations in the country reflect themselves pretty accurately in the settling down of the schools upon the old lines, and that what the Irish bishops, clergy and people have all along contended for, with the strenuous stubbornness of indefeasible right, the principle of religious training on the denominational basis, has triumphed despite the machinations of astute archbishops and hostile governments and often too pliant Catholic commissioners.

We are familiar with the reproach that the spread of education is not desired by the Catholic hierarchy. Of no other country has the puerile slander been so often asseverated as of Ireland. Is it not strange to find that, if the Catholic bishops had had their way, compulsory education would have been the law four years ago, and that the reason why it is not the law is that the Protestant English government blocks the way? Yet such is the fact. The bishops unanimously declared in favor of the principle at the time the law was being enacted for Great Britain, but it was only after the lapse of four years that the government made up its mind to apply the compulsory provisions of the law. And when Mr. Gerald Balfour, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, made the effort at last, he clogged his bill with such conditions as made it certain of rejection. He would give no "conscience clause" to the Irish people, and he offered the long-suffering Christian Brothers such flagrantly unfair terms of public aid, as to leave them still at an enormous disadvantage as compared with other teaching bodies. In these two circumstances alone there was ground enough for an unfavorable reception of the governmental proposals, but there were certain concomitant facts which rendered the proposals not only objectionable but insulting to the whole Catholic people, clerical and lay. In the first place there was the contemptuous rejection of the recommendation of the National Board itself in favor of a free measure; next there was a niggardly and reluctant recognition of the claims of the Christian Brothers; then there was an avowal that were it not for the

obstacles placed in the way of compulsory education by local authorities because of the scandalous discrimination against the Christian Brothers, even this partial recognition would never have been heard of; and lastly, there was the ingenuous avowal that while the government were making a move towards religious education in England, they were determined on maintaining the fiction of non-religious education in Ireland. Cynical indifference to the opinion of Ireland has been a tradition of the Irish Chief Secretaryship from the death of Drummond down to the advent of Morley. Morley himself, partial as he was to the political claims of Ireland, was as adamant on the question of justice to the Christian Brothers; but, determined secularist as he was, he would never have the hardihood to deny to Ireland what his chief was offering at the very same moment in England and asking the support of the Irish representatives, as friends of religious education, in passing it.

Still Mr. Balfour may find an excuse for exposing his colleagues in the ministry to the charge of glaring inconsistency. The relations of men and institutions in Ireland to a controlling outside force often lead to singular paradoxes. Is it not a little curious to find that some of the very class who are now clamoring for religious instruction in England joined in the past with their fellows in Ireland in an effort to maintain non-religious education there? A good many years ago, when there was some rumor of an intention on the part of the government to drop the training institutions known as Model Schools in Ireland, the bishops and lay magnificoes of "the United Churches of England and Ireland" got together and prepared a memorial praying for the maintenance of united secular education in Ireland. This document was signed by 2754 prominent members of these now dissevered and somewhat moribund establishments. Their own stability was no more assured than the system of which they were so much enamored. The march of events has been in a direction surely never dreamed of in their philosophy.

All through this protracted struggle for the schoolmaster in Ireland the attitude and action of the Christian Brothers commands the warmest admiration. Never for a moment did they cease to hold aloft the pure torch of faith and patriotism. With them the inculcation of Catholic doctrine and the teaching of Irish history went hand-in-hand with the unfolding of secular knowledge. The state offered them the bribe of a *per capita* grant if they would cease to teach history and take down the cross and religious picture and be silent on the subject of religion. Again and again was the offer renewed, but the Brothers returned each time an unflinching "No surrender." Then the state moderated its terms, asking

the Brothers merely to remove the religious emblems from their walls as the sole condition of receiving their just dues, but the Brothers still stood firm. Their claims to State aid for the mere secular work done were again and again pressed upon the House of Commons and the government, but successive ministries doggedly declined to recognize them as long as the obnoxious emblems were exhibited. Even Mr. John Morley, large-minded and just though he be, would never give way on this subject. This inexcusable injustice, being no longer possible of maintenance, since it was proposed to give State aid to voluntary schools in respect of the lay instruction they supply, the government essayed to remedy in a very characteristic way. They proposed that the Christian Brothers receive out of the public rate for education ten shillings per head per annum for each pupil passing examination, while the amount asked for voluntary schools of other denominations was twenty-seven shillings and six pence per head! It is not strange, under these circumstances, that people living in Ireland cannot believe that the penal laws against the Catholic religion are altogether matters of past history.

If the element of simple justice were only recognized in the case, the claims of the Christian Brothers would not be limited to mere equality of treatment. Looking at their work from the hard standpoint of practical results, they have deserved better of the State than any other class of educational agencies. They have trained more successful pupils for the intermediate passes than any other teachers. As the State admits its interest in these results by paying for them, it is surely logical that those who organize the victory deserve the substantial reward, at least in some proportional degree. If the advantage be all around, it is manifestly unjust that the educator be denied his due share. A body which has again and again demonstrated the superiority of its pedagogic methods deserves not merely the encouragement of equality in awards, but generous recognition of its superiority.

For the present the question of elementary education in Ireland rests where it was before this abortive attempt at legislation, but the subject will soon be heard of again. What is the position in the realm of higher education? Here the Catholics of Ireland are at a disadvantage so great as to be impossible of redress by the ordinary processes of fiscal readjustment. Something like a revolution would be needed to level their position up to that of the Protestants, as it was by something like a revolution the University of Dublin was founded. But as the age of confiscations, such as those out of which the university sprung, is over, the Catholics can scarcely ever hope to possess an institution like Trinity College, with its vast estates, its splendid buildings and its

noble library. Generations of men have come and gone since it began to be hoped this justice might at last be done by way of atonement, but no British Government has been found as yet so large-minded as to propose it. Nor does Trinity itself seem likely to attempt a solution of the difficulty. Although a few of the bars against Catholics have been removed, in spirit and administration the institution is as strongly Protestant as it was in the beginning.

Trinity College derives its revenues mainly from land. It had its origin in the spoils taken from the Irish and Spanish armies after the disastrous battle of Kinsale; and the subsequent confiscations in Munster and Ulster, under Elizabeth and James, brought it rich slices of territory. Before the outbreak of the late land agitation its revenues from this source alone were about a hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year. The amount received in fees swelled this revenue to an immense sum. All the years the Protestant minority was enjoying this splendid heritage, the Catholic gentry who wished to have their sons educated for the learned professions were obliged to send them abroad. This was the state of affairs for the laity from the "Reformation" period down to the days of Sir Robert Peel. That statesman's famous six days' tour through Ireland on a jaunting-car convinced him that the Catholic religion might be better attacked from the top in Ireland than by striking at the root. A system of colleges in which religion was to have no recognition or mention was the idea which he conceived as likely, if realized, to produce in process of time a weakening of the faith among the upper classes in Ireland, or at least an indifference or an agnosticism, which must in the long run react upon the lower classes by force of precept and example. The indignant denunciation of these colleges—named Queen's Colleges because of the visit of Queen Victoria to Ireland two years after the famine had done its work there—by the great Archbishop McHale of Tuam, was the first great blow to the unholy scheme. The archbishop's policy was strongly opposed, even by some of his venerable brethren in the hierarchy, but it was in the end effectual. Though the colleges are still maintained, their classes are gradually dwindling away, and the crop of agnostics they have produced is by no means commensurate with the outlay. "I do not know that there is any such element in Irish society as a body without religion" was the answer given by Sir Patrick Keenah before the Royal Commission, when questioned by Dr. Dale, one of its members, as to the non-representation of the agnostic element on the National Board. Long ago the government confessed the failure of the Queen's colleges by the establishment of the intermediate system and the Royal University. At

times individual members of the government have gone so far in the other direction as to enter into *pourparlers* with the Catholic hierarchy about the endowment of a Catholic university, but the result usually proved that this pretended liberality had a good deal to do with party politics.

As the field stands at present, there is simply a break in the struggle. Victory, so far, rests with the Irish forces. Nothing more can be done during the present session of Parliament, but the champions of religious education have strong grounds for hope of success in the final issue of the struggle.

In historical importance there is no such interest pertaining to the English Education Bill as in the case of Ireland. It is the fortune of Ireland, for good or for evil, to be the theatre for the testing of vital principles, in the spiritual no less than in the moral and material world. She has set the pace in many things—liberation of conscience, purification of trial by jury, liberation of the soil, electoral reform, freedom of the press. To every one of these great human interests she has furnished her martyrs, and by their suffering secured the benefit of mankind at large. And now she has fired the flame of religious education which we find burning so promisingly in England to-day. In the case of that country there is no such historical continuity in the public school system as we find in Scotland. The "Reformation" there made one grand sweep of everything, practically speaking—churches, schools, monasteries where alms were given to the poor, all the resources of religion and education and humanity; whereas in Scotland the "reformers" were wise enough to keep intact the splendid network of school machinery established by the Church and with the aid of the much-abused Stuart kings. From that period down to the beginning of our own era education in England was left to take care of itself, so far as the government was concerned. In the year 1833 it seems to have dawned upon the mind of some legislator that it was part of the functions of a State to afford help to the schoolmaster, and a sum of a hundred thousand dollars was asked for and given for the purpose of providing school-buildings. Then the nation seemed to sleep over the matter for a period nearly twice the length of the legendary Rip van Winkle's slumber. The late Mr. W. E. Forster first came into prominence as an advocate of enlightened methods in education. A parliamentary committee was, on his initiation, appointed to inquire into the condition of the public school system in England, and the result was the passing of an education act which was then deemed sufficient for the requirements of the occasion and adapted to the wants and wishes of the people at large. Two years later a similar act was passed for the benefit of Scotland; and it is well to note how dif-

ferent was the spirit in which the question was approached by Parliament, when dealing with that country, from that in which the education of Irish youth was dealt with. Every care was taken for the preservation of the "Scottish ideal." That is to say, not only was nothing done to wound the national pride, but every concession was made that was likely to foster the idea that Scotland was not a subject state, but a really integral and co-partner portion of the British Kingdom. A separate Scotch Education Department was created, having the Lords of the Privy Council at its head, and represented in Parliament by its vice-president. The great features of the Scottish Bill were drawn, indeed, with a much more liberal hand than those of the English Bill. Unlike that measure, ample provision was made in the Scotch Act for the religious instruction of pupils. Discrimination of this remarkable character has long been a notable feature of English statesmanship in its dealing with the different portions of what is called the United Kingdom, and any consideration of modern historical developments and social conditions would be misleading and valueless unless this policy and its effects have been carefully noted.

It was not until 1870 that the English law for a uniform system of elementary education was passed, but before that time some tentative work had been done—work which cleared the ground for the erection of the larger edifice.

Since 1833 the practice of making parliamentary grants had been continued in a gradually increasing ratio, and a system of state inspectorship, with the object of seeing that the money was being properly expended and a fair amount of value given for it, had been established. We find a parliamentary commission inquiring into the subject in 1861. It was a period of awakening and anxiety. Trades unionism was in conflict with the law, for the law was all on the side of capital. A series of murders and other outrages perpetrated in Sheffield resulted in the interference of Parliament. A commission of inquiry, with power to condone crime on condition of confession, was established; and this commission disclosed many alarming features in the English social system, the outcome of dense ignorance on the part of the toiling masses and savage disregard of the rights of labor on the part of capitalists and the law. Other commissions followed the subject up, shedding a flood of light upon the wretched condition of the people in the mining and manufacturing districts, and showing millions of them to be, in regard either to the knowledge of God or the elements of morality and civilization, no better than the brute creation. Then, thoroughly alarmed at the state of facts disclosed, government began to act. On the initiation of the Duke of Newcastle, a commission of inquiry into the state of popular

education was instituted in 1861, and in due time presented its report. Its efficiency was felt to be much impaired by the fact that the government did not see fit to place a Roman Catholic representative upon it, yet even with this drawback it elicited some very suggestive information. It revealed the fact that even at that time there was in existence a large Roman Catholic minority in England—of Irish nativity or descent for the most part—and that that minority displayed a zeal for the acquisition of knowledge far beyond its numerical proportion to the rest of the people, or its share in the national wealth.

The percentage of Catholic children who paid the lowest rate of school fee, *i.e.*, a penny per week, was found to be 65.93, as against 37.3 for the children registered as of the Church of England and 17.57 for Protestant dissenters. That is to say, in proportion to their respective numbers, the Catholics who refused to take an entirely gratuitous education outnumbered, combined, the English sects, in their own country, by a very considerable majority. There were on the school rolls at this period, putting week-day schools, evening schools and Sunday schools together, a total of 129,737 Roman Catholic pupils. Religious instruction was given in the different schools, according to the denomination to which they belonged, but the secular idea seems to have been gradually pushing its way, helped on, we are entitled to think, by the reports of inspectors more or less indifferent or agnostic, and certainly hostile to Catholicism. Here is a very suggestive passage from the statement of Mr. Forster, embodied in the report of this commission (p. 322):

“The efforts of the teachers whom I met with appeared directed chiefly to the facts of Scripture history, stimulated hereto by the usual tenor of the inspector's examination. A Roman Catholic lady, writing about a school under her management, which she wished me to see, and describing the religious instruction there given as devotional and practical, remarked, in passing, that it did not consist, as in the Protestant schools, of inculcating the exact number of kings that reigned in Israel, or the precise names of Jacob's sons. The animadversion was, I believe, strictly just. Whatever may be the repetition of forms, the real teaching is for the most part neither devotional nor doctrinal nor practical, but historical, embracing chiefly the facts and names and numbers recorded in the sacred text. An inspector explained to me that his reason for asking minute questions of this sort was, that if he found the children acquainted with these minutiae he inferred a general knowledge of Scripture truth. Whether he is right or not, this practice in inspection gives the direction to the daily teaching of the schools.”

Up to this time the policy mainly followed by the government had been to recognize local authority in education, but insisting on the standard of efficiency in secular branches required by the central authority as a condition of receiving State help. All this was changed by the operation of Mr. Forster's Act of 1870. A

complete system of non-religious education was provided throughout the country. The local authorities were bound, by the terms of the law, to apply no religious test whatsoever to children, and permitted any child to be withdrawn from school when religious instruction was given, if the parents so desired. The central authority was the Education Department, with the Lord President of the Council at its head—a functionary with a place in Parliament to look after the interests of his important office and bear the responsibility of its action when challenged. Under the control of the department is a force of 107 inspectors, 45 sub-inspectors, and 152 assistant inspectors. Over all these is a staff of 10 chief inspectors, and for the convenience of the inspection the country is divided into ten great districts.

In the year 1891 the enrolled scholars at all classes of schools in England and Wales numbered 4,833,329, and of these nearly one-half were on the registers of the Board Schools. A total of 47,823 certificated teachers were in charge, together with 23,508 assistants and 28,231 pupil teachers. The school fabrics numbered 19,649. The teachers in the Board Schools are strictly prohibited from imparting any particular religious formularies, while those in the Voluntary Schools got their pittance from the State on the condition that the “conscience clause” be operative in their schools during the periods of religious instruction.

Prior to the establishment of this system by far the greater proportion of the educational work of the country had been done by Voluntary Schools. The gradual falling-off in the voluntary system since the School Board began to enter into competition with it may be regarded as the main cause which has brought about the present crisis in the educational realm in England. Broadly speaking, the Board Schools are the refuge of the secularist and agnostic element of society in England and Wales, and the voluntary ones formed the rampart of the religious sentiment. We are entitled to assume that the State had no design of helping the cause of secularism or agnosticism by setting up the system of Board Schools, but only desired to act impartially. But the provisions which it made for the working of those agencies were such as to bear unfavorably upon the teaching power and the attendance of the Voluntary Schools, and when the position of the teaching staffs of these latter places became insupportable by comparison with their formidable rivals, they naturally appealed to the government for relief. Lord Salisbury, whatever his views on other subjects, has a decided leaning toward religion in education; and he gave, when approached, much encouragement to the complainants. Mr. Balfour, whose excursions into the region of speculative philosophy have made him a convert to semi-Chris-

tianity, expressed himself still more emphatically on the need of assistance to the tottering voluntary system.

It was very far from the thoughts of the late Mr. W. E. Forster, the deviser of the existing law on education, we may well assume, to banish religion from the mind of youth. He was an earnest, conscientious man, according to his lights, but in his anxiety for the rights of unbelievers he proved himself to be far more careful than in respect for the liberties of the Irish people or the principles of the British Constitution. By his tenderness for the scruples of infidels he provided such safeguards for their feelings as tended directly to the preservation and spread of infidelity. Bearing in mind the fact that the law on school attendance is compulsory, that provision of it which relates to the marking of the attendance-registers is a vital one for the interests of religion. A series of Returns bearing on this subject are appended to the official Report on the Education Commission. From these we find that while it is compulsory on the teachers to keep such a register, it is optional whether the pupils' names be marked on it before or after the period allotted for religious instruction—optional with the particular school board or the particular teacher. This is in accordance with the aim of the famous "conscience clause" in Mr. Forster's act. The children who absented themselves from school during the half-hour when such instruction was being given were the very children who stood most in need of every influence, religious and moral, which could be made effectual in counteracting the pernicious example of ignorant and demoralized parents and vicious surroundings. It appears to have been the desire of a section of the commission to take an optimistic view of the result of this policy, as in the report of the majority we find stress laid upon the returns relative to its practical operation. A series of returns are quoted. Return A, for instance, shows that in 318 Board Schools the registers were marked *after* the religious lessons had been disposed of; in 33 of the schools no religious instruction was imparted; and in 103 religious instruction was encroached upon (presumably in order to devote the time to secular subjects) before the governmental inspections. From another table (Return D) it was ascertained that in 320 departments—that is, branches of schools under head teachers—no religious instruction was given; in 1013 religious instruction was encroached upon previous to governmental inspection, and in 2344 the registers were marked *after* the religious instruction was over. Granting that these figures bear a small proportion to the entire showing with regard to religious instruction and the working of the conscience clause, nevertheless they indicated a most disquieting condition of things at the time the evidence was given. Since then

the downward tendency seems to have been much accelerated. The spread of agnosticism among teachers is a most alarming symptom. So great has been the increase of this moral mildew, both among teachers and scholars, that it appears to the Catholic hierarchy in England as a certain presage of the final extinction of Christianity in the island. That venerable body, in pronouncing on the government's bill, put on record its solemn belief that if this decay in faith be not arrested, another generation may witness the work of Augustine and his successors in England undone, and the relapse of the country into heathenism.

It might have been thought that any proposal of legislation likely to check this downward course would have met with the support of churchmen of whatever denomination. The Roman Catholic bishops lost no time in voicing their approval of the principle of the education bill, while pointing out its glaring shortcomings. But the bishops of the English Establishment, who represent the vast bulk of the Voluntary Schools, and who, therefore, ought to feel the deepest interest in the measure, displayed no unanimity over it. Ten bishops of the northern dioceses adopted resolutions in convocation commending the principle of the bill; but no sooner was their manifesto issued than the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London came out with a counter-declaration. To the latter-named prelate the experiment of granting State aid impartially to all schools coming up to the standard in secular education, while parents had a voice in the religious teaching, appeared, as he expressed it, getting on "a slippery slope." The Archbishop of Canterbury followed up this astonishing declaration by a speech at a meeting of the National Society, in which he boldly advocated the policy of *laissez faire* regarding the Voluntary Schools. If he had had the drafting of the bill, he went on, he would not give these schools another sixpence beyond the four-shilling rate now doled out to them. Where are we to look for an explanation of this extraordinary attitude on the part of two such prominent prelates as the Anglican primate and the bishop of the great metropolitan see?

The twenty-seventh clause of the education bill was the really cardinal proposition of the measure. It was revolutionary, as viewed from existing standpoints. The effect of the previous act was to centralize authority; this bill proposed to diffuse and transfer it. The locality not merely, but the community, even the group, became, under its provisions, the source of power. The clause ran thus:

"If the parents of a reasonable number of scholars attending an elementary school require that separate religious instruction be given their children, the managers shall, as far as practicable,

whether the religious instruction in the school is regulated by any trust, deed, scheme or other instrument, or not, permit reasonable arrangements to be made for allowing such religious instruction to be given, and shall not be precluded from doing so by the provisions of any such deed, scheme or instrument." The semblance of State control over the working of this popular engine was maintained by the further provision that the Education Department was entitled to determine what was really "reasonable and practicable" in all such references.

It is not difficult to understand why Nonconformists opposed such a proposal as this. Creed to such people is an abomination. Vagueness capable of conveying to the mind no tangible image consorts with their ideas of toleration. A morality based upon a sort of religious *mélange* fulfils their notions of spiritual training. It is this latitudinarianism which has led so many into the hopeless maze of infidelity, and it is to lessen its volume that so many Voluntary Schools are maintained. But it is evident from the action of these two exalted dignitaries of the Anglican Establishment that the spread of infidelity is looked on as a lesser evil than any degree of popular or parental control over the education of the children. Truly a remarkable revelation of state church policy!

The charge has been over and over repeated that the spirit of the Catholic Church will brook no exercise of authority by laymen in such affairs. Will any impartial observer compare the action of the Catholic hierarchy in England with that of these Protestant prelates, and tell us where the charge of narrow-mindedness lies? The Catholic bishops did not approve of the bill by any means unreservedly, nor did they approve of this particular clause unreservedly. But they received it as a recognition of the principle for which they have always contended—the right of the parent to control the religious training of his children. Sooner than give parents any voice in this matter—a matter for which they are responsible before God—the heads of a church which is said to represent the principle of revolt from a despotic and grasping ecclesiastical tyranny, ally themselves with the agnostics, the Jews, the freethinkers and the bearers of "the Nonconformist conscience," against a great progressive measure. It is little wonder that Lord Halifax and other distinguished laymen of the National Society drew a painful contrast between the action of these intolerant prelates and that of the Catholic bishops.

But there are many Anglicans who took a different view of the probable working of Clause 27. They saw in it a possible avenue of access to those Board Schools from which religion had heretofore been shut out, and they fondly hoped that there might be co-

operation between their own bishops and those of the Catholics in order to secure so desirable an end. If these forces could have been brought to join, they would have been, it was implicitly believed, literally invincible. Once the principle of financial equality had been conquered, they saw, in their mind's eye, besides, as a result of the levelling up of the efficiency of the Voluntary Schools—now pining away and losing their prestige in many places, for want of efficient teachers and proper teaching appliances—a transference of the Board School flocks to the Voluntary Schools. There was the strongest reason to hope for such a result. It was believed that, if a good fight were made, a share of the public rates could be secured for the Voluntary Schools, besides the parliamentary grant of four shillings which the bill proposed for both Voluntary and School Board pupils. Unless something like this were done, the Voluntary Schools must continue in a position of inferiority to the Board Schools, because of the superior advantages offered to teachers by the latter, and the superior apparatus for teaching provided in them. The position of very many of these voluntary schools, owing to precarious attendance, unreliability of resources and the want of self-respect, entailed by their semi-mendicant position, was pitiable, besides being humiliating to the cause of teaching.

But of all the voluntary schools, those of the Roman Catholics were by far the most to be commiserated. In England, the poorest section of the population are the Roman Catholics, and as a consequence the attendance of their children at school is lowest. In 1894, with a roll-list of 30,597, in London, the percentage of average attendance in Catholic schools was 75.16. In the Board Schools the percentage was, for the same year, 80.4. In the outlying districts things were very much worse. In Limehouse, for instance, the percentage of attendance for the same year was as low as 53.7. As the teachers' salaries depend on the attendance, to a very large extent, the significance of these low figures may be to some extent realized. The teacher of Limehouse earned for that year but fifteen shillings and seven pence for each scholar on his books, as a result of this low attendance, while his neighbor at Dulwich Board School received twenty-six shillings and a penny for each of his pupils. Low average attendance means more than mere financial loss to the teacher. It means a lowering of his professional status in the eyes of the unreasoning. When children attend irregularly at school, they naturally get behind in proficiency. They cannot keep up with the more regular scholars, and the putting back of pupils means the docking of the teacher's results' earnings by the inspector and an unfavorable mark against his school each time it occurs. No matter how able, zealous and

painstaking such a teacher may be, this is his portion, for there is no escaping the automatic working of the iron-bound system; for if the inspector failed in his duty in reporting what he found, he himself would be liable to censure and dismissal.

This instance from Limehouse is but one example out of hundreds. We may form some estimate of the magnitude of the grievance from the fact that it touches the conscience of such a thorough-going foe of denominational education as Mr. Leonard Courtney. In a letter to the *London Times* that eminent Parliamentarian made this confession: "I am myself a friend of undenominational education. I recognize in the teaching of the Board Schools an adequate presentment of piety and doctrine. But I know I cannot claim the assent of all men, perhaps not even a majority, for this view; and though my own desire would be for the continued growth and spreading of common schools, I cannot but admit the wrongfulness of attempting to impose upon my fellow-citizens the burden of supporting schools which they honestly believe to be the seed-plots of terrible mischief, and to which they cannot suffer their children to resort." The hon. gentleman's admission elicited a reply from the mouth-piece of the obnoxious system, the "School Board Chronicle," which proves that it is not merely a monetary wrong that the Catholics of England must continue to suffer, but a moral outrage. It is the Roman Catholic schools, retorts this organ, which are really regarded by conscientious parents as "the seed-plots of terrible mischief." Here we have the true animus of the Board School system, and the drift and direction of that "presentment of piety and doctrine" which Mr. Courtney regards as sufficient. To force Catholics to pay rates for the support of schools where hatred of Catholic teaching is the unavowed but understood spirit of its preparation of "piety and doctrine," is a bitter superaddition to the injury in purse inflicted upon the unhappy rate-payer. There are 2,310,253 children on the rolls of the Board Schools, and of these some not inconsiderable proportion, we have reason to believe, are of Catholic parentage. They are absolutely precluded by the law from receiving any definite religious instruction. They must be content with the state preparation which stands as a substitute. It cannot but be that many of the minds thus imbued with non-doctrinal formulas and pious, meaningless saws must in time lapse into downright infidelity.

One valuable lesson has been derived from the discussion over the abortive measure. We now learn what is the true inwardness of Nonconformity. In its opposition to Catholic claims and denominational teaching it allies itself openly with the secularist and agnostic sections of the Radical party. The rage of the Non-

conformists because of the Irish Nationalist members giving their support to the bill found characteristic expression in the declaration of the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes that the Irish party must look for no more support for Home Rule from that quarter. It was a silly speech, revealing a shallow mind. The Irish party could not have adopted any other course consistently with conscience or common sense. They are not under any obligation to barter their consciences for any political advantages. Very many of the children affected by the bill were the children of Irish Catholic parents. They were demanding for the Catholics of Ireland the same rights which the bill sought to confer upon the English people. The tenets of Nonconformity—whatever these be—do not seem to help to clearness of mental vision.

Happily, not all of the body are so carried away by unreasoning anger as the section led by Rev. Mr. Hughes. Mr. John Morley may be taken—though perhaps not a Nonconformist in the strict sense of the term—as an exponent of a school whose aims and views tend in the same direction. He has opposed the Education Bill on principle, yet he does not share the opinion of the Rev. Mr. Hughes and his section regarding the Irish vote. Speaking at Manchester, a little while ago, he declared that had the Irish not voted in accordance with the dictates of their conscience in this matter, they would not have won the respect of honest men. Mr. Gladstone's leadership, he had hoped, had resulted in teaching Englishmen to judge of the political action of Irishmen fairly and reasonably. The violent outburst of the Rev. Mr. Hughes must have convinced him that this view of the matter was a little too sanguine.

A strong government without the courage of its convictions and its strength is a pitiful spectacle. At no time in modern history has an English ministry acted in so eccentric a manner as the present one with regard to this vital question. It is idle to attribute the abandonment of the two education bills to the power or tactics of the Opposition. Much of the heap of amendments proposed to it came from the government side of the house. The parliamentary machine for dealing with obstruction of an unreasonable kind was in good working order, and the speaker had cleared the way by ruling out batches of amendments whose object was covered by some of the leading propositions in more important *bona fide* ones. Mr. Gladstone's retreat from the Boer war was not more inexplicable than Mr. Balfour's surrender before a vastly inferior enemy. The only rational explanation of the collapse appears to be the element of personal character in the ministry. In its whole composition there is not one man of the fibre of the great Liberal leader now unfortunately out of the fight.

The element of noble enthusiasm which he brought to any great cause, once he made up his mind to espouse it, is a gift not ordinarily bestowed upon leaders of the Tory party. In Mr. Balfour it is notoriously lacking. His language and deportment in public life lead distinctly to the belief that public life is to him a rather disagreeable duty and the cares of office a bore. The ministry had lost heart, for in almost everything to which it had put its hand it had met with defeat and humiliation. Something like demoralization had apparently set in, not amongst the rank and file of the army, but at the headquarters. But how this was to be remedied by the infliction of self-humiliation could be apparent only to the reasoning of dazed and despairing intellects.

We are more concerned with the practical question, What next? however, than with the causes of the mysterious collapse. Mr. Balfour has promised that he will not desert the voluntary schools, but it is not easy to see how he can come to their aid for a very considerable period. Nothing can be done, certainly, this year, and the luckless schools must struggle on haphazard as best they can. He might have got the house to assent to a temporary measure of relief in this regard, leaving the more revolutionary portions of the bill, such as the decentralization proposals, over until the reintroduction of the whole measure next year, or he might have secured a temporary grant from the treasury for the purpose. With the large majority at his command some plan of that kind could easily have been rushed through the House of Commons, and the upper house would hardly oppose such a measure. Failure to do the right thing in either case plainly implies unfitness to govern. Every element in the situation points to the square peg in the round hole theory. A change of leadership seems to be the requirement of the hour. A strong man like Lord Salisbury himself could easily carry the bill through, but he is precluded from action on it in the upper house by reason of its being a measure dealing with money. The peers are prohibited from the introduction of such measures in their chamber by a provision of the Constitution.

Apart, however, from present disappointment, the friends of denominational education have much cause for hope. When so much progress has been made as in this case, the battle may be regarded as more than half won. No matter what government be in power, the question cannot be left where it is. The Tories are pledged to it; if they be defeated by any chance, and the verdict of the country be against them, they must still be powerful enough as a minority to compel any Liberal government to introduce remedial legislation for the voluntary schools at least. Though the Liberals are opposed to the principle of the dropped bill, they

cannot deny the existence of a grievance, and they are morally bound to provide redress, even though they may not do it in the exact way proposed by the Unionist ministry. The light which has been thrown upon the subject through the opening of the discussion has made it impossible to hide the magnitude and character of the great wrong which is being perpetrated on portions of the community by the advocates of a system which is found to be slowly but surely sapping the foundations of belief in God and endangering the very safety of the State.

A curious charge has been made against the framers of the abandoned measure. They are accused of endeavoring to introduce into the public administration the vicious principle of interference in religion and suppression of private conscience. How the glasses of prejudice can blind men, otherwise keen-sighted, to the real facts of a case! It is under the existing system, so much admired of the secularists and the doctrinaires, that the conscience of the individual is really outraged and the principle of arbitrary interference with religion practically applied.

But we may look to the future with some cheer. There are mysterious survivals in the moral order as there are in the material one. A few years ago a beautiful phenomenon was witnessed in a mining district in Greece. Old silver mines that had been abandoned since before the Christian era were reopened, and vast heaps of *débris* that had accumulated about them were cleared away. Then immediately there sprung up all over the place a delicate flower peculiar to the district, but never seen since the mining refuse had been piled over the soil where it grew. After a sleep of two thousand years the tender plant, nurtured in the tomb by a subtle influence superior to death, springs up triumphantly to gladden the earth and testify to the sustaining hand of God. How like in vitality the long-extinguished principle of religious education to the resurrection flower of the Laurium mines!

JOHN J. O'SHEA.

DOCTOR HOLMES'S LIFE AND LETTERS.

THE two sumptuous volumes recently issued by Houghton, Mifflin & Co., and bearing upon their title page "Life and Letters of Oliver Wendell Holmes," must agreeably persuade any one who examines them with the eye of a book-lover that in every way—paper, printing, binding, illustrations—they worthily present their subject. The biographer, Mr. John T. Morse, Jr., is a nephew of "The Autocrat" and the author of several volumes in the well-known series of *Lives of American Statesmen*. Of this particular work of his we regret to say it is impossible to speak in terms of highest praise from a literary point of view. There is a frequent carelessness and even unrefinement which are disappointing where we expect at least the marks of an adequate literary training; there is sometimes a coarseness or slanginess of expression fairly startling; and these qualities are all the more noticeable, because in such contrast with the careful, albeit popular, style of Doctor Holmes himself. The general merit of the work as a biography entitles it to fuller approval; though not all of the author's opinions or comments upon various questions, particularly those of religion, are above criticism.

Mr. Morse will not, on the whole, be faulted as a hero-worshipper. In only one point should we say his statements of fact gave a decidedly false impression—where he writes that Dr. Holmes was not "physically insignificant." Any one who ever saw the man might differ from this verdict, and might claim, further, that the doctor's own exclamation about one of his photographs—"very ugly, but horribly true"—was not much exaggerated, for he was most plain in feature, as well as a Zaccheus in stature; and when he rose to speak, or to read a poem, it wasn't till his eyes began to twinkle, and the whole face to light up, and the witty brain or genial soul to pour itself out, that those before him lost thought of these inevitable first impressions.

There can hardly be said to be any over-estimation, in these volumes, of mental powers or literary achievements. One might almost say the opposite—that sometimes there is too apologetic a tone, and a not sufficiently high appreciation. Perhaps with thoughtful prudence, Mr. Morse does not attempt to forecast Dr. Holmes's permanent place in literature. He considers his best writing to have been in prose, and that *The Autocrat* was the best of this; but says, truly enough, "yet he talked better than he

wrote." Of his three novels he rightly regards *The Guardian Angel* as superior to the others. Whether Dr. Holmes was a great poet he will not try to decide. Let readers make their own answer, he says: "I shirk the responsibility of guiding any one's judgment in so momentous a matter." He considers his short lyrics to be his happiest efforts in verse; but, contrary to general opinion, ranks "The Last Leaf" above "The Chambered Nautilus." He hints that he did almost too much for his own reputation in poetry for occasions. He gives about all of Dr. Holmes's letters which he has been able to find, and grieves over their fewness. Yet he seems somewhat depreciatory of the Doctor in this respect, because, forsooth, "in his own family he was not considered an adept in letter-writing," and quotes approvingly Dr. Weir Mitchell's witty remark: "He was not a man of letters, but a man of notes," alluding to his known cleverness in short replies. For many readers, on the other hand, the several series of letters—to Lowell, Motley, Mr. Kimball, Mrs. Stowe and Mrs. Ward—will prove the most interesting and most valuable portion of these volumes.

Mr. Morse fears criticism (he tells us in his preface), because he has given "too much memoir, too little correspondence;" but the only other method would have been to condense his two volumes into one, and that he should have done this will possibly be the final verdict upon his work, which we own is somewhat long drawn out.

Certainly Dr. Holmes's was about as narrow, restricted, provincial, uneventful a life as can well be imagined. "The utter absence of anything in it to remark upon," says Mr. Morse, "became in itself remarkable." Aside from his foreign study for two years when a young man and his trip abroad for three months in old age, he lived almost all his days in or near Boston; his intimate friends were generally within easy range; he loved his family and his home, and there he mostly staid; he never took part in politics, nor held any office; "nothing ever happened to him." If such a life have a charm, it must be emphatically in its inner manifestations; and so it was with this.

In his talk and in his writings Dr. Holmes lived and lives. His talk has passed away; for, as Mr. Morse grieves to say: "The brilliant talker . . . must become, like a great actor, a mere tradition"; and so "his talk is remembered as the scenery of the clouds is remembered, a picture dwelling in the mind, but never to be produced to eyes which looked not upon it." The record of his talk we have a little of in his writings; but these have also a wider scope, and represent the range of all his inner life. "He was a New Englander, from the central thread of his marrow to

his outermost rind," bluntly writes his biographer, who claims that his "function in literature was to present New England to the rest of the world in his own day, and to all the world in future days," and continues, "He did it admirably, so as to leave nothing to be desired. So far as New England was worth presenting and preserving, his work merits corresponding eulogy."

Following now, a little, the thread of this uneventful life, we learn that he was born August 29, 1809, and that the birthplace was Cambridge, in that old gambrel-roofed house which many of our readers have probably seen, and of which a fine picture is given in one of these volumes—an old colonial house, even then famous as having been the headquarters of one of the American generals at the outbreak of the Revolution, and in later times perhaps equally famous as the "Holmes house." It is not many years since the building was mostly torn down, though a part was moved to a back street and became a tenement for poor people, and was thus occupied until about a year and a half ago, when every vestige of it disappeared from existence. Dr. Holmes lived in this house till his manhood; and he was much grieved when the destruction of the old homestead began, though he admitted that 'the slaughter was a case of justifiable *domicide*.'

His father was a Congregational minister of strong Calvinistic beliefs, "modified," however, as the son says, "by the kindly nature in which they were received," and softened by the influence of the "liberal" surroundings in Cambridge. His mother, Sarah Wendell, is described as "a bright, vivacious woman, of small figure and sprightly manners," with "traits very different from those of her husband," and the son is said to have been more like her intellectually; and, we may add, physically. Coming, as he did, of good lineage, he was always aristocratic in feeling, as his biographer claims, who cites the words of *The Autocrat*: "I go for the man with the family portraits against the one with the twenty-cent daguerreotype, *unless* I find out that the latter is the better of the two. I go for the man who inherits family traditions . . . of at least five generations"; but he did not admire an aristocracy of mere money—"the untitled nobility which has the dollar for its armorial bearing."

Of his childhood and youth perhaps the strongest definite impression—gathered largely from the fragment of autobiography which he prepared in old age, and which forms one of the early chapters of these volumes—is that of the influence of those stern religious beliefs in which he was brought up, and from which he never wholly freed himself. He became, in his writings, a violent opponent of Calvinism, and in opposing its errors it must be owned he sometimes misinterpreted and misrepresented that system.

When he was fifteen he went to Phillips Academy, Andover, to fit for college. It is hinted in this "Life" that his father meant to make a minister of him by sending him to that factory for the manufacture of good Orthodox, as it is called; and Dr. Holmes says himself: "I might have been a minister for aught I know, if a certain clergyman hadn't looked and talked so like an undertaker." He used to contrast the looks and ways of the clergymen who exchanged with his father—some "nominally Orthodox, but weak in the theological joints," who were pleasanter than others, the "Evangelicals, most of them smitten with the Sabbath paralysis"—and now and then one "with a sad face and a wailing voice, which sounded exactly as if somebody must be lying dead up stairs, who took no interest in us children, except a painful one, as being in a bad way with our cheery looks, and did more to unchristianize us with his woe begone ways than all his sermons were likely to accomplish in the other direction."

He entered Harvard College in 1825, and graduated in 1829, in a class with many who became distinguished. There are but few notes of his college career. He does not seem to have injured himself by study. In a letter written when he was a junior, he describes himself as "a plumeless biped . . . standing exactly five feet three inches," in his boots; "not dissipated," and "not sedate," and "in moral qualities rather lazy than otherwise," which we can readily believe, for he says he ranks seventeenth in his class. He used to write verses for college exhibitions, and he was the class poet. When he graduated he was undecided about his profession, and began studying law in the Harvard Law School. But he busied himself mostly in writing poetry for various papers—"Old Ironsides" was written then—and in going with the girls. More than thirty years later he referred to this time:

"In that fatal year I had my first attack of author's lead-poisoning, and I have never quite got rid of it from that day to this. But for that I might have applied myself more diligently to my legal studies, and carried a green bag in place of a stethoscope and a thermometer up to the present day."

So the next year found him beginning the study of medicine in a private medical school in Boston, where he attended two courses of lectures; and then, in the spring of 1833, he went to Paris to finish his studies, returning in the autumn of 1835. During these two years and more there is evidence enough of his devotion to his work, and with increased interest in it. He led a life of study, intermingled with considerable pleasure and recreation—taking his work "with all his might, and his pleasure very moderately"—patronizing the theatres occasionally, and using his long vacations in travelling in England and on the continent. Long after, he gave

many interesting reminiscences of the famous professors under whom he studied ; but, as regards the hard work he did, observed that much of his time in Paris was lost in ill-directed study. Now, however, he was certainly very ambitious;—writing, in November, 1833, “I am, as usual, all medicine; getting up at seven and going to hospitals, cutting up, hearing lectures, soaking, infiltrating in the springs of knowledge. There is a great deal more to be done than I was inclined to suppose, but the more the better, when one gets into good working trim ;” and the next year, “There are subjects which I have scarcely touched, and which I must study in Paris. It is not a selfish matter; I am devoted to my profession, and I wish to return second to no young man in it.” He thought he wasn’t extravagant, but he couldn’t get along without spending \$1200 or \$1400 a year—which must have nearly drained the family purse. He writes once in a rather independent tone to his parents, who were making great sacrifices in his behalf:

“Economy, in one sense, is too expensive for a student. For my part, I say freely that a certain degree of ease connected with my manner of living, a tolerably good dinner, a nice book when I want it and that kind of comforts are in the place of theatres and parties, for which I have less taste than many good fellows of my acquaintance. I can go home, if I must, but while I am here I will not eat a dinner for twenty-five sous and drink sour wine at a shabby restaurant.”

As to his expenses, which included books, instruments, private instruction, he says: “I tell you it is not throwing away money, because nine-tenths of it goes straight into my head in the shape of knowledge.” Some months later his tone hasn’t changed much. “I have spent a year in Paris. My expenses have been seven thousand francs. I have lived comfortably, liberally if you please, but in the main not extravagantly”; and not till a little while before his return home does he meekly write: “I think I shall be much more moderate in my expenses; I will try, at any rate.” It is interesting to note that he was more pleased with the French character the more he saw of it, and thought the French “a great, a glorious people,” and that scientifically they were half a century in advance of the English, but that against this people his feeling was then very strong,—“this nation of sulky suicides,” “without the personal interest of somebody it is impossible to see anything in this country,” “the English spirit of quackery,” and more expressions of a like sort illustrating his tone of mind. Every one knows how wonderfully this spirit towards England and the English changed in later years.

Many reasons are suggested why Dr. Holmes did not have the success as a practicing physician which would have been expected after all his faithful and ambitious study. Perhaps he was too

humane and tender hearted; perhaps his being a wit and a poet had something to do with it. "For some reason or no reason," says Mr. Morse, "the world has made up its mind that he who writes rhymes must not write prescriptions, and he who makes jests should not escort people to their graves." So his pleasantry on first putting out his physician's sign—smallest fevers thankfully received—while it provoked a laugh from those who had no fevers, made those who had them prefer to have some one else treat them; and when he published a book of verse, and was actually invited to deliver the *Φ. B. K.* poem, all this was really too much, he couldn't mean to take his professed vocation seriously! We read that he once owned he didn't make any strenuous efforts to obtain business, and that the thing most pleasing to him about the practice of medicine was keeping a horse and chaise. He always drove a fast horse, and the picture must have been comical enough of the little man bouncing up and down on his seat in the big chaise with his spirited steed at a break-neck pace! Subsequently he thus spoke to students: "Medicine is the most difficult of sciences and the most laborious of arts. It will task all your powers of body and mind if you are faithful to it. The great practitioners are generally those who concentrate all their powers on their business"; and Mr. Morse thinks he never did this act of concentration, or at least not very persistently; and this is probably the secret of the matter.

But he had opportunities, and he gained deserved success on the theoretical and academic side of his profession. He wrote medical essays which won prizes; and one of these essays, that upon "The Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever," received the high praise of being an original as well as greatly valuable contribution to medical science, and the position which he took in it he maintained victoriously against the opposition of the leading American authorities of that day. Some few years before this controversy he accepted the professorship of anatomy at Dartmouth College, which he held during 1839 and 1840. In 1847 he became professor of anatomy and physiology in the Harvard Medical School. He took "great pride and interest" in this position, and held it for thirty-five years. At first his duties were so many and varied that he used to speak of occupying "not a professor's chair, but a whole settee." After 1871 it was anatomy alone which he taught, a subject which was not open to the effects of progressive change like many others, and about which he once wrote in his humorous way: "Fortunately for me there has been no change in human anatomy since Adam lost the rib from his side; and somehow or other I always find a full dozen on both sides in his male descendants."

As a teacher and lecturer Dr. Holmes enjoyed an excellent reputation. His method was to lecture to the lower half of the class rather than to the higher; "to teach a little and to teach it well." He carried out the idea of knowing *something* really and thoroughly, showing himself the persistent foe of what he sharply called "flippant loquacity of half knowledge." The students in those days were often rough and disorderly—medical students are said to be generally so—the lecture on anatomy was the fifth one of the day, and it used to be thought, says Dr. Cheever, who was a student under him, that "he alone could hold his exhausted audience's attention." We need offer no apology for quoting a portion of his interesting description of the lecture and the lecturer:

"Respect for poor humanity and admiration for God's divinest work is the first lesson and the uppermost in the poet-lecturer's mind. He enters, and is greeted with a mighty shout and stamp of applause. Then silence, and there begins a charming hour of description, analysis, simile, anecdote, harmless fun, which clothes the dry bones with poetic imagery, enlivens a hard and fatiguing day with humor, and brightens to the tired listener the details of a difficult though interesting study. As a lecturer he was accurate, punctual, precise, unvarying in patience over detail, and, though not an original anatomist in the sense of a discoverer, yet a most exact descriptive lecturer, while the wealth of illustration, comparison and simile he used was unequalled. Hence his charm; you received information and you were amused at the same time. 'Iteration and reiteration' was his favorite motto in teaching. 'These, gentlemen,' he said, on one occasion, pointing out the lower portion of the pelvic bones, 'are the tuberosities of the ischia, on which man was designed to sit and survey the works of creation.' But if witty, he could also be serious and pathetic, and he possessed the high power of holding and controlling his rough auditors."

To add one or two items to the record of Dr. Holmes's medical career, it may be mentioned that he abhorred homeopathy, and looked upon it with contempt as a "pseudo-science"; that he believed in vivisection, as a necessity, though Mr. Morse is sure that, with his known tenderness for animals, "in his heart he hated it bitterly," regarding it as "a mode of acquiring knowledge justifiable in its proper use, odious beyond measure in its abuse"; that he considered the vocation of woman in relation to medicine to be that of nurse rather than that of physician or surgeon; and still, in an address before the medical school, after uttering that sentiment, he brought down a shower of enthusiasm by adding, "Yet, if here and there, an intrepid woman insists on taking by storm the fortress of medical education, I would have the gate flung open to her, as if it were that of the citadel of Orleans, and she were Joan of Arc returning from the field of victory."

The Doctor was so domestic a man that it would be a flagrant oversight not to refer to his marriage, though we go back in our record to pick up the thread. It was on June 15, 1840, that this event occurred; and he married Amelia Lee Jackson, of Boston.

Mr. Morse's way of speaking of her is most felicitous, "the kindest, gentlest and tenderest of women," "an ideal wife, a comrade the most delightful, a helpmate the most useful." He says she did everything for him, "in a word, she took care of him, and gave him every day the fullest and freest chance to be always at his best, always able to do his work amid cheerful surroundings." A model wife, indeed, for any man, and especially for a literary man! and it is no surprise to read, "she contributed immensely to his success." They had three children, only one of whom is now living. He bears his father's name. He distinguished himself in the Civil War, being wounded in three engagements, and promoted for bravery. He is now fifty-five years old, a lawyer by profession, and has been for many years an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts.

During Dr. Holmes's early married life he engaged a good deal in literary lecturing, as well as medical, a vogue which was then about at its height. He took up this occupation, no doubt, chiefly from necessity, to help out his income; for, while he may have liked it well enough when he could be giving a course before the Lowell Institute—as he did on the English poets—it is well known that he didn't fancy all the inconveniences, and even dangers to his sensitive constitution from the country lecturing. Mr. Morse tells of "the sleepless nights, the dyspepsias, and colds, and aching joints," and of how much he said he should prefer "natural death to puttin' himself out of the world by any such violent means as lecterin'." He didn't hesitate to call it a hard business and poorly paid, yet said he could "get a kind of living out of it if he had invitations enough;" and he kept up the itineracy for many seasons, and in going about used drolly to name himself "the huma, the bird that never lights." He was "a favorite, and had no lack of engagements," we read; and though physically he was under some disadvantage at first, this was soon forgotten in the expressiveness and control of his voice; and his "quick sympathy with his audience, and with what he was saying to it."

A larger literary opportunity came not many years later; one for which the lectures, and the books of verse, and the witty words at dinners and on other occasions, had prepared the way, in the growing reputation which they had given him. In 1857 *The Atlantic Monthly* was projected and began to be issued. Dr. Holmes gave the name to the new magazine, "christening the unborn babe," to use Mr. Morse's expression. *The Atlantic* started out with James Russell Lowell as its editor; and he it was who urged Dr. Holmes to be a contributor, having even made it a condition to his acceptance of the editorship. At first Holmes answered, "Too late! too late!" a shrinking which can hardly have been due to his age

—he was then forty-eight—but probably to “a kind of literary lethargy,” in which, he said afterward, he was half slumbering, and from which Lowell woke him to call him to active service. “The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table”—a title which, it seems, he had used in the brief-lived *New England Magazine*, more than twenty years before—now began to appear, and immediately gave such a reputation to the monthly as abundantly to justify Mr. Howell's words: “Dr. Holmes did not name, he made *The Atlantic*.”

It is not the purpose of this paper to enter upon any sufficient criticism of Dr. Holmes's writings, but at most to allude, in a critical vein, to various qualities of his works as brought out in this biography. It may go without saying that *The Autocrat* shows the high-water mark of Holmes's prose. The provincialism of the work, the New Englandism, the Bostonianism, Mr. Morse makes a great deal of, with an intensity, and a jealousy for New England and for Boston, which equals, if not surpasses, Dr. Holmes himself. He is not content to claim *The Autocrat* as “a picture of New Englandism,” no!—such language, he says, is not strong enough—“it is an actual piece of New England, a sample cut solidly out of the original body.” He must be owned to be somewhat inconsistent in his praise.¹ He boasts that Holmes was provincial only as—say—Walter Scott was; in being a New Englander he is *racial*! New England people have become a *race*! Yet he says “he certainly was *not cosmopolitan*”; and he both defends the fact that he was not, as a higher title to immortality, and also apologizes for it—anxious that readers may not think his hero so narrow-minded as never to have longed for the world without! The fact is that Dr. Holmes was, in many ways, narrow and provincial; and in speaking of The Saturday Club, founded at about this time, which he so especially loved—“he hugged the thought of it”—Mr. Morse himself regrets his narrowness thus: “Partly, his sentiment was the result of the limited sphere of his life; had he ever travelled, seeing foreign lands, mingling with their distinguished people, *becoming in any degree cosmopolitan*, the club would have assumed proportions more accurately adapted to the universe in general.” The Autocrat felt his own narrowness, and sometimes wished it were otherwise; *e. g.*, to Motley he once wrote: “I have lived so long stationary, that I have become intensely local, and doubtless in many ways narrow. I should like to breathe the air of the great outer world for a while, but I am so sure to suffer from asthmatic trouble if I

¹ In spite of all Mr. Leslie Stephen says to the contrary on this point in his paper upon Dr. Holmes in *The National Review* for July, 1896, p. 628.

trust myself in strange places, that I consider myself a kind of prisoner for life," etc.; so one can see it was partly physical difficulty which kept him always in that particular spot and strengthened his mental provincialism; and one is ready to overlook all its narrowness when he goes on to say so genially, "There are some valuable qualities about an old provincial friend like me to a cosmopolitan like yourself. He keeps the home flavor, a whiff of which from his garments is now and then as pleasant, I am willing to believe, as the scent of the lavender in which fair linen has been laid away in old bureau drawers. It is not the fragrance of the garden, but there is something which reaches the memory in it and sets us thinking of seasons that are dead and gone, and of what they carried away with them." Once he longs for even the outer world of New York! and writes: "I hope I shall get there again some time or other, for it de-oxydizes and de-Bostonizes me; and I suppose I am as much of a provincial in many of my ways as—one who lives in the centre of the solar system can well be"! Here, indeed, are irony and humor, seriousness and fun, pride and humility so blended that you hardly know which is the inspiring motive. But enough of the provincialism of *The Autocrat*. Mr. Morse is needlessly anxious, in our opinion, lest Dr. Holmes should be compared with any other writers. He gives a list of some thirty names which have been linked with his in this way, but scorns the notion that he is like any one else, and claims for him supreme originality! "Holmes was Holmes!" he says; his "individuality" so marked that he lived in "literary solitude"; "neither had he followers or imitators"; all which statements may be considered extreme and open to criticism, and at least not representing the sentiment of the literary world. They almost incline us to withdraw our words at the opening of this paper about hero-worship! To claim, as his biographer does, that an author's "fair reputation for individuality" is "whittled away and pared off till there is little left" by merely suggesting "likenesses" would be an idle plea for originality for any writer later than Homer; and certainly for Dr. Holmes! and is as "amusing" and "absurd" as he fancies those "likenesses" are; while to favor the opinion that "he was in no sense a writer inspired by his culture" appears to take from him the very praise that belongs to him; for he was, in a true sense, both cultured and original—the elements of his culture are continually appearing in his writing, and his very shaping and moulding of them becomes his originality. Nor is this a paradox.

It is dangerous for an author who has achieved brilliant success in a certain peculiar line to choose the same method a second time. Dr. Holmes both proved his popularity and showed his

literary skill by being able to follow up *The Autocrat* by *The Professor* and *The Poet*—at the *Breakfast Table*, and later still by the group of papers *Over the Teacups*—all four being now given in the publishers' catalogue as The Breakfast Table series. All were originally published in *The Atlantic*; and the general method followed in all the books—the conversational style—is the same. It cannot be pretended that the excellence of any of the others is at all equal to that of *The Autocrat*, nor that their reception by the public was as enthusiastic; yet the whole series is a remarkable instance of power in competing with the formidable rival—one's self. He showed shrewdness in letting intervals shorter or longer come between the different books. *The Professor* appeared in 1860, *The Poet* eleven years later, in 1871, while *Over the Teacups* was the work of his old age, begun in 1888 and finished in 1891, when he was eighty-two years old. The topics, too, were varied. The Professor, says Mr. Morse, "did not talk in quite the vein of his predecessor; he chose more serious topics"; and he adds: "Because the Professor was less entertaining than the Autocrat, he has been less famous and less widely popular; yet, being more thoughtful and more profound, he has pleased some people better." The Poet, he observes, "was a very charming fellow, yet not quite so agreeable as his predecessors had been." He compares these first three volumes to "the three successive pressings of the grapes from an illustrious vineyard. The *premier cru* is the best; the second is very nearly as good; but by the third squeezing the difference in quality cannot escape notice; still, even then, one says: 'they were indeed grapes from a rare good soil.'"

Besides the wit and wisdom in the prose of all these books, the best of Dr. Holmes's verse, "The Chambered Nautilus," "The One-Hoss Shay," "Iris," "The Broomstick Train," "At the Turn of the Road" and other poems, first appeared in these pages. Allusion has already been made to Mr. Morse's hesitation in passing judgment whether Dr. Holmes was a great poet. The limits of this article forbid more than a few additional words upon this point. There can be no doubt, as his biographer affirms, that "he was a charming *singer*," and that in this lyrical poetry—"his proper field"—he was, what is here claimed for him, "a consummate master of all that is harmonious, graceful and pleasing in rhythm and language"; also, that he showed an unusual readiness in producing those *occasional* verses of his, in which his wit so shone and his delicate sympathy was often so manifest. "What a poet-laureate he would have made!" says Mr. Morse, and adds, "Yet he was not wasted in a republic." He believed in poetic inspiration, and used to say that often he didn't know whither his

pen would carry him, that his will was without power. To a correspondent who wanted a lyric for a fair, he replied: "To write a lyric is like having a fit; you can't have one when you wish you could (as, for instance, when your bore is in his third hour and having it all his own way), and you can't help having it when it comes of itself."

The famous Saturday Club brings Dr. Holmes before us as a *talker*. The original members were some of the chief contributors to *The Atlantic*, though that was all the connection there was between the two. They met to dine together the last Saturday of every month; and at those dinners were gathered at different times Emerson, Hawthorne, Lowell, Motley, Whittier, Agassiz, Sumner, Fields and many more, and among them all, no doubt, Holmes was the most brilliant talker. "Talking," he used to say, "is one of the fine arts—the noblest, the most important, the most difficult—and its fluent harmonies may be spoiled by the intrusion of a single harsh note." He claimed to be as good a listener as he was talker; but Mr. Morse affirms that he did sometimes unwittingly monopolize the conversation, and Colonel Higginson adds his testimony concerning both Holmes and Lowell—the most "habitually brilliant" talkers he had ever met, but who "hadn't learned the art of repression." His mind was very quick in action under the incentive of genial companions, and it bubbled up, and, as Mr. Gosse once described it, "rippled over with an illuminated cascade of fancy and humor and repartee." In talk and on paper, one form which his wit took was that of *puns*. His biographer is chary of speaking of this, and barely mentions that "occasionally the exuberance of his merriment" took this shape, or in apology refers to it as "the irresistible tendency of his youth reasserting itself" in old age; but it was more than "occasionally," or when he was old; it was all his life long, as any one who even reads these volumes will see. His puns and jokes, however, didn't interfere with his serious thinking, and he had a very serious side to his nature. They were always good, too, and to the point, which is more than can be claimed for his own pleasantries which Mr. Morse scatters throughout these volumes. Passages from one or two of the Doctor's letters will illustrate his felicity in this direction:

"The weather here is very cold, and the spring puns are very backward. Early *Joe Millers*, though forced so as to be up by the first of April, are like to yield but a poor crop. The *art o' jokes* don't flourish. I wish you to see that we are some *punks* here in Hubtown, though you have the *demirep-utation* of making worse puns and more of them in your city than are made in any other habitable portion of the globe. The tendency is hereditary, no doubt—all vices are. Didn't Alexander the Great inherit his tendency to get drunk from his father, the notorious *Fill-up* of Macedon?"

To a friend named *Angell*, he writes :

"What infinite changes must have been rung on the celestial title you bear ! . . . How large a proportion of your friends are in the habit of saying, when you call to see them :

'Like *angel* visits,' etc. ?

Do your flatterers speak of all the rest of mankind as being made a little lower than the *ditto* ? Are you not told several times a week, on an average, that no woman could resist your suit, as she could not refuse to be changed into a *ditto* ? Have you ever corresponded with *Deville*, the famous phrenologist ? I presume he is descended from the same stock with yourself, but that some ancestor of his must have fallen and had his name changed. Sir Roderick *Impey* Murchison is probably a branch of the same family. . . . There is one family in this city you ought to know ; of course I mean the *Wings*. I have always understood they were connected to you in some way. Your complimentary letter almost 'raised a mortal to the skies.' I hope mine has not, by its trivialities, 'brought an *etc.* down.'"

Dr. Holmes wrote three novels, *Elsie Venner*, which appeared in 1861, and was first called *The Professor's Story* ; *The Guardian Angel* in 1867, and *A Mortal Antipathy* in 1885. The first two show considerable ability ; the last a marked lack of ability. It is universally considered a failure, whether Mr. Morse's words, "he was then far past the creative age," explain this or not ; and there is no call for saying more of it, except that the problem proposed in it is akin to that of the others. For they were all novels with a purpose, written chiefly to ventilate theories, and these having to do with deep ethical and theological questions. *Elsie Venner* may be called the great snake-story of literature ; Mr. Morse says, "with the exception of the legend of Eve,"—but that in one of his little imitative slurs upon the Bible, and his words need carry no weight. The book imagines the strange case of the child *Elsie* poisoned through prenatal influence from her mother ; and the problem is as to the effect of this prenatal poisoning upon the moral responsibility of the child, or, as Dr. Holmes puts it, "the mighty question of automatic agency in its relation to self-determination ;" and the idea of the story, he says, is conceived in the fear of God and in the love of man. It is the old question of will and necessity—foreknowledge on the Creator's part and freedom of the creature—which was always troubling him from his youth up.¹ But this might easily be called an exceptional, abnormal instance of the limitation of responsibility ; and so in the next novel, *The Guardian Angel*, he deals with the general ques-

¹ Mr. Leslie Stephen, in his criticism of this book, interesting and valuable from a literary standpoint, does not appear in the least to grasp its moral scope and purpose ; saying "it has an *air* of being didactic," and really seeming to imagine that Dr. Holmes has no more in mind, ethically, than to determine the moral code for judging some one who is half woman and half snake ! Vid. *National Review*, July, 1896, p. 632.

tion of heredity in this light. In the preface to that book he owns that both stories are "protests against shifting the total responsibility of all human action from the infinite to the finite" (he considered that there was a responsibility the other way, and that the Creator had obligations to his creations!), but ironically remarks that he won't so proclaim them, lest he may "alarm the jealousy of the cabinet-keepers of our doctrinal museums"! We shall not enter into a discussion of these matters; and shall reserve for the close of our paper further comment upon his ethical and religious opinions, except to note now that, as shown in the novels and in his other books, they are a strange mingling of truth and error, reasonable deductions and the wildest vagaries of misinterpretation,—and to say, also, that we do not think his biographer quite adequately represents him in this respect, except as he afterwards lets him speak for himself in his letters.

As the Autocrat grew famous, he was more and more written to from far and near by all sorts of people, for advice and help, and with petitions as various as some of them were absurd; or, as Mr. Morse elegantly (!) expresses it, "the countless jaws of that many-headed and voracious ogre, 'the public,' began to gnash for the new victim." In that most entertaining chapter, "The Victim of Correspondents," which opens with these words, abundant illustrations are given of his ways of meeting those who wrote to him. He made it a general rule to reply to all letters where he could give pleasure or be of any use to his correspondent. Of course, a great part of the letters he received were those asking literary advice: and in giving this he is said to have been uniformly honest, scrupulously conscientious, and gentle to such as needed plain words of warning. A statement of Mr. Aldrich's at the Atlantic Breakfast in Holmes's honor, in 1879, tells us that within the previous twenty-five years "no fewer than five thousand young American poets [have] availed themselves of his amiability, and sent him copies of their first book." And he adds, "I honestly believe that Dr. Holmes has written to each of these immortals a note full of the keenest appreciation and the wisest counsel." The Doctor himself, in his latest work, lets us into the inner delights of being such a favorite, when he exclaims, of these letters and their subjects:

"What struggles of young ambition, finding no place for its energies, or feeling its incapacity to reach the ideal towards which it was striving! . . . Oh! what hopeless efforts of mediocrities and inferiorities, believing in themselves as superiorities, and stumbling on through limping disappointments to prostrate failures! etc. . . . But what does not one have to submit to who has become the martyr—the Saint Sebastian—of a literary correspondence?"

In 1880 Harvard University conferred the degree of LL.D. upon

Dr. Holmes. Two years later he resigned his professorship, at the age of seventy-three; not, he says, because of any infirmity mental or bodily, nor because his colleagues were tired of him, but to devote himself more fully to literature with the powers that remained to him. For, though he was still bright, vivacious, quite vigorous in body and mind, he felt he was beginning to grow old; and, as his biographer puts it, he resolved to keep close watch upon himself. "Upon this point," says Mr. Morse, "he did not mean to be deceived; he did not intend that the outside world should measure a decadence concerning which he was not himself accurately informed; he meant to be on his guard, and to have as few unpleasant remarks made behind his back as might be. So he began to keep upon himself the close and intelligent watch of the trained observer." In connection with the giving up of his professorship, and before leaving the general topic of his official duties, it is worth while to note the degree of his sympathy with the new methods at Harvard inaugurated by President Eliot. To Motley he writes more than once, in half-admiring, half-criticizing way, of Mr. Eliot's innovations, and how he regards them; *e.g.*:

"I have great hopes from his energy and devotion to his business, which he studies as I suppose no president ever did before, but I think the corporation and overseers will have to hold him in a little, or he will want to do too many things at once." "I cannot help being amused at some of the scenes in our medical faculty—this cool, grave young man proposing in the calmest way to turn everything topsy turvy, taking the reins into his hands and driving as if he were the first man that ever sat on the box. I say amused because I do not really care much about most of the changes he proposes, and I look on a little as I would at a rather serious comedy."

And, again, in a climax of humor:

"It is so curious to see a young man like Eliot, with an organizing brain, a firm will, a grave, calm, dignified presence, taking the ribbons of our classical coach and six, feeling the horses' mouths, putting a check on this one's capers and touching that one with the lash, turning up everywhere, in every faculty (I belong to *three*), on every public occasion, at every dinner *orné*, and taking it all as naturally as if he had been born president."

Of the life of Motley, which Dr. Holmes prepared in 1878, there is no very good account to be given, according to Mr. Morse. It was simply a lavish eulogy, "an idealized picture," and therefore far from satisfactory. The life of Emerson, which he completed in 1884, demands a little fuller consideration. In our opinion it does not here receive quite fair treatment. Mr. Morse is too depreciatory, even unduly severe. He says it was generally regarded as far from fortunate that Dr. Holmes was asked to write the book, because, as it is claimed, there was no bond of union between the two men; he understood Emerson only intellectually, but had no sympathetic appreciation of him; and thinks he was

not "influenced by him in the slightest degree." He speaks of the Doctor's misgivings about attempting the work, of his studied preparation, of his anxiety while writing it, and of his sigh of relief when it was finished. Much of all this may be granted, but may perhaps be differently explained. Holmes was certainly no worshipper of Emerson; and though he admired and loved, he was even "a late comer as an admirer." He was not an idealist, and had little sympathy with Emerson's mystic transcendentalism. The book which he wrote, a kind of biographical and critical study, one which left abundant room for Mr. Cabot's later and fuller memoir, is interesting and valuable. As a study it proves its own worth in its tone of impartial estimate of the excellencies and the defects of Emerson's various writings. It honestly and lavishly praises, and as honestly blames; and though, having to cover so wide a range, it is necessarily brief both in citations and in comments, it is continually suggestive, plain and convincing in its criticism, and, so far as it goes, eminently helpful to all who do not expect an exhaustive analysis in method or unquestioning adulation in treatment.

The three months' trip which Dr. Holmes made to Europe in 1886, accompanied by his daughter, Mrs. Sargent, was as delightful as could have been anticipated, however naturally fatiguing at his age. The time was passed almost entirely in England; and it was really a kind of "triumphal tour," as Mr. Morse calls it, from the attentions with which he was overwhelmed. If he had changed his mind, as he had decidedly, about England and the English since the days of his youth, his new and favorable views must have received most gratifying corroboration. And if he craved academic honors from other lands than his own, here they were at his hand; for Oxford made him D.C.L., Cambridge a Doctor of Letters; and Edinburgh gave him another LL.D. Yet, in face of all the attentions, we can understand the feeling of his biographer, who says:

"One regrets that the Englishmen did not see him at his best. Of course they appreciated the inroads of age and made allowances for them, but making allowances is not a vivid transaction, and the visions of fancy fall sadly short of the realism of actual encounter. We must all wish that he had made that trip thirty years earlier."

The experiences of this visit he pleasantly recounted on his return, in his book, *One Hundred Days in Europe*. After that his principal literary work was the series of papers, *Over the Teacups*, of which we have spoken, and about which he wrote:

"I don't suppose I can make my evening teacups as much of a success as my morning coffeecups were, but I have found occupation, and my friends encourage me with the assurance that I am not yet in my second childhood."

Occupation was, indeed, the main thing for him now, and one can readily accord that "there was something at once pathetic and admirable in the mingling of self-knowledge and resolution which impelled him to it." These papers are well styled "a magnificent *tour de force* of a spirited old man holding his own against the columns of the hostile years." The pecuniary success, everything considered, was quite remarkable, for within a few months of publication the sales had reached twenty thousand copies, and this, he wrote to a friend, was "very gratifying, but oh, if only those whom I have lost could have shared my satisfaction! The pleasure of the pocket is very well in its way, but the pleasure of the heart, when your friends tell you they like what you have done, is of a better quality, and I have had both," etc.

Old age was now verily upon him. Moreover, he was brought to feel the truth of what Cardinal Newman observed so touchingly in his decline, that "the penalty of living is to lose the props of life." In 1884 his son Edward died; in 1888 his wife; and it may be judged what that blow must have been to him. The next year his daughter followed. His letters for some years at this period, as he was made aware of the gentle approach of age or felt its veritable presence, are full of allusions, facetious, thoughtful, dignified, occasionally anxious; yet, it must be said, with hardly any definite looking forward to the hereafter. He was strongly and increasingly reticent upon this subject. That he really did look forward, need not be denied; but it appears to have been, so far as we can judge, with more or less uncertainty; with a degree of trust in God *because of* certain impressions or beliefs, but more *in spite of* others; and in the midst of bright light, as he was, yet, as it were, blinded by it, and still groping, and crying out, as he did, "Do I not ask for light? God knows I do." It may be of interest to cite a few of these allusions. To Whittier he writes, at seventy-two:

"The dismantling of the human organism is a gentle process, more obvious to those who look on than to those who are the subjects of it. It brings some solaces with it; deafness is a shield; infirmity makes those around us helpful; incapacity unloads our shoulders; and imbecility, if it must come, is always preceded by the administration of one of nature's opiates."

To Lowell, Curtis, and Norton, who had sent him a note of birthday greeting at seventy-six, he replies:

"Grow old, my dear boys, grow old! Your failings are forgotten, your virtues are overrated, there is just enough of pity in the love that is borne you to give it a tenderness all its own."

To another correspondent, at eighty-two:

"It is not strange that at three score and twenty and two over, one should find his eyes more or less dim, and his ears more or less dull. I like to write out the figures of my age in good Roman characters, thus, LXXXII. It gives them a patriarchal look, and adds to what Wordsworth calls 'the monumental pomp of age.'"

To Dr. Weir Mitchell he writes, at eighty-four :

"I find myself almost alone, so far as my coevals are concerned. There are two breakwaters left between me, in my quiet harbor, and the great unexplored ocean of eternity, my daughter-in-law's father, Mr. Dixwell, and that dear old nonagenarian, Dr. Furness. . . . I have been riding the high horse; let me get out of the saddle. My birthday found me very well in body, and I think in mind. If I am in the twilight of dementia I have not found it out. I am only reasonably deaf; my two promising cataracts are so slow about their work that I begin to laugh at them."

And at eighty-five, to Charles Dudley Warner, the last letter recorded, dated September 13, 1894 :

"Your kind expressions are very grateful to me. . . . They do me good. . . . Old age at best is lonely; and the process of changing one's whole suit of friends and acquaintances has its moments when one feels naked and shivers."

The end came at last, very gently; he took his walks till almost the last; he was about the house to the very day of his death; and he passed away in his chair, October 7, 1894, "painlessly," writes Mr. Morse, "as so humane a man well deserved to make his escape out of life."

As may be inferred, there are many notes and letters, or parts of letters, scattered throughout this biography; but besides these, *the groups of letters* which comprise two-thirds of the second volume form a most valuable addition to the work. These are: To Lowell, critical and personal; to Motley—the most generally interesting of the different series—upon the Civil War, the College, the Byron and Beecher scandals, and upon friends and friendships; to Elizabeth Stuart Phelps (Ward), partly critical, partly consolatory; a lot of miscellaneous letters, largely to James T. Fields, James Freeman Clarke and Whittier; and, in addition to all these, two series of greatest importance, to James W. Kimball, upon biblical and theological topics, and to Mrs. Stowe, expressing most fully his religious opinions and convictions.

These particular letters deserve more than a passing word, if Dr. Holmes's place among men is to be rightly estimated. For *they bring out the serious side of his life* in the strongest light and with a striking earnestness. No believer in his sincerity or his mental integrity can be put off with being smoothly told that in them "like most sensitive correspondents, he unconsciously assimilated his color to the leaf upon which he was resting."¹ These letters

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1896, p. 833.

declare plainly enough what he considered to be the genuine issues of life; not only that he was really more interested in theology than in medicine or literature, as Mr. Morse somewhere admits, but that these questions of religion were to him of the very deepest concern. They tell how a "liberal" in religion *may* be most narrow and dogmatic; they contain a great many misconceptions of the Bible and of Christianity in its various aspects; they show what he felt to be the disastrous effects of the Calvinism in which he was brought up,—he is like a lame child, he says, who shows his limp at every step, and again, "I don't believe you or I can ever get the iron of Calvinism out of our souls"; they are bitter against what he calls "the incompetent, nay inhuman thinking" of dogma; they bring before us his own uncertainty, under the unrest of the age, with no fixed faith, and yet affirm his strong yearning for faith, his attempt at belief in the midst of doubts; they touch a great deal upon the contrasts of heresy and orthodoxy; under the pressure of questions of will and responsibility, they seem to deny human freedom; they almost do away with the mystery as with the fact of sin (which of course vanishes if human responsibility is nothing); they enlarge upon the mystery of suffering, to him the great *crux* in the world; they make God our Father—"My creed," he says, "is in the first two words of the Pater Noster"; but they present such an imperfect idea of God as to make Him knowable only as the extension of our humanity.

We shall not attempt to give passages from these letters. They need to be read fully and connectedly. Yet this much may here be said. The revelation which they make of Dr. Holmes's inner life is as valuable as it is interesting to all who would truly know the man. Furthermore, with all the uncertainty and conflict which they reveal, they show that he took a far wider, grander view than Mr. Morse seems willing to admit he was capable of taking. With all their free thought, they are not paganism; and with all his "humaneness," so genuine and so earnest, we cannot believe he would be pleased with his biographer's description of him as merely "the humane man, making his escape out of life." That is George Eliot's dreary philosophy—the philosophy of paganism. Dr. Holmes was not a pagan, far from it. A liberal Unitarian he might perhaps be called, if anything, for he never formulated his faith; but he was groping, and struggling, and *growing*. His quarrel, after all, was mainly with Calvinism—to use his own words, in one of his books, with those "doctrines which shock the more highly civilized part of mankind in this nineteenth century, and are leading to those dissensions which have long shown as cracks and are fast becoming lines of cleavage in some of the largest commu-

nions of Protestantism."¹ Whether, if he could have lived his life over again, he would have attained to a full acceptance of Catholicity, we cannot know. There are some such indications, both in the general progress of his thinking and in express statements. He falsely contrasted "Rome and reason" in one of his books; yet elsewhere expressed the independent opinion that "Rome and its offshoots" were "to be one of the main dependencies of the coming generations"; "our children or grandchildren are going to need it." He went so far as to affirm that "the Roman Catholic Church" was "the only one logically safe;" and but a short time before his death published his conviction that the Catholic faith was "a better one to die by than most of the harder creeds which have replaced it."

These are but hints of his tendency, of the direction in which his mind and heart were turning. In spite of inconsistencies and contradictions he does seem to have shown, as he went on in life, an increasingly earnest desire for deliverance from human bondage and for a conscious breathing of God's freedom; a desire to put away error and to seize truth; to come out of darkness into God's own light. "*Do I not ask for light?*" he cries, "*God knows I do.*" If that plaint was sincere, can it be doubted that it did not go unanswered?

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¹ Preface to *The Guardian Angel*, p. xiv.

THE ATTRIBUTE AND NOTE OF SANCTITY IN THE CHURCH.

THE sanctity of the Church is a topic whose discussion is more difficult than that of unity, catholicity or apostolicity. The proposition that the Church is holy is commonly taken to mean that it is a society composed of members who are holy. Polemics against the Catholic Church consist largely in a recital of sins and crimes imputed to the members, but especially to the rulers, of the Church. These indictments may be true statements of facts, or exaggerations or calumnies. They are made the basis of a plea that the Catholic Church is not a holy but an unholy society, and therefore not the true Church.

Moreover, comparisons are made of the Catholic Church with the collective Protestant sects or some one of them, intended to prove that in so far as the true Church is a visible society composed of holy members, it is to be found, at least in part, among the disciples of Luther and Calvin.

The controversy is to a great extent carried on as a dispute concerning the relative moral conditions of nations and peoples nominally Catholic or Protestant, by means of statistics. It has also become more a question of civilization and political and social economy than of the Christian religion, of Christian piety and virtue.

Important and interesting as discussions of this kind may be in able and honest hands, they are not conclusive, unless moral facts and conditions are traced to their causes and principles. If these are cited by a Catholic advocate in favor of Catholicism he must show the relation of cause and effect. If those of an opposite character are cited against the Catholic Church, these supposed facts must be traced to Catholicism as their cause, or the plea is null.

At the very outset it is necessary to distinguish between unity, sanctity, catholicity and apostolicity as Attributes of the Church, and the same as Notes. As attributes they are her essential, constitutive principles, existing in her in all their perfection from the beginning. As notes they are made visible in their effects, by causing actual unity, actual sanctity, actual extension and multiplication, actual succession of Popes and bishops from St. Peter and the Apostles, in a multitude of members through all ages and nations. As notes they are four outward and visible marks

belonging exclusively to the one true Church and to no other society whatever. These notes manifest and distinguish from all sects claiming to possess the doctrine and law of God and of Christ, that One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic Church which Jesus Christ founded, which is the true Kingdom of God on the earth.

The note of sanctity, as has been already said, must not be confused with the attribute of essential sanctity which the Church possesses. This essential sanctity is something higher and more perfect than the actual holiness of the individual members of the Church. It is not easy to define that being which the Church possesses in itself as distinct from the aggregate of its living members. Metaphors are employed to express its specific nature, the Body of Christ, the Spouse of Christ, which of course cannot be interpreted in a literal sense, but only in an analogical manner, and by a figure of personification.

It is really Jesus Christ Himself, in His own Person, who is the principle and the cause by His Holy Spirit of all the sanctifying effects produced in men, individually and collectively, through the medium of the Church, its teaching, discipline and sacramental ministrations. The Church is called His Body, that is, His Mystical Body, by analogy with His Natural Body, because it is a visible organism, animated by His indwelling Spirit. As the Head of this Mystical Body, the chief of its Apostolic hierarchy, He holds all its organic parts in unity by the operation of His Holy Spirit. As the author and source of grace He communicates to it sanctity. As the possessor of sovereign power He makes it capable of universal extension and perpetuity. He is the sole Lord of the world, and therefore there is but one authority, which is His own, exercised through his vicegerents. It is His infallibility which makes the oral and written teaching of the Apostles, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to be the Word of God and a divine revelation. It is the same infallibility which by the assistance of the Holy Spirit gives to the Apostolic hierarchy its prerogative as the authentic and unerring guardian, witness and judge of the divine revelation.

It is Jesus Christ who offers Himself as the Lamb of God to the Father, and gives Himself as the celestial food to the faithful in the Holy Eucharist; Who regenerates in Baptism, seals the baptized with the Holy Spirit in Confirmation, absolves the sinner in Penance and gives the Sacerdotal character in Ordination. The Church, with its ministries and sacraments, is the visible organ of His divine operation, and is therefore called His Body.

Under this figure, the Church is, in a sense, identified with Christ.

Under the figure of the Spouse of Christ, it is represented as dis-

tinct from Him, and personified as His counterpart, the Eve of the new Adam, the mother who bears and nourishes the children of whom He is the Father in the order of regeneration. This figure presents the Church as the ideal of redeemed humanity, in the elect, regarded as destined to final glorification ; and therefore described as clothed with a perfect and spotless sanctity. This sanctity is one of the essential attributes of the Church, which is One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic ; and as the other constitutive and operative principles which are the very essence and nature of the Church cannot be identified with the effects produced, but must be distinguished from the actual phenomena effected in the successive ages and different regions of the world, so also in the case of this attribute of sanctity. And even more so. The principle of unity, catholicity and apostolicity in their active operation, produce their effects in a collective multitude united in the profession of one faith, extended by their number through many ages and countries, under the government of a hierarchy composed of many bishops succeeding to the Apostles. It is this universal and organized society, which is One, Catholic and Apostolic. But sanctity in the sense of moral and spiritual virtue subsists in single, individual subjects. Therefore, the obvious sense of the proposition that the Church is Holy, which suggests itself to the mind at the first sight is, that it is a society composed of a multitude of saints. It is easy to recognize the fact that the multitude of the members of the Church make up a body which is One, Catholic and Apostolic. But it is far from evident that the Church is a society exclusively composed of saints, even in its hierarchy.

The attributes of unity, sanctity, catholicity and apostolicity are not directly and immediately in themselves the notes or marks of the true Church. They are not perceived directly, but in their effects, and are manifested by the phenomena which they produce. In its essential, organic nature, the Church is a hierarchy, beginning in the college of Apostles under St. Peter, as a visible, organic corporation, animated and vivified by the Holy Spirit, with power to perpetuate and extend itself in unity, by Apostolic Succession, and to transmit doctrine and grace from their source in Jesus Christ, indefectibly, until the end of the world. The presence and operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church are made manifest and visible by its historical development in time and space, as a society binding a multitude in unity of faith and order, proclaiming an unchanging doctrine and moral law, and preserving an unbroken succession in the supreme pontificate and episcopate. This phenomenon manifests the attributes of the Church founded by Jesus Christ—the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church—which become in this manner notes, or characteristic marks by which

the true Church can be distinguished from all sects, singly and collectively, whose claim to church privileges is spurious. The four notes are found in a visible and illustrious manner in that society which is the true Church, and are not to be seen in any other. It is easy to show that the Church which is known everywhere as the Catholic Church, and is governed by the Roman Pontiff, possesses the three notes of unity, catholicity and apostolicity solely and exclusively. The note of sanctity can also be vindicated for the same Church in the most conclusive manner. Nevertheless, it requires a longer and more laborious explanation to remove the difficulties and objections which envelop with their obscure mist the glorious edifice of the Church, hiding from the view of the world that sanctity which, once made visible, is the brightest and most evident mark of a divine origin and an in-dwelling presence of the Holy Spirit.

As an essential attribute of the Church, sanctity is a gift of the Holy Spirit, consecrating the Apostolic hierarchy as His medium of teaching infallibly a pure doctrine of faith and morals, and imparting through sacraments and discipline the grace which produces personal sanctity in all its grades, from the baptismal innocence of the infant to the sublime virtues of the most exalted heroes.

As a note of the Church, sanctity must be an effect of the principle of sanctity, visible and evident, together with the other notes, in the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, and in this Church exclusively. It consists first of all in the perpetual unchanging proclamation of the true and pure Faith, that is, of the revealed dogma and moral law entrusted by Christ to the Apostolic hierarchy. This includes the proposition of the ideal of supernatural sanctity derived from the example of our Divine Lord. This ideal is unique and without a parallel and is presented only by the Catholic Church.

The principle of sanctity, being vital and operative, must have the power not only of proposing the ideal of ordinary moral virtue and the higher grades of heroic sanctity in a theoretical manner, but also of producing an actual reality which conforms to the ideal of sanctity and exemplifies it. The note and mark of sanctity is therefore exhibited in the most evident and brilliant manner by the multitude of martyrs and other heroes in a continuous and unbroken succession whose sanctity is illustrated and sanctioned by miracles. These supernatural phenomena are not found in any of the schismatical and heretical sects which broke away from the Catholic Church from the first to the sixteenth century, nor in those which have arisen during the last three centuries. It is impossible to present them in a brief exposition in such a way as to

give them their due and convincing effect. It would require at least one large volume to do this in a satisfactory manner. It is necessary to read the history of the lives of the saints in order to appreciate the evidence they afford that there is but One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, founded by Jesus Christ, the ecclesiastical society governed by the Roman Pontiff as its supreme head. The general and dense ignorance of authentic ecclesiastical history which prevails, together with the gross and extensive falsifications of heretical and infidel writers, have obscured the note of sanctity, and have involved the glorious fabric of the Catholic Church in a mist which it is very difficult to disperse.

The principle of sanctity in the Church has not only produced the most sublime effects of actual sanctity in its members who have been exalted to the highest grades of heroic virtue, it has wrought a social regeneration of entire nations, educated them in a new and Christian civilization, made millions of virtuous and pious Christians, and converted many more millions from a sinful or careless life into sincere penitents. It has peopled heaven with thousands of millions of innocent souls, translated to the kingdom of God in their infancy, and with a countless host of the elect in all the gradations of merit, to inhabit the many mansions of the celestial country.

Nevertheless, it is precisely the note of sanctity which is most vehemently denied to the Catholic Church by her enemies, especially those of the Calvinistic and Puritan type. They object to her claim that she is the medium and instrument of the Holy Spirit for the sanctification of men, that many of her members are sinners, and that sins have abounded in all times and nations which have professed her faith and owned her authority. Alas! it is impossible to deny the fact. But the inference is false. It is implied that the Church ought to make and keep all her members holy, and to banish sin from her domain, which is a false premise.

The grace of God and the sacraments are not magical in their working, and coercive either physically or morally over the mind and will, the character and conduct of rational and free subjects. They give the power to will and to do in the supernatural order of faith, hope and charity, but the willing and doing must proceed from the free co-operation of the human will with divine grace. The regenerated children of God are placed in a state of probation, trial and combat, in which they have to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. They inherit a fallen nature, not perfectly repaired and restored by regeneration. Concupiscence remains, the world is full of dangers and seductions, evil spirits lie in wait along the path of life. Those who sin, sin from their own weakness and malice. However numerous sinners may be, and

however grievous and frequent may be the sins of the members of the Church, the Church is no more responsible than is the Holy Spirit. No one can pretend that the Catholic Church is responsible for the schisms and heresies which have had their cause and origin in rebellion against the authority of the Church. No more can she be held responsible for sins against the moral law which she proposes to her children.

It is chiefly, however, the moral delinquencies of the prelates and rulers of the Church which furnish an offensive weapon against her sanctity to her enemies. Cardinals and bishops, some of whom have occupied very high places in the Church and in the State, have been very worldly men, no better than the generality of secular princes, sometimes even more grievously reprehensible in their moral conduct.

Even in some of the popes, the character of the secular prince has been more conspicuous than that of the pontiff; and there are several who have fallen short of that exemplary sanctity which ought to characterize every bishop, but especially the one who is Christ's Vicar on the earth, and a few, particularly three, who disgraced the Apostolic See by their grievous transgressions of the moral law.

The first Pope who grievously dishonored the tiara was Stephen VII., elected, A.D. 896, by the influence of Lambert, Duke of Spoleto, one of the rival claimants of the imperial crown; but his reign was soon cut short by a violent death. The second on this list of dishonor came thirty-six years later, in 1032—a young prince, not out of his teens, raised to the papal throne by the dominant family of the Conti, who scandalized Christendom by his dissolute life for thirteen years, after which he was induced to abdicate, and who passed the last years of his life doing penance in a monastery. The Pope whom we place third on the list was the too-famous Alexander VI., whose election and reign were really the most grievous and deplorable disgrace which has ever befallen the Roman See. This is so, because he was freely elected by the College of Cardinals, without any serious shock to the moral sense of Christendom. The worst accusations which certain writers have made against Alexander, and the other Roman Borgias, are gross calumnies. Nevertheless, the effort which some well-meaning Catholic writers have made to rehabilitate his private moral character as Cardinal and Pope, has failed. He was faithless to his vow of chastity. This is enough to leave an indelible mark of disgrace upon his name, and upon the names of all who promoted him to the dignities of the Roman Church, because they were more anxious to secure the services of an able statesman and sovereign than to give the Church a holy chief pastor. He was

not, however, as bad as Luther, who took a recreant nun for his mistress, and gave the Landgrave of Hesse a dispensation to keep two wives; or as Cranmer, the apostate Hermann of Cologne, and other violators of their solemn vows, whose names are enrolled with honor in the Protestant annals. If Alexander had been merely a king, and not also a pontiff, his sins would have been condoned and his reign reckoned as illustrious. Even Cæsar Borgia would have received a milder censure on the historic page, were it not that a relentless hatred of the Catholic religion and the Roman Church has driven her enemies to paint every exposed surface of her walls in the blackest colors. It is a singular fact, that a great grandson of Alexander was St. Francis Borgia, one of the most illustrious saints of Spain and of the Society of Jesus, who restored and increased the glory of the name of Borgia, which Alexander and Cæsar Borgia had defaced. This is one of those strokes of Divine Providence, bringing good out of evil, like that which made Solomon, the child of a double crime, the builder of the Temple of Jerusalem. It is in this way that God counteracts the wickedness of men always tending to destroy his kingdom on the earth, and always baffled.

In this way it has happened, that a crisis, to outward seeming fatal, has, in more than one instance, preceded a new development and triumph of the Church contending against the gates of hell. The Church has passed through several disastrous epochs, in which evils existing within her own bosom have been more dangerous than violence from without can ever be.

Her modern enemies, unable to deny that her catholic and apostolic unity, founded on the impregnable Rock of Peter, has survived all these disasters, are driven to contend that she has failed in sanctity. They strive to prove that in the moral convulsions of evil days the Papacy became an evil and immoral power; that wickedness was enthroned when sinners sat upon the throne; that the priesthood became unholy when possessed by unholy men; and the sacrifice was defiled when offered by unworthy hands.

This was the heresy of Wiclef and John Huss. Could the Roman See be called "The Holy See," and be really the supreme and infallible tribunal of doctrine when it was ruled by a dissolute youth like Benedict IX.? Is it possible that such a man as Alexander VI. could be the Vicar of Christ? Such is the argument which is made a plea in bar of all the evidence that Our Lord made St. Peter supreme head of the Church, and that Benedict and Alexander were his successors and heirs in this office. It suffices to rebut this plea to ask: Could it be possible that Judas was one of the Twelve Apostles appointed by the Lord Himself? Could

Caiphas and other wicked men, his predecessors, have been the High Priests of God? Could Balaam have been an inspired prophet?

The enemies of the Church seek to strengthen their cause by exaggerating such historical facts as serve their purpose, adding many other pretended facts, which are either falsehoods or uncertainties, calumniating innocent pontiffs and prelates, drawing false perspectives, and placing historical events in an odious light, in a mist of misleading, distorted and deceptive views, and drowning the whole landscape under a flood of rhetorical invective.

That period which covers a portion of the ninth and tenth centuries, and is justly called the Iron Age of Roman history, affords an abundance of material for the scavengers of polemics. It is true that the great flock of obscene birds has taken flight, scared away by Maitland, Ranke and other non-Catholic historians of the modern school, who have written in a more scholarly and honest temper than that which formerly prevailed. We would not apply any disrespectful epithet to writers of this class, some of whom have really rendered important service to the Catholic cause.

About the middle of the tenth century occurred the extraordinary episode of the brief domination in Rome of a woman, the famous Marozia, which has been made the basis of a most disgraceful historical romance.

Theophylact, Roman senator, and Alberic, Count of Tusculum, were the two most powerful Roman nobles during the glorious pontificate of John X. (914-928). The wife of Theophylact was Theodora; Theodora, the younger, and Marozia were his daughters; and the latter was the wife of Alberic. These women, and another princess, Ermengarda, Marchioness of Ivrea, were remarkable for their beauty, accomplishments and ambition; and have been plentifully bespattered with filth from the sewer of the infamous Luitprand, who was himself an example of how unscrupulous a Catholic bishop can be, and how much mischief he can do. Alberic having been killed in battle, Marozia married Guido, Marquis of Tuscany, brother of Ermengarda; and the three set on foot a revolution in which Rudolph, the nominal emperor, was displaced by Hugo of Provence, who was crowned at Pavia. Guido and Marozia took violent possession of Rome, imprisoned Pope John X., who soon after died, and caused, after two short pontificates, the election of a younger son of Alberic and Marozia, under the name of John XI. Guido having soon after died, Marozia ruled alone, with the titles of Senator and Patrician for about two years. Ambitious of becoming empress, she married her brother-in-law, Hugo, a marriage which was invalid by the

ecclesiastical laws, unless a dispensation, which she could hardly have neglected to obtain, had been granted. The two were preparing to consummate their ambitious projects, when Alberic, the elder son of Alberic and Marozia drove them out and seized on the sovereignty. Marozia was banished, was repudiated by Hugo, on the ground of the canonical impediment, and henceforth disappears from view. Alberic governed wisely and well for twenty-two years, preserving always harmony with the Popes, although for some unknown reasons he kept his brother during the remaining five years of his life in an honorable imprisonment.

Alberic, who had kept up the appearance of governing as the Pope's vicegerent, wishing to end the anomalous division of the spiritual and temporal sovereignties, had his son Octavian educated in the clerical state, that he might reunite both in his own person, which was effected by his election to the pontificate under the name of John XII., who reigned eight years, and called to his aid Otho, the king of Germany, with whom he had afterwards a violent dissension. John XII. is one of the Popes against whom most grievous charges are made, the justice of which we cannot here consider. The tenth age, with all its vicissitudes, was finally closed in 1046, when the series of Hildebrandine Popes commenced, and a new era of the Church and empire, the mediæval period.

We have made this rapid sketch in order to gain a criterion for estimating the justice of the infamous appellation of "Pornocracy" which a distinguished writer has applied to the domination of the family to which Marozia belonged, and in which she played a conspicuous part. It is the vilest term in the English language, and were it not veiled under its Greek form, could not be used with decency. We are ashamed to quote it, and we regret to find it on the page of a Protestant clergyman for whom we have a great respect and a sincere friendship.

Dr. Storrs, who has written many beautiful things about St. Bernard, and even Gregory VII., has dipped his brush in the paint pot of Luitprand to blacken the face and figure of the Roman Church. We fear that he has been moved, like so many others, by the fear lest the tribute to saints and prelates of the Roman Church, extorted by truth and honesty, should make an impression in favor of her claim to be the true Church of Christ.

His ordinary hearers and readers would naturally infer from his language, that the Roman Church became what the old Puritans of England and New England often expressed by a very coarse epithet. The dominion of the Scarlet Woman of Babylon is most exactly expressed by the term "Pornocracy," which is the genuine authentic Protestant idea of the Roman Church.

I have no wish to vindicate Marozia and the group of Italian princes to which she belonged. They were guilty of acts of persecution and oppression of the Roman Church and the Pope, and probably even of assassinations. But there is no evidence that Marozia was such a character as Catharine II. of Russia, the Duchess of Portsmouth, Madame du Barry and Lola Montez. She was married to princes of the highest rank; her sons, Prince Alberic and John XI., were born of her lawful wedlock with the Count of Tusculum, and several of her more remote descendants were illustrious in their character as well as their rank. It is not likely that Alberic, Guido and Hugo would have formed and preserved an alliance with a woman of infamous conduct. And although Hugo repudiated her when she could no longer serve his ambition, his only pretext was the canonical impediment of affinity. The only authority for the heap of foul charges against the Conti family and others which have been spread like dead fish upon many a page of history, is that unscrupulous liar, Luitprand, entirely discredited since the discovery of the Chronicle of Flodoard and the historical researches of Muratori.

Let me ask, now, before leaving Marozia in her obscure tomb, who and what was Ann Boleyn, the mother of the English Reformation and of Queen Elizabeth, declared illegitimate by an Act of Parliament, never repealed? I will not deny the virginity of Elizabeth, but was there no "Pornocracy" in the reign of Henry VIII., and would it not be more modest in those who are derived from him as their religious ancestor to avoid this field of controversy?

No argument can be derived from the sins of rulers and members of the Church against the sanctity of the Church herself. The ideal church is never perfectly reduced to actual reality in the external, collective society of Christians. A society exclusively composed of saints has never existed on a large scale upon the earth. It is not the plan of Divine Providence to shut out moral evil from His spiritual kingdom by an exercise of power. Rebellion broke out among the angels, and the human race in its head, revolted. The rebellion is in the way of being subdued by a warfare between the powers of good and evil under the leadership of the Son of God and Lucifer. But on the earth the good and the evil are not absolutely separated; they are intermingled, and the whole history of the people of God shows the perpetual struggle in its very bosom of the opposing elements. It is the will of God to form His spiritual kingdom out of these imperfect and contending elements, and to make it perfect in the peace of a future state, the celestial Jerusalem.

In the Church Militant there have been dark and disastrous

periods and events which it is painful to contemplate. Saints have been mingled with imperfect Christians, the good and worthy with the unworthy, and with the criminal and vicious. Sins have abounded and disorders have prevailed in the ecclesiastical state. There can be no doubt that the tenth age was a dark and disastrous period, and that in the age sometimes called of Leo X., just preceding the Reformation, there was a crying need of a reform both of discipline and morals. But the relaxation of discipline and morals was caused, not by the influence of Catholic principles, theoretical or practical, but by violation or neglect of the same. Reform was not to be undertaken by revolution in principles, doctrine, organization and discipline, revolt against authority, or any violent means, but by restoration, return to the original and ideal Catholic type, the exercise of legitimate authority in the Church and by the hierarchy.

Declamation against bad, unworthy or worldly and careless prelates, against abuses and moral disorders, is of no force against the Catholic cause, unless these evils can be traced to their origin in the doctrine and polity of the Catholic Church, as their logical and legitimate development. An atheist arguing, from evils in the world, against the theology of Christianity and Theism, is bound to show that this theology makes God the author of sin. An infidel arguing against Christianity from moral evils in Christendom is bound to show that Christianity is responsible for them, and is therefore an immoral and demoralizing religion.

The anti-Catholic plea is merely a kind of inconsistent, incoherent form of the same argument. It has no logical but only a rhetorical force, depending entirely on the ignoring of the true issue by the pleader and the ignorant prejudices of his audience.

The Church is holy because she has always taught a pure and holy doctrine and preserved all the sanctifying means of grace, and has sanctified all who have been docile to her teaching and law in all grades of holiness from the lowest to the highest. She is to be estimated by her genuine and most perfect boughs and fruits, and not by such as are decayed or severed, worm-eaten or rotten.

Whoever is not blind or prejudiced must admit that the papacy and the episcopate have been the great religious and moral powers in the civilized world. Of the 250 popes some 40 have been martyrs or canonized saints; many more have been eminently holy, and of the remainder only a few have been unworthy of their high office. The genuine character and spirit of the papacy are represented and personified in such pontiffs as Clement the First, Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, Leo IX., Gregory VII., Innocent III., Pius V., Pius IX. and Leo XIII. There have been many thousands of bishops, some millions of priests and hundreds of

millions of the faithful. The true representatives of the episcopate have been such men as Athanasius, Basil, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Patrick, Boniface, Remigius, Fisher, Fenelon, Cheverus, Carroll.

There are names of sinners holding high offices in the catalogue of Catholic prelates. But they are not inscribed in the roll of honor in ecclesiastical history. It contains no such names as those of Timothy Aelurus, Photius, Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, or, among princes, George of Saxony, Henry VIII., Elizabeth, Murray. Of those who have deserved honorable mention on the historic page, although there are many who were worthy of canonization, and a much larger number who have resembled more or less closely the saints who have obtained this honor, there are none who have fallen short of the Catholic standard of heroic virtue who have been canonized by ecclesiastical authority, or by the informal verdict of public opinion in the Church. Constantine, Charlemagne, Charles V., Richelieu, those popes and bishops of provincial churches in whom the princely has predominated over the pontifical character, and many others, whether ecclesiastics, statesmen or leaders of thought, who have to a certain extent deserved well of the Church and of human society, have received due credit not unmingled with censure from the judgment of impartial history.

That the effect of the teaching and discipline of the Church has been to produce at all times and everywhere in the midst of the sins and miseries which have only too much abounded in Christendom such abundant fruits of religious and moral virtue as to make the note of sanctity clearly manifest, only the bigoted or the ignorant can dare to deny.

This note is claimed, however, for the Roman Church *exclusively*, and there are many who will readily admit that she has it in common with the sects which are regarded as part of the Christian Church, while vehemently denying that it is her *exclusive mark*.

They contend that religion and virtue flourish within other so-called churches not included in the communion of the Roman Church.

I have no wish to deny or to minimize the existence of the natural virtues, even among Jews, Mohammedans and Pagans. It is, however, out of place here to consider any question in respect to any of these. I am concerned only with the Christian sects. It would be folly to deny that the natural virtues flourish to a great extent among their adherents, and I see no reason why we may not admit that the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity subsist in a great number of sincere and religious persons, separated

from the external communion of the Church, but virtually and spiritually united with it.

However, no matter how many members the sects may have who are holy, their holiness is not derived from any sect, but from the Catholic Church. No sect which has separated from the Catholic Church has ever effected anything for the religious and moral welfare of mankind, or possessed either the attribute or the note of sanctity. The Novatians were indeed strict in their moral doctrine and conduct, but their rigorism was injurious to the cause of religion and morality. The swarm of heretical sects in the early ages were infamously immoral and brought disgrace on the Christian name. The mediæval heretics were a nuisance not only to the Church, but to society and the state. The Lutheran reformation, on the showing of its own disciples, produced an outbreak of immorality and caused untold miseries in Europe. The clergy of the schismatical sects in the east and west have certainly been the instruments of much religious and moral good to their people. They have accomplished this good work by means of sacraments, the Bible, the creeds, the doctrinal and moral truths and precepts retained and inherited from the old Catholic traditions.

Their heresy and rebellion are in themselves only noxious and demoralizing, tending to the destruction of Christianity.

The Calvinistic system, the most logical and complete doctrinal system of the Reformation, destroys all foundation of morality, by making God the author of sin. It is the theory of an immoral universe, worse than the chance medley universe of atheism.

Protestantism, by denying the indissolubility of marriage, has subverted one of the principal foundations of social morality.

The very first principles of Protestantism having become liberated and free to develop, are undermining the whole fabric of supernatural religion, whose downfall must cause Christian civilization to tumble into ruin.

The Note of Sanctity as an exclusive mark of the Catholic Church, shines out most brilliantly in the numerous and unbroken series of martyrs and saints, whose heroic sanctity is glorified and attested by a continuous succession of miracles.

There are, indeed, Christian heroes, not formal members of the Roman Church. Some have died, and others, no doubt, have been willing to die for their Christian profession. But they fall short of the highest Catholic ideal, they are scattered single stars and not a galaxy, and the miraculous element is wanting. The diffused sanctity of the multitude of good Christians is a kind of penumbra to the brilliant central light of the saints.

It remains true, at last, that it is not easy to bring the Note of Sanctity vividly before the minds of the majority. It is the unity

and catholicity of the Church which are most strikingly visible and apparent as her exclusive marks. Her apostolic descent is questioned by none of those who claim the same succession. Her sanctity is sufficiently obvious to destroy all prejudice against the evidence for her exclusive claim derived from her manifest and sole possession of the notes of unity and catholicity.

The history of Christendom, like the history of the world since the fall of Adam, is a sad one, brimful of the record of crimes and miseries. The great obstacle to the spread of the Gospel and the conversion of the heathen is the wickedness of Christians. All Christians are involved in the common disgrace of the Christian name and profession. The children of the Reformation, especially those of England and America, have been in the habit of posing as saints, striking an attitude as if they were inspired prophets, and uttering denunciations of the Catholic Church as a society of sinners.

A great change has, however, taken place among the better and more enlightened class of Protestants within the last half-century. A proof of this is furnished by the language lately used by a well-known English writer, Mr. R. W. Hutton, at the unveiling of the statue of Cardinal Newman in Kensington, London, last July :

"I think we may say that we Protestants have learned from him (Newman) a great lesson. This at least is true, that his long life of winning austerity, the tender glow of his piety and the fundamental steadiness of a nature so strangely sympathetic have rendered it absolutely impossible for any one who really knows his writings ever again to speak of the faith of his Church with anything like the stolid and almost brutal contempt so common amongst us sixty years ago.

"To some extent surely he has helped Roman Catholics to understand, perhaps to love, Protestants. To a very great extent he has helped Protestants to understand and love, not only the thinkers, but the popular mind of his own great Church."—(*London Tablet*, July 18.)

These expressions are of great importance, not as denoting the sentiments of a single individual, but as the testimony of a competent witness to a general fact, otherwise quite patent.

This testimony shows the wonderful power which one saintly prelate has exercised, far more by his holiness than by his genius, to conciliate the respect of non-Catholics to the Catholic Church. And this proves what an influence the Church would gain if her Note of Sanctity could be made to shine out brilliantly by exhibiting the splendid virtues of her saints of all ages. It shows that it is the manifestation of her sanctity which must chiefly give convincing and persuasive force to the preaching of her apostles, and to the evidence that she is the One, Catholic and Apostolic Church, founded by Jesus Christ.

The great mass of the people to whom we preach will look for

this Note of Sanctity, not in the history of past ages and other countries, but in the living, present examples of the prelates, clergy and faithful who are living amongst them. The example of bad and careless Catholics is the greatest stumbling-block in their way. They act on the maxim: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

A great zeal has been awakened for missions to non-Catholics. The great desire and effort of the Holy Father are for the recall of his strayed sheep into the one fold. The same spirit has been awakened throughout the Church, especially in England and America. If our separated brethren respect the clergy as holy men, and recognize in the body of the faithful the religious and moral virtues inculcated by the Catholic religion, their ears and hearts will be open to the truth. Unity and harmony in the hierarchy, discipline, zeal and exemplary life in the clergy, piety and morality in the faithful, will make a more powerful and salutary impression than outward prosperity, splendor of worship, the logic and eloquence of the champions of the faith.

It is the Note of Sanctity which gives lustre and splendor to the other notes of the Church.

When the dark cloud which hides this splendor is scattered, the Church stands as a great fact, present before the mind as the sun is present to vision, exhibiting itself as true by its unity, universality and sanctity. The triumph of Christianity was achieved by Jesus Christ through the Catholic Church. It has continued in the Apostolic Succession of the Supreme Pontiffs and the Episcopate, unchangeable until now, and it must continue until the end of the world. Future conquests of the Kingdom of Christ over the Kingdom of Satan can be achieved only by the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, through which were achieved all the conquests of the past.

AUGUSTINE F. HEWIT.

THE JESUITS AND NEW FRANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

LES JESUITES ET LA NOUVELLE FRANCE AUX XVII^e SIECLE, d'après beaucoup de Documents inédits. Par le *Père Camille de Rochemonteix*, de la Compagnie de Jésus.¹

THE JESUITS IN NORTH AMERICA. By *Francis Parkman*.²

THE OLD RÉGIME IN CANADA. By *Francis Parkman*.

LA SALLE AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE GREAT WEST. By *Francis Parkman*.

“IN writing the history of the Society of Jesus,” says Father de Rochemonteix, in his Introduction,³ “we are also writing that of the French colony, for they have remained inseparable, living the one by the other and mutually helping each other.” The author has had access, as indicated on his title page, to “many unedited documents;” all the archives of the Society, in Canada as well as in Europe, have been placed at his disposal. Among the most important of these he enumerates the “*Historia Societatis Jesu, pars VI^a, ab anno Christi, 1616 ad annum 1646, a P. Josepho Juvenis*,” the thirteenth book of which is devoted entirely to the mission in New France, under the title of “*Liber XIII. continens res gestas in Canada seu Novâ Franciâ*,” the famous “*Relations*,” and the “*Lettres des Missions*.”

The letters written by the missionaries were of three kinds: intimate personal letters, addressed to a friend, a superior, or to the Reverend Father-General, and never intended for publication; others, intended solely for members of the Order, from which extracts were made, published in a volume entitled “*Annuae litterae Societatis Jesu; ad Patres et Fratres ejusdem Societatis*,”⁴ and lastly, those edited for the public, and intended to be printed, generally known as “*Relations*.”

Each series of letters dealt, naturally, with matters of a different nature. Much that a missionary might feel at liberty to write of freely to his Superior, his Provincial, or to the General was, manifestly, unsuitable for publication, or even to be made known to the Society at large; questions of colonial policy, disagreements with secular authorities, unfortunate disputes between the civil

¹ 3 Vols. Paris, Letouzey & Ané, 1895.

² Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1892, 1893.

³ P. v.

⁴ Preface, p. ix.

and religious powers, between the bishops and the religious orders, could not, of course, be dealt with in "Relations" intended for general reading.

The "Relations," therefore, as edited, are only one source of the history of New France, and would, taken by themselves, form but an incomplete account. When supplemented, however, by the information derived from the other letters referred to—a task for which Father de Rochemonteix, a Jesuit himself, is peculiarly well fitted—we get a true insight into the course of events, their causes, their effects, as well as into the motives of the actors; a nearer view, it may be said, than that afforded by Parkman, who, whatever his qualities as a historian, is, as a Protestant, more or less "out of touch" with the spirit of the Society, and who, moreover, could not, from the nature of things, possess such an intimate acquaintance with its records, published and unpublished, as one who, many years a member of the Order, has evidently made those records a special study.

It is as well to insist on this difference between Parkman and Father de Rochemonteix, especially in regard to what may be termed "controversial" points. No man could, possibly, do more ample justice to the heroism and devotion of the Jesuit missionaries and martyrs than Parkman, especially in his "Jesuits in North America," to which we shall have occasion to refer more fully later on; and yet no one has so entirely misjudged those whom he terms "the later Jesuits." At the same time, it must be said, that Father de Rochemonteix is, in the truest sense, an impartial historian. "On every page," says a writer in "*La Revue du Monde Catholique*," of February 1, 1896,¹ "there is revealed a sagacious and penetrating spirit, solicitous above all things for the truth, ready to recognize the weaknesses and faults of his brethren in religion, when they commit them, but prompt also to defend them when he deems them unjustly attacked." He pictures men as they are; as they appeared to their contemporaries, to their religious superiors—who certainly understood the natures of those with whom they had to deal—as they reveal themselves in their most intimate personal correspondence. Such a portrait, if any can be, must surely be true to life.

The first missionary in what is now the Dominion of Canada was a Jesuit, Father Ennemond Massé. He had served first on the Acadian mission, but the history of Acadia, which, it would seem, merits separate treatment, must be passed over with this one single reference in the present article. Father Massé, "sighing only," according to the "Relations," "for the crosses and

¹ Reproduced in *La Verité*, of Quebec, March 21, 28, April 4, 11, 1896.

² "*Les Jesuites*," vol. i., p. 478.

sufferings of the New World," arrived in Quebec on the 19th of June, 1625. The capture of Quebec by the English under Louis Kertk, in 1629, obliged him and his comrades to return to France. This capture was a mere act of piracy on the part of Kertk, peace having been signed between France and England on April 24, 1629—a fact of which the English admiral was aware,¹ though Champlain was not—three months previous to the capitulation of Quebec, on July 19th of that year. By the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (March 29, 1632) all the posts occupied by the English in Acadia and in Canada were restored to France.²

This is the real beginning of the Jesuit missions in Canada. Three Jesuits, Paul le Jeune, Anne de Noué, and a brother, accompanied the provisional Governor, Emery de Caen, on his voyage to resume possession of New France, after three years of British domination. It was, moreover, by the deliberate choice of Richelieu himself, who was known to favor the Capuchins,³ that the Jesuits were put in charge of the missions of New France, the Capuchins, with an honorable delicacy of feeling, having declined a task which they regarded as belonging of right to the two orders who had been expelled by the English, the Jesuits and the Recollets. Richelieu, having decided that it was for the advantage of the colony to be under the charge of a single religious order, had to choose between these two. As the Jesuits, in virtue of their rule, were at liberty to possess property and revenues—from which the Recollets were debarred—the Cardinal chose the former as likely to be less of a charge to the colony, and more able to attract the Indians—reasons of state, doubtless considered of a weighty nature.

Here is the decision, in its original form:⁴

"À ces causes, désirant en cela satisfaire aux ungs et aux autres, et que ce qui appartient aux Pères Jesuittes leur soit rendu afin qu'ils y travaillent à la gloire de Dieu; nous ordonnons que les Pères Paul Le Jeune, Anne de Nouë et Gilbert Buret, qui ont este nommez, . . . aillent reprendre possession des maisons et lieux qu'ils ont desja possédez au dit Québecq, pour y faire les fonctions conformément à leur institut."

The Jesuits have been accused of intriguing, in spite of their professions in a contrary sense, to bring about the exclusion of the

¹ "Les Jesuites," vol. i., p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 182. Parkman asserts (*Jesuits in N. A.*, p. 158) that, in 1642, "partial and ineffective measures were taken, with the countenance of Richelieu, for introducing into New France an order less greedy of seignories and endowments than the Jesuits"—viz., the Capuchins! This may well be compared with the statement in the text. Those who know Richelieu's character may best decide which is more likely to be the true account.

⁴ P. 183, and note 3.

Recollets from the missions of New France. Abbé Faillon¹ writes that "the preference given to the Jesuit fathers by Cardinal Richelieu and the Company of Associates has served as a pretext to *some* to accuse these religious of having excluded the Recollets from the missions in Canada. . . . If they went without the Recollets, it is because the latter did not present themselves at the embarkation; for, in the memoirs which the Recollets composed in their favor, they never complained that a passage was refused them in this year (1632)."

Were the missions to be undertaken such as might prove attractive to human ambition, and were the men themselves, as judged by their subsequent actions, likely to have been influenced by motives of mere jealousy of another order? Both questions, it is hoped, admit of an answer in the negative, by a simple relation of recorded facts, by the admissions of Parkman himself, who had, certainly, no bias in favor of the Jesuits.

"The lives of these early Canadian Jesuits," he writes,² "attest the earnestness of their faith and the intensity of their zeal. . . . One great aim engrossed their lives—'for the greater glory of God.'" . . .

Had Parkman said no more than this, he would have but done justice to the men who, when Canada was restored to France, "sighed for the crosses and the sufferings" of the Indian missions. That he should have thought it necessary to speak of "factitious humility," of "puerile superstitions" in the same breath with such a tribute to their zeal and earnestness, and that, too, in regard to men whose labors, sufferings and martyrdoms, as described by him, should silence such disparagement even if the charges made were true—which has to be proved—only goes to show that his version of their story needs to be compared with that of one who knows them better than he can possibly do, in order that we should really understand and appreciate it.

By the year 1637, there were twenty-three priests and six brothers on the mission,³ assembled in the mission house of Notre Dame des Anges, at Quebec, of whom Paul Le Jeune was the superior. If we would judge of these men by the motives they professed, motives which afterwards showed themselves in all they did and suffered, it may be well to read the expression of them in their own words, as given in the "*Monumenta Historiae Missionis Canadensis*":⁴

"Seven of our fathers (while yet in France) had so divided the seven days of the week that each one by himself, on a different

¹ *Histoire de la Colonie Française (Les Jésuites)*, vol i., p. 184, note 2.

² *The Jesuits in North America*, p. 7.

Les Jésuites, vol. i., p. 189.

⁴ P. 184, note.

day from the others, should offer the sacrifice of the Mass; that no day of the week should pass empty; that no day, in fact, of the whole year (might pass) . . . but that the sacrifice of the Mass should be offered for the happy success of that undertaking," namely, their return to the missions of New France.

The mission house was almost entirely in ruins, and partly burnt by the English. Le Jeune gives the following description of it:¹

"Elle a quatre chambres basses. La première sert de chapelle, la seconde de réfectoire, et dans ce réfectoire sont nos chambres. Il y a deux petites chambres passables, de la grandeur d'un homme en carré; il y en a deux autres, qui ont chacune huit pieds, mais il y a deux lits on chaque chambre. La troisième grande chambre sert de cuisine, la quatrième, c'est la chambre de nos gens."

Such was the first scene of their labors, the home to which they were to return—if alive—at intervals, from their missionary journeys. "Quebec was only a poor village, in which a few hundred Europeans . . . sheltered themselves behind palisades made of trees . . ."² The ideal of the colony was, however, above all things, religious. The Company of the Hundred Associates, who, at this time, had the practical control of New France, wished to "consecrate it entirely to God."³ "To form the body of a colony," they said to Father Le Jeune, "we must begin with religion." They showed, moreover, a great zeal for the conversion of the savages.⁴

The history of New France in the seventeenth century is divided by Father de Rochemonteix into two periods: The first from the foundation of Quebec, in 1605, to the erection of the apostolic vicariate in 1658; the second from the latter date to the end of the century and beyond. The first duties of the missionaries were, of course, to their fellow-countrymen, who were, for the most part, all that they could wish; so much so, that they could say⁵ that "l'accroissement des paroissiens est l'augmentation des louanges de Dieu."

A college was built, the offices of religion were duly performed. It seemed, indeed, as if, in the New World, there was to grow up a people who, in changing their climate, had changed their lives, and had returned to the simplicity and fervor of the first centuries.

It was the very ideal of a state-aided, state-controlled colony; a system of emigration as perfect as the seventeenth century could make it. Church and State combined to render it a success. Such a system has always been the ideal of many would-be reformers.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

² *Revue des Mondes Catholique (La Verité)*, March 21, 1896.

³ *Les Jésuites*, vol. i., p. 195.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201, "Relation of 1636."

It was a favorite one with the late James Anthony Froude. That it ultimately failed must be attributed either to a fault inherent in the system itself, or to the race—some would say the religion—of those who attempted to carry it out. Race prejudice could, however, hardly venture to assert as much. Religious prejudice may be best met by the facts of the case. One such fact will, it is hoped, stand out self-evident, namely, that, had New France been true to the traditions of her founders, Champlain in the state and Le Jeune in religion, she might, but for the unconquerable hostility of the Iroquois, have escaped extinction.

But the chief task of the Jesuits was, after all, the conversion of the savages. The mission-field had been the true home of the Jesuit since the foundation of his order. The Society, not much more than a century old, had covered India, China and Japan with flourishing churches. They had missions in all parts of the world; everywhere the Jesuit sought out, beyond all others, the lost souls of the savages to win them to Christ. So it was that "amid cares of all kinds lavished on the colonists of Quebec, Miscou and Three Rivers, he did not forget his chief work, the moral regeneration of the savages, and of their conversion to Christianity." Father de Rochemonteix adds that "the conquest of the savages of Canada was, from the first moment, the dearest preoccupation, the holy ambition of Father Le Jeune." The one great difficulty was, of course, their ignorance of the Indian languages. The trappers and hunters, who, from their intercourse with the natives, were familiar with the different dialects, refused to impart the knowledge they had acquired. These men, destined to prove one of the most serious obstacles both to the material and spiritual welfare of the colony—to its material welfare, by withdrawing themselves and others from agriculture, and the various useful occupations necessary to the settlement and progress of a colony, to a life of wandering in the forests and association with the savages; to its spiritual welfare, for the same reasons, as also for their persistent continuance in the deadly traffic of liquor—and of vice—with the savages, were, doubtless, afraid of losing their influence with the Indian tribes, should the Jesuits, whose zeal they knew so well, once gain a footing among them, by learning to speak to them in their own languages.

"There was," says Parkman,¹ "one resource, however, of which Le Jeune would fain avail himself. An Indian, called Pierre by the French, had been carried to France by the Recollet friars, instructed, converted and baptized. He had lately returned to Canada, where, to the scandal of the Jesuits, he had relapsed into

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

² *Jesuits in North America*, p. 17.

his old ways” “The charitable superior,” says Father de Rochemonteix, “took pity on him, clothed him, fed him and installed him as schoolmaster of the residence”¹ He was, however, not by any means trustworthy; “sa déloyauté vint à ce point de lui donner exprez un mot d’une signification pour un autre.” At the beginning of Lent he disappeared, with the very obvious intention of escaping its rigors. The pupil had, however, made a certain amount of progress. “He could, after having written, make himself understood by the savages.”² It was a beginning, nothing more; it was not, by any means, sufficient for his purpose. There was only one other way possible, and he thus announces his intention of adopting it: “Je pense donc à m’en aller cet hiver prochain avec les sauvages.”³ He adds: “Si je veux savoir la langue, il faut, de nécessité, suivre les sauvages Qui saurait parfaitement leur langue⁴ serait tout puissant parmi eux, ayant tant soit peu d’éloquence. Il n’y a lieu au monde où la rhétorique soit plus puissante qu’au Canada.”

Those who know the Indian as he is, not as he is pictured—as the savage, dirty, immoral, treacherous, drunken, improvident and superstitious, not as the “noble red man”—can form some idea of what it must have meant to a man like Le Jeune, scholarly, refined, not over robust, not yet fully accustomed to the rigors of the Canadian climate, to pass a winter with a band of Montagnais Indians,⁵ sharing their lot, their travels, their hardships as one of themselves. For the Jesuit it was a simple matter of duty; Father de Nouë had already spent two or three weeks with them, at the end of which time “he appeared,” says Parkman,⁷ “sick, famished and half dead with exhaustion.” The priest, as Le Jeune writes,⁸ “faut prendre sa vie, et tout ce qu’on a et le jeter à l’abandon, pour ainsi dire, se contentant d’une croix bien grosse et bien pesante pour toute richesse.” He adds,⁹ “j’y voudrais déjà être, tant j’ai du mal au cœur de voir ces pauvres âmes errantes sans aucun secours. . . . On ne peut mourir qu’une fois, le plus tôt n’est pas toujours le pire.”

“About the end of October (1633)” writes Father de Roche-

¹ *Les Jésuites*, vol. i., p. 233.

² *Ibid.*, “Relation of 1634,” p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*, “Relation of 1633,” p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 234, “Relation of 1633,” p. 7.

⁵ *Algonquin*.

⁶ These Indians “scattered over the Saguenay and Lake St. John, had taken refuge under the French cannon from their enemies, the Iroquois.” *Les Jésuites*, vol. i., p. 235.

⁷ *The Jesuits in North America*, p. 19.

⁸ *Ibid.* “Relation” of 1633, p. 19.

⁹ *Les Jésuites*, vol. i., p. 236.

monteix,¹ "he embarked in a canoe on the St. Lawrence . . . and on the 12th of November the three bands entered the wooded districts near the sources of the Saguenay. Several feet of snow covered the ground . . . " and through the winter woods Father Le Jeune, laden, as he says, "comme un mulet,"² followed his Indian guides from day to day. "At the fall of evening," the narrative continues,³ "the encampment is made." When game was plentiful there was feasting; when it failed, hunger to the point of starvation. "Pour un bon disner," writes the missionary,⁴ "il faut se passer deux ou trois jours de manger," and adds in another letter,⁵ "le faim m'a pensé tuer." Well might he say that not ten priests out of a hundred could endure such a winter among the savages.

The worst of his sufferings were due to the malice of the sorcerer Carigonan, the brother of his guide, Pierre, known as "the apostate," who, fearing lest his influence over his countrymen should be lessened by that of the missionary, heaped on his head every indignity and insult, and barely stopped short of actual murder.

This veritable martyrdom lasted six months,⁶ but was not without results, for he became fairly skilled in the Algonquin language; sufficiently so, at all events, to instruct his fellow-religious.⁷ He had acquired, at the same time, that knowledge of the customs, laws, manners, religion and superstitions of the savages,⁸ with which the "Relations" are filled, and, moreover, being of a practical nature, and a keen observer, he returned from his expedition with a definite scheme for the evangelization of the savages.⁹

This plan included both the "sedentary" or "stable" tribes, such as the Hurons, and the wandering tribes, such as the Algonquins and Montagnais. It was from among the first that he looked for the greatest number of conversions; gathered, as they were, round the different French settlements, it was comparatively an easy matter to reach them. Nor were the labors of the missionaries, nobly aided by those of the nuns under the saintly Marie de l'Incarnation, without results; the Relations tell of many conversions even in those early years.

As to the Algonquins and Montagnais, his plan was to gather them "in village bodies, near the French settlements, safe from the incursions of the Iroquois."¹⁰ There were difficulties to be encountered; the Company of Richelieu were willing to give the land, but refused to supply the money.

The plan remained, therefore, for several years in abeyance.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

² P. 237.

³ P. 238.

⁴ P. 239.

⁵ P. 240.

⁶ P. 242.

⁷ P. 243.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ P. 240.

That the offer made in 1637 by Brûlard de Sillery, one of the original members of the Company of New France, should have been regarded as the result of divine intervention, who can wonder? "Having learned from the Jesuits and from their Relations," writes Father de Rochemonteix,¹ "the plans of Father Le Jeune for the conversion of the Algonquins and Montagnais, he wished to contribute to it, and did so, as he did everything, en grand seigneur." He gave, we are told,² "a considerable sum," and the residence of St. Joseph de Sillery, about four miles from Quebec, was founded in 1637.³

The result justified Le Jeune's expectations. There were thirty Algonquin families resident at the mission in 1641, one hundred and sixty-seven Indian Christians in 1645.⁴ Their temporal welfare was as much cared for as their spiritual, the Jesuits were as diligent in teaching them agriculture and useful occupations as they were in instructing them in the mysteries of the faith. "Father Vimont, the superior of the mission," writes Mother Marie de l'Incarnation,⁵ "in order to encourage the poor savages, leads them himself to their work, and works the ground with them . . . finding nothing too low which concerns the glory of God and the good of these people."

Other missions of a similar character were founded on the model at Sillery, one at Three Rivers, in 1640,⁶ by Father Buteaux,⁷ at the trading-post of Tadoussac in the same year, Father de Quen being in charge of this latter mission.⁸ "Doubtless," says Parkman,⁹ "in their propagandism they (the Jesuits) were acting in concurrence with a mundane policy;"¹⁰ but, for the present at least, this policy was rational and humane. . . . These sanguinary hordes, weaned from intestine strife, were to unite in a common allegiance to God and the king. . . . Spanish civilization crushed the Indian; English civilization scorned and neglected him; French civilization embraced and cherished him."

In October, 1644, war had broken out between the Hurons and their allies on the one side and the Iroquois on the other, "and terror reigned everywhere."¹¹ Father Druillettes, who had joined the mission in Quebec in 1643, was sent to spend the winter with a band of converted Algonquins, driven to flight from their settlements by fear of the Iroquois. "The Iroquois," they said, "are

¹ P. 247.² P. 248.³ *Ibid.* "The act of donation is dated 1639."⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ P. 249.⁶ P. 251.⁷ Killed by the Iroquois May 10, 1651, when on a missionary journey to the Attikamegs, or "White Fishes," on the St. Maurice River. P. 263.⁸ P. 254.⁹ *The Jesuits in North America*, p. 44.¹⁰ This statement may be compared with the account given by Marie de l'Incarnation just quoted.¹¹ *Les Jesuites*, p. 268.

pursuing us everywhere; we are obliged to go several days' journey from the house of prayer, and, in our sojourn of several months, we ardently desire to have some one with us who may administer to us the Sacraments and teach us the way to heaven."

The hardships undergone by Father Druillettes during his winter among the Algonquins were very similar to those described by Father Le Jeune, with this great difference, that those with whom he sojourned were devout and earnest Christians. Mass was said at every stopping place, in the silence of the forest, Sundays and festivals duly observed. "On Good Friday the savages kneeling at the foot of the Crucifix, near the rustic altar, prayed fervently for their enemies, the Iroquois. 'Lord,' they said, 'pardon those who pursue us with such fury, who put us to death with such rage; open their eyes.'"¹ "Those who know," writes Parkman, commenting on this scene,² "the intensity and tenacity of an Indian's hatred will see in this something more than a change from one superstition to another. An idea had been presented to the mind of the savage to which he had previously been an utter stranger. This is the most remarkable record of success in the whole body of the Jesuit "Relations," but it is very far from being the only evidence that in teaching the dogmas and observances of the Roman Church the missionaries taught also the morals of Christianity. When we look for the results of these missions we soon become aware that the influence of the French and the Jesuits extended far beyond the circle of converts. It eventually modified and softened the manners of many unconverted tribes." Further on he adds:³ "As for the religion which the Jesuits taught them, however Protestants may carp at it, it was the only form of Christianity likely to take root in their crude and barbarous nature."

In 1646 Father Druillettes was sent on a mission to the Abenakis on the Kennebec, and Father de Quen to the Porcupine Nation on the Saguenay. Both missions were successful, but the details are very similar to those already given. Parkman's account is practically the same as that of Father de Rochemonteix, being drawn, to a great extent, from the same sources, the principal one being, of course, the "Relations," but the "coloring," so to speak, is, as might be expected, wholly different. Parkman is, however, more just to those whom he designates as "of the earlier period;"⁴ it is in the latter, and what may be called the more "controversial" period, that his statements need to be compared with those of the Jesuit historian.

It would, of course, be impossible, within the limits of a review

¹ *Ibid.* "Relation" of 1645, p. 14.

² *Jesuits in N. A.*, p. 319.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

² *Ibid.*, p. 269.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

article, to follow Father de Rochemonteix from point to point; we may, however, be able by means chiefly of quotations and summaries, to give a general idea of the contents of the three large volumes which he has written. That his aim was the historic "rehabilitation" of the Society of Jesus, does not lessen the interest of his work; "no religious order has ever united in itself," says Parkman,¹ "so much to be admired and so much to be detested." As to the first, as already said, he is, practically, at one with Father de Rochemonteix—though he cannot refrain from allusions to the other—so far, that is, as the Canadian Jesuits are concerned, and whom he professes to portray as they were;² as to the second—as also said—his account must be compared with that of Father de Rochemonteix, of whom a writer in the "Universe"³ says that "his aim has been to express, without fear of details, the participation of his brethren in this great work. He has treated the question, not without emotion, but without partiality, with a double respect, for his order and for the truth." The same writer adds,⁴ "In this long march of apostleship and of civilization, the Jesuits did not lack sufferings and persecutions. They had to endure hunger, thirst, cold and heat. Another kind of cruel sufferings was reserved to them; in all parts of the world, they have met with enemies and calumniators."

"Death, however," the narrative continues,⁵ "was beginning to harvest these valiant laborers," and among the first was Father Anne de Nouë, for whom it was reserved that, as "he lived only of God and for God," that he should die "far from all human succor, aided and consoled by God alone."⁶ He left Three Rivers on the 30th of January, 1646, in company with two soldiers and a Huron, for the purpose of administering the Sacraments of Penance and Holy Communion to the garrison of Fort Richelieu. "When evening came," we are told,⁷ "they stretched themselves in a large hole, dug in the snow. . . . The two soldiers were very tired." Father de Nouë noticed this, and, listening only to his charity, rose at two in the morning. . . . and started to go to the fort for help. . . . Three days later, . . . a soldier and two Hurons, sent to look for him, found the frozen body of the missionary four leagues above the fort. He was kneeling, with his head uncovered, his arms crossed on his breast, his eyes open and looking to heaven." A martyr of charity, truly. "Greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends." Father Ennemond de Massé died on the 12th of May the same year, and was buried at Sillery, where, in 1870, his bones were

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.³ Quoted in *La Verité* May 9, 16 and 23, 1896.⁵ *Les Jesuits*, vol. i., p. 274.² *Ibid.*⁴ *Ibid.*, May 23.⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 275.⁷ *Ibid.*

found near the old church and a monument erected to "the first apostle of New France."¹

Father de Rochemonteix enters, somewhat at length,² into an account of the establishment at Notre Dame des Anges, at Quebec, of a seminary for Indian boys. This was the second half, so to speak, of Father Le Jeune's plan for the conversion of the savages, of the nomad tribes in particular, who, when converted, were, according to the charter of the Hundred Associates, as drawn up by Richelieu, to be considered as French citizens.³ In so far as the nomad tribes were concerned, Father Le Jeune was, as we have seen, successful;⁴ this plan of a seminary failed simply because it was at total variance with the nature and customs of the Indians themselves. The savage children were impatient of confinement and restraints, "they bewailed their lost liberty, they regretted their cabins and their woods, they saw nothing higher than hunting and fishing. . . . It was impossible to retain even the pupils who were most devoted to their masters. On the other hand, the parents did not understand the advantages of the institution."⁵

Indian families are, as a rule, by no means numerous, seldom exceeding three or four children,⁶ who, from the very nature of Indian life, begin at a very early age to take a share in the duties and labors of the family. That is to say, that the Jesuits had to contend with all the difficulties of school attendance among an agricultural population in an extreme form. That, under such circumstances, the plan of the seminary had to be reluctantly abandoned, was only natural. The funds collected in France in support of this unsuccessful but most costly undertaking were usefully applied to the building of cabins for the Indian settlers at St. Joseph de Sillery.⁷

Nor were the Sulpicians who had come to Villemarie or Montreal⁸ more successful in a similar undertaking. In both cases the priests were blamed by those who, living far from the scene of the labors they were so ready to criticise, were totally unable to realize the difficulties to be overcome. Talon, undoubtedly a great minister, actually "attributed the want of success to the bad will of the Jesuits,⁹ who were accused of opposing the *Francization* of the Indians, for fear of losing the great influence they had gained or hoped to gain over them."¹⁰ Richelieu's wish, as we have seen, was to make French citizens of the converted Indians; the

¹ *Ibid*, p. 277.

² Chapter V., pp. 278-318

³ P. 278.

⁴ In August, 1650, 600 Indians ("neophytes") walked in procession at Quebec on the Feast of the Assumption of the B. V. M. P. 264. Note.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

⁶ P. 286.

⁷ P. 287.

⁸ Founded by Maisonneuve in 1642.

⁹ P. 295.

¹⁰ P. 288.

idea was carried further, and French doctrinaire civilizers of the seventeenth century maintained that the only way to accomplish their purpose was to make them *Frenchmen*! Those who from long experience might naturally be supposed to know better were, of course, accused of factious opposition.

The dispute continued all through the period of which we are treating. Talon's report on the subject, written to Colbert, is dated 1667;¹ in 1691 Frontenac, then governor of the colony, who was a strong advocate of *Francization*,² wrote in favor of "always leaving the French with the Indians, in order to make them Frenchman while making them Christians,"³ and adduced in support of his proposal his twelve years of experience. As a matter of fact—it may be said of invariable experience—"this famous mingling," as Father de Rochemonteix terms it,⁴ . . . "did no good to the Indians and injured the French." As Mother Marie de l'Incarnation said,⁵ "A Frenchman becomes an Indian sooner than an Indian becomes a Frenchman." Here again all experience confirms the truth of the assertion.

It is as well to add that the English Governors of the New England colonies in recognizing the Jesuits as their most dangerous enemies, did them merely justice. In becoming Catholics, in adopting, that is, the religion of France, the Indians became loyal subjects of France without losing their native characteristics. This was all, and more than all, that the success of any such visionary scheme as that of making them *Frenchmen* could ever have accomplished. Their success is measured by the hatred they incurred on the part of their English neighbors, who charged them, justly enough, with making a French subject of every Indian converted to "Popery." The same charge has been made, wholly without justice, against the French missionaries in Uganda. That the convert should sympathize with all the feelings, religious and national, of his missionary is only natural. The possibility of any such charge has been removed in Africa by the appointment of English Catholic missionaries. But in New France the Jesuits were doing no more than their duty in making French subjects of their converts. New France was Catholic, New England Protestant; there was political as well as religious rivalry between the two colonies, every Indian tribe gained to either faith became, from the very force of circumstances, an ally on the one side or the other.

The dispute has been dwelt on somewhat fully, and, to some extent, out of the exact chronological order, wherein we have followed Father de Rochemonteix, for the reason that it affords an

¹ P. 292.

² There really appears no other term available.

³ P. 274. Note.

⁴ P. 293.

⁵ *Ibid.*

explanation of the motives for the many charges subsequently made against the Jesuits. On the one hand, as said above, the English accused the Jesuits of being political intriguers—a charge repeated by Parkman, as we shall see; on the other, Talon, Frontenac, and others of the civil authorities, both in New France and at court, accused them of deliberately refusing to make Frenchmen of the Indians for fear of losing their influence. Neither Talon nor Frontenac was a man to brook opposition, real or imaginary, neither, whatever his other good qualities, was likely to view with favor those to whom he supposed such opposition to be due. The Puritans of New England had no love for the Jesuits at the best of times,¹ regarding them as emissaries of the “Kingdom of Antichrist,”² to say nothing of the fur-trade. Every success, religious or political—the two being, practically, coincident and inseparable—would be an added offence. That the Jesuits were successful, their enemies are witnesses; therefore, the charges made against them by the suspicious civil authorities fall to the ground. It is typical, however, of the lot of the Jesuits, that they should be assailed by secret enemies and open foes, that they should have been burdened “with the weight of life against English Protestants, suspicious governors, despotic ministers, and traders greedy for profit.”³ But all these facts and conditions once fairly understood, we shall be able to estimate at their true value many, if not all, of the charges made against the Society, and be grateful to Father de Rochemonteix for affording us “the satisfaction of seeing facts disprove the legends.”⁴

The mission to the Hurons was of a different nature, in many respects, to that to the Algonquins. There were greater dangers and hardships to be encountered, but neither the one nor the other deterred the missionaries. To those familiar with Parkman's account,⁵ the story as told by Father de Rochemonteix offers little that is new; there is simply, in this case, as throughout the whole history, the difference of view; that of Parkman being what we should naturally expect from an outsider whose admiration for the heroism of the Jesuits, great as it is, cannot overcome his prejudices; that of Father de Rochemonteix, on the other hand, being the view of one who is in sympathy with those of whom he writes, but whose sympathy does not, for all that, make him partial. He is as ready to expose their faults, where he believes them to exist, as Parkman himself; but in cases where either one or

¹ An act of the Colony of Massachusetts (1674) ordained that Jesuits entering the colony should be expelled, and, if they returned, should be hanged. *The Jesuits*, p. 324.

² *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

³ *L'Univers (La Verite, May 9th).*

⁵ *Jesuits in N. A.*, pp. 42-126.

other of two motives is to be imputed, he chooses the better one, not the worse. It is, in fact, a conflict of opinion, rather than of evidence, the evidence being the same—to all intents and purposes—in both instances. Parkman interprets it in accordance with his Protestant “bias,” Father de Rochemonteix in accordance with his Jesuit sympathies. In other words, Parkman reads the story as a foreigner, in a double sense—a stranger both to the language and the religion of those about whom he writes; Father de Rochemonteix as one intimately familiar to both. The question to be decided is—which reading is the more inherently probable of the two, more consistent, that is, with the characters of those spoken of, as evinced by their lives and by their deaths?

Parkman, it must always be remembered, is the descendant of a race of New England Puritans, at all times the bitterest and most uncompromising foes of “Popery,” most especially of the French “Papists” with whom they were in constant conflict. Such race prejudice must, inevitably, be difficult to overcome; more especially as regards the Jesuits, who, of all men, have suffered most at the hands of “friends” and foes. “Protestants, Gallicans, Parliamentarians, Jansenists, students and Liberals,” says the writer in “*L'Univers*” already quoted,¹ “implacable enemies or polite adversaries, have all taken a hand in it with a perseverance which want of success does not discourage.” There was a time—it may be true still with not a few—when the word “Jesuit” was equivalent to “devil”—or not far short of it. “Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?” Parkman is to be credited to the full for having ventured to tell the approximate truth—as far, that is, as he could—concerning the Jesuits, as Scott, before him, wrote in favor of Catholics and of monks; but in both, and in Parkman particularly, the malign influence of three centuries of Protestant tradition was too strong to allow of his seeing things in their true colors and in their real proportions.

Father de Rochemonteix, on the other hand, appeals to our confidence by his perfect candor. He states, in full, the charges made against his order by Abbé Faillon, Abbé Gosselin and others; he quotes, “chapter and verse,” contemporary records, Jesuit and other; the most intimate personal letters—as already said—of those whose lives and deaths are the best proofs that they wrote and spoke the truth.

To return to the Huron mission, a brief outline of which may be given here for the sake of clearness. These tribes, a “stable population, far in advance of the famished wanderers of the Saguenay, or their less abject kindred of New England,” inhabited “the

¹ *La Verité*, May 9th.

² *Jesuits in N. A.* Introduction, p. xxiv.

peninsula formed by the Nottawassaga and the Matchedash Bays of Lake Huron, the river Severn and Lake Simcoe. Its area was small—its population comparatively large. In the year 1639 the Jesuits made an enumeration of its villages, dwellings and families. The result showed thirty-two villages and hamlets, with seven hundred dwellings, about four thousand families and twelve thousand adult persons, or a total population of at least twenty thousand.” “The region”—to quote again from Parkman²—“was an alternation of meadows and deep forests, interlaced with foot-paths leading from town to town. Of these towns, some were fortified, but the greater number were open and defenceless. They were of a construction common to all tribes of Iroquois lineage, and peculiar to them.” . . .

The “Huron mission” included the Tinnontaks, or Tobacco Nation, the Neutral Nation,³ so called because they had been able to maintain a state of strict neutrality between the Iroquois and the Hurons; further south, the Eries, or Cat Nation, akin to the Hurons in customs and language, long the terror of the Iroquois; further south again, on the Susquehanna, were the fierce and resolute tribe of the Andasks.⁴ “Our intention,” writes Bressani, “was to advance always towards the discovery of new peoples, and we hoped that a colony among the Hurons would be as a key to the position.”⁵

The priests in charge of this mission were Jean de Brebœuf, “that masculine apostle of the faith, the Ajax of the mission,” as Parkman calls him;⁶ Charles Garnier, Joseph Marie Chaumonot, Noël Chabanel and Isaac Jogues. Pierre Chastelain, Paul Rague-neau, Simon Le Moine and others joined them later. It was no light task that they had undertaken. The very journey to be gone was full of dangers, for, in 1634, the war between the Hurons and the Iroquois was at its height,⁷ and beset by hardships and difficulties.

Bancroft, the American historian, thus describes it:⁸ “The voyage, by way of the Ottawa and its affluents, was one of more than three hundred leagues, through a fearful country, covered by forests. All day long the missionaries had to cross fords, or to work at the paddles. At night, no other nourishment than a meagre ration of Indian corn, mixed with water; for bed, the ground and the rocks. The canoe must be carried on the shoulders for several

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxv. Lalemant, *Relation des Hurons*, 1640.

² *Ibid.*, xxv., xxvi.

³ “Attiwandaronk,” *Les Jesuites*, p. 320. Note 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

⁶ *Jesuits in North America*, p. 99.

⁷ *Les Jesuites*, p. 324.

⁸ *Hist. of U. S.*, vol. iv., ch. xx. *Ibid.*, p. 325 (*Les Jesuites*).

leagues, at thirty-five cataracts. . . . And thus, swimming, fording, dragging or carrying the canoe, their clothes torn, their feet bruised, the breviary hung round their necks, the missionaries traced their way, in spite of rivers, lakes and forests, from Quebec to the very heart of the Huron country."

Truly, to enter on such a mission, a man "must make the sacrifice of his life."

"Les miracles *dans ce pays*," writes Father Jean de Brebœuf,² "sont ceux-cy : faire du bien aux sauvages, souffrir bien des maux, et ne s'en plaindre qu'à Dieu."

These few words tell the whole story.

"This mission," writes Father de Rochemonteix,³ "was well suited to this heart eaten up with holy ambitions, eager to do greatly and to suffer all things for the salvation of the peoples redeemed at the price of the Blood of Jesus Christ. And yet, the faith could not spread itself on the soil of New France, as he himself was to write one day, but *by labors, by watchings, by tribulations and patience, the laborer will only reap after having long weeded and sown in tears and groanings.*"

This was their true motive ; this their chief object : the salvation of souls. All else is as nothing in comparison. That the plan, offering, as it did, material advantages, should have been favored by Champlain,⁴ for military and commercial, as well as political reasons, was to them merely an incidental circumstance. Had nothing of the kind transpired, they would have undertaken the mission just as zealously, Brebœuf having, in fact, spent some considerable time among the Hurons, in 1625, before the temporary cession of New France to England. That they should have been able to serve their country while serving God, doubtless gave them fresh courage and greater happiness, as it removed all possibility of opposition on the part of the civil authorities, who were always willing that the Jesuits should share the dangers and hardships of the colony, if they grudged them a share in its honors or its government.

"What was the life of the missionaries in these Huron dwellings from 1634 to 1639? Historians have spoken of it more or less ; all have noted the characteristic of terrible austerity that particularly marked it. . . . In reading the *Relations* and the private correspondence . . . we understand how much of truth there is in these few lines of Father J. Lalemant : ' On aimerait mieux recevoir un coup de hache sur la tête que de mener, les années durant, la vie qu'il faut mener ici tous les jours, travaillant à la conversion

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

² *Relation of 1635*, pp. 46, 48, 49. *Ibid.*, p. 327.

³ P. 331.

⁴ P. 335.

des barbares.¹ This life," adds Father de Rochemonteix, "was a veritable martyrdom from day to day."

It would be too long to enter into the detailed history of this mission, from 1635 on to the "opening of the era of martyrs in 1646."² Father de Rochemonteix's account, like that of Parkman, is full of the deepest interest. It would be hard to say which is the more so, except, as already said, on several occasions, that the former is more "sympathetic."

Before taking up the narrative of the events which occurred in the Huron mission during the years 1648 and 1649, as well as of those which led up to them, it may be as well to give the results of the mission so far, and to indicate the chief difficulties by which such results are to be measured.

"These men of God," writes Father de Rochemonteix,³ "turned and returned the soil confided to their care; they watered it with the sweat of their brow, and for years, without result, without hope of harvest." The first adult convert was baptized in 1637, three years after Father de Brebœuf's arrival on the mission. Two years later, fifty Indians were baptized at the village called by the Jesuits Conception; twenty-five at St. Joseph, six or seven at St. Michael.⁴ These figures refer to adult baptisms; there had been a very large number of infants, and not a few grown persons, baptized at the moment of death.

It was not merely that it was difficult to convince the Hurons of the truth of Christianity; even when apparently convinced, they could, with great difficulty, be brought to accept baptism. Father Chaumonot points out the chief difficulty in a letter to Father Philip Napi, superior of the professed house in Rome: "Leur obstination dans l'infidélité," he says,⁵ "est produite par la difficulté qu'ils croient trouver dans l'observation des commandments, et surtout du sixième."⁶

"The fact is," says Father de Rochemonteix, "that of all the nations of the New World, the Huron tribe is one of the most corrupt; it was also one of the most perverse on earth."⁷

"Estre capitaine ches les Hurons," says the same "Relation," "et estre chrétien, c'est joindre le feu à l'eau." . . . Other difficulties might have been overcome. The "honor of dishonor"⁸ was ingrained in their very nature, and by its very nature, strengthened all the other objections usually advanced by savage tribes against a new religion.

¹ *Relations of 1639*, p. 57 (*Les Jésuites*, p. 339). It has been thought best in this, as in all other cases, to give the exact words of the writer, without translating them.

² P. 446.

³ Vol. i., p. 436.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ P. 441.

⁶ The seventh, according to the Protestant version.

⁷ P. 441. *Relation of 1639*, p. 71.

⁸ *Relation of 1642*, p. 85.

The hostility of the Iroquois, constantly at feud with the Hurons and the Algonquins, a feud in which the French became inevitably involved, was, however, the one obstacle to the success of the missions, which no human effort could hope to overcome. Being at the same time a menace to the very existence of the youthful colony, war seemed to be the only possible alternative. This tribe was not, as a matter of fact, very numerous at this period (1640); they counted, indeed, only from two thousand to two thousand five hundred warriors.¹ But though not as powerful, as to numbers, as their enemies, the Algonquins, the Hurons and the French, they were braver than the tribes named, and more united than the coalition formed against them. They had, moreover, a barrier of defence to the south, in the Dutch colony of Manhattan.²

Champlain, as might have been expected, realized the danger that threatened the colony and prepared to face it. He asked for but one hundred and twenty soldiers from France, but failed to obtain them, the Cardinal being busy with the war against the house of Austria.³ By the year 1641 matters had grown more serious, the fact that the French had so far acted merely on the defensive had emboldened the Iroquois to continue their attacks. These attacks were directed with peculiar bitterness against those Indians who had become Christians, and whom the Iroquois regarded, justly enough, as identified with the French. Father Vimont, writing in this year to the Provincial at Paris, says: "Si on n'a ce peuple (les Iroquois) pour amy, ou si on ne l'extermine, il faut abandonner à leurs cruautés tant de bons néophytes, il faut perdre tant de belles espérances."⁴

It meant more than this, it meant martyrdom, and they knew it. The roll of immortal honor begins with that of Isaac Jogues, who, when his French and Huron fellow-voyagers, the latter mostly Christians, were surprised and taken prisoners by the Iroquois on Lake St. Peter, on August 2, 1642,⁵ "listening only to his apostolic heart," says Father de Rochemonteix,⁶ gave himself up as a prisoner, of his own accord, knowing perfectly well what such a captivity must entail. His martyrdom lasted for twelve months,⁷ and must be read, either in the account given by Parkman or in that of Father de Rochemonteix, in order that it may be realized in some faint measure. He was a prisoner in the hands of the Iroquois, and every insult, every indignity, every devilish torture they could invent, short of actually killing him, he underwent, from day to day, with a courage that won the admiration of his tormentors, even while it increased their fury. "In his days of comparative liberty," writes Father de Rochemonteix,⁸ "he could easily have

¹ Vol. ii., p. 77.² *Ibid.*³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ P. 21.⁶ P. 22.⁷ P. 26.⁸ P. 29.

escaped. He did not do so, although condemned to a life more painful than a thousand deaths." . . . Further on, he says: "God blessed so great a zeal. 'Not counting the French and Huron prisoners whom I have helped, consoled and confessed, I have regenerated,' he says, 'in the sacred waters, seventy persons, children, young people and old people of five nations and different languages.'"

French to the heart, a patriot in the truest sense, he contrived, watched as he was, and at the risk of being burned alive¹ if discovered, to send to Montmagny, the Governor of Canada, valuable information as to the numbers and designs of the Iroquois. His place of captivity being near Fort Orange on the Hudson, he owed his final escape to the good offices of the Dutch who, having learned of a design on the part of his captors to burn him alive, in revenge for the ill-success of an attack on Fort Richelieu, finally persuaded him² to avail himself of the proffered means of escape. He embarked at New Amsterdam a month later, and landed on the coast of Brittany on Christmas day, 1643.³

Father Bressani, dispatched at the end of April, 1644, by his superior, Father Vimont, to carry letters and packages to the Huron missionaries, who had received nothing for three years,⁴ was the next to fall into the hands of the Iroquois, in an ambuscade near Fort Richelieu, and to undergo, for four months, a martyrdom very similar to that of Father Jogues. He also was finally set free by the Dutch, and landed at La Rochelle in November, 1644. Both he and Father Jogues returned, *of deliberate choice*, to the scene of their labors and sufferings, after a brief stay in Europe, Father Jogues in 1644, Father Bressani in 1645, both having obtained from the Pope permission to say Mass in spite of the mutilations they had been subjected to.⁵

In July, 1645, a peace was concluded with a part of the Iroquois confederacy, from which the most favorable consequences were expected. It was solemnly confirmed on the 20th of September, the only doubts remaining being, first, as to the sincerity of the Mohawks,⁶ and secondly, as to how far they spoke for the whole confederacy, known as the Five Nations, or only for themselves. It was decided to send an embassy to the Iroquois, and for this task Father de Jogues was chosen.⁷ He had a feeling that he would never return. "He wrote," says Father de Rochemonteix,⁸ "to a Jesuit, in France the confidant of the secrets of his soul: 'Mon cœur me dit que si j'ai le bien d'être employé dans cette

¹ *Ibid.*

² August, 1643, p. 32.

³ P. 32

⁴ P. 36.

⁵ P. 43. Urban VIII, said to Father Jogues: "Indignum esset Christi martyrem Christi non libere sanguinem."

⁶ Called "Agniers" by the French. P. 47.

⁷ P. 49.

⁸ P. 53.

mission, *ibo et non redibo*, j'ira et je ne reviendrai pas; mais je serais heureux si Notre-Seigneur voulait achever le sacrifice là où Il l'a commencé.' . . . These heavy presentiments," continues Father de Rochemonteix, "were not to be long in being realized." His mission, at first apparently successful, was turned to failure by a sudden change of temper on the part of the treacherous Mohawks. After being cruelly tortured, he was put to death on the 18th of October, 1646, at the village of Ossernenon."¹

This murder was the signal for the renewal of hostilities, marked by all the cruelties and massacres of Indian warfare. Even the check sustained by the Iroquois at Three Rivers did not restore courage to the more peaceable tribes living to the north of the St. Lawrence. They no longer dared to come down to Quebec to sell their furs and to be instructed.² But the hearts of the missionaries did not fail them. "Je ne vois icy personne baisser la tête," writes the Superior of Quebec, under date of October 20, 1647, "on demande de monter aux Hurons, et quelques uns protestant que les feux des Iroquois sont l'un de leurs motifs pour entreprendre un voyage si dangereux."³ They were called Joseph Bressani, Adrian Duran, Gabriel Lalemant, James Bonin and Adrian Grelon, all priests, Nicholas Noerclair, lay brother. They were accompanied by some twenty-five or thirty Frenchmen, and were destined to be present at the last hour of a dying tribe, "at the dispersion of the sad remnants of the Huron nation!"⁴

The history of that dispersion has been written again and again. What chiefly concerns us here is the fate of the Jesuits in charge of the Huron missions. It can be briefly told: On the 4th of July, 1648, the village of St. Joseph was attacked, just after Mass, while Father Daniel and his Christian Hurons were still at prayers. Unwilling to fly himself, and wishing to give his Christians time to escape, he went out alone to meet the enemy, to certain and cruel death, "and," writes Father de Rochemonteix,⁵ "this victim of charity died, the name of Jesus on his lips; his death saved from massacre several hundred Hurons." Further on, he adds: "Father Daniel was the first Jesuit who received the crown of martyrdom in the Huron country."

The first, but not the last. Father Jean Brébœuf and Father Gabriel Lalemant were taken prisoners in March, 1649,⁶ at the village of St. Louis, and taken with their Huron fellow-captives, mostly Christians, to St. Ignace. "On the afternoon of the sixteenth," says Parkman,⁷ "Brébœuf was led apart and tied to a stake. He

¹ P. 57.² P. 62.³ P. 63.⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ P. 73.⁶ P. 175, the 16th.⁷ *Jesuits in N. A.*, pp. 388, 389. Father de Rochemonteix's account is practically identical with Parkman's.

seemed more concerned for his captive converts than for himself, and addressed them in a loud voice, exhorting them to suffer patiently, and promising heaven as a reward. The Iroquois, incensed, scorched him from head to foot. . . . As he continued to speak . . . they cut away his lower lip, and thrust a red-hot iron down his throat," "and put burning coals in his mouth," adds the account given by Father Rochemonteix.¹ The same writer continues: "At the instigation of a renegade Huron, *and in hatred of baptism*, they pour boiling water three times over his head and shoulders. . . . 'We baptize you,' they say, 'that you may be happy in heaven.'" Parkman says: "After a succession of other revolting tortures, they scalped him; when, seeing him nearly dead, they laid open his breast, and came in a crowd to drink the blood of so brave an enemy. . . ."

"He desired nothing so much," writes Father de Rochemonteix,² "as to shed his blood for Jesus Christ," and adds, that among his memoirs no expression is so frequent as that of his desire so to die, "Sentio me vehementer impelli ad moriendum pro Christo."³ Who could wish to criticize the motives or the actions of a man who died like this?

"His companion in martyrdom," the Jesuit historian continues,⁴ "Father Gabriel Lalemant, had neither the same physical vigor nor the same moral force. . . . The martyrdom of Father de Brébœuf lasted three hours, his, a part of a day and a night. . . . It had begun, according to some, with that of Father de Brébœuf, according to others, at six in the evening; it lasted all night, till nine in the morning, and nothing was spared him of all that the most ingenious ferocity could invent."⁵

The fugitive Hurons who had escaped from St. Ignace and from St. Louis, took refuge, first at Ste. Marie, where they arrived "by hundreds, without chiefs, without organization, disunited, demoralized, paralyzed with fear, broken with sickness, dying of misery and hunger."⁶ Some, however, took refuge on the Island of St. Joseph, as offering, apparently, a more secure refuge from the fury and the pursuit of the Iroquois. The inhabitants of the villages of St. Michael and of St. John the Baptist appealed to the clemency of the victors, and were enrolled among one of the tribes of the confederacy, thus becoming "the first nucleus of Christianity among the Iroquois."⁷

Ste. Marie having become exposed to attack by the destruction of the other Huron villages, the missionaries decided to abandon it, and to accept the invitation of the Huron refugees on St.

¹ P. 79.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 83.

² P. 80.

³ P. 81.

⁶ P. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷ P. 92.

Joseph's Island.¹ On the 14th of June, 1649, they left Ste. Marie for St. Joseph, where they built a fort, and gathered about them large numbers of refugee Hurons,² hoping that here, at least, they would be safe. The destruction, however, of the two missions among the Tobacco nation,³ and the martyrdom of two priests, Father Garnier and Father Chabanel, the news of which was received at St. Joseph⁴ at the end of December, 1649, seemed to render even this position untenable. A famine broke out during the winter,⁵ followed by an outbreak of disease. A party sent out as soon as the ice began to break up, in search of food, fell into the hands of the Iroquois, who had landed in large numbers on the island itself.⁶ It only remained to abandon the new fort of Ste. Marie, and this course was decided upon by the council of the Hurons at the beginning of spring,⁷ and, on the 10th of June, 1650, "the missionaries, their attendants, and three hundred Christian Hurons, embarked in silence,"⁸ intending to take refuge at Quebec, where they arrived on the 28th of July.⁹

The remainder of their sad history may be briefly told. "The arrival of these savages," writes Father Rochemonteix,¹⁰ "was a heavy burden on the French colony. Supported during the next few months by the charity of the Jesuits and of the Ursuline Nuns,¹¹ in ever-increasing numbers, they were settled in March, 1651, on the property of the Jesuits on the island of Orleans,¹² in a village called, once more, Ste. Marie. Driven even from here by fear of the Iroquois,¹³ they divided into several parties, some of whom made peace with the enemy,¹⁴ the few remaining families finally settling, first at Old Lorette, in 1668,¹⁵ and then at New Lorette, at the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹⁶

"With the fall of the Hurons," says Parkman,¹⁷ "fell the best hopes of the Canadian mission. They, and the stable and populous communities around them, had been the rude material from which the Jesuit would have formed his Christian empire in the wilderness. The cause of the failure of the Jesuits," he adds, "is obvious. The guns and tomahawks of the Iroquois were the ruin of their hopes." Moreover, the Hurons overcome, the Iroquois were left free to attack the French settlements, nor were they long in beginning their attacks.

¹ Now Charity, or Christian Island, near the entrance of Matchedash Bay. *Jesuits in N. A.*, p. 397 : *Les Jesuites*, vol. ii, pp. 94, 95.

² Three thousand Hurons were baptized during the year 1649, p. 96.

³ *Jesuits in N. A.*, p. 403.

⁴ Called also "the new Ste. Marie."

⁵ *Les Jesuites*, vol. ii., p. 109.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁷ P. 111.

⁸ P. 112.

⁹ P. 114.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ P. 116.

¹² P. 119.

¹³ P. 123.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ P. 124.

¹⁶ P. 125.

¹⁷ *Jesuits in N. A.*, pp. 146, 147.

The war lasted, with all its horrors, with all its sufferings, from 1651 to 1660, when it was ended by the heroism of Daulac, or Dollard des Ormeaux, and his companions, at the famous fight of the Long Saut, near Montreal.¹ The Jesuits took their full share in all that such a war entailed. Father Poncet was captured by the Iroquois at Cap Rouge,² in August, 1653, to be ill-used and even tortured during a period of nine weeks,³ being set free, by special treaty, on October 21st of the same year. The Onondaga Iroquois made a treaty of peace in June of the same year;⁴ the Oneidas soon followed, and the capture by the Hurons of a famous Mohawk chief,⁵ brought even that proud tribe to sue for the friendship of the French. The consequences of this treaty were to be of serious import to the French missionaries.

"It was," writes Father de Rochemonteix,⁶ "in the month of November, 1653, that the Mohawks and Onondagas signed the treaty of peace with the French. Father Simon Le Moynes was to be sent to the Onondagas to arrange for the delivery of the prisoners. He started from Quebec on July 2, 1654,⁷ came back to Quebec, bearing proposals from the Onondagas for the foundation of a French settlement in their midst, on about the 11th of September,⁸ and immediately set out on his journey to the Mohawks to confirm the treaty of peace.

"The Onondagas," says Parkman,⁹ "had a deeper plan. Their towns were already full of Huron captives, former converts of the Jesuits. . . . Hence their tyrants conceived the idea that by planting at Onondaga a colony of Frenchmen under the direction of these beloved Fathers the Hurons of Orleans might readily be led to join them."

This was the beginning of the Iroquois mission, "a project," as Parkman terms it,¹⁰ "bold to temerity," which the Jesuits "had long nursed. Their great Huron mission," he continues, "was ruined, but might not another be built up among the authors of this ruin, and the Iroquois themselves, tamed by the power of the Faith, be annexed to the kingdoms of Heaven and of France? Thus would peace be restored to Canada, a barrier of fire opposed to the Dutch and English heretics."¹¹ . . . The errand," he is careful to add, "was mainly a political one."

¹ *Old Régime in Canada*, pp. 72 et seq.

² P. 8.

⁴ P. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵ P. 5.

⁶ Vol. ii, p. 140. His account has been chiefly followed, for the sake of brevity and clearness. That of Parkman is, in some respects, more diffuse.

⁷ P. 141.

⁸ P. 143, note.

⁹ *Old Régime in Canada*, pp. 9, 10.

¹⁰ P. 10.

¹¹ The tone of Fr. de Rochemonteix's book is strongly anti-English, but it is so, obviously, for two reasons: 1st, because the growth of the English power in the New World meant the spread of "heresy" and the extinction, *pari passu*, of the True

Father Chaumonot, who had been in charge of the refugee Hurons at the Island of Orleans, and who was well known to the Huron captives among the Onondagas, was chosen for this new and perilous mission, and Father d'Ablon was to accompany him.¹ "The labors of the missionaries" writes Father de Rochemonteix,² "were crowned with such success that they thought the moment had come to establish a French post in the country according to the desire of the Onondagas, as expressed to Father Le Moyne." Whatever may have been the ulterior designs of the Indians, the missionaries, to judge from the account thus given, would appear to have acted in good faith; that they should have desired to extend the influence and the boundaries of New France at the same time is hardly a sufficient reason for calling their errand "mainly a political one," inasmuch as, in their view, the extension of French domination meant, primarily, the extension of the influence of Christianity.

In the spring of 1656, Father d'Ablon, accompanied by a few Onondagas and other Indians, arrived at Quebec,³ to enlist help and sympathy. Four Jesuit Fathers, three Brothers and fifty-five Frenchmen, under the orders of Dupuy, the commandant of the fort at Quebec, returned with him in May, and with the consent of the Onondagas, the new fort of Ste. Marie was duly founded on the shore of Lake Genneottah.⁴

By the month of October, 1657,⁵ some progress had been made, for Father Mesnard alone had baptised some four hundred persons at two missions, and the other missionaries in proportion. "These beginnings," writes Father de Rochemonteix, "presaged fair hopes, but a vague distrust rested in the hearts of the missionaries."⁶ Nor was this misgiving without cause. They knew the nature of the Indian too well to trust too much to appearances, and events justified their fears. The Mohawks—in violations of their treaties, and of a nominal peace, concluded with Father Le Moyne—fearing the loss of their fur-trade with the English if a French post was established in the heart of the Iroquois country, stirred up the younger members of the Onondaga tribe to drive out the Jesuits and the French, who, in 1658, were forced to retreat to Quebec. "Thus ended the first Iroquois mission."⁷

With the year 1658 ends what Lord Elgin justly called "the heroic age of Canada." In the spheres both of church and of

Faith; 2d, to prove to modern Frenchman that the Society was (and is) loyal and French—so far as French Jesuits are concerned.

¹ Les Jesuites, vol. 2., p. 143.

² P. 146.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ P. 147. A small lake to the south of Lake Ontario.

⁵ Pp. 148, 149.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ P. 155.

state changes were imminent, and it is this latter period, from the date named to the end of the century and beyond, that we have felt justified in designating as "controversial." It is here, especially, that we shall follow Father de Rochemonteix chiefly, because he both indicates the charges made against the Society and supplies the answer.

The subjects with which we must principally concern ourselves in the closing portion of this review may be taken as being: first, the relations of the Jesuits with the Bishop; secondly, their relations with the civil powers, with Frontenac and with Talon especially; and, thirdly, the question as to who really merits the honor of being called the discoverer of the Great West.

Up to the year 1658 all the churches in Quebec, Three Rivers, Montreal, Tadoussac, Sillery and Miscou were governed by the "Fathers of the Company of Jesuits,"¹ who held very special spiritual powers granted to them by Pope Urban VIII.² The general assembly of the clergy of France had proposed the foundation of a bishopric as early as 1646,³ but the wars with the Indians postponed the carrying out of the design; but in 1650 the Company of One Hundred Associates set to work in earnest to obtain the erection of a bishopric, and proposed for the office Father Charles Lalemant, a Jesuit. Three names were, in fact, submitted, and each name that of a Jesuit,⁴ Lalemant, Ragueneau and Le Jeune. Parkman, as might have been expected,⁵ attributes this to Jesuit intrigues. The fact remains that "Goswin Nickel, then the Vicar-General of the Society, refused all three, for this reason, that the rule of the Order forbade the religious to accept ecclesiastical dignities."⁶

The claim of the Archbishop of Rouen to jurisdiction over New France was made in 1647,⁷ founded, presumably, on the fact that a large number of the colonists had formerly lived in that diocese,⁸ and that the secular priests who came to share the labors of the Jesuits from 1634 to 1648 had probably obtained "faculties" from the same archbishop. There was, however, "no brief or positive act from Rome, authorizing the Primate of Normandy to extend his jurisdiction to the American Continent."⁹

We enter no further into a difficult ecclesiastical question in which, at all events, the Jesuits showed the real spirit by which they were actuated by accepting the jurisdiction of the archbishop and, in the person of Father Lalemant,¹⁰ of the dignity of vicar-general. Then came the appointment, at their recom-

¹ P. 160.

² P. 190.

³ P. 192.

⁴ P. 197.

⁵ *Old Régime in Canada*, p. 85.

⁶ *Les Jesuites*, vol. ii., p. 201.

⁷ P. 202.

⁸ P. 203.

⁹ P. 204.

¹⁰ P. 209. Which was not confirmed by the Pope.

mendation, of the Abbé Francois de Laval, as Vicar-Apostolic of New France and Bishop of Petràæ.¹ It may be added, however, that if there were faults, as Parkman is somewhat eager to point out, there were faults on both sides; that the Archbishop of Rouen seems, according to strict ecclesiastical law, to have unduly intruded his claims to jurisdiction over New France; that his appointment of Abbé de Queylus and of Father Lalemant as vicars-general was, consequently, invalid, that the former insisted on his powers, and that the other did not, and that the Jesuits, having declined the bishopric pressed upon them by Anne of Austria, at the urgent request of the Company of One Hundred Associates, were fairly entitled to a voice in the nomination of a bishop.

It may be well, before dealing somewhat in detail with the relations between the society and the civil governors, to consider some of the principal charges made against them, and the replies furnished by their historian.

"The missionaries have been reproached," he says, "with having engaged in trade."² To this he has supplied an answer³—which can now be referred to—in the form of an attestation drawn up and signed by the Company of One Hundred Associates, by those, that is, who, being chiefly interested in the fur-trade, would be sure to resent the very appearance of interference. It reads as follows: "Ayans sceu que quelques personnes se persuadent et font courir le bruit que la Compagnie des Pères Jésuites a part aux embarquements, retours et commerces qui se font audit pays, voulans par ce moyen ravalier et supprimer l'estime et le prix des grands travaux qu'ils entreprennent audit pais. . . . dont ladite Compagnie (de la Nouvelle France) est très particulièrement informée, ont cru estre obligés par devoir de la charité chrétienne de désabuser ceux qui auraient cette créance, par la déclaration et certification qu'ils font par les présentes, que les dits P. P. Jésuites ne sont associez en ladite Compagnie de la Nouvelle France, directement, et n'ont aucune part au trafic des marchandises qui s'y faict." As there was no possible reason why the trading company should have hidden the fact if the Jesuits shared in their trade, and as they would have been sure to complain if they had interfered with it, the Jesuits must, surely, be held as acquitted of this charge.

They were accused, as we have seen already, of refusing "to make Frenchmen" of the Indians, for fear of losing the exclusive influence they had gained over them. Their historian contents

¹ P. 211. Those interested in such subjects may be referred to the accounts given by Parkman (*Old Régime*, Ch. IV.) and by Father de Rochemonteix (vol. ii., pp. 189 et seqq.).

² Vol. ii., p. 176.

³ Vol. i., pp. 352, 353.

himself with repeating that such a task was simply an impossibility, and points out that Bishop Laval and the Abbé de Queylus were equally unsuccessful.¹ It need only be added here that all experience tends to prove that the Jesuits were right and Colbert mistaken; in other words, that local officials are, as a rule, wiser than doctrinaire home authorities.

Again, they were reproached with sacrificing the interests of the colony to the evangelizing of the Indians.² "Their contemporaries," writes Father de Rochemonteix, "Champlain, Boucher, Marie de l'Incarnation, Mgr. de Laval and others, have done justice to the Jesuits on this point, and the works of these last have an eloquence which speaks sufficiently in their favor." This particular charge, as being one of many, only serves to show that the Jesuits had to undergo not only the hardships, dangers and martyrdoms of the Indian missions, but the keener suffering of unmerited reproaches on the part of those who should have been eager to help them in every way.

"From the governor to the meanest laborer," writes Parkman,³ "the Jesuit watched and guided all. The social atmosphere of New England itself was not more suffocating. By day and by night, at home, at church, or at his daily work, the colonist lived under the eyes of busy and over-zealous priests." "They were reproached," writes Father de Rochemonteix, "with oppressing consciences,"⁴ they alone having the direction of souls. And yet, in 1658, "the Abbé de Queylus was in charge of the parish of Quebec, assisted by two secular priests. Very few penitents had recourse to them; there were, as a rule, only three or four, whereas they went in crowds to the confessional of the Jesuits."⁵ Father Ragueneau was surely justified in claiming this as "preuve évidente que ceux-ci étaient fausement accusés de faire pèser sur les consciences un joug intolérable."⁶

Parkman also speaks of the "union of the temporal and spiritual authority in the same hands."⁷ "Les Jesuites," writes Colbert, in his 'Instructions' to the Intendant, Talon,⁸ "dont la piété et le zèle ont beaucoup contribué à attirer dans ce pays les peuples qui y sont à présent, y ont pris une autorité qui passe au delà des bornes de leur véritable possession, qui ne doit regarder que les consciences." "Their authority, in fact, was great," writes their historian; "they had not taken it, it had come to them."⁹

¹ Vol. ii., pp. 177, 178.

² P. 178.

³ *Jesuits in N. A.*, p. 158.

⁴ Vol. ii., p. 179.

⁵ P. 180. Letter of Marie de l'Incarnation to her son.

⁶ *Ibid.* Letter to the General of the Jesuits, August 20, 1658!

⁷ *Loc. cit. ut sup.*

⁸ *Les Jesuites*, vol. ii., p. 182 (and note).

⁹ *Ibid.*

They were, without exception, the ablest men in the colony, the laws of which were, from the very nature of the case, principally concerned with what may fairly be defined as "moral regulations," dealing with drunkenness, vice and such-like matters, in which their advice and experience would be of the greatest possible value; the Superior at Quebec had, moreover, been nominated an ex-officio member of the Supreme Council by Royal Edict. Circumstances compelled them to take an active share in the whole life of the colony; they were chosen, above all, as ambassadors to the Indians; living among their French parishioners they knew, better than the civil authorities could possibly know, what they wished, and what was good for them. They would have been traitors to their duty as priests, as Frenchmen and as citizens had they confined themselves strictly to the care of consciences. They had no choice but to accept the task—arduous and unthankful at the best—which was thrust upon them.

Lastly: "They were also reproached," writes their historian,¹ "with opposing not only the traffic in brandy, but also turning away the colonists from the fur trade." He admits the truth of both statements, but asks whether their conduct were not dictated by wise and pertinent reasons? Those who realize all that the fur trade implies, its inevitable association with liquor and with immorality, the weakening of the colony—as already said—by the withdrawal from all useful communal occupations of a large number of active men, can best decide whether this line of action on the part of the Jesuits is to be commended or not.

In the year 1663 the Company of One Hundred Associates was dissolved, "and all its rights in Canada transferred to the crown."² "By an ordinance of the same year," the narrative continues, "a Supreme Council was established at Quebec, composed of the Governor, the Bishop, the Intendant, several councillors³ and of an attorney-general." The Chevalier de Mézy, whom Parkman calls "the Governor whom Laval had chosen," was appointed "Governor and Lieutenant-General in Canada, Acadia, Newfoundland and other countries of Northern France. He owed his nomination to Mgr. de Laval . . . the Jesuits did not know him.⁴ . . . A great union existed between him, the Bishop and the other members of the Council," who, according to the royal edict of creation,⁵ were to be nominated, "conjointement et de concert," by the Governor and the Bishop.

"All went well at the beginning," we are told,⁶ then arose questions of the division of authority between the Governor and the

¹ P. 180.

³ Parkman says five. *Old Régime*, p. 135.

⁴ *Les Jésuites*, vol. ii., pp. 332, 333.

² P. 331.

⁵ P. 334.

⁶ P. 335.

Bishop, of the amount of salary, and, finally, the Governor undertook to interfere with the collection of the tithes, which the king had authorized the Bishop to collect. "All these arbitrary acts of the Governor," says Father de Rochemonteix,¹ "his hostile attitude towards the clergy and the missionaries, did not discourage the patient firmness and merciful kindness of the bishop" One day, after a dispute with the bishop, the governor wrote to the Jesuits for their advice as to what he should do. Father Lalemant, although he suspected that the governor wished to entrap him, replied simply that "the difference between the two authorities was a matter to be referred to the tribunal of conscience and to the civil tribunal; for the first, one must consult the confessor; as to the second, a religious has no right to judge which side is in the wrong."²

Such an answer did not, of course, satisfy de Mézy, who, after that, "made no more nor less than war against the Jesuits,"³ whose attachment to Mgr. de Laval he could not forgive. He complained to Colbert, but the facts were considered as being against him;⁴ he was recalled, and de Courcelles was sent to replace him, but he died before the arrival of his successor. Talon was sent out, at the same time, as Intendant, his instructions being: "Il est absolument nécessaire de tenir dans une juste balance l'autorité temporelle qui réside en la personne du roi et en ceux qui le représentent, et la spirituelle qui réside en la personne du s^r Evêque et des Jesuites, de manière toutes fois que celle-cy soit inférieure à l'autre."

The spiritual power was, therefore, to be subordinate, "toutes fois"—on all occasions—to the temporal. This fundamental principle of Gallicanism, Josephism, or Erastianism, was to govern the policy of New France henceforth; was to be "the rule of conduct for Governors and Intendants."⁵ Right or wrong—that is not the question here. Faults there were, doubtless, on both sides; but the Jesuit historian may well term such instructions "the fertile source of many conflicts."

This policy is, in fact, the key to all the disputes between the clergy and the civil authorities, disputes which Parkman and de Rochemonteix describe at length, but which will not be entered into at this stage of an article, which must, of necessity, draw towards a close. It remains to deal, briefly, with the missions to the Iroquois, which had been confided by Mgr. de Laval to the Jesuits,⁶ and with the resultant discovery of the "Great West."

¹ P. 337 (and note). Father Lalemant writes: "Effugere non possumus quin suspicetur Gubernator nos in partes Illust. episcopi inclinare."

² P. 338.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ P. 339.

⁵ P. 341.

⁶ P. 343.

"The Jesuits alone," writes Father de Rochemonteix,¹ "understood and spoke the language of the natives, they knew their customs, their laws, their habits of life; they knew by what means to reach their souls, in despite of the obstacles encountered by the holy and austere doctrines of the Gospel. Finally, they had gained over them an incontestable influence by virtue of their devotion and patience." Further on he says,² that "they accepted, with joy and thankfulness, the fairest lot of the heritage of God in those vast regions of the New World."

"The new movement towards the distant missions," he continues,³ "dates from 1660." In that year Father Menard was sent to the Ottawas, a journey of five hundred leagues from Quebec. The spirit of the "earlier Jesuits," as Parkman calls them, was alive in him; "he went," we are told,⁴ "accompanied by his faithful servant, Jean Guerin, where the Spirit of the Lord impelled him, not knowing too well where, convinced only that he should not return from this distant expedition. Six weeks of painful journeying brought him to Lake Superior," where the "Ottawas treated him like a slave."⁵ Finding them brutal, degraded, and absolutely unwilling to renounce polygamy, he reluctantly left them, after long and practically fruitless labors, intending to visit a remnant of Hurons who lived at the extreme southwest of Lake Superior. Their food failing them, he was deserted by his Indian guides, and was never seen again. Whether he died of hunger, or was killed, was never known.⁶

Father Claude Allouez took up the task which the death of Father Menard had interrupted, and following the traces of the latter's journey, arrived, at length, after incredible hardships, at the Huron villages on Lake Superior.⁷ Replaced, after six months, by Fathers Druillettes and André,⁸ he went, by order of his superior, Father d'Ablon, to join him and Father Marquette at Sainte-Marie-du-Saut.⁹ It was from this point that d'Ablon and Allouez started, in 1670, on their mission to the Illinois tribes, living to the southwest of Lake Michigan.

The peace that resulted in 1666, from the total defeat of the Mohawks by the Marquis de Tracy,¹⁰ lasted for eighteen years, and was of immense advantage to the colony. "For a year or two after de Tracy had 'chastised the Mohawks,'" says Parkman, "and humbled the other Iroquois nations, all was rose color on the side of that dreaded confederacy. The Jesuits, defiant, as usual, of hardship and death, had begun their ruined missions

¹ *Ibid.*² P. 344.³ P. 345.⁴ P. 347.⁵ P. 348.⁶ P. 350.⁷ P. 357.⁸ P. 361.⁹ Between Lake Superior and Lake Huron. P. 361.¹⁰ P. 387.¹¹ *Old Régime*, p. 16.

anew. Bruyas took the Mission of the Martyrs among the Mohawks; Milet, that of Saint Francis Xavier, among the Oneidas; Lamberville, that of Saint John the Baptist, among the Onondagas; Carheil, that of St. Joseph, among the Cayugas; and Raffeix and Julian Garnier shared between them the three missions of the Senecas."

We must, unfortunately, confine ourselves to such a brief sketch as the foregoing, of the new Iroquois missions, merely remarking that the traffic in brandy, which the Jesuits had always strenuously opposed, appears to have been a source of serious personal danger, as causing fearful drunkenness among the Indians, and "a drunken Indian with weapons within reach was a very dangerous person."¹

This article must finish with a short account of the discovery of the Great West—a limit, necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but one which appears to be the best under the circumstances.

"The eighteen years of peace with the Iroquois," says Father de Rochemonteix,² "were, for the colony, an epoch of religious expansion and of discoveries. . . . The most considerable event of this epoch, however," he continues, "is, undoubtedly, the discovery of the Mississippi." Further on, he writes,³ "No one, however, had seen the river before 1673, and the Jesuits are the first to express the idea of exploring it."

Father d'Ablon, as we have seen, went, in 1670, on a mission to the Illinois tribes to the southwest of Lake Michigan, accompanied by Father James Marquette. "The discovery of the great river, and the exploration of its shores, were reserved to . . . Father Marquette, and to a young Frenchman, Louis Jolliet."⁴

The story is familiar; a brief outline of it may, however, be given here. They started from Michillimackinac, on the 7th of May, 1673,⁵ and entered the Mississippi on the 17th of June, thirty-four days later,⁶ following its course beyond its junction with the Missouri and the Ohio,⁷ returning after an absence of four months. As is well known, the hardships of the expedition proved fatal to Father Marquette's health. A second journey was undertaken, in October, 1674, to found a mission among the Kaskaskias on the river of the Illinois.⁸ The task proved too much for him in his enfeebled condition, and he died on the return journey, near the mouth of the little river that now bears his name. The tribute paid to him by the State of Wisconsin is but the honor that is his due.

"And yet this Jesuit, the object to-day of so much sympathy and honor, was, for a long time, condemned to a voluntary and unjust neglect."⁹ Frontenac, "the declared enemy of the Society,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

² Vol. iii., p. 1.

³ P. 3.

⁴ P. 4.

⁵ P. 13.

⁶ P. 17.

⁷ P. 19.

⁸ P. 25.

⁹ P. 33.

is the soul of this conspiracy. . . . Louis Hennepin, a Recollet, pretends to believe that the voyage of Jolliet never took place. He does not mention Father Marquette's name," and yet Parkman, while branding Father Hennepin as "the most impudent of liars," goes on to say that "his books have their value." How can any statement made by "an impudent liar," and a wilful calumniator, be of any serious historical value?

"It was reserved for another Frenchman to continue and complete the work undertaken by these first two explorers."³ There is no doubt in the minds of those best fitted to decide that Father Marquette was the real discoverer of the Mississippi, in June 1673. This is the reason for the bare narration of the facts of the case, as given above, which may be supplemented by an equally brief account of the chief discoveries of Robert Cavalier de la Salle.

He entered the Jesuit noviciate on the 5th of October, 1658,⁴ but "the disciple was not easy to manage or to fashion."⁵ He made his three vows, taking the name of Ignatius, in honor of St. Ignatius Loyola, on the 10th of October, 1690, and entered the royal college of La Flèche, to pass two years in the study of physics and mathematics. It is said of him that "Brother Cavalier was not a model of work and application in this house of studies; nevertheless, he gave proof of much talent, and showed remarkable aptitude for the physical sciences."⁶

After teaching for a year at Alençon; spending another year at La Flèche to finish his course of philosophy; teaching again at Tours and at Blois, we finally find him at La Flèche, in 1666, beginning his course of theology.⁷

It is as well, in view of subsequent events, to dwell on this connection of La Salle with the Society of Jesus, a fact which Father de Rochemonteix, having access to all the most private archives, is able to establish beyond question. "As will be seen," he continues,⁸ "he had much difficulty, once he had left the noviciate, in remaining long in one place." . . . "One of his superiors," we are told, "admirably described this state of mind by the one Latin word '*inquietus*.'" And again, "The further he goes, the more heavy, the more insupportable does the yoke of the Rule become to him," so that we are not surprised to read the ultimate decision of the General, under date of March 1, 1667.⁹ "Après un examen sérieux des informations que vous nous avez envoyées, nous vous mandons de renvoyer de la Compagnie Robert Ignace Cavalier, Scholastique approuvé." La Salle left La Flèche and returned to the world on the 28th of March. "Henceforth," says the Jesuit

¹ Pp. 37, 38.

³ *Les Jésuites*, vol. iii., p. 40.

⁶ P. 43.

⁷ *Ibid.*

² *La Salle*, p. 123.

⁴ P. 42.

⁸ P. 44.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹ P. 48.

historian, "he will have few, if any, dealings with the Jesuits;" and adds¹ that "this study . . . will make us understand better the character and temperament of the famous discoverer; it will show us why, in the New World, he held aloof from the Jesuits, to join himself, first to the Sulpitians, and then to the Recollets; it will explain his whole life in Canada." . . .

"Next we find him at Montreal;"² then at his estate of Lachine, granted to him by the Sulpitians,³ where he "at once began to study the Indian languages,"⁴ and where, "on one occasion, he was visited by a band of Seneca Indians, . . . who told him of a river called the Ohio, rising in their country, and flowing into the sea, but at such a distance that its mouth could only be reached after a journey of eight or nine months. Evidently the Ohio and the Mississippi are here merged into one."⁵ "At once" writes Father de Rochemonteix⁶ "he formed the project of going to explore it."

He sold his seigneurie and obtained letters-patent from the governor, authorizing him "to explore the woods, rivers and lakes of the whole of Canada."⁷ The narrative continues: "Mr. Dollier de Casson (a Sulpitian) was then at Quebec, himself organizing an expedition to the Mississippi." Parkman terms it "a similar enterprise,"⁸ and adds that "the seminary priests of Montreal were jealous of these powerful rivals, and eager to emulate their zeal in the saving of souls and the conquering of new domains for the faith." The Jesuit historian, as will be seen, simply states the fact and imputes no motive whatever.

The expedition, guided by Iroquois, left Villemarie (Montreal) on the 6th of July, 1669,⁹ and reached the village of Tina-Toua (on Lake Erie) at the end of September. Here, according to Parkman,¹⁰ they met Jolliet, afterwards the companion of Father Marquette, but Father de Rochemonteix does not allude to this fact. Both accounts agree as to La Salle's illness and as to a change of plans on the part of the priests who were with him. The latter, however, says¹¹ that "two days before they left, La Salle informed them that the state of his health would not allow him to think any more of the voyage which he had undertaken with them. He begged them to excuse him if he left them to return to Montreal." This sudden change of plan did not, apparently, surprise the two Sulpitians.

"We now return to La Salle," writes Parkman,¹² "only to find

¹ P. 49. This account may well be compared with that of Parkman—*La Salle*, pp. 2, 3, 4. La Salle was twenty-four when he left the Jesuits.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ Pp. 5, 6, 7.

⁴ P. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ P. 52.

⁷ P. 53.

⁸ La Salle, p. 10.

⁹ *Les Jésuites*, vol. iii., p. 53.

¹⁰ P. 16.

¹¹ P. 54.

¹² La Salle, p. 21.

ourselves involved in mist and obscurity, What did he do after he left the two priests? Unfortunately, a definite answer is not possible; and the next two years of his life remain in some measure an enigma. . . . He is known to have kept journals and made maps; and these were in existence, and in possession of his niece, Madeleine Cavelier, as late as the year 1756; beyond which time the most diligent inquiry has failed to trace them."

"What became of Cavelier de La Salle," writes Father de Rochemonteix,¹ "after he had separated himself from the Sulpicians? . . . He tells us himself, although in a vague manner and with little precision, in a memoir addressed to Count de Frontenac, in 1677, in which he enumerates his undertakings and his discoveries since his arrival in New France. According to this memoir, he reached the Ohio—the date is uncertain—went down it a sufficiently long distance, . . . and finally stopped more than three hundred miles from the Mississippi, at the Louisville rapid in Kentucky. . . . But from this expedition to Louisville till 1673 what was the existence of this ardent explorer? It would be difficult to say The one point beyond a doubt is that he did not reach the Mississippi this period, otherwise he would not have omitted this glorious exploit in his memoir to the Governor of Canada. . . . The name of the Mississippi does not occur a single time in a work giving the list of his discoveries from 1667 to 1677. . . ."

The rest of his story is familiar history, and has been told at length by Parkman and by Father de Rochemonteix. As in all matters relating to New France during the century with which we have been dealing, it is well for those who wish to arrive at a just estimate of the persons and of the events of that dramatic epoch to correct the account of the American historian by comparing it with that of the French Jesuit. Much allowance, it will be found, must be made not only for the natural bias of Parkman himself, but also for the prejudices of those whom he quotes as authorities. These same authorities are referred to, in the fullest manner, by Father Rochemonteix, but he is careful to show what was their true character. Moreover, as remarked at the outset of this review, he is better fitted to deal with Jesuit documents than any outsider—even a Catholic—could possibly be. Taking into consideration, therefore, all the facts of the case; the many reasons for distrusting those who make indiscriminate charges against the Jesuits, Gallicans, Jansenists, civil authorities, partisans of La Salle, and others, who, whatever their good qualities, must be admitted to have been anything

¹ Pp. 55, 56, 57, 58, 56.

but impartial; Parkman's necessary want of sympathy with Jesuit ideals and motives; finally, having regard to the whole tone of "Les Jesuites;" the candor, the simple statement of fact, the mass of authorities quoted, it must be acknowledged that, of the accounts, that of the Jesuit historian may claim to be a truer estimate of the men who—let their faults be as great as they may—suffered, lived and died for the Faith that was in them.

F. W. GREY.

MONTREAL, CANADA.

BALFOUR'S PHILOSOPHY.

PART IV.

(SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A PROVISIONAL PHILOSOPHY.)

WE now enter upon our fourth and final criticism of Mr. Balfour's philosophy—namely, our examination of the fourth and concluding part of his work, which we think our readers will find the most interesting of them all.

In the three preceding parts¹ we, following our author, considered: (1) the consequences of "Naturalism" (*i.e.*, sensism), refuting that system by a process of *reductio ad absurdum*, and so making its rejection a practical necessity; (2) we examined his statements as to the bases of some philosophical systems, especially "Naturalism," arguing with him that it is speculatively incoherent, but utterly disagreeing with him as to the rational and philosophic basis of theology; (3) thirdly, we criticised his views as to what are the direct and immediate causes of belief, with intent to show that he denied to reason its just claims, greatly exaggerating the action of emotion in determining our various convictions. His continued and vehement depreciation of the action of reason, and his no less continued appeal to instinct and emotion, actually cut the ground from beneath the religious structure he desires to erect. If all depends on mere likes and dislikes, on mere feelings of attraction and repulsion, why should those who feel sympathy with the material and sensuous allurements of naturalism turn aside from the

¹ See AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for 1896, January, April, and July.

representations of Huxley to follow those of Balfour? If reason is not predominant, if what seems to us "perceptions of probability" are not really such, but merely promptings of passion or desire, then on Mr. Balfour's own principles, what can be the use of the whole of his argument? What can its value be unless he admits himself to be but a modern Orpheus who, by the seductive charms of his musical periods and persuasive rhetoric, would delude us into following him through a mistaken belief that we are acting rationally, when in truth we are but the slaves of our senses? Were we to judge him by the third part of his work only, we should regard him as a bacchanal disguised in the cloak of a philosopher.

Authority he represents as overwhelmingly more of an irrational *cause* of belief than a solid reason for conviction. We altogether deny that authority, as he employs the term, has the efficacy he ascribes to it, but we none the less affirm that authority, in the true sense of the term, is an abundantly sufficient *reason* for a multitude of beliefs for which human testimony or revelation can afford us metaphysical or divine evidence. In spite of his profound dissent from the philosophy of Hume, Mr. Balfour's "Authority" is the same thing as Hume's "Custom," and, as we have noted, he makes use (p. 164) of that very term.¹

After referring to the three foregoing sets of inquiries, he tells us² that:

"It remains for us to consider whether it is possible to extract from their combined results any general view which may command at least a provisional assent."

To this consideration he devotes the first chapter, entitled "*The Groundwork*," of this fourth part of "THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF."

It is, of course, plain that from such premisses alone as Mr. Balfour has accepted in his previous three parts, no complete or adequate philosophy can be arrived at. He himself avows that:

"The unification of all belief into an ordered whole, compacted into one coherent structure under the stress of reason, is an ideal which we can never abandon, but it is also one which, in the present condition of our knowledge, perhaps even of our faculties, we seem incapable of attaining."

He then declares³ that:

"The first and most elementary principle which ought to guide us in forming any provisional scheme of unification is to decline to draw any distinction between different classes of belief when no relevant distinction can, as a matter of fact, be discovered."

Yet, as we saw in our review of the second part, the advocates

¹ AMER. CATH. Q. R., April, p. 313.

P. 233.

³ P. 234.

of naturalism have assumed (not only without any preliminary analysis, but apparently without suspecting such a thing was necessary) that the beliefs of physical science stand :

"Not only upon a different, but upon a much more solid platform than any others ; that scientific standards supply the sole test of truth and scientific methods the sole instruments of discovery."

Is there in reality any such difference? That there are differences of some sort Mr. Balfour admits¹ to be undeniable, but do they require us to give precedence to science and to exclude other beliefs from our general scheme?

"One peculiarity there is," he tells² us, "which seems at first sight effectually to distinguish certain scientific beliefs from any which belong, say to ethics or theology ; a peculiarity which may, perhaps, be best expressed by the word 'inevitableness.' Everybody has, and everybody is obliged to have, some convictions about the world in which he lives—convictions which in their narrow and particular form (as what I have before called beliefs of perception, memory and expectation) guide us all, children, savages and philosophers alike, in the ordinary conduct of day-to-day existence ; which, when generalized and extended, supply us with some of the leading presuppositions on which the whole fabric of science appears logically to depend. No convictions quite answering to this description can, I think, be found either in ethics, æsthetics or theology . . . certainly there is nothing in either of these great departments of thought quite corresponding to our habitual judgments about the things we see and handle ; judgments which, with reason or without it, all mankind are practically compelled to entertain."

We altogether dispute the truth of this representation. The "inevitableness" of our perception of the extended external world is a certain and indisputable fact, and it is so because (as we have before urged) we have an intuition of extension, and its "inevitableness" is but another word for the intuitive character of this perception. Certain, however, as it is, it has not the highest degree of certainty, as a sort of fictitious doubt can be entertained about it, but for which all "idealism" would be absolutely impossible. We *may* (because many persons *do*) believe that the inevitable perception of the world about us is either an "inference" or a delusion, produced by the action of some entity, or entities, external to our mind, or else that it is produced by the action of our mind upon and within itself (solipsism), and this without producing absolute and complete scepticism. But first principles cannot possibly be thus doubted. If either the principle of contradiction, the perception of self-existence, or of the validity of logical ratiocination be called into question and really doubted, absolute scepticism and intellectual paralysis are the inevitable result.

It may be said that all persons perceive the world about them, but only a few educated minds apprehend the evident and meta-

¹ P. 235.

² P. 236.

physical truths of first principles. We might grant that such was the case, without injury to our position. For external perceptions are impossible without the presence of the conditions necessary for *sense*-perception (adequate sense-organs), and similarly it would be no wonder if first principles were imperceptible to those who did not possess the conditions necessary for *intellectual*-perception. But, in fact, while a certain degree of education is necessary for an explicit, reflex recognition of such objective truths, they are implicitly perceived in the concrete in the actions of everyday life, as we need not again urge by citing instances.

But Mr. Balfour does not compare our intuitions as to an extended, external world, with any such first principles, but with the proposition, "There is a God," and he adds:¹ "I am myself disposed to doubt whether so good a case can be made out for accepting the second of these propositions as can be made out for accepting the proposition, 'there is an independent material world.'"

This disposition on Mr. Balfour's part is a really reasonable one, since we have no *intuition* of God's existence. That is a truth only to be reached through *ratiocination*, while, as Mr. Balfour very truly says,² our certainty about an external world is "far in excess of anything which mere reasoning can justify."

Thus sensists err widely and fundamentally when they think that there is any ground for elevating physical science to a plane of certitude, above every other kind of knowledge, or who (as we before pointed out)³ deem the evidence gained through the senses to be "the best of all evidence."

Mr. Balfour very ingeniously attempts to show how our ready and spontaneous conviction about the reality of the external world may be no intellectual intuition at all, but the mere result of "natural selection" on active, sensitive organisms.⁴ He says:

"Whether there be an independent material universe or not may be open to philosophic doubts. But that, if it exists, it is expedient that the belief in it should be accepted with a credence which for all practical purposes is immediate and unwavering, admits, I think, of no doubt whatever. If we could suppose a community to be called into being who, in their dealings with the 'external world,' should permit action to wait upon speculation, and require all its metaphysical difficulties to be solved before reposing full belief in some such material surroundings as those which we habitually postulate, its members would be overwhelmed by a ruin rapid and complete."

"Supposing this be so, it follows necessarily, on accepted biological principles, that a kind of credulity so essential to the welfare, not merely of the race as a whole, but of every single member of it, will be bred by elimination and selection into its inmost organization . . . is it not plain that any individual in which such judgments were

¹ P. 237.

² P. 238.

³ See AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1896, p. 300.

⁴ P. 238.

habitually qualified and enfeebled by even the most legitimate scepticism would incontinently perish, and that those only would survive who possessed and could presumably transmit to their descendants a stubborn assurance which was beyond the power of reasoning either to fortify or to undermine?"

This is very clearly put, but granting, for the moment, that our existing intuitions of an extended world were certainly thus developed, such a fact would be a triumphant argument against idealists, for unless an independent, extended world really existed, no sentient organisms would be destroyed by contravening the laws and conditions of an independent, extended world.

Can, however, the truth of this representation as to the origin of our spiritual intuitions be conceded for even a moment? It certainly cannot, for, as Mr. Balfour says:¹

"No such process would come to the assistance of other faiths, however true, which were the growth of higher and later steps of civilized development."

Yet the reflex perception of the absolutely universal and necessary² truth of first principles is just such a higher growth, supreme in certainty, yet evidently no product of "natural selection." If then there is an efficient cause which can, independently of "natural selection," produce this supreme result, *à fortiori*, it could produce the indefinitely minor effect, namely "sense perception," and the apprehension of spatial relations.

There is therefore, no warrant for Mr. Balfour's degradation of our perception of the external world to the level of irrational influences, on the grounds here laid down by him. Still, in a certain sense there is a degree of truth in his affirmation³ that

"Faith or assurance, which, if not in excess of reason, is at least independent of it, seems to be a necessity in every great department of knowledge which touches on action, and what great department is there which does not?"

There is truth to this extent, namely, that a good will and a desire for goodness as well as for truth, have an important influence on belief and conviction, and it is this fact which gives to various beliefs their moral character.⁴

¹ P. 239.

² At page 241 Mr. Balfour uses the terms "universality" and "necessity" in quite another sense, usually that of the "inevitableness" in all men of perceptions of an extended world.

³ P. 240.

⁴ In an article entitled "Sins of Belief and Sins of Unbelief," published in the *Nineteenth Century* for October, 1888, p. 560, we pointed out how even the truth of first principles (though evident both objectively and subjectively) and the trustworthiness of our faculties can be adhered to with a greater or less degree of readiness and firm confidence. What we see to be evidently and necessarily true both object-

As to the intensity and the diffusion of the confidence which mankind feel in the widespread existence of an external world, he¹ further says :

"It is true that all these, whatever their speculative opinions, enjoy a practical assurance with regard to what they see and touch. It is also true that few men have an assurance equally strong about matters of which their senses tell them, nothing immediately, and that many men have on such subjects no assurance at all."

But nothing can well be more certain than are a multitude of hypothetical propositions about which man's senses can, "tell them nothing immediately;" *e.g.*, "if an engine can only travel thirty miles an hour, it could never traverse one hundred miles in an hour and a half." "If A having been entrusted with money to pay a debt of B, should spend it in gratifying a mere desire of his own, he would commit an unjust action," etc.

It is quite true, as Mr. Balfour says, that "the time has passed for believing that the further we go back towards the 'state of nature,' the nearer we get to virtue and to truth," but when he proceeds to affirm² that "we cannot extract out of the coercive character of certain unreasoned beliefs, any principle of classification which shall help us to the provisional philosophy of which we are in search," he makes an ambiguous statement which is very misleading. If he means by "unreasoned beliefs," convictions which are not the direct result of reason—which are not the product of our *intellectual* faculty—he states what is but a truism. Certainly, irrational beliefs can never help us to a philosophy, even of a provisional character. But if he means by "unreasoned beliefs" convictions which are not the result of our inferior intellectual faculty—that of *ratiocination*—but are the product of our higher intellectual faculty—that of direct *intuition*, then he makes a statement altogether false and profoundly misleading. Our "unreasoned" convictions (in this latter intuitional sense) *e.g.* (as to

ively and subjectively, must be true unless we are the victims of a lying power which constantly deceives us and makes the universe a universe of lies.

As we have elsewhere pointed out (in a lecture on "The Implications of Science," see *Nature*, p. 1891, pp. 60, 82, 222 and 343), a man who doubts his faculties or the veracity of the universe must fall into a self-contradiction. For he must obviously ground his doubt upon his perception of the truth, "*We cannot arrive at conclusions which are certain by means of principles which are uncertain or false.*" But if the doubter knows *that* truth, he must know that his faculties are not always fallacious, and therefore that the supposed "lying power" *cannot* deceive him in everything.

The hearty acceptance of the declaration of our reason that goodness is and must be of supreme authority with mankind, and a hearty volitional consent (as distinguished from mere assent) to the certainty of the inference "there is a God," are moral results of the dictates of our intelligence.

¹ P. 241.

² P. 242.

the fact of our existence, and as to universal and necessary truths, and as to the validity of the process of logical inference), not only help us to, but actually provide us with, a philosophy not merely provisional, but satisfying and permanent.

Nevertheless, what he urges against the advocates of naturalism or "sensism," is most true. In so far as they represent "sense-perception" to be the absolute and highest test of truth, he is fully justified in his "complaint," that they should

"require us arbitrarily to narrow down the impulses which we may follow to the almost animal instincts lying at the root of our judgments about material phenomena."

If, as Mr. Balfour represents, we had no rational philosophical system to guide us, it would be as he says,¹

"Surely better—but repugnant to reflective reason—to prove for ourselves some wider scheme which, though it be founded in the last resort upon our needs, shall at least take account of other needs than those we share with our brute progenitors."

He then cites Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel and Spinoza, as witnesses to the inadequacy of the "naturalistic creed," affirming that "men whose speculative genius is admitted" have seldom been content to allow that the world could be narrowed down to that pattern.

Mr. Balfour next tries to remove the obvious and serious objection to his system—the objection, namely, that it is an attempt "to rest superstition on scepticism"; "to form a creed not in accordance with the rules of logic, but with the promptings of desire." We, indeed, are one of his supposed critics who say that having discredited reason, he proceeds to make man's needs a test of truth.

To this criticism he objects² on the ground that he has allowed the fullest play to reason, and urges that if he has diminished in man's eyes the importance of reason, "it is by the action of reason itself that this result has been brought about," and that he has "assumed and acted upon," "the right of reason to deal with every province of knowledge."

But *no* sceptical writer would admit that his teaching was "against reason," certainly those who (like Sir William Hamilton, Mansel, Bacon, Mill, Spencer, etc.) affirm the essential "relativity of human knowledge" do not admit it. Yet though the self-contradiction involved in their systems appears to be apprehended most clearly by Mr. Balfour, he has himself fallen into a parallel inconsistency.

He further denies that in the absence of reason he has contentedly accepted mere "desire," and affirms that he has repre-

¹ P. 243.

² P. 246.

sented "need" and its "satisfaction" as being our guide. This relation (between need and satisfaction) he tells us¹ is "something different from that between a premise and its conclusion"² is equally remote from that between a desire and its fulfilment." Without the logical validity of the first it has not the casual, wavering and purely subjective character of the second. He concludes :

"For the correspondence postulated is not between the fleeting fancies of the individual and the immutable verities of an unseen world, but between those characteristics of our nature, which we recognize as that in us which, though not necessarily the strongest, is the highest ; which, though not always the most universal, is nevertheless the best,"

Now, we are indeed so far from denying that a rational philosophy must be one which responds to human needs, as to have again and again represented that the wonderful and complete concordance which exists between Catholicism and human nature, is a very strong argument in support of the truths of revelation. But all such arguments must ultimately rest on the perception of objective and necessary truth by our intellect, and the weakness of the latter can never be validly adduced as a support for religion. But Mr. Balfour often seems to advocate religion on the ground that badly off as it is for an intellectual basis, it is not more badly off than science is.

Thus he declares we may affirm that if his system

"Furnishes us with no adequate philosophy of religion, it leaves religion no worse, or indeed otherwise provided for, in this respect than science."

And again :³

"We may say of it that it expresses without proof a certain consonance between what we are moved to believe and what in fact *is*. We may not say that the presuppositions of science depend upon any more solid, or, indeed, upon any different foundation."

A true system of philosophy must *indeed*, as Mr. Balfour says, "include human consciousness as an element," and must most certainly refuse to be "cabined, cribbed, confined" between the narrow walls wherein "sensism" would imprison it. But it needs much more than Mr. Balfour concedes ; and as we have, we hope, already sufficiently pointed out, his limited system would be far more fatal to religion than it could possibly be to science, in spite of the good will which underlies his many admirable pages.

¹ P. 248.

² Here again we have ratiocination (a premise and its conclusion) put forward to represent reason !

³ P. 249.

In his second chapter, entitled "*Beliefs and Formulas*," our author considers (1) the various changes of belief which may take place, (2) the effects of such changes on the formulas which antecedently serve to express such beliefs, and (3) the action of formulas on the beliefs themselves.

He tells us:¹

"We shall more accurately conceive the true history of knowledge if we represent it under the similitude of a plastic body whose shape and size are in constant process of alteration through the operation of both external and internal forces. The internal forces are those of reason. The external forces correspond to those non-rational causes on whose importance I have already dwelt. . . . We must not, however, regard this body of beliefs as being equally mobile in all its parts. Certain elements in it have the power of conferring on the whole something in the nature of a definite structure. These are known as 'theories,' 'hypotheses,' 'generalizations' and 'explanatory formulas' in general. They represent beliefs by which other beliefs are co-ordinated. They supply the framework in which the rest of knowledge is arranged. Their right construction is the noblest work of reason; and without their aid reason, if it could be exercised at all, would itself be driven from particular to particular in helpless bewilderment."

After protesting yet once more against this misuse of the word "belief," we gladly allow the substantial truth of the above-cited passage, and we further admit that such organizing formulas may react on the convictions they are formed to organize and preserve, as also that the increase of knowledge may lead to the abandonment of some formulas and the construction of others in their place, as, *e.g.*, with respect to the movements of the heavenly bodies, the phenomena we have attributed to gravity, etc.

As an instance, Mr. Balfour quotes² the change which has taken place with respect to the theories about heat—the change from regarding it as a "form of matter" to considering it as a "mode of motion." Yet these changes of view never, as he truly says, affect our certainty as to the existence of some objective cause for our sensations of warmth.

But a religious doctrine is, he says, too apt to be rejected, owing to changes which have arisen in the mode of regarding some formula supposed to represent it and its relation to other truths.

"How many persons," he observes,³ "are there who, because they dislike the theories of atonement propounded, say, by Anselm, or by Grotius, or the versions of these which have imbedded themselves in the devotional literature of Western Europe, feel bound, in 'reason,' to give up the doctrine itself? Because they cannot compress within the rigid limits of some semi-legal formula a mystery which, unless it were too vast for our full intellectual comprehension, would surely be too narrow for our spiritual need, the mystery itself is to be rejected! Because they cannot contrive to their satisfaction a system of ideological jurisprudence which shall include Redemption as a leading case, Redemption is no longer to be wanted among the consolations of mankind!"

¹ P. 252.

² P. 256.

³ P. 258.

This is excellent and well put. There is a constant danger with pious Catholics of identifying doctrines which are *de fide* with modes of imagining and representing¹ them which may be popular or even universal at any particular time or place.

This is certainly and emphatically the case with that view of the Sacrifice of the Cross which would regard it merely as "defrauding the devil of what would otherwise have been his right," and as "enabling the Almighty, by a legal fiction, to grant a pardon otherwise impossible," instead of its being the greatest and noblest ethical "object lesson" which has been given to the world from its creation to this day.

The Church sometimes loses ill-instructed Catholics because they mistake pious opinions about and familiar representations of a dogma, with that dogma itself, and crowds of non-Catholics are kept out of the Church by the very same cause. From our experience we believe that this is above all the case with respect to the doctrine of eternal damnation—the eternal *pœna sensûs*—although that dogma as authoritatively defined need in no way conflict with our ethical intuitions, as we have elsewhere endeavored to show.

No single proposition put forward by us on that subject has been condemned, and so no one of them need be rejected.

The letters we have received from grateful Catholics who have been enabled, through our humble effort, to remain within the Church's fold, have afforded us a great and abiding consolation.

Mr. Balfour contends that development of doctrine is much easier in science than in religion, because in the latter case particular views are more closely associated with emotion and social activity. We venture to think, however, that scientific disputes are sometimes as intense and virulent as any which have taken place between contending divines. An example of such contentions is supplied by Mr. Darwin's theory—a theory to which its author clung with all the ardor of the promulgator of a new heresy, and which has excited the emotions and directed the actions of many men and women as much as have the doctrines of many a religious sect.

On the other hand, though there is much danger to individual Catholics themselves from their clinging immovably to old and inaccurate notions and mental images,² the development of Catho-

• ¹ Of course this is no way intended to slight the imperative obligation of accepting the words of an authoritative definition of faith no less than the doctrine they are intended to express.

² In our article, "Science in Fetters," in the *Dublin Review* for July, 1895, pp. 12 and 13, we observed, of such mental images, that "the misleading effects of the imagination is a terrible bar to the comprehension and acceptance of the supernatural truths

lic doctrine takes place quite as harmoniously as does that of any branch of science.

As to theological developments, Mr. Balfour himself bears witness to their successful advance, though some expressions he uses in describing it are naturally open to objection. He says:¹

"Yet even in such cases it is interesting to note how unexpectedly the most difficult adjustments are sometimes effected; how, partly by the conscious and still more by the unconscious wisdom of mankind; by a little kindly forgetfulness; by a few happy inconsistencies; by methods which might not always bear the scrutiny of the logician, though they may well be condoned by the philosopher, the changes required by the general movement of belief are made with less friction and at a smaller cost—even to the enlightened—than might, perhaps, have been antecedently expected."

He deprecates² what he calls "the rage for defining which seized so large a portion of Christendom, both Roman and non-Roman, during the Reformation troubles."

But no "portions" of Roman Christendom were so seized; the whole Catholic Church, having seen the ravages effected by the detestable errors which sprung from Luther and Calvin, was compelled to declare what was the truth, and, as Father Hecker declared, the liberty of Christians, outside of what is *de fide*, became, and has continued so to be, hampered and limited through the terrible curse of Protestantism. The decrees of Trent, far from having decayed in the Catholic Church, have provided an excellent framework for the perpetual conservation of the doctrines it defined, in spite of what Mr. Balfour says to the contrary.³

He tells us, however, that what concerns him is the danger that the "combination of theory and practice may threaten the smooth development of religious beliefs." That it may not only do this as regards certain religious bodies which may be interesting to Mr. Balfour, but even shatter them altogether, is very possible; but the greater the practical fidelity of Catholics, the greater will be the ease wherewith any further development of the doctrines implicitly contained in the deposit of the Church, will most surely be effected in the most logical manner possible.⁴

The third chapter, which is headed "*Beliefs, Formulas and Realities*," contains some very excellent matter, but with various exaggerations, while it also displays some misapprehensions on the part of its author.

of revelation . . . all human language is composed of sensuous symbols. It is manifest, therefore, that in every instance there is a danger of pressing too strongly the mere symbol . . . it is surely incumbent on us to be on our guard against the ill effects of mistaking symbols for things symbolized. Otherwise, we may unconsciously be the means of imposing fetters on the religious conceptions of well-meaning, simple-minded persons.

¹ P. 262.

² Pp. 260 and 261.

³ At p. 261.

⁴ See our article, "Authority and Evolution," in the *Tablet* for August, 1896.

He begins with a statement that the theological road is smoothed by the fact that "large changes and adaptations of belief are possible within the limits of the same unchanging formulas," since a close examination shows that different persons may make the same assertion in good faith without thereby meaning the same thing. He gives as an example¹ the assertion "that Julius Cæsar was murdered at Rome in the first century B.C.," and contends that the statement cannot mean the same thing to the historian and the school boy, or to persons who take different views as to the nature of death or that of man.

He says, indeed, "this may perhaps seem to be an unprofitable subtlety," and so in one respect it is; for the naked fact in itself must be the same to all rational persons. Yet it is not *altogether* "unprofitable," since it gives an opportunity for clearing away an ambiguity which lurks beneath that subtlety.

Every external occurrence that takes place and is known to have occurred, has two aspects or characters in the mind of each person who knows it. There is for each such person (1) an objective and (2) a subjective aspect or character to every such fact of knowledge and every statement made expressing knowledge of such fact. The objective aspect is the same for all; but the subjective aspect, or character, is different in every individual. In the instance given such subjective character is made up in each person, *e. g.*, (1) of the relation born by the fact cognized to other facts² known by him; (2) of the sentiments he may entertain: (*a*) as to the person and character of Cæsar; (*b*) as to the best form of government; (*c*) as to ethical possibilities as regards regicide, etc.; (3) of the essential nature of man; (4) as to the nature of death, and a variety of other private beliefs and sentiments. But to say that because men thus differ subjectively they do not agree and mean the same thing with regard to the objective fact, we cannot regard as other than an altogether unreasonable statement.

Mr. Balfour next proceeds to apply this essentially confused notion to the belief of mankind in God. He says:³

"A similar reflection is of obvious importance when we come to consider, for example, such propositions as there is a God, or there is a world of material things! Both these statements might be, and are, accepted by the rudest savage and by the most advanced philosopher. They may, so far as we can tell, continue to be accepted by men in all stages of culture till the last inhabitant of a perishing world is frozen into unconsciousness. Yet, plainly the savage and the philosopher use these words in very different meanings. From the tribal deity of early times to the Christian God, or, if you prefer it, the Hegelian Absolute; from matter as conceived by primitive man to matter as it is conceived by the modern physicist, how great the interval!

¹ P. 264.

² Thus making the difference between the "schoolboy" and the "historian."

³ P. 264.

The formulas are the same, the beliefs are plainly not the same. Nay, so wide are they apart that while to those who hold the earlier view the later would be quite meaningless, it may require the highest effort of sympathetic imagination for those whose minds are steeped in the later view to reconstruct, even imperfectly, the substance of the earlier. The civilized man cannot understand the savage, nor the grown man the child."

From this statement we differ absolutely. Instead of saying "how vast the interval" between the conceptions of the cultured and the uncultured mind, we exclaim, as we have before exclaimed,¹ how complete is the fundamental identity!

Let us consider, first, our conception of God. Like every other idea it cannot be sustained before the mind without the aid of some sensuous image derived from the imagination, and its inadequacy to make known to us the divine reality is simply infinite. Therefore, the God of the savage and of the philosopher become almost identical when compared with the objective reality they severally try to represent.² In a less degree an analogous affirmation may be made as to men's conception of "matter."

Everybody has a practical knowledge of it, but *as it is in itself* it is essentially unknown and unknowable, and will doubtless ever so remain to mortal ken. The atomist and the idealist, different as their conceptions of matter are compared with those of the ordinary man, can speak of it only through the aid of sensuous symbols fundamentally similar to his. The minutest atom is thus for them as solid as a boulder, and a vortex ring of ether as a ring of smoke or vapor. That the civilized man can understand the savage is a truism, for multitudes of Catholic missionaries do so, nor do Christian brothers fail to comprehend the childish minds wherewith long practice has made them familiar.

¹ Our personal intercourse with Sussex peasantry—certainly not exceptionally intellectual amongst peasants—has convinced us that it is an easy matter to make them understand very abstract philosophical truths. With a little patience and some pains in making use of his rustic vocabulary and turns of expression, we found it quite easy to make an illiterate cowherd comprehend Berkleyan idealism, and we were greatly interested to find that he rejected it on the very grounds which had led us to abandon it after having been for years its captive. See *The Origin of Human Reason* (Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1889), p. 238. The difference which divides such men from men of culture is analogous to that which distinguishes the *crème de la crème* of fashionable society from the professional and mercantile classes of the community—namely, the familiar use of a certain vocabulary to which may be added, as regards the inner circle of the *beau monde*, the frequent employment of a peculiar intonation.

² This truth, which we have again and again affirmed, is accepted by Mr. Balfour, who, a little further on (p. 277), says: "It may be, indeed I think it is, the case that our approximate guesses are still closer to his [*i.e.*, primitive man's] than they are to their common object, and that far as we seem to have travelled, yet, measured on the celestial scale, our intellectual progress is scarcely to be discerned, so minute is the parallax of infinite truth."

Mr. Balfour next asks:¹

"Can we, in the face of the wide divergence of meaning frequently conveyed by the same formula at different times, assert that what endures in such cases is anything more than a mere husk or a shell? Is it more than the mould into which any metal, base or precious, may be poured at will? Does identity of expression imply anything which deserves to be described as community of belief? Are we here dealing with things or only with words?"

Of course there are formulas and formulas, and by no means every formula (*i.e.*, every statement) is an assertion of what is really an objective truth. Nevertheless, as to a multitude of such formulas we may confidently affirm that what endures is "more than a husk or shell," and that it is even a very precious "kernel." There is, however, "a husk or shell," but that is neither the formula nor its intellectual content, but that wrapping of mental images wherein every one of our intellectual perceptions and conceptions is enshrouded, and of which our poor human nature is compelled to make use in order to retain such perceptions or conceptions before the mind. We need not here insist upon this fact or on the dangers thence arising to our perception of truth, since we have pointed out this matter at length in a paper² to which we have more than once referred.

We affirm that words "used in the same sense" do correspond "to the same thought," objectively, however different or various may be the subjective conditions attending it, as we have before pointed out with respect to assertions about the death of Cæsar.

Language, no doubt, is very inferior to thought, and often, from narrowness, is unable to give full and complete expression to thought, and on this account new expressions and all sorts of technical terms are invented and come into use. Thus a more and more perfect correspondence between the symbol (the *verbum oris*) and the intellectual conception (the *verbum mentale*) is brought about and terms acquire the validity and force which logic assigns to them. For a blindness to what he regards as the great inadequacy of language to express thought, Mr. Balfour somewhat blames the schoolmen, though as to their indulging in "excessive subtleties," he observes,³ such is "surely no great crime in a metaphysician," and their endeavor to combine "the philosophy and the theology of their day" was an attempt which seems to him "to be entirely praiseworthy."

Mr. Balfour's next strange contention is that all knowledge, and every statement which is incomplete, is false, and therefore

¹ P. 265.

² See, again, our article entitled "Science in Fetters" in the *Dublin Review* for January and July, 1895.

³ P. 267.

he contends¹ that if we say "every belief must be either true or not true," then

"Most, if not all, the positive beliefs which deal with concrete reality—the very beliefs, in short, about which a reasonable man may be expected principally to interest himself—would, in strictness, have to be classed among the 'not true.' " His contention is "that inasmuch as any fragmentary presentation of a concrete whole must, because it is fragmentary, be therefore erroneous, the full complexity of any true belief about reality will necessarily transcend the comprehension of any finite intelligence. We know only in part, and we *therefore know wrongly*."²

It is, of course, most true that no one but God can know the whole truth about anything, because no one but God can know the full relations existing between that thing and divine intelligence. It is also most true that no statement any man can make, and no knowledge a human being can possess about any object whatever, can express or contain all its relations with the created universe.

But to say, on that account, that a partial knowledge is false, erroneous or wrongly known, because it is thus incomplete, seems to us to be an outrageously irrational operation.

Is the statement "the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal" false or erroneous because it does not also express the facts which follow if its sides be produced? Is it false to say "a gibbon's arms are relatively longer than those of any other ape," because it does not also declare that "a gibbon has no tail," or that "no ape except a species of gibbon has a chin?"

But the fact that every statement must be true or false does not in the least conflict with the no less certain fact that many concrete statements are a mixture of truth and error. Every statement so containing truth and error is really not a single statement, but a blending of two or more, which require to be accurately distinguished as component and subordinate parts, each of which will then be found (when the analysis has been carried far enough) to be either true or false.

Mr. Balfour says:³

"However profound may be our ignorance of our ignorance, at least we should realize that to describe (when using language strictly) any scheme of belief as wholly false which has even imperfectly met the needs of mankind, is the height of arrogance; and to claim for any beliefs which we may happen to approve that they are wholly true, is the height of absurdity."

A man would indeed be foolish who should describe any such "scheme of belief as wholly false," or who should affirm that his own had complete objective truth, as we shall shortly see. He continues:⁴

¹ P. 268.

² The italics are ours.

³ P. 270.

⁴ P. 271.

"Nowhere [save in abstract propositions], neither in our knowledge of ourselves, nor in our knowledge of each other, nor in our knowledge of the material world, nor in our knowledge of God, is there any belief which is more than an approximation, any method which is free from flaw, any result not tainted with error. The simplest intuitions and the remotest speculations fall under the same condemnation."

This is much too strong a statement. As to the whole truth about anything, as we just said, no one of course can know that but God, and, *à fortiori*, this applies to our religious knowledge, but that does not prevent our having a perfectly true knowledge of the difference between a group of three marbles and a group of five marbles. Our knowledge of their numerical difference is a perfectly true knowledge, and is not "tainted with error."

Mr. Balfour next remarks:

"To some persons this train of reflection suggests nothing but sceptical misgiving and intellectual despair. To me it seems, on the other hand, to save us from both. What kind of a universe would that be which we could understand? If it were intelligible (by us), would it be credible? If our reason could comprehend it, would it not be too narrow for our needs? 'I believe because it is impossible,' may be a pious paradox. 'I disbelieve because it is simple,' commends itself to me as an axiom; an axiom doubtless to be used with discretion; an axiom which may easily be perverted in the interests of idleness and superstition; but one, nevertheless, which contains a valuable truth not always remembered by those who make especial profession of worldly wisdom."

There is valuable truth in this passage, though it is, nevertheless, a gross exaggeration to say that if it were intelligible to us (which it could only be by our having divine knowledge infused into us), it might not be credible.

Mr. Balfour next proceeds to consider² the questions: (1) how the immutability claimed for theological doctrines and the movement observed in theological ideas can be reconciled, and (2) what is the value of "uniformity of theological profession?"

He thinks answers can be obtained by keeping in mind: (A) the distinction between the function of formulas as *dogmas* and as *bases of co-operation*, and (B) the distinction between the "*accuracy*" and the "*real truth*" of the various beliefs" they express.

As to the former distinction, our author very strangely avers that under certain circumstances "successful co-operation" may be much more important than "the attainment of speculative truths."

We must certainly never forget that Mr. Balfour is, philosoph-

¹ A similar objection was long ago raised by us to the hypothesis of *Natural Selection*, which has been very widely accepted on account of the ease with which it seems, at first, able to explain the phenomena of organic life.

² Pp. 272 and 273.

³ For us, no statement can be accurate which is not really true.

ically, above all a sceptic, while he is a most able and admirable politician in the best sense of that word. We can thus understand his preference, now and again, for "co-operation" rather than for "truth."

Nevertheless the following passage¹ is admirable and very true:

"A church is something more than a body of more or less qualified persons engaged more or less successfully in the study of theology. It requires a very different equipment from that which is sufficient for a learned society. Something more is asked of it than independent research. It is an organization charged with a great practical work. For the successful promotion of this work unity, discipline and self-devotion are the principal requisites; and, as in the case of every other organization, the most powerful source of these qualities is to be found in the feeling aroused by common memories, common hopes, common loyalties, by professions in which all agree; by a ceremonial which all share; by customs and commands which all obey."

But he allows that co-operation may be bought too dear, and, as his position forces him to do, asserts "schism" to be sometimes "justifiable."

He then turns to consider the truth of formulas and so makes plain how it is he can rank "co-operation" above "truth."

He says:²

"No agreement about theological or any other doctrine insures, or, indeed, is capable of producing sameness of belief. We are no more able to believe what other people believe than to feel what other people feel. Two friends read together the same description of a landscape. Does anyone suppose that it stirs within them precisely *the same quality of sentiment*, or works precisely the same subtle associations? . . . But if no representation of the splendors of Nature can produce in us any perfect identity of admiration, why expect the definitions of theology or science to produce in us any perfect *identity of belief*?"

We have on various occasions pointed out how our author's arguments are invalidated through his confusion of "reason" with "ratiocination." In the above passage, however, we have a far more serious confusion, namely, a confusion between *intellectual apprehensions* and *emotional feelings*! To discriminate between numerically different groups of marbles is not an emotion, neither an apprehension that men have inferred through the principle of Causation, that "there must be a God," or the apprehension that the eucharistic presence has been defined by the Church as "Transubstantiation." Emotion, of course, may facilitate and intensify, or weaken, or make difficult, the *acceptance* of religious doctrines; but their intellectual apprehension is an essentially distinct matter.

Mr. Balfour consoles himself for what he considers the impossibility of similarity of belief, by the reflection that there are agreements between men of all epochs in matters about which they seem most to differ.

¹ P. 274.

² P. 275. The italics are ours.

"I like," he says,¹ "to think of the human race, from whatever stock its members may have sprung, in whatever age they may be born, whatever creed they may profess, together in the presence of the One Reality, engaged, not wholly in vain, in spelling out some fragments of its message. All share its being;² to none are its oracles wholly dumb."

As to the different religious conditions of mankind we shall shortly say a few words, but we will first finish our notice of this chapter.

Our author asks,³ and (if knowledge is in the parlous state he represents it to be) he may very well ask :

"When and what are those immutable doctrines which, in the opinion of most theologians, ought to be handed on, a sacred trust, from generation to generation?"

Strange to say, he answers this by representing truths of revelation as parallel to those of "science."

"They also are the trustees of statements which ought to be preserved unchanged through all revolutions."

Yet none of these statements can be more accurate than the, for him, ambiguous proposition which affirms "Cæsar is dead."

Nevertheless we are assured⁴ that the fact they "have a different import for different persons and for different ages,"

"is not only consistent with their value as vehicles for the transmission of truth—it is essential to it"!

This is quite true of religious doctrines in one sense, but not in the Balfour sense, *i.e.*, because they mean different things to different people.⁵

The profound truths of religion have a value which is due to their inexhaustible significance, and this is the *raison d'être* and makes possible "the development of Christian doctrine" as expounded by the late Cardinal Newman.

Therefore to these truths the following words of Mr. Balfour are indeed applicable :

"If their meaning could be exhausted by one generation they would be false for the next. It is because they can be charged with a richer and richer content as our knowledge slowly grows to a fuller harmony with the Infinite Reality that they may be counted among the most precious of our inalienable possessions."⁶

¹ P. 276.

² A singularly pantheistic expression!

³ P. 277.

⁴ P. 278.

⁵ Of course, the dogmas of religion must be different in different persons so far as regards their phantasmata. The imaginations are affected by the different degrees of culture and diverse environments, but that does not prevent the essential unity of the mental conception of each dogma in all.

⁶ To the end of this third chapter Mr. Balfour appends a note wherein he speaks of the exceptionally great value of the results of the Christian controversies of the

We will now return to the questions concerning (1) the entire truthfulness of any and each man's scheme of belief and (2) the different religious conditions of mankind.

Mr. Balfour does not appear to recognize the fact that God has certainly made to us any distinct and *authoritative* revelation, though, as we shall see, he holds that God graciously assists human reason universally. We Catholics, of course, are certain that He has done so, and that the Church acts with Divine authority and conveys to us the most complete knowledge of truths possible for us in those relatively few points which are *de fide*.

Nevertheless, since our reason makes God so far known to us as to enable us to appreciate His utter incomprehensibility—since we know that it is only God who can know what the word "God" really means—it is evident that no revelation could express to us men fully and adequately, God's essential nature or the entire truth concerning His relations with the creatures He has made. These things as known to God himself—that is to say, "objective religion" cannot be communicated to us save by symbols and more or less remote analogies congruous with our nature and faculties. As Holy Scripture tells us, we now can only see "as in a glass darkly."

So far we concede that Mr. Balfour is right in deprecating an assertion that we are "wholly right"—that is, in the sense that we possess objective truth, as known to Almighty God. Mr. Balfour's other assertion,¹ that no scheme of belief is wholly false,² has also a direct relation with the truths above stated.

"first four centuries." He very truly says that the Church insisted on preserving "the idea of the Godhead which was essentially involved in the Christian revelation . . . in all its inexplicable fulness . . . such simplifications as those of the Arians, for example, are so alien and impossible to modern modes of thought that if they had been incorporated with Christianity they must have destroyed it." This is, of course, most true, but it is very interesting as a statement by Mr. Balfour.

Even more remarkable is one made by that illustrious Unitarian, Dr. Martineau in his criticism of Mr. Balfour's book (see the *Fortnightly Review* for April, 1895, p. 564). In the passage referred to he distinctly censures Arianism and supports St. Athanasius, as understood, of course, by Dr. Martineau. He says: "Is not this, then, a true conception, that we see in the mind of Christ the very essence of the mind of God?" For us the wonderful providence which has assisted the Church in her great successive definitions about our Lord, itself amounts almost to a demonstration of the truth of Christianity. Thus the successive errors and their corrections may be tabulated as follows: Error (1), Christ was a mere man; (correction), "Superhuman." (2) He was not really God; (c) He was really God. (3) He was God the Father; (c) He was not so. (4) He was of like substance with the Father; (c) He was of the same substance. (5) He consisted of two persons; (c) He was one in person. (6) He had but one nature; (c) He had two natures. (7) He had but one will; (c) He had two wills, and so on.

¹ P. 270.

² Pp. 270 and 276.

God, omnipotent though He be, cannot, as we have said, make Himself truly comprehensible to us by any revelation. As we have practically said, not only His own Being, but our actual relation to Him, the full nature of His claims, the happiness He can bestow and the awfulness of estrangement from Him, can only be revealed to us with practical efficacy sufficient for our needs. But, *in that way*, they have been amply and truthfully revealed to us.

Hence it is that the profound difference which exists between His revelation and any other religion whatever is so vast that human language is utterly unable to express it.

Nevertheless Christian writers, from the very early days of the Church to our own times, have maintained that other religions have not been devoid of their various shares of truth. St. Clement of Alexandria was amongst the early fathers who thus taught, and amongst later authorities we may cite Cardinal Newman, whose memorable words¹ as to God's action amongst religious errors, were as follows:

"His writing is upon the wall, whether of the Indian fane or the porticos of Greece . . . He is with the heathen dramatist in his denunciation of injustice and tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon crime. Even on the unseemly legends of a popular mythology He casts His shadow, and it is dimly discerned in the ode or the epic, as in troubled water or in fantastic dreams. All that is good, all that is pure, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him."

Therefore in a certain sense the paganism of Greece and Rome was "true," and, in its degree, "righteous," and Zeus and Athene, Ares and Aphrodite were, in their way, fragmentary, one-sided expressions of the Divine.

But to say this simply would be fatally to mislead, because, on account of the poverty of human language, it would disguise the infinite distinction which exists between the Christian religion—the Catholic Church—and every other. Therefore it is that whatever can be urged in favor of any other religions they can at best but be called manifestations of the Divine, while the term *revelation* is reserved for Christianity alone.

To these considerations we shall have again to refer towards the close of our review of Mr. Balfour's valuable work.

In his fourth chapter, "*Ultimate Scientific Ideas*," Mr. Balfour turns aside to examine once more the foundations of science with special reference to the amusing confusions of thought and self-contradictions of poor Mr. Herbert Spencer.

¹ In his *Discourse on University Education*, 1852, p. 96.

He begins by observing that some of his readers are disposed to consider science as a land of Goshen bright with sunshine, and religion a region wrapped in Egyptian darkness. This delusion he proposes to dispel by an examination of "fundamental scientific ideas considered in themselves." These, he says,¹ seem quite simple as used in daily life, yet seem to crumble to pieces under criticism.

And here again we are forced, with regret, to protest against our author's scepticism, which, as we have again and again urged, is far more fatal to religion than to physical science—the latter being supported by *intuitions* and the former being necessarily based on *inferences*.

He takes as his example for criticism the following statement:

"We are, each of us, situated at any given moment in some particular portion of space, surrounded by a multitude of material things, which are constantly acting upon us and upon each other."

He then urges that its purport is clear only till it is examined, and asks a number of questions to which he seems to think no satisfactory answers can be given. We will therefore here quote them and supply our own answers to each in brackets.

"What are we?" [Extended, thinking substance.] "What is space?" [Nothing but an abstraction—the extension of all extended things.] "Can we be in space, or is it only our bodies about which any such statement can be made?" [Our bodies and we are one.] "What is a 'thing,' and in particular what is a 'material thing?'" [Every one who knows anything knows what he means by a "thing," though the elementary nature of the conception of existence forbids its definition.² A material thing is an extended entity.] "What is meant by saying that one 'material thing' acts upon another, or that 'material things' act upon us?" [Those conceptions are too elementary for explanation, but they are perfectly known and understood by every sane mind.]

He then further considers what is a "material thing," saying:³

"Nothing can be plainer till you consider it. Nothing can be obscurer when you do. A 'thing' has qualities—hardness, weight, shape and so forth. Is it merely the sum of these qualities, or is it something more? If it is merely the sum of its qualities, have these any independence? Nay, is such an independent existence even conceivable? If it is something more, what is the relation of the 'qualities' to the 'something more?'"

These very old questions are, of course, most familiar to Catholics

¹ Pp. 280–281.

² Obviously it is as impossible to explain every conception and term as to continue reasoning *ad infinitum*.

³ P. 282.

who have done their "philosophy." The answers are, of course, well known to Mr. Balfour, although, also of course, since he does not accept the evident objective truth of those first principles which are indispensable to a true philosophy, he can have no esteem for those answers which Catholic philosophy supplies. It declares, as we all know, that a "thing" is more than "the sum of its qualities." We also know that it is not only "conceivable" that such qualities may have an independent existence (since all instructed Catholics actually *do*, and therefore plainly *can*, conceive of it), but they know that such qualities do so exist in the case of the Holy Sacrament.

Again he asks, "Can we regard 'a thing' as an isolated 'something,' an entirely self-sufficient and potentially solitary?" To which we reply we certainly can regard "a thing" as essentially 'a thing in itself' potentially solitary, but that does not in the least prevent our recognizing that it owes both its origin and its actual continuance to other things.

Our author tells us that he only serves up these "cold fragments of ancient controversies in order to make it plain that such difficulties, though generally quite ignored, underlie our knowledge of phenomena" no less than our notions of æsthetics and ethics as well as of theology "where many persons seem glad enough to acknowledge" their existence.

He then turns to examine the "very perverted" views which form the basis of "the only modern system of English growth which, professing to provide us with a general philosophy, has received any appreciable amount of popular support"—names Mr. Spencer's.

His teaching is, we learn, that "ultimate scientific ideas" and "ultimate theological ideas" are alike unthinkable, from which (as Mr. Balfour properly affirms) the logical consequence would be that "both these grand departments are infected by the same weakness."

But Mr. Spencer will not admit this.

"The idea that the conclusions of science should be profaned by speculative questioning is to him intolerable." So "he divides the verities which have to be believed into those which relate to the knowable and those which relate to the unknowable. What is knowable he appropriates, without exception, for science. What is unknowable he abandons without reserve to religion."

But Mr. Balfour questions the validity of this curious arrangement; for if "ultimate" scientific ideas are unthinkable, "proximate" scientific ideas are thereby invalidated.²

¹ P. 284.

² P. 286.

"That which in the order of reason is dependent, cannot be unaffected by the weaknesses and obscurities of that on which it depends. If the one is unintelligible, the other can hardly be rationally established."

Mr. Spencer shuts his eyes to doubts about science, saying, "To ask whether science is substantially true is much like asking whether the sun gives light."¹

To which Mr. Balfour rejoins:²

"After due consideration we shall have to admit, I think, that it does not. For it is a statement which, if made intelligently, not only involves the comprehension of matters, space, time and force, which are, according to Mr. Spencer, all incomprehensible, but there is the further difficulty that, if his system is to be believed, what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies, which are unknown and unknowable.³ It would seem, therefore, either that the sun is a subjective affection, in which case it can hardly be said to give light; or it is 'unknown' and 'unknowable,' in which case no assertion respecting it can be regarded as supplying us with any very flattering specimen of scientific certitude."

Mr. Balfour further very justly says that nobody is required to investigate first principles, but that if any one voluntarily undertakes so to do, he should not shrink from results.

Mr. Spencer has failed to see whither his speculations inevitably lead. This is very distinctly recognized by Mr. Balfour, but the latter also, according to us, has likewise failed to see whither his own sceptical system leads, and how inevitably it cuts the ground from beneath that religious edifice he so zealously labors to erect.

Nevertheless, in his fifth chapter (*Science and Theology*) our author very skilfully and admirably draws out the best arguments which his system renders possible, to show that science not only supports, but even itself requires, the aid of religion, and leads us to recognize and apprehend the fact that a divine "preferential" activity energizes in the world about us.

He begins by observing there are two classes of persons who accept a certain amount of theology: (1) those who accept only what they think may be deduced from "scientific principles," and (2) those who accept provisionally and tentatively "so much of theology as they think their naturalistic premisses do not positively contradict."

Now, in order to prevent confusion, it may be well to observe that, as we all know, Catholics only accept such theology as "may be deduced from scientific premisses," since they accept the teaching of the Church as it is grounded on those self-evident first principles of reason which constitute the prolegomena of revelation and by the aid of which the fact of revelation is made clear. But

¹ See his *First Principles*, p. 19.

² P. 287.

³ See his *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 493.

of course they hold, like Mr. Balfour, the system of "sensism" (his naturalism) in utter scorn and contempt.

Nevertheless, subjectively, the disciples of utter "naturalism" are more at ease than are the members of Mr. Balfour's two classes above distinguished. For the "sensists" are blind to the inadequateness and incoherence of their system, while they have a comfortable feeling that they have reached their journey's end, having worked out these principles to their natural conclusion, so that they may at least rest if it is not given them to be thankful.

But the members of Mr. Balfour's two classes have a much worse time of it. As he says:¹

"To them, each new discovery in geology, morphology, anthropology, or the 'higher criticism,' arouses as much theological anxiety as it does scientific interest. They are perpetually occupied in the task of 'reconciling,' as the phrase goes, 'religion and science.' This is to them not an intellectual luxury, but a pressing and overmastering necessity. For their theology exists on sufferance. It rules over its hereditary territories as a tributary vassal dependant on the forbearance of some encroaching overlord. Province after province which once acknowledged its sovereignty has been torn from its grasp, and it depends no longer upon its own action, but upon the uncontrolled policy of its too powerful neighbor, how long it shall preserve a precarious authority over the remainder."

This truly depicts the sad condition of these religionists of feeble convictions and a fragmentary creed precariously supported. But even Catholics, though retaining firmly their faith, may occasionally be vexed and troubled by difficulties which the progress of knowledge has brought forward and which do trouble them, not because they are inconsistent with any dogma, but because they disturb or destroy those images of the imagination (*phantasmata*), the aid of which such troubled souls had become accustomed to make use of in their conception of the dogma in question. As a learned religious once said to us, "every now and then a new lime-light is turned on and vision is for a brief space troubled and confused thereby."

But Mr. Balfour, by his above-quoted remark, by no means intends to deny² either that it is not our business to "reconcile" all beliefs, so far as possible, into a self-consistent whole; or, if that cannot be done, to represent contradictions and obscurities as matters of indifference. The difficulties which "science, ethics, or theology have to solve in common" are, he considers, "more formidable by far" than any which may intervene between science and religion, which he regards as "comparatively trifling."

He clearly states a great and important truth, which is far too much lost sight of, and which is quite ignored by men of science who are not religious. It is the truth that physical science "is in

² P. 291.

¹ P. 292.

no way concerned to deny the reality of a world unrevealed to us in sense perception, nor the existence of a God who, however imperfectly, may be known by those who diligently seek him."

Such matters he declares,¹ as we did in the beginning of the preceding part² of our review, it ought to declare to be beyond its jurisdiction.

What possible concern can the facts of physical science have to do with the dogmas of religion?

Is spectrum analysis less carefully carried on if the observer is a Franciscan tertiary than if he is a follower of Spencer? Is there any inconsistency in a student of Wood's Holl Laboratory making a pilgrimage to Paray-le-Monial out of devotion to the Sacred Heart?

To return to Mr. Balfour: He says that any real difficulty which may exist "in forming a system which shall include both theology and science" does not lie in the doctrine that there is a hyperphysical support for the whole system of "natural phenomena," nor in attributing to it reason, or "something higher than reason, and including reason." He adds:³

"This belief, if necessary for theology, is at the same time so far, in my judgment, from being repugnant to science that, without it, the scientific view of the natural world would not be less, but more, beset with difficulties than it is at present."

Mr. Balfour perceives clearly what has also appeared true to us, that nature, apart from man, does not easily supply us with convincing proofs of Theism.⁴

But he adds:⁵

"That if we bring this [Theistic] belief with us to the study of phenomena, we can say of it . . . that, broadly speaking, and in the rough, the facts harmonize with it, and that it gives a unity and coherence to our apprehension of the natural world which it would not otherwise possess."

He then urges (as we have done again and again) that "the mere fact that *we know*" is full of divine significance. He reminds us that, on the "naturalistic hypothesis," knowledge, reason, and volition are the chance products of the blind operation of material

¹ P. 293.

² See AMER. CATH. QUAR. REVIEW for July, 1896.

³ P. 294.

⁴ Mr. Balfour says: "You cannot infer a God from the existence of the world as you infer an architect from the existence of a house, or a mechanic from the existence of a watch." But we have always maintained, and maintain, that the existence of God is made evident to us by the fact that there is a universe which, being single, could never have owed its qualities to natural selection, and which, since it displays a modicum of knowledge, volition and goodness *in man*, must have had for its cause a being with attributes such that those three qualities in man are but the faintest adumbration of them.

⁵ P. 295.

causes, and that morality and reason are but "unconscious tools in the hands of their immoral and non-rational antecedents." As Mr. Balfour has so well shown in the first part of his work, without assuming a rational cause for our own reason we stultify ourselves. He says:¹

"The professor of naturalism, rejoicing in the display of his dialectical resources, is like a voyager, pacing, at his own pleasure, up and down the ship's deck, who should suppose that his movements had some important share in determining his position on the illimitable ocean? And the parallel would be complete if we can conceive such a voyager pointing to the alertness of his step and the vigor of his limbs as arguing well for the successful prosecution of his journey, while assuring you in the very same breath that the vessel, within whose narrow bounds he displays all this meaningless activity, is drifting, he knows not whence nor whither, without pilot or captain, at the bidding of shifting winds and incalculable currents."

"Consider the following propositions selected from the naturalistic creed or deduced from it:

"(I.) My beliefs, in so far as they are the result of reasoning at all, are founded on premises produced in the last resort by the 'cohesion of atoms.'

"(II.) Atoms, having no prejudices in favor of truth, are as likely to turn out wrong premises as right ones; nay, more likely, inasmuch as truth is single and error manifold.

"(III.) My premises, therefore, in the first place, and my conclusions in the second, are certainly untrustworthy, and probably false. Their falsity, moreover, is of a kind which cannot be remedied, since any attempt to correct it must start from premises not suffering under the same defects. But no such premises exist.

"(IV.) Therefore, again, my opinion about the original causes which produced my premises, as it is an inference from them, partakes of their weakness, so that I cannot either securely doubt my own certainties or be certain about my doubts.

Our author next considers the argument that "Natural Selection" might have brought about a conformity of thought to fact, as he previously suggested that the inevitableness of our perception of an external world might have been thus produced. Evidently, however, as he urges² powers which had been developed solely to enable their possessor to obtain food and escape enemies, not only cannot be expected to supply us with metaphysics or theology; they cannot be expected to give us any general view of the world of phenomena, or to do more "than guide us . . . from the satisfaction of one useful appetite to the satisfaction of another." These perplexities can, in Mr. Balfour's opinion,³ only be escaped by

"The pre-supposition that it (*i.e.*, the world) was the work of a rational being, who made *it* intelligible, and at the same time made *us*, in however feeble a fashion, able to understand it."

This pre-supposition, however, is, in our author's opinion, far from solving all difficulties. Indeed, in a note, he adds:

¹ P, 297.

² P. 300.

³ P. 301.

"There must be a God to justify our confidence in (what used to be called) innate ideas,"

Such a statement, however, is one which leads either to absolute scepticism, or to a system of blind faith, which opens the door to scepticism again. We have already urged, and we venture to think we have demonstrated, that we are provided with evident certitude, and therefore *cannot* possibly be deceived in everything.

Mr. Balfour next argues¹ with full reason and much force that science requires theism for its own completion, since "the ordered system of phenomena asks for a cause."

But he adds, somewhat naively :

"We cannot form, we will not say any adequate, but even any tolerable, idea of *the mode* in which God is related to, and acts on, the world of phenomena. . . . *How* He created it, how He sustains it, is impossible for us to imagine."

Not only *that* is, indeed, impossible, but it is impossible for us even to conceive of² that "*mode*"—that "*how!*" The impossibility of imagining such Divine action save by sensuous symbols, which are not only utterly inadequate and in discord with our intellectual perceptions, is the cause of the rejection of Christian dogma by various men devoted to physics.

The idea of "Creation," for example, is accompanied by mental images in which God appears as a human figure performing various acts of manipulation. The words of Milton, and many pictorial representations handed down from mediæval times, have provided us with a number of mental images which serve merely as symbols to facilitate the apprehension of truths which no mental images whatever can truly represent. What the opponents of "special creation" really object to, is simply their own imaginations of such unimaginable divine activity, fancying that to accept the dogma of creation implies the need of believing in the fidelity of such imaginations; belief in which they absurdly attribute to those who accept that dogma.

But such difficulties meet us not only with respect to God's activity but also with respect to our own, for—as we have frequently pointed out—every act of will, of self-determination is, and must be, in the eyes of "sensists," nothing less than a miracle. Small wonder then that all "sensists" deny the existence of anything so absolutely fatal to their views. But as Mr. Balfour says:³

"Their denial only serves to emphasize the extreme difficulty of the problem raised by the relation of the self to phenomena. So hardly pressed are they by these difficulties that, in order to evade them, they attempt an impossible act of suicide; and be-

¹ P. 302. The italics are ours.

² See *ante*, pp. 39 and 40.

³ P. 303.

cause the self refuses to figure as a phenomenon among phenomena, or complacently to fit into a purely scientific view of the world, they set about the hopeless task of suppressing it altogether."¹

Mr. Balfour has an excellent passage, the argument of which is fatal to "monism." He says² of "mind" and "matter:"

"Both must perforce form elements in every adequate representation of reality. Yet the philosophic artist has still to arise who shall combine the two into a single picture, without doing serious violence to essential features, either of the one or the other. I am myself, indeed, disposed to doubt whether any conception made by the 'subjective' to the 'objective,' or by the 'objective' to the 'subjective,' short of the total destruction of one or the other, will avail to produce a harmonious scheme. And certainly no discord could be so barren, so unsatisfying, so practically impossible, as a harmony attained at such a cost. We must acquiesce, then, in the existence of an unsolved difficulty."

Mr. Balfour next refers³ to the theistic difficulty as to the existence of evil, and declares that from the world presented to us by science, though we might conjecture a God of power or of reason, "we never could infer a God who was wholly loving and wholly just." But we have no desire for a God who should be "wholly loving" to the entire exclusion of justice; but if justice be included, we contend that the world is conceivably the work of a God of love, the truth of a future life being fully accepted. But the problem of evil is so ancient a one that its weight, which has been borne by theology for so many centuries, "is not likely now to crush it."

Miracles next claim our author's attention, and he begins by deprecating any assertion of "the uniformity of nature" in opposition to them because, apart from a philosophy which "naturalism" denies, we have no right to claim any perception with re-

¹ See also the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for April, 1891, p. 320, in the article, "Professing Themselves to Be Wise, They Become Fools."

² P. 304. In a note (on the same page) he well states certain difficulties to "Sensism" from the existence of volition. He says (1) either will acts on matter, or (2) it does not.

(1) If it does, it must be either (a) Free or (b) Determined.

If (a) *free*, "Sensism" is refuted; if (b) *determined*, it is mere *surplusage*; since on the mechanical view of the material universe, its condition at one moment is absolutely determined by its condition at the preceding moment. Therefore in such a world even a "determined" will cannot be a cause of material change.

(2) If it does not act on matter, then volition must (a) either be part of a psychic series accompanying a series of physiological changes (a sort of pre-established harmony), or else (b) "we would suppose that it is a kind of superfluous consequence of certain physiological changes [Huxleyism] produced presumably without the exhaustion of any form of energy, and having no effect whatever, either upon the material world or (presumably) upon other psychic conditions. This reduces us to automata, and automata of a kind very difficult to find proper accommodation for in a world scientifically conceived."

³ P. 306.

spect to such "uniformity" beyond what may enable us to "anticipate the future or reconstruct the past" "without sensible insecurity or error."

But miracles are often protested against in a way which would lead us to believe that those who so protest think that we Catholics cannot hit a cricket-ball or play a game of billiards with any confidence that bat or cue will produce results corresponding to the skill with which they are handled, on account of a lurking fear that "miracle" may be fatal to the wicket-stumps or guard the entrance of each pocket.

"The real difficulties connected with theological miracles," he tells us,¹ concern (1) their evidence as wonders, and (2) their divine character.

(1) As to the amount and nature of the evidence practically adequate to convince a man of the miraculous, it varies, and must vary, according to the previous attitude of his mind. Evidently, an average man of the ninth century would be thus very differently conditioned from a man of the nineteenth. To many a "sensist" of our own day, no evidence would suffice, while to an old-fashioned Protestant no marvel recorded in the Bible would be a subject of difficulty or criticism. But it is possible that a member of a third school, as Mr. Balfour says,²

"May appraise the evidence alleged in favor of 'wonders due to the special action of divine power' by the light of an altogether different theory of the world and of God's action therein. He may consider religion to be as necessary an element in any adequate scheme of belief as science itself. Every event, therefore, whether wonderful or not, a belief in whose occurrence is involved in that religion; every event by whose disproof the religion would be seriously impoverished or altogether destroyed, has behind it the whole combined strength of the system to which it belongs. It is not, indeed, believed independently of external evidence any more than the more ordinary occurrences in history are believed independently of external evidence. But it does not require, as some people appear to suppose, the impossible accumulation of proof on proof, of testimony on testimony, before the presumption against it can be neutralized."

(2) He next proceeds to consider the divine character of miraculous interventions. There are, as he truly says,³ many who reject "miracles," but will admit of what is called a "Special Providence." Others will reject this, but accept, as real, a sort of divine superintendence over the general course of history, while there are yet others who, rejecting such superintendence, "conceive that they can escape from philosophic reproach by beating out the idea yet a little thinner, and admitting that there does exist somewhere a 'power which makes for righteousness.'" Yet, as Mr. Balfour most truly says, "nothing is gained by quali-

¹ P. 313.

² P. 314.

³ P. 316.

fying the admission with all those fanciful limitations and distinctions with which different schools of thought have seen fit to encumber it."

But he suggests a difficulty as to how a "Divine Being who is the ground and source of everything that is," can be more closely related "with one part of that which He has created than with another?"

This difficulty, however, concerns ethics as well as theology.

"For if we cannot believe in 'preferential action,' neither can we believe in the moral qualities of which 'preferential action' is the sign; and with the moral qualities of God is bound up the fate of anything which deserves to be called morality at all. . . . For a universe in which all the power was on the side of the Creator, and all the morality on the side of creation, would be one compared with which the universe of naturalism would shine out a paradise indeed. . . . Once assume a God, and we shall be obliged, sooner or later, to introduce harmony into our system by making obedience to His will coincident with the established rules of conduct. We cannot frame our advice to mankind on the hypothesis that to defy Omnipotence is the beginning of wisdom."

Evidently, the pantheistic conception which represents the First Cause as equally related to whatever exists or takes place, must "empty ethics of all ethical significance, and reduce virtue to a colorless acquiescence in the Appointed Order."

Curiously enough, as Mr. Balfour points out,¹ the modern doctrine of evolution really tends to bring the physicist into greater harmony with the theologian than he stood in before. Not that evolution strengthens the evidence for theism, but, theism being assumed, "evolution does, to a certain extent, harmonize in a special way with that belief in God's 'preferential action' which religion and morality alike require us to attribute to Him." For evolutionary science

"Has adopted an idea which has always been an essential part of the Christian view of the Divine economy, has given to that idea an undreamed-of extension, has applied it to the whole universe of phenomena, organic and inorganic, and has returned it again to theology, enriched, strengthened and developed. Can we, then, think of evolution in a God-created world without attributing to its author the notion of purpose slowly worked out; the striving towards something which is not, but which gradually becomes, and in the fulness of time: will be? Surely not. But, if not, can it be denied that evolution—the evolution, I mean, which takes place in time, the natural evolution of science, as distinguished from the dialectical evolution of metaphysics—does involve something in the nature of that 'preferential action,' which is so difficult to understand, yet so impossible to abandon?"

This is well put, though it contains no novelty of conception—being an idea common to all Theistic evolutionists.

We now come to the consideration of the last chapter of the

¹ P. 319.

remarkable book we have been so long reviewing. The title of the sixth and last chapter is "*Suggestions towards a provisional unification.*" No more than a "provisional unification" is possible on such a "foundation" as Mr. Balfour has constructed for belief; for the depreciation and distrust of reason which pervades it must cause that "foundation" soon to crumble, and the parts erected upon it, however skilfully joined, to speedily fall asunder.

Nevertheless, a great deal that is said in this last chapter is very admirable, and we should be unjust to readers whose patience has accompanied us so far, if we did not make some considerable quotations from it. The reasons Mr. Balfour gives for the acceptance of religion, and of Christianity itself, when grounded on that solid support which is afforded by an explicit recognition of the necessary truth of the first principles of knowledge, acquire full validity and a force of persuasion which no mind, unless fatally prejudiced against them, can reasonably dispute. Mr. Balfour begins¹ by saying that belief in "a living God" not only affords no ground of quarrel between theology and science, but that it is "actually required by the latter," and, therefore, can hardly be refused to ethics, æsthetics and theology. If Theism be accepted as a general principle "applicable to the whole circuit of belief," then difficulties which "naturalism" cannot deal with will receive a practical solution.

The fundamental difficulty is the fact that, according to "sensism," all knowledge springs from what is non-rational and that non-reason is Lord of the Universe.

As to the absolute need of Theism, Mr. Balfour says:²

"Let the case of science be taken first, for it is a crucial one. Here, if anywhere, we might suppose ourselves independent of theology. Here, if anywhere, we might expect to be able to acquiesce without embarrassment in the negations of naturalism. But when once we have realized the scientific truth that at the root of every rational process lies an irrational one; that reason, from a scientific point of view, is itself a natural product; and that the whole material on which it works is due to causes, physical, physiological and social, which it neither creates nor controls, we shall be driven in mere self-defence to hold that, behind these non-rational forces, and above them, guiding them by slow degrees, and, as it were, with difficulty, to a rational issue, stands that Supreme Reason in whom we must thus believe, if we are to believe in anything. Here, then, we are plunged at once into the middle of theology. The belief in God, the attribution to Him of reason, and of what I have called 'preferential action' in relation to the world which He has created, all seem forced upon us by the single assumption that science is not an illusion, and that, with the rest of its teaching, we must accept what it has to say to us about itself as a natural product. At no smaller cost can we reconcile the origins of science with its pretensions, or relieve ourselves of the embarrassments in which we are involved by a naturalistic theory of Nature."

But if Theism turns out to be ultimately implied in our percep-

tions of merely physical phenomena, it is certainly no less implied by our ethical intuitions, which intuitions sensism would similarly trace back to a non-ethical and irrational origin. Again, if we assign a providential origin to "the long and complex train of events which have resulted in the recognition of the moral law," we must surely assign it to those religious evolutions without which a mere catalogue of precepts would have little practical efficiency.

"If, deserting naturalism, we regard the evolutionary process issuing in these ethical results as an instrument for carrying out a Divine purpose, the natural history of the higher sentiments is seen under a wholly different light. They may be due, doubtless they are in part due, to the same selective mechanism which produces the most cruel and the most disgusting of Nature's contrivances for protecting the species of some loathsome parasite. Between the two cases science [physical] cannot and naturalism will not draw any valid distinction. But here theology steps in, and by the conception of design revolutionizes our point of view. The most unlovely germ of instinct or of appetite to which we trace back the origin of all that is most noble and of good report, no longer throws discredit upon its developed offshoots. Rather is it consecrated by them. For if, in the region of causation, it is wholly by the earlier stages that the later are determined, in the region of design it is only through the later stages that the earlier can be understood."¹

But if the assumption of theism thus aids physical science and gives a substantial and influential character to ethical precepts, it has a bearing not less significant on our conception of æsthetics.

If it does not suffice to give beauty an objectivity as obvious as that of number or of shape, we are not thereby precluded, as our author says,²

"From referring our feeling of it to God, nor from supposing that, in the thrill of some deep emotion, we have for an instant caught a far-off reflection of Divine beauty. This is, indeed, my faith; and in it the differences of taste which divide mankind lose all their harshness. For we may liken ourselves to the members of some endless procession winding along the borders of a sunlit lake. Towards each individual there will shine along its surface a moving lane of splendor, where the ripples catch and deflect the light in his direction, while on either hand the waters, which to his neighbor's eyes are brilliant in the sun, for him lie dull and undistinguished. So may all possess a like enjoyment of loveliness. So do all owe it to one unchanging source. And if there be an endless variety in the immediate objects from which we generally derive it, I know not, after all, that this should furnish any matter for regret."

The view here advocated, if applicable to science, ethics and æsthetics, must be *à fortiori* applicable to religion. "For here, at

¹ Pp. 324 and 325. We long ago urged that since, as Aristotle teaches, the "essence of a thing" is what it is to be—*i.e.*, to become—it is easy to exaggerate the importance of embryology, which has in fact been much exaggerated in biological science, though, of course, its value and importance in revealing collateral relationships is unquestionable.

² P. 326.

least, might be expected preferential Divine intervention, supposing such intervention to be anywhere possible."

Mr. Balfour then passes on to consider what he deems may be thought an exception, namely, *natural religion*. This, he says, is defined "as the religion to which unassisted reason may attain in contrast to that which can be reached only by revelation. He objects to this distinction because he does not "believe that, strictly speaking, there is any such thing as 'unassisted reason.'" In this he writes, without knowing it, like a Catholic. As to our mere reason we affirm "*signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine!*" Nor can "Natural Theology," the Theology "*de Deo Uno*," be attained without such Divine assistance, which is refused to no man.

But Mr. Balfour makes far too little of the distinction between "Natural" and "Revealed" religion, and he uses the term "inspiration" in a misleading way—not, however, through any negligence of his, but simply through his want of acquaintance with theological terminology, as he very modestly avows.¹ He also uses² quite loosely the distinction between the "natural"³ and the "supernatural," saying it neither coincides "with that between natural and spiritual, nor with that between 'preferential action' and 'non-preferential,' nor with that between 'phenomenal' and 'noumenal.'" It is, perhaps, *less important than is sometimes supposed*," and, in this connection, "a burden, not an aid, to religious speculation."

Now the nature of a thing is the same, objectively, as its *essence* considered as the fundamental principle, or source, of all its activity. All the powers that flow from the essence of a thing, *as such*, are *natural* powers. Its other (or adventitious) powers are (1) *artificial*, or (2) *supernatural*.

(1) "Artificial" powers are those which supplement and perfect the natural activities, so helping them to fulfil their essential requirements.

(2) "Supernatural" powers go beyond the requirements, or rather the exigencies, of the essence.

Thus an intuitive vision of God is beyond the exigencies of any creature, and the activities or qualities communicated to a creature with a view to this end, constitute "*the supernatural*."

The Scotists held, against the Thomists, that every self-conscious being has a *natural inclination* towards the perfect and immediate vision and fruition of the Infinite. But both schools agree in say-

¹ At p. 332 he says with respect to his use of the word "inspiration:" "It is a question of theological phraseology, on which I am not competent to pronounce."

² P. 328. The italics are ours.

³ It is perhaps needless to remind our readers that the "*Nature*" of a thing, in the metaphysical sense, is the same.

ing that the self-conscious being does not demand ("exigere") it as the necessary and connatural end of its essence.

According to such teaching, then, Mr. Balfour does well in seeking to show that Divine concurrence accompanies our honest struggles after truths, whether scientific, ethical, æsthetic or religious. He is also right in affirming that if, according to scientific teaching, the higher forms of each religion (Revelation apart) are largely produced by the lower, the lower forms, on the other hand, are only to be explained by the higher. It is a fact also, even with regard to revealed religion as manifested in the Church, that "the final product counts among its causes a vast multitude of physiological, psychological, political and social antecedents"—its various "human elements."

Such active and helpful Divine concurrence, which Mr. Balfour terms "inspiration,"¹ is, he rightly says,²

"Limited to no age, to no country, to no people. . . . Its workings are to be traced not merely in the later development of beliefs, but far back among their unhonored beginnings. . . . Are we to find a full measure of 'inspiration' in the highest utterances of Hebrew prophet or psalmist, and to suppose that the primitive religious conceptions common to the Semitic race had in them no touch of the Divine?"

The passage continues on, following in the footsteps of Cardinal Newman, from whose magnificent passage on this subject we have already quoted.

But Mr. Balfour recognizes³ the objection many persons may feel to the placing in one category "the transcendent intuitions of prophet or apostle and the stammering utterances of earlier faiths, clouded as these are by human ignorance and marred by human sin." We have, however, already called attention to the need of making the most profound distinction between revelation and any non-revealed form of religion.

Mr. Balfour also declares⁴ it to be beyond dispute that if we seek in religion not merely a *cause*, but also a *reason*—"a Divinely ordered ground" for believing—we must possess

"Some means of marking off those examples of its operation which rightfully command our full intellectual allegiance from those which are no more than evidences of an influence towards the truth working out its purpose slowly through the ages."

He declares,⁵ however, that the deliverances of no organization,

¹ The word "inspiration" has, as our readers know, a definite signification, and Mr. Balfour would be one of the last to object to its being employed only in its accepted, authoritative meaning.

Inspiration always implies some *impulsion* which mere "assistance" does not. There are, we believe, three degrees of inspiration: (1) *revelation*; (2) *illumination*, and (3) mere *intensification* of knowledge which is always possessed.

² P. 330.

³ P. 332.

⁴ P. 333.

⁵ P. 334.

and of no individual, can constitute a reason as well as a cause of belief, because it is always possible to ask whence such claimants derive their credentials.

But, when the reasonableness of their claims is established, they may perfectly well be a "reason" as well as a "cause" for credence. For mere human testimony, adequately collected and tested, can constitute a fully adequate *reason* for belief as well as be the *cause* of it.

So far Mr. Balfour's main effort has been to show that science, ethics, æsthetics and religious beliefs form a more coherent and satisfactory whole if we consider them in a theistic setting, than if we consider them in a naturalistic one. He next, and finally, turns¹ to consider whether they 'are more' coherent and satisfactory if considered in a Christian setting than in a merely theistic one?

It is very satisfactory that he puts forward as an example of Christian doctrine, the dogma of the Incarnation and boldly grapples with its asserted difficulties. He says:

"It is always assumed by those who do not accept the doctrine of the Incarnation, and it is not uncommonly conceded by those who do, that it constitutes an additional burden upon faith, a new stumbling-block to reason. And many who are prepared to accommodate their beliefs to the requirements of 'Natural Religion' shrink from the difficulties and perplexities in which this central mystery of revealed religion threatens to involve them. But what are these difficulties? Clearly they are not scientific. We are here altogether outside the region where scientific ideas possess any worth, or scientific categories claim any authority. It may be a realm of shadows, of empty dreams and vain speculations. But whether it be this, or whether it be the abiding place of the highest Reality, it evidently must be explored by methods other than those provided for us by the accepted canons of experimental research."

He then reminds his readers that they each and all have in themselves a mystery which defies every attempt at elucidation, namely, the living body with its life, material and mental, which they each and all possess.

"If, then," he adds, "we cannot devise formulæ which shall elucidate the familiar mystery of our daily existence, we need neither be surprised nor embarrassed if the unique mystery of the Christian faith refuses to lend itself to inductive treatment."

But, he continues, opponents may say that if the mystery itself is beyond scientific criticism, the same cannot be alleged of the historical evidence on which it, at least partly, rests. No immunity can be extended to *that*, and as it must ultimately rest on human testimony, that at least can be judged by the usual tests.

Nevertheless he replies:²

¹ P. 335.

² Pp. 336, 337.

"The question is not so simple as those who make use of arguments like these would have us suppose. 'Historical method' has its limitations."

It is, of course, quite true that our estimate of the historical value of a written statement depends on what we may think (1) of his veracity, (2) his competence, and (3) the probability of the facts he recounts. It is also true that any one's estimate as to probability of certain events will depend upon the philosophy he has adopted.

Speaking, in this connection, of the "destructive schools of New Testament criticism," he says:¹

"Starting from a philosophy which forbade them to accept much of the substance of the Gospel narrative, they very properly set to work to devise a variety of hypotheses which would account for the fact that the narrative, with all its peculiarities, was nevertheless there. Of these hypotheses there are many, and some of them have occasioned an admirable display of erudite ingenuity fruitful of instruction from every point of view and for all time. But it is a great, though common, error to describe these learned efforts as examples of the unbiased application of historic methods to historic documents. It would be more correct to say that they are endeavors *by the instituted employment of an elaborate critical apparatus, to force the testimony of existing records into conformity with theories on the truth or falsity of which it is for philosophy, not history, to pronounce.*

What, then, he asks, should be the "mood of expectation," the "temper of mind" with which we ought to consider "the extent of historic evidence for the Christian story?" How should our philosophy (our "general theory of things") affect our estimate of its antecedent probability? The answer to this question, he replies, must depend on our estimate of "the ethical import" of Christianity, "which must again depend on the degree to which it ministers to our ethical needs."

Ethics, absolutely speaking, are so far independent of theology that they do not depend upon the will of God, but upon His Essence. They are also independent of consequences. "Thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt not commit adultery," would be valid and categorically imperative even if death were followed by annihilation. But the influence of natural religion, and, still more, of revelation, upon ethical precepts is enormous. As Mr. Balfour says:²

"An assortment of 'categorical imperatives,' however authoritative and complete, supplies but a meagre outfit wherewith to meet the storms and stresses of actual experience. If we are to possess a practical system, which shall not merely tell men what they ought to do, but assist them to do it."

As to the imperfection wherewith our ethical needs can be satisfied without the aid of "theological sanctions," he observes:³

¹ P. 338. The italics are ours.

² P. 339.

³ P. 340.

"The commonly recognized ethical need is for harmony between the interests of the individual and those of the community. In a rude and limited fashion, and for a very narrow circle of ethical commands, this is deliberately provided by the prison and the scaffold and the whole machinery of the criminal law. It is provided, with less deliberation, but with greater delicacy of adjustment and over a wider area of duty, by the operation of public opinion. But it can be provided, with any approach to theoretical perfection, only by a future life."

He then reminds his readers that the reality of the moral law implies the reality of a future existence, and, though professing himself unable to employ this argument of Kant, he yet advances a very analogous one. Mr. Balfour says :¹

"If the reality of scientific and of ethical knowledge forces us to assume the existence of a rational and moral Deity, by whose preferential assistance they have gradually come into existence, must we not suppose that the Power which has thus produced in man the knowledge of right and wrong, and has added to it the faculty of creating ethical ideals, must have provided some satisfaction for the ethical needs which the historical development of the spiritual life has gradually called into existence?"

But this is an argument, as its author avows, which evidently demands much caution in its employment. It would, of course, be quite unwarrantable to reason *à priori* from general notions about the working of Divine Providence, to the reality of certain historical events; but he adds:

"My contention is of a much humbler kind. I confine myself to asking whether, in a universe which, by hypothesis, is under moral governance, there is not a presumption in favor of facts or events which minister, if true, to our highest moral demands? and whether such a presumption, if it exists, is not sufficient to neutralize the counter-presumption which has uncritically governed so much of the criticism directed in recent times against the historic claims of Christianity? For my own part, I cannot doubt that both these questions should be answered in the affirmative; and if the reader will consider the variety of ways by which Christianity is, in fact, fitted effectually to minister to our ethical needs, I find it hard to believe that he will arrive at any different conclusion."

In the fifth and last section of this last chapter, Mr. Balfour proceeds to consider some² of the needs of mankind to which Christianity thus ministers, making use of examples intended to show that some of these needs increase with the growth of knowledge and the progress of science. Thus Christianity, he contends, is no mere temporary religious improvement appropriate only to a passed age, but "a development of theism now more necessary than ever."

As he truly observes, there are not a few persons (surely *most* unreasonable persons) whom the above statement will astonish,

¹ P. 342.

² P. 393. He says he cannot treat the matter completely, nor for his purpose is such treatment necessary.

because in them the increased knowledge we now have of the magnitude and complexity of the material world, has given rise to a feeling of repulsion against Christianity. Those who know how brief and imperceptible "is the impress made by organic life in general, and by human life in particular, upon the mighty forces which surround them, find it hard to believe that on so small an occasion this petty satellite of no very important sun has been chosen as an event so solitary and so stupendous" as the Incarnation.

But the Church has never defined that it is "solitary." There is no condemnation either of the opinion that God has been incarnate in many worlds, or that he is ever incarnate in one or more of them. But Mr. Balfour well points out that the above-stated prejudice is due to the absurdity of supposing that God values His rational creatures according to "the number of square miles they inhabit or the foot-pounds of energy they are capable of developing." It is a prejudice like that which leads Mr. Spencer to speak, as it were, with bated breath, lost in awe and wonder, at the very numerous and complex vibrations he supposes atoms to perform—surely a most ridiculous form of hypertrophied anthropomorphism!

But, as Mr. Balfour most truly says, "we are not creatures of pure reason," and (as Cardinal Newman fully recognized) the progress of scientific knowledge does make it more difficult for the *imagination* of the many (though not truly for the *intellect* of any) to receive and acquiesce in even natural theology, and this makes a definite and authoritative religion like Christianity more and more necessary.

Mr. Balfour puts forward this thought excellently well:¹ He says:

"We search out God with eyes grown old in studying Nature . . . and imaginations glutted with material infinities. . . . The overwhelming force and regularity of the great natural movements dull the sharp impressions of an ever-present Personality. . . . He is hidden, not revealed, in the multitude of phenomena, and as our knowledge of phenomena increases, He retreats out of all realized connection with us farther and yet farther into the illimitable unknown.

"Then it is that, through the aid of Christian doctrine, we are saved from the distorting influences of our own discoveries. The Incarnation throws the whole scheme of things, as we are too easily apt to represent it to ourselves, into a different and far truer proportion. It abruptly changes the whole scale on which we might be disposed to measure the magnitudes of the universe. What we should otherwise think great we now perceive to be relatively small. What we should otherwise think trifling, we now know to be immeasurably important. And the change is not only morally needed, but is philosophically justified. Speculation by itself should be sufficient to convince us that, in the sight of a righteous God, material grandeur and moral excellence are incommensurable quantities, and that an infinite accumulation of the one

¹ P. 346.

cannot compensate for the smallest diminution of the other. Yet I know not whether, as a theistic speculation, this truth could effectually maintain itself against the brute pressure of external nature. In the world looked at by the light of simple theism, the evidences of God's material power lie about us on every side, daily added to by science, universal, overwhelming. The evidence of His moral interest have to be anxiously extracted, grain by grain, through the speculative analysis of our moral natures. Mankind, however, are not given to speculative analysis, and if it is desirable that they should be enabled to obtain an imaginative grasp of this great truth, if they need to have brought home to them that, in the sight of God, the stability of the heavens is of less importance than the moral growth of a human spirit, I know not how this end could be more completely attained than by the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation."

The great importance of the Christian revelation as counter-acting a specially modern tendency to materialism is next brought forward.

It is indeed true that the most modern refinements of physiology no more constitute arguments against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul than did the results brought about by clubs or spears amongst early races of mankind. It was also known and taught by the Scholastics that no intellectual act could take place in us without a play of the imagination, and that no play of the imagination could take place save by the aid of our material organism. Still, the universally diffused belief in apparitions and in manipulations of intelligence apart from the body, was a great aid to the belief in man's spiritual immortality which has now greatly disappeared, while physical science through many channels and with great force tends to inculcate the all importance of the body. Now as Mr. Balfour most justly says :¹

"Of all creeds, materialism is the one which, looked at from the inside—from the point of view of knowledge and the knowing self—is least capable of being philosophically defended or even coherently stated."

Nevertheless, the body is always with us, and the hints of science that the conscious *ego* (*i.e.*, our mind) is but its passing product, are accentuated by many social phenomena as they appear and before they are philosophically analyzed. Our body is a most fundamental and all-pervading fact for us, and one which seems to lend itself "to every theory destructive of high endeavor."

Now what is needed under these circumstances is, as Mr. Balfour contends :

"Not abstract speculation or negative dialectic. . . . What we need is something that shall appeal to men of flesh and blood, struggling with the temptations and discouragements which flesh and blood is heir to." . . . But "what support does the belief in a Deity ineffably remote from all human conditions bring to men thus hesitating whether they are to count themselves as beasts that perish or among the Sons

¹ P. 349.

of God? What bridge can be found to span the immeasurable gulf which separates Infinite Spirit from creatures who seem little more than physiological accidents? What faith is there other than the Incarnation, which will enable us to realize that, however far apart, they are not hopelessly divided?"

As we have said, again and again, Mr. Balfour far too much undervalues the proofs for, and the value of, "Natural Theology." Nevertheless, it is most true that it is no easy task to deduce from it a satisfactory code of ethical precepts which shall not only commend themselves to the unprejudiced reason, but which shall also act persuasively on those to whom such precepts are unwelcome. The extreme dimness and indistinctness to mortal vision of the God inferentially made known, must cause natural religion to be a sadly inefficient one with respect to the overwhelming majority of men. It is impossible, therefore, to overstate the priceless value to mankind of the Christian Revelation, which authoritatively reaffirms the truths of natural religion, and of all those dogmas which the Church has successively defined. Therefore, what Mr. Balfour says about natural religion, though we think it *absolutely* unjust, is *relatively* valuable and true. The precepts of Christianity are so definite they cannot, like those of theism, be evaded by disputation, they can but be disobeyed; while a God who has not disdained to take to Himself the nature of man and of man for us crucified, can by no means be too dim or indistinct not only for adoration, but also for sympathy and love.

The next topic to which Mr. Balfour turns in considering the practical value of Christianity to human need, is the great insoluble problem of evil. This he declares¹ to be "much less oppressive under the Christian than under any simpler form of theism."

The speculative philosophical answers to the problem are (1) the necessary incomprehensibility to us of the plan of the universe, and (2) that God's omnipotence may be limited by "objective contradictions"² in ways we cannot here and now apprehend.

Mr. Balfour also contends (as he has before contended) that since "ethics cannot permanently flourish side by side with a creed which represents God as indifferent to pain and sin," the conclusions which seem to follow from the coexistence of omnipotence and evil cannot really do so, or morality must be excluded from his "provisional philosophy." Yet, as he himself avows, such a reply is too abstract to be of practical utility even to a suffering philosopher.

He asks,³ and completes his task in the asking :

¹ P. 351.

² The term we have before used for this purpose in our book *On Truth*.

³ P. 353.

"Of what use is it to those who, under the stress of sorrow, are permitting themselves to doubt the goodness of God, that such doubts must inevitably tend to wither virtue at the root? No such conclusion will frighten them. They have already almost reached it. Of what worth, they cry, is virtue in a world where suffering like theirs fall alike on the just and unjust? For themselves, they know only that they are solitary and abandoned; victims of a power too strong for them to control, too callous for them to soften, too far off for them to reach, deaf to supplication, blind to pain. Tell them, with certain theologians, that their misfortunes are explained and justified by an hereditary taint; tell them, with certain philosophers, that, could they understand the world in its completeness, their agony would show itself an element necessary to the harmony of the whole, and they would think you are mocking them. Whatever be the worth of speculations like these, it is not in the moments when they are most required that they come effectually to our rescue. What is needed is such a living faith in God's relation to man as shall leave no place for that helpless resentment against the appointed order so apt to rise within us at the sight of undeserved pain. And this faith is possessed by those who vividly realize the Christian form of theism. For they worship One who is no remote contriver of a universe to whose ills He is indifferent. If they suffer, did He not on their account suffer also? If suffering falls not always on the most guilty, was He not innocent? Shall they cry aloud that the world is ill-designed for their convenience, when He for their sakes subjected Himself to its conditions? It is true that beliefs like these do not in any narrow sense resolve our doubts nor provide us with explanations. But they give us something better than many explanations. For they minister, or rather the reality behind them ministers, to one of our deepest ethical needs; to a need which, far from showing signs of diminution, seems to grow with the growth of civilization, and to touch us even more keenly as the hardness of an earlier time dissolves away."

Most true and most valuable are these reflections on the deep response made by Christianity to human needs—by the doctrine of the Incarnation and the sacrifice of the Cross.

"O crux ave! spes unica!"

as the Church sings.

But surely if we may apply, as we certainly may, such considerations to the support of Christianity in general, they are infinitely more applicable to the support of the Catholic Church.

The Incarnation is indeed the alpha and omega of Christianity, but the transubstantiated eucharistic presence is its infinitely gracious continuation, ministering with unspeakable efficacy to the spiritual needs of all. Well may we ask who has God so near as we have?

In a Catholic church the happy penitent can adore his Risen Lord then and there actually present to him, while every sinner can seek for mercy prostrate at those Divine feet which still bear the glorious wounds whence issued the precious blood to cleanse his polluted soul and to redeem the world.

What worship was ever so glorious, so soul-inspiring and majestic as High Mass celebrated with all the pomp of Easter or of Whitsuntide?

What worship was ever more sweet and soul-satisfying than a

Low Mass said before dawn at some remote and quiet altar where the worshipper, in silence, is alone with God and God's sacerdotal minister?

Infinite was the gain Christianity brought us in showing us God manifest in the flesh—one who, though God, is still our elder brother. Yet it has been a further gain to be enabled to venerate one at once *altogether human*, yet stainless, the Virgin Mother, an advocate, but not, like her Divine Son, a judge.

And how further fitted to respond to human needs has been the peopling of heaven with saints, differing as the stars do in glory and in their correspondence with every variety of the suppliants who seek their aid?

But a response to human need which (for ages past of inestimable value) will become more and more valuable and necessary with the increased relaxation of morals, is the Church's doctrine of holy matrimony—the indissoluble nature of the tie, its inculcation of restraint upon our lower nature and the cultivation of everything highest, noblest, sweetest and most enduring in human love, which through it may become so transfigured as to become worthy of eternity and a heavenly home.

But to pursue these considerations further would perhaps be out of place on our part, though they have been irresistibly suggested to us by Mr. Balfour's comments on our higher needs.

With the passage last cited his book ends, save for a few graceful sentences of apology and a restatement of his general aim. It is unquestionable that he has succeeded in showing the incoherence and irrationality of sensism, and though we deem him unjust to (because he seems not to have sufficiently, if at all, considered it) Catholic philosophy, it is most true, as he says,¹ that no system can be adequate which does not satisfy our ethical needs.

"Any system which, when worked out to its legitimate issues, fails to effect this object can afford no permanent habitation for the spirit of man."

How far he has succeeded in enforcing, illustrating and applying his principles he leaves, he says, for others to determine, and he ends by repeating his conviction "that it is not explanations which survive, but the things which are explained; not theories, but the things about which we theorize, and that, therefore, no failure on my part can imperil the great truths, be they religious, ethical or scientific, whose interdependence I have endeavored to establish."

We have now completed our task, save that it remains for us to write a few concluding words to reaffirm our judgment of the work as a whole, now that our readers are in a position to judge our

¹ P. 356.

judgment by means of the copious extracts we have thought it well to put before them.

We are sure they will agree with us in deeming the book the work of an exceptionally gifted mind, written with distinguished ability, with abundant humor, and much refined, but ever-courteous, irony, and that it is a most zealous defence of religion, and one as satisfactory as its author's standpoint can possibly allow it to be. But, as we think has been clearly shown in the second part of our review,¹ Mr. Balfour himself belongs, to a considerable extent, to that very school of thought he attacks. It is true that he has succeeded in demonstrating in a masterly manner the absurdity of "naturalism" or "sensism," and has proved it to be baseless, incoherent and self-contradictory, but unfortunately, as we have seen, the foundations he provides for the temple of religion are quite unsatisfactory. That no reasoning can be satisfactory which is not based on self-evident truth is surely obvious. Unless we know objective as well as subjective truths, we must remain immersed in a scepticism which amounts to mental paralysis or imprisoned in the ceaseless and hopeless solitary confinement of Fichte's *Solipsism*. Despairing of knowledge and with a profound sentiment of distrust in reason, Mr. Balfour seizes, by an act of natural faith, upon the idea of an infinite, central source of all goodness, truth and beauty, the presupposition of which harmonizes the discords he meets with on all sides and removes the most distressing of his difficulties and the greatest impediments to right. As we have seen, a great deal that he has urged in his last chapters is admirable, but none the less the fatal flaws at the basis of his reasoning remain and vitiate the consequences deduced by him. We can never build theology on a basis of scepticism. Mr. Balfour "believes" that reason is a gift of God, but how, without trusting reason, can he reasonably with certainty affirm that it is His gift?

Only such a philosophy as Mr. Balfour has avowed he has not to give, can serve as an efficient basis for theology. In depreciating reason he over-exalts authority, which nevertheless truly is not only a beneficent guide, but an indispensable instrument of human progress. Yet the "authority" of Mr. Balfour is fatally like the "custom" of Hume.

But Catholic philosophy never allows that reason appeals or should make its final appeal to "custom," "instinct," or even to the authority of the Church herself. This distrust of reason, on Mr. Balfour's part, and his frequent confusion between it and ratiocination, makes him amazingly unjust to the claims of "Natural Theology," which he confounds with "Naturalism" itself.

¹ See the AMERICAN CATH. QUARTERLY REVIEW for April, 1896.

But, unlike that bastard philosophy, it appeals not to *sense*, but to *intellect*, not to *phenomena*, but to *noumena*—to necessary and universal first principles and to our intuitions of our own activity and passivity, and of the extended world about us. Thence, without the need of authority or church, Natural Theology validly deduces the necessary existence of a personal God, who is a punisher of evil-doers and the rewarder in a future life of those who follow faithfully their own ethical intuitions. Reason, and no non-rational impulse, brings us to this great result, and to the threshold of a longed-for and rationally-anticipated revelation, which could not be rationally accepted by us if our reason were not to be trusted in what it declares evidently true, objectively as well as subjectively.

Its declaration puts forever to flight that nightmare which haunts the mind of Mr. Balfour, that reason can itself be traced back to non-rational causes that have elicited it by the action of "natural selection," which then might be equally evoked to account for religious convictions responding to human needs. The satisfaction of such needs must be one effect of true religion, and the perfect and abundant way in which they are satisfied by Catholicity is a most powerful argument in support of its truth. But it is not merely feelings and elevated sentiments which are thus assuaged; but the intellect is thereby abundantly satisfied.

Mr. Balfour, unhappily for himself, does not see this, but is hampered on every side by his doubt and distrust of human faculty, a legacy doubtless of that profoundly evil philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, whose doctrine of "the relativity of knowledge" had so much to do with perverting the very distinguished mental powers of the late Professor Huxley.

But, as we said at the outset of our review, the very fact that Mr. Balfour belongs to the sceptical school, at present so popular, and that there is so much affinity between his own system and that of his opponents, tends to make it specially persuasive and influential in our own day.

Its influence, also, must be altogether for good with those who are devoid of any sound philosophical system, in whose eyes, therefore, fitting response to felt needs may well be all important. He offers them a wide scheme, which, though founded in the last resort, as he avows, upon our needs, yet has, above all, regard to our highest requirements—those of morality and religion. Nevertheless, we think that those readers who have had the patience to follow us through the long course we have felt it necessary to pursue, will now clearly perceive how imperatively Mr. Balfour's system requires to be supplemented, supported and corrected by the fundamental truths of Catholic philosophy.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

THE FICTION OF CORPORATE REUNION.

IT is perfectly natural that Anglican fallacies about "Reunion" should be best apprehended by English Catholics. They only who have lived in England all their lives, who have followed the vicissitudes of Anglicanism, and who know the mental habits of English Protestants, can accurately value the shifting attitudes of a conscience which has been trammelled from childhood by Protestant prejudice. For this reason it seems a pity that French Catholics, who know little or nothing of the Anglican mind, should come forward as teachers or dictators on the deeply vexed question of "Reunion." The Abbé Portal has no doubt meant amiably in his conciliating attitude towards the Ritualists, but he does not know the scope of their misapprehension. In the same way the writers in the "*Revue Anglo-Romaine*"—a review which is now in its thirty-sixth number—do not see that by obscuring the duty of submission they are indefinitely postponing Reunion. The "case" for Reunion stands thus: The Abbé Portal is aware, though he keeps the fact in the background, that Reunion demands, primarily, the recognition of the Papacy as a divinely appointed institution; whereas Lord Halifax, and most of his brother Ritualists, insist on the recognition of the validity of Anglicanism, ecclesiastically, authoritatively, doctrinally. The two claims are not only irreconcilable, they are hopelessly opposed and antagonistic. To put the case differently, the Catholic Church says: If you would come inside the Church, you must anathematize your schism and all your heresies, and must submit with all your heart to the Holy See in doctrine, devotion and practice; whereas the Ritualists say we will participate in Catholic Sacraments, and consent to a fraternal intercommunion, on condition that we retain our present formularies and beliefs and whatever habits we esteem to be orthodox. "Corporate Reunion" on such terms as the Ritualists' would be as much a mockery of truth as of sincerity. It would be indeed a much worse form of error than the insisting on being faithful to private convictions; for to be "in good faith," even in error, is a much better state of mind than to assert that truth and error are convertible.

The advocates of Corporate Reunion are fond of appealing to a memorable precedent, which they conceive to be in some respects parallel. In the time of Queen Mary there was Corporate Reconciliation; why should there not be in these days? It was in the year 1554 that, at Westminster Palace, there was a public,

a national reconciliation of all England to the Catholic Faith ; and it is urged that the reconciliation, while corporate in modern sense, was nevertheless grounded on the principle of "give and take," many concessions of vast import being made to "Anglicans," even to the extent of the recognition of schismatical bishops and of new dioceses created by schismatics. Now here we have a grave misapprehension. In every case where the Papal Legate made concessions, there was a previous grant of absolution to penitent clergy who had confessed to the crime of their past schism, so that in no single instance was installation or promotion permitted by the Catholic authority without full recantation or disavowal and without sacramental absolution. At this point, however, we have to allude to a difficulty which is obscured by not a few controversialists. In the early days of Queen Mary there was an insuperable impediment to the harmonizing of the spiritual and the temporal, parliament not being summoned and the queen not being crowned, and the statute-law remaining consequently in full force. Thus Mary had to be called "the Supreme Head of the Church," a title of which she said to Cardinal Pole's envoy: "I will not have it, even though by accepting it I could gain three other kingdoms equal to those I possess"; but she could not prevent those who drew up her writs from obeying a law which was not repealed. In regard to the six bishops-elect, who were consecrated before the reconciliation, we know that they were absolved *in foro externo*, their proxy going humbly upon his knees, confessing heartfelt sorrow and repentance, and utterly abjuring their acts of schism and other errors, in which spirit they were required to go to confession to a Catholic confessor and fulfil the salutary penance which should be given. And so, too, the members of both Houses of Parliament went on their knees, and did "declare themselves very sorry and repentant for the schism and disobedience committed in this matter against the Apostolic See." Contrast such a spirit as this with the spirit of most modern Ritualists. And that we may say one word more as to the "concessions made by Rome," be it remembered that no concession as to doctrine was ever either granted or asked for. The ratification of newly created dioceses, and of judicial sentences schismatically pronounced, was so far from being a "concession" as to their validity that the Legate decreed that "all such things attempted in any way that was null during the aforesaid schism should receive the vigor of the apostolic sanction, so that they should be considered by all to have been made, *not* by the preceding temerity, but by that authority which he then gave unto them." The concessions, therefore, were not admissions of validity ; on the contrary, they were assertions of invalidity.

While on this point of the Marian Reconciliation, it is almost a platitude to remark that, the whole nation being traditionally Catholic, there could be little need of individual conversions. We may say confidently that five-sixths of the adult population were still profoundly Catholic at heart. Excepting only those who had benefited by Henry VIII.'s spoliation of church property, the nation abhorred the innovations, so that, as Mr. Froude tells us, in the last year of Edward VI. there was what might be called a reign of terror, "the prisons being full to overflowing with Catholic recusants who would not relinquish the Mass." One of the Protestant missionaries to Ireland thus describes the enthusiasm with which the return to the old faith was welcomed in the Cathedral of Killarney: "They rang all the bells in that cathedral; they (the clergy) flung up their caps to the battlements of the great temple, with smilings and laughings most dissolutely; they brought forth their copes, candlesticks, censers and crosses; they mustered forth most gorgeously all the town over, with *Sancta Maria ora pro nobis* and the rest of the Latin Litany." Now, it is obvious that a Reconciliation in those days and a Reconciliation in a three-centuried Protestant England must be very different processes indeed. If we put together what we may call the party of Lord Halifax and the more advanced of the members of the Church Union, and even wish to believe in the ardent aspirations of the majority of the Ritualist laity, we still count only a small minority of English Protestants who could be expected to rejoice in "Reunion." Under Edward VI. it was by the sheer strength of the executive that royal injunctions were enforced against Catholics; in these days royal injunctions against Protestants would meet even with more strenuous opposition. What the nation now wants is conversion—a very different thing from Reconciliation. And if we are to accept the leading organs of the various parties as indicating the bent of the national will, there seems to be a restless desire for compromise, but very little repentance for schism.

II.

It is in regard to the disposition of the English people, as demonstrated by their proposed terms of reconciliation, that the Abbé Portal has been seriously misled, trusting rather to his charity than to his knowledge. We should say, first, that the popular use of the word Reunion shows how completely the whole subject is misapprehended. There cannot be Reunion where there never was Union; and it is certain that between the new Protestant religion—first invented by Henry VIII., and subsequently developed by Elizabeth—and the religion of the Catholic Roman

Church, there never was, never could be, real union. The two religions were opposed on first principles, as to authority, worship, and devotion ; nor was it ever possible to speak of them as being united, any more than of a negative as being identical with a positive, or of *nego* and *credo* as being sympathetic. Let us, then, discard the word Reunion, and use a much truer word, Reconciliation. Now the Abbé Portal, and the "*Revue Anglo-Romaine*," in their earnest longing to bring about Reconciliation, do not like to insist on the hard, stubborn fact that what is called the Church of England is a sect. It is not a Church nor an integral part of the Church, but a purely political organization. It follows, therefore, that each individual Anglican is necessarily in schism and in heresy. And this being so, it is idle to talk of a "corporate" reconciliation, as if the fact of a multitude of dissidents agreeing to "shake hands" with the Catholic Church could in the slightest degree undo their schism and their heresy. They would all remain precisely what they were before, Protestants so far as they chose to be Protestants, and Catholic in their own sense of Catholicity. Reconciliation would mean, I will not obey you. Submission would mean, I do not believe in you. The only practical outcome of such a fictitious fraternization would be that truth and error would have "shaken hands" as good friends on the very ground that no one could know what was the truth.

"Conversion" to the Church is, in reality, the exact opposite of this fiction of "corporate reunion." It means the accepting whatever the Church teaches, and the abhorring whatever she condemns. And the grace of God alone can give to each individual soul the full light which is necessary for conversion. "The gift of faith" is not given in its fulness until after the receiving of the divine sacraments—a gift which so purifies the intellect that it apprehends the necessary truth of Catholic teaching ; but the grace to apprehend the primary duty of submitting to the divine authority of the Church will be given to every soul who asks for it ; so that it must be always a man's own fault if he goes on worshipping his own opinions, instead of asking God to enlighten him. Now who does not see that a "corporate conversion" is a sort of contradiction in terms ? Certainly, God could, if He willed, give the grace of conversion at the same moment to a whole nation, or to a whole Protestant sect ; but this is not His ordinary way. Ordinarily, He acts separately on each soul, in His own time, by special calling ; and each soul is responsible for himself. "Corporate" conversion would shirk personal responsibility ; would shift the burden on to the shoulders of a whole community ; whereas, personal conversion is in the order of Divine Providence, and consistent with all we know of the Divine ways. The

Abbé Portal, in his desire to smooth over the thorny and troublous path of conversion, seems to shrink from the *suffering* which it involves, as though the sufferings were not the price to be paid. As in the early pagan times, the ordinary price of conversion was martyrdom, imprisonment, or at least ostracism, so, in our own day, there is no buying the pearl of great price without being willing to sell all that we possess. Imagine that the same counsel which has been approved by the Abbé Portal, in recommending a "corporate" conversion, had been given to the first converts to Christianity: "Do not suffer martyrdom, but wait till imperial prejudice shall have given way to more kindly amenity, and then you can all become Christians together, without risking the torture or the lion's mouth." This was not the counsel of the Apostles or their disciples, who insisted on individual sacrifice, and left "corporateness" to take care of itself. As Cardinal Vaughan has happily expressed it, with that straightness and ingenuousness which may be said to be characteristic of his teaching: "Every day is making it clearer that the Providential way of bringing about Reunion, at least in England, is by the powerful grace of God acting on the intelligence, the independence, and the goodwill of individual units, as in the past; and that no hope or confidence is to be placed in the idea of corporate reunion."

But this thoroughly Catholic meaning of "conversion" is either obscured or minimized into unmeaningness by the French writers and orators we have referred to. The reason, as we have said, is that they do not know the Anglican temperament, and do not realize the havoc made by false traditions. That a defined article of faith cannot be denied without heresy, and that the authority of the Holy See cannot be rejected without schism, are known to *them* to be axioms of Catholicity; but living always among Catholics, they utterly fail to apprehend how Anglicans can habitually think the contrary. And so they try the courtly experiment of soothing and caressing, with which many sanguine Ritualists are much pleased. A much wiser method would have been to inquire of Cardinal Vaughan what was really the present attitude of the Ritualistic mind, and so to have avoided making mistakes which, though doubtless quite natural, may put back many conversions for many years.

III.

There is another curious delusion, at least implied by the Abbé Portal, to which it is desirable to refer. This delusion is that the Catholic Church would gain so much by "corporate union" with all the contending communities which make up Anglicanism, that she should strive for it on purely interested grounds. And it is

even urged that the Catholic Church is suffering from her loss of "the Nations of the North," suffering "from the lack of the Teutonic element, while the Anglican Church is increasing in strength." We have here a misstatement both of principle and of fact which we must venture to call hardly excusable. As to principle, the suggestion that the Catholic Church, which now numbers two hundred and twenty millions of souls, would gain strength by the corporate adhesion of twenty-five millions of Anglicans, none of whom are quite sure as to their own belief, it may be dismissed as, to say the least of it, uncatholic. The Anglican communion, as a matter of fact, scarcely includes one-half of the people of England; while in the British dependencies it is in a painful minority. And we all know that when a man says he is an Anglican or a Protestant we are no nearer to concluding what he thinks he believes than if he had made no profession of faith. What advantage then to the Catholic Church could accrue from the fraternization of such a host of conflicting opinionists? If such a "corporate reunion" were possible, it would be an injury at which every Catholic would shudder. Happily it is utterly impossible.

But, as a matter of fact, the growth of Catholicity far exceeds the growth of so-called Anglicanism. As to the "Teutonic element," the number of Teutonic Catholics within the fold exceeds by many millions the whole number of Anglicans throughout the world. But let us go a little more deeply into this question of statistics, since it is urged as being of weighty importance.

There may be a difficulty in obtaining the exact truth in regard to numbers, but we may fairly trust authorities which are known not to be addicted to exaggerating Catholic claims. Thus the "*Economiste Français*" assures us that, from the year 1800 to 1890—a period almost embracing the present century—the number of Catholics in Germany has gone up from six to sixteen millions. This does not look as if the "Teutonic element" can be spoken of as being lost to Catholicity. And now, as to the "Nations of the North," the number of Catholics in England and Scotland, in the first year of this nineteenth century, was only 120,000. In the year 1890 it had gone up to 1,690,921. (We believe this to be far below the mark, but it is better to keep on the safe side.) Russia is a good country for comparisons, for we all know how Catholics have been persecuted. The advance of Catholicity in the ninety years was (Poland being left out of the calculation) from 20,000 to 2,935,519. As to the United States the increase in the same period has been given as from 61,000 to 7,977,270. And what do we learn about Africa? 47,000 have grown to 3,000,000. As to China the increase is given as from 187,000 to 576,000; while in

Indo-China it is from 310,000 to 690,772. Turkey in Asia and Europe would not be a promising empire, yet the number of Catholics has gone up from 631,000 to 1,298,475. Switzerland has increased her number threefold. Canada has changed 120,000 into 2,000,000. Oceanica has advanced from the very small beginning of 2800 to 2,000,000. Holland also has converted 350,000 into 1,448,852. And so in proportion in most other countries. And it must be remembered that within the last five years—from 1890 to 1896—the progress of Catholicity throughout the world has been swifter than it ever was before. So that viewing this progress as a whole, we may say that, in non-Catholic countries, the increase of Catholics has been fivefold. And in the old Catholic countries there has been this improvement, that there are now very few “indifferent” Catholics; the great bulk of Catholic peoples being solidly Catholic, and the minority being noisily infidel. There is scarcely any Protestantism in Catholic countries. *That* is a weed which is an accident of British fervor; but it is too shallow a compromise to capture intellects. As a rule, the French, Italian and Spanish peoples are logical, keen-witted, and also humorous; and they know the difference between being taught by divine authority and being taught by individual opinion.

Now it is obvious that a growth in Catholicity is not like a growth in Church of Englandism, or indeed in any kind of Protestantism. Every Catholic believes the same thing, so that the Catholic Church is a compact and perfectly united army; not united only in rejecting what is false, but in affirming what is infallibly true. So that the Catholic one-third part of Germany is a much stronger power than the two-thirds of German Rationalist speculators; and the same must be said of all other countries. What the Abbé Portal calls the “Teutonic element” and the “Nations of the North” are steadily returning to the Catholic faith; not by “corporate reunion”—such a fiction is untenable—but by the individual apprehension of the duty of obedience, aided by the spectacle of divided Protestantism.

We have to enquire, in the face of this steady advance of Catholicity, whether the prospects of a “corporate” reconciliation appear to be lessened or increased; and whether the new phases of Protestantism are better adapted than the old ones for “corporate” submission and conciliation?

IV.

It must be accepted as axiomatic that the only possible reconciliation must be preceded by individual submission. And individual submission in the case of Protestants—and as much in the case of Anglicans as of Nonconformists—would mean, *not* the

surrender of the same errors in all Protestants, but of different errors in each separate Protestant. No two Protestants, whether Anglican or Nonconformist, believe or disbelieve in the same way ; and while one and all misapprehend the Catholic faith, each one of them misapprehends it quite differently. A "corporate" submission would therefore involve the surrender of ten thousand different "objections" of various minds, these "objections" being entertained in varying spirits, and impossible to be formulated or defined. If then the submission of even one Protestant must involve his complete surrender of many heresies, what would be involved in the submission of a mighty host of deeply differing conflicting opinionists? But "surrender" is just that very difficulty which the corporate reconciliationists will not face. They wish to retain all their private ideas, while "submitting" only to an external fraternity. And this is the not submitting at all. For example, the Rev. Piers L. Claughton, who is the Rector of Hutton, and an advocate of corporate reunion, says that "on the Anglican side there must be the acceptance of the infallibility of the Pope, who ruled over the English Church all through the Middle Ages, and was only renounced for the political exigencies of Henry VIII. . . . There must also be the acceptance of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception." Now this seems to come very near to "submission," and we scarcely expect any difficulty. But presently we read that there are "conditions," and the first is that "on the Roman side the validity of our orders and sacraments must be recognized as we recognize theirs, and (2) it must be conceded that the secular clergy may marry." So that here we have an Anglican who actually acknowledges the infallible authority of the Pope, and yet at the same time insists that that infallibility must be instructed as to the essentials of the validity of Holy Orders. Probably there are not many of the High Church party who would combine such contradictory attitudes; but the example serves to show how diversified are the units which are now advocating a "corporate" reunion.

To take another extreme case—extreme in a very painful sense. Father Ignatius, the Anglican monk, writes of a publication by Dean Fremantle as "the very greatest scandal that has ever occurred in our venerable and orthodox Church of England." He says: "For myself I can truly say that the very fact of this awful man being a dean in our beloved Church causes me sleepless nights of mental agony. . . . We need from the Church of England a plain and explicit expression of her mind, such as shall make clear her determination to hold at all cost to the truth of Revelation, which is her only ground of existence. But the Church of England is silent; our archbishops, bishops and convocations are, as

Canon Gore says, 'accomplices' of Dean Fremantle." Now, seeing that the "heresies" which are so strongly assailed were professed and published eight years ago, and that since their publication the Hon. and Rev. W. H. Fremantle has been promoted to the Deanery of Ripon, we cannot conclude that "the archbishops, bishops and convocations" have taken them very seriously to heart. Father Ignatius says that the Bishop of Ripon "has thoroughly and without a word of protest welcomed as dean into his cathedral a man who is a publicly professed unbeliever in the Christian religion, and a notorious defamer of the Scriptures and the creeds." Whether this accusation is wholly just, we need not now stay to inquire. What we are considering at this moment is the practicability of a "corporate" reconciliation which should include the Rector of Hutton and the Dean of Ripon, and all the innumerable "shades of opinionists" which lie between them. Imagine such a coincidence as that Dean Fremantle and the Rector of Hutton should both together sue for "corporate" reconciliation. Join with these two suitors Father Ignatius, the well-known zealous Anglican monk. And that we may have a thoroughly representative deputation, let us add the Editor of the Ritualist "Church Times" and the President of the Protestant Alliance. Every one of these gentlemen, be it remembered, is equally a member of the Church of England, equally entitled to speak on her behalf, equally competent to dictate the terms of reconciliation, the conditions of the proposed "give and take." It is manifest that, in the ante-room, before their admission to the presence of the Papal Legate, Dean Fremantle, the Rector of Hutton, Father Ignatius, the Editor of the Ritualist newspaper, and the President of the Protestant Alliance would have preliminaries to settle which it might take a number of years to bring within a "corporate" agreement. And if it be answered, "yes, but it is the Ritualists alone who really desire reconciliation; the whole of the rest of the communion, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, and probably three-fourths of the clergy, being as indifferent to corporate as they are to individual submission," we must rejoin: then there is an end of all corporateness; for to say that, within one and the same Church of England, the Ritualistic section may be reconciled to the Catholic authority, while all the other sections remain in hostility equally with Catholicity and Ritualism, is to suppose a babel of different creeds in the same Church, even more embarrassing than that which now exists. It would only be adding a semi-Catholic Ritualist sect to the existing semi-Protestant Ritualist sect; and there would be no more corporateness than is possible between members of the same family and the strangers who knock at their gate for hospitality.

We have still, however, another grave difficulty. The Church of England never was corporate in any sense, historical or sound. It was from the first a political sect, held together solely by royal tyranny and compacted by iniquitous laws. It was "corporate" only in the sense in which prisoners are corporate, within a jail from which they cannot escape. Henry VIII. deprived the nation of their true corporate Church, which was theirs by inheritance and by choice; and because the Pope and the whole Church in England were faithful to their whole Catholic duty he created, not a church, but a schismatical sect, of which he made himself supreme head. The story of "how it was done" is as simple as it is desperately wicked. The nobles and the upper classes were bribed by rich gifts of church lands, church abbeys and money; the burgher class were the dependents of the nobles, and the poor were at the mercy of both. At one blow, as it were, Henry destroyed the monasteries, the homes, schools and hospitals of the poor; he punished the now friendless peasantry as vagrants, and thus created the two great evils from which the country has ever since suffered, a national vagrancy and pauperism. To call such a new religion a "corporate" church would indeed be a trifling with words. And when Elizabeth, driven wild with the Pope's rejection of her claims, abolished the Mass, repudiated five sacraments out of seven, and completely stripped Christianity of its doctrine and discipline, of its authority and divine jurisdiction, she did not make a new church; that was impossible; she established a new sect, which was only corporate in the sense that it was the treason of law against God.

Nor can it be assumed that the Church of England is corporate in the sense of its Common Prayer Book or its Formularies. As to the Prayer Book, it was drawn up by the boy-king Edward VI., was ratified by Elizabeth, and ratified once more by Scotch James. So that to regard the Prayer Book as in real sense representing the *ecclesiastical* totality of the nation would be as absurd as to speak of it as Roman Catholic. And as to the Thirty-Nine Articles—which declare that "General Councils may err," that Transubstantiation is "repugnant to the plain words of Scripture," and that "the Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England"—they were so grotesquely at issue with the beliefs of the nation, with all the traditions of a thousand years, as well as with the dictates of common sense, that they could no more be said to "corporately" voice the nation in its doctrinal and supernatural *credo* than they could be said to reflect justly its intelligence or its educatedness, its truthfulness, sobriety, or morality. We must dismiss, then, the whole idea of a corporate reconciliation in its relation to the history of the State Church, and all its forms of worship and unbelief.

V.

Yet happily, the very impossibility of a corporate reconciliation renders the duty more imperative, and the task more easy, of individual submission to the Church. And has it not always been a habit of English Protestants to talk of "every man being answerable to God in his own conscience," and of his "*not* wanting the guidance of others?" It is exactly this condition which should lead each separate Protestant to pray to God to illumine his intelligence, so that, detaching himself from the crowd of contending teachers, who can teach him nothing but their own private opinions, he may obtain the grace of faith sufficient to make his submission, and so to enjoy the divine sacraments of the Church.

There is no intention of alluding in this present paper to the supernatural side of the subject; it belongs to theologians to speak of the supernatural; and an ordinary lay Catholic would be out of his groove were he to go outside ordinary lay reasonings. It is only in the region of common sense that a layman can talk about "submission"; and Englishmen rather pride themselves on their common sense; indeed, they sometimes seem to claim a monopoly.

Now common sense can establish these three positions: (1) That divine truth can be known only by divine authority; (2) that the Church of England has no divine authority whatever; and (3) that, therefore, each separate Anglican must search for divine authority before he can discover divine truth. This is the making individual responsibility not only the best rule but the only rule. It is an absolute folly for any Anglican to wait until half a dozen other Anglicans, or half a dozen thousand other Anglicans, have chatted over the "terms" on which they will consent to be admitted into membership with the one Church of God; it is the inversion of common sense, since the only motive of being admitted into the Catholic Church must be the conviction that she is the only true teacher. If outsiders can make conditions with the Pope, or, like the amiable Rector of Hutton, who would acknowledge his infallibility provided only his own Orders were acknowledged—it follows, logically, that the divine authority of outsiders must be equal to, if not greater than, that of the Pope. Imagine a man saying in his prayers, "I have no objection to obeying Almighty God, provided he will acquiesce in my views"; yet this is exactly what the Rector of Hutton must say when he affirms that he will accept infallibility provided he, the Rector of Hutton, may define its limits and the scope of the truths to be determined. Common sense is a quite sufficient theologian to apprehend that he who possesses infallibility must alone possess the knowledge of its limits; and that to dictate to the Infallible

what it shall allow or not allow, is the same thing with saying: "You are no more infallible than I am, since it is for me to point out to you what you should do." Undoubtedly, as to certain national customs, as to certain matters of discipline or of *modus vivendi*, it is perfectly lawful for Anglicans to beg for concessions, and a variety of such concessions might be made. But in all matters of faith—and the question of Anglican Orders, though not in itself a question of faith, involves questions which are closely allied with the faith—is just one of those enquiries on which the *magisterium* of the Holy See must make final judgment and pronouncement. Now to say to the Holy See, "I am rather attached to my Anglican Orders, and I really cannot allow your infallibility—or, as it would be in the present instance, your *magisterium*—to upset my fondly cherished convictions," is to acknowledge a principle while denying its operation; to admit a law while denying its obligation. It is an attitude which common sense must ridicule, and which Christian piety must condemn. The Holy See is either set in this world to give judgment on points which are disputed, or it has no more prerogative or special gift than has any one of the fourteen hundred Catholic bishops. To admit the prerogative, the *magisterium*, and yet to affect a superiority over its exercise, is a good deal more like the want of the spirit of concession than like the earnestness which desires concessions.

Have we not seen then that the fallacies of corporate reunion are as obvious as is the paramount duty of individual submission to the Church? And this paramount duty, as has been said, is consistent with the exercise of private judgment—the most treasured of the privileges of Protestantism. There is no need to consult with High Churchmen or Low Churchmen; no need to wait for the harmonizing of a score of dissident "views as to reunion;" no need to take counsel with the Archbishop of Canterbury, with Father Ignatius, with the Rector of Hutton, or with the members of the Protestant Alliance; the only rule is to be sincere and in earnest, and to ask God every day for the gift of faith. This course will be common sense and true piety. If the Church of England—that heterogeneous muddle, which no intellect could ever define, and no soul could ever look to for infallible teaching—affirmed that she possessed divine authority, we might naturally say, ask *her* to tell you whence she derives her divine authority, and what does that divine authority teach. But the Church of England repudiates divine authority; she assures you that all churches, all councils "have erred;" she teaches that "erring" is the grand credential of orthodoxy, and that every one who does not err must be in error. We cannot avoid the paradox; it is not ours, it is Anglican. But every Anglican should rejoice in the

paradox, because it clears the way for individual submission. No Anglican has any one whom he can consult; he has no one to obey, no one who can teach him anything about anything; his "Church" is in the same position as himself, knowing just so much of truth as can be gathered from the private impression of what the Roman Catholic Church has always taught. This "private impression" is equally the privilege of all Anglicans; of Cranmer, of Laud, of John Wesley, of Lord Halifax, and of the Protestant Alliance. Away then with the too puerile fiction of obedience to a "Church" which does not exist! Every Anglican, when seeking the truth, must begin by turning his back on the impostor which affirms that "all churches may err."

In a few months what is called the Pan-Anglican Synod will meet at Lambeth for the discussion of—what? We are emphatically warned that the more than two hundred Anglican Bishops will *not* settle doctrinal disputes, will not affirm or condemn. We knew beforehand that they would not attempt to do so; and that if they made the attempt, there would be one universal exclamation, "*risum teneatis amici.*" Now this one curious anomaly, the Pan-Anglican Synod, should clear the way for "individual submission." We can imagine an Anglican, who is really anxious to be reconciled to the Catholic Church, sitting outside the Synod Hall at Lambeth, and waiting for the decisions of the Synod. "Will you tell me," he asks eagerly of the bishops, "whether I am in the Church or out of it? If I am in the Church, of course you can define for me what is the true doctrine of the 'communion service'; whether I ought to adore the Consecrated Host, or to believe only in a spiritual Real Presence?" No answer. "Will you tell me whether the Anglican clergy for the last three centuries have been priests; whose duty it was to hear confessions, and whose power it was to give absolutions; and have they therefore, for three centuries, incurred the anathema of the Church, for never doing what it was their duty to do, and for always preaching against the powers which they possessed?" No answer. "Will you tell me whether the Roman Catholic Church in this country is in schism, and if so, from what Church it is in schism, and by whose authority it is proved to be in schism?" No answer. "Will you tell me what is the Living Authority in the world, to decide for me on all matters of faith; so that, for example, between the teaching of the Tsar's Church, of the English Ritualists, and of the Protestant Alliance, I may be guided infallibly to choose the truth; and will you specially mention *why* the Roman Catholic Church, which is the only Church in the world which claims to teach, and the only Church in the world which does now teach, is to be the one only communion to which I am to refuse

my obedience, under penalty of the Anglican anathema?" No answer.

Individual Submission is the clearest duty of free will within a "Church" which is neither *docens* nor *discens*. If we had to live a thousand years, instead of ten years or one year, we might wait a day or two longer before making quite sure whether we were inside or outside the Church of God. But to risk dying without confession and absolution, without Holy Communion, without Extreme Unction, and without the aid of the Communion of Saints, is what common sense must pronounce to be the wildest act of folly which is so much as even possible to the human mind.

A. F. MARSHALL.

A DAUGHTER OF THE DOGES.

THE Venetian family of the Cornaro had made its name illustrious by the several doges it had given to the state from the fourteenth century onward, and by one of its noble daughters, Caterina, queen of Cyprus. This young woman, daughter of a rich merchant, was given in marriage to James de Lusignan on his being made king of Cyprus, when that island was wrested from the Greeks. Proud though the Venetians were of the wealth brought by their enterprising merchants to the ancient city, it was deemed scarcely fitting that the new king should wed a wife without a title, although her family was one of the oldest in Venice, so the republic adopted the youthful Caterina; it pronounced her a daughter of St. Mark, and became her guardian. And nobly it fulfilled this self-imposed trust, for later, when her royal husband was killed in the defence of his kingdom, Venice watched over the welfare of the widow and her infant child. Finally, her position becoming most precarious, Caterina cast aside the unsafe burden of sovereignty and abdicated in favor of the republic; later she retired to Asolo, where she kept up a mimic court for many years. Pietro Bembo, afterwards cardinal, wrote about the innocent but rather unreal life led there, with its fantastic pastimes and revels.¹ The story of Caterina has fascinated more than one

¹ It is probable that this book was among those printed by the famous Aldus; for Cardinal Bembo, both before and after his elevation to the Sacred College, was a friend and patron of Aldus.

painter of mediæval life, notably Titian, whose portrait of her in the Uffizi Gallery charms us to-day, and Markart, whose "Venice Paying Homage to Caterina Cornaro," was one of Austria's contributions to the World's Fair at Chicago.

Another distinguished member of the family, Luigi, was a great advocate of temperance. In youth he had led a rather wild and irregular life, but when forty years old he reformed completely, and became noted for his sobriety and abstemiousness. After his eighty-fifth year he wrote a "Treatise on a Temperate Life," which was translated into various languages. The work was commended by Addison in the "Spectator," who mentions the author's having reached the advanced age of one hundred and three. A different branch of the family, claiming descent from the Roman "gens Cornelia," also produced many eminent men, among them a pope, Gregory XII., a doge, several cardinals and other prelates, captains, generals, and ambassadors.

But a daughter of the queen's branch was destined to shed the greatest glory upon the name, already so celebrated in the history of its country. Helena Lucrezia Cornaro Piscopia, born in 1646, attracted the attention of all Italy by her virtues, talents and learning. At the time of her birth the office of procurator¹ of St. Mark, second only to that of doge, was held by her brother, Jean-Baptiste. Thus the little Helena had all the advantages of a high station and historic name, and was surrounded from her infancy with the splendid and gorgeous environment characteristic of Venetian life. Surely an enviable position, and yet the child was not dazzled by so much brilliancy; a keen insight into the emptiness of it all appears to have been her birthright. Her chroniclers speak of her as a grave and thoughtful little soul, and tell us of her profound disgust for the ordinary amusements of childhood. She was endowed with an astonishing memory, and the original conclusions she drew from the facts presented to her gave evidence of remarkable reasoning power. Such varied gifts drew the attention of Jean-Baptiste Fabris, a friend of her brother's, who early foresaw the brilliant future of this charming and attractive child; at his suggestion it was decided to train her thoroughly in the ancient languages, and accordingly some of the most learned men of the time were engaged as her tutors. She soon gave evidence of

¹ The Procurator of St. Mark lodged in the palace in the piazza di San Marco; he was obliged to hold three audiences a week, and was not allowed, without express permission from the great council, to be absent more than two days a month. His chief duties were to superintend the cathedral and treasury of St. Mark, take legal guardianship of orphans, and be public executor to such as chose to appoint him. The procurators were held in great consideration throughout Italy, and were remarkably free from intrigue.—*Sketches of Venetian History.*

great proficiency, with an indication that she might eventually surpass her instructors. While still a young girl just budding into womanhood, she spoke with fluency and purity both ancient and modern Greek, Latin, French and Spanish, and it is even recorded that no rabbi could surpass her in a knowledge of Hebrew. Her poems, too, of which many were written at this time, were greatly admired.

Not satisfied with her success as a linguist, Helena studied in turn music, philosophy, theology, and mathematics, in each of which she attained a high degree of perfection, and her reputation spread throughout Europe. To these intellectual gifts and great personal loveliness was added the crowning glory of rare moral beauty. It would have seemed only natural that one so fitted for every enjoyment would have given herself up to all that life proffered so temptingly, above all in a country where nature and art seem to invite one to drink to the full of their charms, and to seize the passing pleasures with no thought of future responsibility. But a high sense of religion and an austere spirit of self-sacrifice guarded the young girl, and made her flee from the seductions of her brilliant surroundings and the more subtle attractions of the applause that followed her every appearance.

Women were still admitted to many of the great universities, and Venice, with pardonable pride, desired its accomplished daughter to give a public proof of her learning by defending a thesis and submitting to the examination for the degree of Doctor of Arts at the famous university of Padua, then under the patronage of Venice. The young girl's native modesty shrank from so public a display of her learning, but finally in deference to the repeated entreaties of her family and the Signoria, she consented to the ordeal. Great preparations were made for the event. On the appointed day the vast cathedral was filled to overflowing with the most distinguished people in Italy, and a crowd of students from the various universities, eager to hear and see this new aspirant for academic honors. The bishop, as was customary, celebrated a solemn high mass; as he pronounced the final blessing, the examiner of the day arose. A more picturesque scene can scarcely be imagined; the dignitaries of the Church in their robes of various hues, the nobles and merchant princes of the great republic, the fair patrician women, framed by the solemn background of the old cathedral, and facing them the pure modest figure of the learned Helena. Perhaps the staid and solemn professor was moved with pity for this girlish candidate; mayhap he even wondered at her audacity, who knows? In any case he was bound to do his duty to his Alma Mater, and not allow mere youth and beauty to gain access to the famed university, unless they were

accompanied by the more solid acquirements of philosophy. No leniency must be shown on account of age or sex, no superficial examination allowed. As question after question of the most difficult nature was answered by the youthful student with a simple ease and dignity that won all hearts, cheers burst forth from the sympathetic listeners. So brilliant were the replies, and so deep and varied the learning evinced by Helena in the subsequent discourses delivered by her, that the judges even declared their willingness to bestow upon her the degree of Doctor of Theology; surely no greater honor could have been offered by the ancient university. The final decision withheld the title, however, but with public recognition of the Cornaro's great and unqualified merit.

A few months later Venice prepared to celebrate its annual fete. The republic desired to honor the daughter who had won so signal a triumph at Padua, and at the same time add greater splendor to the national holiday by espousing her on this occasion to one of its most valiant defenders. The Great Council selected as her husband a nephew of the doge, a young general who had many times led the Venetian fleet to victory. But alas for the plans of these well-meaning and worthy lords, who with all their knowledge of men had failed to read aright the heart of a woman. The Cornaro is not free to wed. From her eleventh year she has consecrated her affections to her Saviour. This secret, religiously guarded, explains her indifference to the homage paid alike to her beauty and her talents. Even now, with maidenly reserve, she hesitates to assign her real reason, but contents herself with modestly declining the honor of the proffered alliance, revealing the true cause of her refusal to her brother alone. He, furious with disappointment, declared her childish promise rash and invalid, and continued to insist upon the marriage, so advantageous from every human point of view.

The day was fast approaching when the historic ceremony of the betrothal¹ of the doge and the Adriatic was to take place. Venice, whose vast commerce made her queen of the sea, was indebted to it for her beauty, her supremacy among mediæval

¹ This privilege had always been cherished by the Venetians with the most tenacious pride, and its anniversary was their greatest holiday. The original ceremony was very simple and touching. The clergy in their most beautiful vestments, and the doge in gorgeous robes of State, met at the Lido, and all the people gathered near. Solemnly various litanies and psalms were recited, then the bishop prayed aloud: "Grant, O Lord, that this sea may be to us and to all who sail upon it tranquil and quiet. To this end we pray. Hear us, good Lord." How heartfelt must have been the Amens of these dwellers by the sea, so many of whom lived upon its bosom and experienced its treachery as well as its beauty. At the conclusion of the prayers the bishop sprinkled with holy water the doge and the court, the chanters intoning meanwhile, "Aspergimi, O Signor," after which the holy water remaining was thrown into the sea.

nations, even her existence. Her very foundations, scanty and shifting, were wrested with effort from the surrounding waters ; in truth the beautiful city owed but little to the land. The waves, as if conscious of the dependence of the city upon them, kissed its stones lovingly ; they softly bathed its beautiful marbles in time of peace and proudly carried its victorious fleets to new honors when Venice waged war against its neighbors, or sought to put down the power of the haughty Turk. Brightly, too, they danced in the sunlight when the mighty ships returned to the lagoons, bringing back the treasures of the East, and filling with pride the hearts of the merchant princes who were its rulers. This mutual dependence was most fittingly shown by a ring, symbol of an indissoluble alliance, and blessed like that which the bridegroom places upon the finger of his bride when he solemnly plights his troth at the foot of the altar. Many were the brilliant scenes enacted upon the fair blue sea, but none that called forth the pride and patriotism of the valiant republic as that pageant that marked the anniversary of her great victory. In the lovely month of May, under the calm sky and the soft sunshine, on the beautiful feast of La Sensa, Ascension Day, all Venice proceeded to make holiday. We may be sure that every Venetian who could secure a boat of any description made his way through the various canals as near to the place of meeting as his little craft could carry him amid the great throng of vessels. On the blue waters of the gulf lay the thousands of gondolas decked with flowers and bright with gayly-dressed pleasure seekers ; the famed Bucentaur, the barge of the republic, resplendent among them all with its gorgeous tapestries and flags, bore proudly through the crowd the doge with the representatives of the senate and council. Martial music resounded over the waters and alternated with the fresh, pure voices of young girls singing patriotic hymns in mingled praise of the republic and the sea, celebrating the magnificence, the glory and the profits of the illustrious alliance about to be renewed. A beautiful altar on the ducal gondola was prepared for the celebration of the sacred mysteries. The prelate in solemn pontifical robes stands ready to bless the betrothal, while the doge, kneeling upon a cushion splendidly embroidered with the arms of the city, sees around him, their heads bowed in homage, the great personages of the State. At the right of the altar stood a number of young boys, careless and happy children of the sea, a living embodiment of the essentially maritime existence of the republic ; on the left, emblem of her aristocratic element, was a group of young girls, members of noble and illustrious families, at their head Helena Cornaro, the cynosure of all eyes. Suddenly from that immense throng is heard a loud joyous cry, followed by the silence of intense expect-

tation. The doge has just received the blessed ring; he advances to the gilded railing of the gondola and exclaims aloud: "O thou, our strength and our power, limitless wave of the ocean, be thou blessed! On this happy day Venice, by my voice, chooses thee for master and spouse. In exchange for this protection, this help that has never failed, she offers thee her gratitude and fidelity. May He who has created thee in all the immensity of thy power even while assigning thy limits receive and guard our promises and our vows." "Long live the Adriatic! Long live the doge!" resounds from a thousand throats; "glory and prosperity to Venice, the queen of the seas!"

The ceremonies over, all gave, themselves up to pleasure as became the citizens of a great and prosperous nation, and in the gay and child-like spirit that characterized their age and clime. Gayly-colored banners hung from gondola and balcony, garlands and streamers brightened the sombre walls of old palaces. As evening came on fireworks were set off on the shores of the lagoons; arrows shot from the church towers, carried their flaming crowns far into the air and the limpid waters of the canals reflected all the sparkling lights from sky and shore. Everywhere was brightness and gayety; here the shrill voices of the children at play, mingled with women's low laughter, there snatches of song or some national air sung by a party of brave sailors as they glided by, keeping time with their oars.

In the palace of the doge a scene of splendor charmed the eyes of all; from the open windows came floods of light and harmony; the balconies were brilliant with flowers and the gorgeous costumes of stately Venetian dames and their cavaliers. Hundreds of gondolas, swaying under the weight of the merry parties they bore along, crowded close to the walls, for all were eager to take part in the official celebration, or, failing that, at least to witness the festivities from as good a point of vantage as could be obtained.

Among the beautiful and honored women in the venerable palace of St. Mark's, Helena Cornaro moved with the modest simplicity that ever characterized her. In the world, but not of it, no thought of jealousy or intrigue disturbed the sweet serenity of her manner. A grave graciousness marked her greeting to all and underwent no change when conducted by her brother to a small oratory concealed from the grand salon by heavy hangings, she saw entering in affectionate discourse the doge and his noble nephew, the most popular hero of the day's fête. Yet Helena understood but too well the motive that had actuated the Signoria in the special honors showered upon her of late, and more particularly during the eventful day now drawing to a close.

She felt that the triumph at Padua had not alone influenced the doge in assigning her so prominent a place in the public ceremonies of the morning. Nerving her heart for the ordeal from which she saw no escape, she listened with a gentle gravity as the doge, with the tenderness of a father, said: "My daughter, do not any longer refuse to crown with joy the whole republic by accepting as your husband the suitor she has chosen for you; both your brother and I join our entreaties with those of all the people." Helena was about to reply, when her brother, anticipating her refusal and the religious motives she would assign, unrolled before her eyes a parchment bearing the authentic seal of Rome, and exclaimed: "Obey, Helen, obey! it is not only your privilege, but your duty, for you are free!" Helena seized the parchment, glancing rapidly over it, and seeing that it was a papal brief granting her a formal dispensation from her vow, she uttered a frightened cry and fell senseless to the floor.

Very early the next morning "the pious Godaninus," abbot of the monastery of St. George, received the following note from Helena: "Hasten, my father, come and save one of your children; hasten, for the danger is imminent." The holy and learned Benedictine repaired hastily to the Cornaro palace in answer to this urgent appeal. Upon seeing him, Helena threw herself at his feet: "Save me, father, save me from a freedom that I have never demanded and that I do not wish to accept." After trying in vain to change the determination of the noble young girl, the venerable abbot could in conscience no longer refuse to receive her vows as an oblate of St. Benedict. Scarcely had he withdrawn, than Helena, calling up all her strength of mind and heart, presented herself before her brother and disclosed to him the new ties by which she had again bound herself unreservedly to God."

Such prompt and energetic firmness had its effect. Both father and brother were finally won over and consented to allow Helena to be happy in her own way. One cannot help wondering whether the young officer took her decision as calmly and whether he, like Helena, was merely being urged to the marriage for state reasons. One almost hopes that such was the case, and that before long he was allowed to unite himself to a maiden of his own choosing, although it would, of course, be far more romantic to picture him as pining away for love of the inexorable Helena.

Her father, while giving his consent that his daughter should lead a celibate and religious life, merely stipulated that she should not enter a convent. To this Helena agreed, grateful for the permission accorded her for leading the life of her choice, and realizing that some sacrifice of her own wishes was due to her family, whose plans she had so materially changed, and to the doge,

whose disappointment she deeply regretted, and for whom she ever retained a warm regard. She passed the remainder of her life under the paternal roof, devoting herself to study, the care of her father and the service of the poor. In the midst of the splendors of the palace she led a life of the greatest simplicity, practicing, as far as possible, the discipline of the cloister and wearing under her rich attire the white habit of St. Benedict. Seeing her Saviour in the person of the suffering and the afflicted, she healed their sorrows with words of pity and hope, and gave for their material wants those comforts she denied herself. Some eighteen years were thus spent in the service of God and humanity, winning for her the admiration of those who had not the courage to follow in the thorny path of self-abnegation and the devoted love of the poor, who recognized in her the perfect disciple of Him who said: "In as much as you have done it unto the least of these, you have done it unto me."

At the early age of thirty-eight, in the year 1684, Helena Carnaro passed to her reward, followed by a mourning crowd of those to whom she had been a mother and a protectress. Her brother, inconsolable at the loss of his gentle companion, grieved unceasingly for her and erected in her honor a magnificent mausoleum in the Church of St. Justin. Padua, too, placed her statue among those of its illustrious citizens. But her most enduring monument is in the hearts of a grateful and admiring people, who have enshrined her in their memories as a shining example of learning, modesty and religion.

ANNE STUART BAILEY.

THE EVENTS AND CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE
INVASION OF ENGLAND BY WILLIAM,
DUKE OF NORMANDY.

THE reign of the Dane in England lasted twenty-four years. These years were mainly glorious. Canute made the name of England feared and respected throughout the Continent, and Scot and Cambrian, Norwegian and Swede, did him homage. The Anglo-Saxon, long harassed and terrorized by the Dane, now joined hands with him, and shoulder to shoulder they moved in the cause of a common country. The sterling worth, the benevolence, the piety, the genius of Canute were irresistible, and the hate of centuries became a dead past.

This consummation, so unexpected and gratifying, was owing to the head and heart of a single individual, and when that head ceased to think and that heart to pulsate, the Anglo-Saxon awoke from the spell of enchantment, old animosities revived, he was himself again. The land was his—its traditions and history, its monuments and ruins, its names and achievements, its poetry and music, its philosophy and arts, its laws and institutions, its scenery and sky, all were his; and though he might embrace the Dane in the bonds of a common citizenship, he would not allow him to occupy the throne endeared to him by a thousand fond memories and recollections—the throne of an Alfred, an Athelstane and an Edgar. His eye and soul went out across the channel; he remembered the poor exile, the saintly brother of the gallant Ironside, and determined to terminate the days of his exile. To determine was to act, to act to triumph, and five years after the death of Canute, Edward, whose memory was to generations of his afflicted countrymen what the memory of Sion was to the captive children of Israel, sat securely on the throne of his ancestors.

The joy of the Anglo-Saxon at the restoration was, however, soon tinged with sorrow by the nobility and generosity of Edward. During the years of his exile in sunny Normandy, he made many friends and acquaintances, to some of whom he was under obligations. Many were attracted to him because of his virtues, accomplishments and misfortunes; others because of the ties of relationship, and not a few through interested motives. All eagerly looked forward to the day of his triumph, and when it came they sought, and, unfortunately, obtained recognition. As they increased in power they became insolent, arrogant and domineering. They talked of William's claim to the succession, and made little effort to conceal their design to secure it to him. They

looked with contempt on the Anglo-Saxon, and were, in turn, regarded by him with thorough detestation. The open rupture long impending came, and the suavity, duplicity and consummate villainy of the Norman were in the ascendant.

Just at this juncture William, Duke of Normandy, whom the king had known from childhood, set foot on the shore of the land that he afterwards deluged in blood and filled with wailing. If, heretofore, he looked upon himself as a dreamer of impracticable dreams regarding the succession, there was much in the situation to cause a change in the estimate. He found his countrymen numerous, prosperous, dominant, and victorious. The language, the songs and the music of Normandy everywhere greeted his ears, and he felt that though he had crossed the channel, he was still at home. Governors, prelates, courtiers, soldiers and sailors evidenced a loyalty to him that boded ill for the future of England. Edward received him, not as a distinguished foreigner alone, but as a brother, and on his departure manifested a magnificence of wealth and affection worthy of a better object than the bastard of Robert the Devil, whose daring ambition was capable of any hazard that promised power or emolument. We will not intrude on his reflections as from the prow of the ship that bore him from the shores of England, he gazed on her receding cliffs, but that they were worthy of his character and surroundings, who can question?

If, as is certainly probable, he counted on the numbers and influence of the Normans in the event of the death of Edward, the return of Godwin and his sons, the subsequent decree of banishment secured against his countrymen must have disturbed the repose of his reflections, of whatever nature, pertaining to the succession. But unfortunately the king's trust in foreigners soon came to his relief in a most unexpected way. Hostages were demanded of Godwin for the security of the peace, and these hostages, one the brother and the other the nephew of Harold, were sent to William for safe keeping. Several years after, in 1065, when Harold had by glorious deeds endeared himself to his people, had become their idol, and when his name was on every lip as the next occupant of the throne, he sought permission of the king to demand in his name the release of the hostages so long in captivity. Whatever opinion the king may have previously entertained of William, it is evident, from his reply to Harold, that his eyes were now opened, and that he had awakened to a full perception of the character of his youthful companion of other days in Normandy. "I will not compell you to stay," said he, "but if you go, it is not by my wish; for your journey will certainly bring some evil upon yourself and upon your country. I know Duke William and his crafty mind; he hates you, and will grant you nothing unless he

gain greatly by it; the only way safely to obtain the hostages from him were to send some one else."¹

Harold, in disregard of the advice of the saintly king, set sail for Normandy, and, after many mishaps and adventures, became the companion in arms and in sports of the wily and treacherous William. No difficulty was made about the release of the hostages, and no pains or expense spared to make his stay one of pleasure and festivity. William, with a deep-set purpose, determined to win his confidence, and he succeeded. When the opportune moment arrived, he disclosed his purpose; he told him of the promise of Edward, while in exile, to make him his heir should he ever occupy the throne of England, and requested his assistance to make that promise good. Harold, who, with his relatives, was in his power, promised assistance. He was then required to fortify Dover Castle, to deliver it up to the Normans when the time came; to marry the duke's daughter, Adeliza; to give his sister in marriage to a Norman, and to leave one of the released hostages as a guarantee for his promise.

All the perfidious conditions were, as a matter of necessity, accepted. William, however, did not stop here; he wished to make assurance doubly sure. With a simple promise made without witnesses, he was not satisfied; he would have that promise ratified by an oath, the most sacred and terrible, according to the ideas of those times, and in the presence of the most august assembly of the country. For this purpose he resorted to an artifice infamous and horrible. Collecting in the council hall of Bayeux all the relics and bodies of saints from the town and neighborhood, he caused them to be placed in a box and the box to be covered with a cloth of gold. When, according to his order, the high barons were assembled, he ascended the throne. Around him were numbers of the nobility, and among them was Harold, entirely ignorant of the purpose of the assembly. The enthroned ruffian, having ordered two small reliquaries—Guizot says a missal—to be placed on the cloth of gold, turned to where Harold stood and thus addressed him: "Harold, I require thee, before this noble assembly, to confirm by oath the promises thou hast made to me, namely, to aid me to obtain the kingdom of England after the death of King Edward; to marry my daughter Adeliza, and to send thy sister that I may wed her to one of my people."² Harold, taken by surprise, as directed, advanced to the cloth on which were placed the

¹ *Chronique de Normandie, Rec. des Hist. de France*, xiii., 223; *Roman de Rou*, ii., 108; *Eadmer*, i., p. 4; *Thierry's Norman Conquest*, vol. i., p. 146; *Guizot's History of England*, vol. i., p. 88.

² *Roman de Rou*, ii., 114; *Eadmer*, p. 5; *Guill. Pictav.*, 191; *Thierry's Norman Conquest*, vol. i., p. 149.

two small reliquaries, or missal, as others say, and swore as commanded. Then the cloth was removed, and to his amazement, he saw that he had been entrapped to swear on the relics and entire bodies of saints. Now that diabolical cunning was triumphant, Harold was no longer needed in Normandy, and the sacrilegious juggler, with the joy of a demon, accompanied him to the coast, where he parted with him, simulating the affection of a brother and displaying a lavishness worthy of a rich and generous prince.

This is the version of Harold's visit as gleaned from the most trustworthy writers. All are agreed that he was in Normandy the guest of William, and that he swore to aid him in obtaining the crown of England. There is some conflict as to the circumstances of the oath, but there is none as to the fact. There is disagreement also as to the purpose of the visit, the Norman writers maintaining that he was commissioned by Edward to notify the duke that he had appointed him his successor. If we consider for a moment what Harold was, what he had done, what his people said of him, his expectations and their expectations, that the only barrier to his ambition and their ambition was Edgar, the son of Edward the Outlaw, an imbecile in mind and body, and that at this time, 1065, his claim was completely ignored; if we consider these things, we must either reject the Norman report or write idiot on the tomb of the king, and fool on that of his messenger.

But are the authorities agreed as to whom this duty was assigned? Does not Ingulf, the private secretary of William,¹ say that it was Robert de Jumièges, Archbishop of Canterbury, and do we not know that he fled from England thirteen years before? Does not William of Poitou² say that the same prelate conducted to Normandy the hostages given by Godwin, and that he was then charged with this duty? Do we not know that instead of conducting hostages, he fled for his life before the reconciliation of Godwin and Edward was effected, or hostages given? If Harold were sent with this message, would not William have so stated in his cause of complaint before the papal court? Would not this be a stronger reason, than any alleged by him before that court, for the invasion of England?³

¹ Page 68.

² P. 44.

³ We indicate here a few points which we are obliged to think detract considerably from the force of the arguments so earnestly urged by our esteemed contributor.

The work attributed to Ingulfus is now known to be supposititious, and is consequently of no historical value.

William of Poitou, who was a contemporary of what he relates, may be quite right in stating that the hostages were conducted to Normandy by Archbishop Robert. It is true, Robert had fled before the reconciliation of Edward and the Godwins; but it was only the day before, and *after* the truce had been agreed to and the hostages delivered, as the Saxon Chronicle expressly states. The archbishop was accompanied

Dr. Lingard rejects both this and the version we have given. He says: "Perhaps it were more safe to rely on the authority of those writers who appear ignorant of both these reports, and who describe the voyage of Harold as an occasional excursion along the coast, from which he was driven by a storm on the barbarous territory of Ponthieu."¹ He bases his rejection of the Anglo-Saxon report on the improbability that one who was desirous of the crown would, willingly, for the sake of the release of two captives, commit himself to the mercy of a rival; and, indeed, had he known him, it would have been an unwise undertaking. Did he know him? Had he any reason to regard him as a rival? Norman power in England was almost completely crushed by the order of banishment which the rebellion of Godwin secured. William had not the shadow of a title to the crown, and made no claim to it, so far as Harold knew. True, his subjects had talked about his succession, but the only ground for their talk was that Robert the Devil, who begat him unlawfully, was the nephew of Emma, mother of Edward. Harold was too busy, too sensible, and too secure, to heed what he could not but regard as idle prattle, since he knew that the king did not want William, and the Anglo-Saxons detested him. Up to 1057, William could have no rational hope, for the rightful heir, Edward the Outlaw, son of the gallant Ironside, was living and his claim recognized. From 1057 to 1065 the king treated Edgar as a son, and it was only when convinced of his unfitness for the throne that he abandoned the project of securing it to him. Then all eyes were turned on Harold.

If these be the facts, he had no reason to regard William as his rival from a legitimate standpoint. But suppose he was his rival,

in his flight by the Bishops of London and Dorchester and a strong escort. What safer or more likely occasion was there for sending the hostages?

That hostages were required by Edward and sent by him to William is certain, and perhaps under the circumstances is not surprising; but that he should not have asked for their release for over twelve years after Godwin's death, but had them retained there as security for the fidelity of Harold is a fact not calculated to give us a favorable idea of the king's friendship for, or trust in, the latter. Should it be deemed so strange, after all, if Edward had really preferred to have for successor his cousin and friend rather than a herdsman's son and rebel with whom he had been forced to make terms? As for the different stories that were in circulation respecting Harold's visit to William, we think that William of Malmesbury was right in preferring, as "*propius vero*," that told by the "*secretioris consilii conscii*;" it seems to us to harmonize best with the known facts and to explain the origin of the other stories, especially if supplemented by what Ordericus Vitalis tells us of Harold's interview with Edward on his return.

As to the representations made by William to the papal court, we can know their nature only in a general way and by conjecture, as the ancient historians have not informed us and there exist no records. This defect, however, our modern romanticists easily supply by their imagination.—Ed.

¹ *History of England*, vol. i., p. 302.

that he knew him, what had he to dread? Was he not the messenger of a powerful and noble king, and if William, as is asserted, was his rival, would it not be the part of wisdom to treat him according to the comity of nations? The king was on the verge of the grave, and if William had cherished any expectations of being made his heir, would not an act of treachery towards his representative endanger it? Was not Harold the idol of his people, and would they not resent any ill treatment of him? How would the Papacy, then the guardian of the rights of Christian states, view an act of treachery on the person of a renowned hero, the trusted agent of a saintly king? Was it not a notorious fact that William, in shaping his course, had an eye constantly to the Papacy? Was it not William's endeavor to give a color of legitimacy to his design, and would not ill usage of Harold defeat it?

The truth is, he did not know him, and very few outside of Normandy did. According to Guizot, he did not know him even at the time he gave his promise to betray his country. "He did not know," he says, "the Norman and his far-sighted schemes."¹ He knew him only as a brave and successful warrior and ruler. With such a character he could not associate treachery. Therefore, unsuspecting as adventurous, he obeyed the call of affection. What more natural than that he should desire to be the one to break the bonds of a loved brother and nephew, and lead them in triumph to their country? What achievement could endear him more to his people? Would they not greet him by the thousands on the beach, would they not line his way to the court, and would not the king, by their presence and exultation, be made more sensible than ever that Harold alone could acceptably take up the sceptre when it had fallen from his hands? Clearly, the motives for the journey outweighed his fears, if fears he had.

Adhering, therefore, to the report of the Anglo-Saxon writers, notwithstanding the doubt thrown on their credit by so careful and learned an historian as Dr. Lingard, we will resume the thread of our narrative. Immediately on his arrival from Normandy, Harold repaired to the palace and recounted to the king what had taken place. It is inconceivable, from what the king then said, that he had the remotest idea of making William his heir, and that he ever had such an idea, whether before or after his coronation, there is no evidence worth the slightest consideration. "Did I not warn thee," said he, "that I knew this William, and that thy journey would bring great evils upon thyself and upon thy nation?"²

¹ *History of England*, vol. i., p. 90.

² "Eadmer," Roger de Hoveden, p. 449; Thierry's *Norman Conquest*, vol. i, p. 150; Guizot's *History of England*, vol. i., pp. 90, 91.

These words furnish Thierry a basis for asserting that the king had in the days of his exile made a promise of his throne to William, but how they do so is somewhat puzzling to those not gifted with his imagination and insight. "These words and this mournful expression," he says, "would seem to prove that Edward had really, in the days of his youth and heedlessness, made the rash promise to a foreigner of a royalty that did not belong to him. It is not known whether, subsequent to his succession, he had by any expressions nourished William's ambitious hopes; but, in default of specific words, his constant friendship for the Norman had, with the latter, supplied the place of positive assurances, and given grounds for believing him still favorable to his views."¹

Intelligent and scrupulously conscientious from childhood, it is not likely that he made what Thierry calls a rash promise, but what we, in the light of Anglo-Saxon history, call an infamous promise. If the promise were ever made, it was made with the view of securing Norman power in case of a struggle for the crown, and there is nothing in the twenty-seven years of Edward's exile to lead us to so dishonorable a conclusion. He was not the next heir to the throne, and would not, in all probability, have been elected if his nephew, Edward the Outlaw, the son of Edmund Ironside, could be reached. Fortunately for Edward he was in England at the time of Hardicanute's death, and the necessity of the situation made an immediate choice indispensable. When, therefore, this promise was said to have been made to a mere boy, almost a child, Edward had only a bare possibility of the succession, and unless violence was contemplated, the promise was meaningless. The crown was not Edward's to give, and William could not hope to gain it except by bloodshed. If, however, this answer of Edward's be the only reliance for a promise, except the *ipse dixit* of William, it is trifling with time and space to notice it.

As meekness and charity were the two distinguishing virtues of Edward, he must have had a clear knowledge of William's purpose when he expressed himself as he did on the occasion of Harold's departure and return. He evidently saw the coming storm that he was powerless to avert, but his prayer was heard. He was now old, and his health had been failing for some time. His reign was long and glorious. He was loved by his subjects as few monarchs had ever been, and his entire devotion to them merited it. In famine and pestilence his benevolence was exceptional, and his constant endeavors to guard them from the horrors of war were singularly successful. The ulcers of the body politic, like the ulcers of the body natural, were healed at his touch. The rebellion of

¹ Thierry's *Norman Conquest*, vol. i., p. 150.

Godwin was bloodless, and the Danish pirates who effected a landing were compelled to retire without striking a blow. The resident Dane, whose rapacity and ruffianism during the reign of Harold and of Hardicanute were almost intolerable, was, by his moderation, transformed into a law-abiding citizen. Obedient to his wishes, the Anglo-Saxon, with a magnanimity almost unique in the history of nations, extended to him the right hand of fellowship, and made him his social and political equal. The union thus cemented stayed the arm of foreign aggression, and compelled the robber kings of the north to say: "We will allow you to reign unmolested over your country, and we will content ourselves with the lands which God has given us to rule."

There may have been other causes than those alleged for his partiality to Normans; his knowledge of William may have forced a display of kindness that was rooted in policy more than in any other motive. All his actions were in their interests, and now, that he was about to leave them to go to that God whose aid he always invoked, they manifested a regard truly filial. Those who stood round his bed in his dying moments, wept as if their hearts would break. He, and he only, was unmoved and among his last utterances was an act of faith and a prophecy: "I shall not die, I shall live," he exclaimed.

Prophetic words indeed! He lived through the dark night of Norman bondage, rapacity and brutality, and he lives to-day wherever England's law has been carried. That law is to be found in every quarter of the globe, and multitudes of Mohammedans and Buddhists, savages and barbarians, of every creed and every complexion, acknowledge its supremacy. The Southern Cross and the Stars and Stripes symbolize and protect a liberty, the germs of which are "the laws and customs of the good King Edward." The bench, the bar, and the pulpit, the three most potent conservators of society and civilization, have lovingly perpetuated his memory and achievements. Literature and art have brought their tributes to him, the Church, by her canonization of him, has made his name enduring as the world, and the great heart of humanity through the ages, in triumph as in trials, has gone out to him as a benefactor without a peer, as an exemplar of the principle that the king can do no wrong, thereby verifying the truth of the expiring exclamation, "I shall not die, I shall live."

The day of Edward's burial was a day of sorrow and rejoicing — sorrow for the departed and rejoicing for the coronation of Harold, the late king's choice and the nation's choice. The news of the accession of the new king was everywhere hailed with delight except by the Northumbrians, whose discontent was, however, readily appeased. The soul and heart of England was now with

him—with him in weal or woe. If he was not of the royal race of Cerdic, he was a Saxon to the core, tried and true. Prophets of evil might cry out in the streets, predictions of disaster and ruin might be borne on every breeze, pious old monks might con over dusty tomes or scan the heavens in search of calamities, the men of brawn and brain heeded not. They felt that with Harold for leader they were equal to any and every foe.

But it is denied that Edward named him as his successor, and asserted that he named William. Were both denial and assertion true, it would not affect Harold's right, for as the free choice of the people he was a legitimate sovereign. It had been the custom to secure the consent of the Witenagemote to the succession, even in the case of a direct heir. While it was necessary that its choice should fall on the descendants or immediate relatives, when such descendants or relatives could be found, of a deceased or deposed king, merit, and not immediate right, might determine the succession. It could, therefore, and as a matter of fact did, reject the direct heir for one better qualified. Edward, as we have seen, was thus chosen, while his nephew was the next in succession. In the case we are considering, there was no heir, except the imbecile Edgar,¹ and a king should be chosen equal to the impending conflict. Harold was, therefore, chosen, and of his right to wield the sceptre by virtue of this choice, viewed in the light of Anglo-Saxon history, there can be and there is no question.

The evidence that he, and not William, was appointed by Edward to the succession, is nearly as strong as that which supports his choice by the people. The Anglo-Saxon writers assert it, and the more trustworthy Norman historians admit it. Dr. Lingard says: "A report had been circulated that Edward, on his death-bed, had appointed Harold to be his successor."² On the same page, in a note, he adds: "I am much inclined to believe this report, not only on the testimony of the English writers,³ but because its truth is acknowledged by the enemies of Harold. *Edwardi dono in ipsius fine*.—"Guil Pict.," 135. *Ægrotus princeps concessit*.—"Order. Vit.," 492.

But grant that he was the choice of the people and of Edward, we are confronted with what is assumed to be a fact, and has obtained currency as such in learned circles, namely, that Stigand, a suspended prelate, officiated at his coronation. On this subject the authority of Dr. Lingard ought to have great weight, as he has thoroughly sifted the evidence bearing on it. "On account of the suspension of Stigand, the ceremony was performed by Aldred,

¹ Lingard, vol. i., p. 306.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Chron. Sax.*, 172; *Hoved.*, 449; *Eadmer*, 5; *Sim. Dun.*, 193; *Al. Bev.*, 126; *Flor.*, 633; *Hist. Etien.*, 515.

the Archbishop of York."¹ The authorities relied on for this statement are Ingulf,² Florence³ and "Hist. Elie."⁴ The note to the text is so pointed that we cannot do better than quote it: "In a fact," he says, "which publicly took place in England, the native writers are more entitled to credit than foreigners. The Normans say Harold was crowned by Stigand,⁵ and the statement is supported by the figures on the tapestry of Bayeux.⁶ But they give only the reports prevalent in Normandy, and William, anxious to interest the religion of his subjects in his own favor, would readily countenance the notion that his rival had been crowned by a suspended prelate."⁷

The news of Harold's coronation, thus legitimate and regular, was not long in reaching William. Thierry's account of his reception of it, gives such an insight into his character that we gladly quote it: "When the duke received this great news, he was in his park, near Rouen, trying some new arrows. All at once he appeared pensive, gave his bow to one of his people, and crossing the Seine, repaired to his palace at Rouen; he stopped in the great hall, and walked to and fro, now seating himself, now rising and changing his seat and position, unable to remain in any one place. None of his people dared to approach him; all remained apart, looking at each other in silence. An officer, admitted to more than ordinary familiarity with William, happening to enter, the others pressed around him to learn from him the cause of the great agitation they remarked in the duke. 'I know nothing certain,' answered the officer, 'but we shall soon learn.' Then advancing alone to William: 'My lord,' he said, 'why not communicate your intelligence to us? It is reported in the town that the King of England is dead, and that Harold has seized upon the kingdom, thus breaking his faith to you.' 'They report truly,' answered the duke; 'my anger is touching the death of Edward, and the injury Harold has done me.' 'Sir,' returned the courtier, 'chafe not at a thing that may be amended; for Edward's death there is no remedy, but there is one for the wrong that Harold has done; yours is the right; you have good knights; strike boldly; well begun is half done.'"⁸

From this it was clear that William was acting a part, a part that was intended to impress those who witnessed it that he regarded the oath in the council hall of Bayeux as something terri-

¹ Lingard's *History of England*, vol. i., p. 307.

² Page 68.

³ Page 63.

⁴ Page 515.

⁵ *Non sancta consecratione*—Stigandi, *Guil, Pict.*, 105.

⁶ Lancelot, 427.

⁷ Lingard's *History of England*, vol. i., p. 307.

⁸ Thierry's *Norman Conquest*, vol. i., pp. 153, 154.

ble and solemn. Terrible, indeed, it was, but chiefly for William, who knew that Harold would attach no obligation to the oath, and that in the event of the death of Edward, he would do exactly what he was reported to have done. The truth was, William had long meditated the conquest of England, and to this end had labored industriously to create a public opinion at home and in Rome, that would, at least, give a color of right to an appeal to the sword. Title by descent he had none, and though the lies of his co-conspirators might work mischief, they would hardly stand the investigation to which he knew they would be subjected when he brought his cause before the papal court, and the approbation of Rome he should have, if possible.

To strengthen his position still more, he dispatched an envoy to Harold to remind him of his oath. The envoy, when granted an audience, said: "William, Duke of Normandy, reminds thee of the oath which thou didst swear to him, by mouth and by hand, upon good and holy relics."¹ The reply was worthy of the warrior king and the gallant race that committed to his care their lives, fortunes and good name. "It is true," said he, "that I swore such an oath to Duke William, but I swore it under compulsion. I promised that which did not belong to me, and which I could not perform; for my royalty is not mine, and I cannot divest myself of it without the consent of the country; nor, without the consent of the country, can I marry a foreign wife. As to my sister, whom the Duke claims, to marry her to one of his chiefs, she died this year; would he have me send her body?"²

Harold never denied taking the oath, and that Edward regarded it as a nullity, his naming him as his successor on his death-bed is the best evidence. Would he who feared God and devoted his whole life to His service, on the threshold of eternity, choose one to wear his crown who could not do so without being a sacrilegious perjurer? And yet that he did choose him is attested by the most reliable historians, for whose truth the scholarship of Dr. Lingard is a guarantee. What the king said on the occasion of Harold's report proves that he accepted the report as true. England at that time so received it, and England's greatest historian, Dr. Lingard, referring to the promise, uses the phrase, "compelled by the necessity of the situation," and to the oath, "constrained to swear."³

But grant that the oath was voluntary, it was better in the breach than the observance, for it required him to do an infamous

¹ *Chron. de Normandie*, p. 229; *Robert of Gloucester*, p. 358; *Chron. Pictav.*, p. 285.

² *Roger de Hoveden*, p. 449; *Eadmer*, p. 6; *Ranulf Higden*, p. 285.

³ Lingard's *History of England*, vol. i., p. 301.

act, namely, to betray his country, and that, too, to a bastard ruffian and a robber race. If the second commandment was understood then as now, Harold would have been guilty of a most terrible sin by the observance of that oath. If loyalty and patriotism were understood then as now, the ages would have execrated his memory, and we of to-day in this grand republic would place him on the same pedestal with our own Benedict Arnold. We have yet to learn that the people of the eleventh century did not understand the second commandment, loyalty and patriotism, and until we are made conscious of our error, we will applaud Harold for disregarding that oath.

Worthless, however, as it unquestionably was, it was fast accomplishing the purposes for which it was secured. It was published far and wide by the witnesses to it, who were numerous, influential and interested. Some of them may have regarded it as a free act, for it had all the appearances of one. Few there were among the great mass of the people who did not believe Harold a perjured usurper. Many shuddered at the mention of his name, and many felt that no vengeance would be too terrible for the offence of which they were duped into believing him guilty. Those who were not dupes were knaves, and between the dupes and knaves the reputation of glorious Harold and his glorious country suffered. The evils that "the good King Edward" foresaw and that he besought heaven to save him from witnessing, were now about to burst forth.

William made no delay in presenting the case he had been making before the papal court. The time was opportune; the microscopic eye of the great Hildebrand was on the evils of Church and State, and though panoramic in range, the cause of the duke concentrated all its power on unhappy England. Thierry states the demand and the reasons for it so clearly that we deem it best to cite him. He says: "The negotiation, commenced with the Roman Church by Robert de Jumièges and the monk Lanfranc, was actively pursued from the moment that a deacon of Lisieux had borne beyond the mountains the news of the alleged crime of Harold and the English nation. The Duke of Normandy laid an accusation of sacrilege against his enemy before the pontifical court; he demanded that England should be placed under the ban of the Church and declared the property of the first occupant sanctioned by the Pope. He founded his demand upon three principal causes of complaint: the murder of young Alfred and his Norman companions, the expulsion of the Archbishop Robert from the See of Canterbury, and the perjury of King Harold. He also pretended to have incontestable claims to the royalty in vir-

tue of his relationship to King Edward, and the intentions which the king had, he said, manifested on his death-bed."¹

Admitting the truth of the foregoing statement, what is there in the reasons alleged for the demand? We have already given the history of the oath, and endeavored to show its nullity. The relationship of the bastard to Edward ought to have cut no figure in the case, though it seems it did, if we are to credit Guizot.² That Harold, and not he, was named by the dying king, we have established. The murder of Alfred and his Norman companions, and the expulsion of Robert de Jumièges, Archbishop of Canterbury, remain to be considered.

In the year 1037, when Harold, the natural son of Canute, ruled in England, a letter bearing the forged signature of Emma was received by her two sons, Alfred and Edward, then exiles in Normandy, requesting one of them to come to England, and assuring them that the Anglo-Saxons were anxious to throw off the yoke of the Dane and restore the ancient dynasty. Alfred, the younger of the two, accepted the invitation, and soon set out accompanied by six hundred soldiers. On landing, he was met by Godwin, who promised to conduct him to his mother. Resting over night at Guilford, on the road to where Emma resided, the followers of Alfred were divided into small squads and provided with lodgings and everything necessary for their comfort. Godwin, on parting with the prince, promised to see him in the morning. In the middle of the night, without the knowledge of Godwin, who, according to the monk of St. Omer, knew nothing of their danger, the partisans of Harold arrived, surprised the Normans in their beds, and when day dawned proceeded to execute a vengeance on them inhuman as any in the records of savage life. Alfred was brought before Harold, and then conveyed in a disgraceful manner to the isle of Ely, where, after undergoing a mock trial, his eyes were plucked out by order of the court. A few days after he died, but whether from his injuries or the weapon of the assassin is not known.

Three or four years afterwards, in the reign of Hardicanute, Alfric, the Archbishop of York, with whom Godwin had some difference, charged him with the murder of Alfred. He was tried in the usual way and acquitted. The monk of St. Omer, who had a clear and full knowledge of the facts, exculpates him, and Edward, whose brother Alfred was, in two of his charters charges the crime on Harold the bastard Dane. However, notwithstanding the testimony of the monk of St. Omer, notwithstanding the evidence of Edward's charters, the treachery of Godwin was the

¹ Thierry's *Norman Conquest*, vol. i., p. 157.

² Guizot's *History of England*, vol. i., p. 94.

war-cry of the Normans, who in their blind resentment accused the Saxons rather than the Danes of the massacre of their countrymen!¹

But grant the guilt of Godwin and the Saxons, twenty-nine years had passed away, and twenty-four of these were as glorious as could be found in the history of any of the continental nations of that age. To this day, the reign of Edward has been regarded as a model one. Why should this act of barbarity be raked from the embers of the past, when nearly all those who had any participation in it were dead? The sins of nations, like those of individuals, should be forgiven when there are evidences of amendment. If, indeed, chastisement and enlightenment were needed, William ought to be the last selected for the work. It ill became the man who cut off the hands and legs of inoffensive prisoners, because of an allusion by their countrymen to his unlawful begetting, to present himself to the Papal court as a proper person to avenge barbarity and teach civilization.² Had the Papal court known him, it would have administered a stinging rebuke.

The expulsion of Robert de Jumièges, Archbishop of Canterbury, is a fiction. He did not stand on the order of his going, but went, went as fast as his horse could carry him. The reported probable failure of the damnable scheme of his countrymen to keep the Anglo-Saxons divided, was sufficient cause for his flight. Had he remained until the reconciliation of Edward and Godwin, and the agreement to a decree banishing all the Normans from the kingdom, it is likely, unless he had made himself particularly obnoxious, the influence of the king would have obtained an exemption for him. It was a bad conscience that expelled him, and if the Anglo-Saxons opposed his return, their reasons were good. An enemy of their manners and customs, and, doubtless, an advocate of the claims of a foreign bastard to their throne, who will blame them for refusing to receive him? If the Anglo-Saxons had some of the manhood and patriotism of which we boast so loudly, did they not deserve praise instead of censure?

But while we applaud their action, with the knowledge of the facts that we now have, we make no complaint against the court that entertained this reason. When the circumstances of the time and the forces at work are considered, it is easy to understand how it could be deceived. If in this age of steam and electricity, of commerce and travel, false ideas of remote, and even contiguous nations prevail, who will be surprised to find them in an age with none of these advantages, and when the strongest motives that can sway depraved peoples were enlisted for their dissemination?

¹ Thierry's *Norman Conquest*, vol. i., p. 118.

² Benoît de St. Maure, iii., p. 93; Willelm Gemet, p. 276.

Thierry tells us that the journey from Canterbury was at this time one of great difficulty, and we know that there was very little intercourse between Rome and England, while Italy swarmed with Normans of every rank and condition. They had taken possession of many of her cities, and the loyalty they professed for the Church gained for them the confidence of eminent ecclesiastics. Poor isolated England was at their mercy.

The papal court devoted some time to the consideration of these reasons, and to the evils with which, it was said, the Anglo-Saxon Church was afflicted. That there were some in that church who were guilty of scandalous practices admits of no doubt, but that these practices were grossly exaggerated by Norman ecclesiastics and adventurers, is certain. The grand record made by it in every century—and that often under most disadvantageous circumstances—since the conversion of Ethelbert, was not much tarnished in the twenty-four years of Edward's reign. Whatever evils there were, the hate and cupidity of Dane and Norman magnified a hundred-fold. The victim of these two thieves, its reputation abroad was unenviable. The Roman official known as the devil's advocate could learn a lesson from them that would impart to his advocacy the characteristics of his potent client.

The court ought, however, to have had pretty accurate information on the condition of the Anglo-Saxon Church, for on the occasion of Archbishop Aldred's return from Rome, after he had procured the pallium, he was accompanied by two cardinals, whose business it was to obtain correct knowledge on the subject. These cardinals were received by Edward with every mark of respect, and throughout the kingdom with a reverence and welcome worthy of the race of a Boniface, a Bede and an Alfred. This was in the year 1060 or 1061, and, we think, no change for the worse took place in the few following years. The papal court, therefore, had other than tainted testimony on the state of the Church, but on the other reasons of William's demand it had only Norman testimony, for Harold made no defence.

Doubtless with this testimony a strong case was made for William, and Harold's refusal to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court made it still stronger.¹ According to the custom of the time, it had jurisdiction; the temporal power was subordinate to the spiritual, and the refusal to obey its summons was, therefore, a grave offence. The Church in the formative period of society had extraordinary powers, and now, in the reign of Alexander II., that the master mind and master heart of the mighty Hildebrand governed, it was determined to assert them. While it made some

¹ Ingulf, p. 69.

mistakes—mistakes unavoidable under the circumstances—it was an effective barrier against the evils inseparable from the agitation, ignorance, cupidity and brutality of the elements that took possession of Europe after the downfall of the Western Empire of the Romans. It was long before this action, and long after it, the supreme court of Christian States, and it was therefore Harold's duty to obey its summons. His failure to do so may have turned the scale against him. We of to-day may decry this power, but we cannot deny the fact, and if the consent of people and rulers confers legitimacy, it was as legitimate as is the Supreme Court of the United States. "Nations," says Dr. Fredet, "oppressed by their sovereigns had no other resource than the protection of the Pope, and sovereigns who wished to act as tyrants had no other check than his authority, which they generally acknowledged, not only in spiritual, but also in temporal concerns."¹ Guizot, in his history of civilization, asserts that "the Church, however imperfect might be her notions of morality and justice, was infinitely superior to the temporal government." He further adds, that "the cry of the people continually urged her to take its place," and that "her interference was, often, just and salutary."

The conclusion reached was favorable to William. A consecrated banner was sent to him, along with other evidences of approval of the invasion of England. The news from Rome was received at a time when he had learned that however the people might condemn Harold, they were unwilling to bear the expense of a war against him and his loyal subjects. Pending the result of his appeal to Rome, he, with the advice of his council, convoked an assembly of the people. After unfolding his plans, he requested assistance in furtherance of them. The assembly positively refused the request, and, in order to carry his point, he had to have recourse to an artifice which proved as successful as the one resorted to in the case of Harold. One by one the members were called into his presence, and the consent that he failed to gain collectively he gained individually.

Now, however, that the consecrated banner was fluttering in the breeze and all its gorgeous emblazonry glittering in the sun, there was no longer need of artifice. Enthusiasm at once rose to fever heat, and the simple religious, as they gazed on it, felt like that grand assembly of all classes, from prince to peasant, who, twenty-nine years later, at Clermont, greeted the utterances of Pope Urban with the cry, "God wills it; God wills it." Those whose sole purpose was self-aggrandizement, and with whom the justice or injustice of the invasion had not a feather's weight, affected to

¹ Fredet's *Modern History*, page 513.

be inflamed with the same holy ardor. The language of Alexander II. was tortured into words of blood, flame and rapine. Harold was a sacrilegious usurper, his people untamed and untamable barbarians. Contributions poured in from all ranks of the people, and pious old mothers brought their sons, fondly believing that in the event of their fall a crown of glory awaited them. From the various surrounding nations came thieves, cut-throats, ravishers, tramps, adventurers and men whose profession was war. If we are to credit some very learned historians, William held out as an inducement to all the pillage of England. Domains, castles, towns, rich heiresses and fat bishoprics were demanded as a condition of enlistment or contribution. Thierry, on the authority of the Norman Chronicle, says that William rejected no one and satisfied all. Guizot, more specific, says that "he promised lands, castles, women, plunder; he even sold an English bishopric to a certain Rêmi of Fécamp for a ship and twenty warriors."¹ His speech just before the battle of Hastings, which we have on the authority of Normans, more than sustains the statement of Guizot. The worst guerrilla chief of the late rebellion could not improve on it. Here it is: "Fight your best, and put every one to death; for if we conquer we shall all be rich. What I gain, you gain; if I conquer, you conquer; if I take the land, you will share it. Know, however, that I am not come here merely to take that which is my due, but to revenge our whole nation for the felon acts, perjuries and treason of these English. They put to death the Danes, men and women, in the night of Saint Brice. They decimated the companions of my relation, Alfred, and put himself to death. On, then, in God's name, and chastise them for all their misdeeds."²

And now that an army of sixty thousand men, with such vicious elements, is ready to cross the channel, we are done with the events and causes that led to the invasion. Our presentment of them, though very imperfect, cannot fail to convince the impartial that so far from being grounded in justice, the invasion was one of the greatest crimes against the rights of nations of which we have any record. The reasons urged for it were, as we have endeavored to show, false or worthless, though made to appear good before the tribunal that passed on them.

In after years, when the work of conquest was secure, William made no claim of title to the crown save that which his sword had won. In the horrible hour of death, when all his terrible crimes

¹ Guizot's *History of England*, vol. i., p. 96.

² *Guill. Pictav.*, p. 201; *Chron. de Normandie*, pp. 232, 233. [William of Poytoun's (*Guill. Pictav.*) account of the speech is quite different. The *Chronique de Normandie* is merely a possible translation of Wace's *Roman de Rou.*—Ed.].

confronted him in all their magnitude; when the ghost of glorious Harold and the ghosts of his murdered people would not down; when the victims of pillage, lust and brutality hovered round him; when despoiled prelates, monks and nuns whispered sacrilege into his ears; when widows and orphans, ragged, hungry and diseased, rose before his agonized vision; when thus tortured and conscience-smitten, where was the murder of Alfred and his Norman companions, where the expulsion of Robert de Jumièges and the perjury of the English king, where the promise of Edward and his relationship to him, and where the barbarism of the Anglo-Saxon people and the pollution of the Anglo-Saxon Church? Did they now justify the invasion, did they confer a title to the throne, or were they in the awful catalogue of his crimes? Let his dying words answer: "I leave the kingdom of England to no one, because I did not inherit it, but acquired it by force, and at the price of blood; I replace it in the hands of God." In other words, "I leave the kingdom of England to no one; I never had a title to it; I never had a valid reason to invade it; it was mine by the might of the sword, mine by murder, mine by pillage, mine by sacrilege, mine by every species of outrage, mine by the power of the devil; I replace it in the hands of God."

In the light of history, in the light of the facts as we have unfolded them, this is no strained construction, no intemperate declamation. Whatever literary Chesterfields may say of it, we proclaim it the plain, unvarnished truth. The facts have spoken it, and in their presence, averse as we are to harsh and whetted words, we characterize William, in every stage of preparation for the work of invasion, as a cool, calculating, hypocritical, determined villain, without a virtue, without a conscience and without a church save for self. This was the language of the Anglo-Saxon people and of the Anglo-Saxon Church, a church which, if we are to credit Montelambert, was the brightest gem in the tiara of Peter. It is the verdict of posterity.

We are aware that he has apologists and even admirers, but so has Henry II., his imitator in the work of conquest, so has Henry the VIII., his imitator in sacrilege, and so has Oliver Cromwell, his successful rival in all iniquity. Recently a monument was erected to his memory at Falaise. If intended to make amends for the ingratitude and inhumanity of his children and of his countrymen, who deserted him in his dying hour, and left him to the care of men who fled, after pilfering his apartments and throwing his naked remains on the floor, we most heartily approve of it. If intended to make amends for the infamy of the sordid wretches who refused to defray the expenses of his funeral, we have no words of censure. If intended to make amends for the brutality of those

who, in their haste to be rid of him, burst his coffinless body in trying to force it into a grave too small for it, we say well done. But if, however, intended to change or rebuke the verdict of posterity, it was a waste of money and artistic skill. The praise which that monument evidences is as powerless to alter the judgment formed of him, in shaping the events and causes that led to the invasion, as was the incense burnt at his grave to destroy or neutralize the stench arising from his bursted carcass. The verdict is unchangeable.

MICHAEL HENNESSY.

THE BULL OF POPE LEO XIII. ON ANGLICAN ORDERS.

LEO, BISHOP, SERVANT OF THE SERVANTS OF GOD. IN
PERPETUAL REMEMBRANCE.

WE have dedicated to the welfare of the noble English nation no small portion of the Apostolic care and charity by which, helped by His grace, we endeavor to fulfil the office and follow in the footsteps of "the Great Shepherd of the sheep," our Lord Jesus Christ. The letter which last year we sent to "the English seeking the kingdom of Christ in the unity of the faith" is a special witness of our good will toward England. In it we recalled the memory of the ancient union of her people with Mother Church, and we strove to hasten the day of a happy reconciliation by stirring up men's hearts to offer diligent prayer to God. And again, more recently, when it seemed good to us to treat more fully the unity of the Church in a general letter, England had not the last place in our mind, in the hope that our teaching might both strengthen Catholics and bring the saving light to those divided from us.

It is pleasing to acknowledge the generous way in which our zeal and plainness of speech, inspired by no mere human motives, have met the approval of the English people, and this testifies not less to their courtesy than to the solicitude of many for their eternal salvation.

¹ Heb. xiii., 20.

With the same mind and intention we have now determined to turn our consideration to a matter of no less importance, which is closely connected with the same subject and with our desires. For an opinion already prevalent, confirmed more than once by the action and constant practice of the Church, maintained that when in England, shortly after it was rent from the centre of Christian unity, a new rite for conferring holy orders was publicly introduced under Edward VI., the true sacrament of orders as instituted by Christ lapsed and with it the hierarchical succession. For some time, however, and in these last years especially, a controversy has sprung up as to whether the sacred orders conferred according to the Edwardine ordinal possessed the nature and effect of a sacrament; those in favor of the absolute validity, or of a doubtful validity, being not only certain Anglican writers, but some few Catholics, chiefly non-English. The consideration of the excellency of the Christian priesthood moved Anglican writers in this matter, desirous as they were that their own people should not lack the twofold power over the body of Christ. Catholic writers were impelled by a wish to smooth the way for the return of Anglicans to holy unity. Both, indeed, thought that in view of studies brought up to the level of recent research and of new documents rescued from oblivion, it was not inopportune to re-examine the question by our authority. And we, not disregarding such desires and opinions, and, above all, obeying the dictates of apostolic charity, have considered that nothing should be left untried that might in any way tend to preserve souls from injury or procure their advantage.

It has, therefore, pleased us to graciously permit the cause to be re-examined, so that through the extreme care taken in the new examination all doubt, or even shadow of doubt, should be removed for the future. To this end we commissioned a certain number of men noted for their learning and ability, whose opinions in this matter were known to be divergent, to state the grounds of their judgments in writing. We, then, having summoned them to our person, directed them to interchange writings and further to investigate and discuss all that was necessary for a full knowledge of the matter. We were careful also that they should be able to re-examine all documents bearing on this question which were known to exist in the Vatican archives, to search for new ones, and even to have at their disposal all acts relating to this subject which are preserved by the holy office, or, as it is called, the supreme council, and to consider whatever had, up to this time, been adduced by learned men on both sides. We ordered them, when prepared in this way, to meet together in special sessions. These, to the number of twelve, were held under the presidency of one of

the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, appointed by ourselves, and all were invited to free discussion. Finally we directed that the acts of these meetings, together with all other documents, should be submitted to our venerable brethren, the Cardinals of the same council, so that when all had studied the whole subject and discussed it in our presence each might give his opinion.

This order for discussing the matter having been determined upon, it was necessary, with a view to forming a true estimate of the real state of the question, to enter upon it after careful inquiry as to how the matter stood in relation to the prescription and settled custom of the Apostolic See, the origin and force of which custom it was undoubtedly of great importance to determine. For this reason, in the first place, the principal documents in which our predecessors, at the request of Queen Mary, exercised their special care for the reconciliation of the English Church were considered. Thus Julius III. sent Cardinal Reginald Pole, an Englishman, and illustrious in many ways, to be his legate a latere for the purpose, "as his angel of peace and love," and gave him extraordinary and unusual mandates or faculties and directions for his guidance. These Paul IV. confirmed and explained. And here, to interpret rightly the force of these documents, it is necessary to lay it down as a fundamental principle that they were certainly not intended to deal with an abstract state of things, but with a specific and concrete issue. For since the faculties given by these Pontiffs to the Apostolic Legate had reference to England only, and to the state of religion therein, and since the rules of action were laid down by them at the request of the said Legate, they could not have been mere directions for determining the necessary conditions for the validity of ordinations in general. They must pertain directly to providing for holy orders in the said kingdom, as the recognized condition of the circumstances and times demanded. This, besides being clear from the nature and form of the said documents, is also obvious from the fact that it would have been altogether irrelevant to thus instruct the Legate—one whose learning had been conspicuous in the Council of Trent—as to the conditions necessary for the bestowal of the sacrament of orders.

To all rightly estimating these matters it will not be difficult to understand why, in the letters of Julius III., issued to the Apostolic Legate on March 8, 1554, there is a distinct mention, first, of those who, "rightfully and lawfully promoted," might be maintained in their orders, and then of others who, "not promoted to sacred orders," might "be promoted if they were found to be worthy and fitting subjects." For it is clearly and definitely noted, as indeed was the case, that there were two classes of men; the first, those who had really received sacred orders either before the secession

of Henry VIII., or, if after it and by ministers infected by error and schism, still according to the accustomed Catholic rite; the second, those who were initiated according to the Edwardine ordinal, who on that account could be "promoted," since they had received an ordination which was null. And that the mind of the Pope was this and nothing else is clearly confirmed by the letter of the said Legate (January 29, 1555), subdelegating his faculties to the Bishop of Norwich. Moreover, what the letters of Julius III. themselves say about freely using the Pontifical faculties, even in behalf of those who had received their consecration "*minus rite* and not according to the accustomed form of the Church," is to be especially noted. By this expression those only could be meant who had been consecrated according to the Edwardine rite, since, besides it and the Catholic form, there was then no other in England.

This becomes even still clearer when we consider the legation which, on the advice of Cardinal Pole, the sovereign princes, Philip and Mary, sent to the Pope in Rome in the month of February, 1555. The royal ambassadors—three men, "most illustrious and endowed with every virtue," of whom one was Thomas Thirlby, Bishop of Ely—were charged to inform the Pope more fully as to the religious condition of the country, and especially to beg that he would ratify and confirm what the Legate had been at pains to effect, and had succeeded in effecting, toward the reconciliation of the kingdom with the Church. For this purpose all the necessary written evidence and the pertinent parts of the new ordinal were submitted to the Pope. The legation having been splendidly received, and their evidence having been "diligently discussed" by several of the cardinals, "after mature deliberation," Paul IV. issued his bull, *Proœclara carissimi*, on June 20th of that same year. In this, while giving full force and approbation to what Pole had done, it is ordered in the matter of the ordinations as follows: "Those who have been promoted to ecclesiastical orders . . . by any one but a bishop validly and lawfully ordained" are bound to receive those orders again. But those bishops not "validly and lawfully ordained" were had been made sufficiently clear by the foregoing documents and the faculties used in the said matter by the Legate; those, namely, who have been promoted to the episcopate, as others to other orders "not according to the accustomed form of the Church," or, as the Legate himself wrote to the Bishop of Norwich, "the form and intention of the Church" not having been observed. These were certainly those promoted according to the new form of rite, to the examination of which the cardinals specially deputed had given their careful attention. Neither should the passage much

to the point in the same Pontifical letter be overlooked where, together with others needing dispensation, are enumerated those "who had obtained as well orders as benefices nulliter et de facto." For to obtain orders nulliter means the same as by an act null and void, that is, invalid, as the very meaning of the word and as common parlance require. This is especially clear when the word is used in the same way about orders as about "ecclesiastical benefices." These, by the undoubted teaching of the sacred canons, were clearly null if given with any vitiating defect. Moreover, when some doubted as to who, according to the mind of the Pontiff, could be called and considered bishops, "validly and lawfully ordained," the said Pope shortly after, on October 30th, issued further letters in the form of a brief, and said: "We, wishing to remove the doubt and to opportunely provide for the peace of conscience of those who, during the schism, were promoted to orders by expressing more clearly the mind and intention which we had in the aforesaid letters, declare that only those bishops and archbishops who were not ordained and consecrated in the form of the Church cannot be said to have been validly and lawfully ordained." Unless this declaration had applied to the actual case in England, that is to say, to the Edwardine ordinal, the Pope would certainly have done nothing by these last letters for the removal of doubt and the restoration of peace of conscience. Further, it was in this sense that the Legate understood the documents and commands of the Apostolic See, and duly and conscientiously obeyed them, and the same was done by Queen Mary and the rest who helped to restore Catholicism to its former state.

The authority of Julius III. and Paul IV., which we have quoted, clearly shows the origin of that practice which has been observed without interruption for more than three centuries, that ordinations conferred according to the Edwardine rite should be considered null and void. This practice is fully proved by the numerous cases of absolute reordination according to the Catholic rite even in Rome. In the observance of this practice we have a proof directly affecting the matter in hand. For if by any chance doubt should remain as to the true sense in which these Pontifical documents are to be understood, the principle holds good that "custom is the best interpreter of law." Since in the Church it has ever been a constant and established rule that it is sacrilegious to repeat the sacrament of order, it never could have come to pass that the Apostolic See should have silently acquiesced and tolerated such a custom. But not only did the Apostolic See tolerate this practice, but approved and sanctioned it as often as any particular case arose which called for its judgment in the matter. We adduce two facts of this kind out of many which have from time to

time been submitted to the Supreme Council of the Holy Office. The first was in 1684 of a certain French Calvinist, and the other in 1704 of John Clement Gordon, both of whom had received their orders according to the Edwardine ritual. In the first case, after a searching investigation, the consultors, not a few in number, gave in writing their answers—or as they call it, their *vota*—and the rest unanimously agreed with their conclusion, “for the invalidity of the ordination,” and only on account of reasons of opportuneness did the Cardinals deem it well to answer by a “*dilata*” (*viz.*, not to formulate the conclusion at the moment). The same documents were called into use and considered again in the examination of the second case, and additional written statements of opinion were also obtained from consultors, and the most eminent doctors of the Sorbonne and of Douai were likewise asked for their opinion. No safeguard which wisdom and prudence could suggest to insure the thorough sifting of the question was neglected.

And here it is important to observe that although Gordon himself, whose case it was, and some of the consultors had adduced, among the reasons which went to prove the invalidity, the ordination of Parker, according to their own ideas about it, in the delivery of the decision this reason was altogether set aside, as documents of incontestable authenticity proved. Nor in pronouncing the decision was weight given to any other reason than the “defect of form and intention,” and in order that the judgment concerning this form might be more certain and complete, precaution was taken that a copy of the Anglican ordinal should be submitted to examination, and that with it should be collated the ordination forms gathered together from the various Eastern and Western rites. Then Clement XI., himself, with the unanimous vote of the Cardinals concerned, on the “*Feria V.*,” April 17, 1704, decreed: “John Clement Gordon shall be ordained from the beginning and unconditionally to all the orders, even sacred orders, and chiefly of priesthood, and in case he has not been confirmed, he shall first receive the sacrament of Confirmation.” It is important to bear in mind that this judgment was in no wise determined by the omission of the tradition of instruments, for in such a case, according to the established custom, the direction would have been to repeat the ordination conditionally, and still more important it is

¹ [The term “*Feria V.*” here used has a technical value. Ordinary meetings of the Supreme Council for the ratification of decrees usually take place on the Wednesdays, and are marked “*Feria IV.*” But the special and solemn sessions which, in matters of graver import, are held in the presence and under the presidency of the Pope himself, who thus in a special way makes the decisions his own, take place on Thursdays, and are marked “*Feria V.*”—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.]

to note that the judgment of the Pontiff applies universally to all Anglican ordinations, because, although it refers to a particular case, it is not based upon any reason special to that case, but upon the defect of form, which defect equally affects all these ordinations, so much so that when similar cases subsequently came up for decision the same decree of Clement XI. was quoted as the norma.

Hence, it must be clear to every one, that the controversy lately revived had been already definitely settled by the Apostolic See, and that it is to the insufficient knowledge of these documents that we must perhaps attribute the fact that any Catholic writer should have considered it still an open question. But, as we stated at the beginning, there is nothing we so deeply and ardently desire as to be of help to men of good will by showing them the greatest consideration and charity. Wherefore, we ordered that the Anglican ordinal, which is the essential point of the whole matter, should be once more most carefully examined.

In the examination of any rite for the effecting and administering of a sacrament, distinction is rightly made between the part which is ceremonial and that which is essential, usually called the matter and form. All know that the sacraments of the New Law, as sensible and efficient signs of invisible grace, ought both to signify the grace which they effect and effect the grace which they signify. Although the signification ought to be found in the whole essential rite—that is to say, in the matter and form—it still pertains chiefly to the form, since the matter is the part which is not determined by itself, but which is determined by the form. And this appears still more clearly in the sacrament of orders, the matter of which, in so far as we have to consider it in this case, is the imposition of hands, which, indeed, by itself signifies nothing definite, and is equally used for several orders and for Confirmation. But the words which, until recently, were commonly held by Anglicans to constitute the proper form of priestly ordination, namely, "Receive the Holy Ghost," certainly do not in the least definitely express the sacred order of priesthood or its grace and power, which is chiefly the power of "consecrating and of offering the true body and blood of the Lord" (Council of Trent, sess. XXIII., de Sacr. Ord., can. 1) in that sacrifice which is no "nude commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the cross" (*Ibid.*, sess. XXII., de Sacrif. Missæ, can. 3). This form had, indeed, afterward added to it the words, "for the office and work of a priest," etc., but this rather shows that the Anglicans themselves perceived that the first form was defective and inadequate. But even if this addition could give to the form its due signification, it was introduced too late, as a century had already elapsed since the

adoption of the Edwardine ordinal, for, as the hierarchy had become extinct, there remained no power of ordaining. In vain has help been recently sought for the plea of the validity of orders from the other prayers of the same ordinal. For, to put aside other reasons which show this to be insufficient for the purpose in the Anglican rite, let this argument suffice for all: from them has been deliberately removed whatever sets forth the dignity and office of the priesthood in the Catholic rite. That form, consequently, cannot be considered apt or sufficient for the sacrament which omits what it ought essentially to signify.

The same holds good of episcopal consecration. For, to the formula, "Receive the Holy Ghost," not only were the words, "for the office and work of a bishop," etc., added at a later period, but even these, as we shall presently state, must be understood in a sense different to that which they bear in the Catholic rite. Nor is anything gained by quoting the prayer of the preface, "Almighty God," since it in like manner has been stripped of the words which denote the summum sacerdotium. It is not here relevant to examine whether the episcopate be a completion of the priesthood or an order distinct from it, or whether when bestowed, as they say, *per saltum*, on one who is not a priest, it has or has not its effect. But the episcopate, undoubtedly by the institution of Christ, most truly belongs to the sacrament of orders, and constitutes the sacerdotium in the highest degree, namely, that which by the teaching of the Holy Fathers and our liturgical customs is called the "*summum sacerdotium, sacri ministerii summa.*" So it comes to pass that, as the sacrament of orders and the true sacerdotium of Christ were utterly eliminated from the Anglican rite, and hence the sacerdotium is in no wise conferred truly and validly in the episcopal consecration of the same rite, for the like reason, therefore, the episcopate can in no wise be truly and validly conferred by it, and this the more so because among the first duties of the episcopate is that of ordaining ministers for the Holy Eucharist and sacrifice.

For the full and accurate understanding of the Anglican ordinal, besides what we have noted as to some of its parts, there is nothing more pertinent than to consider carefully the circumstances under which it was composed and publicly authorized. It would be tedious to enter into details, nor is it necessary to do so, as the history of that time is sufficiently eloquent as to the animus of the authors of the ordinal against the Catholic Church, as to the abettors whom they associated with themselves from the heterodox sects, and as to the end they had in view. Being fully cognizant of the necessary connection between faith and worship, between "the law of believing and the law of praying," under a pretext of

returning to the primitive form, they corrupted the liturgical order in many ways to suit the errors of the reformers. For this reason in the whole ordinal not only is there no clear mention of the sacrifice, of consecration, of the sacerdotium and of the power of consecrating and offering sacrifice, but, as we have just stated, every trace of these things which had been in such prayers of the Catholic rite as they had not entirely rejected was deliberately removed and struck out. In this way the native character—or spirit, as it is called—of the ordinal clearly manifests itself. Hence, if, vitiated in its origin, it was wholly insufficient to confer orders, it was impossible that in the course of time it could become sufficient, since no change had taken place. In vain those who from the time of Charles I. have attempted to hold some kind of sacrifice or of priesthood have made some additions to the ordinal. In vain also has been the contention of that small section of the Anglican body formed in recent times, that the said ordinal can be understood and interpreted in a sound and orthodox sense. Such efforts, we affirm, have been and are made in vain, and for this reason, that any words in the Anglican ordinal, as it now is, which lend themselves to ambiguity, cannot be taken in the same sense as they possess in the Catholic rite. For once a new rite has been initiated in which, as we have seen, the sacrament of orders is adulterated or denied, and from which all idea of consecration and sacrifice has been rejected, the formula, "Receive the Holy Spirit," no longer holds good; because the Spirit is infused into the soul with the grace of the sacrament, and the words "for the office and work of a priest or bishop" and the like no longer hold good, but remain as words without the reality which Christ instituted.

Several of the more shrewd Anglican interpreters of the ordinal have perceived the force of this argument, and they openly urge it against those who take the ordinal in a new sense and vainly attach to the orders conferred thereby a value and efficacy which they do not possess. By this same argument is refuted the contention of those who think that the prayer "Almighty God, giver of all good things," which is found at the beginning of the ritual action, might suffice as a legitimate form of orders, even in the hypothesis that it might be held to be sufficient in a Catholic rite approved by the Church.

With this inherent defect of form is joined the defect of intention, which is equally essential to the sacrament. The Church does not judge about the mind and intention in so far as it is something by its nature internal; but in so far as it is manifested externally she is bound to judge concerning it. When any one has rightly and seriously made use of the due form and the matter

requisite for effecting or conferring the sacrament, he is considered by the very fact to do what the Church does. On this principle rests the doctrine that a sacrament is truly conferred by the ministry of one who is a heretic or unbaptized, provided the Catholic rite be employed. On the other hand, if the rite be changed with the manifest intention of introducing another rite not approved by the Church and of rejecting what the Church does, and what by the institution of Christ belongs to the nature of the sacrament, then it is clear that not only is the necessary intention wanting to the sacrament, but that the intention is adverse to and destructive of the sacrament.

All these matters have been long and carefully considered by ourselves and by our venerable brethren, the Judges of the Supreme Council, of whom it has pleased us to call a special meeting upon the "Feria V.," the 16th day of July last, upon the solemnity of Our Lady of Mount Carmel. They with one accord agreed that the question laid before them had been already adjudicated upon with full knowledge of the Apostolic See, and that this renewed discussion and examination of the issues had only served to bring out more clearly the wisdom and accuracy with which that decision had been made. Nevertheless we deemed it well to postpone a decision in order to afford time both to consider whether it would be fitting or expedient that we should make a fresh authoritative declaration upon the matter, and to humbly pray for a fuller measure of Divine guidance. Then, considering that this matter of practice, although already decided, had been by certain persons, for whatever reason, recalled into discussion, and that thence it might follow that a pernicious error would be fostered in the minds of many who might suppose that they possessed the sacrament and effects of orders, where these are nowise to be found, it has seemed good to us in the Lord to pronounce our judgment.

Wherefore, strictly adhering in this matter to the decrees of the Pontiffs, our predecessors, and confirming them most fully, and, as it were, renewing them by our authority, of our own motion and certain knowledge we pronounce and declare that ordinations carried out according to the Anglican rite have been and are absolutely null and utterly void.

It remains for us to say that even as we have entered upon the elucidation of this grave question in the name and in the love of the Great Shepherd, in the same we appeal to those who desire and seek with a sincere heart the possession of a hierarchy and of orders. Perhaps until now aiming at the greater perfection of Christian virtue, and searching more devoutly the Divine Scriptures, and redoubling the fervor of their prayers, they have, never-

theless, hesitated in doubt and anxiety to follow the voice of Christ, which so long has interiorly admonished them. Now they see clearly whither He in His goodness invites them and wills them to come. In returning to His one only fold they will obtain the blessings which they seek, and the consequent helps to salvation of which He has made the Church the dispenser, and, as it were, the constant guardian and promoter of His redemption among the nations. Then indeed "they shall draw waters in joy from the fountains of the Saviour," His wondrous sacraments, whereby His faithful souls have their sins truly remitted, and are restored to the friendship of God, are nourished and strengthened by the heavenly bread, and abound with the most powerful aids for their eternal salvation. May the God of peace, the God of all salvation, in His infinite tenderness enrich and fill with all these blessings those who truly yearn for them. We wish to direct our exhortation and our desires in a special way to those who are ministers of religion in their respective communities. They are men who from their very office take precedence in learning and authority, and who have at heart the glory of God and the salvation of souls. Let them be the first in joyfully submitting to the Divine call, and obey it and furnish a glorious example to others. Assuredly with an exceeding great joy their mother, the Church, will welcome them and will cherish with all her love and care those whom the strength of their generous souls has amid many trials and difficulties led back to her bosom. Nor could words express the recognition which this devoted courage will win for them from the assemblies of the brethren throughout the Catholic world, or what hope or confidence it will merit for them before Christ as their judge, or what reward it will obtain from Him in the heavenly kingdom! And we ourselves in every lawful way shall continue to promote their reconciliation with the Church, in which individuals and masses, as we ardently desire, may find so much for their imitation. In the meantime, by the tender mercy of the Lord our God, we ask and beseech all to strive faithfully to follow in the open path of Divine grace and truth.

We decree that these letters and all things contained therein shall not be liable at any time to be impugned or objected to by reason of fault or any other defect whatsoever of subreption or obreption of our intention, but are and shall be always valid and in force, and shall be inviolably observed both juridically and otherwise by all, of whatsoever degree and pre-eminence; declaring null and void anything which in these matters may happen to be contrariwise attempted, whether wittingly or unwittingly, by any person whatsoever by whatsoever authority or pretext, all things to the contrary notwithstanding.

We will that there shall be given to copies of these letters, even printed, provided that they be signed by a notary and sealed by a person constituted in ecclesiastical dignity, the same credence that would be given to the expression of our will by the showing of these presents.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, in the year of the Incarnation of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six, on the ides of September in the nineteenth year of our pontificate.

C. CARD. DE RUGGIERO.

A. CARD. BIANCHI,
PRO-DATARIUS.

VISA.

Official of Despatch de Curia: J. dell' Aquila Visconti.

In place of + the seal.

Registered in the Secretariate of Briefs,

I. CUGNONI.



THE CONVERSION OF LONDON.

IT would hardly be too much to say that London is a city without a religion.

It has a vast mass of church-goers, but a curious indefiniteness befalls their religious sense. They may, indeed, and no doubt generally do, preserve the moral sense; but they have no fixed belief, no distinct view of dogma, no certainty about the obligations of the present or the prospects of the future life. They hang on to their hope of a happy hereafter, vague though it be, with an attentive persistency which is the pathetic outcome of the consciousness of immortality in the human heart.

Few are irreligious; some even wish, more or less intensely according to character, to be religious; but they are hampered by a chain of historical circumstances over which they have had no more control than over the physical types of their ancestry.

It is probably better to be of the church-goers, even though overwhelmed by the "seas of doubt" against which Thomas à Kempis warned the disputatious, than to make one of that other and yet vaster body who do not go to church at all. "There are close at our doors," wrote the Bishop of London in his spring pastoral, "hundreds of thousands who are beyond the reach of our ministrations, and who are learning the terrible lesson of doing without religion altogether." Some might say that this godlessness is partly due to the inconclusive nature of the ministrations referred to, no less than to a certain curious stupidity and narrowness of vision very common among the lower class of Londoners; while another undoubted cause is the fact that the passions which sway the multitude swing them away from the magnificent, difficult, but fundamental thought of responsibility to God. There is yet another explanation. A transition time is necessarily a time of discomfort, of doubt, of upheaval; and the present is such a time with England, and especially with its great metropolitan heart, so far, at least, as England and London care at all for the spiritual world of which things seen are but the evidence. Perhaps no one who has not dived into the life of London, and held converse with all and sundry, knows how widely infidelity, in its various fantastic forms, has struck its roots among the lower middle class and the working class. Some there are who have not left themselves enough of the light of reason to argue either way. The besotted denizens of the taverns, growling and swearing away the last traces of having been created only a little lower than the

angels, retain hardly any consciousness of things spiritual; for drink, by undermining the intellect, cuts away the only ladder which leads to that once normal height whence a man can discern the true end and scope of his own existence.

English working-class womankind, even when sober and honest, seldom stands on such a height. The women of the back streets have not a broad outlook nor much forethought. Penny-wise even in temporals, they are far from grasping the doctrine that the real main chance lies in serving God and saving their own souls. The world is their divinity—that world which has so little to give them; and the hope of future glory, sole consolation of the poor old French or Flemish wife in her threadbare, yet ever decent black cloth cloak, is denied to the hapless Londoner with the flaunting rags, the furrowed brow, the coarse voice and gesture. But it is the Londoner's misfortune, rather than her fault, that her hope and worship are pictured so low. Vulgarity is in her blood. England is one of the very few countries in the world where the poor are vulgar. In Continental countries we find it among those classes where its presence is to be expected, but never among the poor. With our people it is probably an effect, as well as a cause, of that heathenness for which they cannot be held responsible.

It is not, however, of the spiritually submerged that we wish to treat here, except by way of a side-light. A goodly number even of the working-class (mostly men), and by far the larger proportion of the cultured minds of England, are in the throes of that anxious, groping expectation which is not the least hopeful sign of the present times. They are feeling after something more decisive and soul-satisfying in the way of religion than has been given to them yet; feeling, in a word, after the reality of things spiritual, the "It is" of the unseen.

Since Wesley partially awoke the torpid nation in the middle of the last century, various attempts to arrive at the "It is" have been made, have failed and have died away in their futility. The evangelical phase, which long held a certain sway, is passing as it is in the nature of phases to pass. Evangelicalism pointed to God and to heaven, and there was a stir and a fervor about it which justified the phrase "awakened"; but it was bitter, and somehow bitterness does not hold the soul nor attract for long together. The creed still exists. There is even a broken reflection of the old May meetings. Scottish Presbyterians still stand up, and English Nonconformists take counsel together, while the roll and clatter of the callous godless Strand go by; and they voice their desire to secularize schools, to oppose the sacerdotal tendency and to reduce religion to its very lowest terms.

But these meetings are sleepy and decorous now compared with

what they were in the roaring days of the forties and fifties. The successor of Pepys's Christian gentleman hardly ventures to denounce a Pontiff who is so generally admired by Europe as is Leo XIII., and contents himself with poking accusations of insincerity at Ritualistic clergymen who are nearer to hand, and about whom Europe knows and cares less. His speeches may find an echo in suburbs where traditions of the fifties linger, but London does not dance to his piping, nor does the heart of the people quicken to his voice.

Dissent in its various forms, though it is still a power in country districts, especially in the far Celtic West, is losing its hold on the city poor. They look on it as mainly the religion of that *bourgeois* class which is the workingman's bugbear, the class of employers and sweaters; and, moreover, the poor long for beauty and brightness, and to be drawn with the cords of Adam. Alone of all dissenting bodies, the almost brand new Salvation Army makes its mark. Its influence is due to the practice of street preaching, always a prolific cause of successes among a people so essentially sermon-loving as are the English, and yet more to its insistence on holiness of life, for nothing in human nature is more strongly marked than the centripetal attraction towards virtue and self-denial, powerfully though passion draw the other way. Above all, the English like to have their national vice attacked. No religious leader will ever gain much ground with them who does not lay siege to intemperance, that fruitful cause of their ruin and degradation; and the veneration in which Cardinal Manning was held in London was greatly attributable to his unbending attitude on the question of drink. Where the Salvation Army fails to satisfy is in the absence of dogma. A craving for dogma, almost as unconscious yet quite as natural as the infant's craving for mother's milk, is one of the marks of a time of revival.

The existence of such a craving furnishes a key to the contentions which tear at the heart of the Established Church. A certain section opposed unconditionally all desire for dogmatic sacramental teaching. Another section, feeling that it would never do to let people go to Rome, set up that claim *to be* the Catholic Church, to prove which is the object of their unending battle and strife. They exhumed ancient doctrines and practices from the past, or copied them from the living exemplar which has been present all along. They made the most of those portions of the prayer-book which Cranmer retained from Catholic times, and ignored those other portions which he admitted to please the party of Geneva, at that memorable time when the shifty prelate made his great attempt to link together conflicting parties with the rope which ever since has served them for their tug of war. But, in

reality, Ritualism was a fresh departure, a new religion rushing forth full of youthful fervor and brilliancy from the brains of zealous, striving and stirring men.

What has been its success? In some respects a very great one. It has well nigh transformed the face of the Established Church; it has brought back the ancient forms of baptism, the use of the Cross, the observance of feasts and fasts. It has aroused the curiosity and caught the fancy, and in some sort satisfied the yearnings, of the refined and artistic English upper-middle-class, and this in spite of the glaring fact that even Ritualism itself is not at all homogeneous. Ritualism includes numerous shades of opinion, and is without a binding principle of unity; and the imagined shadow, which it calls "The Church," is as elusive as a phantom.¹ In many cases, the ritual outruns the doctrine, and effect takes the place of cause. A writer in the "Church Times,"² has said:

"Probably, the tendency towards adopting some of the outward signs of the Catholic Faith, without its doctrines, and still more without its duties, is one of the greatest dangers of the English Church generally at the present time. A great mistake, often made, is that of not going far enough; nothing will succeed so well here as a thorough-going Catholic policy, beginning with a full ceremonial and not making it the end to be arrived at."

This is rather a puzzling state of things for the laity, and the poor, at least, can hardly be expected to ravel it out. I am far from undervaluing the work which the High Church party have done among the poor. Their slum charities are numerous and successful; their open-air preachings and "stations of the Cross" must needs strike some salutary thoughts to sorrow-laden hearts; their schools seem to turn out the cleanest, most decent, and best-marshalled children in the rookery streets of London; and that spirit of order which is wanting to their doctrine comes very much to their aid in practical matters. They have, however, little doctrinal hold over their poor; for the ends and views, strivings and contentions, and angry insistences of the Ritualistic clergy on the subjects of Catholicity, continuity, and the rest, are far too complicated to be understood by the people. A parish church with plenty of guilds and clubs, and energetic clergymen attached to it, has natural attractions for the poor; but one never sees them dropping in for worship at odd times, or for some simple service without music, as one sees the poor in churches of the "Roman

¹ *Vide* that most inconclusive book, Canon Gore's *Christian Church*, which sets forth, in effect, that every one is bound to belong to the Church, while yet the Church is invisible, impossible to find, and liable to error; and, moreover, that Holy Scripture leads us to expect that the Church would be marked by these unsatisfactory characteristics.

² May 15, 1896.

obedience." The contrast is yet more strongly marked in all that concerns religious obligations and the sacramental system. Roman Catholics know and universally acknowledge the obligation of hearing Mass on Sundays, and going at stated times to confession and communion; their priests may have to remind negligent subjects of their duty, but the existence of the duty no one denies. With the Ritualistic clergyman all is different. He tells his people to come to confession; but they cannot understand the need of coming, and, what is worse, their bishops do not want them to come. He advocates fasting, communion; the weary working-folk do not approve of the innovation, and he cannot insist on it. Sometimes, on the other hand, the Anglican laity, who are willing and anxious to go to confession, do not know where to find a confessor. There are hundreds of villages where the clergyman would be entirely nonplussed by a request to hear a confession; and it must be owned that in this matter supply and demand are equally unsatisfactory. The same incongruity exists about everything which High Anglicans call "distinctively Catholic" Dogmata, and consequent practices, which are the life of the Roman Church, become a matter of contention among Anglicans—championed by some, doubted by others, obligatory on no one.

This state of things would open out an endless vista of new difficulties and anarchies, supposing that the cause now *sub judice* at Rome should terminate in the verdict desired by the English Church Union. Indeed, the attitude of the High Anglicans on this question is the strangest ever known. Let the question of the succession be but settled in their favor, and unity and authority are of no consequence. It matters nothing that many of their brethren eagerly disclaim any title to what the first Reformers, with the grace of diction which marked their controversial writings, called "greasy, stinking anti-Christian Orders;" nor that some of their own people (for I conclude that a recent writer in the "Westminster Review" may be classed under this head) declare that the clergy will never be popular so long as they claim supernatural powers. Let the Pope but attribute the succession to Anglicans, and reunion is a certainty, and they will bow down before the successor of St. Peter; but should he decide (on purely historical grounds, for passion and prejudice do not invade the unruffled endless calms of the Vatican) that want of consecration or of intention at the fountain-head cut off the Anglican clergy from the apostolic inheritance, and they will say that, after all, the opinion of the western patriarchs is of no great consequence; that they hail from the East (in some mysterious way of which history does not speak), and can amalgamate with the last again, and be independent. Already the Encyclical has fluttered Anglican episcopal

dove-cotes, showing, as it does, what is already familiar as the alphabet to the Catholic mind, that it avails but little to be a priesthood and an episcopate in schism.

Thus, Anglicanism, with its undoubted graces and virtues, its scholarship, refinement, and identification with the devout zeal and the learning of many choice English souls, yet gives too uncertain a sound to lead a nation to battle against infidelity. Newman called it "a great human institution ;" yet it has nothing approaching to the amount of cohesion possessed by such worldly institutions as a line regiment or a ship-of-war. What would become of these, were their discipline but as that of the English Church ?

It now remains to be asked what is the attitude of London towards that undisputed Catholicism which is recognized as such by friend and foe ; which is full of sap, full of certainties, without half-measures, and the acknowledged antithesis of infidelity. A city set on a hill cannot be hid ; and in spite of every sort of popular inversion of Catholic teaching and practice, it is this religion which, either in love or in hatred, has ever been the cynosure of all eyes.

Of late the hatred has to some extent ebbed away. Our fathers saw a storm of invective and of menace raised against Catholicism in England—a storm so violent that another Gordon Riot, with a government rather behind it than opposing it, was one of the possibilities on the horizon of contemporary history. But it was mostly sound and fury, and signified only that the religion of the Plantagenets had been revived in England, and that the "Protestant Tradition" was protesting, as in duty bound. Ignatius Spencer (Seynt Ignatius, as the coarse old "Punch" of those days, in its many lampoons of the ex-evangelical parson, used to call him) had canvassed Europe for prayers for the conversion of England ; presently the *fine fleur* of Oxford scholarship followed him into the Church by a route different from his own ; and then the Hierarchy was established, received with a wild but impotent howl, and remained, all things to the contrary notwithstanding. Father Spencer died, and no great effort was made for England until after the accession to the Papal throne of Leo XIII., on whom the mantle of St. Gregory has descended. Then arose the Guild of Our Lady of Bransom, to the work of which, in its earlier days¹ I called the sympathizing attention of American Catholics. Since that time it has extended its work in many directions, its principal works as regards London consisting in the organization of lectures on doctrinal and historical subjects, and of open-air processions.

These last have created no small impression in the capital, bring-

¹ 1890.

ing, as they do, the present face to face with the past in the most striking manner. Through the wide gray streets of London, where the tram-car runs and the Sunday cyclist rides, wind religious pageants like to those which flashed of old between the wooden houses and under the Gothic towers of ancient London. Once more a train of vested priests and acolytes bears the crucifix and statues of Our Lady and the saints along the highways of the metropolitan city as in the days when England built up her laws and won her battles under the like symbols ; once more the Pater-noster and the Ave, which gave their names to streets which have them still, rise on the air which blows from the hills of Surrey or the heights of Hempstead. In the hurry and skurry of the nineteenth century, in the midst of the social whirlpool formed by the impact of extreme luxury on horrible, ghastly poverty, are revived the traditions of those more spacious days when the sweater, and the relieving officer, and the gauds of the London season were unknown.

The attitude of nineteenth century *fin de siècle* London towards these new-old sights and sounds is generally respectful and curious, rarely jeering, often necessarily marked by ignorance of the true inwardness of the outward sign—an ignorance, however, which is anxious to be removed.

And here, again, the militant angels of the religious renaissance are to the fore. It has been rightly judged at headquarters that everything now depends on the removal of false impressions ; and a series of free lectures has been organized, not with a view to directly attacking the creeds of others, but with the primary object of explaining Catholic doctrines to the public. These lectures happily attract a motley crowd of listeners, representative of every semitone and quarter-tone in the immense religious gamut of London, from the Anglican clergymen, tentative, but refined and scholarly, down to the prevalent young atheist who fancies himself to be learned because he has been educated by the afflicted rate-payer at a board school. The infidel (a rather rare specimen in London), whose aggressiveness merges on the Parisian ; the gentler Agnostic, who thinks that because creation suffers there cannot be a creator ; the viewy Theosophist ; the genuine old-fashioned honest Protestant, amusingly hampered by crazes about image-worship and bought absolutions ; all these, and many more than these, form the audience of the Catholic revivalists, and a goodly proportion are really in search of a creed authoritative enough and beautiful enough to displace their doubts.

Perhaps the most striking of these lectures, so far as local association goes, are those delivered by lay Catholic gentlemen in Hyde Park. Here, almost on the spot where the martyrs sowed

the seed, a gallant attempt is made, Sunday after Sunday, to carry the harvest. Nor are the workers altogether without reward. Gentleness, courtesy, and a scholarly train of argument win their way. Protestants come from long distances to listen and learn, and to ask *bona fide* questions; and a rash attempt made by an association (unconnected with the Established Church) to clamor down the lecturers, died harmlessly away. Numerous conversions have been traced to both the indoor and the outdoor conferences; and it is probable that the crusade of tract distribution organized by the same promoters, though its results are necessarily to some extent hidden, also bears fruit in that removal of prejudices which, at the very least, leaves the mind as a clear page on which truth may write itself.

The impulse has been given. Men are disheartened with Protestantism because it gives so little; doubtful of Anglicanism because it is doubtful of itself; willing at least to take into consideration the uncompromising and undying claim of the ancient Church. The rest lies, to a great extent, with Catholics themselves, especially with lay Catholics. Their position in this country is one of acute responsibility, and they will have their reward tenfold if they trade aright with their talent, which is the possession of the faith. Even in the minds of their enemies lies a latent consciousness that they are the salt of the earth. They have to bear in mind that not only mortal sin, but venial sins which give scandal, worldly follies or ugly ruggedness on their part, may be an obstacle in the path of Protestants seeking the way home. Leo. XIII., with the wisdom which enables him to penetrate into the needs of the nations which he governs, has not failed to point out, in his letter to the English people, the perils of the hour. And yet, in spite of all obstacles, the old religion is waxing; not only is it leavening literature and reclaiming art, but it is beginning to be even to the people of London a sign and a beacon in the midst of their deep dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. Distinctiveness and authority are what is wanted. Compromise in action may be the essence of worldly policy, but you cannot compromise with facts, and religious truth is not a phantasm, but the most steadfast fact that has been or will be. The "breadth" of such a one as Dean Farrar seems but the breadth of a trackless waste, whereas one wants a path. The eclecticism of such a one as the editor of the "Review of Reviews," who amiably amuses himself with finding the shred of truth in every creed, fails in its intended effect of pleasing the vexed and strenuous seeker after the "It is." The attraction towards a religion which is distinctive and authoritative asserts itself every day more strongly. Men cannot account for it. The Protestant tradition fights against it

still, but by the methods of civilized warfare, as a tradition which has lived to be *fin de siècle* should fight, and no longer with the barbarous weapons of the fifties. High-Anglicanism tries to fling itself into the breach, but is too incohesive even to stop a gap, and is generally looked upon rather as foam and flotsam borne on the inrushing tide.

In the meanwhile, the hour and the men are come. It remains to be seen whether the men will take advantage of the hour, setting forth before the English nation a standard of faith and morals around which the undisciplined army of souls can gladly rally.

AMY M. GRANGE.

Scientific Chronicle.

X-RAYS.

I.—THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

TOWARDS the end of January of the present year vague reports concerning a wonderful discovery in the domain of physics began to come over the ocean. The discoverer was Professor W. C. Roentgen, of the University of Wurzburg. The scientific journals in this country handled the first communications as if they had been hot potatoes. One of them, under date of January 25th, speaks thus :

“There have been received from Europe by cable very insufficient accounts of a discovery attributed to Professor Routgen (*sic*), of Wurzburg University. By the use of a radiant state of matter tube, a Crookes tube, it is stated that he has succeeded in obtaining photographic effects through opaque objects. It has long been known that ether waves of long period would pass through matter opaque to short waves, and that such a screen as is afforded by a plate of blackened rock salt will sift out short waves, while long waves will pass through it. In some unexplained way Professor Routgen, it is claimed, has succeeded in affecting the sensitive plate with waves which had passed through an opaque body. Metals cutting off all waves alike would produce a shadow, so that a metallic object in a box or embedded in the human system could be made to give some kind of an image. The operations are said to have been conducted without a lens, entirely by shadow.

“This is about the substance of the reports. It is yet too soon to indulge in the wild possibilities that have been suggested for the process. When the details reach us the process will probably prove to be of scientific rather than of practical interest.”—*Scientific American*.

The sequel has proved that some parts of the above were true, some erroneous and that the last sentence was wildly wrong.

The next issue (February 1st) of the same journal is equally cautious. “Full reports of Professor Roentgen’s (name spelled correctly now) discovery have not yet reached us, and the accounts so far received do not greatly clarify the atmosphere surrounding his discovery. The effects are said to have been produced by Crookes tubes as the source of light or of ethereal disturbance. The active cause, whatever it is, it is said, was incapable of refraction, at least by an ordinary photographic lens. The discovery is described as having been made by accident. Professor Roentgen was experimenting with a Crookes tube covered with cloth. Some sensitized paper lay near it, and the paper showed next day some streaks of coloration. This appearing mysterious, Professor Roentgen repeated what he had done, and traced the

cause to the tube, and so went on to prove that he could get actinic effects from an active Crookes tube through a screen, generally made of organic matter, and one quite opaque to light, although one account says that the effect can be produced through a plate of aluminum over half an inch thick. Another statement is to the effect that the rays are not undulatory, but move forward in straight lines.

"This statement suggests an analogy between what goes on inside a Crookes tube with the molecules of extremely rarefied air therein and what is supposed to go on in the space between the tube and the sensitized surface. Nine examples of the photographs are said to be in Vienna, sent there from Wurzburg. The Crookes tube, it appears, is placed behind the object to be experimented with, and the photography thus appears as shadow photography, or a species of printing similar to contact printing. It appears probable that the discovery is one of theoretical importance in physics, but probably of no practical value as yet in photography." The same hodge-podge of truths, half-truths and errors; and then follows a wise explanation of what is not understood:

"It is also to be remarked that there may be less of novelty in the experiments than is generally supposed. It is not going too far to say that even the old-time breath images produced by a coin lying on a mirror are recalled to mind by the descriptions received. Then the electric images produced by an electric discharge through a coin and impinging on a photographic plate, Sanford's experiment, have been cited. It has even been suggested that some analogy with Hertz's experiments may exist. He passed radiant energy due to long ether waves through pitch and other bodies quite opaque to short ether waves, such as produce light. There is no novelty in passing ether waves through an opaque organic screen; the difficulty is in getting any actinic effect out of such waves. It is conceivable that their period might be shortened, and this has been suggested as a possible explanation of the achievement."

Oh, yes—doubts, hesitations, caution, "it is thought," "it is suggested," "it is said," "it is possible," "it is conceivable,"—but enough of this, it is time to change the key.

A week later the tone changes completely, all doubts are set aside, a roseate hue steals over the whole scene, and the latest baby of science is brought to light. Since then it has proved to be, without doubt, in many respects, the most wonderful scientific baby of the nineteenth century.

II.—THE ANTECEDENTS.

Before speaking directly of the X-rays, it will be necessary to say something about the discoveries which led up to them. These are: (1) The electric rays, (2) the Geissler rays, (3) the Crookes rays, (4) the Hertz rays and (5) the Lenard rays.

1. *The Electric Rays.*

The starting-point of the whole business is electricity, and for the first glimmering idea of *that* we must peer far back into the twilight

of fable. The first thing that was known in this matter was that amber when rubbed would attract light bodies, such as bits of straw, feathers, etc.

The Greek word for amber is *ἤλεκτρον* (=electron), whence we have the English word "electricity." The electric bug remained in the larva and chrysalis condition for hundreds of years, perhaps for thousands, and it was not until comparatively recent times that it burst from its prison, and came forth in winged beauty to astonish the world. Even then it did not reveal itself all at once, but during these latter years it has made phenomenal progress, and from such humble beginnings as the ability to attract and lift a bit of down, it has come to be the Aladdin of the world, and is every day working more wonders than the wildest inventor of fables ever imagined in his dreamiest hours. Some men, belated newspaper scribblers, still speak of electricity being in its infancy—bah! electricity is a strong young giant rejoicing to run his course, but no baby.

In the course of its evolution, the time at last came when electricity could be produced in large quantities, and then many new phenomena came to light. Among others it was noticed that it was able to break its way across a certain space of air, and that in so doing it would produce a spark of light accompanied by a sharp, crackling sound, mimicking on a small scale the flash of lightning and the sound of thunder. Franklin proved, and we now all believe, that lightning and the electricity which we generate in our laboratories are one and the same thing. We might, therefore, call a streak of lightning "an electric ray," but the appellation would, we think, be hardly acceptable as appropriate. When, however, a body is charged with electricity, there are what are called "lines of electric force" passing outward from it in all directions. They pass through all non-conductors, such as air, glass, ebonite, etc., but are stopped by conductors, such as are all the metals and a number of other substances. These lines of force may with some propriety be called electric rays.

2. *Geissler Rays.*

Some time later on it was discovered that electricity would pass much more readily through rarefied air than through air in ordinary pressures. The same turned out to be true in the case of other gases, but, for our present purpose, it will suffice to stick to the air. This new phenomenon led men to experiment in a systematic way with electricity in air at reduced pressures. A brief summary of the means employed and the results obtained would be about as follows:

Let us take a rather long, say a 2-foot, glass tube, an inch or so in bore, into each end of which a piece of platinum wire has been inserted and tightly sealed. We have said "tube," not because the cylindrical form is necessary, for any other form would answer; indeed, many other forms are used for special effects, but for our special purpose the tube is all that is needed. The wires should project both inwards and outwards a short distance, the outward ends being for connection with the source of electricity, the inward ones for the discharge. The wires,

when connected with the positive and negative ends of an electric machine, are called *electrodes*. "Electrode" means a *way* or *path*, over which electricity is conducted. That one which is connected with the positive end, or pole, is called the positive electrode, or *anode*, which means literally the *way up*; the wire connected with the negative pole of the machine is named the negative electrode, or *kathode*, which means the *way down*. Some spell it *cathode*.

To the side of our tube, and opening into it, it matters not at what point, is attached another tube, short and relatively small. It serves to put the main tube in connection with an air-pump.

All the connections having been properly made, we start up—but hold—we have another preliminary remark to make. It is this: As an electrical machine we cannot here use a dynamo or a battery directly, but must either use a static machine, such, for example, as a Holtz or a Wimshurst, or else a Ruhmkorff, or a Tesla coil, or some equivalent, actuated by a dynamo or battery. The reason of this is that to produce a spark of appreciable length, we need an exceedingly great electric pressure, or voltage as it is usually called, and that is precisely what the static machine gives. Neither the dynamo nor the battery can give directly the voltage required, but the low-pressure current that they do give can be converted into a high-pressure current by means of an appropriate coil. In the units made use of in these measurements, it would take a large battery to give 50; dynamos range from 50 to 3000, but a static machine or a coil will show from 50,000 up to pressures that we have no means of measuring except by guess.

This being known, let us start up our high-pressure current, or at least try to start it up. The probabilities are that it will obstinately refuse to budge, for it would take an enormous coil to give a spark of two feet in the air, and the current must either go the whole distance at a bound or fail entirely. There is an analogy between this and case of steam. While the pressure is rising the strain on the boiler is increasing, and when that has reached the limit of the boiler's strength, a sudden rupture takes place. In the case in hand the air between the electrodes resists, and unless the pressure of the electricity be great enough to overcome that resistance, no breaking through the air can take place. There are but few coils made that will give a spark of twenty-four inches in the air, the ones in ordinary use giving from one-eighth of an inch up to eight or ten inches.

Since we can get no further ahead in this way, it is therefore time to set our air-pumps a-going. As the air in the tube becomes rarefied, its resistance is gradually reduced so that at a given moment the pressure at the electrodes can overcome it, and the current will pass. The sparks, however, will not have the brilliancy or the snap of a two-foot spark in the air under normal pressure. So it is with some men who are most brilliant when encountering and overcoming opposition.

Let us keep our air-pumps working so that the air in the tube may become continually less and less dense. The principal phenomena observable in the tube will then occur in the following order: First the

sparkling will cease, and an occasional noiseless flash will take its place. A little later there will appear a faint, thin streak of reddish-purple light reaching from electrode to electrode. The air in the tube is illuminated along the path of the discharge. The color of the streak will not, however, be quite even throughout, but the end nearest the positive electrode (anode) will incline to rather more of redness, while that nearest the kathode will take on a hue of very decided blue. The streak of light next widens out so as to fill the whole tube, but in so doing it divides itself up into strata lying at right angles to the axis of the tube, the strata being separated from each other by narrow spaces of total darkness. Tubes that have been exhausted to this extent are called Geissler tubes, from the name of a celebrated manufacturer. He made them of all kinds of glass, of all sorts of queer forms, and of various sizes. We may call the rays in these tubes Geissler rays.

3. *Crookes Rays.*

As the exhaustion of the air goes on, a dark space forms just next to the kathode; it widens out, and, seeming to drive before it the strata of light in the tube, gradually stretches along till the purple light is entirely driven from the field, except a little which remains on the anode, not purple now, but only of a whitish glow. In the meantime another phenomenon has been manifesting itself. According as the purple light recedes towards the anode, a phosphorescent glow has been gradually creeping along the interior walls of the tube, following the dark space from the kathode towards the anode, and finally reaching to the very end. The color of this glow depends on the nature of the glass. For English glass it is of a delicate blue, for uranium or canary glass it is a dark green, but the finest and most brilliant color is that given by soft German glass, a beautiful bright green. The light is all on the inner walls of the tube, and not in the free space inclosed by it, where darkness reigns supreme.

To get this phenomenon at its best the air-pressure in the tube must be reduced to something between the one one-millionth and the one twenty-millionth of an atmosphere. Arrived at this condition the tube is called a Crookes tube, from the celebrated English chemist who, following out a suggestion made by Faraday, worked out by means of such tubes the whole theory of what he calls "Radiant Matter."

Something evidently passes from the kathode to the walls of the tube. It may be the minute residue of air which is left in the tube, and which being shot off with violence from the kathode, strikes the glass and makes it glow with that gorgeous phosphorescent light, and then returns slowly to the kathode by a circuitous route, to be projected again and again. This is what Crookes himself and some other eminent scientists hold. On the other hand, it may be nothing but vibrations that are transmitted by the ether, as some other scientists believe. Be that as it may, Crookes proved that the effect travels in practically straight lines, and perpendicularly from the surface of the kathode, no

matter in what position the anode may be placed. If, therefore, the kathode be made to end in the form of a flat disk, directly facing the further end of the tube, nearly all the effect will be concentrated at that end. The phosphorescence there will be all the brighter, and but little will be wasted on the lateral walls of the tube. To keep the anode out of the way, it may be inserted anywhere along the side. The effects observed in these tubes may be said to be due to the Crookes rays. More extensive matter on this subject may be found in the numbers of this REVIEW for April and July, 1892.

4. *Hertz Rays.*

The next step towards the X-rays is Hertz's experiment. In a Crookes tube he placed a piece of gold leaf in the path between the kathode and the further end of the tube, and found that the effect passed on almost as if the gold leaf were absent. This looked like getting the Crookes rays through an opaque substance, a thing which Crookes did not claim to be able to do, and which he seems almost to have proved long before to be impossible. Hertz was a man of wonderful genius, and his experimental proof that electricity is a wave motion, of the same kind as light, will stand as his lasting monument. He did not live to pursue the subject we are now dealing with any further, but his mantle fell on good shoulders.

5. *Lenard Rays.*

The next step forward was taken by Lenard, who took up the work where it had been left by Hertz. He reasoned that if the Crookes rays, or Radiant Matter, passed through gold leaf they might be made to pass out into the open air, and there yield up some new secret. To test this he constructed a Crookes tube, modified by having the end opposite the kathode formed of a plate of metal. The gold leaf would not, of course, support the inward pressure of the air when the tube would be exhausted. Lenard chose aluminum, as having the greatest strength in proportion to its density, and made it only just thick enough to stand the pressure. He found that something did get through the plate, or "window," as he called it. The proof of this was that a phosphorescent substance would glow when placed in front of that window, though no visible light was allowed to fall upon it, and that even a photographic plate was affected by that something just as by common daylight. The distance at which the effect could be produced was quite small, at most not over two inches. Lenard found that these rays of his would pass through the human hand, and cast a shadow of the bones. There is indeed, a dispute as to whether Lenard was really the first to make this discovery, some attributing the whole thing to Hittorff. We have not at hand the evidence that would be necessary to settle this dispute, but that matters little here. We shall, until further development of this question of priority, continue to call them Lenard rays. They are certainly not the Crookes rays; neither, as we shall see presently, are they the same as the X-rays.

III.—THE ACCOMPLISHMENT.

We have at last reached the X-rays proper, and it now remains for us to say a few words on (1) their Production, (2) their Properties, (3) their Nature, and (4) their Uses.

1. *Production of the X-Rays.*

The step from the Lenard rays to the Roentgen, or X-rays, was a short one, so short indeed that many thought, at least for a time, that Roentgen had discovered nothing new, but that he had simply found a new application for an old thing. Nothing could be further from the truth. Roentgen did not discover the Crookes rays, neither did he claim them. He did not discover the Lenard rays, neither did he claim them. He did indeed make use of Crookes tubes and Lenard tubes. He did make use of the knowledge he had gained of what others had done before him, not to appropriate it as his own, but merely to serve as a stepping stone to what they had not reached.

Let us see now how these X-rays are produced. They had been produced over and over again in the very experiments we have already described, but no one had noticed them; so we must begin over again. Take a Crookes tube, one in which the kathode ends in a disk, and in which consequently the opposite end of the tube is strongly luminous. Next take a sensitized photographic plate, which has previously been wrapped in several folds of black paper, such as photographers use for protecting their plates against the light. Neither sunlight nor electric light, even at short range, can penetrate such a covering. Take this plate, so protected, and place it in front of the phosphorescing end of the Crookes tube. The silver salt will be reduced just as if it had been exposed to the open daylight, though less rapidly. The action has gone on, or the rays, if rays they be, have passed onward, through the opaque paper.

Again, take a phosphorescent surface, say a piece of stiff cardboard, covered on one side with any phosphorescent compound. Potassium or Barium Platino-Cyanide, and Calcium Tungstate, are among the best yet tried. Cover the reverse of your cardboard with black paper. Now hold this screen in front of the Crookes tube in action, the protected side towards the tube. The side which is turned away from the tube will now be found to be illuminated. Here again we find the rays passing through the opaque paper, but revealing their existence this time by being converted into light visible to the eye. The black paper cuts off all visible light, but lets through something which is converted into light by the chemical substance beyond. This thing which passes, whatever it may be, is called X-rays. In algebra, X is the sign of an unknown quantity, and as Roentgen did not pretend to know what it was that he had discovered, he proposed the name X-rays. Roentgen-rays would be a better term.

But it has been objected that the Lenard rays will produce these same effects. Yes—but that does not prove identity. Gas will pass through a brick, so will water, but they are not alike. To be identical, two in-

dividual things must be alike in *all* their properties, while non-identity exists if they differ in a single one. Luckily, it is a question of non-identity which we have to prove, and the proofs will become manifest, little by little, as we go on.

2. Properties of the X-Rays.

The literature of the X-rays is growing to be something enormous. Some scientific journals hardly ever let a week pass without one or two articles on the subject. It may be divided into three kinds, the good, the bad and the stick-in-the-porridge varieties. The future historian from New Zealand, or from Samoa, will not lack materials, but he may find it a pretty tough job to classify them. If the above paragraph is deemed unnecessary or out of place, please skip it, and pass on to the properties of the X-rays, as follows:

(a) The X-rays are capable of passing through, not merely black paper, but, under proper conditions, through all the substances that have been tried up to date; and the number tried is legion. It has hence been concluded that the same is true of all matter. We think there is room for a doubt in this affair. Will the X-rays pass through even a phosphorescent substance? It is not easy to decide.

Suppose we have our X-rays produced, as described above, and that our screen is in position. Now, will the rays that have induced phosphorescence in this screen be extinguished in so doing, or will they still journey on, and act in the same way on another screen further on? We might answer on general principles that, when energy has been used up, it is just used up, and can go no further in its original form. As far as our own experiments go, they seem to show that the rays go no further than the first screen, and, consequently, that substances which phosphoresce under the action of the X-rays are themselves opaque to those rays. This view is, moreover, supported by the fact, which we have experienced, that, if the coating on the screen be too thick, the rays will not penetrate and illuminate it all through.

On the other hand, it is quite possible that this is merely a question of degree, and that, with greater electric pressure from the coil, and therefore greater penetrative power in the rays, these might not lose all their energy in the first screen, but might, in part at least, pass through and on, and be revealed by their action on a second screen, or on a photographic plate, beyond. Further experiments on this point are wanted.

With the possible exception, then, of phosphorescent substances themselves, the X-rays pass through all known substances. The degrees of transparency, however, vary between very wide limits. Organic substances in general, as plants, and the flesh, hair, nails and horns of animals, are nearly as transparent to X-rays as glass is to the common light. There are differences, it is true, between them, but the differences are not great. The inorganic parts of an animal, the bones, are very much less transparent. When, therefore, the hand is placed between the Crookes tube and the phosphorescing screen, the X-rays

will pass through the flesh and tendons, and will illuminate that part of the screen covered only by those. They will be stopped, more or less completely, by the bones, and these will consequently cast a shadow, more or less dense, on the screen.

Of all substances, those which are most opaque to these rays are the common metals, as platinum, gold, lead, silver, copper, iron, zinc, etc. The opacity seems to increase in a general way with the density, but by no means in exact proportion thereto. Thus, if a unit thickness of platinum, whose density is 21.5, casts a shadow of a certain intensity, then to cast an equal shadow, you must have of lead, whose density is 11.3, a thickness of 3; of zinc, whose density is 7.1, a thickness of 6, and of aluminum, whose density is 2.6, a thickness of 200. These are about the only substances whose opacity has as yet been determined with any attempt at exactness.

The compounds of the metals share in the opacity of their constituents. Thus, a block of wood, an inch or two in thickness, will cast a barely perceptible shadow, but if painted with white lead, the shadow will be quite dark. Glass (containing lead), an inorganic compound, perfectly transparent to light, is much more opaque than aluminum to the X-rays, while India-rubber, opaque to light, is perfectly transparent to the X-rays. They even pass through the black compound of rubber and sulphur, known as hard rubber, or ebonite, as water does through a sieve. Paper is very transparent; we have seen a metal key through 2000 pages of printed books, leather bindings and all.

But just as, in the strict sense of the word, there is no substance *absolutely* opaque to light, and no substance absolutely transparent, so it is with the X-rays. Light will pass through the densest and most opaque metals, as platinum, gold, silver, etc., if the layers be sufficiently thin, but it will fail to get through the clearest glass or water, if the layer be sufficiently thick. Although the thickness or thinness of the substances employed has a similar effect on the X-rays, still there is an important difference between the two cases. No light from any source that we know of would traverse a plate of iron, or gold, or lead, one-sixteenth of an inch thick, even if the plate were exposed to the light for a century. With the X-rays it is different. Here the time-factor enters; for a plate of metal thick enough to stop the X-rays at first will fail to do so if the action be continued for a sufficient length of time.

(*b*) The Crookes rays originate at the kathode, and leave it in lines perpendicular to its surface, but do not pass through the walls of the tube. Crookes proved both these points to his own satisfaction, and there is no doubt that they are substantially correct. The Lenard rays do pass out of the tube, and, as far as they can be traced, travel in straight lines from the kathode. The X-rays certainly do not, as such, start from the kathode, but are generated at that part of the interior surface of the tube where the Crookes rays strike and produce phosphorescence. From that surface they dart out in straight lines in all directions. This alone is enough to show that the X-rays are different both from the Crookes rays and from the Lenard rays.

(c) When a magnet is presented to the Crookes rays, they no longer travel in straight lines, but are deflected into a path more or less strongly curved, and finally reach the walls of the tube at a different spot from where they previously impinged. The bending will be either towards or away from the magnet, according to the pole which is presented. The Lenard rays are deflected in like manner. In the case of the X-rays no such a phenomenon takes place. This fact clearly proves again the non-identity of the Lenard with the X-rays.

3. *Nature of the X-rays.*

When these rays first came to light, it was predicted that our whole beautiful theory of the wave motion of light would fall to the ground. We are quite content to let that prediction stand for what it is worth. The wave theory stands on a pretty broad and solid foundation, and it is not going to be easily shaken. We do not yet know enough about the nature of the X-rays to be able to predict anything whatsoever about what they may or may not do in the field of theories.

What is really *known* as to the nature of the X-rays might perhaps be conveniently expressed in round numbers by a row of zeros. Still, zeros make but poor feeding for either body or mind, and hence desperate efforts are being made to find out what the X-rays really are. The discovery was first published on January 4, 1896, at the semi-centennial anniversary of the Berlin Physical Society, and during the nine months that have elapsed since that date, probably nearly all the physicists, professional and amateur, of the world, who could command an induction coil, a battery or dynamo, and a Crookes tube, have tried their luck at manufacturing these rays.

The object in view, first in time, but not first in importance, was, of course, to satisfy a very justifiable curiosity by the sight of something said to be really new and really wonderful, as well as to exhibit the same to admiring friends. The next object was to try to discover the most reliable methods of getting the best results, and to see if the X rays would yield any useful practical results. For these purposes all sorts of experiments have been tried with all sorts of currents, and all sorts of coils, and all sorts of Crookes tubes, and all sorts of screens, and, where permanent records were desired, with all sorts of plates, films and processes. In spite of all this we have not yet found the best methods, but we have made immense progress in the utilization of the rays. This will be seen later on.

A third, and in itself a higher object from a scientific point of view, was brought to the front by those who were best fitted to dive into the mystery, the professors of science. The question they naturally proposed to themselves was: "What are these X-rays?" In other words: "What is their nature?" An answer to this question has not yet been forthcoming, but a good deal of progress has been made in the way of finding out what they are not.

Since they give rise to visible light, perhaps they are themselves of the nature of light. Heat is not formally light, but all agree that it is of

the same nature, viz., a wave motion. This doctrine of light, viz., that it is a wave motion of the ether, has been held by all physicists ever since the days of Young and Huygens. The rapid, transverse vibrations of this subtle, elastic medium, which fills all space and pervades all matters, are light and heat, and probably electricity also. The vibrations are transverse, *i.e.*, perpendicular to the direction of the waves, or what amounts to the same, perpendicular to the rays. In sound, which is also a wave motion, the vibrations of the medium, be it solid, liquid, or gaseous, are longitudinal, *i.e.*, in the direction of the rays.

Taking these things for granted, it is asked again: "Are the X-rays of the same nature as rays of light?" The evidences so far brought to bear seem at first sight to be decidedly for the negative.

(a) Rays of light on entering the eye pass through the lens and humors, and falling on the retina produce a sensation which we designate by the same name, light. The X-rays have no such effect; in other words, the retina is not sensitive to such rays. You may place your eye as near as possible in contact with a blackened tube, and you will see nothing. If the retina were coated with a phosphorescent substance, then we would probably be aware of the X-rays without the intervention of a prepared screen. That would not mean that we could see into or through what is now opaque, unless the X-rays were coming from beyond, and even then the result would be at most a mere shadow for X-opaque bodies, and but an illuminated surface for the others. Possibly this might not hinder us from seeing bodies just as we do now, when no X-rays were to the fore. Anyhow, what we have said under this head is in favor of a negative answer to the main question.

(b) When light falls upon a well-polished, smooth surface, as a mirror, it rebounds, as it were, from the surface, according to laws that are perfectly well defined and perfectly well demonstrated. This is called the phenomenon of "regular reflection." It can be explained by the wave theory, but equally well by the old emission theory to which Newton clung. This theory is, that light consists of particles which are shot off from all luminous bodies, and travel straight to the spot where the light is perceived.

Such experiments as have been made seem to prove that if regular reflection exists in the case of the X-rays, it is only to an infinitesimal degree. Still, the proof is not quite conclusive, for it may simply mean that we have not as yet found a surface smooth enough and fine enough to reflect such rays according to the laws of regular reflection. The laws of reflection for waves and for material particles, or even for massive bodies, are the same. Let us, therefore, make a homely comparison. Suppose we have a wall, on the surface of which we have fastened narrow strips in such a way as to leave interstices of, say, an inch square between them. That surface, taken as a whole, would be called terribly rough. Yet a rubber sphere of a foot in diameter, or any number of them, would rebound from that surface practically according to the laws of regular reflection every time, while a ball one-quarter of an inch in diameter would seldom do so. Out of a shower of such balls a few

would be reflected regularly, the rest would strike the edges or bottoms of the holes and be scattered in all directions.

We would have in this what is called "diffusion."

Now if you take a surface that we call by courtesy "*perfectly smooth and polished*," for example, a silver mirror, nearly all the light which falls upon it will be reflected "regularly." But just rub a bit of that surface with your finger, or breathe on it, and the consequence will be that from the surface so roughened you will get a great deal of diffused light, and very little regularly reflected. What would be perfectly smooth for a foot-ball, or even a marble, is very rough for the waves of light. Now it so happens that with X-rays you do get very little regular reflection and a good deal of diffusion from the smoothest surfaces that we have as yet been able to obtain. Perhaps even the very texture of matter, as we know it, is too coarse for regular X-ray reflection. We do not know, and therefore we cannot say, and the only conclusion possible now is, that on this account we cannot conclude either that the X-rays are, or that they are not, of the nature of light.

(c) When a ray of sunlight is made to fall upon the face of a prism of rock salt, it is deviated from its original direction more or less according to the angle of the prism. This phenomenon, which is called *refraction*, is accounted for quite satisfactorily by the theory that light (objectively considered) is a wave motion of the ether. If light travels less rapidly in rock salt than in the air, and we know from direct experiment that it does so, and if, at the same time, it be a wave motion, then it can be proved that it must be deviated from its course in a certain definite direction, when it passes obliquely from the air to the salt, or *vice versa*. If light be not a wave motion, then we know of no hypothesis that will account for refraction.

Attempts to obtain refraction with the X-rays are not quite concordant. Roentgen himself says: "With prisms of ebonite and aluminum I have obtained images on the photographic plate which point to a possible deviation. It is uncertain, however, and at most would point to a refractive index of 1.05." This is very small, the deviation produced in the case of light by some substances being fifty times that much, and besides, even that is "uncertain." Moreover, when the screen was used, no deviation at all was perceived. Others have failed to obtain any evidences of refraction, even with prisms. Therefore, it is concluded that the X-rays are not of the nature of light. Still, once again, it may be just possible that some substance will be found which may be able to refract the X-rays.

(d) Another phenomenon of light is known by the name of "*dispersion*." When, as we have described under the previous heading, a ray of sunlight has been made to pass through a transparent prism of rock salt, we have not only refraction, but a separation of the white light into different colors. On a screen placed across its path the ray widens out into a band of colors, the band lying at right angles to the axis of the prism. The colors will be found arranged in the following order: Red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet. All the colors

of which the white light was composed have been refracted, turned aside from the original direction of the compound ray, the red the least, and the others in order up to the violet, which has been the most refracted of all. This band of colors is called the *spectrum*, and as these colors can all be seen, it is called more exactly the *visible spectrum*.

But there is also an invisible spectrum, or rather there are two of them, the one reaching out from the red end, the other from the violet end of the visible portion. There are, therefore, rays less refrangible than the red ones, and hence they are known as *infra-red* rays; and there are rays more refrangible than the violet ones, and hence they are called *ultra-violet* rays. The space occupied on the screen by the *infra* and *ultra* rays is considerably longer than that occupied by the visible ones. The *infra-red* rays contain a large portion of the heat energy of the original white rays; the *ultra-violet* ones are remarkable for the strong actinic, or chemical, effect which they exert on the silver salts used in photography.

According to the modern wave theory of light the slowest rate of vibration, in the visible spectrum, is that of the red rays. It is at the rate of about 400 million million times in a second. The most rapid rate of vibration is that of the violet rays. It is about 800 million million times in a second. Now it is a fact long known and well attested that rapid vibrations will make their way through substances in which slower ones are arrested, and *vice versa*. Good examples of this are the following: A piece of alum, or even a strong solution of alum in water, will allow nearly all the luminous rays to pass, but it is almost totally impervious to the slower vibrations that constitute heat. On the other hand, a solution of iodine in carbon-disulphide will allow heat rays to pass, but will stop completely the more rapid vibrations of light. The same is true of ebonite.

Such being the case, it has been suggested that the X-rays may be of the nature of the *infra-red* rays, and the fact last mentioned, concerning ebonite, afforded some appearance of probability to the idea. But when it was learned that the X-rays will not pass through the solution of iodine, the probability vanished.

Well, then, are the X-rays similar at least to the *ultra-violet* rays? A point in favor of this hypothesis is that the invisible *ultra-violet* rays may be rendered visible by causing them to fall on a phosphorescent substance. In the same way invisible X-rays become visible by the same process. Yet Roentgen himself offers several reasons against this view, among others the ones drawn from the phenomena of reflection and refraction, which we have already touched on, as well as those drawn from the phenomenon of polarization.

(e) Polarization of light is a rather abstruse and difficult subject, and to attempt to explain it here would require altogether too much space. Suffice it to say that in order to have polarization we must have either reflection or refraction, and as we have neither of these in appreciable quantities with the X-rays, it follows that we cannot have polarization. Yet here again it seems possible, and to some minds it is even probable,

that the X-rays may be found to be of the nature of ultra-violet rays, but with a rate of vibration enormously greater than the poor little 800 million million times a second, as attributed to the violet rays.

(f) Not content with the outcome of all these considerations, Roentgen timidly suggests that the X-rays may possibly be the result of longitudinal, instead of transverse, vibrations. This would put the phenomenon in the category of sound, and would dispose neatly of the difficulty about polarization, for there can be no polarization of longitudinal vibrations. The objections, however, concerning reflection and refraction would remain just where they were before. Adding to one end by cutting off from the other does not help matters much.

All these things summed up bear strongly against the hypothesis that the X-rays are included anywhere within the visible or invisible spectrum, as known to us, but leave it an open question as to whether they may not be vibrations of a too, too, altogether ultra-ultra-visible type.

Q.—What are the X-rays?

A.—We do not know.

Q.—When shall we know?

A.—Probably not till long after the present generation of men is quietly resting under the sod.

Q.—What good are they, anyhow?

A.—We are just going to tell you.

4. *Uses of the X-rays.*

A good saying is worth repeating even if it is "not so original but that it might have been heard before." When the gentle and patient Faraday was once showing a new experiment to a visitor, he was asked that old question which ignorance is always asking of science: "What is the good of it?" Faraday answered: "What is the good of a baby?" The answer to Faraday's answer is: "Time alone can tell." The X-rays are a baby yet, and time alone can tell all the good there may be in them. Still, for a baby they have made a wonderful showing.

The principal use to which the X-rays have as yet been put, and to which they are being more and more applied every day, is to aid the surgeon in his diagnoses, and to a lesser extent, even the physician. Since the denser a substance is, the more opaque it is, as a general rule, to these rays, it follows that a bullet or other metallic object embedded in the flesh or even in the bones, and out of the reach of the probe, will cast a denser shadow than its surroundings, and consequently that its position can be accurately determined. The value of this to the surgeon is self-evident. A bullet could not now be concealed successfully in any part of the human body. Quite a number of cases have already occurred in which much suffering has been averted, and even lives saved, by this means. Knowing just where a foreign body is lodged, the surgeon knows just how to go about getting it out with the least danger. Had the X-rays been known in his day, General Garfield would not have died from the effects of the assassin's bullet. It entered the breast, struck a rib, was deflected from its first course and, glancing around, lodged against the

spinal column. It would have taken a few minutes for an X-surgeon to find its position, a few more to extract it, and death would have been robbed of its victim. Besides, in case of an injury to a joint, it is now possible to determine whether there has been a fracture, or merely a dislocation, without first using the knife, and this is often of vital importance. Malformation of the bones and calcareous formations can be easily detected, and perhaps even appendicitis may yet fall in line.

More than this, the principal organs of the body, such as the liver, lungs and kidneys, can be more or less distinctly discerned, while the beating of the heart itself has been witnessed, and certain diseased conditions of these organs can be traced.

Of course, all this is as yet far from being perfect; but imperfect as it is, it is even now something grand, and there can hardly be a doubt that in time more perfect results will be attained all along the line. Instruments will be perfected and simplified, and the best methods for obtaining this or that or the other diagnosis are already being worked out.

Outfits of X-ray apparatus are being introduced into hospitals, and are destined to form a part of the baggage of armies on the march for war. We need them, and so, God speed them, for the millenium is not on us yet.

But is there no danger in the application of the X-rays? None has yet manifested itself. It has, indeed, several times been stated that their long application to the head has caused the hair to fall off, but, as far as we have been able to ascertain, there seems to be one essential element lacking in these statements; that element is truth. It has also been stated that some persons have been rendered dizzy by too much X-rays. Investigation here, it is said, developed the fact that it was not simple X-rays that did the damage, but rather XX.

Possibly, even probably, other uses may be found later on for these mysterious rays; but should their whole sphere of usefulness remain confined to surgery and medicine, they will have deserved the everlasting gratitude of the whole human race, present and to come.

T. J. A. FREEMAN, S.J.

Book Notices.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE AT THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By *Johannes Janssen*. Translated from the German by M. A. Mitchell and A. M. Christie. Volumes I.-II. Price of both volumes, \$6.25. St. Louis: B. Herder.

In our last number we expressed our joy at the prospect of Janssen's epoch-making work becoming at length accessible to the English-speaking world, and promised an extended notice when we should have leisure to peruse the translation. The more important the work the more important it is that the translation should be, in every respect, a perfect reproduction of the original. It would not be fair to our readers if we gave them the impression that we are content with the production of the combined talents of Mitchell and Christie. We beg their pardon for speaking of them thus abruptly, as we have no further knowledge of their personality. We are, however, painfully aware that, in undertaking to translate Janssen, they undertook a task far beyond their abilities. To do this work satisfactorily would be the province of one who, with a thorough acquaintance of German and English, could combine a far vaster mastery of historical and theological science than our translators can lay claim to. Were the history of merely ordinary worth, an ordinary artist might suffice, but we must insist that Janssen be given to the English public in a dress fitting his dignity and merits. It may be possible, with considerable trouble, to render these two volumes less objectionable in a second edition. Being merely introductory, they are not of so engrossing interest as the main body of the history which is to follow. But, at whatever cost, let the rest of the translation be submitted to a rigid revision in competent hands before publication. We cannot afford to permit so accurate a writer as Janssen to be made to say foolish or absurdly inaccurate things.

Take, as the first instance that occurs to us, the following sentence:

"With a view to weakening the empire, Louis of Bavaria, by his French policy, for years encouraged the dissensions between the emperor and the papacy, and prevented a reconciliation of the emperor with the Church."¹

Here there are as many absurdities as words. Why should Louis of Bavaria, the bitter assertor of German independence of the papacy, wish to weaken his own empire? Why should he have taken such extraordinary trouble to prevent a reconciliation between *himself* and the Church? What was the nature of his "French policy?" Surely, whoever makes Janssen talk so wildly is ignorant both of German and of history. Now turn to the original, and see how the author really wrote:

"Zur Schwächung des Reiches schürte die französische Politik unter Ludwig dem Bayer lange Jahre hindurch die Streitigkeiten zwischen dem Kaiser—und dem Papstthum und verhinderte die Aussöhnung des Kaisers mit der Kirche."

¹ Vol. ii, p. 189.

Quite different ! It was not Louis's French policy, but the policy of the French court, which took advantage of the dissensions between the emperor and the pope to effect a weakening of the imperial power.

This is by no means an isolated instance of the incapacity of our translators ; on nearly every page we have been compelled to turn to the original in order to find out what the author meant to say. For instance, we were startled to read on page 141, note 1, that "an item in the Soester Gerichtsordnung required that the judges 'should sit on the bench like a *raging wolf* !'" The original has it that the judge should "sitzen auf dem richterstole als ein grissgrimmender löwe." There is all the difference in the world between a "grim lion" and a "raging wolf." Our advice to the excellent firm of Herder, therefore, must be, to exercise a severe censorship over his translators, "als ein grissgrimmender löwe." Our national reputation and the interests of scientific research both demand this severity.

Nevertheless, even in an inferior translation Janssen's transcendent merits shine forth conspicuous ; and we repeat our expressions of thankfulness that we are in a measurable distance of possessing this immortal work in English.

The keynote of Janssen's character as an historian was absolute self-restraint. He may have had strong feelings, no doubt he had, but he sedulously repressed them, and remains throughout his work as cold as the facts he accumulates with such overwhelming abundance. He very seldom takes the trouble to draw general conclusions, leaving the reader to draw his own consequences. For this reason, we opine, he will never become "popular" with that large class of readers who are too inert to do their own thinking, and who prefer to let a favorite author supply them not only with the materials for forming a judgment, but with the full-fledged judgment itself. Readers of this ilk must seek elsewhere ; Janssen demands in his reader some share of that indefatigable industry which characterized his own laborious life ; and we agree with him that anyone who shirks the labor of studying all the multifarious details which go to make up the historical judgment, has absolutely no right to pronounce upon the evidence.

It is a strange phenomenon, that although history has been at all times the most fascinating of studies for the human race, yet the true historical instinct, the faculty of historical criticism, has been the latest of human faculties to develop. Great as has been the progress of the race in other departments during the present age, the progress in the art of historical investigation has been the most stupenduous. The histories of other days seem to us now extremely puerile. Compare the Livy of our boyhood with Mommsen. Compare any of the old historians of the Reformation with Janssen. The difference is as great as that between a child's narrative and the narrative of a full-grown man. The child relates only the most salient of external facts, and gives ample play to his imagination ; the adult regards the outward phenomena chiefly as the key to the internal springs of action. The child rattles off one fact after another with little concern as to their correlation ; the full-grown man is most solicitous to discover the concatenation of events. With the older historians' but scant notice was paid to any thing except brilliant "*faits accomplis*." Sieges, battles, victories, defeats, follow each other in rapid succession, and make the narrative as intensely interesting as the most skilful romance. It was magnificent, no doubt, but it was not history, as we now understand history. The task imposed upon the historian of the present age is truly

formidable. He is expected to exhume from hundreds of lurking-places every scrap of parchment that can throw light upon the past. He must fortify every assertion with the best available evidence. He must study, not so much the public march of events, as the hidden life of the people in all its different phases. This mode of investigation is totally fatal to enthusiasm; and, in fact, a modern history is one of the driest of books. The glamor of romance and poetry has given way to a cold matter-of-fact narrative, often as uninteresting to the general reader as the researches of an antiquarian among the tombs. But the outcome of modern research is *truth*, which is infinitely superior to fiction, however attractive fiction may be to the imagination.

When we consider the nature of Janssen's undertaking, the inveterate prejudices which had to be overcome, and the general disinclination of the public to indulge in heavy literature, it is surprising and gratifying to note that during the lifetime of the author no less than *thirteen* editions of his "History" were called for. The first impulse to write came to Janssen in the early fifties, and his life-work engrossed his thoughts until death, on Christmas Eve, 1891, wrenched his pen from his enfeebled fingers. The extent of his researches into every phase of the life of the sixteenth century was astounding. It would be difficult for the specialist of any art or science to point out one neglected detail in his magnificent panorama. We shall content ourselves with giving the bare titles of his divisions: I. Popular Education and Science. II. Art and Popular Literature. III. Political Economy. IV. The Holy Roman Empire and its Position. Under each of these main divisions he groups carefully and methodically all the information which could be gathered, whether from books or manuscripts, concerning the life, thoughts and customs of the German people at the close of the Middle Ages. If his judgments are more favorable to the forefathers of the modern Germans than those so often and so lightly enunciated by Protestant writers, the fault lies, not with him, but with those who have, in parrot-like fashion, repeated traditional calumnies.

Those who have undertaken to write "Anti-Janssen" literature have engaged in a desperate work; for they have been compelled to combat, not Janssen, but the unassailable *facts* marshalled by Janssen with uncommon skill and industry. The prize offered by the Prussian government for the successful overthrow of the great Catholic historian is yet, and will ever remain, unearned.

Among the papers of the lamented author, his devoted pupil and continuator, Paster, found the following touching words, with which we shall conclude our remarks:

"I am conscious of having never fostered sectarian feelings. That I shall have, in the future as in the past, to encounter many attacks, I entertain no doubt. Where my opponents shall advance anything of value, I shall thankfully receive their animadversions; in other cases I will endeavor to maintain repose of soul. *Magna est veritas, et praevalabit.* Mighty is the truth, and will prevail."

A HISTORY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND. Written in 1824-1827, by *William Cobbett*. A New Edition, Revised, with Notes and Preface, by Francis Aidan Gasquet, D.D., O.S.B. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. Price, \$1.25, net.

English Protestantism has not yet recovered from the effects of the stunning blows so unexpectedly delivered seventy years ago by one who had been reared from infancy in that intense hatred of "popery" which

is characteristic of Englishmen, but who had the honesty, when he discovered how iniquitously Protestant tradition had travestied the facts of the so-called "Reformation," to defend the truth and scourge hypocrisy with a vigor too strong for the refined instincts of his recent Catholic editor. Cobbett was, by nature, an enemy to all cant; and since the England of his day was saturated with cant, he had ample matter for the exercise of a pen which was wielded with greater nerve than that of any English writer except, possibly, Dean Swift's. It is not inconceivable that the "saeva indignatio" of the Dean of St. Patrick's might have anticipated Cobbett's *History of the Reformation* by a century, if Lingard's History had been written a hundred years sooner; for one of Father Gasquet's merits in this edition has been to lay emphasis upon the extent of Cobbett's indebtedness to Lingard; and surely, Cobbett could not have obtained his historical facts from a more trustworthy source than that great English priest, whose sterling work has now stood the test of the better part of a century. Although Father Gasquet has, in his notes, carried his anxiety for absolute accuracy to the point of scrupulosity, yet the learned Benedictine confesses his surprise "to find how few were the instances in which some satisfactory authority could not be found to bear out the picture presented in Cobbett's pages." Coming from a scientific and cautious writer like Gasquet, this must be deemed high praise for a work composed by one who did not pose as a professional historian, but was rather a political pamphleteer.

The chief value of Cobbett's little work, in Gasquet's eyes, "would seem, however, to lie, not in the actual accuracy of this or that fact, but in the general impression made upon the mind of the reader. The author's vigorous and graphic style presents a real picture of the results, so far as the people of England as a whole are concerned, of the revolution, social as well as religious, which is known as the Protestant Reformation. The genius of Cobbett instinctively realized that the religious changes in England in the sixteenth century, if not actually promoted by those in power for their own purposes, had certainly resulted in benefiting the rich to the detriment of their poorer brethren. In fact, wholly apart from the religious side of the question, or from any advantages which may be thought to have been secured by the triumph of Protestantism, the price paid for the change by the lower classes must, in fairness, be estimated as very considerable. Viewed merely in its social aspect, the English Reformation was, in reality, the rising of the rich against the poor."

It may be said, in passing, that this calm, judicial manner of writing, à la Gasquet or Lingard, looks rather incongruous on the burning page of Cobbett, who, with the zeal of a man that feels himself to have been throughout life duped and cheated by the interested hypocrisy of "parsons," states his thesis in the following words:

"Now, my friends, a fair and honest inquiry will teach us that this was an alteration greatly for the worse; that the 'Reformation,' as it is called, was engendered in lust, brought forth in hypocrisy and perfidy, and cherished and fed by plunder, devastation and by rivers of innocent English and Irish blood; and as to its more remote consequences, they are, some of them, now before us, in that misery, that nakedness, that hunger, that everlasting wrangling and spite, which now stare us in the face, and stun our ears at every turn, and which the 'Reformation' has given us in exchange for the ease, and happiness, and harmony, and Christian charity enjoyed so abundantly and for so many ages by our Catholic forefathers."

This was certainly carrying the war into Africa, and attacking Protestantism, not only with its own weapon of sturdy vituperation, so different from the traditional apologetics of Catholic authors, but on the very ground upon which Protestantism had shifted the conflict with the ancient Church. Protestantism, conscious of its doctrinal weakness, had endeavored to maintain the position that the Reformation had, at least, elevated the social condition of the populace. Cobbett asserts, and proves, that this is a most impudent falsehood. It is, indeed, the falsehood which, far more than doctrinal errors, had excited his wrath, and spurred him to write his remarkable book. He demonstrates that the great apostasy of the sixteenth century was not only the forerunner but the direct cause of the social miseries which have been the curse of Europe. Catholics have, indeed, said the same thing, though in more moderate language; but the truth is borne in upon our minds more deeply when it comes to us from the very ranks of our foes. It is needless to say, that no serious attempt has ever been made to confute Cobbett's terrible indictment of English Protestantism.

As a sample of our author's vigorous style, we may quote his onslaught on the modern panacea of social woes, Malthusianism :

"Enough now about the celibacy of the clergy; but it is impossible to quit the subject without one word to Parson Malthus. This man is not only a Protestant, but a parson of our church. Now he wants to compel the laboring classes to refrain to a great extent from marriage, and Mr. Scarlett actually brought a bill into Parliament having in one part of it this object avowedly in view, the great end proposed by both being to cause a diminution of the poor-rates. Parson Malthus does not call this recommending celibacy, but 'moral restraint.' And what is celibacy but moral restraint? So that here are these people reviling the Catholic Church for insisting on vows of celibacy on the part of those who choose to be priests or nuns, and at the same time proposing to compel the laboring classes to live in a state of celibacy or to run the manifest risk of perishing (they and their children) from starvation! Is all this sheer impudence or is it sheer folly? One or the other it is, greater than ever was before heard from the lips of mortal man. They affect to believe that the clerical vow of celibacy must be nugatory. Like all the other wild schemes and cruel projects relative to the poor, we trace this at once back to the 'Reformation,' that great source of the poverty and misery and degradation of the main body of the people of this kingdom. The 'Reformation' despoiled the working classes of their patrimony; it tore from them that which nature and reason had assigned them; it robbed them of that relief for the necessitous which was theirs by right imprescriptable, and which had been confirmed to them by the law of God and the law of the land. It brought a compulsory, a grudging, an unnatural mode of relief, calculated to make the poor and rich hate each other instead of binding them together as the Catholic mode did, by the bonds of Christian charity. But of all its consequences, that of introducing a married clergy has perhaps been the most prolific in mischief. This has absolutely created an order for the procreation of dependents on the state; for the bringing into the world thousands of persons annually who have no fortunes of their own, and who must be, somehow or other, maintained by burdens imposed upon the people. Places, commissions, sinecures, pensions; something or other must be found for them, some sort of living out of the fruit of the rents of the rich and the wages of labor. If no excuse can be found, no pretence of public service, no corner of the pension list open, then they must come as a direct burden upon the people; and thus it is that

we have, within the last twenty years, seen sixteen hundred thousand pounds voted by the Parliament out of the taxes for the 'relief of the poor clergy of the Church of England'; and at the very time that this premium on the procreation of idlers was annually being granted, Parliament was pestered with projects for compelling the working part of the community to lead a life of celibacy! What that is evil, what that is monstrous, has not grown out of this Protestant 'Reformation!'

This language is certainly strong, and on the lips of a Catholic would sound uncharitable, but, coming from a Protestant indignant at the vile language used by his co-religionists in their revilings against the "man of sin" and the "scarlet whore," they strike us as a just Nemesis. Father Gasquet has, however, taken the liberty to cut out freely the nicknames of which the author had made copious use, and has replaced an occasional strong or coarse expression here and there by some less objectionable word or phrase.

We return sincere thanks to Father Gasquet for this valuable edition of a book which ought not to be allowed to die out, and we hope it will be scattered broadcast throughout both hemispheres.

BEATI PETRI CANISII, SOCIETATIS JESU, EPISTULAE ET ACTA. Collegit et adnotationibus illustravit *Otto Braunsberger*, ejusdem Societatis sacerdos. Volumen primum. 1541-1556. Freiburg and St. Louis: Herder.

In giving the correct answer to that "most curious and important question" propounded by Macaulay: "How it was that Protestantism did so much, yet did no more; how it was that the Church of Rome, having lost a large part of Europe, not only ceased to lose, but actually regained nearly half of what she had lost"; the indefatigable labors of Blessed Peter Canisius instantly rise to mind as, under heaven, one of the most powerful agents.

The birth of this new Apostle of the North was contemporaneous with the first outbreak of the Lutheran epidemic. He saw the light of day in the quaint old Dutch town of Nimwegen on the 8th of May, 1521. Educated at the University of Cologne, he received the degree of Master in Philosophy, and consecrated himself to a life of perpetual chastity in the year 1540. Three years later he placed himself under the direction of P. Peter Faber, whom St. Ignatius had deputed into Germany, and after making the spiritual exercises was admitted to the Society as the first German Jesuit. It is a signal proof of the esteem in which he was universally held, that at the age of twenty-five years he was chosen by the clergy of Cologne as their ambassador to the court of the emperor in their effort to rid themselves of the apostate archbishop, Hermann von Wied. Two years later he appears at the Council of Trent as theologian to Cardinal Otto of Augsburg. Perceiving his solid worth, St. Ignatius called him to Rome, and kept him for five months under his own supervision. After receiving his solemn vows, the saint despatched him to the permanent field of his labors, distracted Germany. His subsequent history is thoroughly identified with the struggle of Catholicity to stem the flood of Lutheran and Calvinistic heresy in the North. As provincial of his order, as adviser of the German emperor, as representative of the Holy See, he was general-in-chief of the Catholic forces, and was equally efficient in the professor's chair, in the pulpit, in the children's catechism class and in the cabinet of princes. After three centuries, "Canisius's Catechism" remains the bulwark of Catholicity against modern heresy.

The writings of so prominent a champion of true religion are, there-

fore, indispensable to the historian of German Protestantism, and we are delighted that the task of collecting them has been entrusted to so able and diligent an investigator as Father Braunsberger. It will give the reader a vague notion of the labor involved, when he is told that the compilation of the work has entailed researches in two hundred and sixty archives and libraries scattered through England, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Holland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. It is estimated that the work, containing everything of interest relating to Canisius, will be completed in from six to eight large octavo volumes. We have no hesitation in prophesying that it will be regarded as one of the most important contributions to Catholic historical investigations in the present generation.

The first volume contains 214 letters written by or to Canisius, and 125 documents concerning him, from the first extant letter, written by him in 1541, at the age of twenty, to his sister, to the middle of the year 1556, when he was at the height of his influence at the court of Ferdinand. In editing, Father B. retains in the text the original language in which Canisius wrote; but when any other language than Latin is used he inserts a Latin translation at the foot of the page.

It is needless for us to add that we return our sincerest thanks to the editor and the publisher, and recommend the work most warmly to our readers.

HISTORY OF THE CITY OF ROME IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By *Ferdinand Gregorovius*. Translated from the fourth German edition by Annie Hamilton. Vols. I., II., III. London: George Bell & Sons.

It is now nearly forty years since Ferdinand Gregorovius published the first edition of his well-known work, "*Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*," which secured for him a permanent place among the great historical writers of this and every other age. He had the extremely rare gift of uniting the tastes of the antiquarian and the litterateur. He was equally at home among the musty parchments of an out-of-the-way monastery, or in the most brilliant assembly of artists and poets. Italy, in all her relations and aspects, past and present, her skies, mountains, lakes, buried cities, crumbling monuments, the interesting customs of her people, Italy was the goddess of his devotions; and as he spent year after year in that sunny clime, he became ever more infatuated with everything belonging to it. Still, he remained to the last a German and a Lutheran, an alien both in race and religion to the people whose deeds he undertook to narrate.

And more's the pity; for it may take a full century to give to the world one so fully equipped by nature and study for the task of portraying mediæval Rome as Ferdinand Gregorovius, whose facile pen could invest the dulllest subject with a subtle charm. He has made the iron age of humanity and of Rome *readable*, and any one who is conversant with the history of the ninth and tenth centuries is aware what a task that was. He has said many hard things of the Popes in the course of his writing; but no harder than Baronius and other good Catholic authors. Indeed, he, on frequent occasions, defends the character of some unfortunate Pope or dignitary whom his own had abandoned to insult and infamy.

Gregorovius will generally be found fair to individuals; and in this he is quite different from the English Protestant writers, who are wont to vent their hatred of the papacy upon every one who at any time has worn the tiara. Neither does the distinguished German historian mani-

fest any purely theological bias; in fact, his own Christianity seems to have been of too vague a kind to engender hatred of others. But he has a virulent, unrelenting, unconcealed hatred of the temporal power of the Popes; insomuch, that the entire history would seem to have been written to maintain the paradox, that all the ills that have oppressed the human race since the days of Pepin are to be traced to the Pope's temporal sovereignty.

What would have become of the papacy had it not been independent during the turbulent middle ages, Gregorovius does not discuss; though the question must immediately force itself upon every one who devotes a serious thought to the condition of affairs which brought forth the States of the Church, and kept them intact for so many centuries.

However, the historian's personal views as to the fitness of things in general are of secondary importance; what we chiefly demand from him is a truthful exposition of facts; and we do not remember to have met any cases in which Gregorovius can be accused of having wilfully distorted facts to suit his theories.

Of course, historical investigation has made great progress since the first edition of this work appeared in 1859. The author was continually engaged until his death in 1891, in revising it and bringing it down to date in every point. It has been the starting-point of subsequent writers; and it sometimes seems to us that later writers take a particular delight in being able to point out flaws in its statements; but it will be a long time before it will be superseded, and we are much pleased to welcome it in its English garb.

A COMPLETE MANUAL OF CANON LAW. By *Oswald J. Reichel, M.A., B.C.L., F.S.A.* Volume I., The Sacraments. 1896. London: John Hodges, Bedford Street, Strand.

We have fallen in with many a strange book, but a queerer book than a canon law, written by a clergyman of the Church of England, it has not been our fortune to find. As we turned over page after page, replete with erudition, we were forcibly reminded of the rebuke administered to Moses by his hard-headed father-in-law: "Thou art spent with foolish labor." *Cui bono*, all this playing at legislation? In what "branch of the Church Catholic" would this book pass for an authority? Certainly not in the "Roman branch"; for any school-boy could point out dozens of flagrant errors. Not in Greece, nor in Russia, nor even in England, where the only canon obeyed is the sweet will of the individual. How much more logical was Martin Luther, who gathered up all the law books of "Babylon," and made a grand bonfire out of them?

The distinguished author may complain that we are not meeting him in the spirit in which he approaches us; for he has protested at the outset that he publishes this manual "in the hope" that it "may contribute in some small degree to help forward that unity for which Christ prayed by diminishing the prejudice, misunderstanding and ignorance which is so largely responsible for the present divided state of Christendom." But the Church has suffered so much from so-called Canonists, who have opposed their whims and theories to her authoritative voice, that we would look forward with utter dismay to the importation of a fresh batch of them from the ranks of Anglicanism. To a Catholic, *law* is a very solemn and imperative affair, upon which depends the salvation of his soul. Our *norma vivendi* is given by the supreme voice of authority, not fished by the individual out of the ponderous tomes of fathers and schoolmen. Whatever worth this book contains (and we have no wish

to disparage the author's merits) is of purely antiquarian interest. When, yielding to the voice of conscience, he shall join the Catholic Church, he will be obliged to make humble submission to church authority like the rest of us. Imagine him dealing with the law of the land with the freedom in which he indulges himself in spiritual matters. The result must be laughter at his theories, and imprisonment if he undertook to put them in practice.

It is interesting to notice that our Anglican canonist begins his treatise where Catholic writers usually leave off, at the Sacraments. We shall be better able to appreciate his ironical spirit after we shall read what he shall have to say concerning the nature and sources of ecclesiastical authority. At present we are totally in the dark regarding his views on the most fundamental questions of his subject. It is undoubtedly true, as he states, that misunderstandings and ignorance are largely responsible for the actual divisions among Christians; but the main factor, unless we err, is that restlessness under authority innate in our fallen nature.

COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIÆ MORALIS A JOANNE PETRO GURY, S.J., PRIMO CONSCRIPTUM ET DEINDE AB ANTONIO BALLERINI, EJUSDEM SOCIETATIS, ADNOTATIONIBUS AUCTUM, NUNC VERO AD BREVIOREM FORMAM EXARATUM ATQUE AD USUM SEMINARIORUM HJUS REGIONIS ACCOMMODATUM. Ab *Aloysio Sabetti, S.J.* Editio duodecimo novis curis expolitor. Fr. Pustet & Co., Ratisbon, New York and Cincinnati. 1896.

We announce with much pleasure the appearance of the *twelfth* edition of Father Sabetti's admirable Compendium of Moral Theology, the merits of which have been dwelt upon so frequently in our pages that further commendation is unnecessary. The best evidence of the value of the work is the rapidity with which each successive edition is taken up by the clergy of the nation, who look to the learned Professor at Woodstock, and never look in vain, for a clear, satisfactory and concise solution of the doubts which arise in the course of their sacred ministrations.

Turning to page 782, we are not certain that we fully understand the author's interpretation of the clause in the decree of January 18, 1896, which reserves to the Apostolic Delegate the decision regarding the verification of the conditions which justify a confessor in granting absolution without exacting a formal renunciation of the three societies lately condemned. If we remember rightly, the decree does not prescribe this reference to the Delegate *in singulis casibus*, as the learned author seems to imply, but *in casibus particularibus*, which is generally interpreted to mean in cases where there exists a doubt as to the application of the four conditions demanded by the Holy See. As the majority of these cases meet us at the death-beds of penitents, it is obvious that the *recursus* to the Delegate *toties quoties* is absolutely impossible. Nor will the "desired uniformity" be lacking, if confessors adhere scrupulously to the terms of the decree. This appears to us so self-evident that we are convinced it is also the author's view, and we refer to it merely for the purpose of putting our readers on their guard against a possible misinterpretation of his words.

COCHEM'S EXPLANATION OF THE HOLY SACRIFICE OF THE MASS. With an Appendix containing Devotions for Mass, for Confession, and for Communion. With a Preface by *Right Rev. Camillus P. Maes, D.D.*, Bishop of Covington. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. Price, \$1.25.

"This is a very old-fashioned book," says the Right Rev. Bishop of

Covington; "a book written with that sturdy faith and solid devotional feeling which knows no doubt, and acknowledges God's best work with a thankful heart. It will be refreshing reading to our nineteenth century public, the majority of which lives and acts as if God were not nigh unto us, and His saving sacrifice were not the real immolation of His body and the actual spilling of His blood."

The author, Father Martin, of the Capuchin order, called of Cochem, from his birth-place on the Moselle, was one of the saintliest and most energetic missionaries of the seventeenth century. In addition to the ordinary labors of the ministry, he devoted himself to the compilation of a very large number of religious books for the people, which, in their day, enjoyed a popularity almost unprecedented. The work which now appears before us with the weighty recommendation of Bishop Maes, is acknowledged as his masterpiece. It unites, with rare skill, accurate theological doctrine, extensive reading of the Fathers and theologians, and charming simplicity of style. It would be uncalled for in us to raise the delicate question whether the value of the work would not be increased by omitting some of the legends which the author has inserted after the custom of his age. The opening remarks of Bishop Maes were evidently intended to forestall any ungracious criticisms of this sort. But while illustrative stories of doubtful authenticity were in consonance with the tastes of people two hundred years ago, they would certainly be out of place in any new publication at the present time; nor do we perceive the connection between faith and credulity. The Catholics of to-day believe as firmly in the Real Presence as did those who were ever on the alert for visible miracles. Few books there are, which, in the course of two centuries, do not stand in need of a little remodelling, as Father Martin, who was the embodiment of sturdy common sense, would be the first to recognize.

GOFFINE'S DEVOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR THE SUNDAYS AND HOLYDAYS. With a Preface by *His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons*. New York: Benziger Bros. Price, \$1.00.

In order to meet the demand for Catholic publications at extremely low rates, the enterprising firm of Benziger Brothers has reissued the "Devout Instructions" of Goffine, a work which has been deservedly popular for two centuries, and have placed the retail price at one dollar, promising large reductions for quantities. This is certainly as low a price as the most exacting buyer can expect for a large octavo volume of 704 pages, copiously illustrated, printing, binding, and illustrations being of the finest character. The work itself needs no commendation from us at this late date. It is a complete arsenal for our Catholic people, explaining in simple language the life and teachings of Our Lord, the doctrines of Holy Church, the commandments and sacraments, the meaning of the current epistles and gospels, and, moreover, supplying them with ample material for meditation, and a judicious selection of prayers. We can only hope that the enterprise of the publishers will meet with the success which it deserves in so extensive a sale as to reimburse them for their heavy outlay, and encourage them to proceed in editing standard works at greatly reduced rates. Should the present attempt issue in failure, we shall be obliged to take the part of the publishers against a querulous public.

CATHARINE MCAULEY AND THE SISTERS OF MERCY. A Sketch. By *K. M. Barry*
With preface by Rev. T. A. Finlay, S.J. Dublin: Fallon & Son.

"No apology," says Father Finlay, "is needed for the publication of another book on the life and work of Catharine McAuley. It is a subject which will not be easily exhausted, and on which, we may be assured, future writers will yet have much to say. The undertaking of charity which the Christian Church owes to this remarkable woman is far from having reached its last development. Its growth has been rapid beyond what merely natural influences can account for. As a nun, Mother McAuley had but ten years in which to lay the foundation and guide the beginning of the great organization of mercy which looks to her as its foundress. It is now barely half a century since those ten years of effort closed, and the busy worker was laid to rest in the courtyard of her Dublin convent. And already it has become an impossibility to gauge accurately the expansion of the work she left behind her. Twenty years after her death one hundred and fifty-five convents of the Order of Mercy were at work in the Church, established in every region of the earth into which the English-speaking people had carried Christianity."

The present little book undertakes, within the compass of one hundred pages, to narrate the most important facts of the life of this excellent servant of God.

THE CHRISTIAN INHERITANCE. Set forth in Sermons by the *Right Rev. John Cuthbert Hedley, O.S.B.*, Bishop of Newport, London: Burns and Oates, Limited. Received from Benziger Bros. Price, \$1.60.

Under this vague title the learned and eloquent Bishop of Newport has gathered together twenty-two sermons preached by him on various occasions. The bond of union among them, and the justification for the title-page, is the fundamental character which assimilates them; for they are all of that nature known as *dogmatic* or *apologetic*, a species of sermon well worth cultivating in this inquisitive and sceptical age. Those of our readers who are of opinion that the fundamental truths of religion are too abstruse for the general public ought to make a study of these admirable discourses of Bishop Hedley, where they will find a rare union of deep and accurate theology, and a popular style, "understandable of the people." For ourselves, after reading them we are more convinced than ever that the profoundest truths can be made easily intelligible to an ordinary audience if proper care be taken to express the thought in every day language. Dogmatic sermons are increasingly in demand; and we shall henceforth commend young orators to the Bishop of Newport as the most perfect type of the pulpit orator demanded by the times.

ALETHEA: AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS. By "Cyril." Published by Burns & Oates, London.

An historical romance treating of the separation of the Eastern from the Roman Church. All the important characters in that eventful schism, Nicholas I., Ignatius, Photius, Bardas, Cæsar and Michael III., are vividly portrayed. The accommodating Photius is painted in dark colors, but his inhuman cruelty to Ignatius, his insincerity and hypocrisy to the Pope, as seen by his letters, justify the picture and accord with his acts as attested by the historian. The reader will find much to

interest and perhaps stimulate him to a fuller study of this period of Church history, and to the people and customs of ninth century Constantinople. The romance woven around the characters shows much imagination and skill. The modern tone given to the story is, perhaps, its most noticeable fault, but the author is aware of this, and in his closing chapter gives two reasons why he made his story read like a romance of our date. The work is neatly gotten up in two volumes.

THE SCIENCE OF SPIRITUAL LIFE ACCORDING TO THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES. By *James Clare, S.J.* Received from Benziger Bros., New York. Price, \$1.60, net.

"Just as the Sacred Scriptures, if they are to be of practical utility, and are to exercise an influence on our minds and hearts, require that their meaning be explained to us by legitimate and God-guided interpreters," so, too, argues the author, the Exercises of St. Ignatius must be interpreted by competent authority, by the living voice of a director, if possible; otherwise, by the written commentary. It is a valuable companion to any one making the exercises.

LYRA HIERATICA. Poems on the Priesthood. Collected from Many Sources. By *Rev. T. E. Bridgett*, of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Price, \$1.00, net.

The routine of priestly duties is, to the ordinary mortal, so prosaic, that this beautiful collection of poems bearing on the dignity and duties of the priesthood, phases of priestly life and priestly devotions, will come to the jaded missionary like the strains of angelic music. We have had the little book for some time in our possession and always find inspiration and refreshment in its pages.

PEOPLE'S EDITION OF THE LIVES OF THE SAINTS. By the *Rev. Alban Butler*. Published in Twelve Parts. Each Part containing the Saints of the Month. January—Vol. I. London: Burns and Oates, Limited.

We have received through the courtesy of Messrs. Benziger the first volume of this pocket edition of Butler's great Lives of the Saints. Except that the print is rather too fine for our weak vision, we regard it as one of the most acceptable gifts of the season. We recommend it warmly to all those who are desirous of bringing with them in their journeys an edifying and instructive companion.

FLÜGEL-SCHMIDT-TANGER'S SCHOOL AND HAND-LEXICON OF THE GERMAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGES. Two volumes. Large 8vo. Half leather, 1896. New York. Introduction price, net, \$4.50; each part separately, net, \$2.60.

A few years ago Flügel published a large English-German and German-English dictionary in three octavo volumes. The present work is an abridgement of the larger dictionary for ready reference and school use. There has been a strong and increasing demand for just such a dictionary, as the dictionaries in common use were far from satisfactory.

WETZER UND WELTE'S KIRCHEN-LEXICON. Freiberg and St. Louis: Herder. 1896.

We are in receipt of the one hundred and fifth number of this great lexicon. The word is now brought down to *Revolution, French*, and there is every indication of the speedy termination of the long labors of the revisers.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

SAINTS OF THE ORDER OF S. BENEDICT. Vol. I. January, February, March. From the Latin of F. Ægidius Ranbeck, O.S.B. Edited by *Very Rev. J. Alphinsus Morrall, O.S.B.* London: John Hodges, Bedford Street, Strand. 1896.

OUR MARTYRS: A record of those who suffered for the Catholic Faith under the Penal Laws in Ireland. By the late *Rev. Denis Murphy, S.J.* Illustrated from contemporary prints. Dublin: Fallon & Co. 1896. Price, six shillings.

WHY I BECAME A CATHOLIC; OR, RELIGIO VIATORIS. By *Henry Edward Manning*, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Sixth edition. London: Burns & Oates, Limited. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price, 30 cents, net.

QUELLEN UND FORSCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE UND KUNSTGESCHICHTE DES MIS-SALE ROMANUM IM MITTELALTER. ITER ITALICUM. Von *Dr. Adalbert Ebner*. Friedburg and St. Louis: Herder. 1896. Price, \$3.50 net.

A RECORD OF THE CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS HELD IN MAYNOOTH COLLEGE IN JUNE, 1895. Compiled by the author of the "Centenary History of Maynooth College." Dublin: Browne & Nolan, Limited. 1896.

THE LEAGUE HYMNAL. A collection of Sacred Heart Hymns. By *Rev. William Walsh, S.J.* Published by the Apostleship of Prayer, 27 and 29 West Sixteenth Street, New York. Retail price, \$1.00.

HOW TO SPEAK LATIN. A Series of Latin Dialogues with English Translation. By *Stephen W. Wilby*. John Murphy & Co., Baltimore, 44 W. Baltimore Street; New York, 70 Fifth Avenue. 1896.

THE SPIRIT OF THE DOMINICAN ORDER ILLUSTRATED FROM THE LIVES OF ITS SAINTS. By *Mother Frances Raphael, O.S.D.* (Augusta Theodosia Drane). Benziger Bros. 1896. Price, \$1 net.

JOSEPHI FESSLER INSTITUTIONES PATROLOGIAE quas denuo recensuit, auxit, edidit *Bernardus Jungmann*. Tomi II., Pars altera. Innsbruck: 1896. Received from Pustet & Co.

EN ROUTE. By *J. K. Huysmans*. Translated from the French, with a Prefatory Note by C. Kegan Paul. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. Price, \$1.50, net.

OUR SEMINARIES. An Essay on Clerical Training. By *Rev. John Talbot Smith LL.D.* New York: William H. Young & Co. Price, \$1.

A VISIT TO EUROPE AND THE HOLY LAND. By *Rev. H. F. Fairbanks*. Fourth edition. Illustrated. Benziger Bros. Price, \$1.50.

FIRST COMMUNION. Edited by *Father Thurston, S.J.* London: Burns & Oates, Limited. Received from Benzinger Brothers.

SONGS, CHIEFLY FROM THE GERMAN. By *J. L. Spalding*, Bishop of Peoria. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company. 1896.

BOOKS AND READING. By *Brother Azarias*. Fifth Edition, enlarged. New York: The Cathedral Library Association. 1896.

ARE ANGLICAN ORDERS VALID? By *J. MacDavitt, D.D.* Dublin: Lealy, Bryens & Walker. Received from Benziger Bros.

FATHER FURNISS AND HIS WORK FOR CHILDREN, By *Rev. T. Livius, C.S.S.R.* Benziger Bros. Price, 75 cents.

PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY. By *Dr. Paul Carus*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. Cloth. \$1.00.

LE CARDINAL MANNING, Par *Francis de Pressensé*. Paris: Perrin et Cie. 1896.

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS.

Articles for the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW—(*a*) should be sent in neatly type-written ; (*b*) they should not exceed twenty pages of the magazine ; and (*c*) no serials will be permitted without special arrangements with the Editors.





